asean economic and security cooperation at the beginning of the 21st century
DESCRIPTION
This essay begins with a brief history of ASEAN political and economic cooperation before and after the end of the Cold War. Since there have always been external economic purposes behind ASEAN as well as political ones, this essay proceeds to draw on its economic relations with the US, and to some extent North East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) leading up to and following the East Asian financial crisis to understand ASEAN’s economic direction. I will also look at patterns of security cooperation since the World Trade Centre bombings of September 11 2001, specifically in the ASEAN member states most affected by terrorism, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Analysis of these issues will help me to draw conclusions about ASEAN’s position in three aspects of the globalisation debate: models of development, international economic integration and regional security cooperation. I argue that ASEAN’s actions have been very pragmatic, with little long term vision. Sovereignty and independence have always been paramount and the East Asian financial crisis and the War on Terror both underline these premises.TRANSCRIPT
ASEAN Economic and Security Cooperation
at the Beginning of the 21st Century
15/4/05
Chris Haynes
0029115
POLI 444
As the 9th ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting draws to a close in Vientiane, political,
economic and security cooperation in South East Asia and integration in one of the
world’s most successful regional organisations increases. The Finance Ministers
discussed regional and global economic developments and the Roadmap for Financial
and Monetary Integration of ASEAN. They sought to work together to minimise the
damage of the tsunami of late 2004. And they made decisions about other regional
initiatives from the liberalisation of financial services to counter terrorism. How did
ASEAN reach a point at which some are speculating it will be the next European Union?
In Bangkok in 1967, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and the newly
independent Singapore signed an agreement to kick off the Association of South East
Asian Nations, or ASEAN. Brunei joined upon its independence in 1984; Vietnam joined
in 1995; Laos and Myanmar were admitted simultaneously in 1997; and Cambodia came
soon after. From this point, ASEAN has been in the best position to pursue its stated
mission of economic growth, social progress, cultural development, peace and stability in
South East Asia. ASEAN’s 500m people enjoy a combined GDP of $737b and trade of
$720b. (Secretariat)
This essay begins with a brief history of ASEAN political and economic cooperation
before and after the end of the Cold War. Since there have always been external
economic purposes behind ASEAN as well as political ones, this essay proceeds to draw
on its economic relations with the US, and to some extent North East Asia (China, Japan
and South Korea) leading up to and following the East Asian financial crisis to
understand ASEAN’s economic direction. I will also look at patterns of security
cooperation since the World Trade Centre bombings of September 11 2001, specifically
in the ASEAN member states most affected by terrorism, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Analysis of these issues will help me to draw conclusions about ASEAN’s
position in three aspects of the globalisation debate: models of development, international
economic integration and regional security cooperation. I argue that ASEAN’s actions
have been very pragmatic, with little long term vision. Sovereignty and independence
have always been paramount and the East Asian financial crisis and the War on Terror
both underline these premises. To open this essay, I highlight several significant points of
ASEAN’s history.
History
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
When ASEAN was formed in 1967, its primary purpose was to foster growth through
economic cooperation among the five member states. This purpose was spurred by the
Vietnam War and a fear that communism in Asia was spreading. The Domino Effect was
on everyone’s lips. Strong government for containment and state led, export oriented
development was the norm in capitalist East Asia. ASEAN since its inception has made
various achievements in affecting trade policy through bargaining as a bloc. These
achievements made clear two important principles: 1. the value of uniting against a third
party and 2. the utility of rallying behind the most threatened member, be it a poor or rich
country. (Kurus, 823)
Transnational ASEAN economic planning has not seen a great degree of success. In
1976, ASEAN created the ASEAN Industrial Projects Schemes (AIPS). AIPS were large
scale projects, one to a country, that would respond to regional demand and ensure that
resources were utilised optimally. Three of the five original AIPS failed. First, most
members preferred to focus on national industrial development and export more to
international markets rather than just ASEAN. Second, as ASEAN members were at a
similar level of development, they still produced the same tradable goods and their
manufacturers were competitive rather than complementary. Third, the private sector was
not interested in cooperating with the AIPS. (Tan, 936) ASEAN Industrial
Complementation Schemes (AICS) were projects in the 1980s to facilitate specialisation
in automotive components. Its first attempt, in 1981, was unsuccessful. AICS was
replaced by the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) in 1983. AIJV’s objectives
were to encourage greater investment into and within South East Asia and to increase
production by pooling resources and sharing markets. Most of these schemes failed as
well, because goals and guidelines for negotiation were undefined, and because red tape
slowed the process. (937) The payoffs of all these ventures were not high enough because
they implied only regional development, and members did not see high enough benefits
from pursuing them.
To begin trade liberalisation, ASEAN launched the Preferential Trading Arrangement
(PTA) in 1977. However, since their economies were not complementary, ASEAN
governments were reluctant to turn ASEAN into an FTA. They were keener on protecting
domestic markets than opening their economies to their neighbours. Items that fell under
the PTA were negotiated individually, and while tariffs were lowered on certain products,
the most important ones went to the exclusion list. Even by the late 1980s, the PTA only
covered five percent of ASEAN’s total trade. (937-8) According to Lay Hong Tan,
“ASEAN ideology has emphasised national resilience, accompanied by regional
resilience.” (938) The PTA failed because sovereignty and self reliance were so
important to newly independent countries, and economic policies reflected these feelings.
Following the Uruguay Round, ASEAN’s economic integration widened and deepened.
ASEAN members were afraid of falling behind in a world that was creating trading blocs.
They wanted markets to attract FDI. Moreover, many of these governments were quasi
democratic and their legitimacy required their delivering on promised high levels of
growth. They hoped the AFTA would help them deliver. (939)
One goal of the AFTA is intra ASEAN trade but it is a secondary goal. More important is
increasing the competitiveness of individual member states internationally. Between 1993
and 1999, the value of intra ASEAN trade grew at a rate of 11.4 percent annually
(although in real terms it has remained constant as a percentage of the total trade of
ASEAN members). (939) A major part of the AFTA was the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT). The successor to the PTA, the CEPT took a sectoral,
rather than an item by item, approach. ASEAN leaders were afraid that the slowdown of
miraculous East Asian economic growth and later the financial crisis would be damaging
to their countries. They accelerated the creation of the CEPT to 2002 for the first six
member states, and zero tariffs by 2008 for the rest. However, to consider this a feat for
free trade is somewhat misguided. Three lists of traded goods were exempt from the
CEPT. These are a) the temporary exclusion list, products for which the members are not
yet ready to lower tariffs; b) unprocessed, “sensitive” agricultural products; and c) the
general exception list (GEL), products permanently excluded for their qualities of
national security, moral and health hazards and anything retaining artistic, historic or
archaeological value. (940) Malaysia, protective of its automotive parts industry, has said
that, due to the financial crisis, it will not cut tariffs on this sector until 2005. Laos and
Vietnam’s GELs contain categories that include automobiles, petroleum, alcohol and
tobacco. Though the GEL represents only 1.09 percent of all tariff lines in ASEAN, the
vagueness of the wording of this clause (not to mention that of the previous two) enables
member states to designate anything important to their national economy or sovereignty
protected under this list. Full fledged free trade thus still seems a distant point on the
horizon. (941) ASEAN political leaders are tolerant of these abuses, likely because they
all wish to retain some measure of protection over their own economies.
While ASEAN members talk not only of free trade but of a common market by 2020, to
think of ASEAN as the next EU, with supranational authorities, is to think well ahead of
any of the current heads of ASEAN. Unlike in the EU, national sovereignty and non
interference are sacrosanct. Moreover, treaties and declarations tend to be vaguely
worded to afford members the opportunity to opt out of any of them in one way or
another. Supranational authorities are not necessary because of established norms and
consultative and consensus based decision making. The progress of and changes to the
organisation are state led. (948) In spite of the desire for pragmatic decisions and
financial independence, Tan feels that it is urgent that ASEAN progress beyond an FTA
in order to compete with China. ASEAN and China were on a par between 1989 and
1994 for inward FDI flows, but in 2001 China received three times the FDI that ASEAN
received, and this trend looks set to continue. (961) Thus, for all its efforts, ASEAN’s
first few decades showed “lackluster performance” in pursuing economic integration and
growth. (Kurus, 819) Instead, its achievements were largely political.
POLITICAL COOPERATION
While few concrete achievements were made before the First ASEAN Summit in Bali in
1976, ASEAN political leaders had already been meeting to allow ASEAN to slowly and
steadily mature. This early maturation culminated in the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in South East Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in Bali. ASEAN
could then begin to be far more active as a regional organisation. (827) And it began two
years later.
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN members feared a domino effect and
they crafted a response. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, on behalf
of ASEAN, decried the invasion and called on the UN Security Council to do something
to stop it. Unfortunately for ASEAN, a draft resolution to demand the immediate
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was blocked by the USSR. Later,
ASEAN wielded its regional power in the International Conference on Kampuchea. The
organisation worked through the UN to enhance its regional and international position
and demonstrate its relevance. This move was one of security, to prevent the spread of
communism in the region and more immediately, to protect the borders of one of its
members, Thailand. ASEAN proved itself an effective in “managing the external
relations of the individual member states by determining common attitudes on key issues
such as Indochina.” (Kurus, 821-2)
Members see benefits with little cost, most importantly, they do not give up any
sovereignty. (820) ASEAN provides a network of support for its members. ASEAN
members need not feel isolated, and therefore have not had to worry about some of the
patron client relationships other countries lost their autonomy over during the Cold War.
The great powers were not competing in the ASEAN region. Thailand, for example,
benefited from the other ASEAN members’ support in recognising its front line status in
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia during the conflict. (824) And because of China’s
interest in South East Asia, China compromised with ASEAN on a UN settlement for
Cambodia. (825)
Bloc politics have enabled ASEAN states to “assert their position as subjects, rather than
objects of international politics and as full participants in regional and global affairs…. It
is an approach that is vital to a diverse group of states in a strategic and volatile region.”
(825) One Foreign Minister of Singapore described one of the benefits of ASEAN
cohesiveness as accommodating other member states’ policies instead of pursuing
“competitive interference.” Such cooperation has made internal relations possible in such
a motley group of nations with different economies and political cultures. (825)
The creation of ASEAN was a significant achievement in diplomacy. It occurred at the
end of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia and helped normalise relations
between them. It has helped ease the disagreement between Malaysia and the Philippines
over Sabah. ASEAN members’ political and military leaders cooperate and share
information regularly, and interaction among states has gradually increased over time.
Thus, despite the great diversity of the region, ASEAN minimises conflict and facilitates
cooperation in South East Asia. Four ground rules for cooperation that insure sovereignty
is protected: 1. non interference in the internal affairs of other members. 2. peaceful
dispute resolution. 3. respect for each other’s independence. 4. respect for each other’s
territorial integrity. These rules safeguard the supremacy of the state over the Association
by providing the good fences necessary to be good neighbours. (826) For example, until
UN action was taken, ASEAN maintained that the human rights abuses in East Timor
were an internal affair of Indonesia and did not interfere. (827) ASEAN members have
found security in numbers in the face of external threats. But while they have followed
their own rules, they have never proposed giving up their sovereignty to supranational
institutions in the manner of the EU, and instead decide matters among states on a case
by case basis. External economic relations present a different and equally revealing look
at ASEAN’s purpose through its international relations functions.
External Economic Relations
ASEAN has commanded internaional respect, given its members confidence and
promoted amity in South East Asia. These achievements have created an attractive
destination for foreign investment and trade. Member states have seen high growth rates,
before and since the financial crisis. (Kurus, 828) Furthermore, they have been able to
concentrate spending on the civilian sector rather than military. While the benefits of
ASEAN surely played a part in denecessitating military spending, US Cold War strategy
has done so as well. Stephen Gill and Richard Higgott, among others, remind those who
speak with wide eyes of what the World Bank calls “miracle economies” that the
economic miracles were realised by authoritarian governments in East Asia who were
propped up by the US to contain communism. South East Asia, China’s backyard, was a
key strategic point of the Cold War. Thailand even provided to US troops the origins of
today’s infamous sex trade. (Gill, 3) During the Cold War, the US supplied capital aid
and opened its markets to the one way flow of exports in order to support the economies
of South East Asia. (Higgott, 255)
The East Asian financial crisis revealed the weaknesses of Asian regional institutions. It
showed that ASEAN does not contain provisions to prevent such crises in future. (Tan,
952) It could, however, encourage East Asian regional cooperation in the wake of the
perceived failure of the open capitalist model offered by the US and the IMF. (Higgott,
254) The causes of the crisis are not as easy to discern as one might think. Kishore C.
Dash describes two views of the subject. Pragmatic liberals see the crisis as a liquidity
crisis. To this school of thought, the IMF should have aided the supply of liquidity so that
investors did not lose confidence in the capacity of countries to pay back their liabilities.
Market fundamentalists, on the other hand, see the crisis as one of bank insolvency,
brought on by poor structural policies from cronyist and non transparent governments
that should have let markets work unrestricted. They believe the IMF should not have
intervened to bail out governments with failed policies. (Dash, 280-2) Either way, the
integrity of the Western capitalist model has suffered.
Higgott calls the financial crisis “part of the first crisis of post Cold War globalisation.”
(255) Though a realist, Higgott echoes marxist views that the US and IMF want to
impose a Western model of liberalisation on South East Asia. They see East Asia as
having vestiges of outdated state led capitalist growth and urge states to abandon them.
The financial crisis could make these countries more averse to change and could see them
turning inward to greater East Asian economic cooperation at the expense of the US.
(255) The financial crisis brought demands for more economic autonomy for states and
the region in general. Japan was the proposed leader of an Asian Monetary Fund, to
complement, not replace, what many in East Asia see as an inherently biased
International Monetary Fund. But the US, due to its interest in maintaining its influence
through IMF superiority in the region, scuttled the plan. (256) The US believes that an
AMF would slow down Asian financial market liberalisation. (258) In the 1990s, with the
threat of communism all but extinguished, trade liberalisation and financial deregulation
became the priorities. (255) In fact, these two policies have been the US reply to the crisis
as well—the same priorities as before the crisis. For this reason Asians are likely to view
them with suspicion. (258) APEC’s champions wanted to see more open liberalism in
East Asia, more access to East Asian capital and financial markets. But APEC has gone
largely unused and the Bush Administration has shown no real interest in maintaining it
for purposes other than fighting terrorism. (Capie, 239)
The crisis even prompted ASEAN members to do something that flies in the face of
regional norms: they agreed to a mutual surveillance of each other’s economies. The
purpose of this unusually sensitive decision was to promote financial stability and
regional cooperation. Although the AMF fell through, monitoring each other’s economies
follows the IMF framework. Higgott feels that it is time to reconsider the non
interference rules of ASEAN. He also believes that the East Asian community may
introduce strong regional institutional mechanisms to manage such financial problems.
(Higgott, 257) Doing so would certainly enable better competition with the US and the
EU. While I agree in principle, I argue that, had ASEAN members been serious about
actually intervening into their economies, they would have created a supranational
institution charged with doing so. As interdependent as ASEAN’s economies may be, not
one of its members is about to break the rules of sovereignty and stop any other
government’s action.
ASEAN’s leaders have employed populist rhetoric to nullify criticism. They blame the
financial crisis on “neoimperialism” and other poorly defined evils. An implication of
such denigration of the Anglo American capitalist model is that it could be reversed. The
long run could see an increased suspicion of market discipline and tighter controls. Alan
Greenspan disagrees. He said in 1998 that the financial crisis will lead East Asian states
to closer practice and integration with the US. (259) For the same reasons ASEAN’s
norms put up barriers to interference in the internal affairs of its members, they resent the
seemingly unnecessarily broad and sweeping IMF readjustments in the wake of the
financial crisis. The US has shown itself to be insensitive to South East Asian concerns
and as such, “liberal economic internationalism is on trial in Asia at the end of the
twentieth century.” (260) The limits of APEC to enhance cooperation and even act as a
decision making body were exposed by the crisis and subsequent retreat to regional
economic cooperation through the East Asian Economic Caucus and discussion on the
still prospective AMF. (261) Along with greater financial monitoring, Higgott believes
that the US’s role in South East Asia will be more firmly tied to that of the regional
powers than ever before. Japan must reform its economy to continue to exert its will, and
the US is generally seen as a buffer to China, (262) who wants to be the hegemon that
Japan never was. The threat of terrorism since September 11 th have brought international
security to the political fore and South East Asia’s responses to US policy in the region,
although they have varied by country, have been another instructive link to ASEAN’s
wider purpose.
The War on Terror
Unlike many countries, ASEAN members have not simply hopped onto the anti terror
bandwagon, nor have Islamic South East Asian states rejected any cooperation with the
US. ASEAN member governments have maintained close bargaining and cooperative
relations with Washington while criticising American foreign policy in front of their
nationalist and Islamic groups. They have thus generally taken a pragmatic approach to
their dealings with both of these groups, US pressure and domestic pressure, (Capie, 224)
which goes along with my conclusions about their economic and political decisions. The
US has been asserting its hegemony more dogmatically since Sept 11 th. George Bush is
regularly quoted as telling the world “either you are with us or you are with [the
terrorists],” and a US official in South East Asia has gone so far as to say “it is not
enough to be with us [quietly] in the war on terrorism,…you have to trumpet it.” (225)
Some theorists believe that governments will wish either to balance US power or to
bandwagon it. However, it seems more beneficial in the case of ASEAN to take a more
varied and cautious approach. Based on South East Asia’s unique historical relationship
with the US, there is little reason to expect them or believe it is in their interests to either
blindly accommodate and follow US pressures or outright reject them. These theorists, I
believe, simplify matters by explaining motivations in terms of perceived external threats,
civilisational ties or domestic political pressures. (225) But while one might argue that
Canada, for instance, based its War on Terror related actions on domestic politics,
ASEAN members base their decisions on all three of these concerns.
INDONESIA
Former President Megawati Sukarnoputri pledged her support and sympathy for the US
immediately after the terrorist attacks. Indonesia would take a firm stance on terrorism.
But as the Islamic extremist tide and popular dissent from US actions rose in her country,
she criticised the US’s use of violence and refused to take action against the suspected al
Qaeda cells in Indonesia. Cracking down on Islamicism could have destabilised both the
domestic security of Indonesia, through any perceptions of unjust and US influenced
violence against Muslims, and Megawati’s 2004 electoral campaign, for which she would
need the Muslim vote. (228) Likewise, when the US invaded Iraq and called on Indonesia
to help, the government called the invasion “an act of aggression” and called on the UN
to stop it. (229)
MALAYSIA
In response to September 11th, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed
visited the US embassy to sign a book of condolences. This move was warmly welcomed
in Washington. Malaysia wanted to repair relations that had been harmed by acrimony in
the 1990s. Most importantly, however, Malaysia’s government was using the US’s tough
talk on terrorism and weak talk on human rights to legitimise the repression of political
opponents under the Internal Security Act. It found an opportunity. But as US actions in
Afghanistan stoked Malaysian unrest, Mahathir called US military actions as an excuse to
kill Muslims. (230) In February 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, he said “it is no
longer a war on terrorism. It is in fact a war to dominate the world.” Mahathir’s talking
out of one side of his mouth may cool domestic anger, but the government’s military and
intelligence cooperation with the US belie populist rhetoric. Already highly cooperative
on issues of defence, the two governments have increased cooperation since the World
Trade Centre bombing. (232)
THE PHILIPPINES
With confirmed al Qaeda operations in the south, a majority Christian population and
close historical ties with the US, the Philippines has supported the War on Terror more
strongly and consistently than its ASEAN neighbours. The US has responded with
considerable funding and advice for combating terrorism. In November 2002, the two
countries signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), which gives the US
the right to store equipment and weapons on Philippine soil. This move is useful to the
Philippine government in its fight with terrorist groups, particularly Abu Sayyaf, in
Mindanao. (233) The transfer of weapons and equipment is not only a move against
terrorists but also a boon to the Arroyo government in strengthening its ties with the
military, a perennially important actor in Philippine politics. But crucially, a stronger
military translates to an increased ability to counter the rise of China’s power in East
Asia. The MLSA mitigates Manila’s concerns about Chinese encroachments on the
islands in the South China Sea that are disputed territories. The Philippine armed forces
see US policy as helping to contain China and would rather be aligned with the US than
China. (234) Popular protest (which has been known to bring down governments in the
Philippines) and argument in the legislature in opposition to the war in Iraq failed to stop
the Philippines’ signing on to the Coalition of the Willing. The country sent workers to
help rebuild Iraq and received benefits from it in the form of more economic and military
aid. (235)
The US has pushed ASEAN to develop a standard security policy. In 2002, ASEAN
foreign ministers proposed a counter terrorism action plan, and signed a joint declaration
to fight terrorism with the US. (238) However, while some measures are being taken in
practice and on paper on behalf of the US to strengthen ASEAN’s security, the US is
generally keener on bilateral agreements. Evidentially, US relations with Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia and Myanmar have not changed much since September 11th because dangers in
those countries are not as apparent and US interests are not as threatened. (240)
Conclusions
DEVELOPMENT MODELS
Experiments with state led capitalist growth may not be too popular in US policy making
circles, but they seem to have produced some results in South East Asia. The fiascoes of
the regional development initiatives of the 1970s and 80s and the success (albeit a tilted
success because of US strategic priorities) of export oriented industrialisation show the
potential for success of the open capitalist model. ASEAN’s ability to create an
environment conducive to FDI and trade has made exemplars of many of its members
and their paths to modernisation. But the apparently miraculous success of ASEAN to
attract trade and investment was based largely on its alignment in the Cold War; and with
a rapidly industrialising China with the advantage of being one state with common
policies, it is difficult to make a case that ASEAN’s former rapid growth will continue or
that ASEAN provides a paradigm to other regions of the world for state led capitalist
growth.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
It is difficult to judge if the US will get its way because of the advent of the indefinite
War on Terror and the backseat status economic matters are being accorded in US policy.
But dogmatic attempts to impose changes on others tend to lead to resentment.
Nevertheless, too much retreat from US investment would be pernicious to emerging
markets and could just amount to populist rhetoric. To retain a competitive edge, ASEAN
should coordinate its policies more within the Association and with the rest of East Asia.
It should also create regional institutions to insure against future crises. While they may
not want to open their doors completely to foreign investors, although I believe in
revitalising APEC, ASEAN members should at least accelerate free trade among their
members. One benefit of ASEAN is that it opens up closed borders. If poor ASEAN
members, such as the communist Indochinese states, open up their trade to sympathetic
ASEAN neighbours, they are more likely to develop robust economies while protecting
their sovereignty that they hold so dear. As they develop, they can choose to open up
more to global markets and gain greater benefits later on. Confiding in the amity of
ASEAN is the first step toward greater openness, and without the stability ASEAN
promises, it is unlikely these countries would have opened up much until the next
generation or beyond.
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
The case by case basis of which I spoke when describing ASEAN’s response to
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia is the best way member states have found for ASEAN
to manage its affairs. Given the importance of independence, especially in security
matters, ASEAN will take a variety of political matters into consideration before making
its decisions. South East Asia is an ethnically and ideologically diverse region of the
world, like other regions of Asia, Africa and Europe, and the difficulties in regional
security cooperation could be at least as great in other parts of the world. The sensitive
and variable nature of security in South East Asia holds ASEAN members back from a
supranational institution. Big decisions aside, however, ASEAN members have long
recognised the benefits of amity and have been sharing military intelligence data for a
long time. But a predilection for independence in security decisions has led to a
preference for bilateral security agreements within ASEAN and with the US. What
reactions to US foreign policy tell us is that a) ASEAN does not uniformly respond to
security threats that do not directly affect one of its members; and b) ASEAN member
states make decisions, at least in security matters if not many others, in the face of a
number of factors and are not easy to manipulate. Based on what we know about
ASEAN’s history, and if the EU provides any evidence, a standard ASEAN policy for
external security cooperation and pooling of military resources will, for a long time, be
extremely difficult. ASEAN has benefited from reliance on the US for regional security
but may soon be placed between the War on Terror rock and the Rise of China hard place
and be forced to make tough choices. In the meantime, ASEAN will continue to look to
the US to provide some security to balance China.
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