Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

YMUN TAIPEI 2014Yale Model United Nations

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Dear delegates,My name is Adam Gerard and I am a freshman in Morse College at Yale University and this year’s Chair for the ASEAN Committee. I can’t wait to hear all delegates’ ideas and share a weekend of substantive and meaningful debate with everyone.

For a little information about myself, I am a prospective political science and economics double major, and was born and raised in Southern California. Having lived in California my whole life, I love the beach and I’m freezing whenever the weather drops below 50 degrees (Fahrenheit). I’m also a big basketball fan and I’m the captain of my residential college’s basketball team. I’ve had the opportunity to travel to Asia once before, as the keynote speaker for a Youth Leadership Institute hosted in Korea, and I can’t wait to return! I have never been to Taipei, but I am incredibly excited to be joining all of you for this experience.

Finally, I can be contacted at adam.gerard@yale.edu. Please reach out to me about any questions or concerns about the conference I am truly here to make the experience as easy and fun as possible so don’t hesitate to reach out, and I can’t express how excited I am for YMUN Taipei!

Best,

Adam Gerardadam.gerard@yale.edu

YMUN TAIPEI 2014Yale Model United Nations

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic A: Strengthening Mechanisms for Gender Equality

Topic B: South China Sea

Questions to Consider

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Topic AStrengthening Mechanisms for Gender

Equality: Topic History

Gender inequality has ramifications for nearly every other pressing issue of our time: from world hunger and poverty to the global AIDS crisis and globalization and economic policy. Discrimination and violence against women is not simply a collection of random, unrelated acts but rather, it is the manifestation of the millennia - old societal norms and deep-seated systems of structural inequality. As such, its solution presents one of the most difficult challenges of our time. With over 4.2 billion people living in UNESCAP member nations, UNES-CAP is charged with the important task of helping countries in this region to create meaningful changes at the national level and to ameliorate discrimination, violence, and to promote gender equality.

While the effects of patriarchal oppression still im-pact women worldwide, Asian and Pacific nations have unique social and cultural legacies that even more acute-ly affect the status of women to this day. In East Asia, the influence of Confucianism continues to permeate society. Beginning in China in the 6th century BCE, the philosophy and way of life promoted by Confucius spread across Asia, most notably to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. While some of the more celebrated aspects of Confucianism include a great scholarly tradition and equal opportunity in education, Confucian ideals of filial piety (the concept of unconditional obedience due from children to their father), as well as the concept of the home as the most basic unit of the state reinforced strict gender roles and female subservience that con-tinue to shape societal expectations for women in East Asia today.1 Similarly in South Asia, the interpretations of sacred Hindu texts by male scholars and Brahmins encouraged female subservience in the home, widow immolation, child marriage, and bans on widow remar-riage.2 The influence of culture and religion on gender roles and expectations, from Islam in central Asia to the orthodox church in Russia and Confucianism in the East, combined with a plethora of other distinct and unique societies throughout the diverse regions that are now UNESCAP nations, have all contributed to the worldwide epidemic of gender inequality, discrimination, and violence against women.

Women from Bopolu town and neighbouring communi-ties in northern Liberia gather to meet a UN

In 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW is commonly regarded as an international bill of rights for all women, and is the most broadly endorsed human rights treaty within the United Nations. As of August 2012, only eight member nations have refused to ratify the bill: the Holy See, Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga, and the United States. CEDAW specifi-cally addresses the social and political mechanisms that have encouraged discrimination and inhibited attempts at gender equality, and reaffirms the basic human rights women are entitled to under the UN’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.3

When the CEDAW was adopted, almost all nations expressed a number of concerns and reservations with the bill, including UNESCAP members, many declaring themselves not bound by certain articles of the Conven-tion. However, many nations also stated their support for the Convention and expressed interest in establishing governmental bodies and enacting legislation that would serve to address the issues of gender inequality articu-lated by CEDAW.4 The affects of CEDAW and other mechanisms to ensure global inequality have been sub-stantial, but still fall short, perhaps because of signatory countries’ reservations with aspects of the bill. Women around the world, in both developing and developed nations, continue to suffer from gender-based violence and discrimination.

In 1995, the United Nations met in Beijing, China at the Fourth World Conference on Women and produced the Beijing Declaration and Platform for action which focuses on asserting women’s rights as human rights and outlining specific actions that need to be taken to ensure those rights. The Platform for Action continued to emphasize that entrenched attitudes and practices are in large part responsible for perpetuating gender inequality, regardless of state policies. Thus, implementation of the Platform for Action calls not just for legislative changes and protection, but also changes in the fundamental atti-tudes, priorities, values, and practices towards women at all levels of society”.5 Nations must actively continue to address gender inequality and “[remove] all the obstacles to women’s active participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in eco-nomic, social, cultural and political decision-making”.6

The Beijing Platform for Action upheld CEDAW, while

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acknowledging the need to reassess the mechanisms that still promoted gender inequality in the wake of political, social, and cultural changes that had developed since the adoption of CEDAW in 1979 and the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, held at Nairobi in 1985. With Beijing playing host to the Platform for Action, Asian and Pacific nations asserted their pivotal role and interest in addressing the issues of gender inequality and were placed firmly at the center of the global debate over the best means to strengthen mechanisms for gender equality.

The plenary hall at the Beijing International Convention Center (BICC) during a speech given by Hillary Rodham Clinton at the Fourth World Conference on Women. UN/DPI 051331/Zhang Yan Hui.

In 2009, UNESCAP members met in Bangkok to review the successes and failures of regional implementation of the Platform for Action. The Bangkok Declaration for Beijing +15 acknowledges the gender inequalities that currently face UNESCAP nations, including the eco-nomic disparity between men and women, the lack of economic opportunities for women despite better access to education, the continued permeation of cultural norms such as son preference and female infanticide, and the refusal of all member nations to ratify CEDAW. The Bangkok Declaration asserts the need for UNES-CAP members to strengthen institutional mechanism to promote the advancement of women, including the promotion of policies to encourage female participation in the economy, protect the rights of female workers, and ensure the protection of women and girls against sexual violence”.7

However, there is still much work to be done in address-ing and finding solutions to these problems outlined in and omitted from the Bangkok Declaration, including access to basic healthcare services and reproductive healthcare services; violence against women, including domestic violence, human trafficking, and female infan-ticide; women’s disproportionately low level of political representation and high-level government positions; women’s predominance in industries in which they are subject to dangerous working conditions and low wages; and wage gaps between men and women in similar posi-tions with similar levels of education. An estimated 300,000 women work in Cambodia’s textile factories.

Current Situation: Strengthening Mecha-nisms of Gender Equality

Despite much progress in women’s political, social, and economic equality worldwide, discrimination and vio-lence against women continues to persist on a global scale. Mechanisms on the state and international level, including CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, serve to inform and guide nations on the actions to take to further gender equality; however, all UNESCAP na-tions must take active roles in addressing and solving the continuing issues women face, making sure to address them in a manner culturally appropriate to each country. When determining solutions to the global problem of gender inequity, countries should keep in mind their own unique demographic, religious, and cultural histories and consider how each of these factors may affect the effectiveness of legislation. With approximately half of the world’s population comprised of females, continuing equities in even the most developed nations demand to be addressed as quickly as possible. A number of issues remain to be solved adequately by the international community, the most pressing of which include violence against women, political and economic representation, and an ever-present wage gap between men and women.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMENThe United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines violence against wom-en as “any act of gender- based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.”8 Violence against women affects women of any and every class, race, and religion, and can occur in the home as well as in public and private institutions, including the workplace, schools, universities, and state institutions. Violence against women includes domestic violence, rape, human trafficking and forced prostitution, female genital mu-tilation, and honor killings. Currently, the most widely accepted paradigm for solving gender-based violence and discrimination is the “3-Ps”: Punishment, Protec-tion, and Prevention.9 All major conventions and state- level legislation since the Act have urged reforms on all three levels; however, implementation is typically only successful in punishing offenders, and not at a rate high enough to make a significant dent in the root causes of the problem.10

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Unfortunately, the status of women is far too often tied to political and economic situations that are outside of the control of international governing bodies. In China, government efforts at population control through the one-child policy have elevated rates of female infanticide and the incidence of abandonment of female infants, while economic reforms have led to inflation, unemploy-ment, and a conspicuous rise in prostitution.11 Further-more, the current global financial crisis has decimated many of the investment opportunities for women in de-veloping nations. Many experts conclude that crises such as political upheaval, armed conflict, economic crisis, or natural disaster, as well as systemic issues such as inad-equate legal recognition and protection, discriminatory attitudes toward women, and a lack of educational and job opportunities for women and girls can all serve to put a nations’ women at higher risk for sexual violence.

Violence against women absolutely cannot end while it remains culturally acceptable or legal. Many acts of vio-lence against women are protected and even encouraged by the state: the aforementioned one-child policy in Chi-na has led to a rise in female infanticide, and marital rape is still legal in 127 countries.12 Even in countries where specific acts of violence are illegal, the government lacks the control or the interest to protect women from vio-lence. In Afghanistan, the practice of baad, the kidnap-ping of a girl from her family as payment for a family member’s misdeeds, is illegal, but still continues in rural and tribal regions.13 In order to end these traditional practices, including but not limited to female infanticide, female genital mutilation, honor killings, kidnapping for payment, and honor killings, protection of women and education of families, particularly in rural regions, needs to be implemented.

According to the 2005 WHO Multi- Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence Against Wom-en, the percentage of women who have ever suffered from physical violence by a male intimate partner ranges from 13% in Japan to 61% in Peru. Across all countries, between 20% and 75% of women had experienced one or more acts deemed “emotionally abusive” at the hands of an intimate partner, most within the past 12 months.14 Despite these alarming statistics, state policies addressing domestic violence vary widely from country to country, and enforcement of the policies vary just as widely from village to village, city to city. In 2003, WHO published international guidelines for medico-legal care for the medical, psychological and forensic needs of

sexual assault survivors. The frameworks’ three major aims are to “promote policy measures that will support the provision of comprehensive and ethical services to persons who experienced sexual violence; to assist in evaluating current policies and practices relevant to sex-ual violence, identifying existing gaps and setting goals for future policy strategies; and to promote the co-ordi-nation of efforts of police departments, health services, prosecutors, social welfare agencies, and non-govern-mental service providers, such as rape crisis centres.”15

Peasant women from Asian La Vie Campesina move-ments in the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Indo-nesia, South Korea, Nepal and India visiting Bangladesh for an exchange visit.

Also in 2003, UNESCAP organized a “Sub-regional Training Workshop on Elimination of Violence Against Women in Partnership with Men” in New Delhi for gov-ernment officials and civil society representatives to take initiative on ending violence against women. In partic-ular, this training workshop aimed to help end violence against women by recognizing the obvious role men play in violence against women, and showing that the end of violence against women is of vital interest to men.16 Ultimately, the success of such initiatives is dependent both on nations’ willingness to cooperate as well as on the cultural shifts necessary to ameliorate the underre-porting of domestic abuse and violent sexual crime.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPRESENTATION

The empowerment of women in politics and the econ-omy is key to gender parity worldwide. The increasingly pivotal role of UNESCAP nations in the global econ-omy has made it necessary for women to operate as business owners, entrepreneurs, managers, and workers; a country cannot achieve economic success by not tak-ing advantage of half of their country’s potential work-force. Although women have seen great improvements in access to and encouragement in education, they still fall steeply behind men in political and economic repre-sentation. Between 1980 and 1996, female participation in the labor force increased in a majority of UNESCAP nations, but still behind male participation. In Thailand, female participation increased from 49.5%, to 55.2%, with male participation increasing from 54.8% to 63.%. However, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Bhutan, India, and Nepal, all experienced de-

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creased female participation in the labor force between in those sixteen years.17

Economic empowerment is necessary to improve the status of women for many reasons. Access to income raises a woman’s position in her own household, im-proves her self-esteem, and allows a woman to not feel trapped in a situation because she has her own income and skills. By proving women’s importance to economy, the subservience of women expected in many countries can be undermined and transformed. Small businesses are an especially significant way for women to achieve economic empowerment, and should be encouraged by policies and programs that provide women with access to financial resources, technology, and business net-works.18 By promoting equal-opportunity employment, enacting and enforcing anti- discrimination laws, and providing access to business and technology training, women in UNESCAP regions can continue to partic-ipated in the burgeoning economies of Asia at even higher rates than before, improving the region’s general economic well-being.

Women participating in the decision and policy making process at the local, state, national, and international level is necessary to enact legislative change to protect women and promote women’s rights. As of 2013, only 20.9% of national parliamentarians were female, and only 8 women have served as head of state. In Asia specifically, only 18.3% of members of parliament are women.19 Women, who comprise of about half of the UNESCAP region’s 4.2 billion person population, are being represented in the government at dismal numbers. Women not only need to participate in government to address women’s issues, but to also change the societal expectations of what women can achieve. The presence or lack of females in government tends to be a self-per-petuating cycle; when young girls grow up seeing strong female role models in government positions, they imag-ine the same possibility for their own future. However, if girls lack these role models, they tend not to imagine themselves as capable of attaining typically male posi-tions and do not even attempt to reach them.

The importance of female political participation is reaffirmed by research such as that on local councils in India, which found that the number of drinking water projects in female-led councils was 62% higher than those in male-led councils.20 By giving women the means to participate in politics, the number of people passion-

ate about making positive change in their communities and having the ability to do so increases, providing in-numerable benefits to that community. The UNESCAP Country Reports on the State of Women in Urban Local Government found that local government is an import-ant and accessible level of government for women to enter into: costs to campaign are low, the local issues are known by women, and it can serve as a stepping stone to higher levels of office. Although some countries in the UNESCAP region have taken steps to encourage this participation, nowhere is there proportional repre-sentation. Women are discouraged from seeking office due to patriarchal social systems, societal expectations that relegate women to the household, lack of access to information and technology, along with generally dis-criminatory attitudes.21 In order to promote the partic-ipation and representation of women in government, solutions need to be found that address the structural barriers such as discriminatory laws and practices, and the capacity gaps, meaning the problem that women have less access to education, contacts, and resources of men.

WAGE GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

Despite many countries’ encouraging progress toward achieving gender equity, even the most developed countries struggle with a persistent gap in wages paid to equally qualified men and women. In the United States, women make up almost half of the workforce and act as the primary breadwinner for nearly half of American families. They generally possess more degrees in second-ary education than men. However, in 2010 American women earned only 77 cents to every one US dollar earned by a man. This pay gap cannot be accounted for merely in a difference among the kinds of work that men and women are doing; women earn less than men in nearly every occupation for which there is significant wage-earning data. According to the Institute for Wom-en’s Policy Research, if change continues at its current slow pace, it will take another fifty years for women to achieve equal pay to their male counterparts.22

The issue of the gender wage gap is not unique to the western world; unfortunately, countries in Asia have some of the worst gender pay gaps in the world. A report in “Bloomberg” done in August of 2013 re-vealed that South Korea had the greatest gender gap in the world, at 38.9% difference in men’s versus women’s earnings, and was closely followed by Japan at 28.3%.23

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Equally as discouraging is the fact that the gender pay gap has remained fairly consistent worldwide with little to no progress over the last decade.24

No single explanation can account for the gender pay gap. Some legitimate factors, such as level of educa-tion, years of service, and skill level may result in men receiving higher wages than women. However, as men-tioned earlier, women often achieve higher levels of education and yet still receive lower pay than their male counterparts in the same occupations. One reason for this continued disparity is marital status and presence of children in the household. Generally, women with a partner are paid lower wages than women without a partner, while men with a partner are paid higher than their counterparts without a partner. Similar patterns can be observed in men and women with and without chil-dren; women with children are generally paid less than those without, while men without children are generally paid more. The primary reason for this divergence is the changing behavior patterns of men and women when these changes occur, which are often anticipated by employers. Employers generally assume that women will be working less consistently once they have a partner or children, while men are assumed to be working more consistently.25 Attaining the goal of equal opportunities for women in the economic sector is, of course, a neces-sary benchmark to attaining true gender equity; however, without addressing the issue of gender wage disparity, true equality can never be achieved.

Questions to Consider: Gender Equality

1. In the midst of the global financial crisis, how can UNESCAP encourage governments to invest in projects aimed at ending gender-based discrimination and vio-lence?2. Should incentives be put in place to encourage gender parity in the workforce? What would these incentives be?3. How should UNESCAP address the concerns of women who are also ethnic minorities? What unique challenges do these women face, and how can the gov-ernment protect them?4. To what extent should religious and cultural con-siderations be taken into account when implementing changes for gender equality? Is it possible to achieve gender equality while respecting religious and traditional practices? At what point does this amount to cultural imperialism?

5. What are the most effective ways to promote change in rural regions versus urban regions? 6. What role should NGOs play in this process, and what, if any should their limitations be in promoting cultural change?

Endnotes1 Gao, Xiongya. “Women Existing for Men: Confu-cianism and Social Injustice Against Women in China.” Race, Gender, & Class 10.3 November 2003. JSTOR. Web.

2 Forbes, Geraldine, ed. Women in Modern India.

3 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/histo-ry.htm.

4 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/re-ports.htm.

5 “Women.” Global ISssues. United Nations.

6 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/plat-form/plat1.htm#statement.

7 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing15/docs/BPA09_CRP1E.pdf.

8 http://www.unescap.org/sdd/publications/gender/gender_dp_15.pdf.

9 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pag-es/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx.

10 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report 2012, 2012.

11 Walter, Lynn, ed. Women’s Rights: A Global View. Greenwood Press, 2001.

12 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/06/un-women-legal-rights-data.

13 http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf.

14 World Health Organization. WHO Multi-Coun-try Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence Against Women: Summary Report. N.p.: n.p., 2005.

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15 “Sexual Biolence: Strengthening the Health Sector Repsonse.” WHO. http://www.who.int/violence_inju-ry_prevention/violence/activities/sexual_violence/en/index.html.

16 http://www.unescap.org/sdd/publications/gender/gender_dp_15.pdf.

17 http://www.unescap.org/55/e1133e.htm.

18 Ibid.

19 http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leader-ship-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures.

20 Ibid.

21 http://www.unescap.org/huset/women/reports/.

22 http://www.iwpr.org/initiatives/pay-equity-and-dis-crimination.

23 http://www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/biggest-gender-gap-in-earnings-countries.

24 http://dare.uva.nl/document/496277.

25 Ibid.

Topic B: South China SeaHistory of South China Sea

The South China Sea has historically been a calm area of water but in light of recent disputes over the Spratly Islands, the name ancient sailors dubbed the “Danger-ous Grounds” proved to be prophetic for its treacher-ous nature and now it is known for its volatile political potential.

The situation dates back to late 18th century when Vietnam first asserted territorial sovereignty over the archipelago of islands now commonly referred to as the Spratly Islands. However, their claim was challenged as early as 1930 and 1932 by the French and Chinese respectively. France objected on the basis of being the first nation to have launched two official expeditions, the SS De Lanessan and La Malicieuse, which culmi-nated in the planting of their national flag on an island they named Ile de la Tempete. Although, France has since renounced claims to the Spratly Islands following the expiry of mandate and transferred claim efforts to Vietnam. China, on the other hand, continues to insist on historical sovereignty based on the “nine dotted-line” claim which dates back to 1914 when cartographer, Hu Junjie, published a map demarcating the Pratas and Paracels islands as Chinese territory. Not to mention, in 1935, the Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee of the Republic of China (ROC) published a map titled Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea with an eleven dotted-line, which included 132 islets and reefs of four South China Sea archipelagos. In 1949, the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) published their ‘Map of China’ with the eleven dotted-line but later in 1953, with the approval of Premier Zhou Enlai, PRC reverted back to the nine dotted-line map. Therefore, the territorial claims made by ROC and PRC over the Spratly Islands are incredibly similar; setting the back-drop for the largest claim made by any two countries involved in the international dispute.

Most notably, China and Vietnam had two major clash-es over the islands in 1974 and 1988. The first incident began in 1973 when a Republic of Vietnam (RVN) patrol ship rammed a Chinese fishing boat and detained its crew. Several months later, Vietnamese naval forc-es fired two Chinese fishing vessels which entered the Crescent Group. This prompted the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to retaliate against four RVN vessels in the area which resulted in 36 deaths,

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110 wounded and more than 160 missing personnels between RVN and PLAN. This marked a pivotal shift in China’s maritime development and military policy as PLAN was authorized to use deadly force to enforce their claim. Furthermore, Premier Deng later ordered PLAN to establish clear military presence within the ar-chipelago. The second incident occurred in 1988. After months of island-hopping, both China and Vietnam had secured several islands without confrontation, but on March 14, both forces clashed on Johnson South Reef where over 100 troops were deployed. The confronta-tion ended when PLAN succeeded in sinking three RVN ships, routing the rest of the RVN naval forces before a ceasefire was brokered. This issue evolved into a sticking point in international relations as more littoral countries including Brunei, Ma-laysia and Philippines have chimed in with similar claims to various parts or parts thereof the island. Brunei makes the most modest of claims only to the above-wa-ter islets nearest to its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Louisa Reef. Malaysia currently occupies three islands which it considers to be within its continental shelf, which is how the country is involved in the international dispute. The Malaysian Armed Forces is stationed on all three islands namely, Ardasier, Mariveles and Swallow Reef. Philippines makes one of the strongest and third largest claims to the Spratly Islands. She argues that all the islands claimed by Philippines fall within the 200-mile EEZ as outlined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Moreover, she insists that in accordance with UNCLOS, China cannot lay claim on the Spratlys since she is not an archipelagic state. Ever since then, China has also clashed with Philippines Naval Forces in Scarborough Shoal just less than 200 nautical miles from its capital, Manila. The standoff involved more than 15 ships and vessels, adding to the complexity of the region.

However, all this tension has not been without a reason. The South China Sea is of great economic significance due to its vibrant shipping lanes, commercial fishing po-tential and above all, oil. The Geology and Mineral Re-sources Ministry of PRC estimates that area below the Spratly Islands holds almost 17.1 billion tons of oil and natural gas, not forgetting the fact that the South China Sea accounts for 35 percent of the world’s catch, which makes it one of the most profitable fishing areas. These reasons alone are sufficient to explain the involvement

of the immediate countries’ concerns, but more impor-tantly, non-Asian nations are rapidly becoming involved in the situation out of fear that these incidents could destabilize the region and its associated economics. ASEAN emerged as a key mediator as it helped broker an agreement between China and all ASEAN member states to develop the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, explicitly stating that “to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional dis-putes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and ne-gotiations by sovereign states directly concerned”. The issue is that these agreements are non-binding in nature and hence several violations have already taken place. It is no wonder that the situation in the South China Sea is fast being described as the Middle East of Asian politics.ASEAN initiates Code of Conduct for South China Sea

Current Situation: South China SeaBackground

The South China Sea, now often referred to in the me-dia as Asia’s Palestine, is becoming increasingly unstable. This phenomena, combined with an increasing number of governments turning their focus to Southeastern Asia, is setting the stage for dangerous conflicts that would have global ramifications. One of the most signif-icant dangers that arise from the South China Sea region is the fact that numerous regional governments have serious economic and political interests in regards to the Spratly Islands, which are the landforms that occupy the area.

These conflicting and interspersed occupations already generate a fair amount of animosity, which is amplified by what many nations see as encroachment by China throughout most of Southern and Eastern Asia. These land and power grabs are threatening many ASEAN members and leading some to bolster military forces. According to Tetsuo Kotani, a researcher at the Ja-pan Institute of International Affairs interviewed by Bloomberg Buisnessweek, “by [Japan] boosting mil-itary cooperation, it is giving assurance [that Japan] will stand by those ASEAN member countries [...]As China’s neighboring countries develop their own capa-bility, China needs to think twice before taking assertive actions.” While China has long had military and historic grievances with Japan, its actions are pushing it into an increasingly isolated position in regards to its neighbors.

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A recent affront toward the Philippines drew interna-tional attention and even condemnation, when China initially only gave $100,000 toward humanitarian relief efforts after a terrifyingly destructive Typhoon ravaged the country. This meager donation came as the United States and Japan immediately donated $20 million and $10 million, respectively, in the aftermath of Haiyan (eventually, after receiving a large amount of negative press, China sent an additional $1.64 million in supplies). Even in the face of growing animosity toward China over this issue among its neighbors, countries not in Asia are getting involved at a frightening rate. In late October 2013, American aircraft carriers and other ma-jor naval war vessels toured the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands and visited the waters of claimants to the islands; such a strong act, commonplace in the Middle East over the last decades for the United States was just another sign of the US’s “pivot to Asia.” More largely, such actions also signify the inevitable attention paid to the region by NATO in the future, paving the way for skirmishes, diplomatic incidences, and international con-ferences attempting to “remedy” the situation..To make matters worse, an increasing amount of re-serves are being discovered in the region, deep under-water. When the islands were first claimed by China, they were wanted mainly for their political and military ramifications. Recently, a far more significant economic element has come into play. Recent estimates place “5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natu-ral gas” in the region’s seabed in addition to the massive amounts of shipping and fishing that takes place in the waters. These discoveries have furthered the tensions and raised the stakes in what was already a dangerous and precarious situation.

Recent Confrontations: Skirmishes and Diplomatic Conflicts

While the violence that has rocked the South China Sea has its origins in World War II, recent conflicts peaked in the 1990’s and early 2000’s as Vietnamese and Philip-pine fishermen and sailors perished in encounters with Chinese patrol vessels. However, violence and skirmish-es are once again flaring up as a host of nations assert militaristic supremacy in the region. A new era of com-peting militarism began in 2011 as Vietnam conducted new and unprecedented ‘war games’ with the United States in the South China Sea. China responded accord-ingly by launching their first aircraft carrier in December of 2011. At this point it was clear a new chapter had

begun in the no-longer-regional conflict that is still being played out today. In 2013, the United States conducted war games with numerous players in the conflict includ-ing Japan, South Korea, and The Philippines, along with various other countries. While not yet leading to any recent large scale conflicts, China has responded to these war games, most notably with new regulations regarding other regions such as the East China Sea and increasing saber rattling around the entire area of the Southeast Asia without direct military conflict. However, the lack of major conflicts have not prevented the current un-dermining of naval operations in the region. For exam-ple, in late 2012, Chinese fishing vessels allegedly cut the exploration wires utilized by the Vietnam Oil & Gas Group that was conducting searches for resources in the region. The group, a state-ran company called Petro-Vietnam, condemned the actions, and China responded by calling the company’s exploration efforts a serious infringement, and that it was a strong supporter of protecting the freedom of international vessels to travel through the South China Sea. Another worrying con-frontation that occurred in the South China Sea came as a crucial blanket policy imposed by the Chinese govern-ment. The new rules were seen as nebulous, but in es-sence allowed for Chinese vessels to intercept and even search unidentified ships that entered the areas claimed by China; government-run and funded agencies claimed that the regulation was introduced solely for the purpose of discouraging illegally operating around certain islands claimed by China. Despite this claim, this new set of rules involving the stopping of foreign vessels was obvi-ously received with apprehension and wariness by other ASEAN nations. Before the announcement of the new rules, many ships were stopped informally by Chinese vessels, but the new rules made official China’s perceived ability to halt ships travelling in areas of the South China Sea it is not recognized by the international community as having control over. The most worrying aspect of the formalization of this informal practice is the worry that “China is plowing ahead with plans to enforce its claims that it has sovereign rights to much of the sea.”

Previous agreements and conventions have been held (most famously the United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea or UNCLOS), but they have clearly failed to prevent a burgeoning conflict that is constantly developing in the South China Sea.

International Law, Conventions, and Agreements

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The sheer number of annual conferences, meetings, and conventions held in regards to the South China Sea indicate the issue’s importance and bearance on the minds of the international community. As discussed in the history of the topic, UNCLOS was a significant agreement and one that has an important legal impli-cations on naval territorial disputes around the globe. UNCLOS categorized oceanic claims made by nations in two different ways: Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Territorial Sea. While the first type, EEZs, can claim 200 nautical miles off the shore of a nation, Territo-rial Sea can only be claimed up to 12 nautical miles of a nation’s coast. These laws, to which China is at least partially bound by, is another reason why claims over the islands are so crucial in the confrontation. All of these naval claims are based off of land ownership, and since the nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam have a closer proximity to actual South China Sea, many of the claims China makes are based off their ownership of the Spratly Islands. Were China to prove ownership of these islands and gain the resulting oceanic claims, the overlap with the EEZs of other South Asian nations is immense.

Even the format of the conferences in which the issue has been debated and discussed is a major source of contention between nations. China is adept at prevent-ing large councils from discussing the issue and passing binding resolutions even in the context of ASEAN. Instead, China prefers to deal with each specific nation on a bilateral basis. This prevents the effective unifi-cation of other nations’ interests against China and it allows China to assert its influence or operate a “charm offensive” more effectively. For instance, under pressure from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Cambodia, the 2012 ASEAN Chair attempted and was successful at stifling and even completely blocking any references to creating a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea during the Conferences. Even with this Chinese effort in place, there has been important multilateral meetings and con-ferences on the dispute - especially once when Cambo-dia was replaced by Brunei as ASEAN Chair in 2013. At this point, Brunei placed a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea as essentially ASEAN’s top priority for the coming year.

However, even as progress was beginning to appear and tensions began to ease, The Philippines began to lose faith that ASEAN would be able to handle the issue as a regional body and they turned their efforts to the United

Nations and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas. However, shortly after the Philippines had approached the international community to request intervention in the arbitration process, China announced it would refuse to participate in the UNCLOS Tribunal. This refusal will not prevent the panel from continuing the process, but without comment or participation from China. The panel, composed of five member nations (Ghana, Germany, France, Netherlands, and Poland), has promised a decision in spring 2014, but they recog-nize that China, while a member of UNCLOS, did not consent to all sections of the agreement and the body’s decision will not be essentially binding. The parallel failures of both regional and international bodies in the creating of a solid set of recommendations regarding the South China Sea is worrying and demonstrates that neither side is willing to concede claims in virtually any context. Other conferences such as the ones hosted by the Asian Society of International Law and the South China Sea Conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies brought together a great number of experts, but did little to shift the needle in the con-frontation or affect policy.

It is certain that the international community will con-tinue to focus on the situation of development in the South China Sea as the stakes in regards to the conflict continue to inflate, and attempts at arbitration and negotiations continue to stall. Delegates must pay close attention to the economic, social, and political argu-ments presented by all regional and global players in the dispute. They must also judge which resolution will best promote national and global interests and the South Chi-na Sea is clearly no longer a regional issue, it is a global dispute with global ramifications.

Bloc Positions South China Sea

ASEAN – has been pivotal in bringing the most aggres-sive of claimants, including China, to the regional dis-cussion table. However, progress on the agreed Code of Conduct (CoC) can only be described as sluggish at best. China agreed to consultations regarding the CoC since last year but little concrete action has since taken effect. ASEAN consistently pushed for an early conclusion to the CoC while major bloc player, China made several attempts to hamper negotiations and insisted on dealing with claimants individually. This undoubtedly complicat-ed matters for Myanmar who will host her first ASEAN meetings on 15 January 2014 with this issue as one of

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the predominant focal points.

CHINA – fervently maintains its claim over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea under its “blue national policy”, and adopted several offensive measures to bolster her claim. This includes a new fishing law which requires all non-military vessels to register with Chinese regional authorities before fishing or surveying in the area with effect from 1 January 2014. Moreover, the Chinese government has added pressure for both the United States of America and Russian Federation to remove their commercial and military presence from the South China Sea. These demands are set against an already tense political backdrop as US forces recently concluded military exercises with several of China’s opposing claimants such as Japan and the Philippines. However, it is worth noting that China refuses to openly discuss this matter at ASEAN forums and has pledged to work toward developing a CoC. The concern now is whether China will declare another Air Defence Identifi-cation Zone (ADIZ) around territory in the South China Sea as China recently did in the East China Sea.

PHILIPPINES – one of the most vocal claimants in opposition to China continues to assert her claim over the area that falls within her EEZ which she now calls the “West Philippine Sea”. Not to mention, her Depart-ment of Foreign Affairs refuses to acknowledge the new Chinese fishing law until it has verified its validity. She was also the first country to challenge China’s nine-dash line claim by submitting the matter to UN arbitration, a move which no doubt displeased Beijing. Philippines has also utilized multiple regional mechanisms including ASEAN forums and dialogues to openly engage other claimants on the matter of newly imposed Chinese law. Her allies include USA and Japan, which on separate occasions have conducted several military exercises in the region. She most recently deployed additional air force troops on 5 January 2014 to the Kalayaan island group, part of the contested Spratly Islands in response to mounting military pressure from China.

USA – continues to affirm her neutrality in the matter, stating for the record that she is a “champion of security and stability in the region”. There is no doubt that she is placed in a very difficult position since China is one of her biggest trading partners while she cannot afford to abandon longtime allies such as Philippines. That said, the South China Sea is an immensely important waterway for the US because it accounts for almost $1.2

trillion in trade. Therefore, while the US wants to avoid conflict, she is unlikely to drastically reduce her military presence in the region. In fact, she recently revealed that the USS Freedom, a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class 1 performed maritime patrols in the South China Sea during its 10-month deployment to the region. The USS Freedom went undetected by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and made it safely back to its home port in California. Despite these mixed signals, President Obama continues to push for peace and urges all claim-ants to de-escalate tensions.

RUSSIA – refuses to withdraw its military presence and energy pursuits from the South China Sea in spite of recurring warnings from Beijing to do so. In fact, Rus-sia has done quite the contrary as her relationship with Vietnam becomes increasingly pronounced. President Vladimir Putin recently pledged to increase military supplies namely submarines and planes to Vietnam and work on several projects together in the South China Sea region. It is no surprise that this announce has caused Beijing to take a closer look at its growing list of com-petitors. The most likely motivation for Russia’s recent actions point toward the lucrative oil and gas contracts which await her especially since Hanoi has agreed to two licensed blocks in Vietnam’s continental shelf.

Questions to ConsiderIs a compromise possible, and if so, which nations should be granted which lands and usage rights?What is the role of the ICJ and the UNCLOS Tribunal in the conflict?

What changes or revisions should be made to the UNCLOS to prevent future conflicts like this one from occurring, if such changes are even possible? How has the pivot of influence by Western nations to-ward the South China Sea affected the region?

How can ASEAN as an organization work toward pre-venting an outbreak of violence in the South China Sea?What implications does China’s growing economic lever-age have for the future of the conflict over the South China Sea?

Who should prosecute individuals such as fishermen who enter disputed regions?

Can mineral rights and/or profits be shared jointly be-

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tween nations if such an agreement could be reached?

Position Papers are due by May 19th for feedback and by the first committee session to

qualify for awards. Please submit your position papers to your chair via email.

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