atlantic voices vol 3. no. 1
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Niklas Anzinger and Ludwig Jung analyze the on-going Syrian crisis and its effect on Turkey and NATO. They examine the strategic obstacles in Turkey’s approach and argue that in order to overcome the challenges posed by Syria, Russia and Iran, a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel and an increase in political and operational support from Europe is needed. Kai Peter Schönfeld examines the historical background and strategic value of the Élysée Treaty on its 50th anniversary. He argues that the Élysée Treaty is a cornerstone in Europe’s progress towards a Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) and must be improved by industrial cooperation, deepened dialogue and better coordination of crisis management.TRANSCRIPT
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 1
Volume 3 - Issue 1, January 2013
Contents:
Global Pulse: NATO and Turkey’s Syria Challenge: Time to Pair Up
Niklas Anzinger and Ludwig Jung analyze the on-going Syrian crisis and its effect on Turkey
and NATO. They examine the strategic obstacles in Turkey’s approach and argue that in
order to overcome the challenges posed by Syria, Russia and Iran, a rapprochement between
Turkey and Israel and an increase in political and operational support from Europe is needed.
Dialogues, Doctrines, Disappointments: The Élysée Treaty in the
Context of Transatlantic Partnership and European Common Se-
curity and Defence Policy
Kai Peter Schönfeld examines the historical background and strategic value of the Élysée
Treaty on its 50th anniversary. He argues that the Élysée Treaty is a cornerstone Europe’s
progress towards a Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) and can be improved by
industrial cooperation, deepened dialogue and better coordination of crisis management.
50 Years of the Élysée Treaty: Its Impact on EU Foreign Policy and NATO
The 50th Anniversary of the Élysée Trea-
ty serves as a time to reflect upon Europe’s
Common Security and Defence Policy and
the struggle of establishing a secure and unit-
ed European continent.
Having represented a cornerstone mo-
ment in the history of European defence and
international relations, the value of the Fran-
co-German partnership and their engineering
of a Common Security and Defence Policy
cannot be understated.
As Europe now faces a range of threats
comprised of political, military and economic
crises, the need to review and reform the
framework established by the Élysée Treaty
has never been more vital.
The Élysée Treaty not only set in motion
the solidarity and commitment of Europe’s
Transatlantic Partnership, but serves as a
testament that historic rivalries can be over-
come when pursuing a common goal of peace
and security. Something that must be re-
membered when preparing for the kinds of
challenges the Alliance will face in coming
years.
- Jason Wiseman
Fabius, Westerwelle, Le Drian and de Maiziere visiting the Franco-German Brigade. (Photo - Kazda-Bundeswehr)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 2
O ur aim is to analyze the role of the NATO
actors involved in the missile defense op-
eration in Turkey and its long-term conse-
quences for NATO. We argue that the crucial mid- to long
-term threat for NATO is posed by Iran´s nuclear and bal-
listic missile program. The Syrian crisis has the potential to
bring NATO and Turkey closer together and install a ro-
bust defense line along the Eastern rim of the Alliance. We
believe that if Turkey takes its inevitable leadership role
seriously, it must pursue an optimization
strategy of pooling intelligence and tech-
nological upgrades. Essential for the suc-
cess of this strategy would be a reconcili-
ation of its formerly strong security rela-
tionship with Israel.
Analysis - Turkey´s Vulnerability and the Mis-
sile Threat
In a volatile region, Turkey´s central geographic posi-
tion makes it especially vulnerable to the Eastern borders
of Iran, Iraq and Syria. As NATO plans a deployment to
secure its alliance's Eastern rim, Turkey as the directly
affected state plays a decisive role. The Turkish strategy
before the Syrian crisis entailed power-balancing in the
region in order to secure economic conduct with its neigh-
boring countries. As a result, trade with Northern Iraq,
Iran and especially Syria flourished for the benefit of devel-
oping the Eastern Anatolian region in Turkey. However,
the accompanied diplomatic rapprochement with Tehran
and Damascus along with the strategy of championing the
Arab street in order to promote the "Turkish model"
proved to be strategically unsound and not as successful as
intended.1 Following the Flotilla
incident in 2010, the diplomatic
relationship with Israel deteriorated
and Turkish PM Erdoğan adopted
strong rhetoric against Israel in or-
der to appeal to the Arab and Muslim masses. As events
unfolded during the Arab Spring, the illusionary percep-
tions of the Turkish "zero problems with our neighbors"
strategy were laid bare. Iran´s hegemonic ambitions in the
region and fervent military support of Assad in Syria illu-
minated a deep geopolitical antagonism to Turkey. The
concerns of Turkey in terms of refugee influx, retreat ba-
ses for the militant-Kurdish PKK/PYD and the alleged
obligation of protecting Sunni Muslims – not to mention
the economic impact2 – made
Erdoğan a Syria-hardliner in
rhetoric, while failing to gain
the support of a credible mil-
itary power.3 Turkey had to
reassess its lines of defense as
the Syrian ballistic missile
arsenal has become a serious
threat to its own national
interests and citizens.
Turkey had to re-
member the lessons from
1991: in the wake of the un-
raveling Gulf War, Turkey
found itself defenseless due
to NATO´s slow delivery of
NATO and Turkey’s Syria Challenge: Time To Pair Up
GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE
Turkey’s central geographic posi-tion makes it especially vulnerable
Strategic map – the deployment of Patriots along the Syrian border to Turkey (Photo: Stimme Russlands)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 3
Patriots against Saddam Hussein´s Scud missiles. Ankara’s
efforts to procure its own missile defense systems began in
1997 in a call of military cooperation with Israel but the
economic turmoil of the early 2000s impeded the install-
ment plans. While Turkey has obtained significant up-
grades in counter-proliferation and air-defense capability,
NATO's most Eastern member still remains vulnerable
against ballistic missiles.4
As a result of the escalating situation on the Turkish-
Syrian border, the NATO Council of Foreign Ministries
decided in early December 2012
"to augment Turkey’s air defense
capabilities in order to defend
the population and territory of
Turkey and contribute to the de-
escalation of the crisis along the
Alliance’s border.5” The U.S., Germany and the Nether-
lands will deploy air-defense squadrons operating on six
Patriots in a triangular position based in the Turkish cities
of Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Adana. Each of these
Turkish cities has a high number of inhabitants allegedly
protected against ballistic missiles from Syria. NATO
members employ the most technically advanced Patriot
systems with PAC-2 and PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles. Pa-
triot missiles provide protection against incoming missiles
in the range of 50 to 100 kilometers.
The military implications of the Patriots are tightly
circumscribed and make them unsuitable for establishing a
no-fly zone or other measures culminating in direct inter-
vention in Syria. First, their range operability-circle from
the point of their deployment along the Southern border of
Turkey hardly reaches into Syrian territory by distance.
Second, the alleged interception of Syrian airspace in order
to create safe zones for rebel forces is ruled out by the
mandates of NATO and the participating countries. It is
therefore unlikely that the purpose of "self-defense" will
be violated unless the situation changes dramatically. Yet,
the advanced Syrian ballistic missile arsenal and potential
chemical weapon capabilities pose a severe threat as long as
they are not secured - while unlikely, an “irrational end-
game” including the use of those weapons by Assad re-
mains a possibility. Nevertheless the deployment of the
Patriots may have strategic implications. For Turkey, it
signals the power of the Alliance and Turkey’s regional
importance - Ankara is once more proving that it aspires to
a political leadership role apart from its economic power.
For NATO countries, it is the cheapest way of demonstrat-
ing action.6
Collective Defence: Turkey’s Inevitable Leader-
ship
In Germany the voters are highly averse to anything
that could be seen as a bellicose act or imply military ac-
tion. Additionally, Germany has little interest in risking a
confrontation with Russia. If the presumptions are true
that Turkey might push for some
sort of NATO-led intervention in
concert with the U.S. and the Neth-
erlands, Germany will most likely
block or tame any pro-active at-
tempts. While the U.S. would have
the military means, the Obama ad-
ministration is unlikely to let itself be distracted from its
pivot-to-Asia strategy in order to engage in yet another
military adventure in a Muslim country.
No NATO state other than Turkey has shown will-
ingness to take responsibility towards Syria, certainly moti-
vated by the fact that Ankara's own national interest is en-
dangered by the collapsing order in the neighboring state.
No NATO state other than Turkey has shown willingness to take responsibil-
ity towards Syria
Pat-3 radar system in deployment (Photo: Armed International Forces)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 4
Turkey provided retreat and weap-
ons for the Free Syrian Army and
repeatedly called on the internation-
al community and NATO for pro-
active measures. The Patriot deploy-
ment – although militarily limited –
does represent a diplomatic signal
that may not be meaningless: the
US, Germany and the Netherlands
now share concerns for their sol-
diers´ lives and are committed to the
defense of their Alliance partner.
Shared interests can motivate actors
to develop ideas and strategies not
previously thought of in the cost-
benefit calculation.
In the middle run the commit-
ment of NATO can and has to go beyond Syria because the
threat of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile program is
imminent to Turkey. The handling of Syria will challenge
NATO's crisis management.7 With Tehran aggressively
working towards a nuclear weapon, Turkey will no longer
be able to play its mediator role for Iran. As time runs out,
Turkey will have to upgrade its place in the Western de-
fense alliance-structure. At its border, Turkey has to lead
and put all possible assets for a successful operation and
prospectively longer lasting missile defenses in place. The
lack of a clear commitment and decisive action during the
Patriots´ deployment by both Turkey and the other allies
would not only put NATO personnel in danger, but would
endanger the overall success of this undertaking.
Optimization Strategy - A Turkish-Israeli Pillar
The key factors for an optimization of all assets are
intelligence pooling and technological upgrades for the
Turkish military. For Turkey, the necessity arises to re-
store the relationship with a natural ally Erdoğan negli-
gently sacrificed for questionable motives. Israel has prov-
en its advanced military and intelligence capabilities on
several occasions, e.g. during Operation Cloud Pillar in
Gaza. Israel has radar systems which were intended to co-
work with Turkish radars in the phase of their deployment.
Moreover, Turkey and Israel had contracts for the pur-
chase of military equipment8 and joint military exercises,
which deteriorated during the diplomatic stand-off - these
can and should all be brought back to the table. Israel
might be able to afford to work without Turkey for now.
In the long run it will certainly welcome the military asser-
tiveness of NATO and the regional power projection of a
strong Turkey - given clear shared interests on major issues
such as the Iranian nuclear and missile program and the
concerns of chemical weapons from the Syrian stockpile
falling into the hands of Islamists (for this reason, Israel
recently deployed Iron Dome missile defense batteries
along its Northern border).9 Intelligence and military tech-
nology from Israel has the advantage of being readily avail-
able, highly advanced and effective. Turkey cannot afford
to leave this option unexplored.
Ankara has to reconsider the options it temporarily lost
due to alienating Israel. If Turkey wanted to be a balancing
power and a credible proponent of an Israeli-Palestinian
peace settlement, the approach of engaging Hamas and
trying to isolate Israel failed. Compared to Qatar's ability
to influence politics in the Gaza Strip through the check-
book10 and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological
bond with Hamas and geographical proximity to the Gaza
strip, Turkey could neither influence Hamas nor Israel in
any significant way.
Israeli PM Netanyahu reiterated prior to the elections
that Turkish-Israeli relations would be “mutually benefi-
cial” and emphasized “the necessity of acting against Iranian
nuclear ambitions” in 2013.13 NATO, the U.S., Germany
and the Netherlands should insist on the reconciliation and
explain its benefits to Turkey. The first signs of this are
becoming apparent: while Turkey actively blocked Israeli
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen listens to Turkey’s Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz during a NATO defense ministers´ meeting at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels (Photo: Reuters)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 5
NATO participation, it now seems to ease its reserva-
tions.14 The Turkish administration might, however, insist
on low-publicity steps or discrete intelligence cooperation
in order to conceal its miscalculation to the public and to
feed the narrative of a strong Muslim democracy that
stands up to Israel. Nevertheless, it should be clearly de-
manded that Ankara works towards an honest and publicly
acknowledged reconciliation with Jerusalem. In terms of
meeting the geostrategic goal of deterring a nuclear Iran, a
strong and publicly visible collective defense alliance built
on a Turkish-Israeli security pillar appears to be a robust
strategy. Nationalist pride or loosing face can be no excuse
for either side.
Iranian and Russian Reservations
Iran will continue its support for Assad by all means. In
the course of the Syrian crisis, Iran lost a tangible strategic
asset, making weapons deliveries to radical-Shiite Hezbol-
lah in Lebanon more difficult. As the Iranian regime is un-
der heavy pressure due to Western sanctions, which are
leading to a massively deteriorating economic situation, it
might consider drastic options or moderate its tone to fo-
cus on inner stability.
Iranian officials panicked at the deployment of the Pa-
triots. General Hassan Firouzabadi, the Iranian armed forc-
es chief, said "Each one of these Patriots is a black mark on
the world map, and is meant to cause a world war.15" Rus-
sia subsequently problematized its support for Assad and
shares Western concerns about chemical weapons falling
into the wrong hands. Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev said
in an interview that the Russians "never said that our goal
was to preserve the current political regime, or making
sure that President Assad stays in power.16"
Germany will not play an active political role in regard
to Syria, nor will the U.S. But both will not block a NATO
strategy that is well thought out and led by Turkey. Ger-
many and the Netherlands could participate in helping
Turkey deal with the problem of Syrian refugees – which
recently topped the mark of more than 700.000 - by
providing refuge to fleeing Syrians to ease the burden on
Turkey. Engaging and being led by the most important
Muslim ally would furthermore benefit the legitimacy of
the alliance in the region. In the end, Turkey could be-
come the regional power hub it seeks to be - but only if
Ankara is in organic concert with Jerusalem. This optimi-
zation strategy and the grouping of all actors in the course
of the Patriot deployment would not overstretch any of the
passive members of the alliance. A lot rests on Ankara´s
willingness and courage to correct a strategic mistake, get
things back together with Israel and lead the line of defense
as a pillar of NATO on the Eastern rim.
Niklas Anzinger works as a research assistant for the Mideast Freedom Forum Berlin and as an editorial assistant for Turkish Policy Quarterly in the course of an exchange semes-ter at the Marmara University in Istanbul.
Ludwig Jung holds a B.A. degree in Philosophy & Econom-ics from the University of Bayreuth. He is currently pursu-ing a M.Sc. degree in Foreign Service at Georgetown Uni-versity's School of Foreign Service, sponsored by the Ful-bright Program.
1. Soner Cagaptay and David Pollock. Whatever Happened to “The Turkish Model”?. January 7, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/whatever-happened-to-the-turkish-model 2. Soner Cagaptay. Syria's War Affecting Turkey in Unexpected Ways. January 29, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrias-war-affecting-turkey-in-unexpected-ways 3. Aaron Stein and Dov Friedman. Could Turkey Beat Syria?. October 10, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/could-turkey-beat-syria-7575 4. Aaron Stein. Turkey Marches toward Missile Defense. August 23, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkey-marches-toward-missile-defense-7387 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Foreign Ministers’ statement on Patriot deployment to Turkey. December 4, 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6BD09A4E-BF227793/natolive/news_92476.htm 6. Aaron Stein and Shashank Joshi. Missile Creep – Was giving Patriots a step toward war in Syria?. December 10, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/10/missile_creep?page=0,0 7. Philipp C. Bleek and Aaron Stein. Turkey and America Face Iran. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 27–38. 8. Isabel Kershner. Israel Cancels Military Contract With Turkey to Supply Aerial System. December 23, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/middleeast/israel-cancels-military-contract-with-turkey.html?_r=1& 9. Jodi Rudoren and Anne Barnard. Israel Girds for Attacks as Syria Falls Apart. January 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/middleeast/refugee-crisis-grows-as-violence-flares-across-syria.html?_r=0 10. Jodi Rudoren. Qatar’s Emir Visits Gaza, Pledging $400 Million to Hamas. October 23, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/middleeast/pledging-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to-gaza-strip.html?_r=0 11.Today´s Zaman. Israeli PM: Positive ties between Israel and Turkey would benefit both sides. December 11, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-300801-israeli-pm-positive-ties-between-israel-and-turkey-would-benefit-both-sides.html 12. Hilary Leila Krieger. Israel to join NATO activities amidst Turkey tension. December 23, 2012. http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=297004 13. Reuters. Iran warns Turkey not to deploy Patriot missiles. December 15, 2012. http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/15/syria-crisis-iran-idINDEE8BE04E20121215 14. Matt Smith. Al-Assad's grip on power "slipping away," Medvedev says. January 28, 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/27/world/europe/russia-syria/index.html?hpt=hp_t3 15. Reuters. Syrian refugees top 700,000 as exodus swells: U.N. January 29, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSBRE90S0AR20130129 16. Washington Post Editorial. Consequences of U.S. inaction in Syria are clear. January 29, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/consequences-of-us-inaction-in-syria-are-clear/2013/01/28/a03dad0e-6978-11e2-95b3-272d604a10a3_story.html
About the authors
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 6
harmonization of their strategic and tactical doctrines in order
to arrive someday at mutual defence concepts. From this per-
spective, the Élysée Treaty contained highly ambitious tar-
gets. The most significant steps towards this aim were prede-
fined in the creation of French-German institutes for opera-
tional research, binational exchange programs, intercultural
and language instructions amongst the troops, joint armament
and research projects based on common financing and regular
meetings of the responsible political and military authorities.2
In fact, the Élysée Treaty as such was nothing new. It was
rather the product of a ten-year-old French-German military
rapprochement process which had already passed through
several stations. These include, for example, the collapsed
project of European Defence Community
elaborated by Pleven and Monnet, coop-
eration in the European Union and
NATO, arms deals, first approaches to-
wards nuclear cooperation and the agree-
ments of Colomb-Béchard 1956 and
Strauß-Messmer 1960.3 The majority of strategists of that
period aimed at a French-German military cooperation within
the existing frames of NATO and the WEU. However, in the
1950s and early 1960s one major aspect of European security
policy was good relations with the US. Germany and France
competed at the same time for the best position within the
US-European defence strategy against the Soviet Union. That
situation would change fundamentally during the early 1960s.
French and German Reactions to McNamara’s Flexi-
ble Response
De Gaulle and Adenauer, filled with a spirit of distrust
towards the new American president John F. Kennedy and
general McNamara’s revolutionizing concept of flexible re-
sponse, feared that European security might lose value within
US strategy.4 Was there a more independent, European alter-
native? De Gaulle, convinced of the military strength of his
G ermany and France, who have been age-old
fierce enemies and waged wars against one
another for centuries, are now each other’s
closest and most important bilateral partners in terms of
political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Hence,
the partnership between Germany and France has been de-
clared as the main engine of European integration.1 The
Élysée Treaty, signed on January 22nd, 1963 by French Pres-
ident Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, is in the collective memory and identity on ei-
ther side of the river Rhine. It continues to stand as the
most important and frequently commemorated cornerstone
of French-German cooperation along the road to a united
Europe. The main objective of the treaty
was to implement a long-term consoli-
dation and sustainable French-German
solidarity with respect to economic and
cultural development, but also with re-
spect to the security of the two peoples.
Unfortunately, the aspect of security, of bilateral strategic
doctrines, military cooperation and common defence policy
has been neglected for quite some time. The 50th anniver-
sary of the Élysée Treaty this year is an opportune moment
to recall this key element of Europe’s defence strategy and
to analyze its historical genesis. Especially today, under the
impression of contemporary crises, we ought to elucidate
the chances and risks of an enhanced pragmatic French-
German military cooperation from a bilateral, European
and transatlantic point of view.
First Steps Toward a Franco-German Military Co-
operation in the 1950s-60s
The core issues and principles of the Élysée Treaty in
the domain of defence and security policy can only be un-
derstood adequately in the historical context of the 1950s
and 1960s. Both governments pursued an assimilation and
The Élysée Treaty began with a near catastrophic start
Dialogues, Doctrines, Disappointments The Élysée Treaty in the Context of Transatlantic Partnership
and European Common Security and Defence Policy
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 7
armed forces within the force de
frappe and encouraged by French
military nuclear capability, con-
sidered a classical alliance system
instead of the former European
and transatlantic integration. He
attempted several times to con-
vince Germany of an alternative
Franco-German strategic, mili-
tary and nuclear partnership.
Bonn, for its part, sought to find
a balance between Paris and
Washington and wanted to dis-
appoint neither the European
neighbour nor the transatlantic ally. In this context, the Élysée
Treaty must be seen as an approach to find a French-German
common answer to the American concept of flexible response,
which was in that time interpreted by de Gaulle and Adenauer
as insufficient and dangerous. They wanted to set new trends
for the European and transatlantic alliance but did not suc-
ceed. In this regard the Élysée Treaty began with a near cata-
strophic start and was regarded critically across the Atlantic
Ocean and even among many German and French experts.5
From that moment on, French and German security
policy started to drift apart from each other. Due to different
strategic orientations and mentalities, the noble objectives of
mutual defence concepts embedded in the Élysée Treaty expe-
rienced a significant slowdown, if not to say a prolonged stag-
nation.6 Was the desired partnership visionary or unrealistic?
Germany had to choose between Paris or Washington. The
German government and military elite considered justifiably
and realistically that France could never be a proper alterna-
tive or substitute for the US as the protecting power against
the Soviet threat. While the Federal Republic of Germany
reinforced its transatlantic integration, de Gaulle launched a
unique national strategy in France beyond the structures of
NATO. After the affair about the preamble to the Élysée Trea-
ty, de Gaulle became increasingly disillusioned and decided in
1966 to withdraw the French military from NATO and to
shelve the ideas of a close strategic partnership with Bonn.7
Although the French-German
dialogue never came to a com-
plete end, it has never been able
to match the high expectations
of the Élysée Treaty in the do-
main of bilateral strategy and
defence policy.
Military Pragmatism In-
stead of Common Doctrines
However, one shall not
deny some specific successes of
French-German military cooper-
ation that may open up new
opportunities for future devel-
opment. The request for military interoperability between
German and French troops has experienced several sponta-
neous revitalisations since the 1980s. On the initiative of
Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, continued
later by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand, a new kind
of rapprochement led to the creation of the Franco-German
Brigade in 1986 and the Franco-German Defence and Secu-
rity Council in 1988. Furthermore the joint commitment in
Eurocorps, where Germany and France are the most im-
portant framework nations has yielded a variety of results
that include: several approaches to naval cooperation since
1992, the German and French refusal to participate in the
war against Iraq, cooperation in NATO and EU missions,
combined joint task forces and also various armament pro-
jects like the foundation of European Aeronautic Defence
and Space Company EADS or programs like Transall, Ro-
land, Tiger, A-400 etc. Each of these shows that joint pro-
jects are still possible and capable of consensus despite cer-
tain problems.8 The Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty opened
the door for a common security and defence policy in Eu-
rope – an opportunity for Germany and France to further
solidify their strategic partnership. Moreover, after the
reintegration of France into NATO structures and the latest
announcement of the US to concentrate more on the geo-
political situation in Asia-Pacific, France and Germany
might be motivators for the reorganization and reinvention
Adenauer & de Gaulle (Photo-Die Welt)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 8
tion of Smart Defence or pooling and sharing projects.
The successes on the tactical level and the established
routines of military cooperation are an important expres-
sion of the reconciliation between the German and the
French people. They are witness to the successful healing of
ancient rivalries and for pragmatic bilateral forms of Euro-
pean integration along the road to a common security and
defence policy. But they do not necessarily give legitimacy
to further steps towards an enhanced mutual bilateral strate-
gy. That is why an open and honest debate on the chances
and risks, on common interests and strategic necessities
must be held not only bilaterally in France and Germany,
but also in the frameworks of the EU and NATO. Is there
enough political will for such projects? The question must
be asked whether an enhanced Franco-German strategic
partnership would be profitable or
even necessary and in which de-
gree it might help to find adequate
answers to contemporary security
challenges. Where does consent or
dissent dominate? Furthermore it
is important to determine why the Franco-German partner-
ship currently remains dissatisfactory and stagnating. Where
are the problems and what possible solutions do exist? Fi-
nally it is appropriate to analyze some imaginable scenarios
and concrete spheres of an enhanced cooperation between
Germany and France. What lessons were already learned
and what suggestions and advice can be given for the future
development?
Germany and France as Peacemakers and Motiva-
tors for CSDP?
In a recent plenary sitting of the German Bundestag
on the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, Andreas
Schockenhoff, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parlia-
mentary group for foreign affairs, affairs of the European
Union and defence policy, illustrated that European Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy will not progress if Ger-
many and France did not act in concert. What does that
mean? A reform process for a common European geostrate-
gic approach is long overdue. A common position concern-
of NATO, especially in today’s situation of squeezed national
defence budgets leading to pooling, sharing and Smart De-
fence. Although the Élysée Treaty was so far not yet able to
contribute in any way to the desired formulation and conduct
of mutual Franco-German doctrines or strategies, it showed
initial signs of success below the abstract level of strategy.
Interoperability and Cooperation Underneath the Strategic Level
Ulrich de Maizière, former Chief of Federal Armed Forces
Staff, diagnosed that a further substantial deepening of the
Franco-German military cooperation required an overcome of
persisting basic disagreements in the context of security policy
and strategy. Nevertheless, scope is still left underneath the
strategic level. A further extension of personal relations, mu-
tual tactic doctrines and an improvement of interoperability
with regard to logistics and armament were, according to de
Maizière, still imaginable. That is exactly the appropriate basis
and groundwork upon which
German and French military
and political authorities may
give new impetus towards the
goals of the Élysée Treaty. As
French troops stayed in Germany until 1994 and as Germany
played a major role as mediator between France and NATO
before the reintegration of the French armed forces into
NATO structures, a regular bilateral contact between Ger-
man and French soldiers on all levels of military hierarchy
provided a solid basis of interoperability and intercultural
understanding of each other’s military traditions and mentali-
ties. Cooperation in armament projects first led to develop-
ments towards a higher degree of tactical interoperability. It
will be particularly important to work on further cooperation
projects of that kind, first and foremost in the framework of
NATO and the EU. These chances have not yet been suffi-
ciently exhausted. Differences in military mentality, historical
tradition and tactical procedures will undoubtedly continue to
exist between the German and French armed forces. Like
Ludwig Erhard said back in 1965, if there were no disagree-
ments at all, the Friendship Treaty would have never been
necessary for mutual approximations. But in the spirit of a
concept of productive opposites, each side could fertilize the
other and try to exchange tactical and technical know-how.
The gained experience could be helpful in the future realiza-
A reform process for a common European geostrategic approach is long overdue
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 9
ing geopolitics and strategy would ensure that the European
continent remains a competitive actor in today’s increasingly
uncertain geopolitical environment. As Europe is still de-
pendent on the military force of the USA, defence policy
within the EU must be complementary to NATO. And it
must react to America’s shift towards the Asia-Pacific. In this
context America’s pivot to Asia will not only weaken the
West. Positively speaking, it creates more space for European
creativity accompanied by growing obligations and responsi-
bilities. But instead of searching for a common ground, we
experience a resurgence of national grand strategies, of geo-
political diversification and uncoordinated diplomatic multi-
polarity outside the structures of CSDP and even NATO.
France’s strategic priorities lie in the European neighbor-
hood, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, Sahel-zone, Red
Sea, Gulf of Aden and Levant – regions that are crucial for
European security but alarmingly insecure and labile. On the
other hand, Germany has great difficulty in finding clearly
stated strategic interests. Both countries have to meet each
other halfway, resume their bilateral dialogue and coordinate
their strategic agenda. In a similar manner, success was al-
ready achieved in the
economic spheres during
the euro crisis. Germany
and France acted as ac-
cepted pacemakers and
role models without
forcing their political
ideas upon the other
European partners. Thus
Germany has to take
more initiative and re-
sponsibility in the do-
main of European strate-
gic necessities and invest
the military capabilities
of the Bundeswehr,
while France has to avoid
playing a lone hand in
military and diplomatic campaigns.
How Far is Germany Able and Willing to Go in
Questions of Defence?
Germany’s hesitance and procrastination in security
and defence questions, such as the controversy about the
deployment of Tornado airplanes with reconnaissance
equipment in Afghanistan 2007 or the German rejection of
the military intervention in Libya 2011, entailed a certain
degree of distrust among the members of NATO. Some
may even sneer at Germany’s pacifistic stance in interna-
tional relations leading to a certain degree of isolation.
From the French perspective, the chances and risks of an
enhanced military and strategic partnership simply depend
on the question, how far is Germany really able and willing
to go in questions of defence? Due to the political culture,
but also with regard to manpower, equipment and expend-
itures, the military capability of the Bundeswehr – and
even more so of the German Navy – is regarded as rather
limited and below comparable countries of the European
Union such as France or the United Kingdom. As a conse-
quence France started to query whether Germany shall
really be the predestinated partner for defence coopera-
tion. Alternatives do exist. France and
the United Kingdom, for instance,
took the decision in 2011 and 2012 to
raise their defence and security coop-
eration to unprecedented levels. They
aim at expanding their cooperation in
military capabilities, industry, opera-
tions, intelligence and nuclear weap-
ons. Analysts fear that France and the
United Kingdom might turn away
completely from CSDP, although they
both signified as well that they desired
a closer cooperation with Germany. A
triangle Berlin-Paris-London, or a
reinforcement of the Weimar Trian-
gle, whether these are utopian endeav-
ours or not, they are adequate per-
spectives for a further stage in the
development from a Franco-German Merkel and Hollande in France (Photo- Epoch Times)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 10
About the author
and reduced defence expenditures among the European
states on the other, coherence and cooperation is more
necessary than ever. The rather irregular retreat of west-
ern forces from Afghanistan and the German attitude to-
wards operation Unified Protector in Libya are two exam-
ples of inadequate cooperation. In the elaboration of Smart
Defence, Germany and France could work closer together.
In the actual crisis of Mali, Germany could set an example,
take more responsibility and support the French campaign
to a greater extent. Similarly to the spontaneous revitaliza-
tions of the Élysée Treaty in the 1980s, the Franco-
German partnership must be adapted to actual necessities
of strategy and defence policy. Thus it will maintain its
high value for Germany and France, for Europe and for the
Transatlantic Partnership.
Kai Peter Schönfeld is a German Navy officer and stu-dent of history and sociology doing his Masters at Helmut Schmidt University - University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. Since 2012 he is blogging on “Sicherheit vernetzt” about European foreign and defence policy, transatlantic partnership and maritime security. In 2012 he spent six months in Montpellier, France as part of
an interuniversity exchange program.
1. DEMESMAY, Claire: Hat der deutsch-französische Bilateralismus Zukunft?, APuZ 1-3 2013, p. 37. 2. Text of the Franco-German Treaty signed in Paris, 22nd January 1963, in: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ASSEMBLY, GENERAL AF-
FAIRS COMMITTEE (ed.): A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe 1963,
March 1964, p. 29f. 3. GAUZY, Florence: Die Verteidigung. Von der Anpassung der Doktrinen zu gemeinsamen Konzepten?, in: DEFRANCE, Corine; PFEIL, Ulrich (ed.): Der Élysée-Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1945 – 1963 – 2003, München 2005, p. 130-134. 4. SOUTOU, Georges-Henri: L’arrière-plan stratégique du traité de l’Elysée, in: C2SD; CEHD (ed.): Bilan et perspectives de la coopération militaire franco-allemande de 1963 à nos jours, Paris 1999, p. 108f. 5. PFEIL, Ulrich: Zur Bedeutung des Élysée-Vertrags, APuZ 1-3 2013, p. 3f. 6. SOUTOU, Georges-Henri: L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954 – 1996, Paris 1996, p. 45ff. 7. CONZE, Eckart: Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958-1963, München 1995, p. 276ff.; REYN, Sebastian: Atlantis lost. The American experience with De Gaulle 1958-1969, Amsterdam 2010, p. 249ff. 8. BOYER, Yves; LE GLOANNEC, Anne-Marie: La coopération franco-allemande en matière de défense. Jusqu’où l’Allemagne peut-elle aller?, Note de la FRS, 14 juin 2007, p. 1f.
defense partnership towards CDSP. For this objective
there must be more than political will, but rather creative
initiatives, concrete challenges and joint projects.
Initiatives and Specific Needs for the Future
Agenda of Franco-German Cooperation
For the foreseeable future, the Franco-German
declarations on European defence and security policy
signed in February 2012 and on armament cooperation
from June 2012, can be useful approaches. Progress has to
be generated in the framework of three key areas:
1) Industrial cooperation, armament and tactical interoper-
ability: As described in the latest armament declaration,
Germany and France may work together to carry on re-
search in the areas of main ground combat systems, artil-
lery, aviation and helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles,
naval systems, communication, satellite technologies and
aerospace. Furthermore a mutually satisfactory future for
EADS as a leading defence and military contractor must be
found. The cooperation amongst the France-Germany Bri-
gade and Eurocorps needs to be continued or even extend-
ed and further developed.
2) Deepened dialogues among politi-
cal, diplomatic and military authori-
ties: Besides the dominating topic of
the euro and financial crisis, the dia-
logue on foreign affairs, geopolitics
and strategy has to come back to mind. The upgrading of
the Franco-German Defence and Security Council may
provide an appropriate framework for that, prior to the
committees and institutions of NATO and the EU. Notably
Berlin has to react more strikingly to approaches and pro-
posals of defence and security cooperation. The coopera-
tion among the composition of the new French defence
white paper should be further supported and encouraged.
3) Coherent political and military reactions to current cri-
ses: In times of political deconstruction and geopolitical
uncertainty in the European neighborhood on the one hand
There must be more than political will, but rather creative initiatives
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 1 11
In numbers, MoNYS 2012 meant 220 participants,
77 universities involved, 5 continents and 37 countries
represented, 22 guests and speakers, 6 NATO Committees
simulated, 12 major topics debated; 6 days at the highest
diplomatic level. But for its participants, MoNYS meant so
much more: it was a week full of life changing events.
Join MoNYS 2013!
The second edition of MoNYS will be held between
the 8th and 13th of July 2013. This time the Summit will
focus on the importance of NATO’s close relations with its
Member States and Partners and the necessity of them
joining their efforts in achieving the main transatlantic ob-
jectives. All the debates during MoNYS 2013 will evolve
around next year’s central theme: “Defining NATO capabili-
ties towards 2020 - Meeting Future Global Security Challenges
through Cooperation, Collaboration and Crisis Management.”
If you have always envisioned yourself as a future
world leader and opinion maker, now is the time to apply!
MoNYS is looking for students aged between 18 and 28,
with experience and demonstrated interest in such simula-
tions, having a deep understanding of how the internation-
al political scene functions and how world changing deci-
sions are taken.
You can register as an individual delegate, as a
member of a delegation, or as a journalist. A delega-
tion must be formed of 6 people (5 delegates and one am-
bassador), all enrolled in the same university. For further
information, complete eligibility criteria and application
forms, please refer to www.natoyouthsummit.org. The
final deadline for receiving the applications is January
31st, 2013.
Start Your World Career At the
Model NATO Youth Summit
Do you know everything about NATO, or do you wish to
know more? Do you want to prove you have the skills and
the knowledge to become a senior diplomat? Do you
strongly believe you have the power to change the world?
If your answer is “Yes!” to all of the questions above, your
place is at Model NATO Youth Summit 2013!
Why Model NATO Youth Summit?
Model NATO Youth Summit (MoNYS) is the larg-
est international simulation of NATO’s decision-making
process in the world and the only one in Europe. The pro-
ject aims to raise awareness on the mission and main activi-
ties of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while cre-
ating a platform for the young generation to debate on the
major social and political issues that our society faces to-
day. MoNYS gives its young participants the means, the
time and the space to practice their skills and develop the
knowledge they acquired in universities, with the ultimate
goal of shaping them into future world leaders.
The First Big Success: MoNYS 2012
The first edition of MoNYS took place in July 2012.
Students from all over the world arrived in Brussels keen
to discover what it means to work for one of the most
powerful international institutions. For one week, they
debated on topics of great significance for the evolution of
the global society and received valuable information from
the keynote speakers and guests of MoNYS; among them,
the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
whom the participants had the privilege to meet during
their visit to NATO Headquarters.
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic
Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and
security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially
include to the successor generation in our work.
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern
European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
security issues.
◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for
its members.
◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in
Northern Africa and Asia.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of
international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with
NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-
able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues
of importance to the NATO Alliance.
For details of how to submit your work please see our website.
Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the
address listed below.
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and re-main the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
Editor: Jason Wiseman
ATA Programs
As part of its on-going Public Lecture Series, on January 23rd,
the Atlantic Council of Albania is hosting a public lecture on civil-
military relations at the state University of Tirana.
On January 25th the Slovak Atlantic Commission will present
its fifth study from the series of the Transatlantic Policy Briefs that
will center on the debate regarding the contribution of Central
European countries to glob-
al security. The piece will
be read by Tomas A. Nagy
and Peter Wagner, and will
focus on the Visegrad coun-
tries contribution to
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.
On December 14th the Atlantic Council of Finland hosted its
Annual Autumn Meeting in Helsinki. The event featured a speech
from Heli Santala, Secretary General of the Advisory Board for
Defence Information from the Finnish Ministry of Defence.