atlantic voices, vol.4, no. 8
TRANSCRIPT
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 1
- Mikk Raud, Genaro Aguilera-Reza
In light of the events in the past six
months in Ukraine, discussions on NATO
Partnerships and possible enlargement have
become highly relevant. Russia’s aggressive
foreign policy towards former Soviet space has
increased the need for small aspiring countries
to accelerate their full accession to NATO.
At the same time, NATO must focus not
only on Europe, but actively advance its con-
nections around the world. Already established
global ties need to be well maintained and new
partnerships actively sought. It is therefore
important for NATO to divide its resources
and attention in proportion with the arising
needs, without neglecting one or another.
This month’s edition of Atlantic Voices
gives an in-depth overview of NATO’s rela-
tionships with its long-standing partners Geor-
gia and the Republic of Macedonia. Moreover,
moving to the other side of the Atlantic, possi-
ble strategic cooperation with influential pow-
ers in Latin America is under observation.
NATO Headquarters (Photo: NATO)
NATO Partnerships and
Open Door Policy
Volume 4 - Issue 8 August 2014
Contents:
NATO-Georgia Partnership Before the Wales Summit In September 2014 Lavinia Lupu offers an interesting insight about the relations between Georgia
and NATO and the way this has led to a firm path towards membership.
The Cooperative Approach: Securing the Republic of
Macedonia’s Path Towards NATO
Jordan Tasev examines the cooperation that NATO and Macedonia have main-
tained and also explains the aspects of a partnership between the two.
Enlargement of the Transatlantic Link: NATO's Global Partnership with Latin America Genaro Aguilera-Reza explores the possibility of NATO to expand its current
network of partners towards Latin America.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 2
NATO-Georgia Relations: A Review
NATO-Georgia cooperation began in 1992
when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council, which in 1997 became the Euro-Atlantic Part-
nership Council. This is a forum that brings together
the 28 Allies and 22 partner countries and provides the
political framework for NATO’s cooperation with
partner countries in the
Euro-Atlantic area. In
1994, Georgia joined the
Partnership for Peace, a
NATO programme of
practical bilateral cooper-
ation between NATO and
partner countries, accord-
ing to their individual
needs.
Georgia started the
NATO integration pro-
cess in 2002 at the NATO
Summit in Prague. On this
occasion, Georgia declared
its aspiration to become a NATO member and to de-
velop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)
with NATO. Two years later, Georgia became the first
country to agree to IPAP with NATO in order to assist
Georgia in achieving NATO standards and successfully
implementing democratic reforms.
Based on the progress made by Georgia since the
start of the implementation of IPAP, the Allies decided
at the Bucharest Summit that Georgia, together with
Ukraine, would both become NATO members:
“NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We
agreed today that these countries will become members
of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contribu-
tions to the Alliance’s operations and MAP is the next
step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to
membership. Today we make clear that we support
NATO-Georgia Partnership Before the Wales Summit in September 2014
By Lavinia Lupu
A fter years of negotiating while facing all
kinds of internal and external pressures,
Georgia finally achieved one of its first
goals. On June 27, 2014, together with Moldova and
Ukraine, Georgia signed the Association Agreement
(including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Ar-
ea) with the European Un-
ion (EU).
Indeed, the signing of
the Association Agreement
with the EU is a victory for
Georgia, an important step
towards deeper political
association and economic
integration with the EU,
with great impact on the
regional level. But the exul-
tation triggered by this
event was somehow over-
shadowed by the announce-
ment made by NATO Secre-
tary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He said on
June 25, at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in
Brussels, that the upcoming NATO summit in Wales
“will not be about a Membership Action Plan (MAP);
but about more support to bring Georgia closer to
NATO. And it will be a substantive package.”
However, one of the goals of the Georgian
leadership was to receive a MAP at the upcoming
NATO summit in Wales. This is why NATO’s deci-
sion was by far “not really what the Georgian authori-
ties aspired to.”
Considering these remarks, this article outlines
first a brief historical overview of NATO-Georgia
relations. After this, it focuses on the significance of
the latest dynamics concerning the NATO-Georgia
Partnership before the upcoming NATO Summit in
Wales.
Georgian Orthodox priest offers a blessing to Georgian soldiers in 2011 (Photo:
Atlantic Council)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 3
these countries’ applications for MAP.”
In the same year, Georgia and Russia experienced a
short episode of armed conflict. NATO expressed its
concern on “Russia's actions during this crisis” and stated
that “Russian military action has been disproportionate
and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as
incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict reso-
lution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and the Rome Declaration.” At the same
time, NATO proposed in September 2008 to establish
the NATO-Georgia Commission with the aim of deepen-
ing the political dialogue and cooperation between
NATO and Georgia and of supervising the process started
at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. Ultimately, the
NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at assisting Georgia in
recovering from the August
2008 conflict with Russia. In
December 2008, the Allied
Foreign Ministers agreed to
the development of an An-
nual National Programme
under the auspices of the
NATO-Georgia Commission. Thus, the Alliance decided
to maximize its assistance and support for Georgia’s re-
form efforts.
Assessing the Current State of Relations Between
NATO and Georgia
Becoming a NATO member is one of the top for-
eign and security policy priorities of Georgia. Moreover,
Georgia enjoys a pro-NATO domestic consensus. The
results of a recent report indicate that 72% of the Geor-
gian population supports a Euro-Atlantic future. Since
Georgia declared its aspiration to become a NATO mem-
ber at the NATO Summit in Prague, it has been strug-
gling to meet the requirements of the Alliance, namely to
implement the necessary reforms in order to achieve the
Euro-Atlantic standards. This is why when Georgia re-
lates to its efforts to join NATO it often invokes the fol-
lowing elements: the conduct of free and fair parliamen-
tary and presidential elections during the last two years,
the progress made on reforms and Georgia’s contribution
to NATO operations.
In the last two years, Georgia faced two critical
tests: the parliamentary elections in 2012 and the presi-
dential elections in 2013. Before these two events,
NATO underlined the importance of holding free and
fair elections. In the final Chicago Declaration, NATO
stated that “We stress the importance of conducting
free, fair, and inclusive elections in 2012 and 2013.”
The way these two elections were held under-
lined Georgia’s progress towards democracy. The final
reports released by OSCE/ODIHR show that the
Georgian parliamentary and presidential elections were
freely and fairly held. The democratic transfer of pow-
er in Georgia and the peaceful cohabitation process are
the elements that prove, according to the NATO Sec-
retary General, that “Georgia’s democratic process
continues to mature, and in that way, Georgia serves as
a model for the wider region.”
At each important
high-level meeting, Geor-
gia is praised because of
the progress made on re-
forms, especially in the
security and defense sec-
tor. For example, during
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili’s visit to
NATO Headquarters in February 2014, Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen praised Georgia’s
efforts in implementing important reforms: “Georgia is
a strong and committed NATO partner. You are im-
plementing important reforms. And today we see a
more mature democracy in your country, after free
and fair presidential elections last year.”
This is just one example of how NATO per-
ceives and addresses Georgia. This kind of discourse
has remained unchanged since 2012, when at the Chi-
cago Summit, the Alliance “welcomed Georgia’s pro-
gress since the Bucharest Summit to meet its Euro-
Atlantic aspirations through its reforms, implementa-
tion of its Annual National Programme and active po-
litical engagement with the Alliance in the NATO-
Georgia Commission.”
Another important thing that counts when talk-
ing about NATO-Georgia relations is Georgia’s nota-
ble contribution to NATO operations and Euro-
Atlantic security. According to official data, Georgia is
currently the largest non-NATO troop contributor to
At each important high-level meeting, Georgia is praised because of the progress made on reforms,
especially in the security and defense sector.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 4
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan and serves as a transit country for
ISAF supplies. Georgia expressed its desire to con-
tribute to the new NATO-led mission to train,
advise and assist Afghan forces after 2014 and to
participate in the NATO Response Force in 2015.
Georgia also supports Operation Active Endeav-
our, NATO’s only Article 5 operation on anti-
terrorism held in the Mediterranean. As General
Knud Bartels said during NATO’s Military Com-
mittee’s visit to
Georgia on February
11-12, 2014, “this
dynamism in terms
of military engage-
ments is a significant
demonstration of
Georgia's commit-
ment to NATO.”
Based on these
facts, Georgian offi-
cials state on each
o c c a s i o n t h a t
“Georgia has clearly
shown progress re-
quired from a NATO
aspirant country, therefore we [Georgians] have an
expectation that the progress made by us will be
adequately assessed at the upcoming NATO sum-
mit in Wales.” In other words, “when the aspirant
countries are performing, when they are contrib-
uting to the common security… and when we
[Georgians] have public support [within the coun-
try] to the Euro-Atlantic integration, we need vali-
dation from NATO that we are doing the right
things.” From a Georgian perspective, the best way
to “adequately reflect the progress made is to grant
a Membership Action Plan to Georgia.”
But Georgia is already a delicate subject
within NATO, because there has never been a full
consensus concerning its membership in the Alli-
ance. Just to remember the disagreement on
granting Georgia a MAP during the NATO Bucha-
rest Summit when the United States, Canada and
most East European states were in favour of giving
Georgia a MAP, but Germany, France and other
West European countries were against. After many
debates, during the Bucharest Summit, the Allies de-
cided that Georgia, together with Ukraine, will be-
come NATO members: “We agreed today that these
countries will become members of NATO. MAP is
the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct
way to membership. Today we make clear that we
support these countries’ applications for MAP.” Ac-
cording to NATO
officials, Georgia
will become a
NATO member, but
the exact moment is
not known. In this
paradigm, it is a
question of when and
not if.
One of the
most important rea-
sons for the lack of
consensus within
NATO on Georgia is
Russia, which has
always declared that
it strongly opposes such a perspective for Georgia.
For Russia, Georgia within NATO means that NATO
has reached the closest possible point, right next to its
borders. For example, the Russian Minister of For-
eign Affairs said on December 4, 2013, while attend-
ing a session of the Russia-NATO Council that Russia
was convinced that NATO enlargement “not only
preserves the division lines that all of us have commit-
ted to dismantle, but it also amounts to transposition
of those lines further into the East. No one should
take steps that pose a danger to partners’ security.”
Another example of Russia’s position towards this
subject is the answer offered by Aleksandr Grushko,
Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, to the question of
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, during this
year’s edition of Brussels Forum: “Will you accept
Georgia’s right to choose NATO membership if this is
the Georgian decision and if NATO accepts? Would
Georgian Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze and Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, June 24, 2014 (Photo: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 5
you accept that?” His answer was “No. I was absolute-
ly very clear; we are against. We believe that this is a
huge mistake. This is my country’s position.”
On this topic, NATO Secretary General, in an
interview for Foreign Affairs, stated that “NATO en-
largement is not a threat against Russia. On the con-
trary: through enlargement of NATO, we have estab-
lished a zone of security, stability, and prosperity in
Eastern and Central Europe. And Russia has profited
significantly from that. And apart from all this, it’s
not for Russia to decide whether an individual nation
wants membership in NATO, or partnership with
NATO, or a non-alliance policy. That's for each spe-
cific nation to decide.”
In the same interview, the NATO Secretary
General referred to Georgia and its objective to join
NATO, saying that “they do
not fulfil all the criteria at
this moment”. But this does
not mean that NATO will
not stay firm in its decision
taken at the Bucharest Sum-
mit that “Georgia will be-
come part of NATO, provided, of course, they fulfil
the necessary criteria… They [Georgians] have a clear
aspiration. And we stand ready to assist them in ful-
filling the necessary criteria.” The fact that the NATO
Secretary General stated again that the Alliance would
stay firm in its decision taken at the Bucharest Summit
is a very important affirmation both for Georgia and
NATO. For Georgia, this kind of statement repre-
sents an attestation that NATO stands by Georgia and
supports its Euro-Atlantic goal. For NATO, this as-
sertion repeated both at the level of public discourse
and in the official Summit final declarations proves
credibility, coherence and political responsibility.
At the end of his remark on Georgia, the
NATO Secretary General also emphasized that
NATO’s position towards Georgia and its Euro-
Atlantic aspiration “will not be changed by what we
have seen in Ukraine.” This statement should be per-
ceived by Georgia as an assurance that NATO sustains
its Euro-Atlantic goal no matter what external events
take place. At the same time, it could mean that Rus-
sia’s position towards Georgia’s future membership in
NATO does not count, thus removing any interpreta-
tions that Russia has a veto to any NATO aspirants
that were part of the U.S.S.R.
What Lies Ahead for the NATO-Georgia Part-
nership?
Georgia will not receive a MAP at this year’s
NATO Summit in Wales. Instead, NATO will offer
Georgia a “substantive package” of measures to
strengthen cooperation.
NATO Secretary General’s Special Representa-
tive for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Ap-
pathurai, visited Tbilisi on July 9 to discuss this topic.
He declared that the package would enhance security
for Georgians and that it would concretely move
Georgia towards NATO. This would probably mean
closer political cooperation, training the Georgian
armed forces, more Geor-
gian presence in NATO’s
discussions and, a clear con-
firmation that Georgia is
moving closer to NATO.
But given Russia’s
aggression on Ukraine and
the annexation of Crimea,
will this “package” have a clear impact on Georgia’s
security? This is a sensitive topic for Georgia and the
best example to prove it is mentioning the suggestion
of the Georgian Minister of Defence that in response
to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, NATO Allies should
deploy “defensive assets” in Georgia: “Air defence and
anti-armor capabilities are something we need to put
in Georgia and Russians will understand that you are
serious.” This proposal reflects not only Georgia’s
security concerns about the critical situation it finds
itself in after Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, but also
Tbilisi’s perception on NATO and how it should react
toward a partner country in times of crises.
Deploying defence assets by NATO on a part-
ner country’s territory would be something unprece-
dented. First of all, this is because Georgia is not a
NATO member, but a partner. This reality implies
the following consequences: Georgia is not protected
under Article 5, it does not participate in the NATO
decision making process, and it has no access to classi-
fied information. On the other hand, NATO’s Strate-
gic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”
One of the most important reasons for the lack of consensus within NATO on Georgia is Russia,
which has always declared that it strongly opposes such a perspective for Georgia.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 6
identifies “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s
three essential core tasks together with collective
defence and crisis management.
Partnerships are seen as a valuable way for
promoting Euro-Atlantic security, they enable the
cooperation with NATO members, thus becoming
a win-win situation, both for NATO and its part-
ners.
The package proposal offered by NATO to
Georgia should not be perceived as an attempt to
move away from the decision taken at the Bucha-
rest Summit that Georgia will become a NATO
member. Rather, it should be seen as proof that
NATO stands by Georgia by finding solutions so as
to help Georgia move closer to NATO. This is
why Georgia should continue working to achieve
its reform agenda and its democratic consolidation.
NATO always refers to Georgia as being a
“special partner” or a “strong and committed part-
ner”, thus reflecting their good political dialogue
and practical cooperation. Moreover, NATO
states on each occasion that it actively supports
Georgia’s territorial integrity, its democratic pro-
gress and its ongoing process of implementing the
necessary reforms (such as reform of the armed
forces, security sector reform, level of interopera-
bility, defence planning, etc.) in order to meet the
required Euro-Atlantic standards. Together with
the package proposal, these are indicators that the
upcoming NATO Summit in Wales will properly
recognize Georgia’s progress and the fact that it is
on the right path.
About the author
Lavinia Lupu is a Research Fellow within the
Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning
in Bucharest, Romania. She is a PhD candidate at
the National University for Political Studies and
Public Administration in Bucharest, where her
work is focused on conflict transformation, recon-
ciliation in inter-ethnic conflicts, inter-ethnic con-
flicts in the post-Soviet space. She holds a MA in
Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a Visiting
International Fellowship in Azerbaijan.
Bibliography
Books:
Ronald D. Asmus, A little war that shook the world. Geor
gia, Russia and the future of the West, Palgrave Macmill
an, New York, 2010
Reports:
Georgia, Parliamentary Elections 1 October 2012,
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission F i n a l
Report, Warsaw, 21 December 2012
Georgia, Presidential Election 27 October 2013 O S C E /
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,
Warsaw 14 January 2014
Articles:
John C.K. Daly, What does Russia’s annexation of Cri
mea mean for Georgia’s efforts to join NATO?
04/02/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst
Interviews:
NATO is back. A conversation with Anders Fogh Rasmus
sen, Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2014
Surveys:
Luis Navarro, National Democratic Institute (NDI) Georgia,
Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a April 2014
survey carried out for NDI by CRRC –Georgia
Sites:
European Commission, Memo, The EU’s Association Agree
ments with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine, Brussels, 23 June 2014
NATO, Public opening remarks, 25 June 2014
PM calls for NATO MAP for Georgia, 26 February 2014
MAP for Georgia not on agenda of upcoming N A T O
Summit, June 26 2014
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, NATO-Georgia relat
ions
Chicago Summit Declaration, 20 May 2012
Statement, meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the l
evel of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, 19 August 2008
NATO-Georgia Commission
NATO’s relations with Georgia
Foreign Ministers praise Georgia’s reform efforts, 4 Decem
ber 2013
NATO Secretary General praises Georgia’s reform
efforts, 5 February 2014
NATO Military Committee acknowledges Georgia’s pro
gress in defence reforms, 11-12 Febru ary 2014
British Foreign Secretary Holds Talks in Tbilisi, 8 May 2014
Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2014
NATO’s relations with Russia
Georgia sets sights on NATO Membership Action Plan, Jan
uary 16, 2014
Appathurai: ‘Substantive Package’ to solidify NATO-Georgia
ties
Alasania Calls for NATO ‘Defensive Assets’ in Georgia, 1
May 2014
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 7
Join the ‘Future NATO’ Twitter Debate
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Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 8
By Jordan Tasev
T he upcoming NATO Summit in 2014 has
“Future NATO” as its overarching theme
for the whole event. As part of this broad
topic, there will be huge focus on NATO Partner-
ships, their role and diversity. The overarching
goal is to make sure that NATO will be ready for
whatever the future holds.
2014 is an
important year for
NATO and marks
the 20th anniversary
of the two key and
fundamental part-
nership formats: the
Partnership for
Peace and the Medi-
terranean Dialogue.
The Partnership for
Peace was estab-
lished in 1994 in
order to help the
participants developing a relationship with NATO,
allowing them to choose their own priorities, ways
of cooperation and the time frame of progress.
Under this program, the participant is allowed to
touch upon every field of NATO. Currently, there
are 22 countries in the Partnership for Peace pro-
gram. The Mediterranean Dialogue program was
also started in 1994. At present, there are seven
countries involved: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The objectives
of this dialogue are to contribute to regional secu-
rity and stability, achieve mutual understanding
and dispel any misconceptions about NATO
among Dialogue countries.
Furthermore, the biggest NATO operation
– ISAF in Afghanistan is coming to an end. This
operation has included participation from 49 coun-
tries. For the first time, the Alliance had close coop-
eration with the biggest number of its partners, both
on and off the field. Invaluable lessons were learned
and foundations for better, global partnerships were
laid.
The new security landscape created in Europe
will also have a strong impact on the NATO Open
Door Policy. Although already agreed that this Sum-
mit will not be an en-
largement Summit, there
will be strong support to
the aspiring countries.
Acknowledgement of the
new situation is expected
and encouragement for
increased cooperation
with Ukraine and Moldo-
va is almost a necessity.
Learning from the previ-
ous Summits, encourage-
ments for full member-
ship of Republic of Mace-
donia and Montenegro and a MAP for Bosnia and
Herzegovina once they solve their respective prob-
lems are expected too. Their future is part of the
transatlantic family and full membership of the Alli-
ance.
NATO’s Open Door Policy is based on Article
10 of its founding treaty: “The Parties may, by unani-
mous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area
to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may
become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instru-
ment of accession with the Government of the United
States of America. The Government of the United
States of America will inform each of the Parties of
the deposit of each such instrument of accession”.
A squad of Macedonian soldiers patrolling in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2008
(Photo: J. S. Rafoss)
The Cooperative Approach: Securing the
Republic of Macedonia’s Path Towards NATO
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 9
NATO’s enlargement is aimed at promoting
stability and cooperation, building whole and free
Europe, united in peace, democracy and common
values. The NATO Open Door policy and the en-
largement policy is an ongoing and dynamic process
which brought NATO from the 12 founding members
to 28 member countries in 2009.
The case of the Republic of Macedonia will be
analysed to assess the value, benefits and the im-
portance of the NATO Open Door Policy and NATO
Partnership programs for the aspiring countries.
The Republic of Macedonia has been a long
term partner of NATO since 1995 and became an
aspiring country for membership in 1999. First of all,
the approach of the Republic of Macedonia towards
the NATO Partnership must be defined. Going
through the 15th Membership Action Plan (MAP)
cycle and using all mechanisms that NATO offers, the
Republic of Macedonia interprets the NATO Partner-
ship Policy as a member country of NATO and not as
a partner of NATO.
The country cooperates with NATO through
the Partnership for Peace and the Euro – Atlantic
Partnership Council. Using the available mechanisms,
the Republic of Macedonia has advanced in the inte-
gration processes. It has successfully reformed its se-
curity sector and reached the basic conditions for
NATO membership. Reforming the defence and se-
curity sector, civil emergency planning, transfor-
mation of the Army, increasing human resources and
potential, improving legislation and reaching budget-
ary requirements from 2,2% until the economic crisis
are just a few of the results of effective usage of the
Partnership for Peace. The Republic of Macedonia is
actively engaged with all available mechanisms for
practical cooperation with NATO. Using these tools,
the Republic of Macedonia reached the level of
NATO membership in 2008.
For the development of the Republic of Mace-
donia and the successful integration processes speaks
to the fact that from being an importer and consumer
of security from its independence, the Republic of
Macedonia has become a country that exports security
since 2002 with the participation in the NATO led
ISAF mission in Afghanistan. As a part of this mission,
the Republic of Macedonia achieved significant suc-
cess, sending dozens of rotations and reaching high
level of efficiency.
During the ISAF mission, our troops have
maintained physical security of the main base in Ka-
bul. Lessons learned are of immense importance. We
have learned to cooperate with our partners and al-
lies. As part of the Adriatic Charter, we participated
together with troops from Albania and Croatia to the
British and German contingent. Furthermore, in
2010, the Republic of Macedonia participated with
teams of instructors for training in the Military by
assisting a police school in Afghanistan as part of the
86th Brigade of the National Guard of Vermont. This
mission is the first jump in quality which was made by
the Republic of Macedonia in its international com-
mitment. According to the White Paper on Defence,
the Republic of Macedonia has participated in ISAF
with a total of 3500 personnel, the biggest rotation
reaching a number of 250 soldiers.
Furthermore, the country will continue its ac-
tive participation after 2014 in operation “Resolute
Support”. The mission will be to train, advise and as-
sist the Afghan security forces. As part of the
“Resolute Support”, the Republic of Macedonia will
fully undertake its duties underlined by the NATO
operational plans for the mission. The Republic of
Macedonia is also continually active as a logistical cen-
ter for the KFOR mission in Kosovo ever since the
1999 NATO intervention.
It is of immense importance to state the bene-
fits which the Republic of Macedonia receives by par-
ticipating in the international missions. Increased
knowledge, experience and expertise are invaluable
for the future development of the Ministry of Defence
and the Army.
On the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration
the Republic of Macedonia also learned and reaped
the benefits from regional cooperation. As men-
tioned, the country was and is still part of the Adriatic
Charter. This initiative was formed in 2003, with the
support of the United States in the spirit of US-Baltic
charter.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 10
Starting together with Albania and Croatia, the
initiative was enlarged in 2008 with Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Montenegro becoming new
members and Serbia and Kosovo observer coun-
tries.
As a user of the NATO Partnership mecha-
nisms, the Republic of Macedonia reached this suc-
cess and will continue to participate in the missions
led by NATO. Instead of previous physical protec-
tion missions, the Republic of Macedonia will par-
ticipate with expertise
by contributing instruc-
tors and training.
As announced by
the Minister of Defence
Mr. Talat Xhaferi after the meeting in Skopje on
14 November 2013 with the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defence of the US Mrs. Evelyn Farkas:
“Our priority is the engagement for full member-
ship of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO and
EU and in this context for us remains of highest
priority to continue with our participation in the
international missions led by NATO, UN and EU”.
The Republic of Macedonia will continue with its
engagement in international missions.
The best example of this is the participation
in a mission with the National Guard of Vermont
in Senegal. Senegal, beside all its problems, is a
huge security exporter. Until now, Senegal has
participated with 3500 personnel in the UN led
missions, however, they are still in need of instruc-
tors, training, preparation and expertise to im-
prove their capacities and capabilities for interna-
tional missions. Once again, the Republic of Mace-
donia will definitely complete the jump in quality
and will continue with fulfillment of the strategic
goals which are foreseen with these politics.
The NATO Open Door Policy was one of
the key mechanisms that gave the opportunity to
the countries of the Western Balkans to cooperate.
This cooperation brought security, stability and
development of the region. The countries learned
the benefit of working together towards the com-
mon goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration.
The US-Adriatic Charter highlights the amazing
accomplishments of the countries on their way to-
wards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Also, in continu-
ation is promoting and supporting stability and full
Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. Sharing the
same values and having the same goals is of invaluable
meaning for the region after long years of conflicts.
Going through the MAP processes, reforms and
regional and international cooperation has helped the
Republic of Macedonia to ad-
vance and develop as a country.
Participation in international
missions has allowed us to learn
to cooperate with partners both
on and off the field and to learn the most from the
cooperation. Cooperative Approach to Security is a
hihgly valued concept and is included in every main
paper and strategy of the country that is in the direc-
tion of finishing the remaining work towards integra-
tion to NATO and EU . Learning and gaining all the
benefits from it, the Republic of Macedonia will un-
doubtedly continue on this road.
Jordan Tasev has graduated from the Institute for
Security, Defence and Peace Studies in Skopje. He is
currently a member of the Presidency of the Euro-
Atlantic Council of Macedonia, where he has com-
pleted an internship and is working as office manager.
Bibliography
International Security Assistance Force http://www.isaf.nato.int
NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander
Vershbow, Looking towards the Wales Summit White Paper on Defence http://www.morm.gov.mk/ wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BELA-KNIGA-NA-ODBRANATA.pdf Fact sheet on Adriatic Charter http://www.state.gov/p/
eur/rls/fs/112766.htm
About the author
The NATO Open Door Policy was one of the key mechanisms that gave the opportunity to the
countries of the Western Balkans to cooperate.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 11
Balkan SAYS
Security Architecture Youth Seminar
24 – 27 October 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia
The Balkan SAYS 2014 seminar will gather and connect students, young professionals and future leaders, who will, through interesting round tables, debates and workshops, seek for new ways of dealing with regional
security issues. Main focus will be on topics as follows:
Regional security and cooperation through the lens of possible future Western Balkans integration into the Euro-Atlantic family;
The role of youth in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation;
Impacts and consequences of the catastrophic floods in the Western Balkans and more.
See more at: facebook.com/BalkanSAYS
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 12
Enlargement of the Atlantic Link: NATO's Global Partnership with Latin America
By Genaro Aguilera-Reza
N ATO is actively looking for strategic part-
ners in order to contribute to security and
stability in different areas of the
world. Unfortunately, Latin America has been ne-
glected by the Alliance. In recent decades, Latin
America has grown economically and the region is
now internationally engaged more than ever, while
having some of the largest and best equipped armies
in the world. Countries like Mexico and Colombia,
which have friendly relations
with both the United States and
countries that refuse any type of
Western influence in Latin
America, such as Venezuela and
Ecuador, could serve as a bridge
between the Atlantic Alliance
and other countries in this re-
gion. One of the possible rea-
sons why Latin American coun-
tries have not been the ones
taking the initial steps in creating
a partnership is the fear of
“neocolonialism” that some leaders in South America
have been denouncing for decades. It is a crucial time
for Latin American nations to understand that there is
much to learn from a strategic partnership with
NATO where the benefits outnumber the risks of fall-
ing into “neocolonialism”. In other words, both
NATO and Latin American countries need to realize
the importance of working together.
Currently, NATO has a network of partners
and talks are held and information is shared with a
wide range of countries in very diverse areas of the
globe. NATO's global partners include nations such as
Australia, Pakistan, Mongolia and Japan which lie very
far from NATO's area of responsibility, sphere of in-
fluence and of the Atlantic Ocean itself. Nonetheless,
these partnerships contribute to maintaining peace
and stability in different regions of the world. Howev-
er, there has been little or no interest in Latin Ameri-
ca despite its large Atlantic coast and strategic posi-
tion in world trade. The question is open, why
NATO has developed partnerships in many places,
but has not extended its network of cooperation into
Latin America?
An unprecedented event took place in January
2014 when NATO signed a cooperation agreement
with Colombia, marking the first collaboration be-
tween the Alliance and a
Latin American country.
Diana Quintero, Colom-
bia's Vice Minister has
stated that “[Colombia] has
approached NATO in or-
der to be one of its global
allies and this invitation is
in response to NATO’s
goal of sharing good prac-
tices and experiences with
other countries” (Tase,
2014).This demonstrates
the interest that this South American nation has in
establishing a system of cooperation with NATO simi-
lar to those that Japan, Australia or Mongolia already
enjoy. This agreement between NATO and Colombia
could be an initial step in upgrading the status of some
Western-friendly Latin American nations to eventual-
ly become part of NATO's global partners. This arti-
cle will study the cases of Colombia and Mexico and
how they could contribute to the Alliance. It will then
proceed to demonstrate the ways that NATO can help
strengthen these nations’ military structures and share
information in order to improve stability in the area.
Colombia and Mexico are among the most
Western friendly countries in Latin America, both
sharing stable economies comparable to those of East-
ern and Central Europe. Moreover, both Colombia
NATO Deputy SG Ambassador Alexander Vershbow and
the Defence Minister of Colombia (Photo: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 13
and Mexico are two of the countries with the better
trained and most powerful armies in Latin America. At
the same time they suffer from unresolved problems with
drug trafficking and drug related violence. Therefore,
these two nations are good examples demonstrating how
bilateral cooperation can be beneficial to both NATO and
Latin American countries.
Colombia
After overcoming dec-
ades of internal struggle to
maintain its national security
by fighting drug trafficking
and terrorist groups such as
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia
(FARC), Colombia is now
enjoying a more peaceful en-
vironment and one of the
most stable economies in
South America. At the same time, decades of hostilities
have led to a generation of professionals trained in
fighting drug trafficking and terrorism who have arguably
become very respected experts in these fields. For exam-
ple, during the Mexican Drug War, a considerable num-
ber of Colombian intelligence was used to combat drug
violence and drug trafficking in Mexican cities, such as
Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey, where crime dropped dra-
matically. A similar case occurred in Central American
countries, such as El Salvador and Panama, where positive
results were also obtained (FIP, 2012).
Colombia and the United States have a long history
of cooperation at a regional level. During the Clinton-
administration, the Plan Colombia, which served the pur-
pose of dismantling the powerful Medellín and Cali car-
tels and fighting army and police corruption, was a great
success. In a similar way, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) has an office located in Bogotá
which serves as a strategic tool to fight drug trafficking in
the Andean region. According to Geopolitical Monitor,
“the United States has also supported Colombia in its risk
management efforts, the transformation of its armed forc-
es, and (…) have also signed an agreement to establish an
overall assistance and cooperation plan covering four
countries [in Central America]” (Tase, 2014).
In 2014, NATO and Colombia signed a security
cooperation agreement that was “aimed at exchanging
intelligence information in order to improve the capa-
bilities on both sides of the Atlantic to face common
threats, particularly transnational crime” (Sanchez A,
2014). NATO made an excellent step, as this bilateral
agreement will be very fruitful for the Alliance and the
South American nation.
Despite the evident ben-
efits for the region,
many neighboring coun-
tries, such as Venezuela
and Bolivia, did not
share this positive view
and publicly denounced
both Colombia and the
Alliance (AVN, 2014).
Providing the civilian pop-
ulation with clear and full
information of the agreement with NATO could make
the public more open for discussing and accepting
the Alliance’s presence in their country.
The possibilities of cooperation for Colombia
and NATO are extensive. The Atlantic Alliance can
obtain a great source of information from Colombia in
order to better fight drug trafficking in Europe and
elsewhere. This is especially true given that much of
the cocaine plaguing Europe originates from South
America while using smuggling routes across the Atlan-
tic Ocean to make its way into Western African na-
tions, and is eventually carried over in Southwest Eu-
rope and the Balkans to reach the other European mar-
kets. This should be a major issue for the Alliance as it
directly poses a security threat to the Euro-Atlantic
societies while undermining regional stability and con-
taminating the Atlantic Ocean with criminal activity.
NATO could also benefit from collaboration
with the Colombian anti-drug trafficking experts in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become one of the
world’s main producers of heroin, a substance that
eventually reaches European markets, creating a major
addiction problem, especially in countries like the
United Kingdom and Italy, where “there are 100,000
or so heroin users in Milan, a city that the police now
Drug Bust in Mexico (Photo: Council on Foreign Affairs)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 14
calls the European heroin capital.” (McDonald,
2013; Simons 1989). The possibility of using the
experience that Colombia has obtained during its
own drug trafficking crisis and putting it in the
context of Afghanistan could be a great way to
alleviate the problem which originates from Cen-
tral Asia.
There is no doubt that Colombia could
make a great contribution to NATO's Global
Partnership Program. The current bilateral agree-
ment between Colombia and NATO is a good
start to spark same
trend in other West-
ern-friendly countries
in the region. At the
same time, these types
of agreements contrib-
ute to the overall secu-
rity of the Atlantic
Ocean as well as
NATO's sphere of in-
fluence.
Mexico
Mexico is another country that NATO
should consider for establishing a security cooper-
ation agreement that could eventually lead this
nation to become a part of NATO’s Global Part-
nership Program. This Latin American country
possesses the second largest economy in the re-
gion, is the largest US trading partner in the de-
veloping world and already takes part in a trade
agreement with Canada and the United States. In
fact, economists predict that Mexico will surpass
Brazil as the largest economy in Latin America
(Rey Mallen, 2014). It is difficult to understand
why NATO has taken so long to promote cooper-
ation with Mexico as it is so deeply connected
geographically, culturally and economically with
the United States and other nations in the Euro-
Atlantic area.
Mexico has welcomed aid from the United
States in the past decade to fight its war against
drug trafficking in the form of the Plan Merida,
which has achieved somewhat positive results.
Similarly, the DEA has an extensive history of cooper-
ation with the Mexican government. For example,
earlier in 2014, an operation led by the Mexican Ma-
rines aided by DEA intelligence managed to capture
Chapo Guzman, the world's most powerful drug lord
and the second richest man in Mexico. Although there
has been a considerable degree of cooperation with
Mexico, especially from the United States, that has
not been the case with NATO or EU. NATO needs to
understand the necessity of building stronger ties with
this Latin American nation.
Dr. David G. Hag-
lund has written about the
hypothetical possibility of
Mexico becoming a mem-
ber of NATO. Although
this would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible,
he does, however, manage
to get many interesting
points across. To name a
few factors, Mexico lies
closer to the area of influ-
ence of NATO as it is part of North America, as op-
posed to nations that have direct ties with the Alli-
ance, such as Armenia or Azerbaijan, that are geo-
graphically much further apart. Similarly, Mexico has
a longer Atlantic coast than most European NATO
members which would serve the purpose of keeping a
more secure Atlantic Ocean. It is unlikely that Mexi-
co will join NATO in the near future, but it is im-
portant to keep in mind that Mexico is a North Amer-
ican nation that has much to contribute to the overall
security in the region and beyond.
In spite of Mexico's isolationist military pos-
ture, there is much that this nation could benefit from
obtaining a security cooperation agreement with
NATO, especially with its ongoing drug war prob-
lem. The Armed Forces of Mexico could benefit from
training in specific fields in counter terrorism to fight
drug cartels, as these criminal organizations use tactics
that terrorist groups have also used, such as car bombs
and grenade detonations in public, among other
methods (Durbin, 2013). Additionally, Mexico could
Armed Forces Day in Mexico (Photo: Secretaria de Marina)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 8 15
enjoy better access to new military technology. Mexi-
co has been lagging behind in the use of drones which
could serve very well in inspecting and keeping
mountainous regions, jungles and deserts under sur-
veillance in order to locate illegal crops or the hiding
places of cartel members. As a matter of fact, Mexi-
can drug cartels have started to use drone technology
to smuggle drugs into the United States (Lopez,
2014).
The need for a cooperation agreement with
NATO is evident as both Mexico and the Alliance
need to increase their security. Additionally, the
United States and Canada benefit enormously from
having a stable and secure southern neighbor. Their
economies and nations are very well connected and
Mexico could contribute to the overall security in
North America (Sands, 2012). Surprisingly, neither of
the two North American NATO members has been
actively pursuing such cooperation whereas Spain has
led the effort in the past by requesting Mexico obtain
an observer status in NATO exercises.
Conclusion
Despite the great benefits of NATO having
closer ties with Latin America, the Alliance has been
hesitant to pursue global partnerships in the region.
Recently, NATO has signed a cooperation agreement
with Colombia which can set the pace for future ne-
gotiations with other nations in Latin America. The
advantages for both Latin American countries and
NATO in helping each other are ample. The gains for
both parties range from anti-drug trafficking exper-
tise, information sharing, military training, and
providing a larger area of influence to secure the At-
lantic Ocean. It is an indisputable advantage for
NATO to have closer ties with Latin American coun-
tries that have a lot in common with Europe and
North America and also share coasts with the Atlantic
Ocean. Establishing strong partnerships and coopera-
tion with Colombia and Mexico should be taken into
serious consideration in the near future.
Genaro Aguilera-Reza is a native of El Paso-Ciudad Juarez in
the US-Mexico border area. He is a candidate for a MA in Inter-
national Migration from the University of Kent - Brussels School
of International Studies. He holds a B.A. in International Rela-
tions from the University of Arkansas where he focused his re-
search on the Middle East and Latin America. He is currently an
intern at the Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels.
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Haglund., David G. "Pensando Lo Imposible: Why Mexico Should Be the Next New Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Latin American Policy 1.2 (2010)
Hurrel, Andrew. "Security in Latin America." International Affairs - Royal Institute of International Affairs 74.3 (1998)
Ing, David. "Mexico and Spain Seek Closer Ties, NATO Obs erver Status for Mexico." IHS Jane's Defence Weekly (2014).
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Rey Mallen, Patricia. "Will Mexico Surpass Brazil As Latin America’s Largest Economy? Intl. Business Times (2014).
Sands, Cristopher. "Why NATO Should Accept Mexico." Huff Post Canada 18 May (2012).
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Sanchez, Julian. "Mexico, Colombia Y Centro America Se Unen Contra El Narco." El Universal 21 June (2013), Nacion
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Staff, AVN "Maduro Denounces NATO Warmongering Plans in Latin America." AVN 4 Jan. (2014).
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About the author
Bibliography
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North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable
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Editors: Mikk Raud, Genaro Aguilera-Reza
ATA Programs
In cooperation with Latvian authorities, the Latvian Transatlantic
Organization will host the Riga Conference 2014 on 12-13 September.
As well as looking back at the implications of the NATO Summit in
Wales, the confer-
ence draws togeth-
er a variety of ex-
perts to provide a
thorough insight to the most heated topics in security policies. Among
others, Euro-skepticism with rising nationalism, the future of energy
markets, and dependence on information sector are only a few of the
issues that the conference will address.
The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom is organizing a one-
day workshop at the Sage Gateshead, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, UK on 24
September 2014. The event titled “Soft vs Hard Diplomacy: NATO 65
Years On - NATO Summit Analysis” provides an opportunity to re-
examine the NATO’s current approach to soft and hard diplomacy. The
renowned speakers include MPs, NATO personnel and academics from
various universities.
The German Youth Atlantic Treaty Association is organising a
Young Leaders Seminar “NATO after Wales Summit” on 4-5 November
in Berlin. The main focus of the conference will be on NATO’s future,
energy security, cyber space and crises management.
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