David Krajewski

Philosophy 592D- Exam #2 (Final Draft)

1 ) I believe that Epicurus’s argument against the badness of death is unsound. I endorse the

“deprivation account” of the badness of death, which claims that death is bad for its victim only if its

victim would have been better off, had he not died. To defend the “deprivation account”, I will first

consider Feldman’s critique of Epicurus’s argument. Feldman’s critique will lead to his endorsement of

the deprivation account. Whether or not we are sympathetic to the deprivation account, if we suppose

that death is bad for its victim, we might ask “When is death bad for its victim?” I will consider

Bradley’s critique of Epicurus’s argument, where he introduces his view of when death is bad for its

victim, called “subsequentism”, which states that death is bad for its victim after its victim dies. I will

defend subsequentism, and in doing so, I will deny Feldman’s view of “eternalism”, which states that

death is eternally bad for its victim.

Feldman claims that there are two main interpretations we could have of Epicurus’s argument

against the badness of death; that Epicurus is either claiming that death is not intrinsically bad for its

victim or that it’s not extrinsically bad for its victim. Suppose Epicurus is claiming that death is not

intrinsically bad for its victim. According to Epicurus, if death is not intrinsically bad for its victim,

then death cannot be bad for its victim. Consider the following reconstruction of Epicurus’s argument:

(1) Every person stops existing at the time of death. (2) If (1), then no person feels any pain while dead.

(3) If no one feels any pain while dead, then being dead is not painful. (4) If being dead is not painful,

then being dead is not intrinsically bad for the victim. (5) Therefore, being dead is not intrinsically bad

for the victim. If we suppose that there is no afterlife and that I immediately go into nonexistence after I

die, then it seems problematic to claim that death can be intrinsically bad for me. Feldman notes that

Epicurus is working within a traditional hedonistic framework, and according to traditional hedonism,

the only thing intrinsically bad for a person is an experience of pain. Surely after I die, under the

supposition that I go into nonexistence, I do not have any pain experiences (or any experiences at all).

So I cannot experience anything intrinsically bad (or anything at all). If intrinsic badness is the only

thing that can make death bad for its victim, then it follows from Feldman’s first reconstruction of

Epicurus’s argument that death is not bad for its victim, since one cannot experience any intrinsic

badness while dead.

If we interpret Epicurus as arguing that death is not intrinsically bad for its victim, and if we

suppose that intrinsic badness is the only thing that can make death bad for its victim, then Epicurus’s

conclusion that death is not bad for its victim appears uncontroversial. However, suppose we interpret

Epicurus as arguing that death is not extrinsically bad for its victim. Feldman suggests that, with this

interpretation in mind, the reconstruction would look something like this: (1) Every person stops

existing at the time of death. (2) If (1), then no one feels any pain while dead. (3) If no one feels any

pain while dead, then being dead does not lead to anything intrinsically bad for its victim. (4) If death

does not lead to anything intrinsically bad for its victim, then death is not extrinsically bad for its victim.

(5) Therefore, death is not extrinsically bad for its victim. Feldman believes that the weak premise in

this reconstruction is (4). Epicurus is assuming in (4) that something is extrinsically bad for someone

only if it later leads to intrinsic badness for someone. Suppose I do not have enough money to buy food.

Since I cannot buy food, I become so famished to the point that I have hunger pains. My lack of money

is extrinsically bad for me because it later leads to something intrinsically bad for me, my hunger pains.

If my lack of money had not later lead to something intrinsically bad for me, it would not have been

extrinsically bad for me, according to Epicurus. Unlike Epicurus, Feldman does not think that this is the

only way that something can be extrinsically bad for me.

Something might also be extrinsically bad for me in the following way: it deprives me of

something that would have been intrinsically good for me. Suppose at a young age that I marry woman

(A). A few years later we get divorced, and I experience some intrinsic badness (various emotional

pains). Suppose, in another possible world, that I break up with (A) before marrying her. Shortly after,

I would have met woman (B), the woman of my dreams, married her, and had a long successful

marriage. In this world, I would have experienced a lot of intrinsic goodness. It turns out that marrying

(A) deprives me of a lot of intrinsic goodness. In fact, I would have been much better off had I not

married (A), given that I would have had a long and successful marriage, had I not married (A).

Feldman believes that marrying (A) is something that is extrinsically bad for me because it deprives me

of the better life (full of comparatively more intrinsic goods) that I would have had, had I not married

(A). Surely, it does seem that something is bad for me if it deprives me of a lot of intrinsic goods.

Marrying (A) is not intrinsically bad for me (a deprivation in and of itself does not cause pain) but it is

extrinsically bad for me. According to Epicurus, something is extrinsically bad for me only if it later

leads to something intrinsically bad for me. The fact that I marry (A) does not lead to anything

intrinsically bad for me. While I do later experience some intrinsic badness after marrying (A), the

intrinsic badness I later experience is not due to the marriage to (A) itself; it is instead due directly to the

divorce. Epicurus might say, in this situation, that my divorce is extrinsically bad for me because it later

leads to things that are intrinsically bad for me. However, Feldman insists that my marriage to (A) is

extrinsically bad for me in spite of the fact that it does not itself directly lead to things that are

intrinsically bad for me. It does seem that marrying (A) is extrinsically bad for me since it deprives me

of many intrinsic goods. Epicurus’s account of how something is extrinsically bad for someone does not

yield the (desirable and intuitive) result that marrying (A) is somehow extrinsically bad for me.

Epicurus’s account appears too limited in scope since it does not yield this result, and if something can

be extrinsically bad for someone in virtue of it depriving someone of intrinsic goodness, then we might

think that (4) should be dropped from Epicurus’s argument.

We might think that, if death can be extrinsically bad for someone in virtue of it depriving

someone of intrinsic goods, then Feldman’s second reconstruction of Epicurus’s argument has been

rendered unsound. Suppose Bob dies at age 50 from a car accident. If Bob had not died, he would have

gone on to live until age 80 and retired with his wife in Italy. Retiring, growing old with his wife, living

in Italy, among other things, were things that Bob would have had a great pleasure in doing. In other

words, Bob’s death deprived him of many intrinsic goods that he would have experienced, had he not

died. Since Bob’s death deprives him of many intrinsic goods, it follows from Feldman’s view of

extrinsic badness in the previous paragraph that Bob’s death is extrinsically bad for him. If Bob’s death

is extrinsically bad for him, then death is bad for Bob. If we agree with Feldman’s view about how

something can be extrinsically bad for someone, and if we think that these conclusions about the

badness of Bob’s death seem right, then we should no longer accept Epicurus’s argument (Feldman’s

second reconstruction) against the badness of death. It appears that death can be extrinsically bad for us

when, if we had not died, we would have been better off, since we would have experienced many more

intrinsic goods had we not died. However, it does not follow here that death is always bad for its victim.

Suppose I walk out the door and get hit by a bus which causes me to die. If I had not died, I would have

found out at the doctor’s tomorrow that I have a fatal disease. Since I would have had a fatal disease,

the intrinsic badness I would have experienced would have been greater than the intrinsic goodness

experienced throughout the remainder of my life. My death is extrinsically good for me because it

deprives me of a lot of intrinsic badness. However, whenever death deprives one of more intrinsic

goodness than badness, it follows that death is extrinsically bad for its victim.

Bradley considers Epicurus to be arguing the following: (1) Anything that is bad for someone

must be bad for that person at a particular time. (2) There is no time at which death is bad for its victim.

(3) Therefore, death is not bad for its victim. I believe Feldman succeeded in denying Epicurus’s

presupposition that something is extrinsically bad for someone only if it leads to later intrinsic badness.

However, if Bradley cannot establish a time at which death is bad for its victim, Epicurus’s argument (as

Bradley has reconstructed it) might still have some force. Feldman may have shown that death is

extrinsically bad for its victim. But, if there is no time at which death is extrinsically bad for its victim,

it may not make sense to claim that death can be bad for its victim at all. I should note that Bradley is

even skeptical of (1), but he does not need to disprove (1) to show that the argument is unsound.

Disproving (2) will be sufficient to show that the argument is unsound. I will show how Bradley

disproves (2).

Bradley believes there is a time at which death is bad for its victim. He defends a view called

“subsequentism”, which states that death is bad for its victim after its victim dies. If he is right, then (2)

will be disproved and Epicurus’s argument will fall apart, and here is how it will fall apart. In Bradley’s

reconstruction, Epicurus claims in (1) that anything bad for one is bad for one at a particular time. If

Bradley shows that death can be bad for one at a particular time (or times), then it follows from (1) that

death is bad for someone. (2) would be adjusted to read “There is a time at which death is bad for its

victim”. And (3) would no longer follow from (1) and (2). Consider an application of subsequentism to

an everyday example of extrinsic badness.  Suppose I’m a professional wrestler and I break my index

finger.  I use that index finger often whenever I am punching someone in the ring or lifting them up.  My

index finger heals for the most part in a couple weeks and I am able to compete again.  I would have

been much better off during those couple weeks had I not broken my index finger, since it deprived me

of the intrinsic goodness I get from competing in the ring. Breaking my index finger is extrinsically bad

for me after I break it, and it is bad for me at all of the times I would have been better off, had I not

broken it.  Imagine that t1 is the time at which I break my index finger, and t2 and t3 are the times after I

break it (and before it’s healed).  T4 is the time at which my finger is healed.  It turns out that breaking

my index finger is bad for me at t2 and t3 since I would have been better off at those times, had I not

broken it.  However, it stops being bad for me at t4, since I am no longer being deprived of any intrinsic

goodness (I am able to compete again).

        Consider an application of subsequentism to the badness of death.  Suppose someone poisons me

and I die at t1.  Imagine that there are many times at which I would have been better off, had I not died. 

However, had I not gotten poisoned, I would have died of natural causes at age 80.  According to

subsequentism, my death is bad for me at all of the times I would have been better off, up until my

“would have been” (hereafter counterfactual) naturally-caused death at age 80.  Subsequentism has the

(I think) desirable consequence that my death is not eternally bad for me. However, it might turn out

that subsequentism yields a counterintuitive result, if we consider a death that occurred thousands of

years ago. Subsequentism might yield the result that Plato’s death is still bad for him today, even

though he died thousands of years ago. We might think that result is strange, given that most people live

around the average lifespan. If most people live around the average lifespan, their deaths can only

deprive them of things for so much time. Eventually, even if Plato had not died when he did, he would

have died at an average age of natural causes. Bradley would claim that today Plato’s death is no longer

bad for him.  Plato would not have lived for thousands of years in a world similar to ours in most

respects, so it is safe to say that the times at which he would have been better off, had he not died when

he did, were thousands of years ago. In a world very dissimilar to ours, Plato might still be living today.

If Plato still would have been living today, then perhaps his death would still be depriving him of many

intrinsic goods. If we measured the badness of Plato’s death relative to this very dissimilar world, there

would still be times today at which death is bad for Plato. However, Bradley believes that we should

measure the badness of death relative to a world very similar to ours. Relative to a world very similar to

ours, Plato’s death was bad for him thousands of years ago, since he might have been better off at those

times, but it is not bad for him right now and nor has it been for a long time, since there have not been

any times for thousands of years at which death has been bad for Plato.

        Bradley considers an objection to the deprivation account of the badness of death. He thinks

subsequentism can adequately respond to this objection. One might claim that death is not always bad

for the one who dies, even at those times that the victim would have been alive had he not died.

Suppose I poison Bob and he dies. It is easy to imagine that, had Bob not gotten poisoned, maybe he

would have broken his leg the following week.  During those times at which his leg would have been

broken, according to subsequentism, his death is good for him, since it deprives him of a lot of intrinsic

badness at the times at which his leg would have been broken.  Then, after his leg heals, suddenly his

death is depriving him of intrinsic goodness again, and now his death is bad for him. We might think

that death is either good or bad for Bob at various times. It might follow that death is not good or bad

for Bob in an “all or nothing” sense, and that death is either good or bad for Bob depending on which

time we are asking about. This could be an undesirable and counterintuitive consequence of

subsequentism. Bradley has a reply to this objection. It might be said that death is either good or bad

for me in an “all or nothing” sense, taking into account all of the times at which I would have been alive,

had I not died, and adding and subtracting up the values of intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness I

would have experienced. The value I come up with is the value of well-being that death deprives me of.

After I figure out the value of well-being that death deprives me of, I compare this value to the value of

well-being of my actual life. Suppose in my actual life I experienced 50 more units of goodness than

badness. The value of well-being of my actual life is (+50).  However, if I had not died, I would have

experienced 75 more units of goodness than badness. In other words, the value of well-being that death

deprives me of is (+25). I would have experienced 25 more units of goodness had I not died. If the

value of well-being that death deprives me of is a positive number, then death is bad for me in the “all or

nothing” sense. If the value of well-being that death deprives me of is a negative number, then death is

good for me in the “all or nothing” sense. We add up all the goodness and badness of one’s life had one

not died and come up with an overall value of well-being (including the value of my actual life as well

as the value I would have had in my counterfactual life), compare that to the value of my actual life

alone, and that determines whether or not death is good or bad for me.  Feldman thinks death is bad for

its victim at the times that subsequentism entails, however, he also thinks it is bad for its victim at many

more times.  In fact, he thinks death is bad for its victim eternally.

        Suppose the value of the intrinsic goodness I have experienced in my life outweighs the intrinsic

badness.  Suppose again, that I would have experienced 25 more units of intrinsic goodness had I not

died and that I experienced 50 more units of goodness than badness in my actual life.  The value of my

actual life, again, is +50. However, had I not died, the value of my life would have been +75, since

again my death has deprived me of 25 units of goodness.  Feldman claims that this value relation

between my actual life (+50), and the total value of well-being I would have had (+75) always exists.  In

other words, if I ask “When is death bad for me?” one has to respond that according to this value

relation, it always is. It does not matter when this question is asked, since this value-relation between

my actual life and what I would have had eternally exists after I die. It follows that death is eternally

bad for me after I die.

Feldman’s eternalism would conclude that Plato’s death is still bad for him today. In a world

very similar to ours, Plato would not be alive today and death would no longer be depriving him of any

intrinsic goods. However, suppose that Plato’s value of well-being of his actual life was (+100), and the

total value of well-being he would have had was (+125). This value-relation still exists today, so it is

still true now that Plato’s death is bad for him. However, Bradley thinks that Feldman is answering the

wrong question.  He believes that Feldman is asking “When is it true that death is bad for me?”  Surely it

is always true that death is bad for me since the value relation between my actual life and what I would

have had, had I not died, always exists.  Bradley is instead asking “At which particular times is my death

bad for me?”   While it may be eternally true in some sense that death is bad for me, since that value

relation will never go away after I die, I do not think we should conclude that death was bad for me

before I was born.  I did not yet exist, so I could not have been better off in any respect, since I had not

experienced anything. In other words, my actual life did not yet have a value of well-being (I believe

that my value of well-being before I was born was non-zero). In order for death to be bad for me at a

particular time, there has to be a time at which I have experienced some sort of intrinsic goodness or

badness.  In other words, before I was born, there was nothing for my counterfactual value of well-being

to be compared to, since my actual life did not have a value of well-being at all.  So there is no particular

time at which death was bad for me before my birth, and therefore death is not eternally bad for me.

It seems that subsequentism is at least more plausible than eternalism.  If we think that either

subsequentism or eternalism is the correct view about when death is bad for its victim, then it appears

that (2) in Bradley’s reconstruction of Epicurus’s argument has been disproved.  If we think that (2) has

been disproved, then Epicurus’s argument for the badness of death is unsound.  If, however, we think

that both Bradley’s and Feldman’s views about when death is bad for its victim are incorrect, then

perhaps death is “timelessly” bad. However, if death is timelessly bad, we might wonder if it is much of

an “evil” at all.

2. Lippert-Rasmussen believes that he has sufficiently motivated us to reject “The Equal

Wrongness of Killings Thesis” (hereafter EWT). I think his argument for that conclusion is not a good

one. I believe that Lippert-Rasmussen (hereafter L-R) in his paper “Why Killing Some People Is More

Seriously Wrong Than Killing Others”, is sympathetic towards the view that the wrongness of killing is

a function of the badness of death. I will show that it is this view that motivates L-R to reject EWT.

Hanser, in his paper “The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death”, claims that if we instead

view the wrongness of killing as a function of the morality of respect, it does not seem that we should

reject EWT. I am more sympathetic to the view that the wrongness of killing is a function of the

morality of respect. In what follows, I will discuss L-R’s motivations for rejecting EWT and Hanser’s

proposal that (perhaps) the wrongness of killing is not a function of the badness of death. I will also

attempt to motivate the view that the wrongness of killing is a function of the morality of respect. I will

do this, as Hanser does in his paper, by making a distinction between the “morality of interests” and the

“morality of respect”. Hanser claims that in viewing the wrongness of killing as a function of the

badness of death, L-R is exclusively considering the “morality of interests”. I hope I will be able to

show that we have at least equally as good reason to consider the wrongness of killing a function of the

morality of respect. If we do consider the wrongness of killing as a function of respect, then we will

have to be more sympathetic to EWT.

L-R will try to motivate the intuition that the wrongness of killing is a function of the badness of

death, and if we are to share this intuition, we might conclude (as L-R does) that EWT should be

rejected. First, we must accept “The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious” thesis, which

states that it is more wrong to render a person unconscious for a time longer than x than it is to render a

person unconscious for x, other things being equal (to be unconscious, on L-R’s view, is to experience

no mental states). Suppose I stick Bob with a needle that I know will render him unconscious for 8

hours. Suppose I also stick Joe with a needle, but I know this needle will render him unconscious for a

week. It appears, intuitively, that my action towards Joe is more wrong than my action towards Bob.

This intuition can be explained by a deprivation account of, in this case, the wrongness of renderings

unconscious. To deprive Bob of eight hours of his life is not as bad as depriving Joe of a full week.

If we consider “The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious” thesis to be true, and if L-

R has sufficiently motivated the deprivation account as an adequate explanation for our intuition that

depriving Joe of a full week of consciousness is more wrong than depriving Bob of 8 hours of

consciousness, then L-R believes that we are committed to accepting “The Equivalence Thesis”. “The

Equivalence Thesis” states that it is neither more, nor less wrong to deprive a person of an x amount of

conscious experience by killing him than it is to deprive him of the same amount of conscious

experience by rendering him unconscious, other things being equal. Suppose I kill a 50 year-old and I

know that his death deprives him of what would have been 30 great years of his life. Suppose I render

another 50 year-old unconscious for 30 years and this deprives him of what would have been 30 great

years of life. This unconscious 50-year old never comes back to consciousness and dies of natural

causes after the 30 years. Neither man ever has a conscious experience again and both are deprived of

what would have been 30 great years of life. My killing of the 50-year old seems no more or less wrong

than my rendering unconscious of the other 50-year old. In both cases, I intend to deprive someone of

30 great years of life. Not only do my intentions seem equally wrong, but the harms that are suffered by

each man also seem equal. I may have caused the first 50-year old’s death immediately, but each was

deprived of the same amount of time and each never had a conscious experience again. It seems that L-

R has given us sufficient motivation to favor both “The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious

Thesis” and “The Equivalence Thesis”. It appears that if we explain the wrongness of killing and of

renderings unconscious as functions of their badness, then these two theses yield plausible results for the

hypothetical cases that have been raised.

However, we have not yet given up EWT. L-R believes that if we accept the two above theses,

then we have to. Consider a case of two killings. For whatever reason, I must choose between killing

two healthy 40 year-olds, A & B. A has lived a wonderfully lavish life. If I do not kill A, the rest of her

life will contain ordinary ups and downs where the pleasures and pains experienced even out up until

she dies at age 80. B has lived an ordinary life full of ups and downs where the pleasures and pains

experienced even out, and if I do not kill her, she will go on to live a wonderfully lavish life up until she

dies at age 80. The lives at stake here are in reverse. Clearly it would be worse for B to be deprived of

the rest of her life than A, as B would be deprived of a great amount of pleasure (an amount of pleasure

that A has already experienced in her life) whereas A would be deprived of an uneventful remainder of

life. If I accept “The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis”, then I have to say that killing A is equally as

wrong as killing B. But surely they cannot be equally wrong as killing B seems to be much worse than

killing A. We concluded from the discussion of “The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious

Thesis” that unequal deprivations (of time) due to renderings unconscious, all other things being the

same, seem to be unequal in wrongness. We concluded from the discussion of “The Equivalence

Thesis” that equal deprivations (of time), all other things being the same, due to either a rendering

unconscious or a killing seem to be equally wrong. If the wrongness of killing as well as a rendering

unconscious is a function of badness, then it appears we have to deny that all killings are equally wrong

if we also want to accept that different renderings unconscious are unequally wrong. If we do not accept

that different renderings unconscious are unequally wrong, and if we are assuming that the wrongness of

a rendering unconscious and a killing are each a function of badness, we are raising a double standard.

When determining how wrong either of these actions are, it seems to depend on how much intrinsic

goodness (or badness) the killing or rendering unconscious is depriving from the victim. In other words,

we have to judge each action by the same standard (how much it is depriving someone). Suppose I kill

young F, and this deprives F of 25 great years of life. Suppose I kill old G, and this deprives G of one

great year of life. F would have experienced significantly more pleasure than G, had I killed neither of

them. F is much worse off than G is, and my killing of F seems to be more wrong than my killing of G

due to how much worse off F is.

Hanser will try to offer a partial defense of EWT. Hanser believes that when L-R claims that we

should reject EWT and that one killing can be “more wrong” than another killing, L-R is claiming that

the strength of the objection (pro-tanto) to killing varies in strength. According to L-R, if I kill a 20

year-old that would have experienced 25 great years of life had I not killed him, and kill an 80-year old

that would have experienced one great year of life had I not killed him, the strength of the objection to

killing the 20 year-old is greater than the strength of the objection to killing the 80 year-old. On the

contrary, Hanser believes that the strength of the objection (pro-tanto) to killing anyone does not vary in

strength. Hanser would say that the strength of the objection to killing either the 20-year old or the 80-

year old is equal in strength, other things being the same. If the strength of the objection does not vary

in strength (and so is always equal), then it implies that all killings are equally wrong.

In Hanser’s paper, he proposes a view about the wrongness of killing derived from McMahan,

which will be in conflict with the view that killing someone is wrong just in virtue of the badness of

death. McMahan claims that there are two aspects of morality: the morality of interests and the morality

of respect. I violate one’s morality of interests when I prevent them from doing something that they had

a desire to do. Suppose Vince wants to live to see his granddaughter born. But I kill him a few days

before his granddaughter’s scheduled birth. I deprive him of what would have been something very

pleasurable and something that he had a great interest in doing. Death is bad for him because (among

other reasons) it deprives him of a very pleasurable experience, one he was interested in having.

However, I violate one’s morality of respect (in the case of killing) when I violate their right as a person

not to be killed. In other words, I disrespect, according to McMahan, “the equal value of all persons”.

If persons are to be equally valued, McMahan believes they are owed equal respect. It is a great display

of disrespect and a great violation of the equal value of all persons if I kill any person.

What Hanser thinks is an important distinction between these two aspects of morality, is that the

strength of the objection to killing, in the “respect” sense, does not vary from killing to killing. But the

strength of the objection, in the “morality of interests” sense, does vary. There is a greater objection

typically, in the “morality of interests” sense, to killing a young person over an old person because it

deprives the young person of much more pleasure than it does the old person. Also, the young person,

typically, has more of an interest in living the rest of his life than the old person. If I kill the young

person, I am preventing him from ever fulfilling this great desire of his. If we suppose that the young

person typically has a great desire to live his remaining years while the old person typically does not, I

am preventing the old person from fulfilling a relatively much weaker desire. So the strength of the

objection to killing the young person would be greater if the main thing considered is the “morality of

interests”. However, the strength of the objection (pro-tanto) to killing either the young or the old

person is of equal strength if we consider the “morality of respect”. The young person, as a human

being, owns the right not to be killed. The old person owns the same right. No matter which person I

kill, I am disrespecting their right not to be killed. So the strength of the objection to killing, in this

sense, remains the same. When considering the “morality of respect”, the strength of the objection is of

equal strength. When considering the “morality of interests”, the strength of the objection varies.

But McMahon’s account does not yet render L-R’s conclusion regarding EWT incorrect. I

showed how L-R’s argument works when supposing that the wrongness of killing is a function of the

badness of death. However, I should say that L-R thinks his conclusions are compatible with a “respect

account” (which is the McMahan account) of the wrongness of killing. Suppose I kill C and I know C

would have lived 20 more great years. Suppose I kill D and I know D would have lived 20 more very

agonizing years, all other things being the same. It seems that I do not disrespect both of them equally

by killing them. L-R might concede that I violate their right not to be killed in either case. However, to

violate C’s right not to be killed might be more disrespectful than violating D’s right not to be killed

given that C would go on to live 20 more great years while D would live 20 more painful years. It

appears that there is more work to do to motivate EWT.

Hanser claims that the strength of the objection to the wrongness of killing under the respect-

account does not vary with how bad the deprivation is for the victim. L-R seems to be presupposing that

it does if he is to say that killing C would be more disrespectful than killing D. Hanser thinks L-R is

mistaken in making this presupposition. Instead, the wrongness of any action (not just killing) under the

respect- account varies with how serious the “rights-infringement” is for the victim. Under the respect-

account, the wrongness of an action (or the strength of the objection to an action) varies depending on

how seriously one’s right is infringed upon. Hanser thinks that this respect-account will yield plausible

results. For instance, it will conclude that the strength of the objection to killing is greater than the

strength of the objection to a rendering unconscious. It will also conclude that the strength of the

objection to a rendering unconscious is greater than the strength of the objection to an injury and so on.

Consider the action of injuring. When I break somebody’s leg, I am infringing upon their right

not to have their leg broken. More generally, when I injure someone, I am infringing upon their right

not to be attacked. Imagine I break Vance’s leg and I know he will not be able to walk properly for a

few months. However, I break Jim’s leg and I know that, for whatever reason, he will not be able to

walk ever again. I deprive Vance of only a few months of not walking, and I deprive Jim of his ability

to walk for the rest of his life. L-R might claim that breaking Jim’s leg is more disrespectful than

breaking Vance’s leg, given that (to L-R) the wrongness of (or the strength of the objection to) breaking

someone’s leg varies with how bad the deprivation is for the victim. However, the seriousness of the

rights-infringement in either case remains equal. I infringe upon Vance’s right not to be attacked and on

Jim’s right not to be attacked. Under the respect-account, the strength of the objection to breaking either

man’s leg does not vary with how bad the deprivation is for the victim. I disrespect Vance in breaking

his leg equally as much as I disrespect Jim, insofar as I infringe upon each man’s right not to be

attacked.

Consider the action of a rendering unconscious. When I render a person unconscious, I am

perhaps infringing upon their right not to have such a fundamental capacity (the ability to have

conscious experience) fully impaired. Suppose I render Vance unconscious for a year and Jim for 5

years (they both lack mental states entirely during their respective periods of unconsciousness). Hanser

would concede that my action towards Jim is worse for the victim than my action towards Vance, since

Jim is deprived of 5 years of conscious experience while Vance is only deprived of one year. Also,

presumably, Jim would have experienced more pleasure in 5 years if he was conscious than Vance

would have in one year. However, the strength of the objection to rendering either man unconscious

does not vary due to the badness that befalls the victims. I am infringing upon Vance’s right not to have

a fundamental capacity impaired just as much as I am infringing upon Jim’s same right. It is worse for

Jim that I render him unconscious for 5 years and Vance for just one year, but it does not follow that the

strength of the objection to rendering Jim unconscious is greater than the one to rendering Vance

unconscious. I am disrespecting Vance and Jim in the same way; I am infringing upon their right not to

have a fundamental capacity fully impaired.

Finally, when I kill someone, I am infringing upon their right not to be killed. As McMahon

would put it, to violate one’s right not to be killed is to violate the “equal worth of all persons”. When I

kill the young person over the old person, the strength of the objection does not vary. I am violating

each person’s right not to be killed and disrespecting them in an equal way. Hanser does not think that

the strength of the objection to killing is equal to the strength of the objection to rendering someone

unconscious (and certainly not to injuring someone). Hanser thinks that the strength of the objection to

killing is greater than the strength of the objection to either of these actions. He believes that when I kill

someone, I am infringing upon a more serious right than when I render someone unconscious. In fact, it

is not just a more serious interference when I kill someone (since it deprives someone of life

necessarily), but a violation of a more serious right all together. When I render someone unconscious, I

am infringing upon their right not to have a fundamental capacity impaired. However, when I kill

someone, I am infringing upon an even more fundamental right: the right not to be killed. Since I

infringe upon a more serious right when I kill someone, the strength of the objection to killing is greater

than the strength of the objection to rendering someone unconscious.

Hanser does not believe he has shown EWT to be true. However, he does think he has shown

that whether or not we think EWT is true depends on how we view the wrongness of killing. If we view

the wrongness of killing as a function of the badness of death, then when I kill the young person and the

old person, it seems (typically) more wrong for me to kill the young person. If instead we view the

wrongness of killing as a function of the morality of respect, the strength of the objection to killing

anyone is equal, as I infringe upon the same right, the right not to be killed, no matter which person I

kill. I also do not think Hanser has shown EWT to be true (he states that this is not a main objective of

his paper) and neither do I think L-R has given us sufficient motivation to reject EWT. But I am more

sympathetic to the view that the wrongness of killing is a function of the morality of respect.