Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology1970, Vol. 16, No. 2, 329-337

ATTENTION IN DELAY OF GRATIFICATION1

WALTER MISCHEL 2 AND EBBE B. EBBESEN

Stanford University

The role of altcntional processes in voluntary delay of reward was exploredby manipulating children's attention to the rewards for which they werewaiting in a delay-of-gratification paradigm. Preschool children waited for apreferred but delayed reward while facing either the delayed reward, a lesspreferred but immediately available reward, both rewards, or no rewards.The dependent measure was the amount of time they waited for the preferredoutcome before forfeiting it for the sake of the less desired but immediatelyavailable one. Results contradicted predictions from psychodynamic theoryand from speculations concerning self-instructions during "time binding." Un-expectedly, but in accord with frustrative nonreward theory, voluntary waitingtime was substantially increased when subjects could not attend to rewardsduring the waiting period. Implications are discussed for a theory of the develop-ment of delay of gratification.

The concept of voluntary postponement ofimmediate gratification for the sake of moredistant long-term gains has a central placein conceptualizations of the development ofcomplex human behavior. Formulations stress-ing the role of voluntary delay of rewardrange from the possible origins of "psychop-athy" and antisocial behavior (e.g., Mowrer& Ullmann, 1945) to characterizations ofsocietal and cultural adaptation patterns interms of the renunciation of immediategratifications in favor of disciplined seekingof more substantial future gains. At the em-pirical level, extensive experimental work hasbeen done on delay of reward in animals (e.g.,Renner, 1967). Surprisingly, although volun-tary delay behavior has been assumed to bea critical component of such concepts as "egostrength," "impulse control," and "internali-zation," relatively little attention has beendevoted to it in empirical work on humansocial behavior.

One line of research has tried to applypsychoanalytic concepts concerning ego func-tions to motoric inhibition and impulse con-trol (e.g., Singer, 1955). Most of the resultingempirical work has relied on highly indirect

* This study was supported by Research GrantM6830 from the National Institutes of Health, UnitedStates Public Health Service. Grateful acknowledg-ment is due to Jerry Zadny for serving as an experi-menter.

2 Requests for reprints should be sent to WalterMischel, Department of Psychology, Stanford Uni-versity, Stanford, California 94305.

measures of delayed gratification and egocontrol, mainly inferred from human move-ment responses on the Rorschach (e.g.,Spivack, Levine, & Sprigle, 19S9).

In contrast, the present research is partof a larger project to investigate delay ofreward with more direct behavioral measures.For example, subjects were required to chooseamong actual alternatives that varied in delaytime and value (e.g., immediate smaller ver-sus delayed but larger rewards) in realisticsituations (e.g., Mischel, 1966). Past re-search in this vein has investigated the organi-zation of self-control by exploring the rela-tionship between various preference patternsfor immediate smaller rewards or delayedlarger rewards and other theoretically rele-vant aspects of personality functioning. Thenetwork of associations found here so farindicates, for example, significant relationsbetween preference for delayed rewards andindexes of achievement orientation, social re-sponsibility, age, sociocultural and rearingconditions, and intelligence (e.g., Klineberg,1968; Mischel, 1961a, 1961b, 1961c; Mischel& Metzner, 1962). Relations have also beenfound with resistance to temptation (Mischel& Gilligan, 1964) and with severity of psy-chological disturbances (Shybut, 1968). Cor-relational studies were supplemented in re-cent years by experiments to investigate moreprecisely the determinants of voluntary delayof reward and similar forms of self-control inlaboratory situations (e.g., Mischel & Staub,

329

330 WALTEK MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

1965; Mischcl, Grusec, & Masters, 1969). Asa result of both correlational and experimental studies, some of the determinants ofchoice preferences for delayed rewards are be-coming clearer (Mischel, 1966, 1968).

Although choice preferences for immediateor delayed rewards are beginning to be under-stood, the psychological mechanisms throughwhich persons manage to bridge the temporaldelay of reward required for attainment ofdeferred gratification remain remarkably un-studied. In spite of its seemingly evident im-portance, little is known about the self-regulatory mechanisms during the actual de-lay period when the individual must engagein the waiting dictated by his choice of de-layed, larger gratification. Past research hasstudied verbal choice preferences between re-wards varying in value and in the delay timerequired to attain them, but just how sub-jects are able to wait during the temporaldelay remains unknown. Given that one haschosen to wait for a larger deferred gratifica-tion, how can the delay period be managed?'The mechanisms that maintain goal-directeddelay seem especially important, consideringthe fact that the ability to sustain self-imposed delay for the sake of larger butdelayed consequences appears to be a chiefcomponent of most complex higher orderhuman behavior. A main purpose of the pres-ent research, therefore, was to investigate thepsychological processes that mediate sustainedwaiting behavior for delayed gratification.

Freud's (19S9) classic discussion of thetransition from primary to secondary processis one of the few theoretical treatments ofhow delay of gratification may be bridged.According to the psychoanalytic formulation,ideation arises initially when there is a blockor delay in the process of direct gratificationdischarge (Rapaport, 1967, p. 315). Duringsuch externally imposed delay, according toFreud, the child constructs a "hallucinatoryimage" of the physically absent need-satisfy-ing object. Gradually, as a result of repeatedassociation of tension reduction with goal ob-jects, and the development of greater egoorganization, the imposed delay of satisfyingobjects results in the substitution of hallucina-tory satisfactions and other thought processesthat convert "free cathexes" into "bound

cathexes" (e.g., Freud, 1959; Singer, 1955).In spite of much psychoanalytic theorizingand speculation about the role of the mentalrepresentation of blocked gratifications in thedevelopment of delaying capacity, the processremains far from clear.

In their theoretical discussion of impulsecontrol, Jones and Gerard (1967) reasonedthat "time-binding," or the capacity to bridgedelay of gratification, probably hinges onself-instructional processes through which theindividual increases the salience of the de-layed consequences or outcomes of his action.In their view, any factors (situational orwithin the individual) that make delayed con-sequences more salient should enhance im-pulse control and voluntary delay. Their posi-tion, while emphasizing the self-instructionalaspects of attention to deferred outcomes,also implies covert self-reinforcement processesthrough which the subject may reinforce hisown waiting behavior by vividly anticipatingsome of the positive consequences to which itwill lead. Finally, a cognitive-developmentalview might lead one to expect that youngchildren may readily forget the delayed out-comes for which they are waiting, and hencecease to wait unless they are reminded of therelevant contingencies and rewards involvedin the delay-of-gratification paradigm.

In line with all the foregoing arguments, itseems most plausible that conditions that helpthe individual to attend mentally to the de-layed reward for which he is waiting shouldhelp him to sustain the delay. Operationally,these speculations would suggest that anycues that make the delayed gratification moresalient—that help the person to make deferredconsequences more psychologically vivid orimmediate (e.g., by letting him look at them,by visualizing them in imagination, or by re-minding him of the object for which he iswaiting)—should facilitate waiting behavior.Such expectations also seem congruent withthe results of earlier work on choice of im-mediate but smaller versus delayed but largerrewards (Maher, 1956; Mischel, 1966;Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Mischel & Staub,1965). These earlier studies showed that animportant determinant of choice preferencefor delayed rewards is the individual's expec-tation or "trust" that he will really get the

ATTENTION IN D LCI-AY OF GRATIFICATION 331

delayed (hut more valuable) outcome. Con-sequently, conditions that increase the sailence or visibility of the delayed gratificationmay enhance the subject's willingness to waitby increasing his subjective probability thatthe delayed outcome will really materializeand be available after the waiting time ends.

In light of the foregoing considerations, onemight expect that voluntary delay behavior isfacilitated when the subject converts, as itwere, the deferred or delayed object into moretangible form by making it psychologicallymore immediate, as by providing himself withrepresentations or physical cues about it. Themost direct way to increase the salience ofthe deferred outcomes and to focus attentionon them would be to have them physicallypresent and facing the subject, so that he canattend to them readily and vividly. To in-vestigate how attention to delayed and im-mediate outcomes influences waiting behaviorfor them, a first step would be to manipulatethe availability of those outcomes for atten-tion during the delay time.

Previous research on preference for de-layed rewards has been conducted mainlywith subjects at least 6 years of age or older.Preliminary observations of the actual waitingbehavior of nursery school children suggested,however, that the capacity to wait for long-term goals and to inhibit both immediategratification and motoric activity seems to de-velop markedly at about ages 3-4. It washoped, therefore, that research with subjectsin this young age range should be especiallyinformative in revealing some of the processesthat underlie the genesis of goal-directedwaiting.

A first requirement was a paradigm inwhich such very young children would bewilling to remain in an experimental room,waiting entirely alone for at least a shorttime without becoming upset and debilitat-ingly anxious. As an initial step (after theusual play periods for rapport building) eachchild was taught a game in which he couldimmediately summon the experimenter by asimple signal. This step was practiced re-peatedly until the child clearly understoodthat he could immediately terminate his wait-ing period in the room simply by signalingfor the experimenter, who regularly returned

from outside as soon as the child signaled.After this critical procedure had been clearlyestablished, the child was introduced to therelevant contingency. He was shown two ob-jects (e.g., snack-food treats), one of whichhe clearly preferred (as determined by pre-testing) ; to attain the preferred object hehad to wait for it until the experimenter re-turned "by himself." The child was, however,entirely free throughout this waiting periodto signal at any time for the experimenter toreturn; if he signaled, he could have the lesspreferred object at once, but would forego themore desirable one later.

To manipulate the extent to which childrencould attend to the reward objects while theywere waiting, the rewards were removed fromthe experimental room in all combinations,creating four conditions with respect to theobjects available for attention. In one con-dition, the children waited with both theimmediate (less preferred) and the delayed(more preferred) reward facing them in theexperimental room, so that they could attendto both outcomes. In another group neitherreward was available for the subject's atten-tion, both rewards having been removed fromhis sight. In the remaining two groups eitherthe delayed reward only or the immediatereward only was left facing the child andavailable for attention while he waited. Thedependent measure was the length of timebefore each child voluntarily terminated thewaiting period.

In accord with the previously discussedtheoretical ideas, it was predicted that condi-tions in which the delayed reward was presentand visually available would enhance atten-tion to it and hence increase voluntary delaytime for it. It was anticipated that the con-dition in which the child was left withouteither reward would make it most difficult tobridge the delay time and therefore lead tothe shortest waiting. In addition it was ex-pected, although less confidently, that thecondition in which both the delayed and im-mediate reward were available for attentionwould best facilitate waiting time. This con-dition might permit the subject to compareand contrast the two outcomes, possibly pro-viding himself with persuasive arguments andself-instructions to help him delay long enough

332 WALTKK MISCHKL AND EBBK B. EBBKSON

Ui achieve his preferred gratification. OH theother hand, one might also plausibly expectmaximum delay when the child could focushis attention on the delayed reward withoutbeing tempted by the immediate gratifica-tion—that is, the condition in which the de-layed reward was present for attention butthe immediate one was not.

METHODSubjects and Experimenters

The subjects were 16 boys and 16 girls attendingthe King Nursery School of Stanford University.Three other subjects were run but eliminated be-cause of their failure to comprehend the instructionsas described later. The children ranged in age from3 years, 6 months, to 5 years, 8 months (with amedian age of 4 years, 6 months). The procedureswere conducted by two male experimenters. Eightsubjects (4 males and 4 females) were assigned ran-domly to each of the four experimental conditions.In each condition each experimenter ran 2 males and2 females in order to avoid systematic biasingeffects from sex or experimenters.

ProcedureThe procedures were designed to develop a new

method for studying delay behavior experimentallywith young subjects. The development of thismethod was one of the chief goals of the project, andthe procedures therefore are described in consider-able detail.

In the week prior to the start of (he experiment,the two male experimenters spent a few days playingwith as many children in the nursery school as theycould. These nurlurant sessions were designed sothat the children would more readily agree to ac-company the experimenters to the "surprise room"and, once there, would be at ease. After obtaining thechild's consent to go to the surprise room, the ex-perimenter escorted the child to the experimentalroom.

The experimental room was a small private cham-ber containing a table, on which lay five -i-inch-longpieces of pretzel and an opaque cake tin. A chair wasin front of the table, and on a second chair therewas an empty cardboard box. Under the cake tinon the table were five 2-inch-long pretzels and twoanimal cookies. On the floor near the chair with thecardboard box were four battery-operated toys. Onone wall, at right angles with the table, was a one-way mirror. Apart from those objects, the room wasempty. The experimenter pointed out the four toys,and before the child could begin to play with thetoys, asked the child to sit in the chair which wasin front of the table. He then demonstrated eachtoy briefly in a friendly manner, saying with en-thusiasm after each demonstration that they wouldplay with the toys later on, placing each toy in thecardboard box out of sight of the child. These

references to the toys were designed to help relaxthe children and also to set up an expectancy thatboth the child and experimenter would play withthe toys sometime later on in the session (thus, terminating the delay period would not mean having toterminate play in the surprise room).

The next phase required teaching the child thetechnique for terminating the waiting period andsummoning the experimenter at will. For this pur-pose the experimenter said:

Sometimes I have to go out of the room and when1 do, you can bring me back. Do you sec thesetiny pretzels? [The experimenter pointed to thefive i-inch pieces of pretzel that would serve assignals.] Well, if I go out of the room and youeat one of these pretzels you can make me comeback into the room. You can make me come back!Let's try it. I'll go out of the room now andshut the door. As soon as I do, you eat one of thepretzels and make me come back.

The instructions were repeated, if necessary, until thechild seemed to understand them completely.

The experimenter then left the room and shut thedoor, observing through a small viewing hole in thedoor when the child ate the pretzel. As soon as thechild put the pretzel in his mouth, the experimenterreturned, laughing playfully and exclaiming howwell the child brought him back into the room. Toinsure that the child learned reliably how to bring theexperimenter back, this sequence was repeated fourlimes with four of the five small pieces of pretzel,still leaving the last small piece lying next to the asyet unopened cake tin.

Next the experimenter lifted the cake tin, revealingthe two sets of reward objects lying there (twocookies and five 2-inch pretzels). The experimenterasked the child which of the two rewards he likedbetter, and after the child chose, said:

Oh well, you know what? In order for you to eatthose [naming the preferred reward] youwill have to wait here in your chair and sit verystill. I have to go out of the room for a whileand when I come back you can eat those[preferred reward] all up. You can take them offthe table and eat them right up. But, you know,sometimes, I'm gone a long time and if you wantto bring me back you can. Do you know howto bring me back? [All children did know how.|That's right. You eat that little piece [pointing tosignal] and I have to come back. But I have totell you something else. If you eat that and makeme come back you can't have [preferredreward]. You can't have them. But you canhave all the [naming less preferred reward]!If you sit very still in your chair until 1 comeback by myself, then you can eat the [pre-ferred reward]! But if you want to make mecome back all you have to do is eat that [pointingto signal] and I'll come back; but then you can'thave the [preferred reward]; but you canhave all the [less preferred].

ATTKNTION IN DELAY OP GRATIFICATION 33.1

Thus the instructions faced the child with achoice: he could either continue waiting for themore preferred reward until the experimenter re-turned, or he could stop waiting by bringing theexperimenter back. If he slopped waiting, then hewould receive the less favored (but more im-mediately available) reward and forego the morepreferred one. The waiting contingencies were re-peated once more, and then, to assess if the subjectunderstood them, the experimenter asked three ques-tions: "Can you tell me how to bring me back"?"What happens if you eat the pretzel"? "Butwhat happens if you sit very still in your chair andwait for me to come back by myself?" Three chil-dren were unable to answer these questions cor-rectly and were therefore excluded from the dataa priori.

At this point the experimenter was informed of thecondition in which the subject was to be placed byconsulting a slip of paper concealed in the room.This method assured that the experimenter re-mained unaware of the subject's experimental condi-tion until the last possible moment in the procedure.Depending on the condition and the child's choice ofpreferred reward, the experimenter picked up thecake tin and along with it either nothing, one of therewards (the more preferred reward or the lesspreferred reward), or both. The physical arrange-ment was such that the rewards, if left, were directlyin front of the child at about shoulder level. Inall conditions the signal for summoning the experi-menter was left on the table in front of the child.Thus, depending upon the condition to which thechild had been assigned, he was left waiting eitherwith both the delayed and immediate rewards, witheither the delayed but more preferred or the im-mediate but less preferred reward, or with neitherreward available for attention. Finally, in all con-ditions the experimenter excused himself to leave,and as he was leaving, resummarizcd the waiting in-structions and reminded the child that "no matterwhat you do, whether you sit and wait for me tocome back by myself or whether you bring me back. . . . No matter what you do, we're going to playwith my toys when I get back." This instructionwas included to stress that the child's waitingbehavior would not affect his later play period inthe surprise room.

Waiting time was scored from the moment theexperimenter shut the door. The experimenter re-turned either as soon as the child signaled or afterIS minutes—the criterion time—if the child did notsignal. To determine whether or not the child re-membered the waiting contingencies, when the ex-perimenter finally returned he asked the child, "Whathappens now?" All children answered this questioncorrectly. Subjects were also asked why they had orhad not waited. Children who waited to criterionwere allowed to cat the chosen, more preferredreward. Those who did not wait to criterion wereallowed to eat the unchosen reward. Thereafter eachchild played with the toys for a while and thenwas escorted back to his nursery school playroom.

TABLE 1MEAN MINUTES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF

WAITING TIME FOR A DELAYED REWARDAS A FUNCTION OF ATTENTION

Statistic

MSI)

Available for attention

No rewards

1 1.296.84

Bothrewards

1.032.39

Delayedreward

4.876.57

Immediatereward

5.726.43

RESULTSIn accord with the previously discussed

theorizing, it was expected that as the degreeof attention paid to the delayed rewards in-creased, the length of time which the childrenwaited would increase. To determine whetheror not this prediction was fulfilled, the meanlength of time waited (in minutes) was com-puted for each of the four attention condi-tions and is depicted in Table 1. Inspectionof these results revealed that unexpectedly,the children waited longest when the rewardswere entirely absent—that is, in the conditionin which neither the delayed nor the immedi-ate reward was available for attention duringthe waiting period. Furthermore, the childrenwaited the shortest length of time when boththe delayed and the immediate rewards werefacing them during the waiting session. Theseresults were exactly opposite to the predic-tions.

An analysis of variance of the mean delaytimes (Table 2) demonstrated that the over-all effect of attentional conditions was signifi-cant (F = 4.42, df = 3/28, p < .025). Todetermine the relative contribution of the con-ditions to the overall effect, orthogonal con-trasts were computed (Winer, 1962). The firstorthogonal contrast (Ci in Table 2) com-pared the effect of having any reward presentfor attention with having no reward presentduring the delay period. This comparisonyielded an F of 9.S2 (p < .005, df = 1/28).Thus, children waited much longer for re-wards when the rewards were absent thanwhen any rewards were left available for at-tention. The second orthogonal contrast (r:.)compared mean delay times when both re-wards were present with mean delay timeswhen either the delayed or the immediate re-

334 WALTER MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

TABLK 2ANALYSIS 01? VARIANCE FOR MEAN WAITING

TIMES (IN MINUTES) IN EACHATTENTION CONDITION

Sourcu

BetweenC,6'2C,

Error

*p < .10.** p < .025.

*** p < .005.

<V

3111

28

MS

144.2310.5112.4

9.832.63

F

4.4-2**9.52***3.45*

<l

ward was available for attention. The resultsof this contrast suggested a slight trend to-ward shorter delay when both rewards werepresent for attention, rather than when onlyone reward was present (F = 3.45, df — 1/28,p < .1). The final contrast, (Cg), comparingattention to the delayed reward with atten-tion to the immediate reward, was not statis-tically significant (F < 1).

The absolute mean waiting times were prob-ably depressed by the low maximum waitingperiod used, that is, 15 minutes. Ten subjectsout of the total 32 in the study waited themaximum time. Table 3 shows the number ofsubjects in each condition who waited the fullIS minutes. An overall frequency analysisyielded a significant chi-square (x2 = 11.07,p < .025, d/ = 3). Note that not a singlechild waited the maximum time in the condi-tion in which both rewards were available,whereas 6 out of 8 children waited themaximum time when neither reward was pres-ent. These results further support the findingsof the parametric analysis, showing greatest'delay of gratification when the reward ob-jects were not available for attention. Insummary, children who were given the oppor-tunity to attend to any of the rewards while

TABLK 3NUMBER O K CIIII .DKEN WAITING THE M A X I M U M

TIMK (15 MINUTES) IN KACIIATTENTION CONDITION

.Situation

Not wa i l ingWaiting

Rewards available foi' aUculion

None Both Delayed

62

Immediate

62

they were waiting delayed less long than chil-dren who could not attend to any rewardswhile waiting.Follow-Up Data

To test the stability of these findings, apartial replication was conducted in laterfollow-up work. In this replication, themethod was altered in one major way. It wasrecognized that interpretation of the reportedresults might be somewhat hampered by thefact that the signal for terminating the delayinvolved eating a tiny pretzel, and that pret-zels also were the rewards. Therefore, insteadof the tiny pretzel, a desk bell was used asthe signal to terminate the delay period inthe follow-up.

Subjects of comparable age from the samenursery school were run in the two conditionsthat had yielded the main effects. Namely, 12children were left waiting with neither thedelayed nor immediate rewards present and12 with both rewards present.

The findings clearly supported the previousresults. The mean waiting time for the condi-tion in which neither reward was present forattention was 8.9 minutes (SD = 5.26), whilethe mean waiting time when both rewardswere visible was only 3.09 minutes (SD =5.59). These means were significantly differ-ent in the same direction found previously(t ~ 2.61, dj - 22, p< .025). We thereforemay conclude that this attentional conditionproduced reliable differences in the length oftime that children delayed gratification (re-gardless of the signal used to terminate thedelay period).

DISCUSSIONThroughout this study unexpected results

emerged. A first surprise was the long dura-tion of the waiting periods that many of theseyoung children were able to maintain undersome conditions. Tn pilot work, for example,some of the preschool youngsters waited forthe preferred reward quietly by themselves,seated alone in a chair for periods sometimesexceeding I hour—an observation that issurprising, considering the widespread beliefthat young children arc incapable of sustaineddelay of gratification. Moreover, throughoutthe entire study not a single child violated

ATTENTION IN DELAY OF GRATIFICATION 335

the stated contingency rule by consuming thepreferred but delayed reward before the ex-perimenter's return.

The experimental conditions exerted potenteffects on the children's delay behavior, asseen in the finding that six out of eightchildren waited the maximum 15-minute timewhen they could attend to neither the imme-diate nor the delayed rewards, whereas themean waiting time was about 1 minute whenthey could attend to both rewards. These dif-ferences between conditions suggest that it isinappropriate to conceptualize delay of grati-fication as if it hinged on an all-or-none"ability." Instead, most of the subjects inthe present study, in spite of their young age,seemed capable of delay of gratification; theextent to which they did delay dependedcritically on the specific conditions of thedelay period.

The initial theorizing about delay behaviorled to predictions of results which were thedirect opposite of the obtained findings. Itwas predicted that attention to the outcomesavailable in the choice situation while waitingwould enhance delay behavior; instead itsharply reduced delay of gratification. Ex-tensive observations of the children's behaviorduring the delay period provided some cluesfor a better understanding of the mechanismsthrough which they mediated their own goal-directed waiting.

One of the most striking delay strategiesused by some subjects was exceedingly simpleand effective. These children seemed to facili-tate their waiting by converting the aversivewaiting situation into a more pleasant non-waiting one. They devised elaborate self-distraction techniques through which theyspent their time psychologically doing some-thing (almost anything) other than waiting.Instead of focusing prolonged attention on theobjects for which they were waiting, theyavoided looking at them. Some children cov-ered their eyes with their hands, rested theirheads on their arms, and found other similartechniques for averting their eyes from thereward objects. Many seemed to try to reducethe frustration of delay of reward by gener-ating their own diversions: they talked tothemselves, sang, invented games with theirhands and feet, and even tried to fall asleep

while waiting—as one child successfully did.These elaborate self-distractions occurredmainly in the rewards-absent condition andalmost never in the both-rewards-present con-dition, since in the latter group the childrenquickly terminated the delay period.

These observations, while obviously incon-clusive, suggest that diverting one's attentionaway from the delayed reward (while main-taining behavior directed toward its ultimateattainment) may be a key step in bridgingtemporal delay of reward. That is, learningnot to think about what one is awaiting mayenhance delay of gratification, much morethan does ideating about the outcomes.

These observations also seem consistentwith theoretical considerations which (posthoc) could correctly predict the obtained re-sults. Namely, from the perspective of "frtis-trative nonreward" theory (e.g., Amsel, 1958,1962; Wagner, 1966), the occurrence of non-reward when reward is expected elicits a pri-mary frustration reaction. Congruent with thisformulation, when the anticipation of rewardis increased, the aversive frustration effectalso should be greater. Hence one might pre-dict that cues that enhance the salience ofanticipated but still unavailable (delayed)rewards should increase the aversiveness ofthe delay period. Presumably the greater andmore vivid the anticipation of reward, thegreater the frustration generated by its delay.This line of reasoning would suggest that con-ditions that decrease the subjects' attentionto the blocked reward—and that distract himby internal or overt activity from the frus-trative delay of reward—would make it lessaversive for him to continue his goal-directedwaiting and hence permit him to wait longerfor delayed gratifications. These theoreticalexpectations seem closely congruent both withthe obtained findings and with the more in-formal observations of the children's delaybehavior.

The present terminology focuses on thefrustrative aspects of not being able to im-mediately obtain the preferred reward in thedelay-of-gratification paradigm. The sametheoretical considerations, however, apply 1othe aversiveness of the waiting period and ofthe continuous decisional conflict (betweenterminating versus waiting longer). In part,

336 WALTER MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

attending to the rewards in the waiting par-adigm may be aversive, because it increasesthe frustration of anticipating the attainmentof a blocked reward; in part it may be frus-trative, because it enhances the aversivenessof the waiting situation and accentuates theongoing decisional conflict. All of thesesources of frustration seem an integral partof the delay-of-gratification situation, and at-tention to them makes effective delay be-havior more difficult.

It is of considerable interest that delay be-havior was about the same, regardless ofwhether the reward in front of the child wasthe immediately available one or the delayed,more preferred outcome. This finding seemsmost clearly to contradict any Freudian theo-retical expectations that a mental focus onthe delayed outcome (rather than the imme-diate gratification) serves to bridge temporaldelay of gratification by providing an internalor "hallucinatory" representation of the de-sired but deferred or blocked outcome.

It might also be thought that the children'swaiting behavior in the present situation de-pends on implicit "experimenter demands."Such speculations would predict that the pres-ence of the delayed reward should serve as acue to the subject that waiting for the de-layed outcome is expected by the experi-menter. Similarly the condition in which onlythe immediate reward is present should cueless lengthy waiting and enhance willingnessto terminate the delay and settle for the im-mediate outcome. These interpretations areuntenable, however, because waiting times;vere similar in the condition in which onlythe delayed reward was present and the con-dition in which only the immediate rewardwas present.

One further alternative interpretation thatmay be suggested is that attention to therewards simply decreases their subjectivevalue through some sort of habituation pro-cess, and therefore subjects wait less long. Inthat case one would expect the attention tothe delayed reward to result in its subjectivedevaluation and hence predict shorter waitingwhen the delayed reward is present, as indeedoccurred. The same reasoning, however, alsowould predict that the presence of the im-mediate reward should lead to its devaluation

and hence generate longer waiting times forthe more preferred and absent delayed out-come. The finding that the presence of onlythe immediate reward in fact led to less delayargues against such a habituation or value-reduction interpretation of the role of atten-tion in delay behavior.

Throughout the present study it has beenassumed that the content of subjects' ideationwhile waiting would be correlated with theattentional conditions to which they were as-signed. Thus it was assumed that makingrewards(s) available for attention by facingthe subject with them would increase thelikelihood that he would actually attend tothem during the delay period. While thisassumption seems straightforward and parsi-monious, it might conceivably be argued thatsubjects would actually attend mentally moreto the reward objects when the rewards werenot physically present than when they werefacing them. In that unlikely event, however,one would again have to predict a differencein waiting time between the immediate re-ward only and delayed reward only condi-tions. Presumably subjects would then befantasizing and thinking more about the ab-sent outcome, which should lead to differentwaiting times in the immediate reward anddelayed reward only attention conditions.

The lack of significant difference in waitingtime when the subjects faced the immediatereward or the delayed one does seem under-standable from the perspective of frustrativenonreward theory. When the subject attendsto the immediate reward and is tempted totake it, he is frustrated by recalling the con-tingency that attainment of it now preventshis getting the preferred reward later. Whenthe subject attends to the delayed reward, heis frustrated by the fact that he wants it nowbut cannot have it yet. When he attends toboth objects, both of the above aversive frus-trations occur, and hence delay tends to bemost difficult—as was the case. In contrast,when the rewards are not visually present forattention, and therefore not. made mentallysalient, the subject can more easily avoid thefrustration of blocked reward by engaging invarious distraction maneuvers both overtlyand in his thought processes.

ATTENTION IN DELAY OF GRATIFICATION 337

Thus perhaps the most compelling inter-pretation of the findings may be in terms ofthe frustrativeness of delay of reward: thepresence of the rewards serves to increase themagnitude of the frustration effect and hencedecreases delay of gratification by makingthe waiting period more difficult. The overallfindings tentatively suggest that learning toinhibit frustrative ideation, and to divert at-tention away from temptations by focusing,externally and internally, on competing andless frustrating stimuli, may be essential stepsfor mastery of delay of gratification. If thatis true, then the attentional and cognitiveprocesses through which people manage totransform aversive and frustrative conditionsinto bearable ones by generating their ownfrustration-reducing distractions become in-triguing questions for future research on self-control. Such research should help us tounderstand more definitively the mechanismsunderlying the present findings.

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(Received June 13, 1969)