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Armed violence and poverty in Sri LankaA mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty InitiativeNovember 2004

Miranda Alison

University of Warwick


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Armed violence and poverty in Sri Lanka, Alison, Nov 2004 1

The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre for

International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out research to

promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is exacerbated by armed

violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a broader Armed Violence andPoverty Initiative, aims to provide the full documentation of that correlation which DFID

feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through

which such impacts occur and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In

addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and

policy recommendations to donor government agencies.

This report on Sri Lanka is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies are available at

www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources including

existing research studies, reports and evaluations commissioned by operational agencies, and

early warning and survey data where this has been available. These secondary sources have

been complemented by interviews with government officers, aid policymakers andpractitioners, researchers and members of the local population. The analysis and opinions

expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or

policy of DFID or the UK government.

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Executive summary

Macro-economic effects of the warThe case of Sri Lanka exhibits certain exceptional qualities in that its economy grew on

average faster during the war than in the pre-war period. In addition, its growth comparesfavourably with other developing countries not at war. However, there have been

considerable fluctuations in Sri Lankas growth rates that correspond with episodes of armed

violence in the country. The Sri Lankan economy could have grown at a much higher rate if

it did not have to bear the costs of the war. In contrast with other foreign-exchange

constrained economies at war, Sri Lankas exports did not drop dramatically during the

conflict, though greater investment levels in the absence of conflict would have led to higher

exports. It is significant, however, that the major export-earning industries are concentrated

outside the war area and so have been fairly isolated from disruptions. In contrast, the war

has had a severe impact on tourist earnings and employment. Others assert that the lost

potential economic growth of Sri Lanka is greater than has been acknowledged and that high

defence expenditure is the primary cause of economic problems. Defence expenditure as aproportion of the GDP in Sri Lanka is the second highest in South Asia and has surpassed

social expenditures since 1995. Peaks in expenditure match up with periods of heightened

violence and security problems.

SALW, disarmament, demobilisation, crime and violenceThe question of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into society of ex-

combatants from both sides of the conflict is one of the most significant political and

developmental issues currently facing Sri Lanka. The International Organisation for Migration

(IOM) is about to launch a reintegration programme for a limited number of ex-combatants

and their families from both sides of the conflict, intended as a pilot for a larger future

programme should a political settlement be achieved. Problematic categories of combatants

not covered by the programme are deserters from both the army and the LTTE; retired LTTE

members; certain categories of child soldiers; the Home Guards and the National Armed

Reserve; and members of Tamil groups opposed to the LTTE, state-funded and armed. In the

design of demobilisation and reintegration programmes, these potentially vulnerable

categories need to be targeted as well as those more immediately visible. For all ex-

combatants the problems of finding employment, supporting their families and settling into

civilian roles are considerable but for female ex-soldiers there are some gender-specific

issues. Reintegration programmes need to address gendered issues in a more radical way

including grappling with the needs of female ex-combatants in an emancipatory way rather

than reinforcing expected gender roles and inequalities.

Sri Lanka also faces the integrally related problem of the threat to society posed by ex-

combatants. Particularly troublesome is the category of Sri Lankan state military deserters, of

whom it is estimated there are over 50,000. Evidence from other contexts suggests that

reducing one type of violence can actually lead to an increase in other types, particularly

when there is a problem with small arms and light weapons left over from a conflict so

ceasefires and peace processes often witness an increase in economic and inter-personal

crime. This appears to be occurring in Sri Lanka, where violence all over the country seems

to be on the increase. Further, other contexts also suggest that in the post-conflict era the

wartime proliferation of small arms and light weapons contributes to a rise in levels of

domestic violence against women. Data in this area appears to be lacking in Sri Lanka and is

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vitally needed. However, existing local initiatives that combat domestic and sexual violence

should be supported and funded.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs)Over the course of the conflict more than 800,000 Tamils were displaced within Sri Lanka,

over 84,000 sought refuge in India and hundreds of thousands more in other parts of theworld, making up one of the worlds largest IDP populations and one of the western worlds

largest groups of asylum seekers. For IDPs without recourse to family support or the

opportunity to migrate abroad, camps (welfare centres) became the only option. Poverty in

the camps is often severe, residents suffer health problems and their basic needs are often not

met. The main bulk of the IDP population live in the Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula, which

have been particularly badly impacted by the war, but there are significant numbers of IDPs in

the east too. The economic marginalisation of the area as a result of the war, the widespread

exodus and displacement of skilled workers and educated people, and the huge devastation

caused to the infrastructure has had significant impacts in terms of poverty. Within IDP

camps access to employment has been sporadic, food and health care are significant problems

and maintaining good standards of education has been difficult. IDPs in the eastern campsseem to have better nutrition and health than those in the north, but often a worse relationship

with the security forces, especially in the Trincomalee area.

Women have experienced more continuity than men in regard to their normal gender tasks

and identity, but have also changed gender relations as well many women work in paid

employment outside the camps, though some have also suffered resistance to these changes

by men. The steps some IDP women have made and continue to make towards greater

agency and empowerment should be encouraged and supported by development agencies, but

ongoing dialogue with IDP men is a necessary part of this process to ensure that women do

not suffer a backlash from men in their own communities. Finally, the steady flow to the

north-east since the ceasefire of spontaneously returning IDPs, refugees and migrants is a

significant issue affecting Sri Lankas potential for development. The pressures on

government services and UN and aid agency assistance for returnees are significant. Many

attempt to return to their land and homes on their own initiative, where water, sanitary and

other services and infrastructure may be inadequate or non-existent and the prospects for

income generation are grim. Land disputes are also likely. One of the biggest problems faced

by returnees is that of anti-personnel landmines, despite the partial de-mining done so far.

Female-Headed Households, Vulnerable Women and Livelihood StrategiesWith large numbers of men killed or lost through migration or abandonment throughout the

war there has been a significant increase in female-headed households. This increase is seenprimarily in the Tamil communities in the north-east but some Sinhalese communities in the

south also now have greater numbers of female-headed households, as a result of the violent

JVP insurrection in 1987-89. This has serious and gendered implications for families,

communities and society more broadly. Tamil culture accords a very low status to widows

and women living alone without a male family member are looked upon with suspicion and

suffer various forms of social exclusion. A significant problem for lone women trying to

support themselves and their children is the fact that even if they do manage to find some

source of income generation, people in their communities often assume that this money must

come from prostitution. Organisations such as the Centre for Womens Development that

help women establish livelihoods, including training them in unconventional skills, should be

supported.

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MAP OF SRI LANKA, showing provinces and major towns, produced by the US CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA). Available from the University of Texas Library Online:http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg

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http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpghttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/sri_lanka_pol01.jpg


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1. Introduction

The economic effects of armed conflict depend, in part, on the nature and duration of the

conflict and the pre-existing conditions in the relevant economy. Outcomes should therefore

vary. Empirical evidence shows large economic and social costs in major civil wars, over and

above direct war deaths. Economic costs are witnessed in falls in GDP, food production, andexports.

1Meghan OSullivan points out that the economic experience of Sri Lanka seems to

differ quite dramatically from that of other countries at war since its economy grew on

average faster during the war than in the pre-war period, rather than contracting. Its growth

also compares favourably with other developing countries not at war. However, OSullivan

notes that there were considerable fluctuations in Sri Lankas growth rates that correspond

with episodes of armed violence in the country. For example the period of the second

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP Peoples Liberation Front) rebellion, 1987 to 1989,

witnessed a particularly visible decline in growth. The period from the beginning of war in

1983 to the suppression of the JVP in 1989 was one of the slowest periods of growth in post-

independence Sri Lanka, with annual growth averaging 3.7 per cent. OSullivan suggests,

therefore, that Sri Lanka has managed to mitigate the negative effects of conflict but notescape them.2

Although the Sri Lankan economy has grown during the war it has been argued that the

economy could have grown at a much higher rate if it did not have to bear the costs of the

war.3

War often hampers a countrys export sector yet, in contrast with other foreign-

exchange constrained economies at war, Sri Lankas exports did not drop dramatically during

the conflict, though greater investment levels in the absence of conflict would have led to

higher exports. This apparent exceptionalism of Sri Lanka, however, is less surprising when

one considers that the major export-earning industries are concentrated outside the war area

and so have been fairly isolated from disruptions.4

In contrast, the war did have a severe

impact on earnings and employment created by the tourist industry in Sri Lanka. Tourist

earnings grew by over 20 per cent per annum 1978 to 1982, then began dropping after the

1983 ethnic riots until by the late 1980s the total number of tourists visiting the country was

half that of 1982. Tourism then began increasing but fell again by 25 per cent after terrorist

attacks in Colombo in 1996.5

It is a little early to tell the real effect of the current ceasefire on

tourism but certainly tourism to the country does seem to be on the increase again and a few

visitors are even travelling to the north-east.

Muttukrishna Sarvananthan argues that high defence expenditure is the primary cause of Sri

Lankas economic problems. He maintains that the lost potential economic growth of Sri

Lanka as a result of the war is actually greater than has generally been acknowledged (due tothe way such things are measured and what is included and excluded in statistics from year to

year); defence expenditure has surpassed social expenditures since 1995; defence expenditure

as a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Sri Lanka is the second highest in

South Asia (after Pakistan) and is high in comparison to some other war-torn countries; and

labour-intensive military strategy has been economically costly.6

Defence expenditure as a

percentage of the GDP was only 1 per cent in 1982, before the war began, but since the mid-

1980s this figure has vastly increased. Certain peaks in expenditure match up with periods of

1 Stewart, Huang and Wang in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001a.2 OSullivan in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001b, pp. 181-183.3 CEPA, 2001.4 OSullivan in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001b, pp. 189-190.5 OSullivan in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001b, pp. 190-191.6 Sarvananthan, 2003b.

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heightened violence and security problems in 1988, during the JVP rebellion, defence

expenditure was almost 5 per cent of GDP and in 1995 and 1996, when the government

launched an intensive military operation to retake the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE,

expenditure was respectively around 5.4 and 6 per cent.7

Since 1996 it has averaged around

4.3 per cent.8

Annual defence expenditures as a proportion of the total public expenditure

generally increased from 11.2 per cent in 1991 to 14.3 per cent in 1995 then jumpedsignificantly to an average of around 17 per cent for the years 1996 to 2000.

9OSullivan

suggests a further example of Sri Lankan exceptionalism when she points out that during the

war years she examines, 1983 to 1995, Sri Lanka maintained social expenditure in excess of

pre-war levels.10

However, defence expenditure has been growing steadily. Whilst in the

early 1990s defence and social expenditures remained roughly equal as percentages of the

overall public expenditure, from 1995 defence expenditure began outstripping social

expenditure. During the years 1991 to 2001, defence expenditure versus social expenditure

peaked in 2000 when defence expenditure made up 17 per cent and social expenditure 9.8 per

cent of the total public expenditure.11

However, it should also be noted that social

expenditure as a percentage of the public expenditure has actually remained reasonably stable

1991-2001; it is the percentage spent on defence that has significantly increased.

This report is primarily concerned with the household level, particularly in regard to gendered

impacts, and does not address the macro or meso-level impacts of armed violence in Sri

Lanka beyond the brief mention of some key macro-level impacts provided above. This paper

also focuses on the effects of war violence and other types of violence that have stemmed

from or been contributed to by the war and consequent availability of small arms and light

weapons (SALW). The report begins with a brief outline of the Sri Lankan conflict then

moves on to the initial reconstruction of the north of the country. It then addresses the

problem of SALW in Sri Lanka in relation to questions of disarmament, demobilisation,

crime and violence. The report then focuses on internally displaced people (IDPs) before

looking at female-headed households, vulnerable women and livelihood strategies. It ends

with some recommendations for action.

2. Outline of the Sri Lankan conflict

Sri Lanka has an ethnically diverse population of about 17.5 million. The ethnic breakdown

of the population is around 74.6 per cent Sinhalese, 12.6 per cent Sri Lankan Tamil, 7.4 per

cent Muslim, 5.5 per cent Indian Tamil, with other small minorities.12 However, Chris Smith

claims that as a result of the war Tamils now make up only 8 per cent of the population.13

Sinhalese are largely Buddhist and Tamils Hindu, both with a Christian minority. Since the

late 1970s ethnically Tamil groups have been fighting against the predominantly Sinhala-Buddhist state (and Sinhalese and Muslim civilians) for an independent state in the north and

east of Sri Lanka; the war is taken as beginning in 1983. The most powerful militant Tamil

separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or the Tigers), attained

hegemony in the mid-1980s by destroying its competitors. It is well known that women have

7 OSullivan in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001b, p. 192.8 Sarvananthan, 2003b.9 Sarvananthan, 2003b.10 OSullivan in Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001b, pp. 198-199.11 Sarvananthan, 2003b, p. 4.12 Samuel, 2001, p. 185. Indian Tamils are the descendents of south Indians brought over as indentured labour by the

British to work British-owned plantations in the central hills in the mid-nineteenth century. Muslims are considered aseparate ethnic group in Sri Lanka.13 Smith, 2003, p. 3.

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been pivotally involved as combatants in the Tamil groups, particularly in the LTTE. In 1983

the organisation founded a special section for women called the Vituthalai Pulikal Munani

(Womens Front of the Liberation Tigers) and they began battle training in Tamil Nadu

(India) in 1985, also being trained in Jaffna (Sri Lanka) from 1987. Their first battle was

against the Sri Lankan military in 1986. By 1989 this unit had its own leadership structure.14

From the mid-1980s the Tigers have aggressively recruited women into their fighting cadresand after 1990 the proportion of female fighters increased rapidly. The womens military

wing is a well-organised and highly disciplined force. The LTTEs naval force, the Sea

Tigers, and its suicide squad, the Black Tigers, contain large numbers of women. The number

of female combatants is naturally a military secret but estimates vary between about 15-20 per

cent to one third of their core combat strength. At least 65,000 people have died as a result of

the conflict between Tamil groups and the Sri Lankan state, two-thirds of whom were

civilians, and hundreds of thousands more have been displaced or left the country as refugees

and migrants. An agreement on a ceasefire was signed in February 2002 between the Sri

Lankan Government and the LTTE and negotiations on a political settlement began, mediated

by the Norwegian Government. Although at present the ceasefire is largely holding between

the state military and the LTTE, political negotiations are stalled and currently on hold. Thelatest election of a government believed by many to be less committed to peace than its

predecessor has caused some pessimism about the prospects of lasting peace. The peace

process has been further challenged by serious internal divisions within the Sri Lankan

Government since November 2003 and, since March 2004, violent disputes between the

LTTEs northern leadership and dissenting elements of its eastern faction. In addition, there

is currently serious ongoing political violence in the east. In July 2004 a further significant

threat to the ceasefire was presented by a female suicide bomber in Colombo, who killed four

policemen as well as herself. The LTTE deny culpability but are widely believed to have

been responsible.

Alongside the war in the northeast, it is important to note that Sri Lanka has also been

wracked by two other periods of armed violence in recent history: the insurrections against

the state by the JVP in 1971 and, much more significantly, 1987-89. Although it is frequently

described simply as an extremist Sinhala nationalist organisation, in reality the JVP appears to

have been more like an authoritarian socialist group that used appeals to Sinhala nationalism

in an instrumental fashion to garner mass support, and in fact after the July 1983 anti-Tamil

riots a number of its members left because of their objections to the increasingly Sinhala

nationalist bent of the party.15

Sri Lanka did not have a state military until 1971, when the

government created one and began using it internally in response to the JVP uprising.16

The 1987-89 insurrection is remembered as the most violent period in the history of thesouthern areas of independent Sri Lanka. The JVP took advantage of the governments

preoccupation with the war in the north, waiting for crises to occur there to attack the army

from behind, thus illustrating how armed violence can indirectly as well as directly stimulate

further armed violence. This second JVP insurrection was eventually brutally crushed by the

Sri Lankan state forces but at least 40,000 people died at the hands of both the JVP and the

state, though some maintain the number was even higher. The JVP reformed in 1998, now

claiming to be a legitimate, democratic political party that will not use violence to achieve its

aims. It remains, however, opposed to the peace process.

14 Ann, 1993.15 Chandraprema, 1991.16 Chenoy, 1998.

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3. Initial reconstruction in the North

Smith suggests that although the A9 highway from the south of Sri Lanka up to Jaffna is now

open as a result of the ceasefire, there is insufficient infrastructure to transport enough aid and

it will take a very long time and great effort to deliver humanitarian assistance to the neediest

areas in Jaffna. The duration of the war and intensity of fighting in the Jaffna region has hada significant effect on human security.

17Further, Sarvananthan contends that not many new

productive activities have begun in the north-east since the ceasefire, despite fast rising trade

with other parts of the country. He suggests that the major non-market impediments to

economic growth in the north-east are the demarcation of high security zones by the Sri

Lankan security forces, LTTE taxation of local populations and those travelling to the north,

and the general political and economic uncertainty.18

However, my observations in the north

of the country in June 2004 indicate that many positive changes have occurred since the early

post-ceasefire period, the last time I was there:

Kilinochchi, the LTTEs stronghold in the northern Vanni area, is today hummingwith construction and industry;

Many businesses in Kilinochchi now have generator-powered electricity for part of theday and a government electricity supply is expected in the next few months;

The A9 highway has been repaired with the help of World Bank money;

The impact of the lifting of the government embargo on all manner of goods travellinginto the Vanni, removed as a result of the ceasefire, is witnessed in the increased type

and number of goods and services now available in the area;

There appears to have been a significant re-growth of vegetation in the north, whichwas seriously affected by deforestation in the war.

Jaffna, too, shows signs of regeneration but the change is less stark than in Kilinochchi. Oneclearly visible (and welcome) development, however, was in the return of many Muslims and

Muslim businesses to Jaffna Muslims were forced out of the north in 1990 by the LTTE,

leading to the displacement of almost 100,000 Muslims and the loss of their livelihoods.19

However, beneath the surface many problems remain, unemployment and lack of livelihood

opportunities being enormously significant. In the rural areas near Kilinochchi most people

still live in desperate poverty, the majority without electricity or running water. Many

families living in the Vanni were displaced from the Jaffna peninsula in the 1990s and have

lost land, family members and access to their traditional occupations. The LTTEs business

success is probably as significant as its military efficiency; the organisation owns and operates

restaurants, small shops and businesses, and petrol stations all over the world, including

within Sri Lanka itself. Within the Vanni area the LTTE is probably the largest employer andthe majority of businesses in LTTE-controlled areas are run by the organisation, with varying

degrees of formal connection. One of the most-frequented restaurants in Kilinochchi, for

example, is LTTE-run and the vast majority of its staff are very young ex-LTTE members,

released after serving their required four years on the understanding that should war break out

again they will return to fight for the LTTE. This makes true demobilisation and reintegration

elusive for these ex-combatants yet this may be the only chance they have at leaving the

organisation. The LTTE, problematically, remains their main potential source of livelihood

even after they have left armed activities.

17 Smith, 2003, p. 27.18 Sarvananthan, 2003a.19 Silva in Mayer et al., 2003.

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4. Small arms and light weapons: disarmament, demobilisation,crime and violence

In the wake of the February 2002 ceasefire between the Sri Lankan Government and the

LTTE, combatants on both sides of the conflict have been leaving their military positions and

attempting to return to civilian life. The question of their disarmament, demobilisation and

reintegration into society is one of the most significant political and developmental issues

currently facing Sri Lanka. Despite the uncertain nature of the current situation and the lack

of a political settlement, much of the Sinhalese public believes that the war against the LTTE

has been won and that the decommissioning of LTTE weapons should begin as soon as

possible. However, the LTTE appears to have no short-term or even longer-term intention of

decommissioning its weapons or demobilising its cadres.20

Indeed the organisations de facto

police force, the Eelam Police, is actively recruiting and in June 2004 local people in

Kilinochchi told me that the Eelam Police pay a good wage, much better than they are likely

to get working for the state. Female police officers are highly visible in the Kilinochchi area.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has noted that demobilisation ofarmed groups is only possible when there is some measure of disarmament. Similarly, the

success of demobilization efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former

combatants and their integration into civilian life or a restructured army. Disarmament (and

demobilisation and reintegration) often has a symbolic and political importance beyond the

sum of its parts.21

The issue of weapons decommissioning is a vital element in the politics of

peace processes and this is no less the case in Sri Lanka, though as yet decommissioning has

not rated very highly on the political agenda or in reconstruction and development efforts.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is about to launch a reintegration

programme for a limited number of ex-combatants and their families from both sides of the

conflict (50 per cent state forces and 50 per cent LTTE), intended as a pilot for a larger futureprogramme should a political settlement be achieved.

22This programme is highly unusual, if

not unique for the IOM, in that it is being launched before a final or lasting political

settlement has been reached and also in that no real prior progress has been made on

disarmament. IOM views it as important to run the programme now in order to support the

ongoing peace process, since vulnerable groups could pose a destabilising threat to the

process. On the government side the IOM programme works with wounded ex-combatants,

recently retired combatants, and war widows. The majority of LTTE participants in the

programme are wounded rather than retired and the IOM is negotiating with the Tigers over

whether they will give permission to absorb retired combatants. This is a contentious issue

for the LTTE because of its history of being constantly ready to return to war if necessary and

its subsequent hold on ex-combatants who are still physically able. It is particularlyproblematic at the moment given the situation in the east, with many LTTE members

spontaneously leaving due to the internal organisational split and, in particular, many child

ex-soldiers now under the care of the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF). The IOM

would like to include people from those categories in the programme but cannot unless the

LTTE gives them official release papers, which they are unwilling to do. Similarly, on the

government side the IOM wants to include army deserters, especially important given the

security risk they pose, but the army is reluctant to agree to this despite support from some

20 Smith, 2003, p. 4.21 UNDP, 2002b, p. 4.22 Interview with Shantha Kulasekera, National Programme Officer, International Organisation for Migration (IOM),Colombo, June 2004. The programme is known as Reclaim Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Sri Lanka through

Assistance and Information Management.

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Sri Lanka to take action on SALW issues and the proposal is currently being heard in

parliament.35

Smith suggests that the government and security forces face a significant challenge in

ensuring that the weapons that once fuelled conflict between the government and the LTTE

do not come to feed other conflicts across the country, such as a violent resurgence of the[JVP].

36However, what he does not explicitly address is the vital importance of examining

the impact that the proliferation and availability of arms may be having on rates of inter-

personal violence, especially domestic violence and sexual crimes (though he does note

domestic violence is one of the types of violence that has increased countrywide). Evidence

from other contexts suggests that in the post-conflict era, the wartime proliferation of small

arms and light weapons contributes to a rise in levels of domestic violence against women,

particularly (though not restricted to) incidents involving small arms. Political violence

encouraged or supported in the context of war is transformed into interpersonal violence in

peacetime.37

Data in this area appears to be lacking in Sri Lanka and is vitally needed. The

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is now trying to address the

problem of gender-based and sexual violence and is attempting to build local capacities in thisarea, involving hospitals and the police in training.

38There is likely to be a high rate of

domestic violence in the conflict zones and more action needs to be taken in this area. Oxfam

apparently does some work in the area of domestic violence in the east, as do local NGOs

such as Suriya Womens Development Centre in Batticaloa, but there are no specific

programmes by UK government agencies.39

While in Colombo I saw a call for applications

for an interagency training seminar for humanitarian workers on gender-based violence, run

by the Gender-Based Violence Global Technical Support Project of the Reproductive Health

Response in Conflict Consortium, which is a small positive sign. The fact that so little has

been established in the way of responding to sexual violence is extremely worrisome given

the vulnerability of Tamil women in the conflict zones throughout the war to sexual attacks by

the Sri Lankan military and police and the Indian Peacekeeping Force (present 1988-1990).

Sexual violence against Tamil women has, in fact, been a motivating factor for women to

enlist in the LTTE.40

5. Internally Displaced People

Smith contends that the duration of the war has had a gradual but discernible impact upon

already vulnerable groups and upon development. From the IDP camps in the Jaffna

peninsula to the Middle East employment recruitment offices in Colombo, there is barely a

(poor) family in the country that remains untouched by the war.41 During the Sri Lankan war

many civilians have been forced to leave their homes and towns or villages and have becomeinternally displaced people

42, living in extreme poverty and insecurity. Over the course of the

conflict more than 800,000 Tamils were displaced within Sri Lanka, over 84,000 sought

refuge in India and hundreds of thousands more in other parts of the world, making up one of

the worlds largest IDP populations and one of the western worlds largest groups of asylum

35 Interview with Steve Ainsworth, First Secretary (Development Advisor), British High Commission, Colombo, June 2004.36 Smith, 2003, p. viii.37 Farr and Cukier in BICC, 2002.38 Interview with Jae Park, Associate Field Officer (Protection), UNHCR Satellite Office, Kilinochchi, June 2004.39 Interview with Steve Ainsworth, British High Commission.40 Interviews with 14 female LTTE members and ex-members, August and September 2002.41 Smith 2003, p. 2.42 IDP figures given here are from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which limits its statistics to

those whom the UNHCR extends protection or assistance to.

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seekers.43

In all, over 1.5 million Sri Lankans have been uprooted by the civil war.44

For

IDPs without recourse to family support elsewhere and without the opportunity to migrate

abroad, camps (welfare centres) became the only option. Many IDPs have been displaced

for over a decade. Poverty in the camps is often severe, residents suffer health problems and

their basic needs are often not met. In July 2002, before the largest waves of spontaneous

returns of IDPs after the ceasefire, there were an estimated 175,000 IDPs living in welfarecentres.

45In 2002 well over 250,000 IDPs spontaneously returned to their home areas and

several hundred returnees from Tamil Nadu, India, spontaneously returned across the Palk

Straits.46

In 2003, 76,722 IDPs returned to their places of origin, which brought the number

of spontaneous returns since the signing of the ceasefire to 345,734.47

By the end of the third

quarter of 2004 there were still 358,800 IDPs in Sri Lanka.48

At the end of 2003 there

remained 61,000 Tamil refugees in India49

and at the present moment there are still

approximately 122,000 Sri Lankan refugees around the world (including those in India).50

The main bulk of the IDP population live in the Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula, which have

been particularly badly impacted by the war. Malnutrition, particularly in children, is

common due to the war and the governments economic embargo (now lifted) against thetransport of numerous basic goods, foods and medical supplies to the rebel-held areas in the

north-east. UNICEF figures from 2003 suggest that in the Jaffna peninsula around 137,814

people are displaced of a population of 502,356. Of these, 17,669 people live in 144 welfare

centres.51

The economic marginalisation of the area as a result of the war, the widespread

exodus and displacement of skilled workers and educated people, and the huge devastation

caused to the infrastructure has had significant impacts in terms of poverty. Within the IDP

camps access to enough employment to sustain the population has been sporadic, food and

health care are significant problems and maintaining good standards of education has been

very difficult. IDPs in the camps around Jaffna generally fall into the poorest category of

people, who spend 80 per cent of their money on food but only acquire 80 per cent of the

food intake required to prevent malnutrition.52 There has been a clear fall in education

quality and output in Jaffna in recent years and there is a shortage of primary and English

school teachers, especially in rural areas. Schools are ill-equipped and some classes are held

in rough corrugated iron structures. The situation is similar in the Vanni region, which has

also suffered disproportionately due to the war and its position as the LTTEs military

headquarters; real and immediately visible poverty and suffering is clear in the Vanni. The

health sector is in similar disarray and in rural areas there are now almost no medical or

paramedical personnel.

In the east the population is more ethnically mixed than the Jaffna peninsula and it is an area

of serious ethnic tension. Many Tamils fled the region, leaving behind businesses and farms.Muslim traders have filled the gaps, exacerbating tensions between Tamils and Muslims, and

with the return of Tamils to the area there will be more disputes over land ownership.

Correspondingly there continues to be an ongoing problem with Muslims in the east feeling

marginalised and ignored in the peace process. The Trincomalee district has a number of IDP

43 UNHCR, 2003b and UNHCR, 2004a.44 UNHCR, 2003c.45 UNDP, 2002a.46 UNHCR, 2002, p. 334.47 UNHCR, 2003a, p. 360.48 Christian Oxenboll, Associate Statistician, Population Data Unit, UNHCR Geneva. Email to the author, 1 November 2004.49 UNHCR, 2004b, p. 10.50 Christian Oxenboll, UNHCR Geneva, email to the author.51 UNICEF, cited in Smith, 2003, p. 23.52 Smith, 2003, p. 25.

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camps but the inhabitants have a much more strained relationship with the security forces than

seems to be the case in Jaffna, and they are subject to recurrent beatings and harassment and

restrictions on their movements. Relations with local people are also tense. With the

restoration of some farmland in the area there is, however, a source of employment for IDPs

for part of the year and the World Food Programme provides rations in times of under- and

unemployment.53

There are also a large number of both widows and orphans in the area, whoconstitute groups particularly in need of assistance. In the camps near Batticaloa harassment

by the security forces seems to have stopped and IDPs have better nutrition and health than

their Jaffna counterparts. Some work in local rice mills and in agriculture but again the work

is seasonal. In the Batticaloa area as a whole domestic violence, alcohol abuse and violent

crime is high.54

Since March 2004 violent disputes between the LTTEs northern leadership

and dissenting elements of its eastern faction have led to a marked increase in political

violence and assassinations in the east, particularly in the Batticaloa area where large sections

of land are under the control of the LTTE, and a climate of fear and paranoia.55

Existing research on women and gender relations in IDP camps suggests womens resilience,

their capacity for physical and mental survival, their flexibility, and their potential toreconstruct their lives in conditions that reinforced their dependency.

56Joke Schrijvers

argues that on the whole the day-to-day continuation of life in the camps appeared to depend

more on the strengths of the women than on the men. Many Tamil IDP women she spoke to

believed that women, who experienced lower status than men anyway within their caste and

class circles, were already used to experiencing dependency and restriction on their lives and

thus could cope with displaced camp life more easily than the men in some ways the men

had lost more than the women in terms of purpose, status and self-esteem.

Women have experienced more continuity than men in regard to their normal gender tasks

(household work) and identity, but have also changed gender relations as well many women

she met were working in paid employment outside the camps, when the pass system allowed

them to leave. Many men, in contrast, were depressed and/or alcohol or drug dependent.57

Potentially empowering moves towards agency exercised by women have often run up against

the disempowerment evident within some displaced men, resulting in resistance to these

changes in women by some men who perceive their past control over decision-making and so

forth being eroded by women.58

High caste Tamil men, in particular, view women working

as an affront to their egos.59

Selvy Thiruchandran, in fact, contends that it is now almost

exclusively the poorest of the poor who live in the IDP camps, the lower classes and castes,

and women of these classes and castes have always had a greater degree of agency and

empowerment than those from higher classes and castes.60

In this sense the experiences of

women in the IDP camps may not present quite such a dramatic break with the past as someobservers have believed, though the resistance of some men to womens initiatives does still

suggest societal changes. Schrijvers, for example, met a few women from more affluent and

protected families and backgrounds who had taken up paid work for the first time ever,

stretching and even transgressing the strict boundaries of their gendered, caste- and class-

determined identities.61

In terms of Muslim IDPs, changes in gender roles have also been

53 Smith, 2003, pp. 28-30.54 Smith, 2003, p. 31.55 Conversations with Sri Lankans, aid workers, and UN staff, June 2004.56 Schrijvers, 1999, p. 323.57 Schrijvers 1999, pp. 323-324. See also Elek, 2003.58 Elek, 2003, pp. 55-58.59 NGO worker quoted in Elek, 2003, p. 57.60 Interview with Selvy Thiruchandran, Director, Womens Education and Research Centre, Colombo, June 2004.61 Schrijvers, 1999, p. 325.

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visible. Displaced Muslim women in Puttalam district, the destination of a vast influx of

Muslim IDPs after their exile from the north by the LTTE in 1990, have broken tradition by

taking on more responsibility for things that were previously male domains new tasks and

jobs, engaging in waged labour, moving more freely and so on.62

The steady flow to the north and east of returning IDPs, refugees and migrants is a significantissue affecting Sri Lankas potential for development. The pressures on government services

and UN and aid agency assistance for returnees are significant. Many returnees have come

from refugee camps in India, landing illegally at Mannar and attempting to return to their land

and homes on their own initiative, where water, sanitary and other services and infrastructure

may be inadequate or non-existent and the prospects for income generation are grim. Land

disputes are also likely, with the length of time many people have been away. In the latter

part of 2002 and early part of 2003 the primary focus of UNHCR in the north-east was on

returnees, who are immediately provided with non-relief kits including items such as a plastic

sheet to be used as a roof, cooking utensils, buckets, mosquito nets, clothing and so on. After

their initial arrival UNHCR works on their individual needs, and works with NGOs to target

particular villages that are the site of a large number of returns, addressing the need for wells,toilets, schools, emergency housing and so on.

63One of the problems faced by UN agencies

in terms of development in the north-east of Sri Lanka is that because there is as yet only a

ceasefire, not a political agreement, many development actors have been very slow to step in.

This is particularly a problem in areas controlled by the LTTE, since such organisations are

especially reluctant to engage with them. At the same time, the corresponding problem is that

in LTTE areas the Tigers control everything and it is impossible to implement any programme

without going through the LTTE.64

The recurring dilemma in war-torn developing countries

of when to start reconstruction and development in the absence of a stable peace is

exacerbated in the Sri Lankan case by the fact that the rebel group actually controls certain

areas of land.

One of the biggest problems faced by returnees is that of anti-personnel landmines, despite the

partial de-mining done so far. The Sri Lankan army, the LTTE and the Indian Peacekeeping

Force (during its brief period in Sri Lanka) have all laid their own landmines and an estimated

five per cent of the population in the north-east have hand and foot disabilities as a result of

landmines. The LTTE is reportedly clearing its own landmines in areas under its control and

both the LTTE and the army are cooperating with the de-mining organisations. Interestingly,

it seems that the LTTEs home-made Johnny mines are powered by ordinary batteries and

are no threat once the batteries have run down, though there are many more regular landmines

than Johnny mines. The Valikalam, Themmarachchi and Chavakachcheri areas of the

Jaffna peninsula are the most potentially dangerous and this will become an increasingproblem as more and more IDPs return home.65

In August 2002 I travelled with a Tamil

family back to their homes in Chavakachcheri, which they abandoned almost 20 years ago to

flee the country. In light of the ceasefire they, as so many Tamil expatriates, were returning

for the first time to assess the damage to their ancestral homes. Sadly their houses had been

severely shelled and had at various points been occupied by the Sri Lankan army, according

to local villagers who had remained in the area. The buildings are now no more than ruined

shells, the well may be contaminated and the area is still riddled with mines, making any

attempt at rebuilding or resettling extremely dangerous. This particular family is lucky

62 Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam, 2002.63 Interview with Jae Park, UNHCR.64 Interview with Jae Park, UNHCR.65 Smith, 2003, p. 27.

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enough to have the financial resources to remain in the UK, though the older generation

desires to return to Chavakachcheri, but many other families are not so lucky and have no

choice but to live near mined areas. Although de-mining has begun there is still a long way to

go. Informal discussions in 2002 with personnel working for various de-mining organisations

in Jaffna also suggest that there is a certain element of turf war and problems with dividing

up tasks between some of the different de-mining groups, which is nothing but a hindrance inthe essential de-mining work needed in the region.

It is also important to recognise that the issue of displacement is one that illustrates the

multidirectional nature of the link between armed violence specifically, armed conflict

and poverty. While the armed violence has led directly to displacement for hundreds of

thousands of people, almost invariably leading to impoverishment, the experience of

displacement and poverty has in turn partially contributed to the continuation of the conflict

and therefore the armed violence. While researching female combatants in the LTTE in 2002,

one of the themes to emerge from my interviews with members and ex-members as being a

motivation to enlist in the LTTE was the experience of displacement and the attendant

problems of a loss of or decrease in entitlements such as access to education and a sustainablelivelihood. Follow-up research in 2004 again revealed this theme. Kalayvily, currently LTTE

Womens Political Wing leader for Jaffna, comes from a Jaffna fishing family. She was a

primary school teacher and was 21 when she was displaced with her family to the Vanni. She

reported experiencing poverty in the Vanni, with no steady livelihood, which contributed to

her decision to join the LTTE at the age of 22.66

However, it is of course not only displacement that has led to poverty. Poverty in general is a

motivating factor for many LTTE members. Two ex-LTTE members I interviewed from the

Kilinochchi area both come from desperately poor families plagued by health problems.

Keeras father is dead and her mother worked as a labourer to try and support the family.

Keeras younger brother was born physically and mentally disabled and it has been extremely

difficult for the family to make ends meet and care for him. Two of her sisters were LTTE

soldiers and died in battle. Keera left school at 14 to work ploughing fields and at 16 she

enlisted in the LTTE in the belief that her family would be taken care of. She is 28 now and

left the LTTE in 1999 to care for her mother, who had internal injuries. She and her older

brother, also an ex-LTTE member, are the main providers for the family now but Keera has a

piece of shell in her head from battle, which means her employment potential is restricted due

to her headaches, fainting, and inability to work in the hot sun for long periods of time.67

Thangachi, also from a family of multiple LTTE members, left school at 13 to join the LTTE

because she did not want to be a burden on her family and she believed the LTTE would look

after them. One of her sisters, too, was an LTTE soldier killed in battle. Her father used towork in the paddy fields but after being beaten by the army he got a blood clot in his stomach,

which the family believe caused him to develop cancer. Her mother has a skin disease

preventing her from going outside in the sun or near fire so she cannot work outside the home.

Thangachi reported being so poor as a child that after the long hot walk to school each day

she always arrived dirty and smelly, for which she was punished by the teachers and teased by

the other children. The shame she experienced because of this contributed to her wanting to

leave and join the LTTE. She is 23 now and left the LTTE in 2000. Today, Thangachi and

Keera work together on casual hire jobs as labourers, painters, masons, and roofers. They

earn reasonable money when employed but the work is sporadic and both are hampered by

health problems. Thangachi, too, is disabled as a result of battle she has a serious leg injury

66 Interview with Kalayvily (LTTE name), in Tamil with interpreter, Jaffna, June 2004.67 Interview with Keera (pseudonym), in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochchi, June 2004.

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that needs an operation but the family cannot afford the recovery time she would need without

her source of income. Her injury impedes how long she can stand for at a time and how long

she can bicycle for, her only form of transport. She and her brother are also the sole providers

in her family.68

6. Female-headed households, vulnerable women and livelihoodstrategies

With the large numbers of men killed or lost through migration or abandonment throughout

the war there has been a significant increase in female-headed households. The phrase

female-headed households is in common usage within development literature and therefore

is used here for clarity, but it is problematic as it implicitly assumes an autocratic normal

family model where the husband/father is the wage-earner and the wage-earner makes all

decisions. The increase in female-headed households is seen primarily in the Tamil

communities in the north-east.

69

Some Sinhalese communities in the south also have greaternumbers of female-headed households today, as a result of the violent insurrection staged by

the JVP in 1987-89.70

In the Sri Lankan context this has serious and gendered implications

for families, communities and society more broadly. I went to the north assuming that the

primary impact of this would be witnessed in the loss of income to female-headed

households, given the societal expectation that a familys main breadwinner will be a man.

However, what was revealed to perhaps be more significant than this is the reaction of

communities to female-headed households, at least in the Tamil areas. Tamil culture accords

a very low status to widows, and women living alone without a male family member are

looked upon with suspicion and suffer various forms of social exclusion. UNHCR staff in

Kilinochchi said that, in their opinion, the biggest problem for widows trying to support

themselves and their children is the fact that even if they do manage to find some source ofincome generation, people in their communities often assume that this money must come

from prostitution.

One organisation in the north-east concerned with womens needs is an NGO called the

Centre for Womens Development. It is funded in part from its own industries, in part by an

ex-patriate Tamil Womens Organisation, and in part by international NGOs and UN

agencies. Its branch in Kilinochchi is the only NGO or intergovernmental organisation in the

area specifically and solely concerned with women. The Centre was founded in 1990 and

assists women affected by the war and other women in need. It runs five different centres in

the north-east (currently housing almost 400 people in total): for women psychologically

disturbed by the war, widowed women, rape survivors, mentally handicapped women, IDPwomen whose husbands have abandoned them or died, orphans (both girls and boys) and

victims of child labour. The Centre operates various small industries making rope and

palmyrah products, pappadums, and a poultry farm. The women living in the centres work in

these industries and their children attend school, with the end goal being for the women (those

who are mentally and physically able) to move out and support themselves and their children.

The Centre also has a Vocational Training Centre, which can be used by any women and

teaches a wide variety of skills, including those not traditionally expected of women. As well

as the women living in the centres, the Centre for Womens Development also visits and

assists around 400 widows in the Kilinochchi area, advising them on how to generate income,

68 Interview with Thangachi (pseudonym), in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochchi, June 2004.69 see Thiruchandran, 1999.70 see Perera, 1999.

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how to save some of their earnings and so on. It has also reunited some separated IDP

husbands and wives, keeping a close eye on the reunited couples, and taken other husbands to

court to get them to pay support money to their ex-wives and children.71

The Centre for Womens Development has had many success stories, one of whom I met and

interviewed. Ranchny Radhakrisnan arrived in Kilinochchi with her family in 1990, as IDPsfrom Karaingar Island off the Jaffna peninsula. Her father died in 1984 and her mother was

the head of their household. At that time the family had enough money to purchase land, start

paddy fields and grow vegetables. Ranchny was married at 18 and widowed at 20 in 1994,

while pregnant, when her husband disappeared after being taken in by the army. After her

mother died in 1998 Ranchnys sister and her husband took over the land to work and

Ranchny went to the Centre for Womens Development for assistance. The Centre helped

Ranchny to become trained in motorbike, bicycle and sewing machine repair while her son

boarded at an orphanage for a year. She was the first woman at the Centre to learn these

skills, normally seen as mens work, and with financial support from the Centre she

established her own bicycle and motorcycle repair shop in a rural area. Initially she

encountered resistance from locals, who felt it was not an appropriate job for a woman, andharassment from men who saw her, as a lone woman, as fair game.

72Despite this, she

ultimately managed to establish herself in her community and gain acceptance, she has steady

work and is supporting her sons education. She hopes to one day buy out the shop herself

and is saving for that. Others have been less successful. There are some villages in the north

and east, particularly badly affected by war violence, which are almost entirely composed of

female-headed households. I wanted to visit one of these villages in the Pooneryn area to talk

to women about their experiences of the war and how they are sustaining themselves and their

families. In the village in Pooneryn that I was told about, some of the women are war widows

but many had been living in de facto marriages with IDP men who later abandoned them.

The women are in a very vulnerable position and are a politically contentious issue at the

local level, which unfortunately meant that I was unable to visit the village as this would have

caused problems for local UN staff with the LTTE.73

One of the realities of the LTTE-controlled areas is that the organisation is involved in every

aspect of life there, from the shops and businesses they own right up to their parallel political,

legal and judicial structures. As previously noted, this has been problematic from the point of

view of governments and NGOs. In the Kilinochchi area, for example, when working on any

programmes or policies regarding reconstruction and development, the UN and all other

agencies have to work through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) which is

essentially the development wing of the LTTE. TRO has done some excellent and

commendable work with local communities and seems to have a good record of employing,assisting and training women, which is unsurprising given the LTTEs stated commitment to

feminism. I visited the Rural Rehabilitation and Development Organisation in the

Kilinochchi area, which is a subsidiary of TRO and works providing micro-credit for

impoverished locals to start their own businesses and enterprises. All the staff are women,

including the head.

Despite TROs good work it is perhaps understandable that other actors are hesitant to engage

with them because of their links to the Tigers. The issue of orphanages illustrates the

71 Interview with Krishnakumar Suthrsini, Executive Director, and Mrs Kamala, Programme Director, Centre for Womens

Development, in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochchi, June 2004.72 Interview with Ranchny Radhakrisnan, in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochichi, June 2004.73 Unattributed interviews for the security of interviewees.

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ambivalences here. TRO runs five orphanages in the Kilinochchi area (and others elsewhere),

caring for around 1200 children in total. Some of the children were abandoned by their

parents, some are there because their families were too poor to care for them, some have

parents who disappeared, but most are war orphans whose parents died as a direct result of

the war.74

Some of the youngest children I met during a visit to one such orphanage,

Kurukulam, were orphaned at only one day old. Many of their fathers were fishermen, anextremely dangerous occupation during the war, and were killed by the Sri Lankan navy.

Other parents were killed when the army came to their homes or when they fled as displaced

people.75

Kurukulam Orphanage (primarily for girls but with some very small boys) seems to

have achieved a lot with very little. It was established in 1954 but has been run by the TRO

since 1991, funded by diaspora TRO branches. The children are clean, well-fed, lively and

active, are given affection by the staff and are educated both in ordinary local schools and

with supplementary lessons in the orphanage. Most of the young women study up to A

Levels and one was recently accepted to Jaffna University the second from the orphanage.

However, the other side of the issue is the concern of some people that orphanages that are

effectively LTTE-run may provide the Tigers with a ready pool of new combatants, should

the need arise. Certainly the LTTE has a history of recruitment drives at schools andconversations with local people suggest many Tamils are very aware of and concerned about

the vulnerability of children in both orphanages and schools to LTTE recruitment or forcible

conscription. This is a justifiable concern given the widespread use of child soldiers by the

Tigers.

7. Recommendations

Rather than providing any drawn out summary or conclusions here, some recommendations

are given for action on the part of the Sri Lankan government, intergovernmental

organisations, development agencies and NGOs.

Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants is a vitally important issue. In thedesign of further demobilisation and reintegration programmes, awkward and

potentially vulnerable categories of ex-combatants need to be targeted as well as those

more immediately visible: deserters from both the army and the LTTE, ex-members of

the Home Guards and the National Armed Reserve, and Tamil state-funded

paramilitary groups such as EPDP and TELO. Related to this is the problem of

increased rates of common crime which seems likely to be causally linked to the

availability of SALW and the lack of reintegration programmes and employment

opportunities. All these causes, therefore, need to be addressed. Reintegration programmes also need to address gendered issues in a more radical way

including, though not limited to, grappling with the needs of female ex-combatants in

an emancipatory way rather than reinforcing expected gender roles and inequalities.

The predicted high rates of domestic and sexual violence in the conflict zones needs tobe investigated by government and development agencies and greater action needs to

be taken to combat this violence, starting at a basic level with organised and

committed efforts by the police to record detailed and useful statistics on the incidence

of such violence. Existing local initiatives that combat domestic and sexual violence,

74 Interview with Mr Ravi, in Tamil with interpreter, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) Head Office, Kilinochchi,June 2004.75 Interview with Akila, in Tamil with interpreter, Kurukulam Childrens Home, Kilinochchi area, June 2004.

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such as Suriya Womens Development Centre in Batticaloa, should be supported and

funded.

The steps some IDP women have made and continue to make towards greater agencyand empowerment should be encouraged and supported by development agencies, but

ongoing dialogue with IDP men is a necessary part of this process to ensure that

women do not suffer a backlash from men in their own communities. Problems of social exclusion and stigma and lack of access to sustainable livelihoods

and other entitlements remain very real for lone women and female-headed

households in Sri Lanka. A more open and honest dialogue about these women, with

these women, is necessary if any progress is to be made. Organisations such as the

Centre for Womens Development that help women establish livelihoods, including

training them in unconventional skills, should be supported.

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Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna, Economic Imperative for Peace in Sri Lanka, Colombo:

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Selected interviews

Interview with Steve Ainsworth, First Secretary (Development Advisor), British High

Commission, Colombo, June 2004.

Interview with Akila, in Tamil with interpreter, Kurukulam Childrens Home, Kilinochchi

area, June 2004.

Interview with Kalayvily (LTTE name), LTTE Womens Political Wing leader for Jaffna, inTamil with interpreter, Jaffna, June 2004.

Interview with Keera (pseudonym), ex-LTTE combatant, in Tamil with interpreter,

Kilinochchi, June 2004.

Interview with Shantha Kulasekera, National Programme Officer, International Organisation

for Migration (IOM), Colombo, June 2004.

Interview with Jae Park, Associate Field Officer (Protection), UNHCR Satellite Office,


Interview with Ranchny Radhakrisnan, in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochichi, June 2004.

Interview with Mr Ravi, in Tamil with interpreter, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)

Head Office, Kilinochchi, June 2004.

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Interview with Krishnakumar Suthrsini, Executive Director, and Mrs Kamala, Programme

Director, Centre for Womens Development, in Tamil with interpreter, Kilinochchi,

June 2004.

Interview with Thangachi (pseudonym), ex-LTTE combatant, in Tamil with interpreter,


Interview with Selvy Thiruchandran, Director, Womens Education and Research Centre,Colombo, June 2004.

asia srilanka 2004

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