UDC949.711(093.33=20)" 1856/1862":947.073.5Original Scholary WorkLjubodrag P. RISTICInstitute for Balkan StudiesBelgradeSERBO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSFROM 1856 TO 1862 ACCORDING TO REPORTSBY BRITISH CONSULSIN BELGRADEAbstract: Despite the results of the Crimean War and the Paris Peace Treaty(1856),Britishinfluence in the PrincipalityofSerbia couldnot have beenextended to the point of competing with that of Russia. British consuls soonperceivedthat the activity of Russian agents was aimed to gradually under-minethe1856 Treaty and disturb Turkey. Neither Fonblanque, nor Lyttonor Longworthwerediplomaticallyweightyenough toimpedeRussianin-fluence.TheCrimeanWarwas longerindurationandbloodier thansoli-taryRussiaandher four adversarieshadexpected. Thepersistence ofeachsidetoendthewarbyinflictingmilitaryordiplomaticdefeat ontheadversary prolonged the war for three years. Finally, after thealliesprovedthemselvessuperior, thepartiestothewar sat atanegotiatingtablein Paris, or. February25, 1856. A peace treatywasconcluded onMarch30, 1856. Onlythoselessinformedcould have thought that thePrincipalityof Serbia wouldbecameinvolvedinthewar. RussiafirstadvisedSerbia tostandaside, onlytoaskher afterwardsto Join. Themovements ofAustrian troops toward the Sava and Danube riversposed anopen threat toSerbia. FranceandGreat Britain tried todrawherin on their side, but werenonetheless content withher non-interfer-ence. Evenif there hadbeen noexternal pressures, internal circum-stancesinSerbiaandher unpreparednessfor warweresuchthatwarcould be conceived onlyin the event that Serbia herself wasassaulted.However, consideringthat the Principalityof Serbiawas still avassal of Turkey andthat Paris strovetoavoidany reason for freshconflict, Articles 28and 29 of the Paris Peace Treatystipulated thepo-100 Ljubodrag P. Risticsition of thePrincipalityof Serbia. According toArticle28, Serbia re-mained a vassal state with the recognition of "son administrationindependente et nationale, ainsi quela pleine libertedeculte, delegis-lation, decommerceet denavigation". Thenext articlestipulated thatTurkish garrisons were toremaindeployed in Serbian forts, but that noarmedinterventioncould belaunchedagainst Serbia withoutpreviousagreement between thesignatories to the Treaty.'ThethenBritishconsul general in thePrincipalityof Serbia, theelderlyandnot very able Thomas deGrenier deFonblanque, was toimplement twochief tasks: tohinder everything that might shake Tur-keyandexplore possibilitiesforthepenetration of Britishcapital. Hisreports were frequent, thoughnot providingas much informationasmight have been expected of one whohad spent fourteen yearsas con-sul in Belgrade." Hislong-term service andtheexpenence of hiscoun-tryinaffairs withRussia have taught himthat Russia wasa dangerousand sinewy adversary. His reports on Russia's influence in SerbiasometimesseemRusso-phobic, but thenheoftenhadreasontobe. InMarch 1856, Toma Vucic-Perisicrequested fromVienna thatthenewRussianconsul general inBelgradebe receivedwith such ceremonythat, asFonblanque described, would be"toomuchforanEmperor onhis Passage after the conquest of Kingdoms"." Onthe arrival of thenewRussian consul general Colonel Milosevic, the hoistingoftheRussianconsular flagwasgreetedamongthepopulacewithsuch joy,andanunusual ceremony offering blessings to theflag. It wasopende-fiance toward Turkey." At the time, many young Serbs requestedscholarships fromtheRussianemperor to join Russianmilitaryacade-mies' Substantiating hisclaim that thedisposition of theSerbianpeo-ple toward Russia could not be weakened even by the Austrophilpolicy of thosewhoruledSerbia," Fonblanquecabled theForeignOf-Noradounghian, Gabriel effendi. Recueil dactes intemationaux de I'EmpireOttoman, IIIe tome1856-1878, Paris 1902. 78.2 Fonblanque wasappointed consul inSerbiain thesummer of 184L hearrived inZemuninthespring of 1842, andmovedintohis residenceinBelgrade 111thebeginning of 1843 (Stevan K. Pavlowitch. Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia1837-1839. The Mission ofColonel Hodges, Paris1961, 182).3 Fonblanque to Redcliffe (Stratford de Redcliffe). April 3 I, 1856, Belgrade,Foreign Office(FO furtherin the text)78/1197.4 Fonblanque to Clarendon (GeorgeWilliam FrederichVilliers. Earl of Clarendon),October 30, 1856, Belgrade, FO78/1198.5 Fonblanque to Foreign Office. October 30. 1856, BelgradeFO 78/1198.6 Fonblanque to Redcliffe, March 26,1856, Belgrade, FO 78/1197.Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862) 101ficethatthe BelgianambassadortoIstanbul, Blondell deCuelbroeck,ona brief visit toBelgrade, had said the Serbswereverydisposed to-wardRussia."Fonblanquecorrectlyascertainedthat Russiaand Aus-triawerebattlingfor greaterinfluenceinSerbia. Hethought it wouldbebetter if Austrianinfluence prevailed, asitwould beless detrimen-tal. Though he scarcely believedthis possible, despite the fact thatRussiacouldduringits protectorate domorefor the improvement ofSerbia's, position. RussianeededSerbia, Fonblanqueaccused, merelytodisturb anddebilitate Turkey.fThe British consul was convincedthat sympathies for Russiawerebuilt on hatredtowardAustria, admittingtobeingbaffledoverwhy the pro-Frenchstreamhadsunkinto the pro-Russian. ThenewRussianconsul, Colonel Milosevic, didnot leavethe impressionof acapable diplomat, sohis Britishcounterpart inferredthat the formerwouldnot remaininSerbia for long. Fonblanque believed his missionwastoinvestigate thedisposition of theSerbs toward theRussian gov-emment and, till bettertimes, toimplement the policyof "agitation".Milosevichimself contributed tothisopinion. Whilesaying that Serbswereaspeciallygood people, butdissatisfied, remainingquiet thoughnoonewasforcingthemto, he claimed, onthe otherhand, that theSerbswouldlose all their freedomsif they allowed foreignpowerstointerfere. Hewas referringtoaneglect of the provisions of the ParisTreaty." It appearsFonblanquewassurprised thatsosoonafterpeacehadbeenconcluded, Russiadaredtoworkonbreakingit. Sohehas-tened with hisreports onRussia's propaganda that was inducing Serbiato seek its future in direct Russo-Turkish negotiations. It was evenworsewhenthreeRussianofficers of Serbianorigin, inorder todrawto their Side Serbs whowent toschoolin France, said "theSouth-Slavsmust look forrescue, quiteas much towards Paris as to themore north-em,and natural Direction". 107 Fonblanque to Foreign Office, November 28,1856, Belgrade, FO 78/1198.8 Fonblanque to Redcliffe, April J2 and 25, July16 and August 19,1856, Belgrade,FO 78/1198.9 Fonblanque to Clarendon, March 10. 1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1287. ConsulFonblanque saw Russia as a dangerous adversary to his country but alsounderestimatedtheRussians. He says inthesame letter: "Mvbelief inRussianaptitude for civilisation is the same which I entertain of Negro capacity forAbstract Mathematics: though I can claimto knowmore of Russian than ofcoloured men ,. ~10Fonblanque to Clarendon, June 10 and 17, 1857, Belgrade FO 9 5 5 5 6 ~Fonblanque to Rcdcliffe, JLJ1e 11and 21,1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1288.102 Ljubodrag PRisticBritish reportsfromBelgrade containno trace of thestruggle be-tweenthePrinceandCouncil. Perhaps Consul Fonblanque's superiorsin Istanbul and Londondid not request for suchan analysis or he him-self did notconsider it important for hiscountry's politics. However, inJune1857, he wrote,not without reason, that both sons of Prince Alex-ander where ofsuch intellectual and physical capacity that neitherwouldbefit torule, andnamedas manyas sevencandidatestothethrone: StefanStefanovic - Tenka, Aleksa Sirnic, Pavle Stanisic, JovanRistic, Dimitrije Crnobarac, Konstantin Nikolajevic and MilivojePetrovic Blaznavac.l 'It appearsFonblanque wasnot verysurprised when Tenka's con-spiracywas foiledinOctober 1857andmanymenat thetopof Ser-bia's political pyramidarrested. Most of the prisoners were inclinedtoward Russia and hoped she would deposePrince Alexander and rein-state Milos Obrenovic. Asit was saidopenlyinpublicthat the menwereRussophiles, consul Milosevicprotestedagainst allegationsthattheRussiangovernment instigatedtheplanfor the murderof PrinceAlexander. Actingoninstructions receivedfromtheForeignOffice,FonblanqueintervenedwithPrinceAlexander, conveyinghope fromhis government that onlythose foundguilty beyonddoubt wouldbeconvictedandwarnedthat councillorscannot bepunishedbeforethePortewasconsulted. Thiswas not a humanistic move by the British di-plomacy. Britainwasmuchconcerned lest theconvictions overfilltheglass of discontent amongtheSerbianoppositionanddisordersbreakout onabroader scale. Moreso that Serbiashould, insuch astorm,completelyfall underRussia'sinfluence, whichFonblanqueindicatedmight happen. 12In early 1858, Fonblanque reportedthat Russia's influence inSerbiawas growing. Russiaobj ectedtoanycollectiveactionbytheGreat PowersinSerbia. Gradually, PrinceAlexanderwasturningto-wardRussia, probably, according toFonblanque, because of Austria'sposition regardingSerbia's rights inregulatingnavigation along theDanube. ThusFonblanque concluded it wouldbe veryuseful ifEthemPasha'splanned missionwerecarried out. ReconcilingthequarrellingsidesinSerbia would notonlycalmdownthesituation, but developaII Fonblanque to Redcliffe, JW1e 21, 1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1288.12FonblanquetoClarendon, October 9, 12 and22, 1857, Belgrade, FO 7 8 i 2 8 8 ~Fonblanqueto Redcliffe, October 16 and22 andNovember9, 1857, FO78/556and 7 8 l 2 8 8 ~ Clarendon to Redcliffe, NovemberII, 1857, FO195/556.Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862)103feeling of indebtness and gratitude within Serbia toward the PorteWith this, and certain reforms, Turkeymight pull Serbiaaway fromRussia's influence and "interrupt the Pan-Slavistic Current to theSouth-East and South-West of Belgrade". 13Fonblanquewrote neither frequently nor indetail of EtemPa-sha'sdoingsin Belgrade. Writingat thebeginning of theyear that hehadbeen, bytheway, informed that theTurkishcommissioner wastoworkby hiscounsel, and, saying, at theend of the year, incidentally, ina memoir, that hewasthechief advisorto EthemPasha, wouldmeanhehad considerableinfluenceoveror at least hadconsultationswithEthem Pasha. 14In the eveningofMay 26, 1858Fonblanque was fiercely as-saulted in Kalemegdan parkbyan Albanian working for theTurks. Hewaslucky, as, two Belgrade students in thevicinity saved hislife. Fearof the Albanianarousedgratitudetowardthe Belgraders, the effica-ciousness of theBadgasteinorthetalksheconductedinMunich, Vi-enna, Pest or Constantinople, or all these together,affected Fonblanquethat hewrote several restrospectivememoirs andreports witha realis-ticview of thesituationinandaroundSerbia. HesawAustriaasthechief foreignpolitical cause of instabilityinSerbiawhich supportedPrinceAlexander. Ontheopening of the St. Andrew's AssemblyonNovember 30, 1858 Fonblanque wrote fromConstantinople that an in-surrection couldbreak out easily in SerbiaifPrince Alexander re-mained on the throne. He believed the danger far exceeded theboundaries ofSerbia. "Tomy conviction, there is no safety for thePrinciple of Ottoman Territorial Integrity so long as AlexandarPetrovitsKara-Gi urgevits ispermittedtoretaintheTitleof PrinceofServia", wroteFonblanque. If Turkeywouldopposethereturnof theObrenovicdynastyandput upitsowncandidate, theSerbs, aidedbyRussia, wouldtumagainst their suzerain. Ifan insurrection shouldbreakout inSerbia, AustriawouldtrytopacifyIt, andRussia wouldsurely becomeinvolved. That wouldmean, thought Fonblanque, thebreakingupoftheEuropeanpart ofthe OttomanEmpireowingto13Fonblanque to Clarendon, January 30 and February 5, 1858, Belgrade, FO78/1376; Fonblanqueto Alison(CharlesAlison), February24 and25,andMarch25, 1858, Belgrade, FO 7811376.14Fonblanque to Clarendon, February 5. 1858. Belgrade, FO 7 ~ i l 7 ; Mr deFonblanquesMemorandumonMrDalyellsCorrespondencefromBelgrade andofthe Tendences of ServianPolicy, December 14, 1858. Constantinople, FO195/583.104 Ljubodraz P. Ristic"miscalculations ofthe Sultan's Ally at Vienna", not on account ofRussia'sintrigues, as theVienna press claimed.IS Thereversal in Fon-blanque'sinterpretationof thecrisis inSerbiaandseeking the culpritwereobvious.A brief period hadelapsed since thereturn of MilosObrenovic toSerbiauntil Fonblanquesinitial negativeassessments of Milos'sper-sonalityandgoverning. Perhapsthesecond accession of Prince Miloswas directlyor indirectlyfinanciallysupportedbyRussia. However,Fonblanquesurelyexaggerated whenhesaidthatRussia'ssupervisionandaidenabled Prince Milos tostrivesolelytoreignwiththescepterof TsarDusan.l" Beforehis returntoSerbia, PrinceMiloshadmadehisintention clear to ruleautocratically, as he did in his previous reign.He was unable, during his entire secondreign, to adjust to all thechanges that tookplace duringhis twenty-year absence. But he, too, asmany Romanians, Italians, Hungarians, and, ofcourse, other Serbs,strove toward one goal: theunification and independence of hispeople.ThePrince'sirascibledispositionbecame moreprominent in thelatteryears of hislife, andtheundiplomaticconduct of hisaffairswere notinfrequent. The fact that the obstinate Prince dismissedthe Russianconsul fromhis first audienceandthat heterrifiedthe pashainBel-grade by stating that the onlytreaty was the one he himself recognized,convinced evenmorethe British consul that he had beencorrect in hisreports'?Namely, hebelievedthat PrinceMilos shouldbeforcedtoabdicate andleaveSerbia. Heshould besucceeded byhisson Mihailowhowould wiselychannel RussianinfluenceinSerbia andwould notbe an instrument in the hands of Russia, like his father. 1815 Fonblanque to Bulwer (Henry Lytton Bulwer), November 30, 1858,Constantinople, FO195/583.16 Fonblanque to Malmesbury (James HowardHarris, 3rd Earl ofMalmesbury),March 3L1859,Belgrade, FO78/1439.17 FonblanquetoMalmesbury, April 15, 1859, Belgrade, FO78/1439; Fonblanquequoted Prince Milos as telling Osman Pasha: "... You allude to treaties! I could tellvou what Treaties areto me. Thevalid Treaties aremade bvmyself - bymyown~ singleWilli"Fonblanquereportedin August" ...eveni"na written Man"ifcsto.sent tothePorteearly in Marchlast, Milosch denied being subject toanykind ofControl; Declared hewould Govern according to hisown Will, - andonlyvield toMilitary Force when this shouldbe provedmore efficient thanthat which hecould opposetoit;- and, finalllyprescribingI! I that anyForeign Representativeswho askedwhat his Intentions were'? - might be furnishedwithCopies oftheDeclaratory-Act then transmitted." Fonblanque to Bulwer, August 3, 1859,Vienna, FO78/1440.18 FonblanquetoBulwer, April 15, 1859, Belgrade, FO195/651; Lettercited datesAugust 3, 1859.Serbo - RussianRelations (1856-1862)105Thefact that Fonblanque waserroneousin hisassessmentsis hisclaimthat he, of alltheconsuls, was best informed about thedevelop-mentsintheAssemblyof theVirginMary'sNativity. During the As-sembly's sessioninKragujevac, whereaforeigner was permittedtostay only 24hours, under strict police supervision, Fonblanque wasmost interested in: the extent of Russia's influence, changing Art. 17 ofthe 1838Constitution19 andestablishing theright of succession fortheObrenovic family. Fonblanque believed that Russian propaganda in theEuropean provinces of theOttoman Empire had become strongly influ-ential, leadingrapidlytoaconflict betweenthe Slavicpopulationinthe Empire and thePorte. He described Russian politics in theBalkans:"I thinkRussia'sobjects onthis referencewill be satisfiedwith lesstroubleandata smaller cost after thefirst disruptionin Turkey, - withthePrestigesheisquite sureof insuchaPhysical-ForceKingdom ofGrand-Duchy of Servia - witha ruder (but still Popular) kind of Feder-alism in Bosnia and Bulgaria, andallwhich would increase her Facultyof Regulating a finebalance-wheelamongst thelaxGoverning Classesin Moldavia andWallachia, where there isonlya remotelikelihood ofthe People ever asserting itself or counting foranything beyond unwill-ingProduction - in theInstitutions" .20 Whenthelegislationonsucces-sionwas promulgated, Fonblanquesentatranslation of the documentto Russell, stressing that its illegalities rendered analysis impossible-"Fonblanquesreportsprovednot onlythat he was not the mostwell-informedconsul of thedevelopmentsin Kragujevac, but that theRussianconsul Milosevicwas InKragujevac, andhad allegedlypre-ventedthe proclamationof PnnceMilosasdictatorandconsiderablyinfluencedthe work of the Assembly. Onthe last dayof1859, Fon-blanque wrote there wouldbe no crisis in Serbia unless the Princedied. Eventhen, Russiawas contemplatinganothercandidate for Ser-bia' . I h T)ias pnnce yt rone.r-19Fonblanque [(1 l\..usscll (John Russell), September 27 and October 13. 1859.Belgrade. FO78/1440. Article 17 of the Constitution reads: "The 17 members ofthe Council will not be dismissedwithout areason, until it was provedby thesublime Porte. that they had committed a violation of the lawand nationaldecrees". From YCUW6U K,Wif{CGlIliC U KpaJbC6I1Hf' Cp6u/eI835-1903. CAHYOnen.en,e.TJ;PYUITBCffiIXHayK3. M3BOPI1 cpncxor npaaaVII. Eeorpan1988, 72. Anamendment tothisarticle could have altered thebalance 01forcesinSerbiatotheadvantage of thePrincewhichwould have caused muchdiscontent inTurkeyandRussia, and, inviewof possible consequences, theother guarantee powers.20 Fonblanqueto Russc]], Uctober U, !S59 Belgrade. ro21 Fonblanque toRusseli. November21, Belgrade. FO78/HAO22 Fonblanque to Foreign Office. December 30. Belgrade. FO78/1440106 Ljubodrag P RisticTowardthe endof 1859, Fonblanque was seriously taken ill.Some saidit wasbecauseof thebeatinghegot in Kalemegdanpark.As hewasbedridden, a newmanwascharged withconducting affairsat the British consulate in Belgrade. Lytton's reports as of February19,1860, showed he had a tumfor analysis.Several of hisreports gave clear indicationsof preparationsforan Insurrection against the Turkishauthorities in the Turkish provincesaroundSerbia. Lytton inferredthat aninsurrectionwas loomingandthatTurkeywasendeavoring to prevent it. He saw twosources of dan-ger. Thefirst wastheplainlyvisiblediscontent amongthepopulation,though it wastoolatetodeterminethecauses. Thesecondsourceofdangercomposed twoparts: thepolitics of PnnceMilos and, Russianpolitics. Prince Miloscouldchosewhether to be vassal toa weakTur-keyor tobeunderthecap of a strong Russia. There wereseveral rea-sons why Lytton believed Milos would remain neutral. First herefused several addressesof dissatisfied Christiansfromtheneighbor-ing provinces. Second, the Prince was old,and naturallywould want tospend hisdeclining yearsin peace. Third, andmostimportant, wasthePrince'sexperiencewithRussia, whichtaught him"that theambitionof that Powerisincompatiblewithhisown". ThePrincewas intimi-datedby thisand did not wantTurkeydisintegrated. Nonetheless, if aninsurrection should break out thePrince wouldbe compelled to decidewhether to leadit or let it ride byevents. He wouldnot hesitate toleadthe insurrection, thought Lytton, but would sooner reach his aim"through fear of an insurrection, thenby insurrection itself". Russia de-sired that the dissatisfied population rebel, do as muchas it can withitsown forces, and finallybe liberated with Russia's assistance. Thus Lyt-tonformulatedRussia's policy inthewords of her agents inSerbia:"Thedissolutionof theOttomanEmpiremust comefromwithin andnot fromwithout. Let usthereforeencourageinsurrectionandensureitssuccess'i.P Considering ithisdutytodepict thesituationinSerbiabeforeleavingBelgrade, Lytton compiledanextensivereport, withamorepenetrating analysis. At a time whenPrinceMiloswasprepanngadeputationtoConstantinoplecharged withsettingspecificdemands,andwhennewsof national fermentationin Europe inebriated theBal-kanleaders, Lyttondidnot findit difficult toformulateandexpoundonfour problemspertaining toSerbia that might shake Turkey: Turks23 Lytton to Bu1wer, February 19, 1860, Belgrade, FO195/651.Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862)107inSerbiainandaround fortresses, achangeof the 1838Constitution,succession of the princelydignity, and, whatseemed mostcrucial, pos-sibile insurrectioninthe neighboringTurkishprovinces. Lyttonwasinformed that Russia was not sending arms to Serbia but was, however,sendinglargesumsof money. Intheanalysis, Lyttonwasmoreacuteinhisassessments of thePrince'sactivitieswhenheclaimedthat thePrincewas encouragingmovements inneighboringprovincestowincertainconcessions from an intimidated Turkey.I"Lytton stayed on in Belgrade to see to the burial of his senior col-leagueandawait thenewly appointedconsul Longworth. Longworthfell towork vigorouslyonreadingthe archivesof his predecessors,and, analyzing thesituationmorewiselythanLytton, inferred that theRussian Prince Dolgorukyarrivedin Belgrade in February1860 not tostir up hopes for an insurrection, butto curbpassions among theinsur-gentsand withinthe Prince's milieu.25Thenew Britishconsul didnot havetheopportunitytobecomebetter acquainted with Prince Milos, who, old and ill, onlyreceived theRussianconsul. So Longworth had talkswith prince Mihailowhosaidhedid not believe Serbia would have anyadvantages froma new warbetween Russia and Turkey, adding, "Je sais bienque ce nest pas pournos beaux yeux que la Russieferala guerrea la Turquie". Although hedidnot trust prince Mihailo, Longworthwashappy tohear this.26Thefurther development of events ledLongworthtothinknowthat thePrincewasinclined toward Russia, thento believe that hewasunabletoresist thestrongpro-Russianparty. A groupof Turks murdered onthecoast of theSavaRiver beneaththefortress of Belgrade, then, anincreasing number of refugees, particularly fromBulgarian regions, in-termittent skirmishesonthe borderwithTurkey andAksakov'span-Slavicpropaganda, convinced Longsworththat theSerbian police wascontrolledbyMilosevic. He even thought investigationwouldyieldevidence showing Milosevics InvolvementIII themurders on theSavacoast. 27Longworth was very unhappy over prince Mihailo' s growingcompliance withtheRussian party. Hefeltthepro-Russianstream in-24 Lytton to Bulwer, March19, 1860, Belgrade, FO195/65125 Longworth to Russell, AprillO, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.26 Longworth to Bulwer and Russel, May 23, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.27 Longworthto 'J, June 28, 1860, Belgrade, FO78/1515; LongworthtoBulwer,August2 and9, 1860, Belgrade,FO78/1515; Longworth toRussell. August 27,1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.108 Liubodraz P. Ristictensifybecause hecould not come byinformation unless hepaid for it.However, areport that princeMihailohadreceivedinstructionsfromBritain's ambassador to Constantinople Henry Bulwer in September1860 and saidthat Bulwers counsels were in accordance with hisviews, was a ray ofhope. Longworth thus thought prince Mihailo"may perhapswish tomoderate the action of theRussian party withoutventuringtocometoanopenrupturewiththem".28WhenprinceMi-hailostrove toconsolidatepowerimmediatelyafter his father'sdeath,Longworthreported that thequestion of thesuccession was not soim-portant that the Porteshouldnot yield, andrecognizeprinceMihailosuccession tothe throne, topacifythesituationin and around Serbia-"WhenPrinceMihailoformedthe new government, Longworthgainedthe impressionthat hehadturnedhis backslightlyonRussia. Long-worthseemstohavebelieved thatthe new Princewas notat homeinthe existingset of circumstances, "Ifearthata gooddeal of whatwasmerelyambiguousinhis conduct maybenow more unfavorablychar-acterized. It would seem as ifhe had been tampering with allparties; totheRussian, thoughavoidingarupture, his attitude hasbeenreserved,whiletowardsthePorte it has been byturnsforwardandconciliatory:baffled however in thisdouble game hehas now recourse toher adver-saries who ifI amnot deceived must as consequenceoftheir ownmaneouvers have anticipated and been waiting forhisovcrtures.F'InDecember, 1860, Longworth could not learn what the state ad-visor, Jovan Marinovic, would attempt toprocure byvisiting Europeancourts. Hecouldonlypresumethat hewouldtry to winsupport forSerbia'sdemandssent tothePorte -primarily, recognitionfor succes-sion to the princely thronel!At theclose of January, 1861, LongworthhadreasontobelievethatJovanMarinovichadfailedtoobtainwhathehad hoped for inSt. Petersburg. Nevertheless, influence of the Rus-sian partyincreased,and itsleaders, Stevca Mihaj lovicand Metropoli-tan Mihailo, were instruments ofthe Russian consul general. At hisinstructions, alargenumber of emissarieshadleft BelgradetocollectinformationandincitethedissatisfiedpopulationinBosnia, BulgariaandAlbania.VSo, mildlyspeaking, it was unusual that thenew Rus-28 Longworth to Bulwer, September19,1860, Belgrade, FO 78il5l5.29 LongworthtoRussell, October22, 1860, Belgrade, FO78/1515; Ibid- Bulwer,November16 and December 3, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515/30 Letter from December 3, 1860.31 Ibid; Longworth to Russel, December 6, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.32 Longworth to Bulwer, January29, 1861, Belgrade FO 78/1585.Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862) 109sianconsul, Vlangaly, expressedtoLongworth"hissurprisethat peo-pleshould imagine there was sucha thing as a Russian partyhere; andwhat was still moreamusing" continued Longworthinhis report, "hesaidaServianwarned himagainsttoofreelycommunicatingwithan-otherServianbecause hedidnot belong tothat party. Thefact isthatMr Vlangalyrather overdoesthepart of apassiveobserver of eventswhichhehasprobablybeeninstructed to assume; that of a toozealousagitator played by his predecessor having in some degree compro-mised hisgovernment". 33Atthesametime, Longworthbegantosus-pect that the Russia's and Austria's policies toward Serbia werecomingcloser toeachother. Hebecameconvinced of thiswhenAus-triapermittedSerbia toimport armswhenthereweresuresignsthatamovement for national liberation wasstrengthening in Serbiar'Theadvent of spring brought onmore problems. Refugees, flee-ing mostlyacross theeastern border of Serbia, werebecoming a press-ingproblem. InJune, 1861,PrinceMihailocomplained toLongworththat Russia, bydrivingout Tatarsfromthe Crimeaandfillinginthevoid withBulgarians, was solving its own problems andadhering to itspolicy of underminingTurkeyfromwithin. Thefact that this causedtrouble forSerbia, Russia did not mind. Thisfurther put off Prince Mi-hailofromRussianpolicy. Whenherealizedthat thepreparednessofhis armywasfarbelow thenecessarystandard, he tried to establish or-der on Serbia's borders and suppress the agitation of Russian agents.35Longworth waswrongwhen hewrote that theso-called "Russianparty" hadsubsidedbefore theconveningof the Assemblyof Trans-figurationt" After the Assembly closed, he reportedthat the streamVlangalyreferredtoasthe "democraticparty" intheAssembly, hademergedastheonlyoppositiontothePrince'sillegal measures. Ana-lyzingthe causesof conflict betweenthe "Russianparty" andPrinceMihailo, Longworth said rumor had it inBelgradethat Russia waswillingtosupport afureign candidatetothe Serbianthrone. Moreso,33 Longworth toBulwer. February18, 1861, Belgrade FO 78/1585.34 Ibid: Initial news of this date fromNovember 1860 and in Februarv 1861Longworthhastheinformationthat Franceand RussiaagreethatAustria 'occuPYBosnia (Longworth - Bulwer, November L 1860, Zemun, FO 195/651:Longoworth to Foreign Office. February 19,1861, Belgrade, FOLongworth to Rus:elL Mayi I. 1 I.Belgrade, FO78/1585.35 Longworth to Bulwer, .Tullc 25, 1861, Belgrade, FO585.36 Longworth toBulwer, August 3.1861 Belgrade. FO781l585.110he learnedthat the "Russianparty" andfriendsof the former prince,Alexander Karadjordjevic, were hatching a conspiracy.:'?Longworth underscored more than once that the decisionsadoptedby the TransfigurationAssemblywere contraryto Turkey'sinternational obligations, whichwere, ofcourse, bindingfor Serbia.Thebest andleast perilous, thought Longworth, would have been if theprince had respected hiscommitment andunreservedlyplaced himselfunderthe protectionof the Porte. But, saidLongworth, "hehadpre-ferredhoweverbeingavassal of Russia orof Francewhoalternatelyandbyagreement, it wouldappear, dictatetheprogramof the meas-uresto bepursued here". It seemed then that a new threat had emergedfor Britain'spolicyof calming thesituationinSerbia. FrenchcolonelHipolit Mondain had been appointed armyminister.VLongworth and ConradVasic, the Austrian charge d' affaires.wereinstructed bytheir governmentstosubmit amemorandum tothePrince, which theydid, at theend of 1861, protesting theunlawful de-cisions of the TransfigurationAssembly. IntalkswithPrince Mihailoand Ilij a Garasanin, Longworth assertedthat they knewtheir argu-ments werenot irrefutable. Butthesupport theyhad, Longworthwassure, fromRussia and France, enabledthemto abide by their deci-sions.I? At the instructions of his superior fromConstantinople, SirHenry Bulwer, Longworth reiterated Britain's warnings to IlijaGarasaninandPrinceMihailo. Garasaninattachedimportance toare-organization of thenational army, insisting it wasimperative toSerbiabecause of thedevelopmentsinher vicinity. During talkswith PrinceMihail0, Longworthnoticedthat the national army initself posedathreat as Serbiahadnoresourcestoarm, clothe, feed or pay it, thussucha situationmight betakenadvantage of. "HisHighnesscould notfail to perceivethat my observationappliedmoreparticularlytotheRussianpartytowhoseplotsand intriguesheisawareI (Longworth,Lj .R) havealwaysgivenhimcredit for opposingsomeresistance. Itmust at the sametime servedas ahint if theidea had notbeforeoc-cured to himthat the ready acquiescence of Russia in the militiascheme thougha ground of additional confidence asregardsthePorte,37Longworth to Bulwer,September16, 1861, Belgrade, FO 7811585.38LongworthtoBulwer, October28and30, 1861, Belgrade, FO7811720 andFO195/686.39Longworth to?, January 4, 1862, Longworth to Russell, January 25, 1862,Belgrade FO 7811672.Serbo- Russian Relations ( 1856-1862) IIImust justifyalarmastoher own designsinconnectionwithit", saidLongworth, mferring thatthePrincewas still undecidedontheques-tion of the national army.i"Having established that the organization of theSerbian armywaspart of a preparation to destroy and divide the Ottoman Empire,Russell proposedto Austriaanewjoint step. In keepingwith this,Longworth received instructions fromthe Foreign Office in April1862, topoint out to Prince Mihailo, at everyconvenient moment, thatinternal administrationinSerbiawas infact independent and that aRussianyokewouldbemorefierce thanthenominal taxSerbiawaspayinginthe formof puttingupwith asinglegarrisondeployedinBelgrade."! As other bigpowers didnot joinAustriaand Britianintheir protest, theSerbian government hadnoneed to yield to thepres-sure.At theendof themonth, Longworthinformedthat thePrince'semissary Milan Petronijevic had returned from St. Petersburg. Al-though hisinformer wasunsuccessfulin learning the details of themis-sion, Longsworth thought he had correctly assumed its obj ective.PrinceMihailohadendeavoredsotofreehimself fromthe "Russianparty", that hehad, thought Longworth, nearlyrupturedrelationswiththe Russiangovernment. Petronijevic wascharged withamending this.HethenhadtoascertainwhetherSerbia hadRussia'ssupport, shouldevents inBosnia-Herzegovina takeamorefavorableturn, indemand-ing fromthe Porte theadministration of Bosnia. Thiswould, of course,requireRussia'sbacking inmoneyandarms. Petronijevic, Longworthhadlearned, hadreceivedpromisefor financial andpolitical support,but was reprimandedforthePrince'scasual attitudetoward thebelli-cose Orthodoxpopulationintheneighboringprovinces.FInfact, al-though promising a loanand the sale of a largenumber of old guns, theRussian government had advised a moderate policy.Several daysbefore Belgrade wasbombed fromtheTurkish fort,Longworthhadnoticedanunusual vivacityintheRussianconsulateafter Vlangaly's return fromVienna.i' The bombardment had pre-vented him fromlearning moreabout it.40 Longworth toBulwer, March17, P ~ Belgrade, FO 7R!l672.41 Foreign OtTicct\ Longworth. April g, ] R62, London, FO n!l67].42 Longworthto Bulwcr. l\.pli126. 1862.. Belgrade, FO7S/1672.43 Longworth to Bulwcr..June I L1862, Belgrade, FO 78/1672.112 Liubodraz PRisticPursuinghumanisticgoals rather thanperformingadiplomatictask, or, perhaps, overcome byaninjured vanitybecause theAustrianconsul Vasichad goneto theBelgrade fortunsolicited, and, allegedly,affected an end to the bombing, Longworth cooperated more withVlangalyandtheFrench consul Tastuat thebeginningofdiplomaticactivitiestopacifythehostilities. Asadoyenof theBelgradeconsu-larycorps, Longworthbelieved that Vasicsstayin thefortduringthebombardment should be condemned. But he quicklychanged his mind.Hereceived a severerebuff fromConstantinople to the effect that Brit-ain's policy"generallyagreesbetter with that of Austria in Serviathanwiththat of any other Power"and to cooperate with Vasic. Whentheyrealized that "the Servians, backed by the FrenchandRussian, are be-coming quiteunreasonable", Longworth's superiorsbelieved it was be-cause their consul "went too much withFrance and Russia againstAustria". As hereceived clearinstructions and realizedhispositionasconsul was shaky, Longworthapologizedfortheerror but couldnotconceal his anger andresentment.i"Hecontinuedtoreport ferventlyon the developments in Belgrade, but to theend of the Kanlyja confer-ence, mentioned neitherVlangalynor the Russianparty. Onlyoncehereportedthat acertainMajor DjordjevichadarrivedfromRussiaandwas immediately appointed chief commander ofthe Serbian army.Longworthsaw1Il Djordjevic a Russian Mondain in Serbia andunder-scored it might jeopardize a peaceful solution to the problem."Theconferenceof theambassadorsof theGrait Powers ontheSerbianquestioncommenced on July22, 1862, in the summer resort ofFuadPasha in theConstantinople suburbof Kanlyja. Britain's ambas-sador Bulwer sometimes advocated Turkishinterestsmore vehementlythantheTurkishambassador himself. Hewasbacked bytheAustrianinternuncioOsten-Prokesch. Serbian interests weretruculentlyrepre-sented by FrenchMarquis de Moustier. Russian ambassador Lobanov-Rostovskysupported Moustiersproposalsbut not asSerbiaexpectedfromaRussiandeputy. TheItalian ambassador, MarquisCaracciolo,44 Bulwer to Russell, June21. 1862, Constantinople. Correspondence relatmg totheBombardment ofBelgrade inJune 1862, (Further: Correspondence.. ) FO421:Longworthto Bulwer, June22. 1862, Belgrade, FO7 8 6 7 2 ~ Bu1wer toRusselLJune22, 1862, Constantinople; Bu1wer to Russell, June24, 1862, Constantinople;Bu1wer to Russell, June24, 1862, Istanbul, Correspondence...~ ForeignOfficetoLongworth, July7. 1862, London, FO78/1671: LongworthtoBulwer, July 8, 8 6 2 ~ Ibid - Russel, July28 and 31, August1, 1862, BelgradeFO 78/1672.45 Longworth to Bulwer, August8, 1862, Belgrade, FO 78/1673.Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862) 113hadnot enough strenghtoaffect decisionstoSerbia'sadvantage. Butthe hesitant stand of Prussian ambassador Baron WerthemmadeMoustier shrink to moderacy in his demands. The conference closed onSeptember 4, 1862, and therepresentatives of the Guaranteeing Powerssignedaprotocol onSeptember 8. Itwas decidedthat thefortressesSokoandUzicewereto be demolished. Anda decisionof thirtyyearsbefore was confirmedwhereby Muslims settledoutside the fortresswalls were tobe evacuated. Guarantees against additional bombard-mentsweregivenin anunusual manner, witha rejection of a proposalthatTurkeypayfor thedamages of thelast bombardment. Serbia's de-sires wereonlypartially fulfilled.TheBritishconsul inBelgrade, of course, knewnothing of theprogress of the Conference in Kanlyj a.** *TheCrimean War put Great Britain and Russia on opposite sides.Britain was on the winning side. Russia, thedefeated side, hadmuch togiveup.She had to give over to Britain priority in Constantinople.Butin the Balkans, Russia had what Britain would never achieve: thesym-pathy of the Slavic Orthodoxpopulationand awidely ramifiedandsuccessfulnetwork of agents. If Britain reigned over Constantinople inthe diplomatic game, Russiaspun athick cobwebinthe provinces.Evenif theyhad no reason to compl ain about a shortage of money, theBritish consuls in Belgrade couldnot haveavoided what had happenedto Longworth in1861: informative isolation. Judging by reports, Long-worthwas unabletoestablishstrong tieswithanyprominentSerbianpoliticianin order toobtaininformation, althoughGarasanin hadoncelefthima bagof privateconfidential letters. Theonlyreliablesourcesfor British consuls werethe Austrian consul andtheTurkishpasha.Thus the reports byBritishconsuls inBelgradeabout Russo-Serbianrelationsfrom1856-1862arerather meager, at times evenverging onconjecture. But theywereableto establish thechief courseof therela-tions, so Fonblanque wasnotmistakenwhenheclaimed that "the pol-icy ofRussia IS one of Perturbationenattendant mieux".46Bulwerstated the generalpolicyof hiscountrywhenhe arrived in Belgrade af-ter the Kanlyj aConference, inOctober 1862. He admittedthat theSerbshadreasonto beunhappyandpromised theSerbian government46 Fonblanque to Clarendon, March 10. 18" 7, Belgrade, FO78/1278.114 L)ubodrag P. RisticSInceresupport ineverythingthat wouldnot present abreachof theprinciple of Turkish integrity.Translated by DraganaVulicevicCPIICKO-PYCKl1 OLl:HOCl1OLl: 1856. Ll:O 1862. rOLl:l1HE- rrpcMaII'3BCIIITajIIMa 6plITaHcKlIxKOH3yJIa1I3 Beorpana -PC3IIMCO)J,pCJI,6aMa Ilapncxor yroaopa 3aKJbYl.JCHOr 30. MapTa1856.romme jc. 1I3Mcl)y OCTaHOr. yKIIHYT pycxn nporex'ropar ITa)], KHC:>KCBIIHOMCpfinjoxi. Cp6I1ja je. ounxrYronopoxi, CTaBJbCna non KOJICKTIIBHII npOTCK-TopaT BeJUIKIIX cnna. MCl)YTlIM, nyrorommra.n YTIIu;aj II I10)J,pmKa pYCIIjcCp6njII OCTaBIIJIlI cy JJ,y60Ke TParOBCy rrOJlIITWIKOMMIImJbClhYrrpIJ.TlWIHOr6poja cprrCKIIX )J,p)l(aBHIIKa II, MO)l()J,a jour )J,y6JbC, ypC3aJIII ocehan,e )J,yra II naueyCBCCT cpncxor rpabaaaaaII CCJbaKa. EpnrancxarrOJlIITIIKao-rynan,aTypCKCUapCBIIHC je. nax, )J,I1KTIIpaHa 6pIlTanCKIIMKOlI3YJIlIMa y Eeorpany