assured access to the global commons workshop …...access to the global commons (aagc) project, and...
TRANSCRIPT
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What are the priorities of your ___?
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Assured Access to the Global Commons
Workshop Survey Analyses
Mr Mehmet Kinaci
The aim of these four surveys was to provide quantitative data in support of the Assured Access to the Global Commons (AAGC) project, and to further inform policy and decision makers, the international community, and the public. Although based on a limited sample pool, the questionnaires gathered the first-hand opinions of groups of experts from nations, universities and academia, international organizations, the private sector, and military commands on the four domains of the Global Commons (GC). The questions consist of two main parts; the first part of the questionnaire is focused on general issues covering all four domains: maritime, air, space, and cyberspace, of the Global Commons; the second part is more focused specifically on domain-related matters, in order to identify priorities and relevant issues amongst the limited participants. For scientific purposes and further studies on this subject, we recommend that a larger sample would provide significant policy-relevant data, and establish a baseline for measuring views/perceptions on NATO‟s and other key stakeholders‟ roles in assuring access to the Commons.
NATO in the Maritime Commons, survey from the third ACT workshop, Norfolk, Virginia, 30 September 2010
1. General Findings
a. What are the priorities of your nation / command / organization / company / university in regards to the domains of the Commons? Survey results indicate that the participants gave the first priority to the Maritime domain which is followed by the Cyber domain in importance. “Although maritime and air commons are relatively traditional constructs, albeit with new circumstances and implications, the space and cyberspace commons add new, crucial, and yet somewhat imprecise conceptual and operational dimensions.” (Giarra, 2010). This result is an indication that those concerned with the Maritime domain are also interested in the Cyber domain, due to their increased inter-relationship. A comprehensive approach to the GC reveals that the maritime domain is more closely linked with the Cyber domain, which was supported by the discussions during the workshop.
b. In respect to development of policies, standards, and norms, participants responded to the question - Which organization is best suited to lead the development of policy, standards and norms in the GC? - The UN was identified as the best suited to lead development of policies in all of the commons. The highest priority was given to the Maritime domain. NATO and the European Union (EU) followed the United Nations (UN) in terms of leading development of policies, standards and
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UN NATO EU SCO Others No One Reg Coal& Org
Who has the Capability and Means?
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Air
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63%
Should GCs Domains Be Adressed Independently?
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No
25%
75%
Should Military & Civilian Use Discussed Separately?
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norms. Private industry ranked fourth behind NATO and the EU. Of particular note, by contrast private industry followed the UN to lead development of policies and norms in the Cyber domain of the Global Commons.
c. When it comes to who has the capability and means to implement those policies - Following the development of policies; which organization has the capability and
the means for provision of assured access to the GC? NATO was identified as the lead organization with the capability and means. “NATO clearly recognizes its essential role in confronting and defeating these and other threats and challenges.” (Giarra, 2010). However, participants‟ support for NATO leadership was not as high in the Space and Cyber commons as it was for maritime and air. The EU and UN followed NATO. In the Cyber domain, participants had a divided view on who has the capability and means. The private sector was also
identified as a possible leader on providing assured access to the cyber domain.
d. In response to the question - Should the domains of the GC, (maritime, air, space, and cyberspace) be addressed independently? - A majority of the participants (63%) believed that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together. “It is misleading to conceptualize or deal with the interests of stakeholders in the GC independently, that is, to differentiate between the military, civil, or commercial spheres, or to segregate military service roles. This is because the domains of the commons are inherently interwoven – military maritime, space, aerospace, and cyberspace operations or activities – and because the networks that enable operations or activities in the various overlapping sectors are themselves threaded together.” (Giarra, 2010). The different features and requirements of the commons were the two main concerns. Therefore, the features and requirements of each domain should be taken into account during development of policies. “One size fits all” may not be the best solution, since those experts involved in policy development might have limited knowledge of the other commons.
e. Do you agree with the following statement? “There is a difference between military and civilian use of the GC.” Should these two areas be discussed separately? -
“Command of the sea means controlling the lines of communication that crisscross the ocean‟s surface, so that a state‟s commercial and military ships can freely move across them.” (Mearshelmer, 2003). The roles and capabilities of the military in the commons differ significantly from the expectations of international organizations. In regards to use of the commons by different key stakeholders, such civilian and military users; 75% of the participants responded that civilian and military use of Global Commons should be discussed together, adopting a comprehensive approach.
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Main Threats Against Assured Access to GCs
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SpaceCyber
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Assured access to GCs should be a NATO mission?
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StronglyAgree
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NATO should establish partnership(s) with UN/EU
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f. What are the main threats to assured access to the GC? There was mixed response to this question. A lack of internationally agreed regulations, rogue nations, and international terrorism appeared to be the highest concerns for the participants. These were followed by economic instability, emerging powers, an increase in the number of nations possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems, and natural
phenomena and/or disaster. Piracy, along with organized crime and drug trafficking, were of less concern to the participants. Although all participants were aware of the number of piracy events, and their impact on international trade, they perceived it as a lower threat to assured access than the other concerns mentioned before. Polluters, climate change, and immigration are also recognised as a threat to assured access to the GC.
g. Assuring access to the GC, as part of a broader international concern, should be a future NATO mission. In response to this statement, 94% of the participants agreed that the Maritime domain should be a NATO mission, 82% agreed on the Air domain, but this number dropped to 69% for the Cyber domain. As illustrated on the chart, the agreement was the strongest for Maritime, and only somewhat for Air and Cyber. For the Space domain, participants were less positive. Although this workshop focused on the Maritime domain, there was a general agreement on an increased NATO role for assured access to the GC.
h. NATO should establish partnership(s) with the UN/EU and others regarding assured access to the GC. Participants almost 100% agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in the Maritime domain, and to a lesser degree in the Air domain. There was some uncertanity for the Cyber domain, and despite a general agreement on NATO partnerships with the UN/EU and others, there was more disagreement regarding the Space domain. This might be due to a lack of understanding of NATO‟s role in the Space domain.
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Deterrence Protection Attribution Collaboration Coordination Retribution
Responsibilities of NATO on Provision of Assured Access to GCs
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NATO is adequetly prepared to work with Partners
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GC domains impact on the following areas
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i. In your opinion, what are the responsibilities of NATO on provision of assured access to the GC? Collaboration, coordination, and protection are the top three
responsibilities envisioned by the participants for NATO in assuring access to GCs in the future. These are followed by deterrence as a NATO responsibility. Attribution and retaliation are observed as the least likely responsibilities for NATO. These findings are aligned with the responses to the previous questions. As NATO develops its relations
with the UN/EU and other organisations, collaboration and coordination are seen as the main elements to achieve effective partnership. NATO, as the most successful defence alliance "in the history of the world,” has the capability and the means to provide protection and deterrence. In conclusion, the results indicate that NATO provides assured access to the GC through collaboration and cooperation, whilst maintaining capability and means to deter and protect.
j. NATO is adequately prepared to work with the EU and other partners to execute its responsibilities toward assured access to the GC. The response to this question varied significantly. In the maritime domain, 63% of the participants believe that NATO is ready, whilst 25% disagree. Perceptions of NATO‟s readiness to work in the other domains remain low, particularly in the Space and Cyber domains.
k. Which GC domain has the most significant effect on the areas identified below? Assured access to the Maritime domain has the most significant effect on energy and the economy, followed by the political and military areas. The maritime domain also has a moderate level of impact on the environment and governance, as well as law. Assured access to the air domain has the most significant effects on the military, political and economic areas, while the space domain has the highest expected impact on the political, information, and military areas.
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Should NATO Play a Regional Role?
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Definition of Maritime Domain of GC
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Should NATO Play A Supporting Role?
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2. Maritime: In this section, participants were asked specific questions related to the Maritime domain of the GC. Not only national and NATO representatives, but also the academic and industry representatives were well informed on NATO‟s role and involvement in anti-piracy operations and NATO Operation Active Endeavour.
a. NATO should only play a regional role in responding to maritime threats by collecting, analysing and disseminating data. 75% of the participants disagreed that NATO should play only a regional role in responding to maritime threats, while only 19% were in support of such a limited role. This is consistent with the previous results indicating that the Maritime domain should be a NATO mission, one that is closely linked to overall NATO roles and engagements.
b. NATO should have a significant role in collecting, analysing, and disseminating data in order to protect assured access to the maritime domain of the GC. Participants strongly agree (87%) that NATO, with its capabilities and means, is expected to play a significant role in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data. NATO is expected to work with partners, including the UN/EU and others, as required. Another response indicates that NATO should collaborate and coordinate on deterrence and protection in assuring access to the maritime domain of the GC.
c. Do you agree with the following general definition of the maritime domain of the GC: “The world‟s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them?” This definition is taken from (Giarra, 2010), and 69% of the participants agree with the definition in general. When it comes to the other domains of the GC, however, it would be much harder to obtain similar concurrence on a definition. The Maritime domain has long been an area of concern, and nations under UN leadership addressed this at the end of the 20th Century. “After the UN Charter, the most comprehensive agreement in existence is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. With more than 155 state parties, this convention has become a „constitution‟ for the world‟s oceans.” (Giarra, 2010). Definition of other domains of the GCs will be addressed during other workshops.
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High North Indian Ocean Mediterranean Atlantic Pacific Others/ChokePoints
Geographic Areas Primary Interest to NATO in Maritime Domain
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NATO's Naval Presence Should Continue & Improve
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NATO Naval Presence Provided Safety to International Shipping
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Increase in the Number of Nations Possessing WMD and Delivery Systems & Missile Tech are the
Biggest Threat to Maritime Domain
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d. Which geographic areas are of interest to NATO regarding assured access to the maritime domain of the GC? In response to this question, the Mediterranean and Atlantic were given the highest priority. The High North and Indian Ocean were given second priority. Although all participants recognise the importance of the Pacific, participants recognised that it is not an immediate interest for NATO.
e. In your opinion what are the priorities of the listed military objectives and goals in order to secure freedom and assure access in the maritime domain of the GC? In response to this question participants have given the first three priorities to Freedom of Access, Freedom of Use, and Freedom to Transit. Freedom from Attack was given fourth priority. Freedom to Attack was identified as the lowest priority by the participants. This result is completely consistent with the previous findings on NATO‟s responsibilities.
f. With regard to NATO‟s operations to deter and disrupt piracy and protect shipping in the Indian Ocean, do you agree that a Naval Presence of NATO in the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) provides safety to international shipping? 75% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence enhances the safety to international shipping.
g. Do you agree that NATO‟s contribution to counter-piracy operations should continue and be further improved in areas where the Alliance‟s access to the Maritime Commons is threatened? 63 % of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence should continue and improve.
h. Do you agree that an increase in the number of nations possessing WMD and delivery systems, new weapons systems technologies, and improved missile systems are the biggest threats to assured access to the maritime domain? Only 25% of the participants agreed that more nations with WMD and delivery systems is the biggest threat. This result aligns with the findings of the main threats against AAGC. Lack of internationally agreed regulations, rogue nations, and international terrorism were identified to be the highest concerns to the participants.
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NATO Naval Presence Provides Deterrence Against Piracy
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i. Do you agree that a NATO naval presence in the IRTC of the Indian Ocean provides deterrence against piracy? More than 80% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence provides deterrence.
3. Key findings and insights of the Maritime Domain Survey Analysis:
The results of this survey indicate that those concerned with the maritime domain are also interested in the cyber domain due to its increased inter-relationship with the maritime domain.
The UN was identified as best suited to lead the development of policies, standards, and norms in all of the GC, followed by NATO and the EU, and then private industry. The highest priority was given to the Maritime domain. NATO was identified as the lead organization with the capability and means to provide assured access to the Maritime domain, followed by the EU and UN. However, participants‟ support for a lead role for NATO was not as high in the Space and Cyber commons as it was for Maritime and Air. A majority of the participants (63%) agreed that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together. However, they also said the features and requirements of each domain should be taken into account during development of policies. “One size fits all” may not be the best solution to problems across the commons, since those experts involved in policy development for one domain might have limited knowledge of the other domains.
With regard to use of the commons by different key stakeholders, such civilian and military users; 75% of the participants responded that civilian and military use of the Global Commons should be discussed together, adopting a comprehensive approach.
Lack of internationally agreed regulations, rogue nations, and international terrorism appeared to be the highest concerns to the participants. These were followed by economic instability, emerging powers, an increase in the number of nations possessing WMD and missile delivery systems, and natural phenomena and/or disaster. Piracy, along with organized crime and drug trafficking, were of less concern.
94% of the participants agreed that the Maritime domain should be a NATO mission, 82% agreed on Air, but these numbers dropped to 69% for the Cyber domain. The agreement was the strongest for Maritime, only somewhat for Air and Cyber, and weakest for the Space domain.
Almost 100% of participants agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in the Maritime domain, and to a lesser degree in the Air domain. Collaboration, coordination, and protection are the top three actions envisioned by the participants as NATO‟s future responsibilities for assuring access to the GC.
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As NATO develops partnerships with the UN, EU, and other organisations, collaboration and coordination are seen to be the main elements. In the maritime domain, 63% of the participants believe that NATO is ready, whilst 25% disagree. NATO‟s readiness to work in the other domains, particularly Space and Cyber, is seen to be low. Assured access to the Maritime domain of the GC has the most significant effect on energy and economies, followed by the political and military sectors.
Although NATO is a regional organization, it is expected to play a global role. 75% of the participants saw a global role for NATO in response to maritime threats, while only 19% were in support of a solely regional role.
69 % of the participants agree with the definition of the Maritime domain in general. When it comes to the other domains of the GC, definitions are harder to agree on.
The Mediterranean and Atlantic were given the highest priority in terms of geographic interest to NATO in the maritime domain. The High North and Indian Ocean were given second priority. Participants recognised the importance of the Pacific, but recognised that it is not an immediate interest for NATO.
Regarding access to the GC, participants gave priority to Freedom of Access, Freedom of Use, and Freedom to Transit, in that order. Freedom from Attack was fourth. Freedom to Attack was given the lowest priority by the participants.
75% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence provided safety to international shipping. 63% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence against piracy should continue and improve.
Only 25% of the participants agreed that an increase in the number of nations possessing WMD and delivery systems is the biggest maritime threat. This result aligns with the findings on the main threats against assured access to the GC.
More than 80% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence deters piracy in the Indian Ocean.
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NATO in the Air & Space Commons, survey from the fourth ACT workshop, Kalkar, Germany, 15 October 2010
1. General Findings a. Participants were asked, What are the priorities of your nation / command / organization / company / university in regards to all domains of the GC? Survey results indicate that these participants saw the Space and Air domains as their two top priorities, closely followed by the Cyber domain. This result indicates that those concerned with the Space and Air domains see a close relationship between the Cyber domain and the rest of the domains. A comprehensive approach to the GC reveals that the Space and Air domains are becoming more closely linked with the Cyber domain, which was supported by the discussions during the workshop.
b. Which organization is best suited to lead the development of policy,
standards and norms in the GC? The UN was seen to be the best organization for this role in the Space, Cyber and Maritime domains, whereas NATO was identified as best suited to
lead policy development in the Air domain. The space domain was given a higher priority for new policy than the air domain. The EU was given a higher rank than NATO in the space domain owing to its established capabilities as part of the European Space Agency (ESA). Scientists from European nations can function at a world-class level in their specialist fields, and the ESA enables capabilities individual European nations cannot achieve on their own. Of particular note, private industry
was seen as second only to the UN for leading the development of policies and norms in the Cyber domain. c. Following the development of policies, which organization has the capability and the means to assure access to the Global Commons? Here NATO was identified as the lead organization, followed by the UN and EU in all domains. “NATO clearly recognizes its
essential role in confronting and defeating these and other threats and challenges.” (Giarra, 2010) However, participants‟ support for NATO as a leader was not as high in the Space and Cyber domains as it was in the maritime and air domains. EU capabilities are greater in the space domain than in other domains, while the private sector was also identified as a possible leader for assured access to the cyber domain. Although NATO got the most votes, participants were
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divided on who has the capability and means to assure access in the Cyber domain. d. Should the four domains of maritime, space, air, and cyberspace be addressed independently? A slight majority of the participants (45%) disagreed, saying that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together. “Contemporary American strategists recognise the commons, individually and as a group, as central to American national security interests.” (Denmark & Mulvenon 2010). The different features and requirements of the commons were the two main concerns. Therefore, as with the Maritime domain, participants said the features and requirements of each domain should be taken into account during policy development, because experts on air and space policy might have limited knowledge of the others commons. e. Do you agree with the following statement: “There is a difference between military and civilian use of the GC”? Should these two areas be discussed separately? The roles and capabilities of the military in the commons differ significantly from the expectations of international organizations. “Geography made the United States a natural sea power, and successful exploitation of air, space and United States (US) technological prowess made the US a power in the cyber commons as well. The commons, in turn, serve as a key enabler of the U.S. military and its ability to project power globally (Denmark & Mulvenon 2010).” In regards to use of the commons by different key stakeholders, 56 % of the participants responded that civilian and military use of the Global Commons should be discussed together, adopting a comprehensive approach. f. What are the main threats to assured access to the Global Commons? This question brought a mixed response. Rogue nations, lack of internationally agreed regulations, and international terrorism appeared to be the highest concerns to the participants. “America should work with the international community, including allies, friends, and potential adversaries, to develop international agreements and regimes that preserve the openness of global commons (Denmark & Mulvenon 2010).” Development of international agreements, including on potential adversaries, is an important step in the establishment of a consultation mechanism. The top three threats were followed by emerging powers, economic instability, organized crime, and an increase in the number of nations possessing weapons of mass destruction
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(WMD) and missile delivery systems. Piracy and drug trafficking, and natural phenomena and/or disaster, were of less concern to the participants. Participants in general were focused on air and space. Although they were aware of the impact of piracy on international trade, they perceived it as little threat to assured access to air and space, compared with the participants in the Maritime domain workshop. g. As part of a broader international concern, should assured access to the Global Commons be a future NATO mission? 66% of the participants agreed that assuring access to the Maritime and Air domains should be a future NATO mission, 55% agreed regarding the Space domain, while this number dropped to 50% for the Cyber domain. As illustrated on the chart, agreement was strongest for Maritime and Air, only somewhat for Space, while for Cyber, results were mixed. Although this workshop focused on the Air and Space domains, there was general agreement on an increased NATO role for assuring access in the Maritime domain. h. NATO should establish partnership(s) with the UN, EU, and others regarding assured access. 84% of participants agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in Space, 78% agreed for the Air and Cyber domains, 73% for the Maritime domain. The importance of engagement with partners to ensure Alliance security in the current threat environment cannot be overstated. This point was recognised by all participants in general, while particular concerns were raised in the Space and Cyber domains, regarding either a lack of capability, or sensitivities regarding international law and sovereignty.
i. In your opinion, what are the responsibilities of NATO with regard to assuring access to the Global Commons? Collaboration, coordination, and protection are the top three actions envisioned by the participants as NATO‟s future responsibilities in this regard. These are followed by deterrence. “The dynamics of security relationships have changed.
We have moved from the concept of collective security to the concept of cooperative security, involving different players and actors (Pamir, 2010).” Attribution and retaliation were seen to be the least important responsibilities for NATO. These findings align with responses to the previous questions. As NATO develops partnerships with the UN, EU, and other organisations, collaboration and coordination will be the main elements to achieve effective partnership. In conclusion, NATO provides assured access to the commons through collaboration and
cooperation, whilst maintaining the capabilities and means to deter and protect.
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j. NATO is adequately prepared to work with the EU and other partners to execute its responsibilities on provision of assured access to the Global Commons. The response to this statement varied significantly. In the maritime domain, 50% of the participants believed that NATO is ready /somewhat ready, whilst 17% disagreed. 45% saw NATO as ready to work in the Air domain. Participants believed that NATO‟s readiness to work with other partners remains low, particularly in the Space and Cyber domains. k. Which GC domain has the most significant effect on the areas identified below? Assured access to the Space domain of the GC will most significantly effect information and economies, followed by the military, political, and technological sectors. The Air domain has the most significant effect on the military, economic and political sectors, followed by the social, technological, and information areas. The Maritime domain has the most significant effect on the economy, energy and the military, followed by the political and governance sectors. The Cyber domain has the most significant effect on the economy and Information areas, followed by the social, political and military areas. 2. Air and Space a. Asked what are the main threats to the Air and Space domains of the Global
Commons, participants noted space debris, jamming, electronic warfare, and exploitation of cyber defences and commercial systems as their top concerns. These are followed by destruction of ground stations and signal interference. Space debris was identified as the single biggest threat. More than 6000 satellites were placed into orbit between 04 October 1957 and 01 Jan 2008, by approximately
4600 launches. Those satellites can now be categorised as follows: 31% are controlled, 37% are “drifters,” 14% are uncontrolled, 13% are failing, and 5% are unidentified.1 Debris caused
1 Source: European Space Agency
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NATO should have a significant role in collecting, analyzing & disseminating data
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NATO should develop a Space Policy & a SCO
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NATO should only respond space threats by collecting, analyzing and disseminating data
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by attempts to destroy those 6000 satellites, such as happened when a Chinese anti-satellite missile test in 2007 destroyed a Chinese weather satellite, are a serious concern. b. NATO should only respond to space threats by collecting, analysing and disseminating data. 50% of the participants agreed or strongly agreed with this approach, whilst 39% were against such a role. It is clear that participants would like to see NATO have more of a role in the space domain of the Global Commons; however, the nature of this role remains unclear. This is consistent with previous results indicating the space domain should be a NATO mission, closely linked to overall NATO roles and engagements.
c. When participants were asked whether NATO should have a significant role in collecting, analysing, and disseminating data to protect assured access to the air and space domains of GC, 83% agreed or strongly agreed that NATO, given its capabilities and means, should play a significant role. NATO is also expected to work with partners such as the UN. EU, and others as required. Another response indicates that NATO should collaborate and coordinate in order to provide deterrence and protection to assured access to the air and space domains of the GC.
d. NATO should develop a Space
Policy and establish a Space Coordination Office. These two points were also strongly supported by the participants, 89% of whom agreed or strongly agreed. The EU already moved several steps ahead in 1975, by establishing the ESA, an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the exploration of space, currently with 18 member states. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is responsible for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses
of outer space. It is also responsible for implementing the Secretary-General's responsibilities under international space law, and for maintaining the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
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Do you agree with the general Space definition?
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StronglyDisagree
Don't know
NATO needs more Space Expertise
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Which orbital regimes are of primary interest to NATO?
e. Do you agree that NATO needs to incorporate more Space expertise into the NATO command structure? 89% of the participants supported that idea. Other international organizations such as the UN and EU have taken steps to establish infrastructure and working practices for space. As a political / military Alliance that depends on space, and has an interest in assured access to the space domain, NATO should develop its own or use nations‟ expertise to catch up in this field.
f. Do you agree with the following
general definition of the space domain of the GC? “Space begins at the lowest perigee of an orbiting satellite (about 150 km above Earth‟s surface), and extends to infinity?” Interestingly, 39% of the participants strongly agreed or agreed somewhat with the definition, while exactly the same percentage disagreed. More than 20% of the participants were concerned by the use of a definition originated by one nation. This result is not a surprise, as participants‟ views on the Space domain of the Global Commons were shown to be diverse.
g. There are different
categories and classification of orbital regimes. Participants‟ answers to the question: which orbital regimes are of primary interest to NATO? Geosynchronous Orbit and Sun-Synchronous Low Earth Orbit were identified as the areas of primary interest to NATO. Sun Synchronous Low Earth Orbit provides regular earth coverage at consistent revisit times. As such, it is the primary orbit type for imaging and weather satellites. These satellite types provide quantifiable improvements to NATO planning and operations. Satellites in Geosynchronous orbit rotate in relative position to the Earth so that they appear to stay in one geographic location. A perfect stable geostationary orbit is an ideal that can only be approximated. These orbits are especially useful for telecommunications satellites and other missions that require persistence.
15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Freedom fromAttack
Freedom toAttack
Freedom ofAccess
Freedom of Use Other
Military objectives & goals in space domain
89%
6% 6%
NATO Shared Space Situational Awarenes Programme would increase the ability of NATO
Yes
No
61%
17%
22%
Space Assets support to NATO operations in Afghanistan
Yes
No
Don't Know
h. Asked to rank military objectives and goals in the Space domain, participants gave Freedom of Access the highest priority, followed by Freedom of Use, and Freedom from Attack. Freedom to Attack was the least supported option. The first UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in August 1968, with 78 states and a large number of international organizations attending.2 In August 1982, the Second UN Conference (called UNISPACE 82) had 94 state participants and 45 observers from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. This conference dealt with the entire gamut of space sciences, technologies, and applications from the scientific, technical, political, economic, social, and organizational points of view. The Third UN Conference (UNISPACE III) was held in July 1999. The key objective this time was to create a blueprint for the peaceful uses of outer space in the 21st century. i. Do you agree that a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) program would increase the ability of NATO to assure access to the Space domain? 89% of the participants responded positively. According to AJP 3-3, SSA is “the requisite current and predictive knowledge of space events, threats, activities, conditions, and space systems status, capabilities, constraints and employment to enable commanders, decision makers, planners and operators to gain and maintain freedom of action in space through the spectrum of conflict.” In other words, SSA is foundational to all space activities. As NATO‟s reliance on space capabilities grows, so must its understanding of the domain through which those capabilities are delivered. Sound decisions are predicated on solid information.
j. Asked whether they agreed that Allied nations‟ space assets effectively support NATO operations in Afghanistan, 61% of participants responded positively. 22% were not aware of the scope of nations‟ Space-based support to the current operations in Afghanistan. 17% of the participants found this support unsatisfactory. While Space capabilities are vital to operations in Afghanistan, the mechanisms by which operators and planners can request support are not well understood, and there is a perception that more could be accomplished if theatre personnel were better trained to use space assets. Per AJP 3-3, “the Joint Force Commander can designate a Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) to facilitate unity of effort with member-nation space operations and military component space capabilities.” However, there does not appear to be an active use of SCA at this time.
2 UN conferences on outer space - Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - issues, power, condition, sector
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/Peaceful-Uses-of-Outer-Space-UN-CONFERENCES-ON-OUTER-SPACE.html#ixzz1B0uEPnzw
16
56% 44%
Increase in the number of nations accessing and using space domain threatens NATO's objectives
Yes
No
78%
17%
6%
NATO should continue to use of national space capabilities
Yes
No
Don't Know
72%
22%
6%
Collective security, applied to national space assets, can deter intentional interference by state actors
Yes
No
Don't Know
k. Do you agree that NATO should continue to make use of national space capabilities as provided and not seek direct ownership of space assets? 78% of the participants said yes to this question. In this time of financial austerity, to request funding for the creation of an expensive space program would be unrealistic. Participants recognised that NATO‟s involvement in the space domain requires it to develop expertise and establish policies, but agreed that it should continue to use national assets.
l. Do you agree that the
increase in the number of nations capable of accessing and using the space domain threatens NATO‟s ability to use space in the pursuit of operational objectives? 56% of the participants agreed that such a threat exists. This does not necessarily imply that access to space is a threat in itself, but greater access will result in more orbiting objects. As there is no existing mechanism to deal with orbital debris, this increased congestion will likely constrain operations, based simply on the requirement for orbital safety. On a related note, NATO has gained significant asymmetric advantage through the use of space capabilities. As access to space capabilities grows, it also follows logically that nations will learn how to use those capabilities to support their objectives, which may run counter to NATO‟s wishes.
m. Do you agree that the
concept of collective security, applied to national space assets, and deters intentional interference with space capabilities by state actors? Participant responses indicated that NATO can gain deterrent value and a measure of protection by explicitly stating its intent to defend contributing nations‟ space capabilities. Arguments for this line of reasoning are voiced elsewhere. For example, from a U.S. perspective, one author argues that dispersing “U.S. national security payloads across satellites owned by a range of other nations and business consortia friendly to the United States…would confront prospective attackers with serious risks of horizontal escalation, in that attacking a shared international security space infrastructure might bring more states into the conflict.”3 Participant responses imply that the risk of inadvertently widening a conflict by involving NATO might also complicate a potential adversary‟s decision to attack, and therefore increase deterrence.
3 Morgan, Forrest E., Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment, The RAND
Corporation, 2010 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG916.html
17
3. Key findings and insights of the Air and Space Domains Survey Analysis:
The priority of the participants was on the Air and Space domains of the GC. They are also interested in the Cyber domain due to its close relation with the rest of the domains.
The UN was identified as the organization best suited to lead the development of space policies, while NATO was identified for the Air domain and as the organization that has the capability and means to implement policy.
The majority of attendees agree industry must play a role in policy development, and that civilian and military use of the commons must be addressed together.
The definition of “space” remains complicated. 39% agreed with the offered definition and 39% disagreed. The remaining 22% did not express an opinion.
Rogue nations, lack of internationally agreed regulations, and international terrorism were selected as the main threats to assured access to the commons. The majority see assured access as a NATO mission, through collaboration, coordination, and protection. This confirms the work of others: “We have moved from the concept of collective security to the concept of cooperative security, involving different players and actors.” (Pamir, 2010). However, only 45% of participants rate NATO‟s readiness to work in the Air domain highly, and most believe that NATO‟s readiness to work with other partners remains low, particularly in the Space and Cyber domains.
As a political/military Alliance that uses space and has interest in assured access to the Space domain, participants believe that NATO should develop its own or use nations‟ expertise to advance this field.
Space debris, jamming, electronic warfare, and exploitation of cyber defence and commercial systems were identified as specific threats to assured access to the Air and Space domains.
A strong majority feel NATO should respond to threats in space by developing a NATO space policy, expertise, and situational awareness. NATO is also expected to play a significant role in collecting, analysing, and disseminating data, and increasing Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
The concept of collective security for space was also widely supported.
Participants were most concerned with freedom of access to space, and freedom to use space capabilities. They were least concerned with the freedom to attack others in space.
Participant responses indicate that NATO can gain deterrent value and a measure of space protection by explicitly stating Alliance intent to defend contributing nations‟ space capabilities.
18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Maritime Air Space Cyber
What are priorities of your ........?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
UN NATO EU PrivateIndustry
Others SCO OSCE US No One
Which Org is best to lead development of Policy & norms?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
NATO in the Cyber Commons, survey from the fifth ACT workshop, Tallinn, Estonia, 19 October 2010 . 1. General Findings
a. In response to the question, “What are the priorities of your nation / command / organization / company / university in regards to the domains of the GC?” survey results indicate that these participants gave first priority to the Cyber domain, followed by Air. Cyberspace is now an integral part of modern life, and interconnected with all domains of the
Global Commons. “This unique system has evolved into a truly global commons…. Because of the fundamental importance of cyberspace to modern society, the international community has a significant interest in preserving the openness and stability of the cyber common.” (Rattay, Evans, Healey, 2010). The Cyber domain has become increasingly important for both the public and private sectors since the 1980s.
b. Which organization is best suited to lead the development of policy, standards
and norms in the GCs? The UN was seen as the logical leader for policy in the maritime, air, and space domains; NATO and the EU followed. NATO was identified as the organization best suited to lead the development of policies in the Cyber domain, followed by the EU and
the UN. The role of the private sector was given more weight in comparison with the other domains. In general, NATO is not viewed as a good choice to lead the development of policies in the commons, but rather as an enabler, forum, and advocate. Participants in the Cyber workshop, however, did not follow the pattern of previous surveys in finding the UN to be the best choice to lead
development of policies and norms for the Global Commons. This might be a good indication of NATO‟s expertise in developing norms and policies on complex issues. Although it was generally agreed that the UN should lead such an initiative, participants might have preferred NATO due to the urgency of the situation in cyberspace.
19
71%
14%
14%
Should GCs domains be adressed independently?
Yes
No
43%
50%
7%
Should Military & Civilian Use Discussed Separately?
Yes
No
Don't Know
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
UN NATO EU Others SCO Nations OSCE US
Which organisation has the capability and the means?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
c. Following the development of policies, which organization has the capability and the means to provide assured access to the GC? In this survey, the EU was identified as the organization with the capabilities and means to assure access. NATO and the UN were next, while others such as private industry followed them. This is the first survey in which the EU was seen as the best organization to implement policies in the Cyber domain. The EU has developed a series of regulations and follows an integrated approach to cyber issues, while avoiding, on moral and practical grounds, development of offensive cyber capabilities. In regards to the other domains of the Global Commons, NATO was identified as the organization that has the capability and means to implement policies. The Cyber domain clearly inspires a different viewpoint from the others. d. Should the four domains of the GC be addressed independently? Although there is a general view that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together, 71% of the participants in the Cyber workshop agreed that the domains of the GC should be addressed independently. In the literature, there are two different views: “Contemporary American strategists recognise the commons, individually and as a group, as central to American national security interests.” (Denmark & Mulvenon 2010). “It is
misleading to conceptualize or deal with the interests of stakeholders in the Commons independently.... This is because the domains of the commons are inherently interwoven...and because the networks that enable operations or activities in the various overlapping sectors are themselves threaded together.” (Giarra, 2010). As in previous surveys, the different features and requirements of the commons were the two main concerns, and should be taken into account during the development of policies.
The Global Commons are a system of systems, and should be addressed together. e. Do you agree with the following statement: “There is a difference between military and civilian use of the GC”? Should these two areas be discussed separately? The roles and capabilities of military operations in the commons differ significantly from the expectations of international organizations. 50% of the participants supported the idea that the military and civilian uses of Cyberspace should be discussed together, while 43% believed they should be discussed separately. Due to the intertwined, highly complex national and international architecture of Cyberspace, any incident could affect both military and civilian users. Civilian and military uses of the Cyber domain overlap in many areas. These survey results show an even split on whether they are best discussed together or independently.
20
0
10
20
30
40
50
Main Threats Against Assured Access
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Maritime Air Space Cyber
Assured Access to GCs should be a NATO mission?
Don't know
Strongly Disagree
DisagreeSomewhat
Agree Somewhat
Strongly Agree
f. What are the main threats to assured access to the GC? There was a mixed response to this question. Organized crime and lack of internationally agreed regulations were identified as the biggest threats to assured access to Cyberspace, with organized
crime seen in this context as a transnational threat. Emerging powers, international terrorism and rogue nations appeared to be the highest concerns for the participants following organised crime. This result reflects the fact that most governments, international organizations, and businesses experience dozens or even hundreds of cyber-attacks every day, primarily of the nuisance, lone-hacker type, but increasingly from criminals and spies. Although international terrorism remains a major concern, no
terrorist group has yet initiated a major disruptive attack. Most state and non-state actors depend on access to cyberspace, and such an attack could take down the attacker‟s own network. Having said this, emerging powers and rogue nations remain a major concern for the participants. g. Should assured access to the GC, as part of a broader international concern, be a future NATO mission? In response to this question, 100 % of the participants agreed that access to the cyber domain should be a future NATO mission (71% strongly agreed, 29% agreed). This is the first time that all participants in a survey agreed that a specific
domain should be a NATO mission. As illustrated on the chart, agreement (strongly agree/somewhat agree) for the rest of the domains remained at 70%. This result corresponds with the findings of the Group of Experts report: NATO must accelerate efforts to respond to the danger of cyber-attacks by protecting its own communications and command networks; helping
Allies to improve their ability to prevent and recover from attacks; and developing an array of cyber defence capabilities aimed at effective detection and deterrence.
21
39
52
21
48
40
9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Deterrence Protection Attribution Collaboration Coordination Retribution
Responsibilities of NATO on Provision of Assured Access to GCs
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
StronglyAgree
AgreeSomewhat
DisagreeSomewhat
StronglyDisagree
Don't know
Is NATO adequetly prepared to work with UN/EU and others?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
StronglyAgree
AgreeSomewhat
DisagreeSomewhat
StronglyDisagree
Don't know
Should NATO establish a partnership with UN/EU and others?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
h. Should NATO should establish partnership(s) with the UN, EU, and others regarding assured access to the GC? 93% of participants strongly agreed that NATO should establish partnership in the Cyber domain, and to a lesser degree (around 70%) in the Maritime, Air, and Space domains. The importance of engagement with partners to ensure Alliance security in the current cyber threat environment cannot be overstated. NATO should work with partner nations, international organizations, academia, and industry to ensure that these threats are addressed and the cyber domain remains open to everyone. NATO‟s partnerships with international organizations such as the UN and EU, as well as regional organizations such as ASEAN, are critical to assured access to the Global Commons.
i. In your opinion what are the responsibilities of NATO to provide assured access to the GC? Protection, collaboration, coordination, and deterrence are the top four actions envisioned by the participants as NATO‟s future responsibilities regarding assured access to the GC. This is the first time protection was given the highest priority, again reflecting the importance of defence and assurance for the cyber domain. Attribution and retaliation were regarded as the least important responsibilities for NATO. Technical
attribution is the most difficult aspect of cyber-attacks. Misattribution is a significant danger; in an uncertain situation, because poor and misleading information can quickly lead to wrong conclusions and a retaliatory attack against the wrong target. In summary, participants preferred a defensive posture rather than an offensive one.
j. Is NATO adequately prepared to work with the EU and other partners to execute its responsibilities on provision of assured access to the GC? The response to this question varied significantly. In the cyber domain, 42% of the participants believed that NATO is ready / somewhat ready, whilst 36% disagreed. Most participants did not have a clear view on NATO‟s readiness to work with other partners. NATO should enhance its narrative and transparency to explain how the Alliance will approach assured access to the Global Commons. This can help avoid confusion amongst experts and establish trust with partners and emerging powers.
22
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Impact on PMSEII(+)
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
86%
14%
Is Cyber one of Global Commons' domain?
Yes
No
Don't Know
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
To provide thecommander the
means toeffectivelycommand
assigned assets
To ensure theAlliance HQs and
forces areadequately
trained to performassigned missions
To provide thecommander and
forces thenecessary
awareness andunderstanding to
effectivelyconduct
operations
To improveeffectiveness of
operationalmissions
To protectpersonnel,
infrastructure, andcritical resourcefrom potential
threats
To deploy NATO’s ability to deploy,
conduct, and sustain
expeditionary operations
To provide NATOforces withappropriate
medical support
To ensure non-NATO actors are
adequatelytrained toeffectively
contribute toNATO-led
operations
To improve the effectiveness of NATO’s military contribution to a Comprehensive
Approach
To strengthen NATO’s ability to
inform and maintain public
support
Secure Freedomof Seas
NATO should develop following Capabilities
k. Which GCs domain has the most significant effect on the areas identified below? Participants decided that assured access to the Cyber domain most significantly affects information and the economy, followed by the political, technological, and legal sectors. These were followed by governance, the military, and energy. The cyber-attack in Estonia in 2007 is regarded as the first full-scale cyber-attack against a state, disrupting economic activity, communications, and other aspects of daily life. Another example of a major cyber-attack is the attack that targeted the Energy Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of Iran‟s Natanz nuclear facility. Many critical infrastructure facilities throughout the world run on a SCADA system. l. What capabilities should NATO develop? Not only national and NATO representatives, but also well-informed attendees from academia and industry identified adequate training, command and control, strong situational awareness and understanding,
and the ability to deploy, conduct, and sustain expeditionary operations, as the top four areas in which NATO should develop capabilities for its roles in all domains of the Global Commons. These top four were followed by securing freedom of the seas, and protecting critical infrastructure and resources. 2. Cyberspace
a. To the question, “In your opinion, is Cyberspace a domain of the Global Commons?” 86% of the participants said yes. Cyberspace is a unique domain, and the newest of the Global Commons. It does not occupy a physical space as do the rest of the domains. While aspects of Cyberspace are not completely free from state sovereignty, no state has the ability to exercise complete control of it.
23
79%
14%
7%
Is Cyberspace as a complementary new theatre of operations?
Yes
No
Don't Know
0
10
20
30
40
50
Easy access tocheap
technology
Difficulties ofattributingmaliciousactivities
Easilyreachabletargets for
cyber spoilers
Lack ofregulation
Impossible todefend
No ownership Anonymity No leadership Widedistribution
ofinformation
Theborderlessnature of
Cyber Space,no passport
required
Due to factcyberspacecovers all ofthe world'sjurisdictionit's hard tocooperate
Difficulties inapplyingexisting
regulationand
determiningthe gaps inregulations
Strategic Features Effecting Cyber Security
b. Would Cyberspace be better classified as a complementary new theatre of operations? 80% of the participants agreed that cyberspace could be classified in this way. Analysts Alvin and Heidi Toffler termed information-enabled warfare as a third wave in military affairs. “The modern militaries extensively depend on information assets and
cyberspace, especially in scenarios where the deployment is across the globe.” (Sharma, 2009). Cyberspace has become a centre of gravity for the globalized world, due to increased reliance on the Cyber domain to support daily life. The information circulated in the cyber domain across the globe is vital not only to military operations, but also to the global supply chain. The consideration of Cyberspace as a new theatre of operations could implicitly suggest the need of military capabilities to cover the entire spectrum of military operations.
c. What is the importance of the following strategic features affecting security in Cyberspace? Respondents identified anonymity, easy access to cheap technology, and difficulties of attributing malicious activities as the top three influences on cyber-security. Anonymity will continue to be a key agenda item when it comes to cyber-security. “Whether the Internet affords too much or too little anonymity is a matter of dispute, but most agree
that anonymity can be used for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Anonymity can be liberating, allowing online users to become less inhibited by social conventions and restraints. At the same time, the benefits of anonymity can be dubious when it is used to avoid accountability for socially unruly behaviours and illegal activities.” (Kim, 2010). Other issues, such as easy access to cheap technology and the difficulty of attributing malicious activities, can be classified as part of the asymmetric nature of Cyberspace. “Reducing anonymity in the cyber realm would have many positive effects for cyber security, including maintaining a trusted realm for commercial transactions, providing accurate attribution for cyber-crime, and enabling credible cyber deterrence.”4
4 Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University
24
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Threats to security in Cyberspace
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Populations Centres ofcommerce
Integratedglobal economy
Militarycommand and
control systems
Military assets Criticalinfrastructure
Level of risks to following targets
d. In your opinion, which of the following actors and factors constitute the most probable threat to security in Cyberspace? Participants‟ biggest concern was the threat from organized crime, followed by threats from state actors in general, and lack of agreement and consensus on policy among nations. Participants were also concerned about military adversaries, hackers, terrorists, and other emerging powers; they also named China and
Russia as threats to security in Cyberspace, as depicted in the graph. “In August 2008, when Georgia suffered a cyber-attack that accompanied its invasion by Russia, the world sat up and took notice.” The Wall Street Journal reported: “Georgia States Hit by Cyber-attack,” while The New York Times reported: “Before the Gunfire, Cyber-attacks.” (Farivar, 2009). When we consider security in cyberspace, we need to consider not only
peacetime threats, but also those that might arise during crises and conflicts phases in which the Alliance may intervene. e. In your opinion, what is the level of risk for the following cyber vulnerabilities and targets? Participants were concerned with the following top three areas: centres of commerce, the integrated global economy, and critical infrastructure. Populations in general and military command and control systems were perceived to be at a lower risk. “The cyber-attacks against Estonian networks in 2007 were a wake-up call for information based societies in general, and for NATO in particular…. They forecast the risk that critical information infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector, including that which
supports energy, transportation, banking, communications and the media, could in the future be the target of cyber-attacks by a strategic opponent.” (Cutts, US Dept. of Homeland Security, 2009).” This US analysis accords with the insights provided by the participants‟ answers. Critical infrastructure, centres of commerce, and the integrated global economy will be the first targets of cyber warfare, and are prone to the highest risks.
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
Deterrence bydenying benefits to
the attackers
Protection ofinformation and
infrastructure
Retaliation Retribution Resilience Active defences Common securitystandards
Partners-widewatch and warning
network
Stronginternational legal
regime
Developing newhardware and
software
Best defence against cyber attacks
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Protect theirown systems
CERT(ComputerEmergencyResponse
Teams)
Globalsituationalawareness
Provideglobal
deterrence
Collectingand sharing
ofinformationand lessons
learned
Respondingto a cyber
attack
Protectingthe critical
infrastructure
Military's role in Cyber Space f. What role can
the military play in securing access to Cyberspace? Participants noted that the first role for the military is to protect their own systems, and the second is to protect critical infrastructure. These are followed by global situational awareness, responding to cyber-attack and collecting and sharing of information, lessons learned and best practices. The United States is one of the countries that has established a military command for the Cyber domain. USCYBERCOM‟s mission statement advocates a list of similar action items: “USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defence of specified Department of Defense information networks; and prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and deny the same to our adversaries5.”
g. In your opinion what is the best defence against a cyber-attack? Participants‟ top four choices were to establish active defences, protect information and infrastructure, establish a partner-wide watch and warning network, and enhance deterrence by denying benefits to the attackers. Resilience and strong international legal regime followed these four. This same question is being asked widely today: “[T]he exploitation of cyberspace is more sophisticated than implied by the idea of „cyber war': hundreds of thousands of actions
are targeting our systems each day, each with different aims and effects, not necessarily aimed at immediate destruction or disruption but rather more subversive effects. How do we respond to this6?” Responses are diverse. “I do not believe in this context that passive defences are sufficient. In a constantly evolving environment they do not guarantee total security, nor do they dissuade actors. So active defence – by which I mean using technologies that are able to identify and risk assess unexpected events, trace them to
5 U.S. DoD, U.S. CYBERCOM Fact Sheet dated 25 May 2010
6 Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones, Thursday, March 11 2010
26
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Recognising CyberSpace as the next
domain of warfare
Need for quickresponse activecyber defences
Protection ofcritical
infrastructure
Enhancingcollective defence
(article 5)
Need to preserve NATO’s
technological advantages and superior military
capabilities
Ensuring supportto Operations
Close cooperationand
interoperabilitywith industry and
partners
Primary interest areas for NATO
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Freedomfrom Attack
Freedom toAttack
Freedom ofAccess
Freedom ofUse
Others
Military Objectives and Goals
source and immediately disrupt them – is a concept and approach that should be seriously considered.7” Such expert opinions generally align with those of the participants.
h. Which of these activities are of primary interest to NATO? Participants
identified protection of critical infrastructure, recognition of cyberspace as the next domain of warfare, and the need for quick responses and active cyber defences as their top answers.
These are followed by close cooperation and interoperability with industry and partners. “But many nations do not have the capacity to control such exploitation of their sovereignty. This points to the need for increased technical help and capacity-building by organizations like NATO and the EU.”8 NATO‟s Heads of State and Government agreed on
NATO‟s role in the Cyber domain: “In order to ensure NATO‟s permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO‟s doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber-attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012, and the bringing of all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection.”9
i. In your opinion, of the listed military objectives and goals, what are the
priorities for the Cyber domain? Participants identified freedom of access, freedom from attack, and freedom of use as the top three priorities, whilst freedom to attack closely followed them. However, freedom of access, freedom from attack, and freedom of use were given higher priorities when working with partners, industry and other stakeholders.
7 Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones, Thursday, March 11 2010
8 Ibid
9 NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 Nov 2011
27
93%
7%
NATO should develop Cyber intelligence capabilities
Yes
No
Don't Know
79%
7%
14%
NATO should develop Cyber offensive capability
Yes
No
Don't Know
43%
43%
14%
NATO cyberwarfare capability could provide cyber deterrence
Yes
No
Don't Know
j. Do you agree that NATO should develop Cyberspace intelligence capacities to increase the ability of NATO to assure access to Cyberspace? Almost 93% of the participants agreed that NATO should develop cyberspace intelligence capabilities. “A new strategic intelligence challenge: Poorly understood strategic Information Warfare (IW) vulnerabilities and targets diminish the effectiveness of classical intelligence collection and analysis methods. A new field of analysis focused on strategic IW may have to be developed.” (Singh, 1997).
k. Do you agree that NATO should develop Cyberspace offensive capacities to
increase the ability of NATO to assure access to Cyberspace? 79% of the participants agreed that NATO should develop cyber offensive capabilities. “Russia has clearly signaled an intention to develop both offensive and defensive information warfare capabilities.” (Singh, 1997). US Deputy Defence Secretary William J. Lynn III explained that “Cyber [warfare] is an especially asymmetric technology; the low cost of computing devices means that our adversaries don‟t have to build an expensive weapons system like a fifth-generation fighter to pose a disproportional threat.” Consequently, he said, many militaries are building offensive cyber capabilities.
l. Do you agree that a full spectrum of NATO Cyber warfare capacities could
establish Cyber-deterrence? The participants were divided on this subject, with 43% supporting the idea and an equal number rejecting it. “Many cyber security experts and national security policy makers assume that it is impossible to achieve a comprehensive
cyber deterrence strategy.... In today‟s cyber threat environment there are a number of adversaries including: nation-states; terrorists; patriotic hackers and; cyber criminals. Each of these adversaries has different interests and objectives. Further, some of these adversaries, like terrorists, believe they have nothing to lose and therefore are not threatened by the use of force – digital or physical. Accordingly, cyber security experts and policy makers believe it is difficult to develop a deterrent strategy to address all of these adversaries.” (Noran,
2009). Michael Nacht, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, pointed out that “deterrence” as a concept need not be wedded to Cold War deterrence policies based on massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction. He advocated a picture of deterrence based on value, suggesting that frustrating attacks through better defense, limiting their impact through resiliency, or retaliating in other areas, such as diplomatic or economic sanction may be effective means of deterring attacks. The analysts emphasized the importance of attribution and also the need to establish a new “business model” for cyber security, which includes a public-private partnership.10 The division among survey participants reflects expert views.
10
Michael Nacht, Cyber Deterrence Conference, 2 Nov 2009
28
3. Key findings and insights of the Air and Space Domains Survey Analysis:
Although NATO is not viewed by the international community as a leader in the Global Commons, it was identified as the best suited to lead development of policies in the Cyber domain of the commons, followed by the EU and the UN. In this way, participants in the Cyber workshop did not followed the trend of previous surveys, which chose the UN for this role. Participants might have preferred NATO due to the perceived urgency of the situation.
The EU was identified as the lead organization with the capability and means to implement policies. NATO and the UN were next, followed by others such as private industry. The EU has developed a series of regulations and follows an integrated approach to cyber issues. This is the first time the EU‟s means and capabilities were chosen as the best to implement policies in a domain of the commons.
Although there is a general view that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together, 71% of the Cyber workshop participants thought the domains of the GC should be addressed independently, and that the features and requirements of each domain should be taken into account during the development of policies. The roles and capabilities of military operations in the commons differ significantly from the expectations of international organizations. 50% of the participants supported the notion that military and civilian use of the Cyber domain should be discussed together.
Organized crime and lack of internationally agreed regulations were identified as the biggest threats to assured access to the Cyber domain. Organized crime in this context should be regarded as a transnational threat. Emerging powers, international terrorism and rogue nations appeared to be the next highest concerns for the participants, following organised crime.
All participants (100%) agreed that the Cyber domain should be a future NATO mission (71% strongly agreed, 29% agreed). This is the first survey in which all participants agreed that a domain should be a NATO mission.
93% of participants strongly agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in the cyber domain, while only 70% responded favorably to this idea for the Maritime, Air, and Space domains.
Protection, collaboration, coordination, and deterrence were the top four actions envisioned by the participants as NATO‟s future responsibilities in providing assured access to the GC. This is the first survey in which protection was given the highest priority.
The response to NATO‟s readiness to work with partners and other international organizations varied significantly. In the Cyber domain, 42% of the participants believed that NATO is ready / somewhat ready, whilst 36% disagreed. Participants had no clear view on NATO‟s readiness to work with other partners.
Assured access to the Cyber domain of the GC has the most significant effect on information and the economy, followed by the political, technological, and legal sectors. These were followed by governance, the military, and the energy sector.
Asked whether Cyberspace should be considered a domain of the Global Commons, 86% of the participants agreed that it should.
29
80% of the participants agreed that cyberspace could be classified as a new theatre of operations. This concept could implicitly suggest the need for military capabilities to cover the entire spectrum of military operations.
Respondents identified anonymity, easy access to cheap technology, and the difficulties of attributing malicious activities as the top three features affecting security in cyberspace.
Participants‟ biggest concern were the threats from organized crime, followed by those from state actors in general, and a lack of agreement on policy from nations.
When we consider the security of cyberspace, we need to consider not only peacetime threats but those threats that occur during crisis and conflict phases, to allow the Alliance to intervene in multiple scenarios.
Participants were concerned with the following top three areas: centres of commerce, the integrated global economy, and critical infrastructure. These are considered to be the first set of targets for cyber-attack, and are prone to the highest risks.
The first priority for the military is to protect their own systems, and the second priority is to protect critical infrastructure. These are followed by global situational awareness, response to cyber-attack, and the collection and sharing of information.
Participants identified the following four best defences against cyber-attackers: establish active defences, protect information and infrastructure, establish a partner-wide watch and warning network, and enhance deterrence by denying benefits to the attackers.
Participants identified protection of critical infrastructure, recognition of cyberspace as the next domain of warfare, and the need for quick-response active cyber defences as top priorities for NATO. These are followed by close cooperation and interoperability with industry and partners.
Participants identified freedom of access, freedom from attack, and freedom of use as the top three priorities for Cyberspace, followed closely by freedom to attack.
Almost 93% of participants agreed that NATO should develop cyberspace intelligence capabilities. 79% agreed that NATO should develop cyber offensive capabilities.
The participants remained divided on the notion that a full spectrum of NATO cyber warfare capacities could lead to a cyber-deterrence. 43 % supported idea, whilst the same number rejected it.
30
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Maritime Air Space Cyber
What are priorities of your ........?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Which Org is best to lead development of Policy & norms?
NATO in the Global Commons, Asia-Pacific Perspective, survey from the sixth ACT workshop, Singapore, 15 November 2010 As with the other surveys, the first part of the questionnaire for this workshop focused on general issues covering all four domains of the Global Commons. The second part focused specifically on maritime-related matters in South East Asia, in order to identify priorities and relevant issues amongst the participants. This was a very small sample, so findings are only illustrative and not conclusive. 1. General Findings a. What are the priorities of your nation / command / organization / company / university with regard to the domains of the GC? Survey results show participants gave first priority to the maritime domain, followed by the Air and Cyber domains. “Although the challenges Southeast Asian nations face are more regional than global, the focus of the
world is expected to shift to this region, in particular to the South China Sea and Straits of Malacca, over the next decade. Over 80 % of China‟s oil imports and one-third of the world‟s annual maritime trade flow through the Strait of Malacca. The South China Sea is a major shipping highway linking the oil fields of the Middle East and the factories of East Asia. It is also home to some of the largest un-tapped stores of oil and natural gas in the world.”11
b. Which organization is best suited to lead the development of policy, standards, and norms in the GC? Participants chose the UN for this role, followed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Maritime domain. NATO and the EU followed in the other three domains. ASEAN12 was established as a regional organisation in 1967, to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development, and to promote regional peace and stability. Since its creation more than four decades ago, tensions among members have never escalated into armed confrontation.
11
Abraham Denmark and Zachary Hosford, “China‟s naval build up and its implications for the Asia Pacific Region,” World Politics Review, 14 September 2010, page 6 12
Founding fathers of ASEAN are namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
31
0
10
20
30
40
UN NATO EU Others SCO ASEAN ReCAAP
Which organisation has the capability and the means ?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
71%
29%
Should Military & Civilian Use Discussed Separately?
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
71%
21%
7%
Should GCs domains be adressed independently?
Yes
No
Don't Know
c. Following the development of policies, which organization has the capability and the means to provide assured access to the GC? The UN was identified as the lead organization in this case. NATO and the EU followed the UN, and ASEAN followed them. Although ASEAN offered a forum to deal with friction among regional countries, through political dialogue and confidence building, it lacks the tools, means, and capabilities to implement any decisions.
d. Should the four domains of the GC be addressed independently? Although there was a general view that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together, 71% of the workshop participants agreed that the domains should be addressed independently. The discussions during the workshop supported these results, as the participants followed a practical approach and focused on the maritime domain in general. Participants considered the other domains of the Global Commons, such as Air and Cyber, in light of their relevance to the Maritime domain.
e. Do you agree with the following statement: “There is a difference between military and civilian use of GCs”? Should these two areas be discussed separately? 71% of the participants agreed that military and civilian use should be discussed separately. As
mentioned previously, participants in this workshop took a practical approach, and focused on issues such as environmental protection, cooperation in food safety and standards, water management, preventing deforestation and managing reforestation, and regional disaster management. Assured access to the Global Commons and their use are always linked with practical issues such as energy and resource security. “The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of ensuring food and energy security in the region. In this regard, they welcomed the efforts
to create the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) as a permanent mechanism to ensure food security in the region and the intention to develop a comprehensive strategy on sustainable and integrated food and bio-fuels production and consumption.”13
13
Statement of the 11th ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers Meeting, Ha Noi, Vitenam, 21 July 2010.
32
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35Main Threats Against Assured Access
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
StronglyAgree
AgreeSomewhat
DisagreeSomewhat
StronglyDisagree
Don'tknow
Should NATO establish a partnership with UN/EU and others?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
f. What are the main threats to assured access to the GC? Participants‟ responses identified a first order of threats and a second order of threats. In the first group were lack of internationally agreed regulations, climate change, international terrorism,
economic instability, and rouge nations. The second tier included natural disaster, piracy, organized crime, immigration, polluters, drug traders and the increase in the number of nations possessing WMD. This result accords with the current realities that Southeast Asian nations are dealing with. They are most concerned with a lack
of internationally agreed regulations, and established ASEAN and ReCAAP to address regional issues with regional platforms.
h. Should NATO establish partnership(s) with the UN, EU, and others regarding assured access to the GC? 86% of participants strongly agreed/ agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in all domains of the Global Commons. However, they gave a higher priority to Southeast Asian regional organizations such as ASEAN. NATO should develop policies that can help establish practical links with partner nations,
international organizations, the private sector, academia, and industry to ensure that these threats are addressed, and access to the Global Commons remains assured for everyone. NATO‟s partnerships with international organizations such as the UN and EU, as well as regional organizations such as ASEAN, are critical to achieve this objective.
33
24
41
14
49 48
5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Deterrence Protection Attribution CollaborationCoordination Retribution
Responsibilities of NATO on Provision of Assured Access to GCs
0%
20%
40%
60%
Is NATO adequetly prepared to work with UN/EU and others?
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
0
10
20
30
40
50Assured Access to GCs has the most significant
effect
Maritime
Air
Space
Cyber
i. In your opinion what are the responsibilities of NATO to provide assured access to the GC? Collaboration, coordination, and protection were the top three actions envisioned by the participants to be NATO‟s future responsibilities. Collaboration and
coordination are generally first choices, because they allow practical and diplomatic action, without military intervention. Protection and deterrence involve military capabilities. Southeast Asia‟s regional approach is to resolve issues through discussions, but they also maintain military capabilities to provide
protection and deterrence.
j. Is NATO adequately prepared to work with the EU and other partners to execute its responsibilities on provision of assured access to the GC? The response to this
question varied significantly. In the Maritime domain, 46% agreed; in the Air domain 62%; and in the Cyber domain, 39% agreed that NATO is ready / somewhat ready. In the Maritime and Cyber domains, 23% disagreed, while for Air 16% disagreed. Participants did not have a clear view of NATO‟s readiness to work with other partners, in particular regional partners and organizations such as ASEAN. NATO should enhance its
narrative and transparency on how the Alliance will approach assured access to the global commons, avoiding confusion amongst experts and establishing trust with partners and emerging powers. k. Which GC domain has the most significant effect on the areas identified below? Assured access to the Maritime domain of the GC has the most significant effect on the economy, followed by the political, military and energy sectors. These were followed by the legal, governance, and environmental sectors. The second highest priority was given to the Air domain, in which assured access has the most significant impact on the military, economic, environmental, and political sector.
34
15%
54%
8%
23%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
Should NATO Play a Regional Role?
Don't know
StronglyDisagree
DisagreeSomewhat
AgreeSomewhat
StronglyAgree
38%
46%
15%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
Should NATO Play A Supporting Role?
Don't know
StronglyDisagree
DisagreeSomewhat
AgreeSomewhat
Strongly Agree
23%
31%
15%
31%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
Definition of Maritime Domain of GCs
Don't know
StronglyDisagree
DisagreeSomewhat
AgreeSomewhat
StronglyAgree
2. NATO’s role in the maritime domain of the GC
a. Should NATO play only a regional role in responding to Maritime threats? 69% of the participants strongly agreed/ somewhat agreed that NATO should stick to a regional role. Only 8% disagreed with this statement. It was clear during the discussions that NATO does need to develop a clear message for the areas where it wants to engage global partners. Participants from the Southeast Asia nations were more concerned about regional organizations and regional issues. They indicated, however, that they
were open to establishing links, and would be more cooperative once they understand NATO‟s intent. b. Should NATO have a significant role in collecting, analysing and disseminating data in order to protect assured access to the Maritime domain of the GC? 84% of the participants believed NATO should play a supporting role. ASEAN nations are involved in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, together with NATO, EU, and US task forces. However, there is little understanding of NATO in the region, as its role is not obvious in this part of the world. Southeast Asian nations and regional organizations such as ASEAN are not thinking about global issues in the context of security, but they need to consider cooperation with partners at the global level to address the regional problems associated with globalization. In this regard, partnership with NATO should not be excluded. By the same token, if NATO is going to engage with the region as part of its new strategy of supporting stability in the Global Commons, the Alliance must be able to present a clear narrative on its aims.
c. Do you agree with the following general definition of the Maritime domain of the GC: “the world‟s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them?” Only 23% of the participants agreed with this definition, whilst 46% somewhat/ strongly disagreed with it. Almost a third of the participants stated that they did not have any idea. This result is another indication of regional Maritime problems. Maritime security and the South China Sea are very important to the regional countries of China, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. China has an interest not only
35
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Geographic Areas Primary Interest to NATO in Maritime Domain
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Military objectives and goals to secure freedom and assure access in maritime
domain
in current regional issues, but it also has historical claims. These claims are causing major concerns for ASEAN countries and the broader region. China has attempted to keep disputes bilateral, apparently believing that its expanding economic and military power will force the smaller countries of Southeast Asia to eventually acquiesce.14 Assured access to the Global Commons, particularly in the Maritime domain, is closely linked to already existing and potential conflicts of interest, and threats to security and stability, in the South China Sea. As the dispute over islands in the South China Sea and the waters surrounding them shows, definitions can differ based on legal, historical, or cultural interpretations. Therefore, it was difficult to agree a general definition of the Maritime domain, as reflected in the survey results. d. Which geographic areas are of primary interest to NATO regarding assured access to the Maritime domain of the GC? Participants agreed that the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and High North are of primary interest to NATO, closely followed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Southeast Asian nations understand NATO‟s role in global affairs, and its global interest as a regional organizations, but without a clear understanding of NATO‟s purpose and intent, remain cautious towards NATO. Although they are aware of NATO operations in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa, they expect NATO to continue to focus on the Euro-Atlantic region. e. In your opinion, what are the priorities among the listed military objectives and goals in order to assure access in the Maritime domain of the GC? Participants assigned the highest priorities to freedom of access, freedom of transit, and freedom of use, closely followed by freedom from attack. Given the importance of the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea for shipping and trade, these results support geographic and regional concerns. For example, the Strait of Malacca is designated an international waterway, and safe passage is guaranteed under international law. In order to address piracy and crime at sea, regional/littoral states have established joint security patrols on the water and “eyes in the sky” air patrols. As a consequence, transit is becoming safer in the Straits of Malacca, but less secure in the less managed South China Sea.
14
Abraham Denmark and Zachary Hosford, “China‟s naval build up and its implications for the Asia Pacific
Region,” World Politics Review, 14 September 2010, page 6
36
69%
31%
NATO naval presence provided safety to international shipping
Yes
No
Don't Know
69% 8%
23%
NATO naval presence provided deterrence against piracy
Yes
No
Don't Know
77%
23%
NATO's naval presence should continue & improved
Yes
No
Don't Know
f. With regard to NATO‟s operations to deter and disrupt piracy and protect shipping in the Indian Ocean, do you agree that NATO‟s naval presence in the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Indian Ocean provided safety to international shipping? 69% of the participants agreed with this statement, whilst 31% stated they have no opinion. Growing piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa is undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa, and the safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway into and out of the Suez Canal. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region, since 2008. As of today, piracy is about money and has no known ties to terrorism.. ASEAN nations are also involved in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, together with NATO. g. Do you agree that NATO‟s contribution to counter-piracy operations should continue and be further improved in areas where the Alliance‟s access to the Maritime
commons is threatened? 77% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s presence should continue and improve, whilst 23% had no opinion. NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities in compliance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and in conjunction with actions against piracy initiated by other actors, including the European Union. This result indicates that NATO‟s intent in regards to counter-piracy operations is well-advocated and understood by Southeast Asian Nations.
h. Do you agree that NATO‟s naval presence in the IRTC in the Indian Ocean provides deterrence against piracy? 69% of participants agreed, whilst 8% disagreed. This disagreement originates from the nature of piracy. It is a well-known fact that pirates adapt their tactics according to conditions. Since August 2008, the pirates‟ area of operations has
changed dramatically. Pirates have successfully high-jacked for ransom vessels northwest of the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA), an area with no previous historical pirate activity. They have also high-jacked vessels from within the MSPA. The pirate gangs now view the crew, cargo, and vessel as a single commodity and as such demand a single higher fee during the ransom negotiation. It could be argued that NATO‟s naval presence deterred pirates operating in designated area of operation.
37
54% 38%
8% Piracy in SE Asia will remain as a
major security concern
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
92%
8%
Cooperation must be enhanced including mechanism for
intelligence sharing
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
54%
31%
ReCAAP contributed to enhance the security of
regional waters in SE Asia Yes
No
Don'tKnow
i. Do you agree that piracy in Southeast Asia is likely to remain a major security concern for governments and the shipping industry for the foreseeable future? 54% of the participants agreed that piracy will remain as a concern, whilst 38% disagreed. Sea piracy is a major maritime security problem for Southeast Asia. By far the greatest concentration of piracy incidents globally in 2010 was off Somalia, but attacks in Southeast Asian waters have also increased. A total of 71 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships were reported in the Asian region. Of these, 58 were actual hijackings and 13 were attempts. There has been an increase in the number of incidents reported between Jan-Jun 2010 compared to the same period in 2007, 2008, and 2009.15 This result is an indication of a divided view among participants of the degree to which piracy presents a threat to international commerce in the region. j. Do you agree that cooperation between regional states must be enhanced to include “mechanisms for intelligence sharing to improve maritime security? 92% of the participants agreed with this idea. Southeast Asian nations are improving regional cooperation within ASEAN. “Noting with satisfaction ASEAN‟s on-going cooperation in non-traditional security issues, we resolved to further enhance greater interaction and cooperation among relevant agencies of ASEAN Member States in addressing non-traditional security issues, particularly counter-terrorism and transnational crimes, and maritime security. We agreed to task our senior officials to continue the work to finalise the ASEAN Declaration on Humanitarian Assistance to People and Vessels in Distress at Sea.16” This result accords with the level of support provided at the highest levels of authority. k. Do you agree that the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has enhanced the security of regional waters in Southeast Asia? ReCAAP is a government-to-government agreement that addresses piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia by focusing on information sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements. Its regional Contracting Parties (member countries) are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, South Korea,
Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam. In addition, Norway has signed on. 54% of the participants agreed that ReCAAP contributed to the security of regional waters, whilst 15% of participants disagreed. 31% of participants had no opinion. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre reported an increase in piracy activities in Southeast Asia during January-June 2010, compared with the same period each year from 2006-2009.
15
Half Yearly Report, ReCAAP, January-June 2010 16
Joint Communiqué of the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, "Enhanced Efforts towards the ASEAN
Community: from Vision to Action” Ha Noi, 19-20 July 2010
38
92%
8%
Major users of SE Asia waterways should assume a
greater responsibility for maritime security
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
54% 46%
Signing agreement on safety of maritime navigation would improve maritime security
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
92%
8%
Energy Security concerns impacts on assured access to
maritime domain of the GC in SE Asia
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
l. Do you agree that major users of the region‟s waterways should assume a greater responsibility for enhancing maritime security? 92% of the participants agreed. Regional countries, especially Indonesia and the Philippines are major shippers, and also
leading providers of international seafarers. The Northeast Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are heavily dependent on seaborne trade through waters at risk of pirate attack off Somalia and in Southeast Asia. Japan is at the forefront of moves to counter piracy in these areas, while China and South Korea have also deployed warships to the waters off Somalia.
m. Do you agree that signing the Convention of Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) by South Asian nations would help to improve maritime security? This Convention was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The SUA Convention is intended to regulate unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews. These include the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. 54% of the participants agreed that joining the SUA Convention would improve safety, whilst 46% stated no opinion on the subject. Regional countries remain divided on extradition and prosecution of those involved in piracy, therefore this result accords with the position of the countries. n. Do you agree that energy security concerns have an impact on assured access to the Maritime domain of the GC in Southeast Asia? 92% of the participants agreed that they do, whilst 8% stated no opinion. “Economic growth and burgeoning populations have put South Asia‟s energy security in a perilous state. Already energy and power shortages are stunting development in some of the region‟s least developed locations, spurring political insurgences and social dislocation. Should this trend continue, the region
will face dire economic, social and political crises.”17 China, India, and Japan deserve special interest in regards to their demand for energy. “China‟s soaring energy needs have generated considerable anxiety among Chinese strategists about the country‟s „energy security‟ and its strategic position more broadly.... While China only became a net oil importer in 1993, it now meets more than 50 per cent of its oil needs through imports, and that figure may reach 80 per cent by 2030.
Most of these imports are shipped...through the Indian Ocean and the narrow Malacca Strait. Worries about the vulnerability of these supply lines have helped motivate a range of Chinese policies in recent years; Beijing has supported its national oil companies (NOCs) as they invest overseas, approved pipeline projects to overland neighbors, concluded long-term
17
Energy and Security in South East Asia, Ebinger, C.K., Brookings Institute
39
31%
54%
15%
Increase in the number of nations possessing WMD and delivery
systems are the biggest threat to Assured Access to maritime domain
Yes
No
Don'tKnow
supply contracts with producer states, started construction of a strategic petroleum reserve, and looked to build a more powerful navy.”18 o. Do you agree that an increase in the number of nations possessing WMD and delivery systems, and improved weapons systems technologies and missile systems are the biggest threat to assured access to the Maritime domain? 54% of the participants disagreed with this statement, whilst 31% thought that WMD and delivery systems are the biggest threats. Although the situation of North Korea is well recognised, it is not at the top of their agenda. 3. Key findings and insights of the Asia Perspective Survey Analysis:
Survey results indicate that participants see their first priority as the Maritime domain, followed by the Air and Cyber domains.
The UN was identified as the best organization to lead in the development of policies in all domains of the GC, followed by ASEAN in the Maritime domain. NATO and the EU followed in all other domains.
The UN was also seen as the lead organization with the capability and means to implement policies. NATO and the EU were next, followed by the UN and ASEAN.
Despite a general view that the domains of the Global Commons should be addressed together, 71% of workshop participants thought they should be addressed independently. Discussions during the workshop supported these results, as participants followed a practical approach and focused on the Maritime domain.
71% of the participants agreed that military and civilian use of the domains should be discussed separately. Participants focused on issues such as environmental protection, cooperation in food safety and standards, water management, preventing deforestation and improving reforestation, and regional disaster management.
Lack of internationally agreed regulations, climate change, international terrorism, economic instability, and rouge nations were identified as the biggest threats to assured access to the GC. Natural disaster, piracy, organized crime, immigration, polluters, drug trafficking, and proliferation of WMD followed.
86% of participants strongly agreed/ agreed that NATO should establish partnerships in all domains of the Global Commons. They gave a higher priority, however, to Southeast Asian regional organizations such as ASEAN.
18
Rethinking energy security in China, Kennedy Andrew, June 6th
2010
40
Collaboration, coordination, and protection are the top three actions envisioned by the participants as NATO‟s future responsibilities toward providing assured access to the GC. Collaboration and coordination usually lead, because they provide practical and diplomatic action, without military intervention.
Asked whether NATO is ready to work with EU and other partners, 46% thought NATO was ready /somewhat ready in the Maritime domain, 62% in the air domain, and 39% in the cyber domain. 23% disagreed with regard to the Maritime and Cyber domains, and 16% for Air.
Assured access to the Maritime domain was thought to have the most significant effect on the economy, followed by the political, military, and energy sectors.
69% of the participants strongly agreed/ somewhat agreed that the NATO should play a regional role. Only 8% disagreed with this statement. It was clear during the discussions that NATO does need to produce a narrative with a clear message for the areas where it wants to engage global partners.
84% of the participants agreed that NATO should play a supporting role. ASEAN nations are involved in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, together with NATO, EU, and US task forces. However, there is little understanding of NATO in the region, as its role is not obvious in this part of the world.
Only 23% of the participants agreed with the definition of the Maritime domain offered, whilst 46% somewhat/ strongly disagreed with the definition. This result is also another indication of regional maritime problems. Maritime security and the South China Sea are very important to regional countries and China, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Participants agree that the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and High North are of primary interest to NATO, followed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Southeast Asia nations understand NATO‟s role in global affairs and its global interest as a regional organizations, but lack of a clear NATO narrative and intent creates a cautious approach towards NATO.
77% of the participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence in Indian Ocean should continue and improve, whilst 23 % stated no opinion.
69% of participants agreed that NATO‟s naval presence provided deterrence to piracy, whilst 8% of disagreed. This disagreement originates from the nature of piracy, and the tendency of pirates to adapt their tactics to their adversaries‟.
54% of the participants agreed that piracy will remain a concern, whilst 38% disagreed. Sea piracy is a major maritime security problem for East Asia. By far the greatest concentration of piracy incidents globally in 2010 was off Somalia, but attacks in Southeast Asian waters have also increased. This result is an indication of a divided view of the degree to which piracy presents a threat to international commerce in the region.
92% of the participants agreed that cooperation between regional states must be enhanced to include intelligence sharing. In the meantime South Asian nations are improving regional cooperation within ASEAN.
ReCAAP is a government-to-government agreement that addresses piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia by focusing on information sharing, capacity building, and
41
cooperative arrangements. 54% of the participants agreed that ReCAAP enhanced the security of regional waters, whilst 15% of participants disagreed. 31% of participants stated no opinion.
92% of the participants agreed that major users should assume greater responsibility for maritime security. Regional countries are major shipper and shipping countries and some, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, are leading providers of international seafarers. The Northeast Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are heavily dependent on seaborne trade through waters at risk of pirate attack.
Unlawful acts under the SUA Convention include the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. 54% of the participants agreed that joining the Convention would improve safety, whilst 46% stated no opinion on the subject.
92% of the participants agreed that energy security concerns have an impact on assured access to the Maritime domain, whilst 8% stated no opinion.
54% of the participants disagreed and 31% agreed that WMD and delivery systems are the biggest threats in the Maritime Domain.