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Council Special Report No. 50November 2009

Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning

The United Statesin the New Asia


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The United States

in the New Asia


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Council Special Report No. 50

November 2009

Evan A. FeigenbaumRobert A. Manning

The United Statesin the New Asia


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The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think

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Foreword vii Acknowledgments ix

Council Special Report 1Introduction 3Form Over Function? 5Asia Resurgent 7Wake Up, America 10Dj Vu 12Back to First Principles 14

Rules to Live By 17Northeast Asia: Getting Serious 22And Southeast Asia? 26Conclusion 29

Endnotes 31About the Authors 33Advisory Committee 35

IIGG Mission Statement 36

Contents


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vii

No region o the world today is more dynamic than Asia. Across thecontinent, booming countries have built engines o economic growth

that have lited hundreds o millions out o poverty. Along with thiseconomic strength has come increased strategic importance, leading toAsias emergence as a principal center o global power in the twenty-rst century.

An essential question associated with Asias rise is how to build amultilateral ramework capable o eectively channeling the regionsenergies. Notwithstanding its economic and political advances, Asiaaces a range o challenges. Critical issues, such as the division o the

Korean Peninsula and the status o Taiwan, are unresolved. Linger-ing historical grievances persist between some o the regions majorpowers. And several countries ace enormous internal hurdles, rang-ing rom economic inequality to serious shortcomings in governance,that could produce scenarios capable o threatening regional stability.The task or policymakersboth in Asia and in other countries withinterests in the regionis to develop multilateral institutions that canhelp manage these challenges while acilitating urther economic and

political gains.In this Council Special Report, commissioned by CFRs Interna-tional Institutions and Global Governance program, Evan A. Feigen-baum and Robert A. Manning examine Asias regional architecture andconsider what it means or the United States. They identiy shortcom-ings in the regions existing multilateral mix and contend that this is notsimply an Asian concern. Instead, the United States must increase itsinvolvement in shaping Asian institutions in order to advance U.S. stra-tegic interests and protect the competitiveness o American rms.

To do this, the authors outline six principles or U.S. policy towardAsia as a whole and recommend particular policies toward Northeastand Southeast Asia. Among other steps, they urge the United States to

Foreword


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viii

maintain a strong presence at Asian meetings; avoid intractable secu-rity issues and ocus instead on topics ripe or cooperation; make use oad hoc groupings as well as ormal ones; and view some Asian institu-tions that exclude the United States as acceptable or even desirable, justas with the European Union.

The United States in the New Asia oers a rich analysis o Asias mul-tilateral landscape and makes a strong case or why it matters to theUnited States. The report also presents thoughtul recommendationsor how Washington can infuence this landscape in ways benecial toAmerican interests. The result is a document with important implica-tions or U.S. policy toward a region that promises to play a central role

in shaping the coming era o history.

Richard N. HaassPresidentCouncil on Foreign RelationsNovember 2009

Foreword


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ix

We are enormously grateul to the members o our advisory commit-tee, whose names are listed at the back o this report. They oered

trenchant critiques, historical perspective, a lesson or two in econom-ics, and much support. CFR President Richard N. Haass read an earlydrat o our paper and encouraged us to publish it as a Council SpecialReport. James M. Lindsay, CFRs director o studies, gave us advice andassistance throughout.

Daniel Michaeli provided extraordinary research assistance andhelpul critiques, and brought his wonderul enthusiasm to the project.We owe much to Patricia Dor and Lia C. Norton in Publications, and

to Lisa Shields, Leigh-Ann Krap, and Sarah Doolin in Communica-tions and Marketing.

This publication is part o CFRs International Institutions andGlobal Governance (IIGG) program and has been made possible by thegenerous support o the Robina Foundation. We are especially grateulto the IIGGs director, Stewart M. Patrick, an old colleague rom ourdays on the State Departments policy planning sta. We could not bemore delighted to be contributing to the IIGGs work.

Evan A. FeigenbaumRobert A. Manning

Acknowledgments


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Council Special Report


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3

Introduction

President Barack Obama heads to Singapore in November or the 2009Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation orum (APEC) summit. It will be

his rst oray into the arcane world o Asian multilateralism. And i hisadministration adopts a new approach, it could yet ashion a more sus-tainable role or the United States in a changing Asia.

For more than a decade, creating multilateral orums has rivaledbadminton as the leading indoor sport o Asian academics, think tanks,and governments. But the United States has mostly watched rom thesidelines as proposals multiply and Asians organize themselves into analphabet soup o new multilateral groups.

Most o these recent eorts have produced exceptionally modestresults. Symbolism aside, would Asia be any less secure without theAssociation o Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum?What about the Thai-sponsored Asian Cooperation Dialogue, whichincludes Bahrain and Bhutan but not the United States, or the misnamedEast Asia Summit, which includes India rom the subcontinent andNew Zealand rom Oceania? Would the security, economic, and envi-ronmental challenges o East Asia become any harder to address i these

orums ceased to exist?It is easy or Americans to dismiss such ventures as irrelevant in aregion populated by big powers, where bilateral alliances and ancientstrategic rivalries still loom large. That would be a mistake.

Yes, traditional balances o power endure in Asia. But there are atleast three reasons why U.S. decision-makers ought to take Asian archi-tecture seriously.

First, Asians themselves take architecture seriously and view multi-lateral institutions and agreements as essential to the development o

their region. Washingtons credibility in Asia, so important to a hosto U.S. interests, depends, as it has since 1945, on whether and how theUnited States adapts to Asian interests, judgments, and goals.


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4 The United States in the New Asia

Second, the United States might yet persuade Asians to ashion amore eective architecture in the utureone that will help secure itsinterests in the region.

Third, and not least, some multilateral institutions that exclude theUnited States have become the locus o economic and nancial trendsthat will increasingly disadvantage U.S. rms and work against U.S.objectives. Certain preerential trade agreements and nancial arrange-ments, as well as regionally based regulations and standards, threatenAmerican interests. And some o the new institutions created withoutU.S. involvement, notably ASEAN Plus Three,* hold the potential tomarginalize the United States in Asia over time.

For this reason, Americas traditional hub and spokes approachto the regionwith the United States as the hub, bilateral alliances asthe spokes, and multilateral institutions largely at the margins o U.S.policyis unsustainable. The United States will pay increasing costs toits interests, credibility, and infuence unless it acts to shape multilateraltrends in Asia.

China is becoming a locomotive or other Asian economies and liesat the center o the regions supply and production chains. But even at a

time o global nancial crisis, the United States continues to bring thegreatest capacity to the table on the greatest number o issues vital tothe uture o the region. Surveys show that pluralities o strategic elitesin Asia continue to view the United States as an essential strategic bal-ancer, vital to stability. And at least some o the boldest new propos-als or uture regional institutions, such as Australian prime ministerKevin Rudds proposal o a new Asia Pacic Community, incorpo-rate the United States precisely because Washington retains enduring

interests and oers unique capabilities vital to Asias uture.

Apurposeul multilateralism that pools the eorts o those with thegreatest capacity could make Asia a more prosperous and secure region.By leading with new ideas and much more vigorous economic engage-ment by the administration, the United States can help dene new rolesor itsel in a changing Asia.

*The ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philip-

pines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) plus China, Japan, and South Korea.


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5

Form Over Function?

Achieving this more purposeul multilateralism will require leader-ship by and among Asias big powers, as well as adjustments to how the

United States and others have sought to construct multilateral institu-tions in Asia. I groups are to emerge that enable those with the greatestcapacity to tackle specic problems, they will require a greater ocus onunction than orm.

But unortunately, orm, not unction, has been the principal drivero nearly all Asian multilateralism or more than a decade. Process hasbecome an end in itsel as Asians have ormed redundant group aterredundant group, oten with the same membership, closely overlap-

ping agendas, and precious little eect on regional or global problems.Senior ocials meet regularly through these institutions, and that is agood thing. But none o them has taken collective action in the ace oAsias most recent urgent problems. In the tsunami o 2004, the EastTimor crisis o 2006, the avian infuenza epidemic o 2007, and theMyanmar cyclone o 2008, regional institutions were overshadowed byad hoc international responses, requently led by the United States.

One o the ironies o modern Asia is that Southeast Asians built

most regional groups, even though the regions economic, military, anddiplomatic power resides overwhelmingly in Northeast Asia. Together,China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States compriseclose to 45 percent o global gross domestic product. They include theworlds three largest economies and hold some 50 percent o globaloreign exchange reserves. They are its largest consumers o energy,its largest emitters o greenhouse gases, and, with the possible excep-tion o France and India, the worlds leading proponents o civil nuclearpower. They include major nuclear weapons states, three o ve perma-

nent members o the United Nations Security Council, and some o theworlds principal sources o patents or technological innovation.


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How did this mismatch come about? How did the part o EastAsia with so much less economic, technological, and military capac-ity become the principal architect o nearly every recent eort to poolAsian power and capacity?

It is in part an accident o history. At the end o the Cold War, manyAsians worried the United States, which had underpinned securityin East Asia since 1945, would declare victory and simply go home.ASEANa collection o less powerul, Southeast Asian statescalledor dialogues to keep the major players, including the United States,engaged in the region. The major powers, rom Tokyo to Washing-ton, had no qualms about participating in ASEAN-centric dialogues

because such dialogues did not impinge on their interests.In act, creating such a balance in their relations with major powers

was precisely what ASEAN states had in mind. For ASEAN, balanc-ing the role o great powers to the northChina and Japanhad longprovided an important impetus to regional community building. Andconcern about China, in particular, helped drive the transormation oASEAN ater the end o the Vietnam War.

ASEAN ultimately survived the end o a threat that had provided a

source o its cohesion by bringing reunied Vietnam into the ASEANold. Put bluntly, ASEAN states believed they could more eectively bal-ance Chinas growing weight and infuence i Hanoi were saely insidethe ASEAN tent. Thus, as China sought to cherry-pick the regiondealing with issues bilaterally, so its size and power might tilt the playingeld in its avorASEAN countries sought to oster greater balance bydiscussing issues with China collectively. And in some areas, such asthe South China Sea, China accommodated their concerns, bolstering

ASEANs aith in its strategy.


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7

Asia Resurgent

But the prolieration o new multilateral groups in Asia must be viewedin another context as well. Since the end o the Cold War, the world has

been in transition rom an era dened by what it is not (the postColdWar world) to a world in which a label has yet to stick. The driving orceor an increasingly integrated world has been globalization, particularlyin East Asia, where trans-Pacic trade and investment mushroomedater the Vietnam War, and where intra-Asian trade and investmenttook o even aster ater 1991. Beore the recent economic crisis, intra-Asian trade had surpassed even that within the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA). Viewed in this light, the rise o new orums

coincides with Asias coming o age as the hub o the global economy.Indeed, Asias growing web o connections was especially reinorced

by the 199798 nancial crisis, which hit hardest in places like Indonesiaand Thailand. Across the region, elites came to view the United States asarrogant and aloo, dictating clichd solutions to skeptical Asians. Andthe United States, which had bailed out Mexico in 1994, reused to bailout Thailand just three years later, ueling perceptions that it neglectedSoutheast Asia. The United States continues to pay a price or those

perceptions to this day.

3

In this context, Asians groped or their own solutions. And, morethan any other actor, the traumas o 1997 and 1998 became an infectionpoint, spurring the most recent wave o pan-Asian multilateralism.

Those years were the turning pointthe moment that providedthe impetus or Asia-only approaches that exclude the United States,and which also spurred Asias turn away rom APEC in avor o theASEAN Plus Three, which has become the most coherent and substan-tive pan-Asian grouping. In that sense, the 199798 crisis comingled

with a long-standing desire among some Asians to orge cohesion outo their regions enormous dierences.


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It is worth comparing Europe and Asia in this regard, since the com-parison illuminates stark dierences and illustrates many o the lega-cies Asians have sought to overcome.

Europeans have been linked since the end o the Roman Empire by asense o the political and economic interrelationships among the vari-ous parts o their region, by Christianity as their dominant religion, andby their subsequent historical struggles with Islam. European collectiveidentity ound expression in the concept o the Holy Roman Empire,the Treaty o Westphalia, and the Concert o Vienna.

But a jumble o British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Ameri-can, and other colonialisms marked Asias modern history. And Asians

not only experienced dierent colonial regimes, but were divided byBuddhist, Conucian, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian religious tradi-tions as well.

Contemporary Asian regionalismand the desire to orge at leastsome pan-Asian cohesion out o these enormous dierenceshasound expression across Asia. Take postwar Japan, a U.S. ally with astrong sense o trans-Pacic identity. Even as it has nurtured a robustalliance with the United States, Japan and its bureaucracy have incu-

bated a variety o Asian regional ideas and ideologies, especially withrespect to Asian monetary integration. It was Japanese ocials whoin 1997 proposed the establishment o an Asian Monetary Fund, a pro-posal that helped give rise to todays Chiang Mai Initiative o bilateralswaps among the ASEAN Plus Three countries.5 And a new Japanesegovernment under Yukio Hatoyamathe rst nonLiberal DemocraticParty government in nearly two decadesnow envisions an East AsianCommunity, although its details are vague and probably ragmentary

even in Tokyo.

6

The responses that emerged rom the 199798 crisisAsia-onlybond unds, Asia-only currency swaps such as Chiang Mai, and Asia-only trade and investment pactsbuilt on existing concepts and rame-works. They built, too, on the regions principal existing multilateralentity, ASEAN. Todays ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit,and unctional ideas such as Chiang Mai have their origin in (or werelent new impetus by) this searing experience o 199798.

But pan-Asian solutions have had little utility in the midst o the

rst truly global nancial crisis. And, with the exception o the SixParty Talks on North Koreas nuclear program, most o the new orma-tions in the region are centered on process, not unction or measurable


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9Asia Resurgent

results, and are unwieldy, with too many actors who lack capacity andthus bring too little to the table on too many issues.

Contrast, or instance, what Japan and China can do to ght nancialcontagion with what Laos and Myanmar, or even Vietnam, can realisti-cally do. Sadly, the same is true o some o the regions leading trans-Pacic institutions: Is Asia better positioned to ght todays nancialcrisis because APEC has twenty-one member economies instead o justthe nine that are also in the Group o Twenty (G20)? Or is APEC stron-ger or including Papua New Guinea and Peru while excluding India,an Asian giant soon to be a top ve global economy that is increasinglyconnected to East Asia?

With or without the participation o the United States, regionalgroups in Asia duplicate one anothers roles. They have too many mem-bers, and mostly lack unctionality or a comprehensive template tomeasure and systematically assess results. They have developed habitso dialogue, but social interchange and political rhetoric dominate.Lingering suspicions and historical anxieties remain. Asian concernsabout maintaining ace have typically meant that the most sensi-tive topics, rom human rights to territorial disputes, are avoided. The

ASEAN Regional Forum is perhaps the best example o this. It is Asiasleading security orum, and yet all o the potential sources o majorconfictChina-Taiwan, Korea, India-Pakistan, and sensitive territo-rial disputesare o the table.

For groups to emerge that can solve real problems by pooling realcapabilities, unction will need to drive orm, not the other way around.And unction ultimately will need to be married to capacity, with thosethat have the greatest capacity playing the most signicant roles. For

the United States to lead, albeit as an increasingly equal partner, Wash-ington must demonstrate to Asians that a redened U.S. role will beimportant i a coherent and purposeul architecture or twenty-rstcentury Asia is to emerge rom the present stew.


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10

Wake Up, America

The reality to which the United States must adapt is that Asians areredening their region, trying to develop a sense o Asian identity

and enhance their clout in the global system. Some orums, includingpan-Asian groups that exclude the United States, are inevitable becausemeetings, seminars, summits, and ministerials are so deeply embroi-dered into the abric o East Asian international relations. But thesegroups now include a nascent pan-Asian trade and nancial architec-ture, with regionalism becoming one layer o the emerging multilay-ered international system. One challenge, then, is to ensure that Asiasregionalism is consistent with global norms and practices, including,

or instance, those o the World Trade Organization (WTO).The good news is that Americans have woken upalthough a ail-

ure by the Obama administration to reinvigorate trade policy, or aresurgent protectionism, could dramatically undermine Americasposition in Asia. At least a serious debate about architecture is nallyunder way in the United States, building in part on the experience othe Six Party Talks, one o the ew groups ormed with a well-denedand specic unctional agenda. Washington has at last acceded to the

ASEAN Treaty o Amity and Cooperation as its Asian partners urgedor years. And on a bipartisan basis, Americans advocate greater Asianinvolvement in the G20 and a role or Asia in the international nancialinstitutions commensurate with its economic and nancial weight.

Indeed, one outcome o the September 2009 Pittsburgh G20 is thatdecisions were taken that supplant the Group o Eight (G8), with theG20 becoming the new high table or managing the global economy.The G20 may thus become an important venue and interace or theUnited States with Asia, especially ater G20 members decided in Pitts-

burgh to increase the shares o developing countries in the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank by 5 percent and 3 percent,respectively. A prospective Asia-Pacic caucus in the G20 might oer


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11Wake Up, America

such a mechanism, allowing the United States to orge trans-Pacicapproaches to regional and global issues with China, Japan, India, SouthKorea, Indonesia, and Australia within the G20 context.

All o this is welcome, and part o a gradual but unmistakable reshap-ing o the global order o which Asia is an increasingly central compo-nent. But make no mistake: a more serious American attitude towardAsian architecture refects a change o approach, and a bipartisan oneat that.

For more than a decade, through two administrations, both Demo-cratic and Republican, the United States responded to Asian entreatiesthat it get serious about multilateralism by chanting we like APEC in

response to nearly every Asian proposal or a new group. But APEC,too, meets none o the crucial tests: it is large, unwieldy, and built aroundan ill-dened Pacic community that almost inexplicably includessmall Latin American economies, some o whose principal connectionto Asia is having a beach on the Pacic Ocean. Indeed, APEC, like manyo the new pan-Asian groups, mismatches countries o widely varyingsizes, endowments, and capabilities.

As a Pacic, but not Asian, power, the United States needs to base

its eorts on a hardheaded assessment o what tables it needs to sit atand when and where it can aord to step aside. The United States wasonce the preeminent power in Asia and in most respects remains thecritical extraregional actor and strategic balancer. But primacy no longermeans hegemony. One way to think about current trends is to recognizethat the postWorld War II primacy the United States enjoyed in Asiawas a historical anomaly. The reemergence o Japan, China, India, andAsia writ large returns Asia to the global stature it enjoyed in the prein-

dustrial period.Adapting American primacy to the realities o the new Asia meansaccepting that some pan-Asian orums are here to stay and will becomecentral to the regions political landscape. Americans must understandthat, just as the United States is not a member o the European Union,Washington does not need to sit in every room or join every conversa-tion to pursue its core interests in Asia. The policy challenge is to inte-grate some pan-Asian and trans-Pacic groupings while ensuring thatothers unction in complementary ways.


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12

Dj Vu

The bad news is that the most widely discussed ideas or reinvigoratingU.S. leadership replicate the very weaknesses o existing rameworks.

Americans and Asians increasingly share a tendency to promote over-lapping arrangements o groups, including groups o vague purpose,as, in themselves, a solution to Asias problems.

Take one idea: the proposed U.S.-China-Japan trilateral process,which Secretary o State Hillary Rodham Clinton endorsed in a February19, 2009, interview with JapansAsahi Shimbun, now temporarily stalledbut likely to begin eventually with trilateral policy planning talks.

The new group cuts out the other principal U.S. ally in Northeast

Asia, South Korea. It risks irrelevance i it ducks the hard issues, such ascompeting Chinese and Japanese territorial claims, Japanese concernsabout Chinas military posture, and Chinese suspicions about the U.S.-Japan alliance and missile deense. And it will create rustration or evenincreased tension i it does try to delve into such tough issues. Althoughthe new group will grope or purpose, it is not obvious what issues orcapabilities are unique to these three actors and do not already exist inother multilateral orums.

What is more, the new U.S.-China-Japan trilateral joins a conusingwelter o at least ve existing Asian trilaterals: U.S.-Japan-South Korea,China-Japan-South Korea, U.S.-Japan-Australia, China-India-Russia,and U.S.-Japan-India. The latter three countries conduct the Mala-bar military exercise, but some in New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washingtonadvocate expanding their cooperation through coordinated diplomaticand strategic eorts. And among some in the our capitals, lingeringsentiment remains or a prospective quadrilateral bringing the UnitedStates, Japan, Australia, and India together.

Is there a purpose to all this redundant and overlapping geometry?What is unique to any o these groups o three or our that wouldenable enduring solutions to the most pressing security, economic, or


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13Dj Vu

transnational problems? There are almost no issues o signicance thatany o these existing or proposed trilateral or quadrilateral groups canresolve working alone.

Start with energy security, which some have suggested is the mostpromising agenda item or a U.S.-China-Japan group, including the

Asahis respected editor in chie, Yoichi Funabashi.

Why not include Russia, potentially the major new source o regionaloil and gas supply? There is already an Asia-Pacic Partnership on CleanDevelopment and Climate that includes the United States, China,Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, as well as a China-initiatedenergy ministers dialogue among ve o these six countries, exclud-

ing only Australia. There is a rat o existing multinational technology-based initiatives that include most o these countries. And there is theMajor Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Changethat includes seventeen o the most important economies.

How about nancial coordination, another prospective subjector the U.S.-China-Japan (and China-Japan-South Korea) trilateral?Why would the United States, China, and Japan not include Europein a G4, given that the euro is an international reserve currency, albeit

on a smaller scale than the dollar, and the our largely dominate globalnance? Or why not coordinate instead among central bankers o theworlds largest reserve currency, the United States, and the largest hold-ers o dollar oreign exchange reserves, such as China, Japan, Singapore,and South Korea?


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14

Back to First Principles

A more eective and purposeul multilateralism would begin with les-sons learned. Neither Asia nor the world lacks a history o successul

multinational coordination. But especially since the end o the ColdWar, the most successul multilateral groups have been ad hoc and inor-mal, mobilizing specic coalitions to address specic issues, imminentproblems, and immediate crises.

Crisis has tended to be the catalyst o such successul multilateralventures. But Asias redundant existing mishmash refects an underly-ing assumption that dialogue and process are benecial in and o them-selves. Thus geometries have been created only to grope or missions

and unctions.At some level, this refects the liberal institutionalist view that well-

unctioning institutions in themselves can mediate problems and ambi-tions. But recent experience, certainly in Asia, suggests that institutionsare only as useul as the major powers are invested in them. The prevail-ing approach has devalued most o Asias existing architectures whiledoing little to oster a more eective one: in every crisis o recent years,the most eective global and regional problem-solving has been borne

o necessity and ocused on results.The most successul groups have assembled quick-moving countries,animated by the urgency o crises, that combine interest, resources, andexpertise. They eschew the big international security questions that sopreoccupy think tanks and academe. They are unencumbered by ritu-alistic institutions and attendant bureaucracies. And they ocus on dis-crete, oten imminent problems.

Consider the Tsunami Core Group, through which the United States,Japan, Australia, and India provided rapid and eective relie around

the Indian Ocean or nine days in 2004 and 2005. As ormer under-secretary o state Marc Grossman has put it, the Core Group was anorganization that never met in one o diplomacys storied cities, never


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15Back to First Principles

issued a communiqu, never created a secretariat, and took as one oits successes its own demise. Indeed, the group was eective preciselybecause it was ad hocits members could spend serious money todeploy capable and sustainable orces to deal with crises.

The same goes or the ad hoc response to avian infuenza, which dem-onstrates that the United States is hardly the only power in the Pacicattracted to ad hoc multilateralism. China played an important conven-ing role in organizing a 2006 pledging conerence and promoted inter-national coordination ater an initial U.S. call to action. Or take the 2008Myanmar cyclone, when India, Thailand, Malaysia, and others joinedthe United States in quickly organizing ad hoc relie mechanisms.

The lesson is straightorward: rst identiy the unctional problem,and then assemble the right group o players. Put dierently: avoidgeometry or its own sake. Form should ollow unction, and any mul-tilateral group in Asia is more likely to be eective i it assembles thosewith the greatest power and capacity and has a clear, agreed purpose.Heads o state, ministers, and senior ocials can and must meet on someregular basis, both regionally and globally. For this reason, having anoverarching orum where leaders come together on a regular basis can

be a useul oundation rom which to assemble eective mechanisms,whether ad hoc or more enduring. But durable and eective groupingsare more likely to emerge rom demonstrated common purpose thanrom abstract geometry.

It is not, to be sure, dicult to understand why and how so manyAsian institutions took orm, not unction, as their touchstone. ASEAN,whose members have historically lacked mutual trust or many reasons,is the best example. In the case o ASEAN, putting orm rst was not

an alternative to putting some useul unction rst, but an alternativeto the member states continued near isolation. Form helped ASEANcountries, or at least the original six, become comortable with oneanother and amiliar with nearby leaders.

But more than orty years have passed since ASEAN took shape.And whether in ASEAN or in Asia writ large, disparities o capacityand conficting objectives make it dicult to address unctional chal-lenges in large groups or most established institutions.

At a moment o historic transition there is good cause to reevalu-

ate existing institutions and modiy them as necessary to adjust tocurrent realities. At the global level, recent discussion o change in themanagement o the IMF is one positive example o this. There ought


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to be a sense o experimentation in eorts to ashion new orums. Butinnovation has been sadly lacking in both pan-Asian and Asia-Pacicgroupings. Instead, the region has seen a good deal o hollow process,driven by bureaucratic inertia or path dependence: groups are ormed,ritualistically meet, ritualistically issue statements, and then ritualisti-cally persist.


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17

Rules to Live By

Six rules o thumb could guide a more eective U.S. approach. Theycan be applied consistently, both to big ormal groups, such as APEC,

and to smaller ad hoc groups.

1. Show up. Until a new, more unctional approach emerges, the UnitedStates pays a price when the president or cabinet secretaries cancel tripsand skip regional gatherings. These gatherings achieve littleand thatis precisely why it is time or a new, more unctional approach to Asianarchitecture. But there are huge symbolic political costs to U.S. absencerom existing gatherings. Every skipped meeting reinorces doubts

about U.S. credibility, undermining Washingtons ability to promote adierent approach.

2. Avoid core security issues and ocus instead on what is practical. Why?Eorts to ashion a new security architecture or East Asia have gonenowhere or several reasons: Americas Asian alliances dissuade secu-rity competition, provide reassurance, and remain the backbone o EastAsian security; there is simply no basis or collective security among

China, Japan, and South Korea; and collective security is inconceivableprior to Korean reunication and a mutually satisactory resolution oTaiwans status.

This means the United States will want to continually reinorce andadapt its alliances. And it will want to resist any eort to use regionalarrangements that exclude Washington to undermine those vital rela-tionships. North Koreas nuclear and missile tests only reinorce tomany in the region the value o the existingand long-standingU.S.security guarantee. And in the coming decade and perhaps beyond, that

desire or the U.S. security guarantee in Asia is unlikely to diminish. Inthe interim, nearly every power in Asia is hedging against uncertainty:What are Chinas intentions? What are Japans goals?


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Until the central questions o Korea and Taiwan are resolved, notto mention a welter o knotty bilateral and multilateral territorial dis-putesand until China and Japan come to terms with each other in amanner similar to that o the Franco-German reconciliationthere isno basis or cooperative or collective security in the Pacic. Calls or anAsian equivalent o the Organization or Security and Cooperation inEurope and the like have allen on dea ears or this very reason.

3. Do not limit U.S. thinking to the ormal groups. Habits o cooperationemerge rom mutual interests, shared objectives, and, as with the Tsu-nami Core Group, joint eorts to conront real problems. The success

o ad hoc responses in recent years suggests a premium on inormalityand fexibility.

4. Acknowledge that even as Asian powers assume global responsibili-ties, they will remain attracted to many aspects o regionalism. The globalsystem is multilayered, complex, and fuid. When the dust clears romthe current nancial crisis, the character o economic globalizationmay be signicantly changed with respect to capital fows, production

chains, and trade patterns in Asia.In East Asia, it is ASEAN Plus Three that will, most likely, be at the

core o this new regionalism. The group is likely to ocus on an economicagenda that challenges traditional American approaches and certainlydisadvantages U.S. rms.

I Japanese and Korean rms enjoy tari-ree treatment o the man-uactures they sell in China while U.S. rms ace the current averagemost-avored nation rate o 9 percent, American rms will lose sub-

stantial sales in an import market worth well over one trillion dollars.And they will lose substantial sales in Korea and Japan, too, as ASEANPlus Three moves toward urther tari reduction.

ASEAN Plus Three is on a trajectory to become the locus o intra-Asian trade liberalization. And, with Asians unlikely to embrace theUnited States as a member o ASEAN Plus Three, the United Statesneeds not just to take intra-Asian trade liberalization eorts more seri-ously, but to conclude the Doha round so that multilateral liberaliza-tion can erase such intraregional trade preerences. Otherwise, U.S.

economic losses will mount.ASEAN Plus Three may also become the locus o intensied discus-

sion o Asian monetary interests. Thus, the United States ought to pre-pare or the Chinese renminbi, in the words o World Bank president


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19Rules to Live By

Robert B. Zoellick, to evolve into a orce in nancial marketseven ithat remains a generation away.

5. Do not balk at every pan-Asian institution that excludes the United States.Washington can hardly tell the worlds leading economies that they arenot allowed to speak to one another without Americans in every roomand in every conversation. Neither can the United States have NAFTAor a Free Trade Area o the Americas while telling Asians they cannotpursue pan-Asian trade arrangements. Some pan-Asian ormations areinevitable, and the United States should view them similarly to its sup-port or European institutions.

The act is, most pan-Asian institutions will move orward regard-less o American views and preerences. So the Asian groups that meritvigilance rom Washington are those that pursue unctional agendasdetrimental to American economic or security interests, such as preer-ential trade agreements.

But the United States will need to careully calibrate its responses.Some o the closest U.S. allies in Asia are actively promoting pan-Asian arrangements that exclude the United Statesor instance,

Japan and South Korea through ASEAN Plus Three, and Japaneseprime minister Hatoyama through his East Asian Community. For themoment, then, an immediate challenge to the United States is that itsallies are, in some cases, acilitating meaningul pan-Asian architec-tures that exclude it. Washingtons rst response should be to consultclosely with Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo to encourage coordinationand, where possible, joint eorts.

But that is not enough, and so a sixth and nal rule will be essential:

6. Start leading, not least by presenting the region in a consultative mannerwith new ideas, including or ad hoc multilateral cooperation. The UnitedStates, quite simply, can no longer succeed without adapting to theserealities o a new Asia. This means it will need to oer a credible alter-native vision, not least by strengthening its own trans-Pacic and globaltrade engagement but also by suggesting innovative ways to streamlineregional institutions. Americans and Asians need to think togetherabout how and where trans-Pacic and pan-Asian institutions should

intersect and reinorce each other.This would useully begin with a serious conversation with allies

and partners about what the experiments in Asian multilateralism havewrought in the two decades since the end o the Cold War.


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Asian governments themselves complain about redundant insti-tutions with overlapping agendas and a decit o results. Privately,many concede a growing need to streamline and rationalize Asianarchitecture.

So why not join with those Asian voices? For instance, Hadi Soe-sastro, a leading Indonesian economist, argues that what needs to beattempted is to reorm and restructure the existing mechanisms so thatthey become key elements o a more coherent and consolidated regionalprocess. Indonesias leading strategist, Jusu Wanandi, has proposedmerging the two mostly redundant leaders summitsAPEC and theEast Asia Summitone o which includes the United States, the other

o which does not.Wanandi calls or a regional institution that could accommodate

the three big powersChina, India, and Japanin a kind o concerto power that will be able to maintain uture equilibrium in the region,together with the United States. Thus, he concludes, regional archi-tecture in East Asia and the Asia-Pacic needs consolidation.

Merging the two leaders summits would link pan-Asian with trans-Pacic institutions in just this way, and it would continue to provide an

overarching orum rom which to assemble both ad hoc and enduringunctional mechanisms. Indeed, much as the ASEAN Regional Forumunctions as Asias security ministerial, the region could convert APECrom a summit into its economic ministerial, ully melded into a new,more integrated architecture. Or else, leaders meetings could simplybe rotated between APEC and an expanded East Asia Summit. Eitherway, the result would be cleaner and much more ecient: one summit,two unctionally specic ministerials, loosely connected. And Taiwan,

which attends APEC but no other regional group because o Chineseobjections, would not suer drastically because its unocial represen-tation would be unaected by whether APEC is held as a summit or asa ministerial.

The time is ripe or this sort o resh thinking because even thosewho have been most closely associated with the APEC process nowraise rst-order questions about whether it has a uture. C. Fred Berg-sten chaired APECs Eminent Persons Group rom 1993 to 1995. Heputs the point succinctly: Do the Asian members o APEC want a pri-

marily Pacic Asia uture (whether it is constructed via a 10+3, 10+6, orsomething else) or do they want an Asia Pacic dimension as well? Ina recent options paper, Bergsten (who would preer that Asians join the


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21Rules to Live By

United States in rescuing and reinvigorating APEC) even oers ter-minate APEC as one o his optionsor instance, i Asians shouldinstead decide that their seats in the G20, combined with their sheereconomic and political weight, are enough to protect Asian interestsand ensure respectul attention by the United States. BergstensAmerican voice has been joined by Asian voices. Barry Desker, a lead-ing Singaporean strategist, is equally blunt: I APEC ails to break newground, it will soon ade.

There have been potentially important, i modest, eorts amongAPEC members to move beyond consensus decision-making and takeconcrete steps toward WTO-compatible ree trade expansion among

those prepared to move orward. A P4 (New Zealand, Singapore, andChile, later joined by Brunei) launched such an agreement in 2005, turn-ing it into a P7 with Australia, Peru, and Vietnam in 2008. The UnitedStates joined the ray at the end o the Bush administration, dubbing itthe Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP). But even as Canada is now con-sidering joining the agreement, the Obama administration has put U.S.participation on hold. Such steps could be the building blocks or aneventual Free Trade Area o the Asia-Pacic (FTAAP), but that remains

a distant aspiration.For Americans who believe a sustainable U.S. role in Asian architec-

ture requires robust unctional linkages, it is clearly time or the UnitedStates to lead creatively with riends and alliesperhaps by returningAPEC to its economic roots, perhaps even by moving beyond APEC,but certainly through reinvigorated trade policies in the region.


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22

Northeast Asia: Getting Serious

In the end, the greatest challenge to multilateral cooperation will lie inNortheast Asia. Collective security is inconceivable at present, but endur-

ing solutions to a host o transnational issues will require cooperationamong those with the maximum capacity and interest to solve them.

China, Japan, and South Korea (the Plus Three) have created a tri-lateral mechanism, ocused mainly on economic issues. But addressingissues at the core o the Plus Three agendatrade, investment, stan-dards, and energy securitywould be more eective and ecient i itincluded the capabilities o the United States. And the United States hastangible and vital interests in nearly everything that happens in North-

east Asia.A good place to start pooling the resources o those with maximum

capacity would be to expand this Plus Three to the ve players who havecooperated in the Six Party process. Expansion rom three to ve wouldbring together the ve major actors in the north Pacic who combineinterest, resources, capacity, and expertise on a host o economic, envi-ronmental, transnational, and diplomatic questions. Converting theexisting Plus Three into a orum that assembles the right players also

oers a better chance than the proposed U.S.-China-Japan trilateral oensuring lasting cooperation on a modestbut concreteagenda orNortheast Asia.

This could be done in several ways. It could mean adding the UnitedStates and Russia to the existing Plus Three to create a ormal ve-partymechanism or Northeast Asia. It could also mean starting with ve-party coordination on the margins o the G20.

A ve-party mechanism is appealing on several levels: although theUnited States will have to stand aside as some pan-Asian institutions

advance, it is, by virtue o geography and history, a Pacic power andespecially a north Pacic power. Only twelve miles in the Bering Straitseparate the United States rom the Asian mainland. The United States


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23Northeast Asia: Getting Serious

has vital interests that suggest it will remain a north Pacic power or asar as the eye can see. Meaningul and eective Northeast Asian institu-tions ought to refect that, both in their membership and agenda.

At the same time, the Six Party diplomacy has been a pathbreak-ing exercise. The North Koreans have stymied the ultimate objectiveo denuclearization, but the lesson or the other ve is that they canstill work well together when they share an overlapping interest and aocused, unctional objective. They can work well together in a varietyo ways, even i the sixth party ultimately prevented their earlier eortsrom succeeding.

At various junctures, other countries sought to join the North Korea

denuclearization dialogue. But these veand no othersare at thetable because each possesses a specic and material set o tools and coreinterests or addressing the nuclear problem. Each brought real capac-ity to the tablediplomatic, economic, or political. In this instance, asin ew others in the history o Asian institution-building, orm ollowedunction and capacity determined who ultimately sat at the table.

In May 2004, the United States, recognizing the unique concen-tration o global power among these ve countries, sought to explore

this sort o ve-party mechanism. It proposed ve-party policy plan-ning talks with a modest, but ocused, agenda distinct rom the ques-tion o North Korean denuclearization: oil and gas pipeline strategies,coordination o strategic petroleum reserves, localized environmentalproblems such as Asian yellow dust and brown cloud, civil nuclearsaety, public health policies, and regional economic cooperation.

The idea ounderedeven though Japan and South Korea embracedit, and Russia oered a provisional yesbecause China worried about

North Koreas reaction and a resulting drag on the Six Party Talks.But ve years later, North Korea appears to be seeking deliverablenuclear weapons. It has tested two nuclear devices, launched two rock-ets, threatened urther nuclear and missile tests, and generally isolateditsel in the bargain. Pyongyangs rhetoric suggests it seeks to be dealtwith in any uture talks as a nuclear weapons state.

So whether North Korea eventually returns to the Six Party pro-cessas it well may, as a result o Chinese blandishmentsthe other vecountries have common interests quite apart rom North Korea. And

now more than ever, there is no reason to give Pyongyang a veto overthe uture o Northeast Asian cooperation, especially on issues whereNorth Korea has ew interests and brings zero capacity to the table.


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On a rich agenda o transnational and economic issues, such asthose that animated the 2004 U.S. proposal, the ve have overlappinginterests but pursue too ew complementary policies. The three mainpowers o the region are also moving orward without the United Statesthrough their creation o the Plus Three, an outgrowth o the ASEANPlus Three. In that setting, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo have sought break-throughs not on the security questions that so preoccupy Americansbut on bread-and-butter issues such as investment, trade, nancial andexchange rate questions, regulatory standards, energy, and tourism.

That oers a more robust agenda or cooperation than the peaceand security mechanism that has long been the ocus o discussion in

Northeast Asia. The Six Party Talks convened a constituent workinggroup, including Pyongyang, to explore it. But the prospects or such asecurity mechanism are dim. I a breakthrough were achieved on NorthKorea, including, ultimately, a path to normalization o its relationswith the United States and Japan, there would indeed be a rich, security-centered agenda or a six-party Northeast Asia orum. But such prog-ress seems more distant than ever.

At this point, then, the more compelling rationale or security-related

cooperation among the ve is contingency planning, including manag-ing the transition to an eventually reunied Korea. Given the politicaltrajectory o North Korea as it alls urther and urther behind the resto a dynamic Northeast Asia, managing change on the Korean Penin-sula could oer an organizing principle. The ve main players wouldbe prudent to begin quietly discussing how to cope with various pos-sible contingencies and responsesalthough this is something evenSouth Korea and Japan, both allies o the United States, have histori-

cally ound dicult to do. The ve could pursue nontraditional securityissues, such as disaster relie. But introducing China into the equationcould make cooperation more dicult still. Ater Chinas 2008 Sichuanearthquake, or example, Chinese sensitivities precluded Tokyo romsending a C-130 carrying tents and blankets or the victims, so Japanhad to opt instead or a charter. Beijing has also been reluctant to dis-cuss planning or humanitarian crises that could occur on the KoreanPeninsula. Until the undamental security dynamics in Northeast Asiachange, the obstacles to any agenda that pursues regionwide coopera-

tive or collective security remain high.But there are more useul organizing principles than security coop-

eration, in any case. Expanding the Plus Three to ve would bring


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25Northeast Asia: Getting Serious

additional capacity and resources to the table on a host o vital economicand transnational issues that have little to do with North Korea. Thedoor could remain open to North Korea, largely symbolically. Beijingand Seoul would likely seek to include Pyongyang i its behavior wereto change. And i North Koreas behavior were to improve dramati-cally, the greater security interests o the United States would argue orPyongyangs inclusion as well. The act remains, however, that the vehave a qualitatively dierent role and status, and, unlike North Korea,they bring substance and tangible capabilities to the table on a richmenu o interests unrelated to security.

That refects their economic, technological, strategic, environmen-

tal, and nancial weight. Each brings something to the table that couldcontribute to a modest, clearly dened, results-oriented eort. Andthere is precedent on which to build: both the 2004 U.S. proposal orve-party policy planning talks and a subsequent Japanese proposal ora ve-party Northeast Asia energy mechanism.


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26

And Southeast Asia?

Meanwhile, the United States will need to continue and expand itsrobust engagement with Southeast Asia, not least because ASEAN will

remain at the core o Asias large, ormal multilateral institutions. TheASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, and other mechanismsare here to stay. And a U.S. presence is not only welcomed but expectedin the orums and institutions in which Washington participates. ButWashington is also well positioned to capitalize on enormous bilat-eral opportunities, especially with Indonesia and Vietnam. The UnitedStates has many more reasons to engage Southeast Asia than the utureo regional institutions. And this suggests that Washington should not

rely on ASEAN as its sole vehicle or such engagement.O course, even as the United States pursues ad hoc mechanisms

and moves beyond ASEAN-centric multilateralism, it would be oolishto pay ASEAN no heed. Forty years o commitment to ASEAN has,in many ways, altered the undamental dynamics between SoutheastAsian states. The ormation o ASEAN, which has grown to representsome 500 million people, was made possible by Indonesian presidentSuhartos abandonment o Sukarnos policy oKonrontasi with Malay-

sia. But ASEAN gained its cohesion rom shared concerns about com-munist expansion beyond Indochina, and it has successully leveragedmeetings at all levels o leadership and bureaucracy to oster a sense ocommon interest, reinorced by personal acquaintance with counter-parts in other ASEAN capitals. It has also had some notable successes.ASEAN played a useul role, or example, in the 1991 Cambodian peacesettlement. In a region once wracked by confict, it is signicant thatwar has never broken out between ASEAN members.

Quite appropriately, then, in September 2008 the United States

became the rst ASEAN dialogue partner to appoint an ambassadorto ASEAN, an initiative spearheaded by Senator Richard G. Lugar(R-IN) and completed in the last months o the Bush administration.


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27And Southeast Asia?

The United States now works with ASEAN through the ASEAN-U.S.Cooperation Plan announced in 2002; the ASEAN-U.S. TechnicalAssistance and Training Facility established inside the ASEAN sec-retariat in 2004; the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership agreementsigned in 2005; the Enhanced Partnership Plan o Action signed in2006; the ASEAN-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreementalso established in 2006; and under the rubric o the Treaty o Amityand Cooperation, which the United States joined ater the Obamaadministration took oce in 2009.

But although the United States has done well to reinorce its relation-ship with ASEAN, and thus its relationships in Southeast Asia, an intel-

lectually honest appraisal should also acknowledge ASEANs severelimitations. As Indonesias Wanandi has bluntly put it, ASEANs lim-ited cohesion has become a limiting actor. . . . [It is] increasingly doubtulwhether ASEAN will be able to take the lead in institution-building.

Expansion o its membership to Indochina and Myanmar and theweakness o ASEANs alphabetically rotating chairmanship have cre-ated structural limitations to ASEAN eectiveness. ASEANs ound-ing members, understandably, wanted all ten Southeast Asian countries

joined as a cohesive orce to help balance China. But their timing waspoor: Myanmar could not be assimilated to ASEAN ways andunlikeVietnamCambodia and Laos carry little weight. A wise personscommission asked to advise on the creation o an ASEAN charter rec-ommended replacing consensus with majority decision-making, butthe adopted charter has allen short o this goal.

One question, then, is whether ASEAN members share the creativitythe European Union has demonstrated in negotiating and attempting

to ratiy the Lisbon Treaty. Asia is not Europe, and Asian institutionscan hardly be compared to the EU. But the Lisbon process, like the EUconstitutional process that preceded it, has refected a sense o trial anderror and an eort to improve Europes institutions. That process oexperimentation continues apace in Europe.

ASEAN may change slowly, but Southeast Asia is changing dramati-cally. Thailand and the Philippines have become less coherent polities,less eective both inside and outside the ASEAN context. Indonesia,Singapore, and Vietnam have become more prominent and economi-

cally dynamic, with robust bilateral ties to the United States. As avibrant new democracy and a member o the G20, Indonesia warrantsspecial attention, not least because the Yudhoyono government seeks


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a broad-based partnership with the United States. Meanwhile, U.S.-Malaysia relations have improved on the basis o trade, counterterror-ism cooperation, and military exchanges.

The United States has been doing more with ASEAN, especiallythrough the Enhanced Partnership announced by the Bush administra-tion in 2005. But it has also been doing moremuch morebilaterally.And given the considerable gap in military, economic, and diplomaticpower between Northeast and Southeast Asia, there will always be seri-ous limitations to ASEAN-centric multilateralism.


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29

Conclusion

For so many reasons, the nature o American engagement in Asia willshape the regions uture. But it is essential to adapt U.S. policy to the

contours o change in Asia i the United States wishes to remain vitaland relevant there. A generation hence, in 2030, the United States couldnd its rms at a competitive disadvantage in a part o the world thatwill constitute about hal o the global economy. Already we see, orexample, South Korea moving ahead on a ree trade agreement with theEuropean Union as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement languishesin Washington. And that is not the end o the story. The United Statescould nd an Asia much less willing to accommodate its interests, and

particularly its commercial, economic, and nancial interests. Withoutvigorous engagement, especially multilateral trade engagement and lib-eralization, American credibility and infuence will wane. Others willll the vacuum.

The punch line, then, is this: President Obama has a unique oppor-tunity to adapt U.S. policy to the new realities o a changing Asia.The starting point remains Americas bilateral alliances and partner-ships, which lie at the core o U.S. engagement with the region. But it

is time to build on these rich, multiaceted relationships by exercisinggreater multilateral leadership in Asia and reinvigorating U.S. leader-ship on global and regional trade liberalization. And it is essential thatthe United States begin a serious conversation with its Asian partnersabout a more purposeul and unctional multilateralism that respectsAsias trajectory while redening how and where the United States tsinto a twenty-rst century Asia.


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31

Endnotes

. Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, and William Watts, Strategic Views on AsianRegionalism: Survey Results and Analysis (Washington, DC: Center or Strategic and

International Studies, February 2009), p. 6.. Kevin Rudd, Its Time to Build an Asia Pacic Community, address to the Asia Soci-ety AustralAsia Centre, Sydney, June 4, 2008, http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5763.

. Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East AsianPolicy (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2006), chapter 2; Ellen L. Frost, AsiasNew Regionalism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), chapter 6.

. Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyoten, Change o Fortune (New York: New York TimesBooks, 1992); Toyoo Gyoten, Steadily Towards the Asian Common Currency,Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 13, 2003; Eisuke Sakakibara, The Asian MonetaryFund: Where Do We Go From Here? Institute o Strategic and International StudiesInternational Conerence on Globalization, February 26, 2001, http://www.map.gsec.

keio.ac.jp/les/kl_eb01.pd; Keiko Ujikane and Tatsuo Ito, Asia Needs Own Mon-etary Fund to Stem Crisis, ADBs Kawai Says, Bloomberg, February 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&reer=asia&sid=acuxFHCbE5Vc;Hitoshi Tanaka, A New Leadership Role or Japan, Global Asia 4, no. 1 (spring 2009),p. 15; Henrik Schmiegelow, How Asian Will Asia Be in the 21st Century?ASIEN 100(July 2006), pp. 5560, http://www.asienkunde.de/content/zeitschrit_asien/archiv/pd/A100_054_061.pd.

. Phillip Y. Lipscy, Japans Asian Monetary Fund Proposal, Stanord Journal o EastAsian Aairs 3 (summer 2003), pp. 93104.

. Yukio Hatoyama, Address at the Sixty-Fourth Session o the General Assemblyo the United Nations, September 24, 2009, http://www.moa.go.jp/policy/UN/

assembly2009/pm0924-2.html; Japan, China to Work Together on Creating EastAsia Community,Japan Times, September 29, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090929a3.html.

. U.S. Department o State, United States Accedes to the Treaty o Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, July 22, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126294.htm.

. Hillary Rodham Clinton, interview by Yoichi Funabashi and Yoichi Kato, February 19,2009, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/February/20090219163832eaias0.5075342.html; China Puts Breaks on Talks with Japan, U.S.,Japan Times, July31, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090731a4.html; Cui Xiaohuo,U.S.-Japan-China Talks to Focus on Key Issues, China Daily, June 8, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-06/08/content_8257370.htm.

. Yoichi Funabashi, Forget Bretton Woods II: The Role or U.S.-China-Japan Trilater-alism, Washington Quarterly, April 2009, pp. 725.


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32 Endnotes

. Marc Grossman, The Tsunami Core Group: A Step Toward a Transormed Diplo-macy in Asia and Beyond, Security Challenges 1, no. 1 (2005), pp. 1114.

. American policymakers have promoted ad hoc approaches beore, but with too little

eect on the multilateral arrangements that have emerged in Asia. See, or instance,James A. Baker III, America in Asia: Emerging Architecture or a Pacic Commu-nity, Foreign Aairs, Winter 1991/92, http://www.oreignaairs.com/articles/47433/james-a-baker-iii/america-in-asia-emerging-architecture-or-a-pacic-community.

. For an example o one such proposal, see James Goodby and Markku Heiskanen,Old Ideas and New Diplomats: A Fresh Beginning in Northeast Asia? Nautilus In-stitute Policy Forum Online 09-034A, April 29, 2009, http://www.nautilus.org/ora/security/09034GoodbyHeiskanen.html.

. Robert B. Zoellick, Ater the Crisis, remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School o AdvancedInternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, September 28, 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22329125~page

PK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html.. Hadi Soesastro, Kevin Rudds Architecture or the Asia Pacic, East Asia Forum,

August 14, 2008, http://www.csis.or.id/scholars_opinion_view.asp?op_id=683&id=14&tab=0.

. Jusu Wanandi, Remodeling Regional Architecture, PacNet, no. 13 (February 18,2009), http://csis.org/les/media/csis/pubs/pac0913.pd.

. C. Fred Bergsten, Pacic Asia and the Asia Pacic: The Choices or APEC, PolicyBrie 09-16 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute or International Economics, July2009), pp. 34.

. Barry Desker, Why APEC Needs Results in Sydney, RSIS Commentaries, Septem-ber 2007, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0952007.pd.

. Japan Shelves Military Aid Flight, BBC News, May 30, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7426899.stm.

. Senator Richard G. Lugar, Lugar ASEAN Proposal Enacted by Administration,press release, August 10, 2006, http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cm?id=261634;Singapore Ministry o Foreign Aairs, Singapore Welcomes Conrmation o theUnited States Ambassador or ASEAN Aairs, press release, May 1, 2008, http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/press_room/press_releases/singapore_welcomes_conrmation_o_the_united_states_ambassador_or_asean_aairs.

. U.S. Agency or International Development, The ASEAN-United States EnhancedPartnership, http://www.asean-us-partnership.org/index.htm.


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33

Evan A. Feigenbaum is senior ellow or East, Central, and SouthAsia at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2001 to 2009, he served

at the U.S. Department o State in various capacities: as deputy assis-tant secretary o state or South Asia, deputy assistant secretary o stateor Central Asia, member o the policy planning sta with principalresponsibility or East Asia and the Pacic, and as an adviser on Chinato Deputy Secretary o State Robert B. Zoellick, with whom he workedclosely in the development o the U.S.-China senior dialogue. Duringthe intensive nal phase o the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative romJuly to October 2008, he co-chaired the coordinating team charged

with moving the agreement through the International Atomic EnergyAgency Board o Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, andthen to Congress, where it became the U.S.-India Nuclear CooperationApproval and Nonprolieration Enhancement Act. He received thedepartments Superior Honor Award ve times.

Beore his government service, Dr. Feigenbaum worked at HarvardUniversity, where he was lecturer on government in the Faculty o Artsand Sciences, and executive director o the AsiaPacic Security Ini-

tiative and program chair o the Chinese security studies program inthe John F. Kennedy School o Government. His books include ChinasTechno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition rom theNuclear to the Inormation Age. He received his AB in history rom theUniversity o Michigan and his AM and PhD in political science romStanord University.

Robert A. Manning is a senior adviser to the Atlantic Council. Theviews in this special report are solely his own and do not represent the

U.S. government or any U.S. government agency. Mr. Manning servedat the U.S. Department o State rom 2001 to 2008, on the policy plan-ning sta and as senior counselor or energy, technology, and science

About the Authors


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34 About the Authors

policy. As senior counselor, he advised the undersecretary o state orglobal aairs and other senior ocials on a range o issues, includingenergy and climate change policy, new energy technologies, develop-ment and the Millennium Challenge Account, science and technologyissues, and North Korea and Iran nuclear issues. He also was one othe creators o the Global Issues Forum with India and subsequentlywith China.

From 1997 to 2001, Mr. Manning was director o Asia studies and asenior ellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he led severalTask Force studies, including Task Forces on Korea and Southeast Asia.From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Manning was an adviser or policy and public

diplomacy to the assistant secretary o state or East Asian and Pacicaairs. Prior to this, he was an adviser to the oce o the secretary odeense. His publications include The Asian Energy Factor; the CFRreport China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control; essays on nuclearweapons; numerous journal articles on international energy and Asiansecurity issues; and book chapters in edited volumes on China, Korea,Japan, energy, and energy security.


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Morton I. AbramowitzThe Century Foundation

Richard L. ArmitageArmitage International L.C.

Charlene BarsheskyWilmerHale

Chas. W. Freeman Jr.Projects International, Inc.

Ellen L. FrostPeter G. Peterson Institute or InternationalEconomics and National Deense University

Michael J. GreenCenter or Strategic & International Studies

James A. Kelly

Sukhan KimAkin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP

Nicholas R. LardyPeter G. Peterson Institute or InternationalEconomics

Richard P. LawlessRichard Lawless and Associates

Kevin G. NealerForum or International Policy

Marcus NolandPeter G. Peterson Institute or InternationalEconomics

Joseph S. Nye Jr.Harvard University

Douglas H. PaalCarnegie Endowment or International Peace

James J. PrzystupNational Deense University

Mitchell B. ReissCollege o William & Mary

Stanley Owen RothThe Boeing Company

J. Stapleton RoyWoodrow Wilson International Center orScholars

James J. Shinn

Princeton University

Advisory Committee orThe United States in the New Asia

Note: Council Special Reports refect the judgments and recommendations o the author(s). They do not

necessarily represent the views o members o the advisory committee, whose involvement in no way

should be interpreted as an endorsement o the report by either themselves or the organizations with which

they are aliated.


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The International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) pro-gram at CFR aims to identiy the institutional requirements or eec-

tive multilateral cooperation in the twenty-rst century. The program ismotivated by recognition that the architecture o global governancelargely refecting the world as it existed in 1945has not kept pace withundamental changes in the international system. These shits includethe spread o transnational challenges, the rise o new powers, and themounting infuence o nonstate actors. Existing multilateral arrange-ments thus provide an inadequate oundation or addressing many otodays most pressing threats and opportunities and or advancing U.S.

national and broader global interests.Given these trends, U.S. policymakers and other interested actors

require rigorous, independent analysis o current structures o multilat-eral cooperation, and o the promises and pitalls o alternative institu-tional arrangements. The IIGG program meets these needs by analyzingthe strengths and weaknesses o existing multilateral institutions andproposing reorms tailored to new international circumstances.

The IIGG program ullls its mandate by

Engaging CFR ellows in research on improving existing andbuilding new rameworks to address specic global challengesincluding climate change, the prolieration o weapons o massdestruction, transnational terrorism, and global healthand dis-seminating the research through books, articles, Council SpecialReports, and other outlets;

Bringing together infuential oreign policymakers, scholars, and

CFR members to debate the merits o international regimes andrameworks at meetings in New York, Washington, DC, and otherselect cities;

Mission Statement o the

International Institutionsand Global Governance Program


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37Mission Statement o the IIGG

Hosting roundtable series whose objectives are to inorm the oreignpolicy community o todays international governance challengesand breed inventive solutions to strengthen the worlds multilateralbodies; and

Providing a state-o-the-art Web presence as a resource to the wideroreign policy community on issues related to the uture o globalgovernance.


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Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities: International Norms and U.S. PolicyMatthew C. Waxman; CSR No. 49, October 2009

An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report

Enhancing U.S. Preventive ActionPaul B. Stares and Micah Zenko; CSR No. 48, October 2009A Center or Preventive Action Report

The Canadian Oil Sands: Energy Security vs. Climate ChangeMichael A. Levi; CSR No. 47, May 2009A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

The National Interest and the Law o the Sea

Scott G. Borgerson; CSR No. 46, May 2009

Lessons o the Financial CrisisBenn Steil; CSR No. 45, March 2009A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Global Imbalances and the Financial CrisisSteven Dunaway; CSR No. 44, March 2009A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Eurasian Energy Security

Jerey Manko; CSR No. 43, February 2009

Preparing or Sudden Change in North KoreaPaul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit; CSR No. 42, January 2009A Center or Preventive Action Report

Averting Crisis in UkraineSteven Pier; CSR No. 41, January 2009A Center or Preventive Action Report

Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining ProgressAnthony W. Gambino; CSR No. 40, October 2008A Center or Preventive Action Report

Council Special ReportsPublished by the Council on Foreign Relations


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39Council Special Reports

Deterring State Sponsorship o Nuclear TerrorismMichael A. Levi; CSR No. 39, September 2008

China, Space Weapons, and U.S. SecurityBruce W. MacDonald; CSR No. 38, September 2008

Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences o American IndebtednessBrad W. Setser; CSR No. 37, September 2008A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Securing Pakistans Tribal BeltDaniel Markey; CSR No. 36, July 2008 (Web-only release) and August 2008A Center or Preventive Action Report

Avoiding Transers to TortureAshley S. Deeks; CSR No. 35, June 2008

Global FDI Policy: Correcting a Protectionist DritDavid M. Marchick and Matthew J. Slaughter; CSR No. 34, June 2008A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Dealing with Damascus: Seeking a Greater Return on U.S.-Syria RelationsMona Yacoubian and Scott Lasensky; CSR No. 33, June 2008A Center or Preventive Action Report

Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda or ActionJoshua W. Busby; CSR No. 32, November 2007A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Planning or Post-Mugabe ZimbabweMichelle D. Gavin; CSR No. 31, October 2007A Center or Preventive Action Report

The Case or Wage InsuranceRobert J. LaLonde; CSR No. 30, September 2007A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Reorm o the International Monetary FundPeter B. Kenen; CSR No. 29, May 2007A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benets and RisksCharles D. Ferguson; CSR No. 28, April 2007

Nigeria: Elections and Continuing ChallengesRobert I. Rotberg; CSR No. 27, April 2007

A Center or Preventive Action Report

The Economic Logic o Illegal ImmigrationGordon H. Hanson; CSR No. 26, April 2007A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report


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40 Council Special Reports

The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement SystemRobert Z. Lawrence; CSR No. 25, March 2007A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Bolivia on the BrinkEduardo A. Gamarra; CSR No. 24, February 2007A Center or Preventive Action Report

Ater the Surge: The Case or U.S. Military Disengagement rom IraqSteven N. Simon; CSR No. 23, February 2007

Darur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass AtrocitiesLee Feinstein; CSR No. 22, January 2007

Avoiding Confict in the Horn o Arica: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and EritreaTerrence Lyons; CSR No. 21, December 2006A Center or Preventive Action Report

Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chvezs VenezuelaRichard Lapper; CSR No. 20, November 2006A Center or Preventive Action Report

Reorming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives RightKeith E. Maskus; CSR No. 19, November 2006A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Foreign Investment and National Security: Getting the Balance RightAlan P. Larson and David M. Marchick; CSR No. 18, July 2006A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Challenges or a Postelection Mexico: Issues or U.S. PolicyPamela K. Starr; CSR No. 17, June 2006 (Web-only release) and November 2006

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy or Moving ForwardMichael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. 16, June 2006

Generating Momentum or a New Era in U.S.-Turkey RelationsSteven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall; CSR No. 15, June 2006

Peace in Papua: Widening a Window o OpportunityBlair A. King; CSR No. 14, March 2006A Center or Preventive Action Report

Neglected Deense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland SecurityStephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto; CSR No. 13, March 2006

Aghanistans Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to NormalcyBarnett R. Rubin; CSR No. 12, March 2006A Center or Preventive Action Report


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41Council Special Reports

Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear TerrorismCharles D. Ferguson; CSR No. 11, March 2006

Getting Serious About the Twin DecitsMenzie D. Chinn; CSR No. 10, September 2005A Maurice R. Greenberg Center or Geoeconomic Studies Report

Both Sides o the Aisle: A Call or Bipartisan Foreign PolicyNancy E. Roman; CSR No. 9, September 2005

Forgotten Intervention? What the United States Needs to Do in the Western BalkansAmelia Branczik and William L. Nash; CSR No. 8, June 2005A Center or Preventive Action Report

A New Beginning: Strategies or a More Fruitul Dialogue with the Muslim WorldCraig Charney and Nicole Yakatan; CSR No. 7, May 2005

Power-Sharing in IraqDavid L. Phillips; CSR No. 6, April 2005A Center or Preventive Action Report

Giving Meaning to Never Again: Seeking an Eective Response to the Crisisin Darur and BeyondCheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 5, September 2004

Freedom, Prosperity, and Security: The G8 Partnership with Arica: Sea Island 2004 and BeyondJ. Brian Atwood, Robert S. Browne, and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 4, May 2004

Addressing the HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A U.S. Global AIDS Strategy or the Long TermDaniel M. Fox and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 3, May 2004Cosponsored with the Milbank Memorial Fund

Challenges or a Post-Election PhilippinesCatharin E. Dalpino; CSR No. 2, May 2004A Center or Preventive Action Report

Stability, Security, and Sovereignty in the Republic o GeorgiaDavid L. Phillips; CSR No. 1, January 2004A Center or Preventive Action Report

To purchase a printed copy, call the Brookings Institution Press: 800.537.5487.Note: Council Special Reports are available or download rom CFRs website, www.cr.org.

For more inormation, email [email protected].


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