assignment1 compilation

8/19/2019 Assignment1 Compilation

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW IIATTY. CHRISTIAN VILLASIS

ASSIGNMENT NO.1

CASE NO. 1ABAD, SHAREL ANN N.

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. HON. JANSEN R.RODRIGUEZ, in his !"!i#$ !s P%&si'in( J)'(& *+ #h& R&(i*n! #%i! C*)%# *+M!ni!, B%!nh -, JOSEPH CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS,s)s#i#)#&' $ h&% s*n, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIAG.R. NO. 1/00 NOVEMBER 0, 0211

3ACTS4 Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners and StrongholdInsurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc., Elena Tiu el !ilar, "sia "tlanticResources #entures Inc., Registers of eeds of $anila and $alabon, and all personsclaiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching %Ramon& and his successors'in'interest. TheComplaint, captioned as one for (isinheritance, eclaration of )ullity of "greement and*ai+er, "ffida+it of Etra'-udicial Settlement, eed of "bsolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title ith !rayer for /the0 Issuance of /a0 Temporary Restraining 1rder and /a0 *rit of !reliminary In2unction,( as docketed as Ci+il Case )o. 34'536465 andraffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of $anila %RTC&.

Respondents alleged that they are the heirs of 8im San, also knon as "ntonio Ching 9

Tiong Cheng 9 Ching Cheng Suy %"ntonio&. Respondents -oseph Cheng %-oseph& and-aime Cheng %-aime& are allegedly the children of "ntonio ith his common'la ife,respondent $ercedes Igne %$ercedes&. Respondent 8ucina Santos %8ucina& claimedthat she as also a common'la ife of "ntonio. The respondents a+erred that Ramonmisrepresented himself as "ntonio:s and 8ucina:s son hen in truth and in fact, he asadopted and his birth certificate as merely simulated. Ramon misrepresented thatthere ere only si real estate properties left by "ntonio. The respondents alleged thatRamon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. 1n 1ctober 4;, 5;;


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the Complaint hich can be properly settled in an ordinary ci+il action, but as deniedby the RTC. C" upheld RTC.

ISSUE4 *hether or not the RTC should ha+e granted the $otion to ismiss filed by the!ETITI1)ERS on the alleged ground of the RTC:s lack of 2urisdiction o+er the sub2ect

matter of the complaint.

RULING4 )o re+ersible errors ere committed by the RTC and the C" hen they bothruled that the denial of the petitioners: second motion to dismiss Ci+il Case )o. 34'536465 as proper. E+en ithout del+ing into the procedural allegations of therespondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estoppedfrom =uestioning the RTC:s 2urisdiction after ha+ing +alidly submitted to it hen the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant !etition is still in order.

"n action for recon+eyance and annulment of title ith damages is a ci+il action,hereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as

ad+ancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a specialproceeding, hich concomitantly re=uires the application of specific rules as pro+idedfor in the Rules of Court. " special proceeding is a remedy by hich a party seeks toestablish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary ci+ilaction here a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or thepre+ention or redress of a rong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not acomplaint should be filed.

>nder "rticle ;5< of the )CC, disinheritance can be effected only through a ill hereinthe legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees ith the RTC and the C"that hile the respondents in their Complaint and "mended Complaint sought the

disinheritance of Ramon, no ill or any instrument supposedly effecting the dispositionof "ntonio:s estate as e+er mentioned. ?ence, despite the prayer for Ramon:sdisinheritance, Ci+il Case )o. 34'536465 does not partake of the nature of a specialproceeding and does not call for the probate court:s eercise of its limited 2urisdiction.

It is an elementary rule of procedural la that 2urisdiction of the court o+er the sub2ectmatter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespecti+e of hether or notthe plaintiff is entitled to reco+er upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. "s anecessary conse=uence, the 2urisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend uponthe defenses set up in the anser or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherise, the=uestion of 2urisdiction ould almost entirely depend upon the defendant. *hatdetermines the 2urisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearingfrom the allegations in the complaint. The a+erments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.

Court agrees ith the C" that the nullification of the documents sub2ect of Ci+il Case)o. 34'536465 could be achie+ed in an ordinary ci+il action, hich in this specific caseas instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon.

2 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W I I

A S S I G N M E N T 1


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Ci+il Case )o. 34'536465 as not instituted to conclusi+ely resol+e the issues relatingto the administration, li=uidation and distribution of "ntonio:s estate, hence, not theproper sub2ect of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceasedperson under Rules @A';5 of the Rules of Court.

CASE NO. 0ALEGRE, MUTYA S.

LUISA 5HO MONTA6ER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER7BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER7DALUPAN 7 VERSUS 7 SHARIADISTRICT COURT, 3OURTH SHARIA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILINGDISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAERG.R. NO. 189/8: JANUARY 02, 022/

3ACTS4 In 5;6


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court. Jurthermore, the reliefs prayed for re+eal that it is the intention of the pri+aterespondents to seek 2udicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. These include thefolloingF %5& the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent and %4& the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

4. HES. !etitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate frombeing a party defendant in a ci+il action applies to a special proceeding such as thesettlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. >nlike a ci+il action hich hasdefinite ad+erse parties, a special proceeding has no definite ad+erse party. Thedefinitions of a ci+il action and a special proceeding, respecti+ely, in the Rules illustratethis difference. " ci+il action, in hich a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the pre+ention or redress of a rong necessarily has definitead+erse parties, ho are either the plaintiff or defendant. 1n the other hand, a specialproceeding, by hich a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, hasone definite party, ho petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or

particular fact, but no definite ad+erse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis thatthe estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. "s a specialproceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determineall the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to thoseentitled to the same.

CASE NO. ;ANGANGAN, AL3RENDO JR. T.

SHE5ER v. ESTATE O3 ALICE SHE5ERGR. NO. 1:8/10 DECEMBER 1;, 0228

3ACTS4 "lice Sheker died and her estate as left under the administration of #ictoria$edina. "lice left a holographic ill hich as admitted to probate by the Regional TrialCourt of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claimsagainst the estate. "lan -oseph Sheker, a creditor of the estate, filed a contingentmoney claim in the amount of !hp 43


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RULING4 nder Sections 5 and 6, Rule 7< of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons ha+ing money claims against thedecedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respecti+e money claims otherise, they ould be barred, sub2ect to certain

eceptions.

" money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims hich is tobe recogniKed and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. "nd as a motion, its office is not to initiate ne litigation, but to bring amaterial but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in hich the motion isfiled. " motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidentalmatters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some =uestion that is collateral to themain ob2ect of the action and is connected ith and dependent upon the principalremedy.


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CASE NO. 9BALTAZAR, ESTRELLA C.

HON. JOSE 3. 3ERNANDEZ, JUDGE O3 THE COURT O3 3IRST INSTANCE,NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL. #S. HERMINIO

MARAVILLAG.R. NO. L718// MARCH ;1, 1/-9

3ACTS4 1n "ugust 46, 5;67, respondent ?erminio $ara+illa filed ith he Court of JirstInstance of )egros 1ccidental a petition for probate of the ill of his deceased ifeigna $ara+illa ho died on "ugust 54 of that same year. In the ill the sur+i+ingspouse as named as the uni+ersal heir and eecutor.

1n September A3, 5;67, !edro, "suncion, and Regina $ara+illa %brother and sisters of the deceased igna $ara+illa& filed an opposition to the probate of the ill, on theground, inter alia, that the ill as not signed on each page by the testatri in the

presence of the attesting itnesses and of one another.

1n $arch 5


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prohibition& prayed for are not in aid of appellate 2urisdiction of the Court of "ppeals,since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed anopposition. on the grounds that the amount in contro+ersy is less than !433,333.33 andthe decision of the probate court %of Jebruary 7, 5;


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Suntay, 8'A37@, -uly A5, 5;6, 63 1.G. 6A45 #ano +. #da. de Garces, et al., 8'


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hich a+ers that there is no sufficient e+idence on record to 2ustify and support themotions for the remo+al of the herein co'administrator $atias S. $atute. Instead of resol+ing the foregoing motion, the probate 2udge issued the contro+erted order remo+ing the respondent as co'administrator ithout gi+ing him the opportunity toadduce his on e+idence despite his eplicit reser+ation that he be afforded the chance

to introduce e+idence in his behalf in the e+ent of denial of his motion to dismiss and9or demurrer to e+idence.

The probate court issued an order remo+ing $atias S. $atute as co'administrator.?ence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order remo+ing himas co'administrator is a patent nullity. >pon the other hand, the petitioner ad+ances thereason in support of the order of remo+al that the probate 2udge accorded therespondent all the opportunity to adduce his e+idence but the latter resorted to dilatorytactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to e+idence.

ISSUE4 *hether or not Rule A6 %no Rule AA& regarding 2udgment on demurrer to

e+idence is applicable to special proceedings such that its disregard by the probatecourt amounts to gra+e abuse of discretion.

RULING4 Hes. Section 4, Rule @4 of the Rules of Court pro+ides that in the absence of special pro+isions, the rules pro+ided for in ordinary ci+il actions shall be, as far aspracticable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the abo+e cited Rulein special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authoriKed by the Rules. Instead of resol+ing the foregoing motion, the probate 2udge issued the contro+erted order remo+ing the respondent as co'administrator ithout gi+ing him the opportunity toadduce his on e+idence despite his eplicit reser+ation that he be afforded the chanceto introduce e+idence in his behalf in the e+ent of denial of his motion to dismiss and9or

demurrer to e+idence. The Court +ie that the abo+e actuation of the probate 2udgeconstituted gra+e abuse of discretion hich dooms his impro+ident order as nullity.

To bolster, the ruling of the Supreme Court, to itF This duty is pro2ected into bolder relief if e consider, hich e must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as ell as insubstance a demurrer to evidence alloed by Rule A6, by +irtue of hich the defendantdoes not lose his right to offer e+idence in the e+ent that his motion is denied. Said RulestatesF

"fter the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his e+idence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted , may mo+e for a

dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and la the plaintiff has shon no right torelief.

The application of the abo+ecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, isauthoriKed by section 4 of Rule @4 hich direct that in the (absence of specialpro+isions, the rules pro+ided for in ordinary ci+il actions shall be, as far as practicable,applicable in special proceedings.(




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CASE NO. -JOSEPH BUSTAMANTE

VENTURA V. VENTURAG.R. NO. L70-;2- APRIL 08, 1/

3ACTS4 "ppellant $aria #entura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio#entura hile $iguel #entura and -uana Cardona are his son and sa+ing spouse hoare also the brother and mother of $aria #entura. 1n the other hand, appellees$ercedes and Gregoria #entura are the deceased:s legitimate children ith his former ife, the late !aulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees as denied by thedeceased in his ill.

Before his death, Gregorio #entura filed a petition for the probate of his ill hich as

e+entually admitted. This hoe+er, did not include the appellees. In the ill, theappellant, although an illegitimate child, as named and appointed by the testator to bethe eecutri of his ill and the administratri of his estate. "fter the death of Gregorio,appellant $aria filed later on a motion for her appointment as eecutri and for theissuance of letters testamentary. Such as granted. Thereafter, $aria filed her accountsof administration but hich as opposed due to the +eracity of the reports as notreflecting the true income of the estate and epenses, by the spouses Ee=uiel #ictorioand Gregoria #entura and by the spouses $ercedes #entura and !edro CorpuK. "sincident thereto, four motions ere filed by $ercedes #entura and Gregoria #entura,one of hich as to remo+e $aria as the eecutri of said estate on the grounds thatshe is grossly incompetent maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of

the estate in the in+entory merely an illegitimate daughter ho can ha+e no harmoniousrelations ith the appellees she has neglected to render her accounts of administrationand that she has ith permanent physical defect hindering her from efficientlyperforming her duties as an eecutri. $aria filed her opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that such be denied or held in abeyance until after the status of $ercedes and Gregoria #entura as heirs of the testator is finally decided. The Court of Jirst Instance hoe+er ruled for her %$aria& remo+al as such and appointed in her place$ercedes and Gregoria upon filing of a bond and be issued ith letters of administrationupon their =ualification.

ISSUE4 *hether the remo+al as proper.

RULING4 Hes. $ercedes and Gregoria in the decision in Ci+il Cases )os.53


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institution of heir but the de+ises and legacies shall be +alid insofar as they are notinofficious,( and as a result, intestacy follos, thereby rendering the pre+iousappointment of $aria #entura as eecutri moot and academic. This ould nonecessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the folloing pro+isionF

Section


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sur+i+ing children of the late Troadio $analo, filed a petition ith the respondentRegional Trial Court of $anila for the 2udicial settlement of the estate of their late father,Troadio $analo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo $analo, asadministrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directing thepublication of the order for three %A& consecuti+e eeks in a nespaper of generalcirculation in $etro $anila, and further directing ser+ice by registered mail of the saidorder upon the heirs named in the petition at their respecti+e addresses mentionedtherein. uring the hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order declaring thehole orld in default, ecept the go+ernment, and set the reception of e+idence of thepetitioners. !etitioners file their opposition. Se+eral pleadings ere subse=uently filedby petitioners culminating to the filing of an 1mnibus $otion.

!etitioners claim that the petition in S!. !R1C )o. ;4'


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Subse=uently, Lenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint ith the Securities and EchangeCommission against 1scar. The complaint stated that it is a deri+ati+e suit initiated andfiled by Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of LE)IT? I)S>R")CEC1R!1R"TI1) hich are no or formerly in the control, custody, and9or possession of

respondent and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses !edro and "nastacia Reyes that ere arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated by 1scar for himself and hich ere not collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and9or settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses.

1scar filed a $otion to eclare Complaint as )uisance or ?arassment Suit. "nd,claimed that it is not a bona fide deri+ati+e suit as it partakes of the nature of a petitionfor the settlement of estate of the deceased "nastacia that is outside the 2urisdiction of aspecial commercial court.

The RTC denied the motion in part. 1scar ent to the C" on a petition for certiorari ,prohibition, and mandamus. The appellate court affirmed the RTC 1rder. " petition for

re+ie on certiorari under Rule 6 of the Rules of Court as filed.

ISSUE4 *hether or not the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has 2urisdiction o+er the sub2ect matter of Rodrigos complaint.

RULING4 The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and directstatement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and mustspecify the relief sought. Section 6, Rule 7 of the Re+ised Rules of Court pro+ides thatin all a+erments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistakemust be stated ith particularity. These rules find specific application to Section 6%a& of !.. )o. ;34'" hich speaks of corporate de+ices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and9or to the stockholders.

"llegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats arelargely conclusions of la that, ithout supporting statements of the facts to hich theallegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effecti+e cause of action. The late-ustice -ose Jeria, a noted authority in Remedial 8a, declared that fraud and mistakeare re=uired to be a+erred ith particularity in order to enable the opposing party tocontro+ert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake. Testedagainst these standards, e find that the charges of fraud against 1scar ere notproperly supported by the re=uired factual allegations. *hile the complaint containedallegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the contro+ersy ithin the special commercial courts 2urisdiction they

are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of la.

)ot e+ery allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporateofficers ill bring the case ithin the special commercial courts 2urisdiction. To fall ithinthis 2urisdiction, there must be sufficient neus shoing that the corporations nature,structure, or poers ere used to facilitate the fraudulent de+ice or scheme. Contrary tothis concept, the complaint presented a re+erse situation. )o corporate poer or office




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as alleged to ha+e facilitated the transfer of the shares rather, 1scar, as an indi+idualand ithout reference to his corporate personality, as alleged to ha+e transferred theshares of "nastacia to his name, alloing him to become the ma2ority and controllingstockholder of Lenith, and e+entually, the corporations !resident. This is the essence of the complaint read as a hole.

In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitutea ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In casesgo+erned by the Interim Rules of !rocedure on Intra'Corporate Contro+ersies, hoe+er,a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint tosho on its face hat are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainantishes to in+oke the courts special commercial 2urisdic.

CASE NO. /CHAN, RICHARD P.

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO VS. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC.G.R. NO. > DATE4 G.R. NO. 1882-- > SEPTEMBER 11, 022/

3ACTS4 Carlos 8. !uno, ho died on -une 46, 5;


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corporation. uring such interim period, the heirs stand as the e=uitable oners of thestocks, the eecutor or administrator duly appointed by the court being +ested ith thelegal title to the stock. >ntil a settlement and di+ision of the estate is effected, thestocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or eecutor. Conse=uently, duringsuch time, it is the administrator or eecutor ho is entitled to eercise the rights of the

deceased as stockholder.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of hether a person, claimingproprietary rights o+er the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased mustbe +entilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling theestate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child ho claims to be an heir to adecedents estate cannot be ad2udicated in an ordinary ci+il action, as in a case for thereco+ery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, hich is one for specificperformance M to direct respondent corporation to allo petitioner to eercise rightsthat pertain only to the deceased and his representati+es.

CASE NO. 12CHENG,RENLYN B.

CELESTINO BALUS VS. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DECALUNODG.R. NO. 1-/82 JANUARY 1:, 0212

3ACTS4 ?erein petitioner and respondents are the children of the deceased Rufo Balusho died on -uly


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its name, and e+en after it as e+entually bought back by the respondents from theBank.

RULING4 )o. The rights to a person:s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and

transmissible rights and obligations eisting at the time of his death, as ell as thosehich ha+e accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case,since Rufo lost onership of the sub2ect property during his lifetime, it only follos thatat the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estateto hich his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents ne+er inherited the sub2ect lot from their father.

"lso, there is nothing in the sub2ect Etra2udicial Settlement to indicate any epressstipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue ith their supposed co'onershipof the contested lot. 1n the contrary, a plain reading of the pro+isions of the Etra2udicialSettlement ould not, in any ay, support petitioner:s contention that it as his and his

sibling:s intention to buy the sub2ect property from the Bank and continue hat theybelie+ed to be co'onership thereof. !etitioner and respondents, therefore, ere rongin assuming that they became co'oners of the sub2ect lot. Jurthermore, petitioner:scontention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co'onership of the sub2ect property contradicts the pro+isions of the sub2ect Etra2udicial Settlementhere they clearly manifested their intention of ha+ing the sub2ect property di+ided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 59A portionof the same. !artition calls for the segregation and con+eyance of a determinate portionof the property oned in common. It seeks a se+erance of the indi+idual interests of each co'oner, +esting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and gi+ingeach one a right to en2oy his estate ithout super+ision or interference from the other. In

other ords, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co'onership, an ob2ecti+ehich negates petitioner:s claims in the present case.

CASE NO. 11CHU, LEA MONA P.

RU3INA LUY LIM vs. COURT O3 APPEALS, AUTO TRUC5 TBA CORPORATION,SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MAR5ETINGCORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INCG.R. NO. 10981: JANUARY 09, 0222

3ACTS4 1n 55 -une 5;;, !astor H. 8im died intestate. ?erein petitioner, as sur+i+ingspouse and duly represented by her nephe George 8uy, filed a 2oint petition for theadministration of the estate of !astor H. 8im before the RTC of NueKon City. !ri+aterespondent corporations, hose properties ere included in the in+entory of the estateof !astor H. 8im, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for eclusionof certain properties from the estate of the decedent.




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In an order dated 37 -une 5;;6, the RTC, sitting as a probate court, granted the pri+aterespondents: tin motions. The Court ordered the eclusion of the real properties of pri+ate respondents from probate proceedings.

Subse=uently, Rufina 8uy 8im filed a +erified amended petition. She alleged that the late!astor H. 8im personally oned during his lifetime the folloing business entities, to itF

"lliance $arketing, Inc., Speed istributing Inc., "uto Truck TB" Corp., "cti+eistributors, Inc. and "ction Company. "ll the enumerated companies capital, assetsand e=uity ere hoe+er, personally oned by the late !astor H 8im. ?ence the allegedstockholders and officers appearing in the respecti+e articles of incorporation of theabo+e business entities ere mere dummies of !astor H. 8im, and they ere listedtherein only for purposes of registration ith the Securities and Echange Commission.!etitioner also a+erred that TCT )o.


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ISSUE4 *hether or not the probate court may decide on the issue hether to include or eclude in the in+entory of the estate of the decedent certain real properties duly

registered in the name of pri+ate respondents.

RULING4 *e reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COUR O! APPEA"#F

. . . The function of resol+ing hether or not a certain property should be includedin the in+entory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is oneclearly ithin the competence of the probate court. ?oe+er, the court:sdetermination is only pro+isional in character, not conclusi+e, and is sub2ect tothe final decision in a separate action hich may be instituted by the parties.

In CUI$O% vs. RA&O"EE , here similarly as in the case at bar, the property sub2ect

of the contro+ersy as duly registered under the Torrens system, *e categoricallystatedF

. . . ?a+ing been apprised of the fact that the property in =uestionas in the possession of third parties and more important, co+eredby a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such thirdparties, the respondent court should ha+e denied the motion of therespondent administrator and ecluded the property in =uestionfrom the in+entory of the property of the estate. It had no authorityto depri+e such third persons of their possession and onership of the property. . .

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the in+entory of the estate of the 8ate!astor H. 8im are in the possession of and are registered in the name of pri+aterespondent corporations, hich under the la possess a personality separate anddistinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the +eil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusi+eness of said titles in fa+or of pri+aterespondents should stand undisturbed.

"ccordingly, the probate court as remiss in denying pri+ate respondents: motion for eclusion. *hile it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restrictedcapacity and eercising limited 2urisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue

orders in+ol+ing inclusion or eclusion of certain properties in the in+entory of the estateof the decedent, and to ad2udge, albeit, pro+isionally the =uestion of title o+er properties,it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by la and reinforced by

2urisprudence, should be eercised 2udiciously, ith due regard and caution to thepeculiar circumstances of each indi+idual case.




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)otithstanding that the real properties ere duly registered under the Torrens systemin the name of pri+ate respondents, and as such ere to be afforded the presumpti+econclusi+eness of title, the probate court ob+iously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamyfact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.

By its denial of the motion for eclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusi+eness of title in fa+or of pri+ate respondents.Certainly, the probate court through such braKen act transgressed the clear pro+isionsof la and infringed settled 2urisprudence on this matter.

"s to the order of the loer court, dated 56 September 5;;6, the Court of "ppealscorrectly obser+ed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch ;A acted ithout 2urisdiction inissuing said order The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bankaccounts in the name of the pri+ate respondent corporations.

*?EREJ1RE, in +ie of the foregoing dis=uisitions, the instant petition is hereby

IS$ISSE for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of "ppeals hich nullifiedand set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch ;A, acting as aprobate court, dated 3 -uly 5;;6 and 54 September 5;;6 is "JJIR$E.

CASE NO. 10CUDALAP, DAGIW7A 5.

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT O3 APPEALS, THIRDDIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO

MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, AND TERESITACUENCO GONZALEZG.R. NO. L709890 OCTOBER 0-, 1/8;

3ACTSF 1n '( !ebruary )*+, Senator $ariano -esus Cuenco died at the $anilaoctors: ?ospital. ?e as sur+i+ed by his ido, the herein petitioner, and their 4 minor sons, all residing in NueKon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondentsherein, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

8ourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a !etition for 8etters of "dministration ith the CJI Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in $anila but a

resident of Cebu ith properties in Cebu and NueKon City.

In the meantime, or specifically on )' &arch )*+,, %a eek after the filing of the Cebupetition& Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition ith the court of first instance of RiKal%NueKon City& for the probate of the deceased:s last will and testament and for theissuance of letters testamentary , here she as named eecutri. Rosa also filed an




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opposition and motion to dismiss in CJI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolutiono+er the opposition until CJI NueKon shall ha+e acted on the probate proceedings.

8ourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CJI NueKon, on ground of lack of 2urisdiction and9or improper +enue, considering that CJI Cebu already ac=uired

eclusi+e 2urisdiction o+er the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss ere denied.1n appeal, the C" ruled in fa+or of 8ourdes and issued a rit of prohibition to CJINueKon to refrain perpetually from proceeding ith the testate proceedings andannulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission toprobate of the decedent:s last ill and testament and appointing petitioner'ido aseecutri. !etitioner:s motion for reconsideration as denied in a resolution of respondent Court of "ppeals, dated 7 -uly 5;


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4. )o. Since the NueKon City court too cogni/ance o+er the probate petition before itand assumed -urisdiction o+er the estate, ith the consent and deference of the Cebucourt, the NueKon City court should be left now , by the same rule of +enue of said Rule@A, to eercise 2urisdiction to the eclusion of all other courts.

>nder the facts of the case and here respondents submitted to the NueKon City courttheir opposition to probate of the ill, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearingdespite due notice, the NueKon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate courtdid, to ha+e acted ithout 2urisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent:s ill andappointing petitioner'ido as eecutri thereof in accordance ith thetestator:s testamentary disposition.

Jurther, in the relati+ely recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of !irst Instance of %egrosOccidental ith facts analogous to the present case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings o+er intestate proceedings.

CASE NO.19GURO, JAMAIYAH G.

3ULE VS. CAG.R. NO. L792:20 NOVEMBER 0/, 1/8-

3ACTS4 !etitioner #irginia G. Jule, debtor of the decedent "mado G. Garcia filed iththe CJI of 8aguna a petition for letters of administration alleging, inter alia, (that on "pril4


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RULING4 ). he C!I has -urisdiction over the sub-ect matter

The -udiciary "ct of 5;7, as amended, confers upon Courts of Jirst Instance 2urisdiction o+er all probate cases independently of the place of residence of thedeceased. Section 5, Rule @A, specifically the clause (so far as it depends on the place

of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,( is in reality a matter of +enue, as the caption of the Rule indicatesF (Settlement of Estate of eceased!ersons. 2enue and !rocesses. It could not ha+e been intended to define the

2urisdiction o+er the sub2ect matter, because such legal pro+ision is contained in a la of procedure dealing merely ith procedural matters. !rocedure is one thing 2urisdictiono+er the sub2ect matter is another. The poer or authority of the court o+er the sub2ectmatter (eisted and as fied before procedure in a gi+en cause began.( That poer or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, hich simply directs the manner inhich the poer or authority shall be fully and 2ustly eercised.

" fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of ill,

and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of 2urisdictiono+er the sub2ect matter. It is merely constituti+e of +enue. "nd it is upon this reason thatthe Re+ised Rules of Court properly considers the pro+ince here the estate of adeceased person shall be settled as (+enue.(

'. he petition should have been filed in 3ue/on City and not in Calamba1 "aguna

The term (resides( connotes e0 vi termini (actual residence( as distinguished from (legalresidence or domicile.( In the application of +enue statutes and rules M(resides( shouldbe +ieed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physicalhabitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence

in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merelyresidence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residencesimply re=uires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a gi+en place, hile domicilere=uires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one:sdomicile. )o particular length of time of residence is re=uired though hoe+er, theresidence must be more than temporary.

"s applied to the herein case, the last place of residence of the deceased "mado G.Garcia as at NueKon City, and not at Calamba, 8aguna. " death certificate isadmissible to pro+e the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. "s it is, thedeath certificate of "mado G. Garcia, hich as presented in e+idence by #irginia G.

Jule herself and also by !reciosa B. Garcia, shos that his last place of residence asat NueKon City.

4. he -udge may consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator




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Section 5 of Rule 73 pro+ides that (%& hen there is delay in granting letterstestamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the alloanceor disalloance of a ill, the court may appoint a special administrator to takepossession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the =uestions causing thedelay are decided and eecutors or administrators appointed. )othing is rong for the

2udge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. "fter all, the consideration that o+errides all othersin this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of thedecedent. >nder the la, the ido ould ha+e the right of succession o+er a portion of the eclusi+e property of the decedent, besides her share in the con2ugal partnership.Jor such reason, she ould ha+e as such, if not more, interest in administering theentire estate correctly than any other net of kin.

CASE NO. 1:HINGPES, MAR5 JOSEPH BAJADO

ARTURIO TRINIDAD VS. COURT O3 APPEALS, 3ELI? TRINIDAD


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other co'oners, unless the former repudiates the co'onership. Thus, no prescriptionruns in fa+or of a co'oner or co'heir against his or her co'oners or co'heirs, so longas he or she epressly or impliedly recogniKes the co'onership.

In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, inthe concept of a co'oner, as recei+ing from pri+ate respondents his share of theproduce of the land in dispute. >ntil such time, recognition of the co'onership bypri+ate respondents as beyond =uestion. There is no e+idence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co'onership of petitioners father Inocentes o+er theland. Jurther, the titles of these pieces of land ere still in their fathers name. "lthoughpri+ate respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 5;3 and had notshared ith petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,they manifested no repudiation of the co'onership. In &ariategui vs. Court of

Appeals1 the Court heldF

Corollarily, prescription does not run again pri+ate respondents ithrespect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for hose

benefit prescription is in+oked, ha+e not epressly or impliedly repudiated theco'onership. In the other ords, prescription of an action for partition does notlie ecept hen the co'onership is properly repudiated by the co'oner %elBanco +s. Intermediate "ppellate Court, 56< SCR" 66 /5;7@0 citing -ardin +s.?ollasco, 55@ SCR" 6A4 /5;740&.

1therise stated, a co'oner cannot ac=uire by prescription the share of theother co'oners absent a clear repudiation of co'onership duly communicatedto the other co'oners %$ariano +s. e #ega, 57 SCR" A4/5;7@0&. Jurthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannotbe barred by laches %el Banco +s. I"C, 56< SCR" 66 %5;7@&. 1n the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration

of co'onership and for segregation and con+eyance of a determinate portion of the property in+ol+ed %Ro=ue +s. I"C, 5


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amount as intended for the payment of the purchase price of one %5& unit Jord nion Sa+ings and $ortgage Bank, herein the JCCC as theassignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to >nion Sa+ings and$ortgage Bank.

emand letters for the settlement of his account ere sent by petitioner >nion Bank of the !hilippines %>B!& to Edmund, but the latter failed to render payment. Thus, onJebruary 6, 5;77, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim SantibaOeK, Edmund and Jlorence, before the RTC of $akati City. Summonsesere issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund as not ser+ed since heas in the >nited States and there as no information on his address or the date of hisreturn to the !hilippines.

In her anser, respondent Jlorence S. "riola alleged that the loan documents did notbind her since she as not a party thereto. Considering that the 2oint agreement signedby her and her brother Edmund as not appro+ed by the probate court, it as null and+oid hence, she as not liable to the petitioner under the 2oint agreement.

The Regional Trial Court %RTC& dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The RTCstated that the claim of the petitioner should ha+e been filed ith the probate courtbefore hich the testate estate of the late Efraim SantibaOeK as pending, as the sumof money being claimed as an obligation incurred by the said decedent.

>pon appeal to the Court of "ppeals %C"&, the decision of the RTC as affirmed by theappellate court.




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ISSUES4

5. hether or not the partition in the "greement eecuted by the heirs is +alid

4. hether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is +alid

A. hether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.

RULING4 The agreement eecuted by the heirs is not +alid.

In testate succession, there can be no +alid partition among the heirs until after the illhas been probated. The la en2oins the probate of a ill and the public re=uires it,because unless a ill is probated and notice thereof gi+en to the hole orld, the rightof a person to dispose of his property by ill may be rendered nugatory. Theauthentication of a ill decides no other =uestion than such as touch upon the capacity

of the testator and the compliance ith those re=uirements or solemnities hich the laprescribes for the +alidity of a ill.

In the present case, the deceased, Efraim SantibaOeK, left a holographic ill hichcontained the pro+ision hich reads as follosF

%e& "ll other properties, real or personal, hich I on and may be disco+ered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately precedingparagraph in fa+or of Edmund and Jlorence, my children.

The Supreme Court %SC& agree ith the appellate court that the abo+e'=uoted is an all'encompassing pro+ision embracing all the properties left by the decedent hich mightha+e escaped his mind at that time he as making his ill, and other properties he may

ac=uire thereafter. Included therein are the three %A& sub2ect tractors. This being so, anypartition in+ol+ing the said tractors among the heirs is not +alid. The 2oint agreementeecuted by Edmund and Jlorence, partitioning the tractors among themsel+es, isin+alid, specially so since at the time of its eecution, there as already a pendingproceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic ill co+ering the saidtractors.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already ac=uired 2urisdiction o+er all the properties of the deceased, including the three %A& tractors. To dispose of them inany ay ithout the probate courts appro+al is tantamount to di+esting it ith

2urisdiction hich the Court cannot allo. E+ery act intended to put an end to indi+ision

among co'heirs and legatees or de+isees is deemed to be a partition, although it shouldpurport to be a sale, an echange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, ineecuting any 2oint agreement hich appears to be in the nature of an etra'2udicialpartition, as in the case at bar, court appro+al is imperati+e, and the heirs cannot 2ustdi+est the court of its 2urisdiction o+er that part of the estate.

$oreo+er, it is ithin the 2urisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of theheirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no shoing that the signatories in the




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2oint agreement ere the only heirs of the decedent. *hen it as eecuted, the probateof the ill as still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine ho theheirs of the decedent ere. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Jlorence S. "riola toad2udicate unto themsel+es the three %A& tractors as a premature act, and pre2udicial tothe other possible heirs and creditors ho may ha+e a +alid claim against the estate of

the deceased.Jor the second issue, the Court ruled in the negati+e.

!erusing the 2oint agreement, it pro+ides that the heirs as parties thereto ( have agreed to divide between themselves and tae possession and use the above5described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taen as herein after stated which is in favor of !irst Countryside Credit Corp.( Theassumption of liability as conditioned upon the happening of an e+ent, that is, thateach heir shall take possession and use of their respecti+e share under the agreement.It as made dependent on the +alidity of the partition, and that they ere to assume theindebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they ere each to recei+e. The partitionbeing in+alid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not recei+e any such tractor. Itfollos then that the assumption of liability cannot be gi+en any force and effect.

Jor the last issue, the Court notes that the loan as contracted by thedecedent.?oe+er, the petitioners should ha+e filed its money claim ith the probatecourt in accordance ith Section 6, Rule 7< of the Re+ised Rules of Court.

Jrom the records of the case, nothing therein could hold pri+ate respondent Jlorence S. "riola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentarye+idence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guarantyagreement, ere eecuted and signed only by the late Efraim SantibaOeK and his sonEdmund. "s the petitioner failed to file its money claim ith the probate court, at most, itmay only go after Edmund as co'maker of the decedent under the said promissory

notes and continuing guaranty, of course, sub2ect to any defenses Edmund may ha+eas against the petitioner. "s the court had not ac=uired 2urisdiction o+er the person of Edmund, e find it unnecessary to del+e into the matter further.

CASE NO. 18NOCON, AUDREY ROSE

HILADO VS. CAG.R. NO. 1-912 MAY , 022/

3ACTS4 The ell'knon sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate. ?e assur+i+ed by his ife, pri+ate respondent -ulita Campos Benedicto %administratriBenedicto&, and his only daughter, Jrancisca Benedicto'!aulino. "t the time of hisdeath, there ere to pending ci+il cases against Benedicto in+ol+ing the petitioners.pri+ate respondent -ulita Campos Benedicto filed ith the RTC of $anila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her fa+or hich as granted. pri+ate




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respondent submitted an In+entory of the Estate, 8ists of !ersonal and Real !roperties,and 8iabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. it included as among the liabilitiesthe to pending claims. petitioners filed ith the $anila RTC a $anifestation. !ri+aterespondent opposed the manifestation9motion, disputing the personality of petitioners tointer+ene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. !etitioners also filed other

pleadings or motions ith the $anila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of pri+aterespondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the in+entory that had beensubmitted thus far as un+erified, incomplete and inaccurate. The $anila RTC denied themanifestation9motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties. C"affirmed.

ISSUE4 *hether or not the petitioner has the right to inter+ene in the intestateproceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.

RULING4 )o, Section 5 of Rule 5; of the 5;;@ Rules of Ci+il !rocedure re=uires that aninter+enor (has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of

the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be ad+ersely affected by adistribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court ( *hile thelanguage of Section 5, Rule 5; does not literally preclude petitioners from inter+ening inthe intestate proceedings, case la has consistently held that the legal interest re=uiredof an inter+enor (must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simplycontingent and epectant.( Section 4, Rule @4 further pro+ides that (/i0n the absence of special pro+isions, the rules pro+ided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far aspracticable, applicable to special proceedings.( notithstanding Section 4 of Rule @4,inter+ention as set forth under Rule 5; does not etend to creditors of a decedenthose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of (inter+ention( under Rule5; simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

CASE NO. 1OLAYTA, JESTER 5UTCH A.

HEIRS O3 MAGDALENO YPON VS RICA3ORTEG.R. NO. 1/-2 JULY , 021;

3ACTS4 !etitioners filed a complaint against respondent for cancellation of title andRecon+eyance ith damages. In the said complaint, they alleged that deceased$agdaleno Hpon died intestate and childless lea+ing properties behind. Claiming to bethe sole heir of the deceased, respondent Gaudioso eecuted an affida+it of self'ad2udication hich caused the cancellation of certificate of title co+ering the propertiesof deceased to the pre2udice of the petitioners ho are collateral relati+es andsuccessors'in'interest of deceased.

In his anser, respondent claimed that he is the laful son of the deceased ase+idenced by the folloing documentsF %a& his certificate of 8i+e Birth %b& to %4& letters




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from !olytechnic School and %c& a certified true copy of his passport. Jurther heclaimed that petitioners ha+e no cause of action against him the complaint fails to statea cause of action and that case is not prosecuted by parties'in'interest as thepetitioners ha+e not been 2udicially declared laful heirs of deceased.

The RTC ruled in fa+or of respondents, finding that the complaint failed to state a causeof action. It held that hile the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship ith$agdaleno in a pre+ious special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as thedecedents compulsory heirs. 1n the other hand, respondent as able to satisfactorilyestablish that he is the son P hence his compulsory heir Pof the deceased through thedocuments submitted to the court hich included the marriage contract of the decasedand one Epegenia E+angelista. "fter the motion for reconsideration as denied, itsought direct recourse to this Court. ?ence this petition.

ISSUE4 *hether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the sub2ect

complaint failed to state a cause of action as proper.

RULING4 The Court held in the affirmati+e. !reliminarily, Cause of action is defined asthe act or omission by hich a party +iolates a right of another. It is ell'settled that theeistence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

"ccordingly if the allegations furnish sufficient allegations the case should not bedismissed. In the case at bar, although petitioners made allegations that they are lafulheirs of the deceased, , the rule that the determination of a decedents laful heirsshould be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in anordinary action for cancellation of title and recon+eyance, from granting the same

-urisprudence dictates that the determination of ho are the legal heirs of the deceasedmust be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reco+ery of onership and possession of property.)6wphi) This must take precedenceo+er the action for reco+ery of possession and onership. The Court has consistentlyruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the ci+il action for thereason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. It is thendecisi+ely clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a specialproceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a statusor right.

"s as settled in prior 2urisprudence, matters relating to the rights of filiation and

heirship must be +entilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding institutedprecisely for the purpose of determining such rights. By ay of eception, the need toinstitute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may bedispensed ith for the sake of practicality, as hen the parties in the ci+il case had+oluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their e+idenceregarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had conse=uently rendered 2udgment




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thereon, or hen a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closedand terminated, and hence, cannot be re'opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing eceptions, or those of similar nature, appear toeist. ?ence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to

determine the heirship of the parties in+ol+ed, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Ci+il Case )o. T'44


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Respondent made the complainant and his family belie+ed that he is the representati+eof the estate and that he needed a donpayment right aay. "ll the hile, the Sabidongfamily %ho belong to the underpri+ileged& relied on the representations of therespondent that he as authoriKed to facilitate the sale, ith more reason thatrespondent represented himself as the City Sheriff. Respondent as able to collect

sums totaling !43,333 from complainants family.

ISSUE4 *hether or not a property forming part of the estate under 2udicial settlementcontinues to be sub2ect of litigation.

RULING4 Hes. In the case at bar, hen respondent purchased 8ot 55'" on )o+ember 45, 5;;, the ecision in Ci+il Case )o. 5@3< hich as promulgated on $ay A5,5;7A had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is nolonger (in litigation( at that time considering that it as part of the ?odges Estate thenunder settlement proceedings %Sp. !roc. )o. 5


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The spouses -uan !an and Teresa $agtuba died intestate in 5;A and 5;7,respecti+ely. They possessed a homestead, consisting of to parcels of land, located atBarrio Bunaan or $ausagon, Calamba, $isamis 1ccidental. 1ne parcel is identifiedas 8ot )o. 5;4@. It has an area of A.;@;5 hectares. The other parcel is Identified as 8ot)o. 5554. It has an area of 57.34;5 hectares. "ccording to Guadalupe !iKarras and her

children, a third parcel, 8ot )o. 5;43, ith an area of eight hectares hich assur+eyed in the name of Concepcion !an and hich ad2oins 8ots )os. 5;4@ and 5554,also forms part of the estate of the deceased !angilinan spouses.

The administrator presented a pro2ect of partition herein the combined areas of 8ots)os. 5554 and 5;4@, or 44.3374 hectares, ere partitioned. It as also pro+ided in thepro2ect of partition that the sum of !6,377.63, as the alleged debt of the estate toConcepcion !an should be di+ided e=ually among the three sets of heirs, or !5,


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The appellant contend that the loer court, as a probate court, has no 2urisdiction todecide the onership of the tel+e'hectare portion of 8ot )o. 5554. 1n the other hand,the appellees( or the heirs of Jrancisco !angilinan counter that the loer court did notdecide the onership of the tel+e hectares hen it ordered their eclusion from thepro2ect of partition.

ISSUE4 *hether the onership of a parcel of land should be decided in the intestateproceeding or in a separate action.

RULING4 *e hold that the instant case may be treated as an eception to the generalrule that =uestions of title should be +entilated in a separate action.

"s a general rule, the =uestion as to title to property should not be passed upon in theestate or intestate proceeding. That =uestion should be +entilated in a separate action.That general rule has =ualifications or eceptions 2ustified by epediency andcon+enience.

Thus, the probate court may pro+isionally pass upon in an intestate or testateproceeding the =uestion of inclusion in, or eclusion from, the in+entory of a piece of property ithout pre2udice to its final determination in a separate action. "lthoughgenerally, a probate court may not decide a =uestion of title or onership, yet if theinterested parties are all heirs or the =uestion is one of collation or ad+ancement, or theparties consent to the assumption of 2urisdiction by the probate court and the rights of :third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the=uestion of onership.

?ere, the probate court had already recei+ed e+idence on the onership of the tel+e'

hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its eclusion from title in+entory. Theonly interested parties are the heirs ho ha+e all appeared in the intestate proceeding. "s pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They shouldnot be forced to incur additional epenses %such as filing fees& by bringing a separateaction to determine the onership of the tel+e'hectare portion.

The 2ust, epeditious and inepensi+e solution is to re=uire the heirs of Jrancisco!angilinan to the in the intestate, proceeding, Special !roceeding )o. 6


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same layers&. They should anser the motion ithin fifteen days from ser+ice. In their anser the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses %such as the+iolation of section 557 of the !ublic 8and 8a& to support their theory that 8ot )o. 5554still forms part of the estate of the spouses -uan C. !angilinan and Teresa $agtuba andthat the heirs of Jrancisco !angilinan should bear one'third of the epenses incurred by

Concepcion !an in Ci+il Case )o. 6


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hich is one of the attributes of onership. Such rights are enforced and protected fromencroachments made or attempted before the 2udicial declaration since respondentac=uired hereditary rights e+en before 2udicial declaration in testate or intestateproceedings.

"fter the death of Enri=ue Jactor, it as his eldest child, Gloria Jactor'8abao ho tooko+er the administration of the sub2ect property. "nd as a conse=uence of co'onership, soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the sur+i+ing co'oners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co'oner, hich includes theright to the administration and management of the sub2ect property.

"s found by the Court of "ppeals, petitioners unsupported claim of possession mustyield to that of the respondent ho traces her possession of the sub2ect property to her predecessors'in'interest ho ha+e alays been in possession of the sub2ect property.


assignment1 compilation

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