assignment no 13

8/10/2019 Assignment No 13

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CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADO CASES NO. 13

1. CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and

FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, respondents. [G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005]

FACTS: The siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry

against Cesar Sampayan in the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel

of land, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been

supposedly effected through strategy and stealth.

Defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor

their mother have ever been in possession of the land and that he does not even know plaintiffs identities or

their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he

asked and was given permission therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs.

Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. Also, Sampayan

alleged that the plaintiffs claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed

and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960, and

that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado,

while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both vendees, so

Sampayan averred, have actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the present. He

thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

The MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit. Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to

the RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors

in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of

such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein private

respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of the land. Unable to accept the RTC judgment,

Sampayan went to the CA on a petition for review which was denied. His motion for reconsideration having

been similarly denied. Sampayan now files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT MCTC HAS JURISDICTION? 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FOR

FORCIBLE ENTRY IS PROPER?

HELD: 1. Yes. For the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint

avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived

thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth.[8] The complaint in this case

makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing


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rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction

over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.

2. Not proper. ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, is the

proper action.

In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and

that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Absence of prior

physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint.

Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this Court is not a

trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during

trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions which are present in this case to wit: when the findings of facts

are conflicting; and when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the

parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute

that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his

predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on

the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in

possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-

interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively,

continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.

Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing since 1960

onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their

mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor, Dionesias

statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular

inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on the land.

We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that

private respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold

that the mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical

possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject

thereof.


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2. LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR VS. SILVERIO BUGARIN, substituted by his widow, CONSOLACION

BUGARIN.

FACTS: Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of

San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at

Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same from spouses

Artemio and Angela Pronto. She was issued Tax Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon. DPWH

constructed a road which traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioners lot, for

which she was issued Tax Declaration.

Later, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the

same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and

ownership against respondent.

Respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered

by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955.

In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is

covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property.

Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.

The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of

the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession

and ownership thereof. The RTC affirmed the assailed decision, hence petitioner filed a petition for review

before the Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or

prior actual physical possession. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the

instant petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY?

HELD: No jurisdiction.

It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical

possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her

allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint, the

cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence,

acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of

cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with

jurisdiction over the case.


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3. GABRIEL ELANE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent Inocencio Chua filed an action for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo

City for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land designated as Block V, LC

Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private

respondent by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961.

Private respondent alleges that on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner

was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent. The order

made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter. 4 When his demand

letter of March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent filed an action for forcible

entry.

Petitioner Gabriel Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a

parcel of land located at Upper Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, designated as Block

V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated

April 10, 1979; on which he constructed a warehouse and a gasoline station pursuant to permits issued to him

by the said bureau and that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and

uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow;

and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him

for the years 1970 to 1979. 6

MTC dismissed the complaint and which, on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the RTC. Thereafter, herein

private respondent elevated the case on a petition for review to respondent court which reversed the decisions

of the two courts a quo and rendered judgment ordering therein respondent Elane to remove or demolish the

residential house or building that he constructed on that part of the land in question, to vacate and return

possession of said parcel of land to therein petitioner Chua and to pay said petitioner P5,000.00 by way of

attorney's fees, with the costs of suit. 7 A motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: WON ca committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the petition for review?

HELD: No grave abuse of discretion.

Private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of

petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the

parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968.

Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.


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Petitioner's intrusion upon the disputed premises can properly be categorized as one effected through stealth.

Where forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the

time private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned

thereof.23 The records reflect that such discovery and prohibition took place on February 15, 1980, reiterated

thereafter in the demand letter of March 1, 1980, both to no avail. Consequently, the one-year period had not

expired on March 6, 1980 when private respondent filed the ejectment suit with the then City Court of

Olongapo City.


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4. CARMELITA T. PANGANIBAN, petitioner, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Carmelita Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with private

respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Through the SLDA, private respondent subleased to

petitioner a gasoline station located at 427 Samson Road, EDSA, Caloocan City. The Agreement may be

terminated by SHELL at any time during the first six (6) month. If it is not terminated during the first six (6)

months, it shall continue to be in effect for another period of 4 years, unless otherwise terminated as herein

provided in paragraph 5(3). The parties agree that this Agreement is, however, co-terminus with SHELLs

lease on the site referred to under paragraph 1 of this Agreement notwithstanding the total 5-year period

aforementioned.

Private respondent is not the owner of the lot subject of the sublease. Private respondent was only leasing the

lot from its owner, Serafin Vasquez, for a period of 15 years.

Private respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring on July 31, 1995. Private respondent then

advised petitioner to wind up her business. Believing that the SLDA had not yet expired and was still effective,

petitioner continued to pay rentals for the gasoline station. Private respondent refused to accept the

payments.

Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Makati City. Private respondent filed an unlawful

detainer case against petitioner with the MTC of Caloocan City.

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case in RTC claiming that the issue of the renewal of the lease

should be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the MTC.

MTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. Petitioner appealed.

RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order

which was denied because of petitioners failure to appear at the hearing.

Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC. SC referred the petition for certiorari to the CA

because the appellate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court and petitioner failed to cite a special or

important reason for the Court to take immediate cognizance of the petition.

CA denied the petition for certiorari on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ca erred in affirming rtc-makatis dismissal of civil case no. 95-1010 on motion of

shell on the ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after shell had filed its answer?

HELD: No, dismissal is proper.


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An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully

withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the latters right to hold possession under a contract,

express or implied.[25] Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when the SLDA would

expire is the key issue that would determine petitioners right to possess the gasoline service station. When the

primary issue to be resolved is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and

not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.

There is a more compelling reason for the dismissal of the action for declaratory relief. The Metropolitan Trial

Court had already resolved the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondent even before the Regional

Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory relief. The Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Decision on

September 25, 1996 and this decision is now on appeal.[26] The Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for

declaratory relief on February 21, 1997 based on the April 30, 1996 Motion to Dismiss filed by private

respondent that raised the ground of litis pendentia. Based on the record, it appears that private respondent

failed to inform the Regional Trial Court of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court on the unlawful detainer

case. The significance of the earlier resolution of the unlawful detainer case, however, will not escape our

attention.

Indeed, the action for declaratory relief had become vexatious. It would have been an exercise in futility for the

Regional Trial Court to continue the proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the Metropolitan Trial

Court had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for only five years or until July 31, 1995.[27] Moreover,

the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court once it attains finality would amount to res judicata. The proper

forum for petitioner to clarify the provision of the SLDA on the expiration of the term of the contract is in her

appeal of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the unlawful detainer case.

Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer case should have been dismissed because private

respondent was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit 269 days from July 31, 1995, the date

private respondent claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer should be filed within one year

after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession occurs.[28] When the action is to terminate the

lease because of the expiration of its term, it is upon the expiration of the term of the lease that the lessee is

already considered to be unlawfully withholding the property.[29] The expiration of the term of the lease

immediately gives rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer.[30] In such a case, a demand to vacate is no

longer necessary.[31]Private respondent therefore had one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case

for unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the unlawful detainer

case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not sleep on its right when it filed the

unlawful detainer case well within the prescriptive period for filing the action.

The action for declaratory relief was not yet submitted for resolution when private respondent filed the action

for unlawful detainer. There is also no proof that private respondent filed the ejectment suit in anticipation of

the early resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Private respondent was not out to frustrate the


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impending resolution of the action for declaratory relief when it filed the ejectment suit. In fact, the unlawful

detainer case was already decided upon by the Metropolitan Trial Court even before the Regional Trial Court

dismissed the action for declaratory relief. It appears that it is petitioner who wants to avoid the adverse ruling

in the unlawful detainer case by insisting that the action for declaratory relief be given preference even after the

ejectment suit was already decided. The abuse feared by petitioner does not apply in this case and yet,

petitioner urges us to reevaluate the applicability of a doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. This, we

cannot do. We can only rule upon actual controversies, not on scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit

her interest.


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5. NONITO LABASTIDA and CONSTANCIA LABASTIDA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE

C. DELESTE, SR., JOSE L. DELESTE, JR., RAUL L. DELESTE and RUBEN L. DELESTE, respondents.

FACTS: Plaintiffs [private respondents] are the owners of a parcel of land and a portion of said lot was leased

to defendants [herein petitioners] for the sum of P200.00 as monthly rental. Plaintiffs filed a case against

defendants denominated as one for recovery of possession and damages with preliminary mandatory

injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that in the latter part of 1979 plaintiffs served notice to the

occupants-lessees on their land, including defendants, to vacate the property because the owners would erect

a commercial building thereon; that defendants, instead of heeding the request, repaired their (defendants)

building, put additional constructions on the lot, partitioned the first storey of the building and converted the

same into four (4) stores or business spaces and subleased the same to other persons without the knowledge

and consent of the plaintiffs; that after other previous notices, plaintiffs sent a written demand to defendants to

vacate the land but the latter refused; that again, plaintiffs made and sent another writtennotice to defendants

to vacate but to no avail; and that plaintiffs suffered actual damage in the amount of P40,000.00 which was

the increase of construction materials and labor costs and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the trial

court over the person of one of the defendants and over the nature or subject matter of the action and (b)

pendency of an ejectment case filed by the plaintiffs against the same defendants in the MTC of Iligan City

involving the same property.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court, ruling that the complaint was filed after one year from the

date of demand. Defendants reiterated their defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, insisting that the

case should have been filed before the municipal court. The trial court gave judgment for the private

respondents based on the findings. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of

the trial court.

issues: 1. WON the action is for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) or for ejectment (desahucio)? 2.

WON the rtc has jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioners?

HELD: 1. Although entitled For Recovery of Possession, Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it

is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by private respondents that the case was actually for

unlawful detainer.

In their complaint, private respondents alleged that they were the registered owners of the lot subject of the

case and thus entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were their lessees, paying rent on a month-to-

month basis; and that despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by private respondents, petitioners

refused to leave the premises. This amounts to an allegation that petitioners were unlawfully withholding

possession of the land. A lease on a month-to-month basis is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon


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notice to vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee.[7] The refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives

rise to an action for unlawful detainer.

Private respondents action is not for recovery of possession. It is not for a determination which party has a

better right of possession. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the action to be for

ejectment.

2. RTC has no jurisdiction.

In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.[9] In

this case, several demands to vacate were alleged to have been made by private respondents, the last of

which was dated February 20, 1983. As the complaint was filed on December 3, 1983, that is, within one year

from February 20, 1983, it is clear that the case should have been brought in the Municipal Trial Court.

The Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction if the deprivation of possession had been committed through

other means than those enumerated in Rule 70, or if the period of dispossession under Rule 70 has lasted for

more than a year.

Where there are several demands made, the period of unlawful withholding starts to run from the date of the

last demand on the theory that if the lessor brings no action shortly after the demand, it may be because he

has agreed to the renewal of the lease.

Rule 70, Sec. 2 provides that no action could be brought against petitioners for alleged violation of the terms

and conditions of their lease agreement unless a notice to vacate is given to the lessee. On the other hand, if

the action for unlawful detainer is based on the expiration of the lease, no notice is required. Any notice given

only serves to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. Such a notice

is needed only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the

lease.


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6. YAP v. CRUZ

Facts: Private respondent Cruz was the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five years in the

premises in question just before this controversy started. He religiously paid the monthly rentals of P1,400.00,

introduced several improvements and operated a veterinary clinic known as Malate Veterinary Clinic.

Sometime in the latter part of July, 1985, he offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and some of its

equipment to Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap, et al., the petitioners herein.

Cruz introduced to the landlord Dr.. Yap as the person interested in taking over the clinic. However, the

negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said

premises with the landlord. As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with

Damages" with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 against petitioners herein and the landlord.

MTC rendered its judgment in favor of Cruz and ordered the defendants to vacate. The RTC affirmed the

MTCs decision. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the case. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lease between Cruz and the landlord is still valid and subsisting which justifies him

for filing the complaint of Forcible Entry with Damages?

HELD: Yes. Correctly, the petitioners claim a right to the premises in question apart from the proposed sale of

the goodwill. Precisely, private respondent's action for forcible entry and damages recognizes such fact

because he predicates his cause of action on the deprivation of his possession by virtue of the new lease

contract executed by the petitioners with the landlord.

When the petitioners and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private respondent was

still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private respondent has not effectively relinquished his

leasehold rights over the premises in question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill.

Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the condition

is not complied with.

In the case at bar, however, the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the private respondent is

clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private respondent continues to be in force and can

not be deemed to have expired as of the end of the month automatically. Neither can the non-payment of the

rent for the month of August, 1985 be a ground for termination of the lease without a demand to pay and to

vacate. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the case of Vda. de Kraut v. Lontok, G.R. No. L-

18374, February 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 281, which was cited by petitioners in support of their contention that a

lease on a month-to-month basis may be terminated at the end of any month and shall be deemed terminated

upon the lessee's refusal to pay the increased rental because here there was neither demand on the part of

the landlord to pay the rental nor refusal on the part of the private respondent to pay the same as in fact he

made a tender of his rental payment in the latter part of August, 1985. Thus, when the landlord and the


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petitioners entered into a new contract of lease effectively depriving the private respondent of his lease, they

were clearly guilty of forcible entry in view of the subsisting lease of private respondent.


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7. IGNACIO & DE LA CRUZ v. CFI of BULACAN & LIPANA

FACTS: The said landholding is owned by Felizardo Lipana and tenanted by Alipio Marcelo until his death.

Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations at the time of death, namely:

CAR Case No. 750-Bulacan '62, "Alipio Marcelo vs. Felizardo Lipana;" and CAR Case 827-Bulacan '62,

entitled "Felizardo Lipana vs. Alipio Marcelo." A third caseCAR Case No. 895was filed on December

20, 1962 by Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz (the latter having been the

alleged common-law wife of Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as entitled to succeed to the

tenancy and status of the deceased. On July 23, 1963, acting on a motion of Maximo Marcelo to enjoin

Magdalena dela Cruz from interfering with his peaceful cultivation of the landholding, as well as an urgent

motion of Felizardo Lipana for leave to cultivate the same land.

Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases was entered into by Maximo Marcelo and

Felizardo Lipana, wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the landholding in favor of the latter. A

judgment in accordance with the terms and conditions of said compromise was thereupon rendered by the trial

Judge on November 5, 1964, declaring that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 895 and 827 were deemed closed and

terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.

On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint against Lipana (Case No. 1221), asking the

CAR to declare her the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual, rentals thereof during the past three

years and to award damages in her favor by way of attorney's fees and consequential expenses. In her

complaint she alleged the Alipio Marcelo, the former tenant, surrendered the landholding to Lipana on

November 21, 1962, where upon she succeeded as such tenant upon agreement with the latter that on

November 13, 1964 the CAR issued an order stating that the dismissal of CAR Case No. 895 was without

prejudice to her right to file an independent action to assert her claim against Lipana, her co-defendant therein;

the together with her husband 2 she continued to work on the land during the agricultural year 1964-65, but

that after they had plowed the land in preparation for the agriculture natural year 1965-66 defendant's

henchmen created some disturbance at the place for the purpose of ejecting her for forcibly therefrom. Plaintiff

was allowed to litigate as pauper, and notice of the filing of the complaint was served up Lipana on July 31,

1965.

On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on an action for "Ejectment

and Forcible Entry" (Civil Case No. 235), with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

against Magdalena dela Cruz and her husband Lorenzo Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had been placed in

possession of the landholding by the provincial sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated

January 27, 1965 in CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895.

Defendants denied the substantial averments of the complaint and alleging as affirmative defense the

pendency of CAR Case No. 1221. On August 2, 1965 the Municipal Court of Plaridel ordered defendants,


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pending the hearing of the case on the merits, to desist from plowing, harrowing, and/or planting the land in

question upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond of P2,000.00.

On October 7, 1965 plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in contempt of court for having plowed,

narrowed and planted the land in question in spite of the existence of the injunctive order.

On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering defendants

to vacate the land and to remove their house therefrom. This decision was likewise appealed to the Court of

First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3363-M. Again, defendants were allowed to

appeal as paupers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan has jurisdiction over the ejectment case

against petitioners, which case was subsequently appealed to the Court of First Instance, where it was shown

that another case had been filed ahead in the Court of Agrarian Relations wherein petitioners asked that they

be declared the lawful tenants of the disputed landholding.

HELD: The facts show clearly that these cases proceed from and involve essentially a tenancy dispute. Before

Civil Case No. 235 was filed in the Municipal Court of Plaridel three cases involving the same landholding had

already been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The issue as to who had been in actual possession of

the land since the death of the tenant Alipio Marcelo was before the CAR in Case No. 895, a suit brought by

Maximo Marcelo against Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz, wherein he sought to be declared as the tenant by

right of succession to Alipio Marcelo. The case, however, was dismissed together with CAR Cases Nos. 725

and 827 originally brought by Alipio Marcelo, without the issue of actual possession having been resolved, by

virtue of the compromise agreement entered into between Maximo and Lipana. Magdalena dela Cruz

thereafter filed her complaintCAR Case No. 1221to have herself declared the lawful tenant of the

landholding.

While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the

allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the

real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. 3 The decision of the CAR, it should be

remembered, was rendered upon a compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.

The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon in

said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895 were "deemed

closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;" and the writ of execution was

limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo Lipana immediately in possession of the landholding formerly cultivated by

Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent, and/or representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo."


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8. SALVACION P. ONQUIT v. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA & SHERIFF MATIAS

FACTS: The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry casewith prayer for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction with damages. Said case was assigned to her sala. The

complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction

stating that said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR) because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants

filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion for Disqualification, Request for Disqualification and Request

for Resolution. Basically, these motions were founded on the trial courts alleged lack of jurisdiction. In a single

Order, respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge, the claim regarding

the nature of the case at bar would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.

In the complaint now before this Court, complainant details several allegations and one of which is that the

land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform

which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court;

She recounts that ejectment cases were earlier filed before her sala against some of complainants family

members involving different areas of the disputed lot. In these separate cases, respondent Judge ordered their

ejectment, which she claims is the reason for complainants vindictiveness. She claims moreover, that in a

Special Civil Case (No. 1852) filed against her before the Albay Regional Trial Court, to restrain her from taking

cognizance of Civil Case No. 1048-L, she nevertheless proceeded Civil Case No. 1048-L, after the special civil

case was dismissed. She then ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and required an

injunction bond from complainants opponents. Allthese were resented, according to the respondent Judge, by

the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she took cognizance

HELD: No. Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as the pleadings and exhibits

submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent Judge.

The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible entry case did not taint her action with grave

abuse of authority, even if defendant had alleged that the land in question was under agricultural tenancy, and

that there was an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be divested of

jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the nature of an action and a

court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the plaintiff. Basic is the rule that the material

averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And,

jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple

expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the

parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an


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Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the

land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted. This matter was even brought up on a petition for

certiorari with prohibition to the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied. These

antecedents are sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of authority in

assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her sala.


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9. BERNARTE v. CA

FACTS: Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia,

Leticia Arastia-Montenegro and Juanita Arastia, filed a complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act

No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,

Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court.

It was alleged that after the EDSA Revolution, herein petitioners, who organized themselves into the

Anibang Manggagawa sa Agricultura (A.M.A.), illegally intruded into the land located at Lubao, Pampanga

(with an aggregate area of around 210 hectares) of the plaintiffs, burned the existing sugarcane plants and

started to cultivate small portions thereof. As a result, the land was abandoned by Rustico Coronal, the civil

lessee, and taken over by plaintiff-owners. Alleging further that there had been "definite" findings and rulings by

the Department of Agrarian Reform" that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the parties, petitioners

herein continued to forcibly enter, intrude into and molest the possession of the over the land in question in

violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657. The complaint prayed for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order to enjoin petitioners from entering into the land and intruding in the possession thereof and,

after hearing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which should be made permanent after a full-

blown trial.

Petitioners averred that they had been in continuous and peaceful possession of their respective tillages since

1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratrix of the landholding in question. They moved for

the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction as it was the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to

Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, that had jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, on November 29, 1989,

petitioners filed before the DARAB a complaint against Estrella Arastia (DARAB Case No. 161-P'89), the

complaint alleged that on September 25, 1989, through the use and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia

forcibly evicted and drove them out of their landholdings, harvested and appropriated their standing rice crops,

destroyed their vegetable crops, took their deep well and set fire on their houses.

After conducting the necessary proceedings, the BARCs found that petitioners had been in possession and

cultivation of their respective farmholdings. This fact was contained in the report dated May 23, 1988 of Mr.

Vicente Jimenez, CARPO/Officer-in-Charge, Provincial Office of Pampanga, to the Secretary of the

Department of Agrarian Reform which was transmitted to the DARAB on September 18, 1989.

ISSUE: Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the Arastias, petitioners should

be reminded that the allegations in a compliant are determinative factors of said issue. On this matter, the

Court declared:


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10. RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA INC. v. DIMATULAC

FACTS: The deed of sale in favor of Reyes was cancelled by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by

reason of her non-occupancy of said property, and made the land available for distribution to the landless

residents of San Rafael. In 1971, respondents took possession of the property and were allocated portions of

200 square meters each. They paid the purchase price and awaited their Emancipation Patent titles.

Despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the government, Reyes sold the property to the

spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon in a Deed of Sale dated April 4, 1973. The spouses thereafter

obtained TCT No. 106153 thereon. On finding, however, that respondents were in possession of the property,

Valentin and Razon filed a complaint for recovery and damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case

No. 6152, with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac. The Republic intervened in said case and along with

respondents, contending that the title of the spouses was null and void, because the sale by Reyes was in

violation of the terms and conditions of sale of the lot by the RPA to Reyes. The trial court decided in favor of

the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon. But on appeal, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909,

entitled "Spouses Maximo E. Valentin and Retina Razon v. Sps. Ricardo Garcia and Mona Macabili, et al.,"

reversed the judgment, cancelled the title of the spouses, and decreed the reversion of the property to the

government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.

meanwhile, on February 15, 1987, or during the pendency of the case, Razon mortgaged the property to

petitioner rural bank to secure a loan. The property was subsequently extra-judicially foreclosed when Razon

failed to pay the loan and on October 20, 1987, petitioner purchased the property. TCT No. 330969 was

accordingly issued to herein petitioner.

Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac. Petitioner

alleged that respondents were occupying the property by mere tolerance as they had no contract of lease with

it, nor right or claim annotated on its title. It also averred that it had advised respondents of its purchase of the

property and had demanded that respondents vacate the same, but its notice went unheeded. Respondents in

their Answer claimed that they had been occupants of the land since 1971 and had been awarded as

beneficiaries by the government after the titles of Reyes and Razon were nullified. They also maintained that

the lots had been reverted to the government by virtue of the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.

14909. MTC dismissed the case. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC dismissing herein petitioner's

complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondents. The appellate court also dismissed the

petition and ruled that the possession of respondents was not by mere tolerance but by lawful mandate of the

law and by virtue of its final judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for

unlawful deatainer of the petitioner bank?


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11. DURAN VS . COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. Nos. 125256, 126973, May 2, 2006

FACTS: The complaint in the case at bench is for Reconveyance of certain portions of a 449 square meter

parcel of land situated in Mabolo, CebuCity covered by TCT No. 99527 in the name of defendant-appellant

Jesus Duran who is married to Demetria Duran. Plaintiffs-appellees Jorge Olivar, Praxedes Umpad

Gantuangco assisted by husband Alberto Gantuangco, Emilio Dichos, Luisa Nuez assisted by her husband

Faustino Nunez and Juanito Lawas sought to recover the portions on which they have built their respective

dwellings as shown on a Sketch Plan of the controverted lot.

TCT No. 25018 shows that the prior owner of the lot was one Antonina Oporto who leased out the property to

the plaintiffs and the defendants. Oporto decided to sell the whole lot later. Two witnesses namely plaintiffs-

appellees Jorge Olivar and Praxedes Gantuangco gave concurring testimonies that plaintiffs and defendants

requested owner-lessor Antonina Oporto to sell the lot to them. Evidence further shows that the latter acceded

to sell the land to the parties at P100.00 per square meter. Defendant-appellant Jesus Duran however was

designated by plaintiffs to negotiate for the lowering of the purchase price. This fact is practically corroborated

by defendants-appellants claim that it was Jesus who insisted that he be the one to bargain with Antonina

Oporto. Subsequently however, defendant-appellant Jesus bought the lot in its entirety for himself from

Antonina Oporto on for the sum of P37,000.00. The aggrieved plaintiffs-appellees learned of the transaction

only when they were summoned to appear before the barangay captain in anticipation of the filing of the case

for unlawful detainer. As a consequence, plaintiffs-appellees impute bad faith on defendant-appellant Jesus

Duran.

Defendants-appellants filed an Unlawful Detainer case with the Municipal Trial Court, Cebu City.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners against them.

ISSUE:WON Court of Appeals dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer valid?

HELD: Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the

parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to

create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any

such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on

the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest

and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or

circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested

with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand,

constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and

prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of

confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to

hold.


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The dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer, we find the same correct in view of the operative

antecedents.

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and

unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his

pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the

issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

In this case, petitioners assert a right to possess by virtue of their purchase of the property. Private

respondents, on the other hand, also claim ownership by virtue of constructive trust. The issue of ownership,

being inextricably linked with that of possession, should therefore be resolved for purposes of determining the

question of possession.

Given the Court of Appealss ruling that petitioners assertion of ownership is unlawful and that private

respondents are entitled to reconveyance, the appellate court could not but take its own findings into account

to determine who among the parties has a better right to possession. It correctly dismissed the complaint for

unlawful detainer and ruled that petitioners are obliged to turn over the possession of the pertinent portions of

the property to private respondents being the owners thereof.

As regards the procedural question of whether the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the

petition purportedly filed late because private respondents filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the

RTCs decision, it is settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the RTC in the

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases.[12] Petitioners

contention should, perforce, be rejected.


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12. ROBERTS vSs. PAPIO, G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007

FACTS: Sometime in 1982 she purchased from defendant a residential house and lot situated at Brgy.

Valenzuela, Makati City. Upon Papios pleas to continue staying in the property, they executed a two-year

lease contract which commenced on May 1, 1982. The monthly rental was P800.00. Thereafter, TCT No.

114478 was issued in her favor and she paid all the realty taxes due on the property. When the term of the

lease expired, she still allowed Papio and his family to continue leasing the property. However, he took

advantage of her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and refused to pay despite repeated

demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letterthrough counsel requiring Papio to pay rentals from January

1986 up to May 1998 and to vacate the leased property. The accumulated arrears in rental are as follows: (a)

P360,000.00 fromJanuary 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997 at P2,500.00 per month; and (b) P50,000.00, from

January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998 atP10,000.00 per month. She came to the Philippines but all efforts at an

amicable settlement proved futile. Thus, in April 1999, she sent the final demand letter to defendant directing

him and his family to pay and immediately vacate the leased premises. Amelia Roberts, through her attorney-

in-fact, Matilde Aguilar, filed a Complaintfor unlawful detainer and damages against Martin Papio before the

MeTC.

Papio alleged that he executed on April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of lease. Roberts, his

cousin who is a resident of California arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the property. Believing

that she had made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property, he accepted. She

then remitted P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate

mortgage. However, he was alarmed when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared

(for P83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also demanded that the defendant turn

over the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then believed that if he

signed the deed of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to allow

him to redeem or reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount.[18] When Roberts agreed, Papio

signed the deed of absolute sale.

Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property for

P250,000.00. In July 1985, since Roberts was by then already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized

representative, Perlita Ventura, the amount ofP150,000.00 as partial payment for the property.[19] On June 16,

1986, she again remitted P100,000.00, through Ventura. Both payments were evidenced by receipts signed

by Ventura.[20] Roberts then declared that she would execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the title

to the property. However, Ventura had apparently misappropriated P39,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 that she

had received; Roberts then demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of

absolute sale. Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the failure of her

authorized representative to remit the full amount ofP250,000.00. Despite Papios demands, Roberts refused


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to execute a deed of absolute sale. Accordingly, defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to

demand payment of rental and eject him from the property.

ISSUE: WON the MeTC had jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of who between

petitioner and respondent is the owner of the property and entitled to the de facto possession thereof.

HELD: Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises the defense of

ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of

ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment

rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in

no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment would not bar an action

between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.[46]

The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property of the

defendant.[47] The MeTC is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply because the

defendant asserts ownership over the property.

The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or de facto possession of the

property. Even if the defendant claims juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim

that his transaction with the plaintiff relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage, or that he had

repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC may still delve into and take cognizance of the case and

make an initial or provisional determination of who between the plaintiff and the defendant is the owner and, in

the process, resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession. The MeTC, in unlawful detainer case,

decides the question of ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the issue of

possession.[48] The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or

interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action

brought specifically to settle the question with finality, in this case, Civil Case No. 01-851 which respondent

filed before the RTC.


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13. TECSON vs. GUTIERREZ, 452 SCRA 781

FACTS: On August 21, 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent before the

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 2287.[2] They alleged that they were the owners of a

residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-62466, which they leased to respondent for

and in consideration of four cavans of palay yearly under an oral lease agreement. The lot was to be used by

the respondent as the site of his dwelling. They declared that starting the year 1995, respondent failed to pay

the yearly rental. Thus, they considered the lease terminated and made oral and written demands on him to

vacate the property. Respondent, however, stubbornly refused to leave.

On the same day, petitioners also filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent before the MTC

docketed as Civil Case No. 2288.[3] They charged him of occupying, since January 1997, a portion of their

residential lot under TCT No. T-62465, without their consent. This lot is adjacent to the subject lot of Civil Case

No. 2287.

In his answer, respondent averred that he was a farmer beneficiary of a homelot composed of the subject

parcels of land. He alleged that the petitioners unlawfully reclassified the lot from agricultural to residential,

subdivided it, and evicted the tenants. Respondent also stated that the same lots were the subject of DARAB

Case No. R-03-028101-98.

On August 21, 1998, the MTC decided Civil Case No. 2288 in favor of petitioners. It ruled that respondent

cannot claim entitlement to acquire the subject lot as his homelot for the following reasons: (1) respondent was

not a tenant-farmer of the petitioners; (2) the land was residential and not agricultural, and the respondent was

using it for purposes other than agricultural; (3) the subject lot was far from respondents farm; and (4) no

certification was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform that the land was respondents homelot.[4] The

MTC ordered respondent to vacate the premises and to pay petitioners a monthly rental of P800 beginning

January 1997 until he vacates the premises.[5]

On August 24, 1998, the MTC likewise decided Civil Case No. 2287 in favor of petitioners based on the same

reasons. The MTC ordered the respondent to vacate the parcel of land and to pay petitioners four cavans of

palay or its equivalent per annum beginning 1995 and every year thereafter until he vacates the subject

land.[6]

Respondent appealed the decisions to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He maintained that it is the Department

of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the MTC, which has jurisdiction over the actions. The

RTC, however, affirmed in toto the MTC decisions.

ISSUE: WON the case involved agrarian reform matters which should be resolved by the DARAB and not by

the MTC.


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HELD: NO. At the outset, we must point out that this appeal stemmed from ejectment suits wherein the

jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint[12] and the character of the relief

sought.[13] In their complaint for unlawful detainer, petitioners alleged that the respondent unlawfully withheld

possession of the land despite several demands on him to vacate the premises, and that these demands were

made after the latter failed to pay the rent. Likewise, in their complaint for forcible entry, petitioners averred

that respondent deprived them of physical possession of the land by means of stealth and strategy. Based on

the averments in the complaint, the Municipal Trial Court indeed properly acquired jurisdiction over the cases

below between herein petitioners and the respondent.

Although respondent impugned the validity of petitioners title over the property and claimed it to be his

homelot, this assertion could not divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases.[14] The court could

not be divested of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases on the mere allegation that the defendant asserts

ownership over the litigated property.[15] Moreover, a pending action involving ownership of the same property

does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings.[16] The ejectment

cases can proceed independently of the DARAB case. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the

defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting

ownership over the disputed property.[17]

It is settled that the only issue for resolution in ejectment suits is the physical or material possession of the

property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.[18] In forcible entry and

unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the

question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, nonetheless, has

the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining

the issue of possession.[19]

In our view, petitioners are entitled to possess the parcels of land. For respondent failed to show that the land

had been awarded to him by the Department of Agrarian Reform as his homelot.


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14.BUGARIN vs. PALISOC, G.R. No. 157985, December 2, 2005

FACTS: The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 11799,

filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision [4] dated

February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It

also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals.

Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 while private respondents

moved for execution pending appeal. On January 8, 2003, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision with the

modification that petitioners must start paying rentals from the date of the appealed decision.

On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of

Execution. In an order dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied the motion and granted private respondents'

motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a

writ of execution pending appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003, petitioners were served with the writ and

notice to vacate.

Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the mandatory requirements of Section 28 [7] of Rep.

Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no

consultation on the matter of resettlement. They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial

assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of

the law.

ISSUE:WON the Orders of the MeTC proper.

HELD:YES. Under Section 19, [10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible

entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the

court's duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting

an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable

compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. [12] Once the

Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under Section 21, [13]

Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme

Court.

Clearly, petitioners' petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost

remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is

available but was lost through fault or negligence. [16] Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not

prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory. [17] The RTC acted correctly when it remanded

the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.[18]


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Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment.

Both orders were issued after the requisite notice and hearing. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not issue

any writ of preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the judgment.

Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order of demolition by filing a petition for review with prayer for

TRO before us. We earlier denied said prayer for TRO. We also find petitioners' contention that the said orders

violated Rep. Act No. 7279, particularly Section 28(c), [19] totally without merit. Under the provision, eviction or

demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar.

Moreover, nothing is shown on record that petitioners are underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined in

Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279. [20] The procedure for the execution of the eviction or demolition order

under Section 28(c) is, in our view, not applicable.


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15. ANTONIO vs. GERONIMO, 476 SCRA 340

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainerwas filed before the MTC of Antipolo, by Alexander Catolos (private

respondent), who alleged that he was the registered owner of 4 parcels of land situated at Mayamot, Antipolo,

Rizal. The defendants therein were the petitioners, who were occupying the said properties.

Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land without requiring them to pay

rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate the same in the event that the former would

need the premises. However, when private respondent did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises,

petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand.

The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent. In a Decision , respondent judge ordered

petitioners to vacate the subject properties and pay the amount of P200.00 as reasonable compensation for

the use and occupation of the properties, as well as P20,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorneys fees.

Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. The lower court granted the motion

and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition

Partial demolition had already taken place by April 1994. Private respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion,

seeking the full implementation of the writ of demolition. This was granted.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed Resolution, authorizing Mayor Daniel Garcia to acquire thru

expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public purposes/socialized housing. Another resolution,

was issued amending the previous resolution by further authorizing the municipal mayor to secure financing for

the acquisition of the said parcel of land subject of this case.

In Resolution the Sangguniang Bayan informed respondent court of the expropriation and the fact that the

funds required for the same have already been included in the 1996 budget, and requested that the demolition

be held in abeyance. At this point, the writ of demolition had not yet been fully implemented.

The demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE: WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the writ of execution and

demolition in an ejectment case.

HELD:NO. In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is

immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may be stayed by the defendant only by: (a) perfecting an

appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable

compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal.[12] These

requisites must concur. Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to

pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and

upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the


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appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement; hence, if it is

not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases which provide for the exceptions to the rule cited above. These are the

existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the

monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a material change in the

situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable or where there is compelling urgency for the

execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances

In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo.These resolutions cannot

partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in the ejectment proceedings. They

merely express at most an intention to expropriate. Private respondent correctly maintained that there was no

positive act of instituting the intended expropriation proceedings.

Assuming arguendo that instead of resolutions, an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, we still

find for private respondent. There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of eminent

domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The power of eminent domain must not be

exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for resolving a critical problem such as urban squatting. The safeguards

afforded by law require strict observance.

Expropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been instituted.


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16. SPOUSES MARCIANO CHUA and CHUA CHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES

MARIANO C. MORENO and SHEILA MORENO, respondent.

FACTS: on March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered judgment for

petitioners [private respondents herein] with respect to four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City,

ordering the ejectment of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of

P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to

petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The decision was received by private respondents counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he filed

a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the

RTC.

On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although

private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a

deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule

70, sec. 8.

Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots. Also claimed that while

they are willing to pay bond, they had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure

a bond.

RTC denied motion for execution, on the ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the

ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private

respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on time. CA overruled RTC (RTC erred in extending the period for

filing a supersedeas bond).

ISSUE: WON RTC wrong in extending bond period. (YES)

HELD: The bond was filed out of time. The motion for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the

petitioners received a copy of the MTCs decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no

supersedeas bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as

a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the

aforecited rule.

To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment (ejectment) while the appeal is pending, the foregoing

provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files

a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of

the appeal (Sec 8 rule 70 ROC).


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Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have computed

this themselves.


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17. BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner,

vs.

HON. CARLOS Y. GONZALES, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Branch VI;

PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Iloilo, and JUANITO PEA, respondents.

FACTS: In the city court of Iloilo City, in a decision dated April 29, 1976, ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an

apartment in a building owned by Juanita Pea and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the premises have

been vacated, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. It was not indicated in the decision when the payment of the

monthly rental should commence and no back rentals was adjudged.

Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he had been occupying the apartment

since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment; that the commissioner's report on the alleged

dilapidated condition of the building was not set for hearing, that he occupied the apartment as residence and

for use as a carinderia which allegedly was his sole means of livelihood, and that he should be given a

preference to reoccupy the apartment after the completion of the repairs.

The city court denied the motion in its order of June 2, 1976. Bienvenido Once appealed. He deposited in the

city court rentals from april to September 1976.

Juanito Pea, the owner of the apartment, filed in the Court of First Instance a motion dated July 9, 1976 for

immediate execution of the city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a

supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.

Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution (defendant not paying superseades bond).

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending appeal. (YES)

HELD: No such bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment. The

attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas bond.

Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the

judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution of the city

court's judgment.

Order of execution was not justified under the rules (ROC when it was 1977). Under the rules of court at that

time, it only requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that

bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to time. The execution proceeding

already mentioned is void.


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18. Siy vs NLRC

For resolution is private respondent Elena Embangs motion to cite Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of

petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court for delaying this case and impeding the execution of the

judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay and holiday

premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in

favor of Embang (He was a regular employee). On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC) denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with

some modifications on 13 month pay. NIRC denied the MFR and CA denied Certiorari and Redconsideration of

Siy even up to the SC Siy tried to vent his claims which was also denied.

Embang filed a motion for execution. Atty. Quevedo filed in his answer that Embang rejected offers for

reinstatement. When the labor arbiter granted the writ of execution, Atty. Quevedo again went to the higher

courts.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Quevedo is in contempt (YES indirect)

HELD: SC denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the

decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court)

remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.

Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and

may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of

fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries

which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality

of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a writ of execution is not appealable. Thus, Atty.

Quevedos deceptively innocent appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules

of procedure resulting in the obstruction of justice.


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19. Encinas vs National Book Store july 28, 2005

FACTS: In the Resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T. Calimag, counsel for Roberto

P. Madrigal-Acopiado and his attorney-in-fact Datu Mohaldin R.B. Sulaiman, to show cause why he should not

be cited for contempt of court for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial decision to this Court.

This concerns his compliance therewith entitled Motion to Show Cause.

Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of Court and Petition-In-Interventionon (to

which was appended a copy of the fake decision) behalf of his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will

prevail. He reasons that he was misled in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the forged judicial

decision) made available to him at the time of submission of the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. At the

same time, he asserts that there was an honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that there

was never any malice intended in the submission of the questioned documents. In fact, he even welcomes the

referral of the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation so as to identify the mastermind of the production

of the fake decision.

ISSUE: WON the lawyers are guilty of contempt (YES direct)

HELD: Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a

court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the

court, and can be punished summarily without hearing.

It is insulting to assert a claim before this Supreme Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and

conceived by one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would pass judicial muster. The

Supreme Court cannot accept counsels declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a member of

the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know better. He is required to thoroughly prepare himself

on the law and facts of his case and the evidence he will adduce. The minimum he could have done was to

verify with the appropriate authorities the documents upon which his clients based their claims, and not have

relied on his clients assertions.

Counsels actuations may even constitute a violation of the lawyers oath. As an officer of the court, he is

reminded of his basic duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial

officers, to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled

by any artifice, and to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.


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20. Regalado vs GO

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter

by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz

Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally

dismissed from employment.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), EHSI, Kunack and Barin employed the legal

services of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where herein petitioner Atty.

Regalado worked as an associate. NLRC reversed Labor Arbiters rulings. Gos MFR denied.

Respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. CA granted Gos petition for certiorari.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties

of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim.

With the approval of the Labor Arbiter; In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day,

issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.

After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on 29 July

2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July

2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel

moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with

respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel. The waiver and quitclaim was declared void.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Regalado is in contempt (NO)

HELD: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2)

through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural

requirements as outlined must be complied with.

Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting

particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and

directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner

Atty. Regalados compliance with the appellate courts directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty

of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the

commencement of the indirect contempt action.

Clearly, respondent Gos Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in mot

assignment no 13

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