bahm waht is knowledge

7/28/2019 Bahm Waht is Knowledge

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What Is Knowledge?Author(s): Archie J. BahmReviewed work(s):Source: The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Mar., 1943), pp. 266-273Published by: American Association for the Advancement of ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/17829 .

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266 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLYor more in height and twice as wide.They have been termed laccoliths bysome writers, but a true laccolith wouldpresuppose that the conditions requisitefor vuleanism existed at the time of itsformation. Since the time when truevuleanism may be reasonably assumedto have existed, the meteoritic bombard-ment must have obliterated all such fea-tures. They may very well have beenformed by meteorites perforating thecrust of a lava lake at an earlier stagewhen its crust was not so thick and whenthe lava was more fluid, with the resultthat a small mound was formed by ex-trusion, concealing any rim that mayhave been produced by the meteorite'spenetration.Other mounds show funnel-like open-ings in their summits as though a bubblein viscid matter had started to collapse.Still others seem to have fully collapsed.These are what might be expected whereforeign materials are being intruded,

from without, into the lunite. Mete-orites carry considerable amounts ofchemcially active ingredients. Naturallythere will be developed certain chemicalactivity accompanying the heat of im-pact. Ebullition will result. Some ofthe gasses escape, but in some casespockets or bubbles will form and thesemay become frozen at any stage on theirway to escape at the surface.The rills and deep gorges which arequite numerous on the moon presentsomething of a problem. Many of thestraight, furrow-like structures may bethe result of meteoritic encounters in analmost horizontal plane. Others areprobably the results of faulting whichmust of necessity have accompanied thegigantic collisions represented by thelarger pits and the maria. They musthave been produced contemporaneouslywith the production of other conspicuouslunar features. Otherwise they couldnot have survived.

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?By Dr. ARCHIE J. BAHM

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY, TEXAS TECHNOLOGICAL COLLEGE

COMMON sense tells us that the table inour room is colored and solid, has size andshape, is heavy and endures. It existswhere it is without depending upon usfor its existence. If we left the roomand came back later, it would still bethere and would have been there all thetime, unless, of course, somebody orsomething had moved it. Our looking atit does not affect it, does not change itsnature, does not modify it in the least.Its color, size and shape are really just aswe see them. We could feel its weight ifwe lifted it. Many of us can look at itand all see the same thing. These state-ments may seem so obvious that it isfoolish even to mention them. If one

claims they are untrue, he may be con-sidered mentally unsound. Yet, commonsense itself leads us to question them andeventually to deny many of them.NAIVE REALISM

In order to identify the views more orless commonly held by unreflective peo-ple, epistemologists have coined the termr"naive realism." The naive realist is a"straw man" set up to represent us inour unreflective moments. This strawman is not quite like any of us, for mostof us have reflected somewhat. Thusnaive realism must be, paradoxically, areflective statement of an unreflectiveview. It may be summarized as follows:


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WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 267(1) Objects are independent of theirbeing known. They can endure or con-tinue to exist without being experiencedby any one.(2) Objects have qualities (properties,characteristics,, attributes) which areparts of the objects.(3) Objeets, including their qualities,are not affected merely by their beingknown. They are neither made norchanged merely by our knowing them.(4) Objects, seem as they are and areas they seem. Appearances are realities.(5) Objects are known directly, i.e.,they are in experience. There is nothingbetweein them and our knowledge ofthem.(6) Objects are public, i.e., they canbe known by more than one person.Two or nmorepeople can see the sameobject.

CRITICISMSFNAIVEREALISMTrouble arises for the naive realistwhen attention is called to the fact that

statements 1 and 5 are incompatible.Objects are independent of experienceand yet are in experience. One's experi-ence, knowledge, ideas, are located withinone's head. But objects are located out-side of one's' head. How can objectswhich are outside of one's head be in ex-perience which is inside of one's head?Trouble arises for the naive realist alsowhen he faces the fact of error. Whenerrors are called to attention, we recog-nize them and are happy that we havenow arrived at the truth. But if askedwhat assurance there is that the new viewis true, we reply that it seems true. Butthis is the same assurance that we hadof the error before it seemed to be anerror. Trouble arises for the naiverealist in modern times because so muchreflection by others has taken place. Heis constantly confronted with evidencethat the qualities which objects have areconditioned by various factors affectingdifferent people differently and the same

person differently at different times. Ina world of science, the naive realist has ahard time retaining his naivet,.Criticisms of naive realism may beclassified for convenience under fourheadings.(1) It fails to account satisfactorilyfor error. If things are as they seem andseem as they are, then whatever seemsto be so is so. Such a view makes errortheoretically impossible, for an error issomething which seems to be so but isn'tso. Recall the common experience ofseeing a stick partially submerged inwater. Upon first sight the stick appearsbent or broken. If naive realism is takenat its face value, then if the stick seemsbent it is bent. If the stick is pulled outof the water, it is seen to be straight.Does the stick bend as it goes into thewater? Previous experience with sticksand water usually suggests "No." Butthe stick appears to bend as it goes intothe water. What, then, can be done todetermine whether the stick is really bentor really straight? For the moment itseems both bent and straight. Since itcan not be both, one of the two appear-ances must;be erroneous. The next stepcommonly taken is to run one 's handalong the stick down into the water. Tothe hand the stick seems straight, eventhough to the eye it seems bent. Thestick is really straight. He dismisses thebent appearance as an error or illusion,and drops the matter. But what are illu-sions? They are objects which are notas they seem. If some objects are not asthey seem, then it is false that all objectsare as they seem. If some objects are notas they seem, what makes seeming some-times "so" and sometimes "not so," andhow often is seeming " so" and how often"not so"?Examples of error trouble the naiverealist, buut hey trouble him little. Hegoes from conviction to new conviction,confident in the reliability of his newestview. When pressed with the query,


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268 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY" But how can you tell that your newconviction is more reliable than the onegiven up as erroneous'?" he often an-swers, "Well, I just know." Or, if youget him in a corner and prod him for anexplanation, five kinds of replies eventu-ally come out: (a) He appeals to his othersenses for corroboration. (b) He com-pares with past experiences. (e) He re-peats the experiment. (d) He invokes thetestimony of others. (e) He appeals toinstruments.(a) If appearances derived through onesensory channel appear contradictory,it is natural to appeal to other senses forcorroboration. If a dull ring indicatesthat the china is cracked, one naturallyfeels with his finger and looks to see. Butsometimes different senses contradicteach other and sometimes different sensescorroborate in error. When senses con-tradict each other, which shall be ac-cepted as reliable? The half-submergedstick looks as if bent, but feels straight.The distant carpenter's hammer strokeis seen to stop but heard to continue.When senses corroborate in error, one isstill more baffled. Who has not had theexperience, in a railway terminal, ofhaving the train start moving? First hefeels the rumble of the wheels over thetracks, and hears the movement of thewheels under him, and looks out to checkto see if he is at last moving. Then he isshocked to find that not his but the nexttrain is moving.(b) Comparison of present paradoxeswith past experiences involves greaterpossibilities of error and greater para-doxes. For past experiences, to be com-pared, must be remembered. But mem-ory often has failed us. How can we besure that it is not failing us again? Andthe past experiences themselves mighthave been erroneous. Can the possibilityof erroneouLsrecollection, added to thepossibility of erroneous past experience,be used to deny evidence present athand? Perhaps, however, recollection of

experiences repeated in the past manytimes may be considered more reliablethan a single present experience. Yet ex-periences in the past may have beenconsistently erroneous.(e) Doubts sometimes lead to experi-mentation. Is the bent stick reallystraight? The naive realist pulls it outand puts it back in several times and feelsof it several times to prove that it isreally straight. But how can he discountthe fact that it also appears bent re-peatedly? Also, if past experiences canhave been consistently in error, why notpresent and future experiences?(d) When doubts about one's beliefsbecome serious, it is natural to consultothers. " Does this stick look bent toyou ? Feel of it and see if it isn'tstraight." Gregarious naive realists de-rive much satisfaction from social cor-roboration, but they fail to recognize twothings. First, their perception of otherpeople as objects which may be con-sulted is also liable to error. Most of ushave mistaken manikins, mirror imagesand movie motions for real men. Or indreams we have consulted our friendsand gained their agreement. That testis there that there are real people toconsult? Secondly, even if we consultreal people, are they not subject to thesame errors as we? Can not people be inagreement and yet be in error? Forcenturies people agreed that the earthwas flat. If others share our error, whatcan we profit by consulting them forproof?(e) The last resort of the naive realistis an appeal to instruments. Heat ismeasured by thermometers. Weight ofpurchases is measured on scales. Thecolor of blood is revealed under a micro-scope. But the appeal to instruments,like the other appeals, is a confession offailure. For it is a confession that ap-parently obvious objects are not self-evident. And an appeal to instrumentsis an appeal to reflection. To the extent


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WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 269that men are reflective they cease to benaive.Before we let the naive realist out ofhis corner, let us ask him one more ques-tion: "How can you tell that you are notdreaming?" lie naturally replies, "Ican pinch myself to see if I am awake.""But can you not dream of pinchingyourself and convincing yourself thatyou are awake?" "Yes, but I can askothers if I am awake, and can walk andrun and read." " But can you notdream of doing these also?" He isforced to admit, "Yes," but persists indiscovering additional suggestions, in-cluding that of waking up. But peoplesometimes dream of waking up anddream of wakiing up their friends to co-operatively settle their dreaming doubts.If there is nothLing n one's waking mo-ments about -which one can not dream,and if dreams seem real, then what as-surance has one that he is not now dream-ing ? If he has none, then in how far ishe justified in maintaining the truth ofhis beliefs any mrorehan a dreamer has?How can he tell when he is in error?(2) It fails to take into account theextra-organic and int-ra-organic condi-tions of knowing. Some scientists de-scribe the human body as an organismand distinguish for coiivenience betweenextra-organic a-nd intra-organic factors,i.e., factors outside the body and factorsinside the body. If many factors be-tween the thing causing the idea and theidea itself affeet the idea, then the ideamay be different from what it would beif it were influenced by the thing alone.Let us consider a few such factors.Extra-organic conditions of visual per-ception include light sources, pigments,atmospheric conditions, glasses. Lightsources are of miany sorts, and what onesees may be stinmulatedby a single sourceor many sources, by light of a single fre-queney or of maixed requencies, by lightof a single intensity or of many intensi-ties, shining from one angle or from

many angles. All these make a differ-ence. Some pigments absorb all rays,others none, others some. Atmosphericconditions affect visibility, exemplifiedby fog, snow, dust, rain and heat waves.Glasses, telescopes, microscopes, their ac-curacy, their adjustment, their color, allaffect perception. Does the real natureof things change as these intervene ?Furthermore, the distance which lightwaves travel is a factor whic'h naiverealists neglect. If light travels at arate of 186,000 miles per second, somefraction of a second is required for trans-mission from table to eye. So we "see"the table, not as it is when the light wavereaches the eye, but as it was when thelight wave left the table. Such fractionof a second seems so insignificant in thetotal reaction involved in perception thatit may be ignored for practical purposes.When distances become great, however,the significance changes. Astronomersastound naive realists with assertionsthat stars which seem to be up there havelong since ceased to be there.Visual perception is conditioned intra-organically 'bythe comnplicatednature ofeyes. Before a colored table can be per-ceived, light waves reflected from thetable's surface must travel through somemedium to the surface of the eye, pene-trate the skin, travel through the aqueoushumor, the lens, the vitreous humor, tothe retina and its rods, which react tovariations in light intensities, and itscones, which react to variations in wavefrequencies. These cells behave like littlechemical batteries or photoelectric cells.When stimulated by light they generateelectric currents or nervous impulseswhich are sent through neurones to thebrain. Somehow the brain functions insuch a way as to produce attention to, andconsciousness of, the object being ex-perienced.

How can color, which the naive realistsupposed the table to have, travel on lightwaves which are merely high-frequency


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270 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLYvibrations, penetrate skin, liquid andlens, then undergo chemical transforma-tion, travel through neurones as electricalimpulses, enter conscious experience un-changed?How can shape, which the naive realistsupposes the table to have, be transmittedinto conscious experience? Rays travel-ing simultaneously reach different partsof the curved cornea at slightly differenttimes, travel through a mobile doubly-concaved lens, reach the curved rearinner surface of the eyeball only afterbeing inverted. Then the rays stimulatechemical reactions in the rods and cones;but these may react at slightly differentrates, if they are variously fatigued, orsome may not react at all. What happensto the supposed shape of the table duringthese chemical reactions? Then nervousimpulses are set up traveling through theoptic neurones of different lengths, whichtwist maze-like on their way to and in thebrain. Since we see with two eyes, wereally get two sets of patterns of rays.Impulses through the optic nerve splitin such a way that those coming from theright half of each eye terminate in theleft rear lobe of the brain and those fromthe left half of each eye in the right lobeof the brain. These lobes seem to beseparated from each other by a longitudi-nal fissure. How can the supposed shapeof the table stand such distortion, trans-formation, duplication and separationwithout affecting its appearance?How can size, which the naive realistsupposes the table to have, be transmittedinto conscious experience? The table-topis three by five feet. But that size cannot really be contained within a headwearing a size seven hat. Size too mustbe transmitted through a tiny hole calledthe pupil and meander through twistingbrain-paths. Not size but, at best, rela-tive size can be perceived.

(3) It fails to take into account differ-ences in public knowing. To the previ-ously mentioned extra-organic and intra-

organic conditions we may add somewhich emphasize differences between peo-ple. Naive realists believe that two ormore persons can see an object at thesame time and all see it as it is. Thus allthese people can have exactly the sameexperience. But disputes about objectsillustrate differences in experiences.Also, scientific tests have been devisedto demonstrate these differences, as forexample through colorblind tests and theanomaloscope. The anomaloscope is asystem of prisms and lenses mounted ina tube such that one can see through aneyepiece two halves of a lighted circularfield, the color and intensity of which arecontrolled by screw-adjusted slits per-mitting monochromatic yellow light (589millimicrons) to reflect from one half anda mixture of monochromatic green light(536 mm) and monochromatic red light(670 mm) in any proportion to reflectfrom the other half. Tests show thatwhen one person has adjusted the ano-maloscope so that both halves of thevisual field appear equal in color and in-tensity, another person who looks willobject that they appear different and willrequire readjustment to make the halvesappear equal. Thus is demonstrated re-ported differences in experience whenextra-organic conditions of stimulationremain constant. Thus obviously differ-ent people may not see the same objectas it is, but experience different objectswhen confronted by the same stimulussource.(4) It fails to take into account the"constructed character" of knowing.The term "constructed character"' ofknowing may be used to name the syn-thesizing process that goes on in the brainbefore experiences are produced. Thevarious nervous impulses do not appearin consciousness to be consciously as-sembled or constructed into an object.Obieets annear in conseiousness as

1 Roy Wood Sellars, " Principles and Problemsof Philosophy," p. 52.


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WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 271wholes. They enter experience alreadymade. Some unconscious or subconsciousprocess determines our conscious experi-ences for us, even though we can neverbecome aware of it. The mystery ofconsciousness may nlever be explainedsatisfactorily, but it is obvious to thosewho reflect that something happenswithin us to make us see things the waywe do. This something must be takeninto account in explaining the nature ofknowledge.Perhaps the most startling construe-tion is that of consciousness itself. Con-sciousness seemnso be continuous, at leastfrom wakiing in the mnorninguntil goingto sleep at night. But psychologists now-adays are inclined to think that con-sciousness is not a continuum but a seriesof pulsations, each lasting some fractionof a second. The relative durations ofperiods of impulses to the durations ofperiods between impulses vary fromperson to person and from time to time.Measurement of the length of these pul-sating periods of consciousness is difficultand mnustbe done by indirect means.Pulsations of consciousness sometimescorrespond to eye-jerks, which pass un-noticed by most readers. One sees theline of print1edwords he is reading as acontinuous line, but if he observes an-other reader's eyes he will note that eyesdo not move continuously but stop, flick,stop and flick. If consciousness is aseries of impulses, why do we seem to beconscious continuously? In order to beconscious of the period between momentsof consciousness we would have to beconscious when we are not conscious.This is impossible. We can experienceneither the period. between, nor the end-ing, nor the beginning of a flash of con-sciousness. In order to experience theend of a flash, we should have to be con-scious long enough to include the endwithin consciousness, which again is im-possible. In order to experience the be-ginning of a flash of consciousness, we

should have to be conscious already andto include the beginning of the flash ofconsciousness within consciousness. Thusthe illusion of continuity of consciousnessis a basic illusion without which experi-ence could not be. The naive realist cannot believe this.Another basic construction is the con-struction of "objects." Objects seem tobe "out there," even though they are notreally out there as experienced. One maytry the experiment of looking at his ownhand, which he usually considers a partof himself. His hand seems to be outthere. Try again to look at the tip of hisnose. It too seems out there. Try again,with eyes closed, to imagine his ownbrain. If he can imagine it, the image ofit too seems to be out there, not as if inthe room before him, but still as an objectout there in experience.Taking leave of naive realism, we maysummarize the types of criticismnoffered.It fails to account satisfactorily for error.It fails to take account of the extra-or-ganic and intra-organic conditions ofknowing. It fails to take into accountdifferences in public knowing. It failsto take into account the co:nstructedcharacter of knowing. If these criticismsare warranted, then naive realism is un-tenable. The naive realist is baffled bythem. But the natural urge to believethat things are as they seem is so strongthat in practice he is little troubled bythem.

SCIENTIFIC REALISMIf naive realism is untenable, thenwhat view shall one hold? Skipping overmany steps which one would normallytake in the gradual process of reflectionand many steps which have been takenhistorically in the development of reflee-tive thought,' we may summarize a viewcalled "scientific realism. " Like thenaive realist, the scientific realist is alsoa straw man set up to represent the pointof view which "the" scientist would hold


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272 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLYif all the assumptions and conclusions ofthe different sciences were synthesizedinto a single view of the nature of know-ing. Comparing scientific realism withnaive realism (see p. 1), we may sum-marize comparable essentials as follows.Basic throughout is a distinction betweenwhat we shall call real "things" and ap-parent or experienced "objects."(1) " Objects" are dependent upontheir being known; they can not endurewithout being experienced. " Things "are independent of their being known;they can endure without being experi-enced.(2) "Objects" have qualities (proper-ties, characteristics, attributes) which areparts of the "objects" (but not parts of"things "). " Things" have qualities(properties, characteristics, attributes)which are parts of the " things " (but notparts of "objects").(3) "Objects" (including their quali-ties) are affected by, are dependent fortheir existence upon, are determined intheir nature by, their being known."Things" (including their qualities) arenot affected merely by their being known.(4) "Objects" seem to be real"things" but are not real "things.""Things" are not as they seem to be.Appearances are not realities and reali-ties are not appearances.(5) " Objects" are known directly;they are in experience. "Things" areknown indirectly; they are not in experi-ence; they are known only through "ob-jects" which " represent" them, andwhich are caused by them and by otherextra-organic and intra-organic condi-tions which happen to operate conjointlywith them.(6) "Objects" are private, i.e., cannot be known by more than one person."Things" are public, i.e., may be thecause of "objects" in more than oneperson.

CRITICISMS F SCmENTUIcREmLISMSatisfactory as this view may seem to

scientists, there are certain criticismswhich should be considered.(1) Scientists also depend upon sensesfor information. Like naive realists,scientific realists also get their experi-ences only through sensory channels.The scientist still seems to see the half-submerged stick as bent or broken. Eachof his types of perception is equally liableto error. Thus scientific conclusions, inso far as their reliability depends uponthe reliability of perception, are subjectto the same criticisms as naive realism.Price's way of putting this criticismis worth repeating.

Every man entertains a great number of be-liefs concerning material things, e.g., that thereis a square-topped table in this room, that theearth is a spheroid, that water is composed ofhydrogen and oxygen. It is plain that all thesebeliefs are based upon sight and on touch (fromwhich organic sensation can not be separated):based on them in the sense that if we had nothad certain particular experiences of seeing andtouching, it would be neither possible nor reason-able to entertain these beliefs. Beliefs aboutimperceptibles such as molecules or electronsor x-rays are no exception to this. Only they arebased not directly on sight and touch, but indi-rectly. Their direct basis consists of certainother beliefs concerning scientific instruments,photographic plates, and the like. Thus, overand above any intrinsic uncertainty that theythemselves may have, whatever uncertainty at-taches to these more basic beliefs is communi-cated to them. It follows that in any attempteither to analyze or to justify our beliefs con-cerning material things, the primary task isto consider beliefs concerning perceptible or" macroscopic " objects such as chairs andtables, cats and rocks. It follows, too, that notheory concerning I microscopic I objects canpossibly be used to throw doubt upon our be-liefs concerning chairs or cats or rocks, so longas these are based directly upon sight and touch.Empirical science can never be more trustworthythan perception, upon which it is based; and itcan hardly fail to be less so, since among itsnon-perceptual premises there can hardly fail tobe some which are neither self-evident nor dem-onstrable. Thus the not uncommon view that theworld which we perceive is an illusion and onlythe "scientific" world of protons and electronsis real, is based upon a gross fallacy, and woulddestroy the very premises upon which scienceitseqlf 1PnPnds.2

2 H. H. Price, " Perception, " p. 1.


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WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 273(2) Scientific concepts are human con-structs. While scientific realism at-tempts to take into account the fact thatknowing involves some mysterious sub-conscious synthesis, nevertheless it cannot prevent its own concepts from beingthus mysteriously synthesized or con-structed. E-very scientific idea is a hu-man idea, is aii idea limited by the pecu-liar limitations inherent in the mind orminds of those who entertain it. Somescientists who are especially self-criticalcease to be scientific realists. This criti-cal attitude is exemplified by P. W.Bridgman's "The Logic of Modern Sci-

ence." The laws of physics, like all sci-entific laws, are merely " operationalideas" which serve to explain in whatway, though not why, events occur in ex-perience. In how far -regularoccurrencesrepresent real events outside of experi-ence is not the business of science to say.Such a view seems to scientific realists asa thin pale shadow of science, not onewhich gives -usz he knlowledge of realitythat scientists believe they are lookingfor. Yet, if scientistIs believe they canpenetrate reality, can they explain howthey can do it with ideas which are sub-consciously constructed and which havetheir momentary existences locked upwithin flashes of pulsating consciousness?(3) Scientists still have no better teststhan dreamers. This charge at firstshocks scientists as absurd. But, forevery test that a scientist proposes for hisbeing awake or for the reliability of hisconclusions, one may ask, "Is it impos-sible for him tzodream that this is so ?Surely he must answer "No " andthereby admit the impossibility of prov-ing his position any better than adreamer might.(4) Scientific realists unwittinglyclaim impossible transcendence. Admit-

ting that "objects" are private, scientificrealists themselves fall into the egocentricpredicament. Only private "objects"are experiencible. How then is it possi-ble to know either that there is an unex-perienced real world or what it is like?When scientific realists claim that theyknow that there are -public"things" andthat they are electrons, atoms, niolecules,etc., they claim to know the existence ofand, within limits, the nature of unex-periencible things. How can knowledgewhich is locked up, so to speak, withinmoments of conscious experience tran-scend those mnomentsand reach out, soto speak, into the unreachable real worldto know it? Knowledge of reality seemsto presuppose experience of the unex-periencible. To be real is to be inde-pendent of experience, so inherent inscientific realism is the necessity of ex-periencing what, by the very nature ofexperience, can not be experienced.(5) Scientists still fail to explain why"objects" appear as if they were"things." The mystery of why appear-ances seem real remains a mystery to theend. The scientific realist is beset with abelief in the reality of the objects he talksabout. Even though he is constantlycritical, can he ever conceive a real atomwithout conceiving it as real? Why, ifone 's conceptions continue to be withinhim, does he conceive objects as if theywere really " out there "?No attempt has been made in this arti-cle to give any final answer to the ques-tion, "What is knowledge?" Two typesof answers have been presented and criti-cized. It is hoped that the reader hasbeen aroused sufficiently to investigateother types of answers such as rational-ism, idealism, scepticism, agnosticism,critical realism, neo-realism, pragma-tism, positivism or the author's proposed"tentative realism. "

bahm waht is knowledge

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