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O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political

geography perspective

Yvonne Klpper

Published online: 19 June 2008# Springer-Verlag 2008

Abstract This article analyzes water-related conflicts in Southeast Asia and draws

the attention to controversial damand hydropowerschemes. It focuses on three

dam projects in Thailand, Laos and Burma that are all interwoven by different

characteristics of development assistance. But they also slightly differ in terms of the

implementation stage, the geopolitical setting, the socio-economical frameworks and

the actors involved. Against this analytical background, the approach unveils the

complexity of internationalising conflicts that are created under the influence of the

ongoing globalisation and by multiple actors involved, their networks, strategies and

power relations. Scarcity of resources

securing energy by development assis-tance provides a brief introduction by drawing the main global configurations.

Energy supply and poverty alleviationnew dams in Southeast Asiazooms in on

the specific stage by mirroring dam disputes in Southeast Asia (SEA). Based on

these fundamentals, in Different damsdiverse actors and conflict potentials the

case studies are reconstructed to highlight the multiplicity of dam-projects and

inherent controversies. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new instru-

ments of dispute resolution offers an outlook on conceptual ideas on how to deal

with future dam disputes under the auspices of development assistance.

Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

APMDM Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement

AOP Assembly of the Poor

DA Development Assistance

Egat Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

ERI EarthRights International

AEJ (2008) 6:325343

DOI 10.1007/s10308-008-0187-x

NO187; No of Pages

Y. Klpper (*)Department of Political and Social Geography, Prof. Reuber, University of Mnster,

Robert-Koch-Strae 26, 48149 Mnster, Germanye-mail: [email protected]

URL:http://www.uni-muenster.de/Geographie/

Y. Klpper

Friedelstrae 24, 12047 Berlin, Germany


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GoL Government of Laos

IRN International Rivers Network

LDC Less/ Least Developed Country

MRC Mekong River Commission

MW Megawatt(s)NGO(s) Non Governmental Organisation(s)

NT2 Nam Theun 2 Dam

NTPC Nam Theun 2 Power Company Ltd.

SEA Southeast Asia

SEARIN Southeast Asia Rivers Network

SWC Salween Watch Coalition

TERRA Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance

WCD World Commission on Dams

Scarcity of resourcessecuring energy by development assistance

The Mekong Region is an emerging economic area and a new frontier for

resource development. [...] But some trends also indicate the onset of increased

competition and possible tensions in the region, especially given the important roles

of China and Thailand in the Mekong region. (Son2007).

Hardly a day passes by without the media reminding us of the critical nature of

globally rising energy demands and worsening climate changeboth of which seem

to have reached critical stages. Hence experts are calling for all nations to secure theirenergy supplies and the necessary, scarce natural resources like oil, gas and water. In

consequence, most of the developed nationsplace the issue on their political agenda

and closely link it with geopolitical security matters and development assistance

(DA). The DA often adopts neo-colonialand neo-liberalfeatures, as the sought

after natural resources are especially found in developing countries(LDCs)1.

What is newand for Western countries probably even more challengingis the

fact that other (formerly) developing nations such as China, India and Thailand are

entering the DA-arena as well2. Out of this situation emerges a global footrace for

energy resources that certainly has become a sensitive issue as it touches

economical, socio-political and ecological spheres. In consequence more resource

conflicts are arising and tensions occur on quite diverse spatial levels. They are

shaped by multiple features and sometimes even lead to wars. Hence it can be

concluded that resource conflicts today represent a global phenomenon and

symbolize a crucial issue (Klare2001).

Water in particularas an essential and irreplaceable basis for lifeis becoming

rare. As it is not tied to a certain place, water can flow through (and therefore is

shared by) several riparian states. Thus, water constitutes an international resource

that has become increasingly disputed at the international scale over the last decades

1 As the term developing countriesis linked with a negative connotation, the United Nations introduced

the phrase less/least developed countries (LDCs) that is used in the following (Nohlen 2000, p. 23).2 Without doubt, China currently is the most influential agency (cf. Different damsdiverse actors and

conflict potentials). For further information see e.g. Beattie and Yeh (2007) and Lawrence and Middleton

(2007).

326 Y. Klpper


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(Dore2003)3. Predominantly in LDCs, the water crisis and its various consequences

are regarded as symptom and cause for social discrimination and poverty. Thus

water resource users at all scales frequently find themselves in direct competition

for this economic and life-sustaining resourcein turn creating tensions, and indeed

conflict, over water. (Giordano and Wolf2003, p. 163).The Asian setting appears particularly critical, as the region hosts more than 50%

of the worlds populationwhile occupying only 36% of the global water resources.

And taking a closer look at SEA, it appears that although this region possesses

several large rivers, it is periodically hit by fatal floods and extreme droughtsdue

to a fairly poor water (mis-) management on distinct levels (Diouf 2007; Unesco

2003)4. In consequence, this situation leads to huge socio-economic inequities and

the destruction of ecosystems upon which local communities depend. Hence SEA is

already running beyond its ecological means. [...] And water is one of the most

symbolic cases of this deficit.

(Rae Kwon Chung; cited by Fuller2006, p. 1)5

.

Energy supply and poverty alleviationnew dams in Southeast Asia

Past and current tendencies

From this backdrop, the article draws attention to disputes over dams and hydropower

production in SEA. Here, particularly the dam building on international rivers and their

main tributaries has led to controversies again and again. Since the early 1960s, theprimary construction-goals were power generation, irrigation and flood protection. Until

recently, the socio-ecological basisespecially of dams affecting peoples livelihood

was not taken into account. In consequence, the latter often got seriously damaged by the

dams (Scudder2005)6. After having erected many hydropower schemes under the DA-

paradigm of economic growth and modernisation, the late 1990s and early 2000s

brought along a decade of stagnation. Mainly responsible for this deadlock and the

Anti-Dam Fashionin DA was the rising public awareness of the huge negative socio-

ecological impacts of dams. This analysis was supported by the report of the World

Commission on Dams (WCD), whereupon even the World Bank withdrew from new

dam projects for a couple of years (Khagram2004, p. 812)7.

3 The actors that play a crucial role in the controversies have become internationalised accordingly. Hence

these two important conflict-constituents build the focal point of the analysis (cf. Different dams

diverse actors and conflict potentials and Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new

instruments of dispute resolution).4 To meet the need for a credible and effective river basin management organisation, the Mekong River

Commission(MRC) was established. But as it is only obliged to provide the member-states with legally non-

binding recommendations and guidelines, the MRC faces a crisis of legitimacy and relevancy (Miller2003).

5 Due to predicted population growth and climatic change, experts estimate that this conflict potential will

worsen in the future (Elhance1999; Pearce2006; Shiva2002).6 See also Dore (2001), Lang et al. (2000) and Usher (1997).7 The WCD was an interdisciplinary panel of dam opponents and supporters. Co-financed by the World

Bank, it conducted a worldwide study on consequences of dams (Bosshard 2005). The WCD concluded

that in (too) many cases there has been paid an unacceptable and often unnecessary price to secure mainly

economic benefits of dams, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by

communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment. (WCD2000, p. XXVIII).

Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 327


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But recently dam-building is experiencing a revival through DA: Dams are once

again on the agenda and are promoted as engines for development, poverty

alleviation and sustainable, climate friendly energy generation(Porter2007). Under

banners like Water for Responsible Growth, dam leviathans are built again

primarily in LDCs of Africa, Asia and especially SEAwhere dam expertspredicted a huge hydropower potential. Projects have been re-invented and are

now packaged as sustainable, participatory, equitable, integrated, and so on,

incorporating the language of development discourse and critique. (Miller 2003,

pp. 1314; World Bank2006).

They are either developed by traditional Western DA-agencies, or by newly

arisenactors from countries like China and Thailand (Schneider and Richter2007)8.

Besides geopolitical purposes, the lofty goal is to build dams in the LDCs by using

DA and to export the bulk of produced energy to neighbouring countries that are in

need of power. The LDCs in turn usually are obliged to use the here from receivedrevenues for programmes on poverty reduction (Lang 2004, pp. 67).

The dam constellation of Thailand and its neighbours

The portrayed state of affairs gets highlighted by focussing on the constellation of

Thailand and its riparian states Burma and Laos: Since the early 1960s, about 25 large

dams have been implemented in Thailandmostly all by centralised government.

Following a neo-liberal path of modernised development paradigms, these large scale

projects were supported by

and built in cooperation with

powerful protagonists like(inter-) national dam constructing companies, multi- and bilateral financial institutions

and the energy industry. As our economy was growing so fast in the 1950s and 60s, we

were in desperate need for projects on development and infrastructure. Dams wereand

I think, they still area great source for energy. Thats why we from Egat built many

dams. And that was very easy until the 1980s.(Interview rH39; cf. Yuthana2008).

The ongoing process of Thai-democratisationled to the consolidation of a solid

civil society. Out of this, a strong movement of local peoples organizations emerged

and formed specific Terrains of Resistance(Routledge1997). The groups received

wide support by (international) Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs), scien-

tists, activists and the media (cf. The Pak Mun Dama classicnational terrains of

resistance). Until now, they increasingly defend themselves against dam projects

and other development schemes threatening their livelihood and natural basis

many times being quite successful. Therefore, Thailand has built the dispute-arena

over dam projects for a long period and the pro-dam protagonists today face

difficulties in legitimizing nationwide dam projects (Baker1999; Connors2003).

Due to the 1997 Asian Crisis, the need for energy and dams vanished from

economic and political agendas. But while recovering from this crunchtogether

with an ongoing geopolitical repositioning and reshuffling in SEA under the pressure

8 Sometimes these competing actors even conduct joint ventures such as the Nam Theun 2 in Laos (see

below). At the (media) forefront of pushing dams are the international development banks like the World

Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). They are strongly backed by the dam building industries,

consultants, governments of the LDCsand increasingly by the private sector (cf. Different damsdiverse actors and conflict potentials).

328 Y. Klpper


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of globalisation and regionalisationThailand now again faces a rising need for

electricity (Lang 2004, Lohmann 1998)9. In consequence the Thai administration

and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (Egat) are seeking new energy-

options to feed this increasing demand. As Thailand faces rising costs for gasits

primary source of energythe responsible actors are pursuing a new strategy that ischaracterized by specific neo-colonial features:

Under the patronage of DA and regional economic collaboration, Thailand swaps

the conflictive issue of securing affordable energy to adjoining poor countries. And

as hydropower is (once again) regarded as an inexpensive and sustainable power-

source, Laos and Burma are the Thai prioritydue to their huge potential for dams.

To buy power from neighbouring countries is our top choice to secure power to

meet Thailand's growing demand, particularly in case as we are unable to build more

power plants. (Interview nG57).

Accordingly, Thailand adopts the donor role by fostering dam projects as foreignaidoften jointly cooperated with Western DA-agencies. In the next step, Thailand

imports the therewith generated electricity at a fixed low pricewhile Laos and

Burma in turn receive revenues and development stimuli (Fahn 2003; Tara 2008).

Hence the Thais speak of a Win-Win-Situation for all parties involved, whereas at

the same time avoiding tensions at home. Southeast Asia is the region [with] a

status as one of the worlds resource hot spots. [And] Thailand can be described as

the most powerful local economic force in the region that has major resource

development interests within the boundaries of its basin neighbours. Neighbouring

countries are increasingly becoming the water resource

frontiers

of Thailand.

(Hirsch and Cheong1996, p. 38; cf. Lang2004, p. 80).

Another goal for the Thai protagonists is to strengthen their geopolitical standing

in the region, as Thailand sees itself more and more confronted with a soaring

economic pressure from China. Beijing has expanded its search for energy, minerals

and markets. And it has also pulled its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours firmly

into its orbit with aid, trade and investment. (Irn 2008). The Thai-strategy gets

strong support by the Laotian and Burmese governments, as both countries want to

overcome poverty. They are obsessed to achieve the goal by converting into the

power batteries of SEA (Irn 2007)thus pushing for a good deal of more dams

(Bartle2005; Fullbrook2007)10.

Different damsdiverse actors and conflict potentials

This briefly illustrated constellation is shaped by multilayered struggles that become

best visible through a more detailed examination of different dams. Hence, it appears

worthwhile to take a closer look on the conflict-prone interdependence of dams and

9 Although energy experts are accusing the government and the power industry of constantly over-

predicting the energy requirement on purpose (Greacen and Footner2006).10 Furthermore it is backed by eager plans of Asian governments to establish a Mekong Power Gridthat

is currently pushed forward. If realized, the grid would interconnect the power-lines of riparian Mekong

countriesthus, transforming Thailand into the power hub and energy broker of SEA (Osborne2007;

Ryder2003).



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DA as it is presented in SEA. Therefore, the paper draws the attention to

reconstructing three consciously chosen dam stories in order to further elaborate

multiple attributes of this sensitive topic. These case studies slightly differ, as all of

them currently face different implementation stages. Consequently, they each

provide specific opportunities to reflect the relevant facets in terms of influencinginstitutional frameworks, actors involved and (possible) conflict-features11. To

bestow an orientation at first, the dams locations are displayed in Fig. 1.

The Pak Mun Dama classic national terrains of resistance

Brief overview of striking Pak Mun characteristics

The dam lies at the confluence of the rivers Mekong and Mun in Northeastern

Thailand

generally perceived as the Thai-almshouse. After many years ofemerging and vanishing plans, the government, Egat and World Bank agreed in

the early 1990s to realize the multipurpose, run-of-river Pak Mun dam. Although

the project faced local and national resistance, the contested dam was finally built.

But albeit construction ended in 1994, the protagonists still have to cope with

numerous disputesdue to several troubling, unsolved problems (Blake2006).

Hence, the dam provides a long, conflict-prone chronicle that even made

supporters question the dam by stating, that it was a mistake of the World Bank

to get involved. Pak Mun was such a very small project that wasnt even needed in

Thailand. And all the current social problems should have been foreseeable. So Iguess there was a kind of automatism that couldnt be stopped anymore, once it was

launcheddue to some questionable insider relationships. (Interview iF84). At the

end, Pak Mun gained notoriety in two respects: On the one hand embodying a failed

dam, while on the other hand representing the landmark of a strong civil society

movement in Thailand which achieved the renunciation of dams in the nation. Thus,

Pak Mun became a well-known, outstanding resistance-symbolagainst DA-related

projects in SEAeven nowadays.

Planning and construction of the damthe conflict

Although plans existed since the 1960s, Pak Mun gained in importance merely

because of special interest politics during the 1980s: As the then weak government

was in desperate need for gaining support, it decided to build a prestigious dam

justified by rising energy demand, economic strength and poverty reduction. Thus,

dam supporters speeded up the project and rushed it through a process of

questionable political channels and impact studies (Foran 2006; Kraisak 2002).

Coming to the final construction decision in 1991, the dam fell into the transition

period from classical DA-Era under the banner of modernisation-paradigm to the

emerging sustainable development concept. Hence, the project was approved amid

the peak of rising anti-dam building sentiments in the countrywhen Egats policy

11 Due to space limitations of this article, the complex dam-biographies are only presented in a nutshell

here.

330 Y. Klpper


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was most scrutinized. Consequently the people started to protest and fight against it

immediately upon the beginning of the construction. (Interview nH60).

Then the conflict-lines loomed on two spatial spheres: both on a horizontal-local

level between neighbouring Pak Mun supporterssponsored by Egat and

opponents on the ground, and on a vertical-national level between governmental

decision-makers and local antagonists (cf. Fig. 2). By unifying to the Anti-Pak Mun

Dam Movement (APMDM), the opponents gained strong support through

Fig. 1 Location of the case studies (Source: United Nations (2004), modified by the author)



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scientists, NGOs, activists and the media (Kanokrat2003)12. Consequently, Egat and

the government were exposed to multiple obstacles and forced to the negotiating

table frequentlyresulting in rising expenditures and time lags13

.For the dispute, also the WCD-report played a vital role as it included Pak Mun as

one of eight case-studies worldwide (cf. Past and current tendencies). The WCD

compared the intended outcomes with actual results of the hydropower damand

scientifically confirmed in 2000 the failure of Pak Mun. This has long been

concealed by Egat and denied by the World Bankbut the WCD exposed that if all

the benefits and costs were adequately addressed, it is unlikely that the project would

have been built in the current context. (Kunurat et al. 2000, p. XI).

Accordingly, both conflict-lines worsened as none of the several governments

involved appeared able to resolve the deadlock. Even the 2001 election pledge ofThaksin to perform an impact study and to settle the struggle did not find its way out

of the tricky impasse. Instead it led to again reigniting disputes. Hence, at the end

this interference even deepened the actors fault, as the government decided against

the scientists suggestion by commanding the annual floodgates opened for only

4 months in order to enable fisheries (Foran2006)14.

12 The APMDM merged in the nationwide Assembly of the Poor (AOP) which even received

international attention as it conducted longsome protest campswell-known as Villages of the Poorin

front of Bangkoks government house (Missingham2003).

13 Besides compensation issues and exploding costs, particularly the serious problems with declining

fisheries was the main point of concern, as the local majority was dependent upon this (Blake 2006).

Hence, the lions share of the workforce was obliged to become migrant labourers in consequence

leading to a worsening social disruption of the local society-structure (Foran 2006).

Fig. 2 Multiplying levels of dam conflicts in Southeast Asia (Source: authors own design 2008)

14 The scientific recommendation was to constantly open the gates, as even without the Pak Mun Dam

there would be no problem in terms of the power generation and power security. And we have proved that

the local income would increase quite a lot with the opening. (Interview rS14).

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Present situation of Pak Munlessons learned and continued conflicts

Even until today Pak Mun has become a focal point of conflictnot only

nationally but internationallyas everybody sees what a disaster the decision was.

(Interview nH60). Although Egat and government officials call Pak Mun a wrap, thedisputes still continueparticularly due to annual recurrences of the discussion on

the dam gatesopening. The latest of these clashes lingered on for 4 months in 2007

and was only settled dissatisfactory. Mainly responsible for the impasse, are the two

intertwined conflict lines mentioned above as those are still present. This leads to a

worsening local rift, because of the way in which Egat and the government tried to

construct the dam and handled the conflict. (Interview rS14).

Particularly the scientists, NGOs and activists declared Pak Mun a failure as it did

not fulfil any of its original promises. Instead of providing development and energy,

the overpriced project bequeathed an economically and socially destructed region.Hence, experts doubt whether any reasonable solution can be found in the

foreseeable future as the protagonists goals are contradictory (Foran 2006).

Due to several challenges, the parties involved faced during the implementation,

they finally all draw their lessons out of the Pak Mun experience. Pak Mun served

as catalyser for everybody involved in terms of drawing individual lessons. And it

helped to empower democratic structures so that the Thai speak up for their rights.

But dam opponents also know now that they still need to raise more resistance

against such projects. (Interview iM66)15.

The probably most important conclusion about Pak Muns

strong resistance was formany involved that it forced the dam supporters to stop any further projects on Thai

ground. In consequence, the dam is also seen to be responsible for todays strategic

shift of Thai-dam builders. Thus, critics fear that the Pak Mun story laid the ground for

the exportof large damsenvironmental and social problems to the other countries

where people might have a more difficult time protesting, but the Thai-actors are not

responsible for complying with international standards. The furore over Pak Mun has

blocked new dam construction in Thailand, prompting Egat, to back hydro-electric

projects in neighbouring Laos and Burmaout of the reach of Thai environ-

mentalists.(Interview rS14).

Based on this assumption, the reconstructions of the Nam Theun 2 and Salween

dams might provide evidence.

The Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laosbuilding the perfect dam under a new

development assistance framework

Nam Theun 2 at a glance

In reference to Thailands strategy, the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) is conveniently

situated close to the Thai-Lao Border. The project reflects a trans-basin scheme,

15 One striking lesson was the consonantly agreement for a necessarily more transparent process including

participation of the (affected) population as well as to perform detailed studies upon expectable

environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Subsequently, quite a number of those lessons were taken into

consideration in planning following dam projects. For detailed lessons learned see Blake (2006), Foran

(2006), Kanokrat (2003).



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diverting the flow of the Theun River down to the Xe Bang Fai Riverboth main

Laotian Mekong-tributaries (cf. Fig. 1).

Due to numerous reasons, the planning has been disputed particularly on

international scale that lead to massive delays. But in 2005 supporters finally agreed

to build the $1.6 billion NT2-damin order to serve as vehicle on the road of Laotiandevelopment. Hence, the 1.070 MW-project is currently under construction

scheduled to be completed in 2009. The scheme already contains an agreement

between the government of Laos (GoL) and Egat. This stipulates delivery of 95% of

the generated electricity to Thailand at a fixed, low rate over the upcoming 25 years. In

turn, the constructorsmainly the World Bankoblige the GoL to invest the

generated income of approximately $ 2 billion to alleviate the striking Laotian poverty.

Thus, the NT2 Power Company (NTPC) promotes this single largest infrastructure

project ever undertaken in Laos as win-win-solution for all parties involved

(Tribollet2006).First and foremost, ADB and World Bankas the main backers of the project

are eager to realize this dam16. After facing several setbacks, they are in need of a

successful dam story. Hence, the NT2 supporters established a PR-machine and

spent about 10% of the project costs to absorb the immense socio-ecological

consequences in order to create a prestigious platinum project. We believe that a

sound approach to selling hydroelectricity, supported by improved government

policies, is the best way for the country to increase the amount of money it can

invest in health, education and basic infrastructure for the benefit of the poor.

(Wolfensohn cited in Imhof2005: 1; World Bank2005).

Ambitious planning and constructionprestigious re-entry into dam building

Although the project was first conceived in 1970, it only gained momentum since

1993. Nevertheless, it was not before 2005 that NT2 finally received green light: the

Asian Crisis, the increasing negative image of dams and the broad scrutiny given by

the WCD to dams caused long delays17. Thus, the project reflects the first of the

new, post-WCD dam era that also marks the first involvement of the World Bank,

after stepping out of such schemes for several years (Blake 2006).

Besides the mentioned poverty reduction and power supply, the NT2 is

particularly intended to serve as role model for economic and geopolitical reasons.

Accordingly, the construction consortium wants to legitimize several future projects

by creating the NT2 as the perfect dam. On the other hand, the development banks

16 The World Bank plays a crucial role for the go-ahead as international private investors made their

involvement dependent on a risk guarantee from the bank. Accordingly, the model is a public

privateJoint Venture which the World Bank hopes to deploy for other dams, too (World Bank2005).17 Furthermore, several controversies over the projectsdesign accounted for the setback. These struggles

occurred between NT2 proponents and opponentsmainly international NGOs like International Rivers

Network (IRN) and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA). Finally the

disputes ended in unaccountable numbers of studies as the bank, together with [...] developers of the NT2

project, undertook years of studies assessing alternatives and best options [...]. It is also why NT2, has had

the most extensive consultations process in the history of the country.(Porter2005).

334 Y. Klpper


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and Thai protagonists are afraid of (further) losing their geo-strategic and

commercial standing in SEAas China is gaining more and more influence here18.

Especially the World Bank depends on a successful dam project nowadays. And I

guess nowhere else in the world it would be so easy to build a dam like NT2 than

here in Laos. (Interview nH60)19

.As Laos offers limited political space for civil society resistance, the dam-

opposition primarily wasand still iscarried by a couple of international agents.

Hence, the conflict-arena became internationalised and proceeded primarily on

horizontal-linear levels (cf. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new

instruments of dispute resolution). Shortly after opposing NGOs realised their

inability to stop the scheme, many of them backed out from their NT2-involvement.

But NGOs such as IRN decided against withdrawal and switched to a watchdog-

strategy. In this manner, IRN hopes to contribute to realising the project in most

appropriate ways for the affected people and the environment. We discovered thatsomebody has to play the watchdog, if you cannot prevent the dam. Hence we look

very closely on the development on the ground. And if we think the dam

construction doesnt adhere to the social and environmental aspects, we immediately

try to raise alarm. (Interview iN58).

Thus, after initially protesting against shady plans and the oppression of the local

population, the main resistance currently focusses on the complex social and ecological

issues surrounding the NT2s construction. Particularly the questionable resettlement-

handling and the contentious treatment of deforestation that joint the setup of the Nakai-

Nam Theun Biodiversity Conservation Area, are in the limelight

and have attractednumerous controversies over the past decade (Bechstedt2006)20.

The challenging NT2 currently thrives and prospersso do conflict lines

Whilst construction is proceeding on time, the environmental and social programs

implementations are lagging behind. NT2 is 70 percent complete and on track to

begin operations in 2009. [But] there have been challenges in making sure the social

19 Besides the political structure and economic surroundings, the site-specific geographical premises are

unique. There is a 350m high plateauthe Nakai Plateauwhich can supply the main head, meaning

you can go for a relatively small dam and get huge output of energy down the plateau.[...] God has done

half of the work for us. Therefore we do not have to build a 350 meters bigger and higher dam .

(Interview iE62).

18 From their view, the recently increasing Chinese DAengagement in Asia and Africa demonstrates

that these concerns seem justifiable. The growing Chinese influence is unveiled for instance by the fact

that the China Development Bank covers a loan budget bigger than the World Banks and ADBscombined accounts (Beattie and Yeh 2007). Hence, NT2-proponents legitimize their involvement by

stating that if the ADB and World Bank would not build dams like NT2, these dams would be

constructed by Chinese banks and companies anyway. (Interview iF32).

20 The projects socio-ecological blueprint appears indeed promising (Shivakumar2007; Tribollet2006).

But the relocation performance of roughly 6,200 people and the realisation of environmental safeguards

are watched critically (Schuettler 2008). Furthermore, the dams anticipated negative impacts upon

ecology and approximately 100,000 affected people living downstream along the Xe Bang Fai River was

taken into account only marginally until recently (Bechstedt2006).



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and environmental aspects progressed at the same rate as the construction.

(Schuettler2008).

Consequently, the latter are still major themes for dispute. And by virtue of several

factors, a considerable increase of conflict lines can be identified: Among the ongoing

struggle between NGOs and NT2-constructors on the horizontal-international level,various tensions are emerging within the dam-builders network21. And as the

decision-makers only show limited willingness to address existing problemsand

instead prefer gloss over the internal conflictssome (formerly) executive staff

change sides in order to ally with dam-opponents such as IRN, hoping to better raise

the issue this way (Interview iF61; cf. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks

require new instruments of dispute resolution).

Nevertheless the NTPC and World Bank are still holding up NT2 as an excellent

example of an integrated, holistic approach that enables poverty alleviation

although its development effectiveness continues to be questioned. It thereforeremains contestedeven within the NT2-constructions consortium. Still, the

protagonists remain keen on presenting the project as a role model of perfect dam-

building in the media and in public, as especially the World Bank is under

considerable strain. The NT2 is a high-risk project with significant reputational risk

for the Bank. (Shivakumar2007).

The Salween dams on the ThaiBurmese borderquestionable dam schemes kept

confidential

The Salween dams

The planned Salween dam projects are located straight on or close to the Thai

Burma Border on Burmese ground (cf. Fig.1). The region is ecologically unique and

partly protected by Salween Wildlife Sanctuary and Salween National Park. All

together, the existing schemes envision construction of a cascade of (at least) four

dams, with two of them in advanced planning-stages22: The Tasang dam is a public

private ThaiBurmese joint venturewith Chinese enterprises most likely to join.

Tasang has a capacity of about 7.000 MWhence a really huge, big dam, with a 7-

times bigger capacity than the NT2. (Interview nG30, The Nation2007).

The further downstream located, 1,200 MW Hat Gyi dam marks cooperation

between Egat and the Burmese regime that is also in search of private (Chinese)

investors. All of the schemes have in common that about 85% of the electricity

output would be exported to Thailand and that they are kept fairly secret. It is

interesting how little there is in the media here about what is happening on the

Salween. Egat obviously wants everything low-key with as little publicity as

21 Main reasons are the internally rising discontent regarding the socio-ecological performance as well as

the behaviour of specific protagonistspredominantly GoL and poorly skilled NTPC-staff (Shivakumar

2007).

22 Thus, preparatory building measures are already underway. Besides these projects, China also plans to

construct up to 13 dams on their Salween partbut faces rising environmental resistances (Nguyen and

Amin2007).

336 Y. Klpper


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possible. (Interview nN85). The plans also appear most sensitive regarding the

geopolitical situation, as well as ecological and Human Rights issues (Luntharimar

2003). In close relation to NT2, the Salween supporters try to legitimate the

projects with similar DA-objectives, while the major goal seems to be motivated

primary economically (see above). They [=Burma] need development, soThailand as strategic partner with Burma, should cooperate closely with Rangoon

to bring about modernisation and economic prosperity in the country for mutual

benefit. (Achara2004).

But in striking contrast to the NT2, these projects feature quite differing actors

networks due to the global geopolitical situation. Furthermore, the dams possess a

stronger local resistance movement on both sides of the borderhence providing a

good deal more conflict-lines.

Hydropower plans

geopolitically sensitive and controversial

Although studies identified tremendous hydropower potential since the 1950s, the

Salween embodies the longest free-flowing river in SEA until today. Similar to NT2,

ideas firmed up only from the 1980s ondue to growing regionalisation and rising

energy demands of neighbouring countries23. By signing the obligatory bilateral

power purchase agreements, Salween projects recently gained momentum in order

to produce lowest cost electricity supply with very little impact on Thailand.

(Luntharimar2003, p. 31). Hence, the confidential schemes count among the new,

neo-colonial era

of dam-building. However, other than in Laos, the projects arepushed ahead particularly by newly arising Thai and Chinese DA-actors. As the

Western strategy of sanctioning Burma rules out their participation, classical DA-

agents such as the World Bank are not involvedalthough some of these

protagonists definitely favour the Salween schemes (Interview iF35)24. Moreover,

traditional dam opponents are keeping away, toothus weakening the resistance.

Purposely absent, interestingly, are the conservation organisations, institutional

bodies and watchdogs that dominate the playing field of Salweens neighbour, the

Mekong. (Zao2008).

Besides purchasing energy and increase revenues, the dams are essential to the

supporters for several reasons: The Thais want to gain prestige in order to strengthen

their weakened geopolitical and economic standing in competition to China. For the

Burmese Junta, the dams offer a good legitimisation to tackledistracting problems

with ethnic minoritiesas all projects are located in volatile areas where battles

between Burmese troops and ethnic forces continue since six decades already. The

23

So far, hydropower accounts for about one-third of Burmas mere 1,500 MW electricity production. TheSalween-dams would add up to 16,000 MW of capacity (Bartle 2005).

24 Just the ADB forms an exception through indirectly supporting the Tasang dam, as this is (as well as the

NT2) part of the planned Mekong Power Gridwhich is an ADB promoted program. They funded the

feasibility study for the design of the dam as it would fit perfectly into the idea of Regional Economic

Cooperation for Power Development. (Interview iN44; cf. The dam constellation of Thailand and its

neighbours).



14/19

junta is just advancing their plan to squeeze the Karen and other minorities into

submission. (Interview iA42; Pianporn2007).

The political systems of both countries provide specific spaces for local resistance

although quite limited in Burma. Consequently in contrast to Laos, opponents are raising

voiceseven inside coercive Burma. Hence, the Salween-supporters find themselvesexposed to (sometimes deadly) hurdles on vertical conflict-levels (Wolff2006). And as

the combatants get (narrow) international support from various ethnic groups along the

river, human rights activists, environmentalists, scientists and NGOs, the string of

struggle gets internationalised here, too25. However, as the plans are either kept secret

or are praised by Egat, resistance proves difficult. To strengthen its potential, the

opponents formed a network called Salween Watch Coalition (SWC) and try to

employ distinct strategies in order to resist the dams on different scales26. In their

criticism they particularly doubt the damslocations will lead to a secure power supply

for Thailand. They also blame the Thai-protagonists for partnering with one of themost repressive regimes in the world, as this reflects a misconception of development

that will inevitably lead to accusation by the international community (Pianporn2007;

Transboundarywaters2004).

The current state of affairspushing ahead despite imponderabilia

Thai developers pigeonholed the Salween-projects after the 2006-coup. But recently

the new elected government pushes ahead for the dams again under the revived pro-

Burma economic policy. Consequently, in March 2008 Thailands Export

Import-Bank agreed to hand out a four-billion-baht loan for Tasang dam, which had been

put on hold since 2005 (Bangkok Post2008).

This decision dashed the hope of dam-opponents, as they believed to be able to

prevent the projects because of the international public outcry after the Burmese

saffron uprising (Tunya 2007)27. Nevertheless the SWC keeps on resisting. And

since they worry that the dam-developers will not adhere to international

implementation-standards, their strategy is widened to also demand criteria such

as a legal mechanism to ensure public participation in decision-making, mitigation

efforts, and to achieve best international practice. (Zao2008).

Hence, the vertical-international conflict-line is still present. But furthermore,

two horizontal dispute-spheres are emerging. On the one hand, struggles appear on

the local level between dam supporters and opponents, as Egat pursues a dam

propaganda similar to what it did at Pak Muninstead of discussing the pros and

cons of the projects. This already results in rudimentary rifts among the local

25 The NGOs are mainly TERRA and Southeast Asia Rivers Network(SEARIN) from Thailand, as well

as the American-based EarthRights International (ERI).

26 On international scale they try to raise awareness upon the dams negative aspects e.g. by publishingbooks, maintaining a website and initiating Salween Action Days. On national Thai-scale in turn, thepriority is to cooperate with the media, in order to question Thai energy demands and to frighten the

population by giving warnings of a rising Burmese refugee wave to Thailand because of the dams

(Pianporn2007).

27 Another setback was the assassination of one of the Karens outstanding leaders in Thailand, as he

strongly defeated the dams (Tada 2008).

338 Y. Klpper


15/19

population (Interviews lP21 & nH60; cf. The Pak Mun Dama classic national

terrains of resistance). Other controversies arise on the vertical-international

space, because Burmese decision-makers start to play Thai-actors off against

Chinese-protagonists in order to obtain the best economic output possible (The

Nation2007).In conclusion, various question-marks still surround the Salween dams

development and the related conflict degrees. These include possibilities for political

change in Burma that might even invite classical dam-actors such as the World Bank

to engage.

Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new instruments of dispute

resolution

Lighting up diverse dam patterns

The case-studies presented provide a multi-faceted insight into the topic and enable a

comparative analysis of dams in various stages. Although the projects are all

interwoven by altering DA-features, they differ slightly in terms of geopolitical

settings, socio-economical frameworks and protagonists involved. Hence, the dam-

stories grant the opportunity of contrasting varying actors networks and unveiling

the multiple conflict potentials on diverse spatial levels.

Albeit other influencing variables

and even though suffering a setback after theWCDthe DA still plays the crucial role in legitimizing dams. Only the paradigms

DA-protagonists refer to have changed: from growth and modernisation to

sustainable energy security, poverty reduction and geopolitical issues. The most

essential modification is the expansion of actors involved. Due to this proliferation,

the DA-struggle for resources and strategic standings is increasingly shaped by

newly arising, powerful characters from e.g. Thailand and China. Consequently, both

the traditional protagonists and the new developers are currently in search for

their roles and positions. Thus, they sometimes build dams in co-operation, while

competing in others.

As the global tendency presumes a rising power demandthat obviously leads to

pursue more dams in LDCs with huge hydro-potentials like Burma and Laosa

growing potential for conflicts between the actor-networks needs to be expected, too.

Characteristic traits of actor networks in dam conflicts

The analysis reveals that actors are linked in strategic and usually loosely structured

networks, while sharing similar objectives. Regarding the various dam projects,

these associations are quite distinctive. Nevertheless, they are all culture-specific and

follow institutionally structured patterns. Furthermore, they all exist at overlapping

(inter-) national scalesand the protagonists networks seem to become even more

complex in the wake of an ongoing globalisation.

But the associations are also characterized by a prevailing, deadlocked perception

of a stereotypical good and bad actors dichotomy. This slant gets tightened through



16/19

actors own cognitions of the others respectively28. What seems even more

essential is the fact thatalthough the awareness of this bearing is presentmost of

the protagonists are not willing to minimize the resulting conflict potentials. This is

underlined by the fact that only marginal interfaces do exist, where actors are eager

to cooperateor even switch sides. For many involved parties, it seems moreimportant to hold on the dichotomic black-and-white thinking, rather than trying to

overcome it and intend to collaborate in order to handle dams in more sophisticated

ways (see below).

In SEA, Thailand serves somehow as the base of diverse, powerful actors that are

seeking hydropower in riparian stateswith international DA-protagonists support-

ing them. On the other hand, it serves as the spring-board for actors opposing this

evolution. They resist the neo-colonial strategy in order to stop dams, or at least

achieve a more balanced development with a betterrecognition of socio-ecological

issues

wherein they appear sometimes quite influential, too. Hence, all involvedobviously use the relatively free and democratic political Thai space, to resistor

to expandcontroversial dams in the neighbourhood.

Internationalising and multiplying dam projects conflict lines

The three outlined dam-stories give an idea of the intrinsic conflict-diversity at dam

projects that depend on various parameters. Moreover, the analysis unveils the

tendency to more manifold and higher conflict-arenas: they get increasingly

internationalised under the banners of globalising DA and regionalisation-efforts.Correspondingly, the conflict-lines multiply. In the next step, these tendencies

strongly influence the overall context of dam-buildingas it is depicted in Fig. 2:

Furthermore, the publics and the mass medias perceptions of controversies play

a complementary, crucial role in this framework. In consequence, particularly the

conflicts between competing and dichotomising actor networks shape the powerful

medial construction and public awareness. Thus, for instance the vertical

controversies at the Pak Mun and the (internationalised) horizontal disputes at the

NT2 are present(ed). But geopolitically sensitive struggleslike the Salween project

or network-internal disputes as in case of the NT2-buildersare also negotiated

beyond these perceptions, or rather suppressed.

Outlines on how to avoid future dam conflicts

There are various approaches at hand to handle resource disputese.g. the concepts

of Conflict Governance, 3rd-Party Intervener and Intercultural Mediation

(Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Weller 2007). Some broad strategies to stopor at

least minimisethe inherent dispute-potentials and to overcome such difficult

situations can be provided.

28 For instance, the locally affected people, activists, peoplesorganizations and NGOs seeing themselves

as the good ones and the governments, development banks, consultants, dam builders, financiers and

other DA-agents as the bad guysand vice versa.

340 Y. Klpper


17/19

As the concepts stated above are often criticised for being too technical, the WCD

for instance deployed a rights and risks based approach that provides a more

political foundation and is directed particularly to dam disputes (WCD2000).

But in this authors view, these approaches target too much the development of a

generalising recipe to handle conflicts. In doing so, the concepts are construedsingle-edgedhence tending to overlook the complex shape of the dam projects.

Thus, they fall short of accommodating the diverse actors interests present in the

dam-building. They run the risk of disregarding various important patterns that

influence the emergence of controversies and its conflictive process.

In this respect, it appears essential to overcome the search forand application of

these universalising conflict-resolution models that need to be questioned. In fact, more

promisingand challengingit seems to broaden the analytical horizon in order to

recognise the various structures and facets of the conflict and its frameworks. Based on

such an increased awareness, a toolboxshould be deployed which provides a diverse

set of instruments and mechanisms. These in turn can be launched and applied

individuallydepending on the patterns and shape of the (potential) dam conflict.

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