australian public business enterprises: analysis of changing accounting, auditing and accountability...

Financial Accountability C3 Managcmnt, 9(2), May 1993, 0267-4424

AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: ANALYSIS OF CHANGING ACCOUNTING, AUDITING

AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES

JAMES GUTHRIE*

INTRODUCTION

The public sector in Australia has recently undergone significant change (Guthrie, Parker and Shand, 1990). These changes have occurred both in the public service generally, and in Public Business Enterprises (PBEs) in particular. A fundamental change has been the way that the Commonwealth and several state governments’ have altered the constitution of many PBEs. Governments have been turning away from the traditional ‘statutory form’ and adopting instead a ‘corporate form’ for the corporate governance, legal, accounting, auditing and accountability regimes. These processes are labelled ‘corporatisation’* and the resultant entities are known as Government Owned Corporations (GOCS).~

These changes are international. Recently, the World Bank identified at least 1,343 government enterprises in 83 countries that had been subjected to significant equity re-arrangements in the past decade (VPBRC, 1991). This has involved a reconstitution of governing structures, relationship with central government, the nature of the product, ownership of capital, performance measurement and accountability regimes. These changes are not only confined to developed nations (Wettenhall and Nuallain, 1990; and Boston et al., 1991), but also developing nations (Ramamuriti and Vernon, 1991). If the changes are international, this does not lessen the importance of understanding the effects within nations.

The central focus of this paper is to concentrate on one nation, Australia, and one level of government (the Commonwealth). The main argument is that as PBEs change form (from departments to statutory authorities, to corporations, to private companies) then also the norms, concepts and practices of accounting, auditing and accountability ( A M ) will change in response to these developments.

This paper updates the earlier work of Glynn and McCrae (1986) and McCrae and Aiken (1988). The more recent paper discussed the emergence of statutory authorities (SA) as an organisational form for PBEs instead of ministerial departments. They outline changes in the accounting and

The author is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Accounting at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He acknowledges the generous assistance of the Public Sector Research Centre at the University of New South Wales. Also the constructive comments from Richard Laughlin, University of Shefield and Lee Parker, Flinders University.

@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1993, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 20142, USA. 101

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accountability for these bodies. Guthrie (1990) extends their analysis by analysing the adoption of the corporate form for PBEs undertakings. He identifies several unresolved problems inherent in the phenomenon of GOCs.

The current paper is a case study of one particular policy debate (1988-1990) at one level of government in Australia. The result was the legal basis of PBEs changing from that of a statutory authority to that of (government-owned) companies subject to the Companies Act. The paper locates this within the broader move towards commercialisation of aspects of the public sector. Taking as its focus the inquiry of the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administrat ion ( SSCFPA).4

Broadbent and Guthrie’s (1992) review of recent ‘alternative’ public sector accounting research shows that accounting was increasingly being appreciated and studied in the organisational, institutional and social contexts in which it operates. Rather than looking at the procedures of accounting in technical isolation, more and more attention has been given to investigating how the forms that accounting takes and the ways in which it functions are influenced by and how they influence the wider functioning of organisations, institutional and social settings in which accounting is located. The present study takes this latter approach.

The various governments in Australia are at different stages concerning changes to PBEs. Also various models of corporation exist at the federal and state (see VPBRC, 1991). At the Commonwealth level, PBEs are being reconstituted according to the Companies Act. Thus providing the legal status of a private or publicly listed company. Three policy papers (Kerin, 1986; Walsh, 1987; and Evans, 1988) led the push for the adoption of corporate- type structures for certain PBEs. In the Department of Transport and Communications (DTC) portfolio there has been establishment of five incorporated companies (Qantas, Australian Airlines, Aussat, Australian National Line (ANL), and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC)).5 Also five statutory corporations (Telecom, Australian Post, the Federal Airports Corporation, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the Australian National Railways).

The following section of this paper provides a historical overview of the development of PBEs in Australia. The SSCFPA inquiry and report are introduced in the subsequent section. The fourth section analyses several arguments for and against a reformulated AAA. The final section presents conclusions and also indicates several unresolved issues.

BACKGROUND

In Australia PBEs are not of recent origin, but are a matter of historical development. The early colonial needs for national and community services created an environment in which the government financed and created PBEs.

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AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 103

These activities were what private enterprise had not been willing to undertake or had failed in private hands (Evatt, 1989). Australia pioneered the world in the 1880s with public management and ownership. The failing railway systems were transformed by a new administrative body, described as the statutory or public corporation (Wiltshire, 1990). In Australia many of the basic utilities of a monopoly character (e.g. water, electricity, roads, ports, airports) were established and financed by a system of public ownership.

PBEs owe their origin to definite social or political objectives. These included regulating price charging; developing resources that might otherwise remain latent; assisting in national defence; and providing essential community services not provided by private capital (Guthrie, 1991a). The development of PBEs in Australia has been different from other nation states (Wiltshire, 1990). For example, there are few cases of nationalised industries or mixed capital ownership within Australia. Also, unlike America there has not been a history of private capital injection into natural monopolies such as energy, harbours and transport industries.

PBEs are undertaken within the three levels within Australia. Because of their historical development there are many marked differences in their aims, charters, legal relationships, type of activities and financial reporting and accountability links. Various regulatory models have been used for PBEs (see Figure 1) during the twentieth century.6

Originating in the use of the Department form, PBEs in the early part of the century were based on a single statute model. The single statute provided standard accounting auditing and accountability procedures, as well as governance structures.

By the 1950s, this blanket enactment was replaced by separate legislative acts for each entity (e.g. a statutory authority with specific managerial and financial structures laid down within). By the late 1980s in the Commonwealth there was a push towards the adoption of corporate type structures for certain PBEs. The single regulatory framework model was once again gaining vogue and there are two streams to these developments.

The first stream is the corporatisation or privatisation of PBEs where reliance is placed upon Corporations Law. The second stream is the introduction of specific Acts (for example, in NSW the Government Owned Corporation Act).

Figure 1

Transformation of Regulatory Models for PBEs during the Twentieth Century

~

_ _ _ _ Departments -W- Statutory Authorities -1Q- Corporatisation LQ- Privatisation


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In NSWs PBEs must reorganise their governance, managerial and financial structures in line with the requirements of the Act.

The use of corporate structures and techniques for the structuring and operations of PBEs has meant that a prototype model has evolved. This model includes separate legal entities status, boards of directors, accrual accounting, private sector audit and annual reporting requirements. The use of the corporate form has created several accountability tensions. Traditionally, the main mechanism for accountability was the link between parliament and the statutory corporation via the responsible minister, to whom parliament may direct inquiries. Annual reports, accompanied by statements of account, are usually required to be tabled in parliament, via the responsible minister. Financial accountability links are established when the Auditor-General reviews the accounts and reports directly to parliament upon those accounts. Social and political accountability links are established via the minister and parliamentary scrutiny ,

A SIGNIFICANT EVENT: THE SSCFPA INQUIRY AND REPORT

Since the early 1970s there has been a growing interest in the management and finance of PBEs. In the federal sphere the activity ranged from the Royal Commission on the Australian Government Administration (RCAGA, 1976) and policy statements (Kerin, 1986; Walsh, 1987; and Evans, 1988) to Parliamentary committees’ interests UCPA, 1989, 1991 and 1992; and SSCFPA, 1989). Also in various states and territories there has been a similar litany of inquiry reports, recommendations, and proposed and actual legislative changes.

In 1989 there was a watershed inquiry by the SSCFPA into GOCs and their reporting requirements. This detailed inquiry found an upsurge in the use of companies and a series gap in the scrutiny ability of Parliament. The major thrust of the recommendations was the strengthening of AAA regimes. The SSCFPA inquiry was prompted by several developments, including the rapid growth in PBEs subsidiary companies and the conversion from statutory authorities to company status. Coates (1990) observed, that parallel to the increased use of the company structures, there had been a change in the management principles applying to PBEs. This had involved the change from conformity to rules and regulations to ‘letting the managers manage’ with a resultant devolution of authority and a switch to ‘accountability for results’.

A brief summary of debates and contents of the report will now be. undertaken by examining four issues. The first and second issues on the identification and approval processes associated with GOCs, were descriptive in nature. The SSCFPA report found significant problems in describing the number and types of GOCs and also a confused regime of approval mechanisms.

The third issue concerned the suitability of companies as vehicles for

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government activity. On this question there was some disagreement within the Committee (p. 16).

Some members of the Committee saw no reason for any use of the company structure other than as a subsidiary to entities within the defined public sector accountability system. Others considered that there is a place for the use of companies directly owned by the government.

The Chairperson saw no advantage in the use of the company form. He indicated that its likely use would probably reduce accountability in practice (Coates, 1990). The fourth issue concerned the provision for accountability to Parliament. A redefined accountability regime was being forged by the executive for GOES, placing emphasis upon financial performance and market forces, rather than upon traditional concerns with compliance, probity and financial processes.

The Committee recommended that all government companies be required to conform to the reporting standards of statutory authorities. It argued that these financial reporting standards have been long established and well tested (p. 34). On the question of who should audit government companies, the Committee was supportive of the JCPA recommendations (JCPA, 1989) that the Auditor-General be reinstated as the auditor of all government entities. Also that GOCs should be audited to standards laid down in the Audit Act

In summary, the detailed inquiry and subsequent report of the SSCFPA found that the upsurge in the use of companies had led to serious gaps in the ability of Parliament to carry out its proper functions of scrutiny. The major thrust of the recommendations was to suggest strengthened parliamentary accountability for GOCs and PBEs.

(pp. 35-36).

A CONTEST OVER THE CORPORATE FORM AND REFORMULATED AAA

Several issues associated with the adoption of the corporate form are analysed via three categories; annual reporting (including performance measurement and CSOs); auditing; and accountability issues.

Annual Reborting

The first category of analysis is annual reporting. Argument for incorporation under the Companies Act was that it imposed the same structures and discipline as the private sector competitors (e.g. annual reporting as required by the Act). The counter argument was pursued by the two peak accounting professional bodies (the ASA and the ICA). They stated that the requirements of the Companies Act (designed to protect the position of shareholders and creditors) were not appropriate. They further argued that, the accountability requirements


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Table 1

Various Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Issues Associated with Corporatisation

1. Annual Reporting a) Form and Reporting * What should be the content and format of annual reports? * How should annual reports be distributed? * What accounting methods are to be used and who gets to set the ‘standards’ of good practice? * Should Parliament have a role in annual reporting prescriptions? * Is statutory backing required for financial reporting to cover all government entities?

Who should provide financial and reporting guidelines (the Executive government and approved by Parliamentary Committee)? * Should there be different reporting requirements for various categories of government entities? * How can parliamentary scrutiny be formalised and enhanced?

b) Performance Measurement Is a financial account sufficient to fulfil the accountability requirements of

GOEs? How will rate of return be calculated?

* What pricing policy is to be adopted for the services of GOEs? How are assets and liabilities to be recognised, measured and reported? What other type of information is required to judge ‘performance’?

* What type of account should be provided to the parliament and the public about the performance of GOEs? * Which organisation is responsible for performance review (i.e. Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, Auditor-General, Parliamentary Committee, etc.)?

c) The Identification and Calculation of Community Service Obligations

* What are the political and social accountability requirements for PBEs? What services or activities within government bodies represent CSOs?

* Who will and how are the CSOs to be identified? * What price is going to be placed on these and who pays for CSO? * What government PBEs do not have a CSO? * Should the basis for identifying and calculating the cost of CSOs be subject to guidelines and disclosed in annual reports?

(CSOa)

~

2. Provision of Auditing Services How should the auditor be appointed (independence)?

* How should the auditor be paid for the work undertaken (resourcing)? Should the role of the auditor be extended to include reporting on

performance indicators and performance (mandate and scope)? * Should all audit reports be directed at management, the responsible Minister or parliament (reporting process)?

What audit standards are appropriate for the conduct of compliance and performance auditing (standards)? * To what extent should public sector audit work be undertaken by private sector auditors (access)?


AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

Table 1 (continued)

107

3. Accountability Issues * How should ministerial responsibility be redefined?

What is the use of partnerships, limited liability status, subsidiaries, exempt proprietary status, or trusts for PBEs? * Should control and oversight of the financial practices for public business entities (ability to freely borrow, overseas loans, government guaranteed debt, payment of dividends, repayment of previous government loans, special ‘productivity dividends’) be reduced?

What regulation and monitoring is required for charges and pricing? * Is there a lack of parliamentary scrutiny of the accountability regimes and processes?

of government companies should be more stringent than those of private companies. Table 1 outlines several annual reporting issues that have arisen during the corporatisation debate^.^

Associated with annual reporting is the issue of performance measurement. DTC proponents of the corporate form argued that PBEs be judged by private sector criteria of performance (for instance, the ‘bottom line’ and related ‘financial’ statement indicators). Opponents argued that annual reports of PBEs should, in addition to financial statements, provide wider performance information (for instance, in equal employment opportunity, industrial democracy, management improvement and compliance with freedom of information requirements). The ACOA submission (p. 301) argued that rather than abandon such requirements, the opportunity could be taken to compel GOCs to disclose fuller information about their activities (for instance, in protecting the environment, supporting Australian industry, ensuring the safety and availability of goods and services, and adopting employment practices and industrial democracy). Several bodies (e.g. ASA, p. 145; and ICA, p. 931), argued for wider reporting by the GOES. The contested issue concerned the performance account to be provided to Parliament and the public.

Another component of annual reporting is the identification and reporting of community service obligations (CSOs). In evidence given to the SSCFPA, the DTC argued that a company structure is appropriate when the organisation does not have a CSO. This is defined as an obligation or a service that a body has to provide which a purely commercial body would not have to provide (p. 421).

The proponents of corporations suggest that GOCs can be classified as having commercial objectives and community service obligations. These classifications are supposed to be dichotomous. However, what services or activities within the government bodies represent CSOs? How are these to be identified? What price is going to be put on them? What criteria have been established to identify CSOs?

This classification scheme suggests that there has been a change in the


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objectives and orientation of certain PBEs from community and public service, to commercial. T o take the example of a publicly owned railway overnight being made commercially oriented (that is, reclassified as a GOC): how does one go about identifying the railways’ CSOs? For instance, does one focus on general level criteria, such as national defence, infrastructure development, employment, national economic prosperity, etc.? O r does one focus on specific level criteria, such as the promotion of types of service (passenger, bulk freight, other freight) or the operation of branch lines, or the operation of individual railway stations, or the frequency and timing of services along lines or stopping at particular stations, or the provision of passenger or freight service at concessional rates and so forth (Guthrie, 1990).

As highlighted in the above, numerous aspects associated with GOCs’ financial reporting to parliament, there are various ‘solutions’ available to policy makers, executive government, managers and the parliamentarians. What is central to this process is the remoulding of accountability regimes, which is at the heart of debates about corporatisation and privatisation.

Provision of Audit Services

The second category for analysis concerns the provision of audit services. The use of ‘present fairly’ audit opinions for incorporated PBEs. Briefly, the argument in favour is that the annual financial statements will be audited in conformity with professional Australian auditing standards and will provide a ‘presents fairly the financial position . . . and results of operations’ opinion. The attestation of the companies’ financial statements will provide assurances for the Ministers and Parliament about the reliability of the reported performance information.

Proponents argue that a reconstitution of these public bodies as corporations will be accompanied by significant changes in audit work. Walker (1989) identifies changes to the nature of audit work and the type of audit report delivered to Parliament (and hence placed on the public records). Requirements for audits in the Corporation Code oblige an auditor to express an opinion on the financial statements. There is no requirement to report on non- compliance with rules for the authorisation of expenditure, failure to safeguard assets, misappropriation on the part of staff, internal control weaknesses, and the efficiency or effectiveness with which GOCs management have pursued government policies (Walker and Guthrie, 1989).

Moreover, private sector auditors usually view their role as solely being to form an opinion on the financial statements. The peak bodies of accountants (ASA, and the ICA) however, argued that audits of PBEs must be undertaken in terms of procedures laid out in the Audit Act 1902. Under the Act, the Auditor-General may report to Parliament on weaknesses in the internal control, waste and inefficiency, and failure to conform to prescribed procedures when acquiring assets or expending monies. Moreover, the Minister could be



answerable for identified deficiencies, via public accountability through the Parliament.

Accountability Issues

Accountability issues is the third category of analysis. Several groups sympathetic to a more commercial orientation argued for the removal of unnecessary restrictions. Commenting on this, the ACOA identified several restrictions (public sector borrowing requirement limits; tendering conditions; determination by central authority of a range of industrial relations matters, including salary and superannuation arrangements). The ACOA submission, goes on to argue that the removal of these restrictions will not lead to increased efficiency as they are based on at least three questionable or inappropriate assumptions. The first concerns the ‘let the managers manage’ argument, and ‘market accountability regimes’ are based on the premise that there will not be Ministerial or government interference into the management of government owned bodies once they are converted into companies. Second, that public bodies will always operate in a competitive environment (rather than in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets) so that they are forced to compete on equal terms with private sector organisations, and so that comparisons of performance between government owned enterprises can be readily made. Third, that public bodies are solely profit-maximising enterprises, and do not exist to pursue broader government policies, or do not have social objectives or community responsibilities; and that the rate of return can be measured objectively because, for example, large asset bases can be valued by reference to current market prices.

In summary, as PBEs are changed from departments, to statutory authorities, to government owned corporations, and finally to privatisation, also the accounting, auditing and accountability arrangements change, as these arrangements are different for each form (see Guthrie, 1989; Walker, 1989; and Johnson and Rix, 1991). Table 2 illustrates the various different accounting, auditing and accountability for statutory authorities and GOCs.

IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATISATION

This case study of the contested nature of corporations was limited in focus to one event, the SSCFPA inquiry.’ The trend within governments in Australia to redefine accountability of PBEs was identified. According to this redefinition, ‘financial discipline’ and ‘efficiency’ would become the central tenets of accountability regimes.

Johnson and Rix (1991, p. 102) in a study of the Australian electricity industry stated that:


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Table 2

Accounting, Auditing and Accountability for Statutory Authorities and Government Owned Companies

Statutoly Authorities Gout. -Owned Companies

1. Annual Reporting 1.1 Annual Reports

Distribution Parliament: some libraries; Shareholders; also placed on public record may not be tabled in Parliament.

standards rules specified in Schedule 5 of the Corporations Law.

some on request.

Accounting Methods Usually unspecified; Approved accounting usually Australian Accounting Standards.

1.2 Performance Measurement

Financial Reports As specified; usually Balance sheet, and loss accrual accounting. statement (which

necessitates use of accrual accounting).

Performance Indicators Range of indicators; Not required by specified by various Corporations Law. regulation and administrative orders.

1.3 Community Service Obligations ~~ ~ ~~

csos Not specifically stated, but Purely commercial, no recognised and may be cso. funded.

2. Provision of Audit Services

Auditor Auditor-General Auditor-General or agent;

Audit Reporting Audit of Audit of financial - financial statements statements only. - compliance issues - performance (elective)

or private sector auditor.

3. Accountability Issues

Ministerial Directly responsible. Not directly responsible. responsibility

Monitoring and Parliamentary oversight. Stock market or other Control ‘market’ oversight.



the trend towards corporatisation . . . is based on the confusion which exists between financial accountability, such as is provided (however inadequately) through the relevant sections of the companies code (or its equivalent), and the necessary political and social accountability expected of authorities in a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. Put simply, decisions regarding the proper legal or constitutional form for public authorities should take account of their special situation arising from their public ownership. (Emphasis in the original.)

A focus on just the financial accountability of these GOCs raises several issues, which were identified in the body of the paper. The push for corporatisation and privatisation has its roots in the neo-classical economics (Guthrie and Johnson, 1992). The current wave of macro and micro economic reforms is led by the belief that ‘market mechanisms’ and ‘private sector business practices’ should prevail upon ‘rational decision making’ within the public sector.

As PBEs change their form along the continuum of departments, to statutory authorities, corporations and finally to privatisation, there are significant differences between the accounting, auditing and accountabilities arrangements under each form. Indeed the wider use of the corporate form or privatisation as a vehicle for conducting the business of PBEs can be expected to weaken arrangements for accountability within the public sector.

While the corporate form may allow these enterprises to compete on a more equal basis commercially, it does not guarantee, in fact it may be incompatible with, the preservation of a broader range of economic and social responsibilities, over and above profit-making (Guthrie, 1991a; and JCPA, 1992). Some of these responsibilities were, historically, part of the rationale for the establishment of these enterprises in earlier decades. Other responsibilities have been added later (e.g. a pace setting role in afirmative action or occupational health and safety) but are no less important. At present the commercial legislation to which these GOCs will be subject, contain no mechanisms for reporting or auditing of these broader responsibilities and private sector flaws will not be rectified (Turnbull, 1992).

In the Australian system of government, ministers and public servants are accountable to the parliament for the use of the public resources with which they have been entrusted. The parliament, representing the resource providers, has a responsibility to ensure that the resources are wisely used and safeguarded. The parliamentary committees’ scrutiny (e.g. public accounts committee) of government activity and stewardship is one of the means of meeting this responsibility.

In Australia recently, parliamentary inquiries have expressed considerable parliamentary concern about several important AAA issues associated with PBEs. These bodies have not been subject to regular parliamentary review in the past. The timeliness and quality of annual reports from these bodies has been questioned. Other accountability aspects have been raised, especially PBEs’ performance reporting.

A choice will be made between accountability regimes based on the premise


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of ‘the discipline of the market’ or based upon ‘parliamentary accountability’ during the 1990s. Both provide different AAA arrangements for PBEs. At the heart of discussions over the status and operation of GOCs lies a contest between the executive and parliament about the redefinition of traditional accountability, and revised rules and mechanisms associated with parliamentary accountability.

4

5

6

7

8

NOTES

The government of Australia is known as the Commonwealth or Federal government. State governments (e.g. NSW, Victoria) refer to the governments of each of the six states and two territories (Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory). The Australian system of government is different from the traditional Westminster system of government. The following classification scheme is used. Corporatisation (use of a corporate form for legal, governance, management, accounting and accountability purposes for the running of public sector business activities). Privatisation (the selling of part or all of a corporatised public sector entity to private capital). Public business enterprises or statutory corporations are known via a variety of terms and these are not all synonymous with statutory authorities. I elected to use PBEs and GOCs as the over arching current term in use.

In practice the various governments in Australia have adopted different terminology and characteristics by which to classify public sector activities. Also PBEs are evolving and ever changing. This use of different terminology and the rate of change can be confusing, as there is no agreed standard or Comrnonweath statistical definition. The documents analysed in this study are the government policy papers (Evans, 1988; Kerin, 1986; and Walsh, 1987). The Parliamentary Committees (JCPA, 1989, 1991 and 1992; SSCFPA, 1989; and SSCFPA evidence, 1989). and subsequent debates (Coates, 1990; and Guthrie, 1990). These are only part of the rich documentary sources concerning this policy debate. Many of these GOCs are being privatised, with the sale of all or part of the capital base being sold to private shareholders. A lack of homogeneity stems from the historical development of PBEs in Australia. Various regulatory models have been developed and transformed at the three levels of government. The ‘evolutionary’ view of change suggested by Figure 1 is only a model representation. In practice, many PBEs operate under different regulatory framework and AAA requirements. A table format was used for economy in the presentation of the various issues associated with corporatisation. The case study identified and raised several crucial questions and disputed viewpoints concerning PBEs. This paper does not purport to provide answers to the complex financial, auditing and accountability issues involved in corporatisation. As has been demonstrated elsewhere, the application of public sector accounting and auditing change in the Australian Public sector has involved contested zones at various levels - individual, groups, organisation, institutions and concepts (see English and Guthrie, 1991 ; Guthrie, 1990 and 1991b; Hamburger, 1989; and Parker and Guthrie, 1990 and 1991).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA ACOA ASA c s o s DTC GOCs ICA JCPA NSW PBEs RCAGA SA SSCFPA VPBRC

Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Administrative and Clerical Officers Association Australian Society of Accountants Community Service Obligations Dept. of Trade and Communications Government Owned Corporations Institute of Chartered Accountants Joint Committee of Parliamentary Accounts New South Wales Public Business Enterprises Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration Statutory Authorities Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration Victorian Public Bodies Review Committee

australian public business enterprises: analysis of changing accounting, auditing and accountability...

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