1NCInterpretation – The Aff must present a concrete strategy for the operationalization of their advocacy through specific political institution outside of the debate community.

Violation – The affirmative presents an integration of power relations without tying that interrogation to a specific mechanism outside of the debate community. They become the revolutionary hero who limits analysis to one scenario instead of formulating strategy to turn theory into replicatable praxis – their strategy is that of the armchair philosopherNewton-1971 –Huey P. Newton- Black Capitalism Reanalysed- Huey P. Newton Reader- 227-228

We see then that power has a dual character and that we cannot simply identify and define phenomena without acting, for to do so is to become an armchair philosopher . And when Bobby and I left Merritt College to organize brothers on the block we did so because the college students were too content to sit around and analyze without acting. On the other hand, power includes action, for it is making phenomena perform in the desired manner. But action without thinking and theory is also incorrect. If the social forces at work in the community have not been correctly analyzed and defined, how can you control them in such a way that they act in a desired manner? So the Black Panther Party has always merged theory and practice in such a way as to serve the true interests of the community. In merging theory with practice we recognized that it was necessary to develop a theory which was valid for more than one time and place. We wanted to develop a system of which was good anywhere, thus it had to be rather abstract. Yet our theory would relate to a concrete analysis of concrete conditions so that our actions would always be relevant and profitable to the people. Yet, at the same time, it had to advance their thinking so that they would move toward a transformation of their situation of exploitation and oppression. We have always insisted on good theory and good practice, but we have not always been successful in carrying this through. When the Black Panther Party defected from the Black community; we became, for a while, revolutionary cultists. One of the primary characteristics of a revolutionary cultist is that he despises everyone who has not reached his level of consciousness, or the level of consciousness that he thinks he has reached, instead of acting to bring the people to that level. In that way the revolutionary cultist becomes divided from the people , he defects from the community. Instead of serving the people as a vanguard, he[or she] becomes a hero. Heroes engage in very courageous actions sometimes, and they often make great sacrifices, including the supreme sacrifice, but they are still isolated from the people. Their

courageous actions and sacrifices do not lead the people to a higher level of consciousness, nor do they produce fundamental changes in the exploitation and oppression of the people . A vanguard, however, will guide the people onto higher levels of consciousness and in that way bring them to the point where they will take stemer actions in their own interests and against those who continue to oppress them. As I've said previously; revolution is a process , not a conclusion. A true revolutionist will not only take courageous actions, he will also try to advance the people in such a manner that they will transform their situation. That is, by delivering power to the people the true revolutionist will help them define the social phenomena in their community and lead them to the point where they will seize the time and make these phenomena act in a desired manner.

Vote Neg – the judge should only vote for political options that can truly activate debaters agency

1NC 2/Reasons to prefer – 1. Ground – We’re here to engage on how power relations

interact with different political methodologies. We lose not just our state links but links to way teams turn their analysis into action. In the abstract any analysis of power can be good. This is a call for the affirmative to interact with material oppression – violent revolution, a nation state, are examples of how the Aff could have chosen a political strategy outside of a topical plan, proving we provide a freedom within limits that solves their framework offense.

2. Minority Participation – Adopting a view of power based on philosophical abstraction turns their attempts to engage politics because minorities need to have political analysis that relates to the material conditions they face. They make debate less relevant for people of color

bell hooks 1990, black feminist and author, postmodern blacknessIt is sadly ironic that the contemporary discourse which talks the most about heterogeneity, the decentered subject, declaring breakthroughs that allow recognition of otherness, still directs its critical voice primarily to a

specialized audience, one that shares a common language rooted in the very master narratives it claims to challenge. If radical postmodernist thinking is to have a transformative impact then a critical break with the notion of "authority" as "mastery over" must not simply be a rhetorical device, it must be reflected in habits of being , including styles of writing as well as chosen subject matter. Third-world scholars, especially elites, and white critics who passively absorb white supremacist thinking, and therefore never notice or look at black people on the streets, at their jobs, who render us invisible with their gaze in all areas of daily life, are not likely to produce liberatory theory that will challenge racist domination, or to promote a breakdown in traditional ways of seeing and thinking about reality, ways of constructing aesthetic theory and practice. From a different standpoint Robert Storr makes a similar critique in the global issue of _Art in America_ when he asserts: To be sure, much postmodernist critical inquiry has centered precisely on the issues of "difference" and "otherness." On the purely theoretical plane the exploration of these concepts has produced some important results, but in the absence of any sustained research into what artists of color and others outside the mainstream might be up to, such discussions become rootless instead of radical. Endless second guessing about the latent imperialism of intruding upon other cultures only compounded matters, preventing or excusing these theorists from investigating what black, Hispanic, Asian and Native American artists were actually doing. Without adequate concrete knowledge of and contact with the non-white "other," white theorists may move in discursive theoretical directions that are threatening to and potentially disruptive of that critical practice which would support radical liberation struggle.

1NC 3/3. Revolutionary education – Contextualizing analysis of

oppression around material change is essential to provide political training to make more effective advocates. Ignoring politics only cedes the political to the right which uniquely hurts people of color. We must gain the tools to fight power in the halls of power on our terms

Themba-Nixon Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy to advance their welfare- 2k [makani, Changing the rules what public policy means for organizing Colorlines 3.2]

In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation.

Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work.

The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are

just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the

tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were

heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a

clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decision maker

with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of

interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decision makers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore.

Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of

retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

1NC 4/4. Existential ethics – The affirmative interpretation of political

change replicates the Eurocentric notion of ethics as a way of thinking, or conceptual ethics, versus ethic as action, or existential ethics. This means that Western imperialism can be perpetually justified.

Marimba Ani. Yurugu: An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior. March 1994 Pg.329-331

It has been part of the posture of the moral philosophers of European culture to disavow cultural commitment, yet their work has contributed significantly to the survival and intensification of the rhetorical ethic-the hypocrisy and the deception that constitute a vital and definitive part of the content of European cultural imperial- ism-and, therefore, to nationalistic objectives. To begin with the Platonic-influenced utamawazo provides the theoretical basis for a conceptual ethics; an ethical system, the themes of which are considered to be valid, as long as they are consistent in terms of the logic of that system. What is "ethical" becomes what is "rational" and "logical." The most "ethical" statement is the purest abstraction. As Havelock correctly observes, the individual "thinking" psyche becomes the seat of morality and the individual's ability to act ethically is based on his ability to think "rationally"; i.e., "abstractly." The result, again, is "talk." The European idea is that words divorced from action , feeling, commitment, from human involvement can them- selves be relevant to (and properly inform) human interaction-as long as they are part of a consistent syntax; an approved semantical system. This pursuit itself is an exercise in self-deception. Primary cultures are characterized by an "existential ethic" (Stanley Diamond) that is based on and refers to actual behavior. European culture gives rise to semantical systems and instead of being concerned with the inconsistency between "word" and "deed" (which could conceivably be the determinant of ethical behaVior), the moral philosophers are merely concerned with verbal and what they call "logical" inconsistency. One result of this characteristic of the culture is a tendency to make philosophers the most irrelevant of people and to effectively divorce their work from any decision-making capacity or role that in any way influences the ethical behavior of European peoples. What this tradition has done instead is to support the culture in its ability to use words without meaning, and to support Europeans in their quest to deceive others and themselves as well. The body of literature known as "ethical theory" has to a large degree been conducive to the growth of moral hypocrisy in European culture. It is the "liberal" academic tradition in contemporary European/ European American culture that uses the rhetorical ethic best to sup- port the objectives of European chauvinism. Ingeniously these theo- rists use the semantical systems of the moral philosophers, the "brotherhood" rhetoric of the Christian statement and empty abstractions like "humanitarianism" and "universalistic ethics" as evidence of the ideological commitments of the Europeans and therefore as indices of the nature of European culture. They are "critical," because they say that the imperialistic behavior of the European has represented a conflicting theme or "negative" tendency in European development. The result of their theories , however, is that they succeed in making the European responsible for everything -the "good" as well as the "bad"- and in the end the good far outweighs the bad and will, of course, triumph

along with "reason." Norman F. Cantor provides an excellent example of the subtle chauvinism of the European liberal academician in his work on Western culture. He says, The new ethos of the late 1960's sought to restore to their central place in Western culture the religious, mystical, compassionate, imaginative, and altruistic ideals that had been tarnished or ignored by industrialism and secularism, by the mechanism and bureaucracy of modern life. 22 The new ethos had indigenous roots in some of the central cur- rents of the Western tradition-in Christian mysticism, in the Enlightenment's vision of a happy and peaceful world, in Romanticism's yearning of the union of self and nature and for the union of all individuals in the Absolute Spirit, in anarchism's faith in the spontaneous association of men in a harmonious community when freed from the brutality and oppression of the state, in Nietzsche's life-affirming ethic and Freud's revelation of the pri- macy of erotic impulses, and in the existential philosophy of Camus, Sartre, and Jaspers. 23 The trick is to "claim" ideas that have failed to influence the def- inition of the culture: because they do not fit in with the asili. In this way, \any critique of European ideology informed by a vision of the human that could only have been created either by a rejection of European value or in a culture qualitatively different from European culture itself becomes a "Western" product. And this argument (if "argued" at all) is made on the basis of values that were, for the European, never more than rhetoric! "Christian mysticism" becomes "Western," and the "Enlightenment's vision of a happy world" is not tarnished by the fact that this world was to be defined in terms of and controlled by European "progress." Cantor's characterization of "Western liberalism" is a perfect statement of what I have called the "rhetorical ethic." In the statement that follows, taken from the concluding paragraphs of his three-vol- ume work on European cultural history, Cantor claims, for the cul- ture, its most severe critics. Movements that would seek the destruction of what the West has meant are characterized as expres- sions of Western humanism and of Western ideals. This excerpt is evi- dence of the characteristic of European cultural nationalism that we are here delineating. This particular example is all the more signifi- cant because it represents a fairly recently published text, used to explain and interpret to the European-American college student, the nature and meaning of Western-European history: It is a pernicious misreading of history to identify Western civiliza- tion with the racism, imperialism, and capitalism of the late nine- teenth century. Even in their heyday, these attitudes and institutions were only one side of the Western world view and way of life. The destiny of Western civilization immeasurably transcends the mistakes of one era. The West has had its confusion, horror, and misery, its moments when anti-human doctrine have seemed on the verge of carrying all before them. But it is the glory of Western civilization that it has never stood still and has never neglected for long the quest for institutions that can contribute to the realization of human freedom. Soon its best minds have recalled the highest ideals of the classical and Christian traditions ; they have inspired their contemporaries with the vision of a great age of beginning anew , of the establishment of God's kingdom on earth or a secular equivalent in their own time." Cantor concludes his panegyric with the assurance that the "great upheavals of the 1960's were collectively only manifestations of the age-old western tradition by which Western 'civilization' peri- odically 'renews itsel!.'" In this way he debunks the need for revolu- tion; and in fact "claims" the revolutionaries, who, he says, will ineVitably and happily be

overshadowed by the "rationalists and moderates, II who have restructured the institutions of the past and redirected the ideas of the present. The result has never been perfect justice or absolute truth but sufficient justice and enough truth to satisfy the anxieties of the contemporary era while reestablishing the social peace and political order that the progress of civilization requires .22 And so ends Cantor's historical study of the "genesis and des- tiny" of Western culture. With its greatest minds as the custodians of "civilization"-not just "European civilization." My interpretation of that history is quite different, as it is informed by an African-centered perspective and methodology. Cantor is concerned lest the students of the "new ethos" would "shatter" and irrevocably separate from what has historically been Western European culture. Our conclusion is that the European tradition must be "shattered" if a truly "new ethos" is to replace the old . This means a new utamaroho to fulfill a different asiii. But then centered in African interest I understand European culture to be identified with anti-Africanism, the imperialistic pursuit, and with a denial of the human spirit; whereas Cantor finds this identification "pernicious" and makes the claim that the "liberation of the human spirit" has been a "central current" in the Western tradition. Ultimately Cantor's objectives are chauvinistic. He is concerned with influencing students in such a way that they will act to maintain the "peace" and "order" necessary for the continuance of the European conception of "progress," i.e., the persistence of European power.

5. Pragmatism – Their desire to seek a perfect conceptual understanding of power before reengaging the political makes the good the enemy of the perfect, something people of color can’t afford. Our framework seeks a praxis that avoids utopianism.

Yancy 1 (George Yancy and Cornel West, "Cornel West", p 70)The final component of the political construal of prophetic pragmatism deals with the issue of power. Here, West announces that prophetic pragmatism will unmask the different power structures that present themselves as natural. Along with this, he Ervors a genealogical strategy that will similarly unearth the relevant practices and systems of beliefs inappropriately dependent upon questionable moral values. Confessing to his Foucauldian connections, he states that “Prophetic pragmatism shares with Foucault a preoccupation with the operation of powers. It also incorporates the genealogical mode of inquiry .... [Plrophetic pragmatism promotes genealogical materialist modes of analysis similar in many respects to those of Foucault.”3" West finally construes prophetic pragmatism as a form of tragic thought. although not a “doomsday” form of thinking. To the extent that prophetic pragmatism evades involvement with a priori epistemological concerns but instead focuses on the everyday concerns of human beings, West cautions that. despite our efforts to better our existential condition, both personal and social evil are persistent realities not immediately submissive to our intentions to do good. Evil’s evasion of the good that we seek to do will continue. West's focus on the presence of evil is not an invitation to concede defeat but rather one to force us to become humble as we realize that our best intentions are not immune to failure. Prophetic pragmatism. according to West, “is a form of trage thought in that it conlionts candidly individual and collective experiences of evil in individuals and institutions - with little expectation of ridding the world of all evil.”3' As with his other construals. West links his

conception of prophetic pragmatism, as a fomi of tragic thought, with democracy. What he seems to be getting at here is the idea that it is misleading to assume that we can totally and completely realize the absolute ideal of democracy as a historically manifested reality. Democracy remains an ideal that we must constantly pursue while realizing that we are not pursuing an illusion. The dynamics of human existence and the dialectical tensions between human being and the natural world continually give rise to various obstacles and challenges as we seek a more socially enriching existence. Nevertheless, in acknowledging the constant struggle to improve things, West warns against surrendering to pessimism or yielding to the seductive idea of perfectibility. Hence, he maintains: Prophetic pragmatism denies Sisyphean pessimism and utopian perfectionism. Rather. it promotes the possibility of human progress and human impossibility of paradise. Human struggle s its at the center of prophetic pragmatism , a struggle guided by a democratic and libertarian vision , sustained by moral courage and existential integrity , and tempered by the recognition of human finitude and fragility.” Clearly. West focuses persistently upon the importance of creating “new possibilities for human agency.” He even briefly describes his prophetic pragmatism as a form of historical consciousness attuned to the struggles of the past as well as appreciative of the alternative forms of life based upon the best of the past. But he quickly interjects the theme of the tragic, stating that the praxis of prophetic pragmatism “is tragic action with revolutionary intent ."33 Finally, forever straddling two modes of thought at once, West reiterates that prophetic pragmatism is not blind to the fact that utopian schemes QIIIJOK escape the limitation presented by the unfortunate condition of individuals and the structures of injustice normally sustained by social, economic and political institutions. So, even if prophetic pragmatism evades pessimism, it still cautiously embraces utopianism. According to West: Prophetic pragmatism. . . tempets its utopian impulse with a profound sense of the tragic character of life and history. This sense of the tragic highlightst be irreducible predicament of unique individuals who undergo dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and death and institutional forms of oppression that dehumanize people.” Now that we have some understanding of \Vest's impressionistic conception of prophetic pragmatism. we can offer an evaluation of it. We should keep in mind, however, that thus task is complicated by West's preference for a method of reading that emphasizes moving the reader through passionate and motivational rhetoric rather than the reader through the dispassionate execution of arguments. Hence, in criticizing West, we must focus on the vision at the heart of his prophetic pragmatism and not treat it as a systematic body of truths.

Next. Academic systems like debate feed off of descriptions of (black, female, queer) suffering. Narrations of sufferings are spread throughout the academy, transferred, passed around like capital. The affirmative supports this violent system through their depictions of suffering in the 1AC. Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19

In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination . We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else.

Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else . We

have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert , manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying,

completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this . We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education ! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are

created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant . We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even

our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness,

individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to

their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation , a provocation . Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university , to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how

desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or

simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure , or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned.

The link is the presentation of narratives of suffering. When they voice descriptions of suffering, they create a system of empathy and enjoyment. As a result of this empathy and enjoyment leads to more violence because individuals are satisfied with the status quo. The case turns itself by feeding into this problematic cycle of narratives and feelings through their narratives of suffering.

Hartman ’97 [Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY 1997 Saidiya V.- “SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21]

As well, we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through

the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative, all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am

trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it

does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete

defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral

character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, effaces and restricts black sentience. As Rankin himself states, in order for this suffering to induce a reaction

and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” to quote Zygmunt Bauman, the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does suffering elude or escape us in the very effort to bring it near? It does so precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy and by way of

Rankin’s indignation and imagination. If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power , pleasure, and profit , then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body.

They also trivialize suffering. It is the assumption that all the suffering and exploitation can be represented with mere spoken words and reflection on the ballot claiming it’s a good form of scholarship. Their style is bad which makes the people a commodity.

The only subaltern voice the academy grants visibility to is pain narratives and damage representations for commodification through research that underlies colonialism.Tuck and Yang – ’14 – Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, SUNY New Paltz and Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego (Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” Humanizing Research, https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf, p. 223-226, MM)

Research is a dirty word among many Native communities (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999), and arguably, also among

ghettoized (Kelley, 1997), Orientalized (Said, 1978), and other communities of overstudied Others . The

ethical standards of the academic industrial complex are a recent development , and like so many

post-civil rights reforms, do not always do enough to ensure that social science research is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the individual or community being researched. Social science often

works to collect stories of pain and humiliation in the lives of those being researched for commodification . However, these same stories of pain and humiliation are part of the collective wisdom that often informs the writings of researchers who attempt to position their intellectual work as decolonization. Indeed, to refute the crime, we may

need to name it. How do we learn from and respect the wisdom and desires in the stories that we (over) hear, while refusing to portray/betray them to the spectacle of the settler colonial

gaze? How do we develop an ethics for research that differentiates between power—which deserves a denuding, indeed petrifying scrutiny—and people? At the same time, as fraught as research is in its complicity with power, it is one of the last places for legitimated inquiry. It is at least still a space that proclaims to care about curiosity. In this essay, we theorize refusal not just as a "no," but as a type of investigation into "what you need to know and what I refuse to write in" (Simpson, 2007, p. 72). Therefore, we present a refusal to do research, or a refusal within research, as a way of thinking about humanizing researchers. / We have organized this chapter into four portions. In the first three sections, we lay out three axioms of social science research. Following the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990), we use the exposition of these axioms to articulate otherwise implicit, methodological,

definitional, self-evident groundings (p. 12) of our arguments and observations of refusal. The axioms are: (I) The subaltern can speak , but is only invited to speak her/our pain; (II) there are some forms of knowledge that the academy doesn't deserve; and (III) research may not be the intervention that is needed . We realize that these axioms may not appear self-evident to everyone, yet asserting them as apparent allows us to proceed toward the often unquestioned limits of research. Indeed, "in dealing with an open-secret structure, it's only by being shameless about risking the obvious that we happen into the vicinity of the transformative" (Sedgwick, 1990, p. 22). In the fourth section of the chapter, we theorize refusal in earnest, exploring ideas that are still forming. / Our thinking and writing in this essay is informed by our readings

of postcolonial literatures and critical literatures on settler colonialism. We locate much of our analysis inside/in relation

to the discourse of settler colonialism, the particular shape of colonial domination in the U nited

S tates and elsewhere, including Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Settler colonialism can be differentiated from what one

might call exogenous colonialism in that the colonizers arrive at a place ("discovering" it) and make it a permanent home (claiming

it). The permanence of settler colonialism makes it a structure , not just an event (Wolfe, 1999). The settler colonial nation-state is dependent on destroying and erasing Indigenous inhabitants in order to clear them from valuable land. The settler colonial structure also requires the enslavement and labor of bodies that have been stolen from their homelands and transported in order to labor the land stolen from Indigenous people. Settler colonialism refers to a triad relationship , between the White settler (who is valued for his leadership and innovative mind),

the disappeared Indigenous peoples (whose land is valued, so they and their claims to it must be extinguished), and the chattel slaves (whose bodies are valuable but ownable, abusable, and murderable). We believe that this triad is the basis of the formation of Whiteness in settler colonial nation-states, and that the interplay of erasure, bodies, land, and violence is characteristic of the permanence of settler colonial structures . / Under coloniality, Descartes' formulation, cognito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am") transforms into ego conquiro ("I conquer, therefore I am"; Dussel, 1985; Maldonado-

Torres, 2007; Ndlvou-Gatsheni, 2011). Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2009) expounds on this relationship of the conqueror's sense-of-self to his knowledge-of-others ("I know her, therefore I am me"). Knowledge of self/Others became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories, and the rule over them. Thus the right to conquer is intimately connected to the right to know ("I know, therefore I conquer, therefore I am"). Maldonado-Torres (2009) explains that for Levi Strauss,

the self/Other knowledge paradigm is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a

science (pp. 3-4). Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest , then, is an exercise of the felt entitlement to transgress these limits . Refusal , and stances of refusal in research , are attempts to place limits on conquest and the colonization of knowledge by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is sacred, and what can't be known . / To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers uncomfortable , and may, to them, seem dangerous. When access to information, to knowledge, to the intellectual commons is controlled by the people who generate that information [participants in a research study], it can be seen as a violation of shared standards of justice and truth. (Simpson,

2007, p. 74) / By forwarding a framework of refusal within (and to) research in this chapter, we are not simply prescribing limits to social science research. We are making visible invisibilized limits, containments, and seizures that research already stakes out. / One major colonial task of social science research that has emerged is to pose as voicebox , ventriloquist , interpreter of subaltern voice . Gayatri Spivak's important monograph, Can the Subaltern Speak? (2010), is a foundational text in post-colonial studies, prompting a variety of scholarly responses, spin-offs, and counterquestions, including does the subaltern speak? Can the colonizer/settler listen? Can the subaltern be heard? Can the subaltern act? In our view, Spivak's question in the monograph, said more transparently, is can the subaltern speak in/ to the academy? Our reading of the essay prompts our own duet of questions, which we move in and out of in this essay: What does the academy do? What does social science research do? Though

one might approach these questions empirically, we emphasize the usefulness of engaging these questions pedagogically; that is, posing the question not just to determine the answer, but because the rich conversations that will lead to an answer are meaningful.

The question—What does or can research do?—is not a cynical question, but one that tries to understand more about research as a human activity. The question is similar to questions we might ask of other human activities, such as, why do we work? Why do we dance? Why do we do ceremony? At first, the responses might be very pragmatic, but they give way to more philosophical reflections. / Returning to Spivak's question, in Can the Subaltern Speak? Spivak casts Foucault and Deleuze as "hegemonic radicals" (2010, p. 23) who / unwittingly align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture" .... In the name of desire, they tacitly reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power ... (pp. 26-27) / Observing Foucault and Deleuze's almost romantic admiration for the "reality" of the factory, the school, the barracks, the prison, the police station, and their insistence that the masses know these (more) real realities perfectly well, far better than intellectuals, and "certainly say it very well," (Deleuze, as cited

in Spivak, 2010, p. 27), Spivak delivers this analysis: "The ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern is the left intellectual's stock-in-trade" (2010, p. 27). Spivak critiques the position of the intellectual who is

invested in the ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern for the banality of what serves as evidence of such

"speech," and for the ways in which intellectuals take opportunity to conflate the work and struggle of the subaltern with the work of the intellectual, which only serves to make more significant/authentic their own work (p. 29). All of it is part of a scheme of self-aggrandizing. / Rosalind Morris, reading Spivak, criticizes nostalgia in the academy that "bears a secret valorization and hypostatization of

subalteraity as an identity—to be recalled, renarrated, reclaimed, and revalidated" (2010, p. 8). / Subalternity is less an identity than what we might call a predicament, but this is true in a very odd sense. For, in Spivak's definition, it is the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed .

CUT HERETo the extent than anyone escapes the muting of subalternity, she ceases being a subaltern. Spivak says

this is to be desired. And who could disagree? There is neither authenticity nor virtue in the position of the oppressed. There is simply (or not so simply) oppression. Even so, we are moved to wonder, in this context, what burden this places on the memory work in the aftermath of education. What kind of representation becomes available to the one who, having partially escaped the silence of subalternity, is nonetheless possessed by the consciousness of having been obstructed, contained, or simply misread for

so much of her life? (Morris, 2010, p. 8) / We take this burden of speaking in/to the academy, while being misrecognized as the speaking subaltern or being required to ventriloquate for the subaltern, as a starting dilemma for the work of representation for decolonizing researchers. It is our sense

that there is much value in working to subvert and avert the carrying out of social science research under assumptions of subalternity and authenticity , and to refuse to be a purveyor of voices constructed as such . / This is the place from which we begin this essay, inside the knowledge that in the same ways that we can observe that the colonizer is constituted by the production of the Other , and Whiteness is constituted by the production of Blackness (Fanon, 1968; Said, 1978), the work of research and the researcher are constituted by the production and representation of the subaltern subject . Further, as we explore in Axiom I, representation of the subject who has "partially escaped the silence of subalternity" (Morris, 2010, p. 8) takes the shape of a pain narrative .

On Case

Their framing of the ocean as something to be explored is problematic and Eurocentric. Instead of exploring the ocean, they should leave it be. Exploration of the ocean is Eurocentric and problematic. The ocean does not want to be explored.Siskind 14Mariano Siskind, B.A. in Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina; M.A., Ph.D., in Comparative Literature, New York University, Captain Cook and the Discovery of Antarctica’s Modern Specificity: Towards a Critique of Globalism, 10 Jun 14, pg. 19The Antarctic sublime annuls the possibility of discovery, and pre- vents , through astonishment, the expansion of reason, the all-encompass- ing process of globalization that

Cook had taken to most corners of the world. Cook discovered in the unsurpassable sublimity that he faced the sheer impossibility of discovering Antarctica.34 Because, if the actions of discovering and naming imply and are implied in the world-historical signifiers that articulate the Kantian-Hegelian genealogy of globalization (colonialism, commerce, the universal imposition of reason and its objecti- fications, the state and property rights), then the Antarctic sublime has to be read as the very specific location of the resistance of the White Conti- nent to globalization. Or to state it differently: the sublime is a material manifestation of the impossibility of the universalizing operation of glo- balization; a resistance to representation so effective in its radicalism, that puts in crisis the whole idea of a globalization that encounters in the sub- lime a limit to its absolute need to realize itself as a global totality. A resis- tance, a limit: the sublime is nothing but the line that leaves Antarctica outside of modernity ; a crack in the edifice of the universal that renders evident its hegemonically constructed nature.