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2. G.R. No. 79347 January 26, 1989
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (SEPTEMBER
CONVENTION), petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Kalipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Hundred Island Chemical Corporation and Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation, respondents.
Apolinar Sevilla for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dominguez, Armamento, Cabana & Associates for respondent Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corp., Inc.
Isidro D. Amoroso for respondent Hundred Island Chemical Corp.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of
respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part states:
x x x
Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office finds that the
best forum to determine once and for all whether or not herein appellant-
intervenor commands support of the rank-and-file in the unit is through the
process of a certification election.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the contending unions.
Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further delay, withthe following choices:
1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation;
2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention) and 3.
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.
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SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)
The basic facts of this case are undisputed:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the
Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of LaborRelations (BLR) by respondent Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed
as BLR Case No. A-6-201-87. A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written
consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said
corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1
June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's
workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved for the striking outof KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato
D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for
intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17
June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to the respondent
Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987,
this petition was filed. And as prayed for in the said petition, We issued a
temporary restraining order dated 24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has
contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted
since the delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional rightof labor to organize.
The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor General in his
consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to
participate in a certification election thru a motion for intervention without a
prior showing that it has the required support expressed in the written consent of
at least twenty (20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit.
In taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads:
SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign
the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter shall have
twenty (20) working days within which to grant or dismiss the petition. In a
petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized
establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the
same is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all the
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employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be
satisfied upon the filing of the petition for certification election, otherwise, the
petition shall be dismissed. In either case, he shall cite the ground.
Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former relates,
and which provides:
SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are hereby
amended to read as follows:
x x x
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where
there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed
by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of
at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Uponreceipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct
of a certification election.
Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition
for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the
contested order. It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite
written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to
petitioners for certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.
Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a motion for
intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written
consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V,
Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage requirement
pertains only to the petition for certification election, and nothing else.
This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20% requirement
is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial interest in the
representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation by
the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere
fact that 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the
petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-
Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134
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SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification
election.
In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the
certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to settle once and
for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR,
69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention
has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any
injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual
purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the certification
election. After all the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary
Restraining Order dated 24 August 1987 LIFTED. With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994
CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY
SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (URTMSEU), petitioners,
vs.
REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.
C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner.
Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated
January 31, 1991 of the Secretary of Labor which reversed on appeal the Order
dated December 20, 1990 issued by Med-arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaringpetitioners as the duly-elected officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly
Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU) as well as the order dated March 5, 1991
denying petitioner Catalino Algire's motion for reconsideration.
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The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the management of Universal
Robina Textile at its plant in Km. 50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna.
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through
private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for
the holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's med-
arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing
that such an election be held.
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot
be conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et
al.) and private respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of
DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer.
The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:
Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:
LINO ALGIRE REGALADO
and DE MESA
his officers and his
officers
1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the
two contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of
collecting bargaining.
2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings. 1
The result of the election were as follows:
Lino Algire group 133
Regalado de Mesa 133
Spoiled 6
Total votes cast 272
On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 400-
9009-AU-002), which DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the
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effect that one of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks inside the
box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to as
the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same
was a valid vote in their favor. The group argued that the two checks made
even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his political franchise in favorof Algire's group.
During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the
envelope containing the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one
ballot contained two (2) checks in the box opposite petitioner Algire's name
and his officers.
On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the
questioned ballot valid, thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and
accordingly certified petitioner's group as the union's elected officers. 2
Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the
Secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January
31, 1991, the latter's office granted the appeal and reversed the aforesaid
Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of another election
of officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union
(URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the election of
15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference." 3
Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IVof the DOLE set the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22,
1991, reset to April 2, 1991, and finally reset to April 5, 1991.
Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was
denied for lack of merit and the decision sought to be reconsidered was
sustained.
Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues:
(1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book Vof the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case,
considering that the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave
abuse in the exercise of authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
(2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.
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with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging
that the assailed decision of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public
respondent is by nature immediately executory and the holding of an election
at any time after April 5, 1991, would render the petition moot and academic
unless restrained by this Court.
On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of
another election of union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision.
There is no merit in the petition.
The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a
person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in
accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from the
conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned
ballot is not within his competence. Therefore, any ruling made by the
representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an
absolute nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in
excess of his functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant,
what was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the
root of this controversy, was a consent election, not a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent
election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose
being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers
in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process
and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election. 5
The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is
spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such
action by such officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties,
expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit
unauthorized markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously
intended to identify the votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot,
which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.
If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's
ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably
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during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity
shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.
Moreover, petitioners even question at this stage the clear instruction to mark a
check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such
instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be interpreted that a voter mayvote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or
vice-versa,"6notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had
already been held where no such question was raised.
In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that
should best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining
negotiations should be achieved through the democratic process of an
election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be
circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express
their choice once and for all in a determination where anything is open to their
sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is minimized,
if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988
WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (WMWU), petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA
WARREN MANUFACTURING CORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-ANGLO), respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a preliminary injunction
and/or the issuance of a restraining order seeking to set aside: (1) Order of the
Med-Arbiter dated August 18,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is hereby ordered
conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of Warren Manufacturing Corporation, within 20 days from
receipt of this Order, with the following choices:
1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industry Workers Union (PACIWU);
2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;
3. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Mfg. Corporation petition-ANGLO;
and
4. No Union.
The representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties to a pre- election
conference to thresh out the mechanics for the conduct of the actual election.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15).
and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Labor dismissing the appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation
and herein petitioner (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18).
This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the
petitioner and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial
Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of
Labor Relations are as follows:
On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election, alleging
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that there exist a C.BA between the respondent and the Warren
Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to expire on
July 31, 1986.
While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on
conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed on July 25,1985,
stipulating, among others, as follows:
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To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have
agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August
25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by MOLE. ...
It is cleanly understood that the certified union in the said projected election
shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry
date on July 31, 1986.
On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this Office, directing that a consent
election be held among the rank and file workers of the company, with the
following contending unions:
1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU)
2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;
3. No Union.
On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held, and yielded the following
results:
PACIWU----------------------------94
WMWU----------------------------193
Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an Election Protest.
In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed by the union this time with
the Valenzuela branch office of this Ministry, and after conciliation, the parties
finally agreed, among others, to wit:
In consideration of this payment, ... individual complaints and PACIWU hereby
agree and covenant that the following labor complaints/disputes are
considered amicably settled and withdrawn/dismissed, to wit: ...
On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election Protest
filed by the PACIWU was ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed
by the filing of a petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and
Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both
opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither
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petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-year no certification
election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent,
therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification election be dismissed. (Rollo,
pp. 11-12).
As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Ministry of
Labor and Employment, ordered on August 8, 't 986 the holding of a certification
election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren se
Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned choices.
Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein filed separate
motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed
the same for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with
the company itself opting not to appeal.
The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of November 3, 1986 without
giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment and
issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for (Rollo, pp. 18-20).
The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on November 27, 1986
(Ibid.,pp. 29-32). The public respondent through the Hon. Solicitor General filed
its Comment to the petition on December 10, 1986 ( Ibid., pp. 34-43) and private
respondent ANGLO, filed its comment on December 16, 1986 ( Ibid., pp. 45- 51).
The petitioner with leave of court filed its reply to comment entitled a rejoinder
on January 6,1987 (Ibid., pp. 52-62).
In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was given due course and the
parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 76).
Memorandum for public respondent was filed on February 20,1987 (Ibid., p. 82-
88). Respondent PACIWU's memorandum was filed on March 18, 1987 ( Ibid., pp.
95-99). SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum was filed on March 23,1987 ( Ibid., pp.
100-1 09) and the petitioner's memorandum was filed on March 31,1987 ( Ibid.,
pp. 110-120).
In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues:
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A. The holding of a certification election at the bargaining unit is patently
premature and illegal.
B. The petition filed by private respondents do not have the statutory 30%
support requirement.
C. Petitioner was denied administrative due process when excluded from med-
arbitration proceedings.
The petition is devoid of merit.
A.
Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following grounds:
Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
provides, among others:
... however no certification election may be held within one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the declaration of a final certification result.
and
Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:
No certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any
Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between the employer and a
legitimate labor organization.
Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no certification election rule
and the principle of the Contract Bar Rule.
This contention is untenable.
The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25,1985
at the Company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was
a consent election and not a certification election(Emphasis supplied). As
correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed
one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation
of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a
certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate
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and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a
certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor
entitle the participants thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA
although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to choose
their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty(60) day freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return to Work
Agreement signed by the parties emphasized the following:
To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg. Corp., parties have
agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August
25,1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by the Ministry of
Labor and Employment .....
It is clearly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall
respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date onJuly 31, 1986. (Rollo, pp. 46, 48-49).
It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was
not for the purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining
representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being an
existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only
to determine which labor union shag administer the said existing contract.
Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code apply:
ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify
the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the
duty of both parties to keep thestatus quo and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
Corollary to the above, Article 257 of the New Labor Code expressly states that
No certification election issue shall be entertained if a collective agreement
which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of this Code exists
between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining
agreement." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
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Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers Association v. the
Director of the Bureau of labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be
no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election
at the proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the three year
period ...
Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the petitioner and the
Company on June 2, 1986 does not adversely affect the petition for certification
election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
clearly provides:
Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.There representation case shall not,
however, be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or
during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of
the representation case.
Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and explicit, leaving no room for
construction or interpretation, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that
administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and
are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137
SCRA 314 [1985)).
As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining agreement was due to expire
on July 31, 1 986. The Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of employees
signified their consent to the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized
intervenor to file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he found that the
petition and intervention were supported by more than 30% of the members of
the bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of the Labor Code
makes it mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification
election (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, et al., 134
SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng
Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was
even more specific when it stated "No administrative agency can ignore the
imperative tone of the above article. The language used is one of command.
Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the
support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be
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granted, The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under
the circumstances, "mandatory"..."
The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the petition and
intervention filed in the case at bar were supported by 30% of the members of
the workers is clear and definite.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. L-51602 January 17, 1985
GEORGE & PETER LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR, respondents.
Manuel B. Pastrana for petitioner.
Gerardo E. Gestopa Jr. for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner George and Peter Lines, Incorporated, is a domestic corporation
engaged in shipping, while respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU) is a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor.
On July 6, 1978, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by respondent ALU
with Region VII, Cebu City, of the Ministry of Labor, praying that it be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of petitioner corporation there being no labor union organized
thereat.
Petitioner corporation OPPOSED the petition stating that respondent Union does
not represent the majority of the employees concerned; and that more than
80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels claim that they are not
members of any union and have no desire to join any. It then filed on August 17,
1978, a Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all whether
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the employees concerned wanted respondent ALU to be their sole bargaining
representative.
On August 25, 1978, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying
respondent ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the licensed and
unlicensed employees of petitioner corporation, opining that the majority
membership status of any union is determined before or at the time of filing of
the petition and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime.
Petitioner corporation moved for reconsideration alleging that the employees
concerned, consisting of about 80%, denied their membership with respondent
Union, and that a certification election should be called in the interest of fairness
and justice.
The entire records of the case were forwarded to the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations. On February 5, 1979, the BLR Director modified the Order of
August 25, 1978 by directing a certification election among the rank and file
employees of petitioner corporation. Reconsideration sought by respondent
Union was denied by the BLR Director on May 31, 1979, on the ground that there
exists a doubt regarding the majority status of respondent ALU because of the
withdrawal of membership by the workers, and directing the Labor Relations
Division of the Regional Office of origin to hold a pre-election conference, and
to conduct the certification election.
Respondent Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration, argued that publicrespondent erred in finding its majority status doubtful as the same was proven
during the hearing of the case before the Med-Arbiter.
The BLR Director, in its questioned Decision of August 13, 1979, reconsidered its
Resolution of May 31, 1979, and directly certified respondent ALU as the sole
bargaining age it of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation
Thus, this Petition for certiorari wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said
Decision, posing the following issues.
(1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor
commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly reversing his two previous
resolutions for the holding of a certification election?
(2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and exclusive
bargaining representative with petitioner thru a certification election? and
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(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election?
It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct certification by
respondent Union, a written manifestation duly signed by about 80% of the
employees concerned, retracting their membership from said union, was
submitted by them to the MOLE. Respondent Union submits, however, that the
employees were merely pressured by management into withdrawing their
membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that the
retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged majority
representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the issue in the Union's favor,
public respondent held that the withdrawal of membership from the Union
subsequent to the filing of the petition for direct certification did not affect the
same nor did it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.
We find for petitioner.
The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization
which it desires to join. 1The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory
and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a
certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-
adversary character, 2the bargaining unit to represent them. 3The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 4
As the right of respondent Union to represent the employees is seriously put in
doubt by the withdrawal of 80% of the membership, which the Union claims tobe involuntary, the best forum to determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure
exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification
election itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret
ballot. 5Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of
ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive
bargaining representative. 6That there are no competing Unions involved
should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being
the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still
choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employeesconcerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been
filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is
best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification
election. If respondent Union is confident that it commands the majority of the
workers, there is no reason why it should object to the holding of a certification
election.
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WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of August 17, 1979 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is hereby
directed to cause the holding of a certification election within thirty (30) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED
8. G.R. No. 75037 April 30, 1987
TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL,
ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES,
RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.
No. 75055 April 30, 1987
TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO
ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO
ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents.
Jaime G. de Leon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75037.
Pacifico de Ocampo and Benjamin C. Gascon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75055.
GUTIERREZ, JR.:
These consolidated petitions for certiorari seek the review and setting aside of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission's decision in NLRC Case No.
AB-6-11685-81 dated May 26, 1986, affirming the October 12, 1984 decision of
the Labor Arbiter, and of the NLRC resolution dated June 28, 1986, which denied
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and
members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and
registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of the petitioner company.
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On March 11, 1980, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed
between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in
TDI including herein private respondents, and a copy was filed with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MOLE) on October 29, 1980 for certification. The CBA
had a term of three (3) years from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982. It also containeda union security clause. which provides:
All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become
members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as
a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good
standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.
On or about the early part of October 1980, while the CBA was in effect
and within the contract bar periodthe private respondents joined another
union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang PilipinoKAMPIL) and organized its localchapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos
being elected President and Vice-President, respectively.
On November 7, 1980, KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to
determine union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file
a grievance with TDLU on November 7, 1980 pursuant to Article XV of the CBA.
Acting on the grievance of TDI, TDLU wrote the private respondents on
December 23, 1980 requiring them to explain why TDLU should not take
disciplinary action against them for, among other things
Disloyalty to the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (T.D.L.U.) by forming and joining
another union with a complete takeover intent as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all rank and file employees at TDI. (p. 16, Rollo)
TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with
its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Except for
Josefino Paguyo who, despite due notice, was absent during the investigation
conducted on January 2, 1981, all the private respondents were present and
given a chance to explain their side. Thereafter, in a resolution dated January 9,
1981, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board
of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the
Union effective January 16, 1981. By letter dated January 10, 1981, TDLU notified
TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that
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TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost
their membership with TDLU.
Acting on the demand of TDLU, TDI, in a Memorandum dated January 13, 1981,
notified "that effective January 16, 1981, we shall file the usual application for
clearance (with preventive suspension to take effect on the same day) to
terminate your services on the basis of the union security clause of our CBA.
Accordingly, TDI filed with the MOLE on January 14, 1981 its application for
clearance to terminate the employment of private respondents. This application
docketed as Case No. NCR-AC-1-435-81 specifically stated that the action
applied for was preventive suspension which will result in termination of
employment, ... due to (T)hreat to (P)roduction traceable to rival (U)nion
activity. The private respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal
dismissal against TDI and Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU,which complaint was docketed as Case No. STF-1-333-91. The cases were jointly
heard and tried by Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio.
However, on January 26, 1981, the Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents'
petition calling for a certification election among the rank and file employees of
TDI. The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-aliathat the existence of an uncertified
CBA cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election
(Emphasis supplied). On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), the order for the holding of a certification election was reversed and set
aside by the BLR on July 8,1982, thus:
A careful perusal of the records of the case will reveal that the uncertified CBA
was duly filed and submitted on 29 October 1980, to last until June 30, 1982.
Indeed, said CBA is certifiablefor havingcomplied with all the necessary
requirements for certification. Consistent with the intent and spirit of P.D. 1391
and its implementing rules, the contract bar rule should have been applied in
this case. The representation issue cannot be entertained except within the last
sixty (60) days of the collective agreement. (Emphasis supplied) (p. 243, Rollo)
The last 60 days in a collective bargaining agreement is referred to as the
"freedom period" when rival union representation can be entertained during the
existence of a valid CBA. In this case, the "freedom period" was May 1 to June
30, 1982. After the term of the CBA lapsed, KAMPIL moved for a reconsideration
of the July 8, 1982 decision of the BLR on July 23, 1982 on the same ground that
since the CBA then in question was uncertified, the contract bar rule could not
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be made to apply. On December 3, 1982, the BLR reversed itself, but for a
different reason and heldthat:
Movant union (Kampil) now seeks for the reconsideration of that Order on the
ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence,
the contract bar rule cannot properly apply in this case.
After a more careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that
the instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the
arguments raised by herein movant.
It should be noted that the alleged CBA has now expired. Its expiry date being
30 June 1982. Consequently; there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing
a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of
respondent. The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening
event, that is, the expiration of the contract. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 244-245,
Rollo)
TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision with the Supreme Court,
docketed as Case No. G.R. No. 63995 TDI argued that KAMPIL did not have a
cause of action when the petition for certification was filed on November 7,
1980 because the freedom period was not yet in effect. The fact that the BLR
issued its order when the 60-day freedom period had supervened, did not cure
this defect. Moreover, the BLR decision completely overlooked or ignored the
fact that on September 21, 1982, a new CBA had been executed between theTDLU and TDI so that when the BLR allowed a certification election in its order
dated December 3, 1982, the contract bar rule was applicable again. This Court
denied TDLU's petition in a minute resolution on November 14,1983.
Using the foregoing as relevant and applicable to the consolidated cases for
the clearance application for termination filed by TDI and the illegal dismissal
case filed by the private respondents on October 12, 1984, Labor Arbiter
Teodorico Dogelio rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate
the private respondents and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with
backwages. It should be noted that the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision
even before the petitioner company could file its memorandum, formal offer of
exhibits and its manifestation and motion to correct tentative markings of
exhibits. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC in NLRC
Case No. AB-6-11685-81 in its decision dated May 20,1986.
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TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration of the questioned decision, In its
motion, TDI alleged, inter alia, that respondent NLRC did not rule on the validity
of the CBA as a contract, neither did it resolve squarely the validity of the
enforcement of the union security clause of the CBA. TDI stated further that
respondent NLRC failed to consider the fact that at the time the privaterespondents were expelled by TDLU and consequently terminated by TDI, the
union security clause of the CBA was in full force and effect, binding TDI and
TDLU.
For its part, TDLU said that the decision of the Supreme Court in the certification
case could not be used by respondent NLRC to justify its decision in the dismissal
case because the issues on the cases are entirely different and miles apart. It is
for this reason that there are two (2) cases that are involved. TDLU explained
that the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the petition for certiorari of TDI and
TDLU in the certification case because the original CBA existing at the time the
private respondents formed and joined KAMPIL had already expired. However,
TDLU made it clear that when the private respondents organized KAMPIL in TDI,
the same CBA was still in force and the disaffiliation did not take place within the
freedom period. Hence, at that point in time, the private respondents
committed disloyalty against the union.
On June 26, 1986, respondent NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by TDI and TDLU for lack of merit. In its petition, TDI alleged that:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS
DISCRETION AND IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW IN RENDERING ITS DECISION
EN BANC OF MAY 20, 1986 AND IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THEREOF IN ITS RESOLUTION SOLUTION DATED JUNE 26, 1986
BECAUSE
1. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAS IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WERE EXPELLED BY TDLU FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP ON JANUARY 16,
1981 AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TDLU HAD DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA, THE SAID CBA WAS
AN EXISTING AND A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND TDLU, AND
EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
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2. IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT A UNION SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CBA UNDER
THE LAWS;
3. THE EXPULSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM TDLU WAS THE UNION'S
OWN DECISION. HENCE, WHEN TDLU DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION OF THE CBA BY SEPARATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT, FOR HAVING LOST THEIR
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION, THE PETITIONER WAS DUTY BOUND TO DO SO;
4. THE ALLUSION THAT THE CBA WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS (BLR) HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A VALID
CONTRACT BETWEEN ALL PARTIES THERETO.
II
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
COMMIT ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PETITIONER'S PRODUCTION EFFORTS TO BE
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND EVENTUAL REMOVAL.
On the other hand, petitioner TDLU in essence contends that:
THE CBA IS VALID AND BINDING NOT ONLY ON TDI AND TDLU BUT LIKEWISE ON
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RATIFIED THE SAME IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF TDLU; HENCE, THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE IS VALID
AND BINDING ON THEM;
THE ACTION OF TDLU IN REQUESTING FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION
SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA BETWEEN TDI AND TDLU IS PART OF THE INHERENT
RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION;
TDLU CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES BECAUSE ALL
THAT IT DID WAS ASK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CBA, WHICH CBA HAS NEVER
BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE SOUGHT TO
BE ENFORCED WAS NOT ALSO DECLARED NULL AND VOID;
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISAFFILIATED THEMSELVES FROM TDLU BY ORGANIZING
THE LOCAL CHAPTER OF KAMPIL IN TDI IN OCTOBER 1980, BUT THE ACT OF
DISAFFILIATION WAS COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE FREEDOM PERIOD PROVIDED
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1391 WHICH LIMIT ALL PETITIONS FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION, DISAFFILIATION AND INTERVENTION TO THE 60 DAY
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FREEDOM PERIOD PRECEDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE CBA. HENCE, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS COULD BE EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP FOR DISLOYALTY AND
OTHER INIMICAL ACTS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF TDLU.
The private respondents admit that the root of the whole controversy in the
instant case is the organization of a Local Union Chapter of KAMPIL at TDI and
the subsequent filing of a petition for certification election with the MOLE by said
local chapter. This local chapter of KAMPIL was organized with the help of,
among others, the private respondents some of whom were elected union
officers of said chapter. They contend that their act of organizing a local
chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was
pursuant to their constitutional right to self-organization.
The issues to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not TDI was justified in
terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis ofTDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA
between TDI and TDLU; and (b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor
practice in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private
respondents.
We enforce basic principles essential to a strong and dynamic labor movement.
An established postulate in labor relations firmly rooted in this jurisdiction is that
the dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in
accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights
is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice.
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed
shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop,
the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance
of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and
strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of
the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. (See Pascual, Labor
Relations Law, 1986 Edition, pp. 221-225 and cases cited therein.) There is no
showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguardsenunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security
arrangements brought to us for review.
In this light, the petitioner points out that embedded at the very core and
asraison d'etrefor the doctrine which enforces the closed-shop, the union shop,
and other forms of union security clauses in the collective bargaining
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agreement is the principle of sanctity and inviolability of contracts guaranteed
by the Constitution.
This Court speaking thru Mr. Justice Labrador, in Victorias Milling Co., Inc., v.
Victorias-Manapia Workers Organization(9 SCRA 154), ruled:
Another reason for enforcing the closed-shop agreement is the principle of
sanctity or inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. As a matter
of principle the provision of the Industrial Peace Act relating freedom to
employees to organize themselves and set their representative for entering into
bargaining agreements, should be subordinate to the constitutional provision
protecting the sanctity of contracts. We can not conceive how freedom to
contract, which should be allowed to be exercised without limitation may be
subordinated to the freedom of laborers to choose the organization they desire
to represent them. And even if the legislature had intended to do so and madesuch freedom of the laborer paramount to the sanctity of obligation of
contracts, such attempt to override the constitutional provision would
necessarily and ipso factobe null and void.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-
shop agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the
contract. The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor
practice, as it was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to beregular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and
binding.
In the instant case, the CBA in question provides for a Union Security Clause
requiring:
(c) All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this contract become
members of the union in accordance with its constitution and by-laws shall as a
condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good
standing in the union for the duration of the agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Having ratified that CBA and being then members of the TDLU, the private
respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to
maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a
requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private
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respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the
corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, there was no
freedom period to speak of yet. For under Presidential Decree No. 1391,
promulgated May 29, 1978, the law applicable in this instance provides:
No petition for certification election for intervention disaffiliationshall be
entertained or given due course except within the 60 day freedom period
immediately preceding the execution of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
and under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules Implementing PD 1391 "... pending
certification of a duly filed collective bargaining agreement nopetition for
certification electionin the same bargaining unit shall be entertained or
processed." (promulgated September 19, 1978). The Labor Code further
mandates that "no certification election shall be entertained if a Collective
Bargaining Agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the l ife of such
collective agreement (Art. 257).
The fact, therefore, that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) failed to certify or
act on TDLU's request for certification of the CBA in question is of no moment to
the resolution of the issues presented in this case. The BLR itself found in its order
of July 8, 1982 that "the certified CBA was duly filed and submitted on October
29, 1980, to last until June 30, 1982 is certifiable for having complied with all the
requirements for certification.
The validity of the CBA is not here assailed by private respondents. They
admitted having organized the local chapter of KAMPIL at TDI, although it is
claimed that this was done when there was no certified CBA between TDI and
TDLU that would constitute a bar to the certification election. Of significance is
the ruling inManalang v. Artex Development Co., Inc.,(21 SCRA 561, 569)
decided on a factual setting where the petitioners had affiliated themselves
with another labor union, Artex Free Workers, without first terminating their
membership with Bagong Buhay Labor Union (BBLU) and without the knowledgeof the officers of the latter union, for which reason the petitioners were expelled
from the BBLU for acts of disloyalty; and the company, upon the behest of BBLU
dismissed them from employment pursuant to the closed-shop stipulation in a
Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Court ruled:
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The validity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of March 4, 1960 is not
assailed by the petitioners. Nor do they deny that they were members of the
BBLU prior to March 4, 1960 and until they were expelled from the union. ...
The petitioners further contention that the closed-shop provision in the collective
Bargaining Agreement is illegal because it is unreasonable,restrictive of right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution is a futile exercise in
argumentation of this Court has in a number of cases sustained closed-shop as
valid union security.
Finally, even if we assume, in gratia argumenti,that the petition were unaware of
the stipulation set forth in the collective bargaining agreement since their
membership in the BBLU prior to t the expulsion thereform is undenied there can
be no question that as long as the agreement with closed-shop provision was in
force they were bound by it. Neither their ignorance of,nor their dissatisfactionwith, its terms and condition would justify breach thereof or the formation by
them of a union of their own.As has been aptly said the collective bargaining
agreement entered into by officers of a union as agent of the member,and an
employer,gives rise to valid inforcible contractual relation against the individual
union members in matters that affect the entire membership or large classes of
its member who employed under an agreement between the union and his
employer is bound by the provision thereof,since it is a joint and several contract
of the members of the union and entered into by the union as their agent.
In an earlier case, this Court held:
Nor can it be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss
an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty
or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair
labor practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor
can agree in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the
union, and cohesion and integrity of their organization And as an act of loyalty
a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor
union and to consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation. Thisis what was done by respondent union. And the respondent employer did
nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the herein
complainants upon the recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not
only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is
allowed by the Magna Charta of Labor when it provided that while it is
recognized that an employee shall have the right to self-organization, it is at the
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same time postulated that such right shall not injure the right of the labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein (Section 41(b) par. 1, Republic Act 875). This provision is
significant. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-
organization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employeeis given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted
in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization The law
requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to the
full extent its cohesion and integrity.We therefore, see nothing improper in the
disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into
between the parties. (Ang Malayang Manggagawa ng Ang Tibay Enterprises, et
al. v. Ang Tibay, et al. 102 Phil. 669) (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with petitioner TDLU that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in
G.R. No. 63995 entitled TDLU v. Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipinacould not
be construed as to extinguish the right of TDLU to expel private respondents for
acts of disloyalty when they organized a local chapter of KAMPIL in October
1980 in TDI. The subject matter brought to this Court in G.R. No. 63995 was the
decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 3, 1982 requiring the
holding of certification election in TDI within twenty (20) days from receipt of said
BLR's decision which reads:
Movant union (KAMPIL) now seeks for the reconsideration of that order on the
ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence,the contract bar rule cannot properly apply to this case.
After a careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the
instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments
raised by herein movant.
It should be noted that alleged CBA has now expired, its expiry date being 30
June 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent.
The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening even that is,the expiration of the contract.(ANNEX C, TDI's Memorandum dated November
28,1986; Emphasis supplied).
It is clearly apparent that the BLR aforesaid Order which this Court upheld in G.R.
No. 63995 when it dismissed TDLU's petition in a minute resolution, did not pass
upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents
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from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty. That question was
neither raised nor passed upon in the certification case, and was not a proper
issue therein because a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a
mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determine the bargaining
unit to represent the employees (George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated LaborUnion, 134 SCRA 82). Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of
said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private
respondents insofar as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and
termination from employment of TDI is concerned.
Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the
CBA in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982.
Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification
election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening
event, that is, the expiration of the CBA."
But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of
such supervening event, ordered the holding of a certification election could
not and did not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of
disloyalty committed in October 1980 when they organized KAMPIL's local
chapter in TDI while still members of TDLU. The ineluctable fact is that private
respondents committed acts of disloyalty against TDLU while the CBA was in
force and existing for which they have to face the necessary sanctions lawfully
imposed by TDLU.
In Villar v. Inciong(121 SCRA 444), we held that "petitioners, although entitled to
disaffiliation from their union and to form a new organization of their own must
however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the
security clause of the CBA: "
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of
self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of
dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and
destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit theirrights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence
and equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling
mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial
measures, in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its preservation and
continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and
fall. (Idem., p. 458)
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The private respondents cannot, therefore, escape the effects of the security
clause of their own applicable collective bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 26, 1986 and the resolution dated June 26,
1986 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. AB-
11685-81 are hereby SET ASIDE. The expulsion of private respondents from
TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION and their consequent suspension and
termination from employment with TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., without
reinstatement and backwages, are hereby SUSTAINED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991
ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, and UNION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(UCECA), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), more specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), to supervise the activities of government employees; in this case, unions of
judiciary personnel who serve in the Court of Appeals.
The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has concentrated on
labor relations in the private sector. Its enforcement machinery and the mass of
law and jurisprudence governing its functions are entirely geared to the
handling of the peculiar problems arising in private employment. In this case, the
BLR has tasked itself to intervene not only in a quarrel between two groups ofgovernment employees but more important, in a quarrel between employees
working for an independent branch of government, the Judiciary.
The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent
Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent
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to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2)
whether or not a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting
for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for
certification election.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of
Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or
certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as BLR Case
No. 4-11-90) alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals
Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer
enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA
alleged that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.
On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that
the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303)
employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA with
misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition, a
copy of the names of members some of which were twice listed, written without
consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were forged. In
addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon
learning of the fraudulent act, resigned from the union.
In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraudand claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors.
On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate
of Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159 and
in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved
for deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of
BLR 6-19-90.
On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being
dilatory, to which ACAE replied that the maxim ofres ipsa loquiturshould be
applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak for
themselves."
On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90
(cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.
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It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that
UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of
the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's
motion for reconsideration was denied.
On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election
conference.
Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election,
ACAE filed this petition forcertiorariand prohibition. We issued a temporary
restraining order effective August 29, 1990.
The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to
handle disputes among associations of employees working for the judiciary.
There is no question that government employees may organize provided thepurposes behind such organization are legitimate.
No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government employees as
having the right of self-organization. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III, 1987 Constitution)
In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.
xxx xxx xxx
(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)
The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:
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Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law. (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs)
xxx xxx xxx
The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government employees
is of more than passing concern especially when those who organize and hope
to engage in certain forms of concerted action are court employees.
Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent
position. They have a right but it is not clear to what extent they may exercise it.
Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated problems arising from
unionism in government as distinguished from unionism in the private sector.
Obviously, the same rules do not and cannot apply under the present state of
the law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil service laws and
budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws
required by the constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights andprivileges to all workers in the public and private sectors.
At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government service
are governed by law, not by the relative strengths of management and labor as
they hammer out mutually acceptable terms across the collective bargaining
table. Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management" in
government areemployees.At the same time, everybody forms part of the
"owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The qualifications and eligibilities
of civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of salaries,
disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are
governed by statutes, rules, and established principles which are the products of
decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil service systems
abroad.
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The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of employment
including the regulation of labor-management relations in the government
sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal them, form part of the
response to any requests or demands of organized groups of government
personnel. Any understanding between the top officials of a governmentagency and the union which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate to the
law governing the particular issue or situation.
We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should
supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit the determination
strictly to the question before us the holding of certification elections.
Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after the certified bargaining
representative flexes its muscles and engages in concerted action will have to
await the filing of more appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment of
applicable legislation.
The Constitution provides that the rights ofallworkers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike, are guaranteed provided these are in accordance with law.There is
reference to the need for a law governing the procedures incident to self-
organization.
What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of Appeals?
The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order No. 180issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right
to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a Public Sector Labor-
Management Council; and for Other Purposes."
The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:
SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil
Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The
application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department
which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications may also be filed with the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall
immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations
within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
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SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certification shall be
issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization
with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and
defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly
approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary ofLabor and Employment.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of
the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be
designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees.
SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded
voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is
registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, and that the said organization has the majority support of the rank-
and-file employees in the organizational unit.
SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees'
organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor
Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and
shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file
employees in said organization unit. (Rollo, pp. 235-237)
It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure for a
limited purpose. Certain provisions and procedures in the Labor Code were
engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation of unionism in the
governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month and a half before
Congress reconvened after the revolutionary government was replaced by the
present government, it unfortunately lacks a legislative record, parliamentary
debates, and the insights that only the elected representatives of all the people
can bring to bear in the regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship.
The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits its
challenge to an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The
argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical conclusion, only this
Court would have the power to supervise certification elections in the Court of
Appeals. The task is not for us and we certainly have no intention to undertake it.
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It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the power, to
regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the Supreme Court
included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity of the
judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It
is axiomatic, for example, that any demands of court employees for highercompensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other
agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved
legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by us, the final
decision on all such questions would still be with this Court.
All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to
supervise the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the same way
that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities
to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the
certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise,
machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180
requires organizations of government employees to register with bothCSC and
DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or
experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job.
Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate
employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman andthe DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining
whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive
at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it
occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification
elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.
One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE
cannot persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because
its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its having organized under the
same executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads:
1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity,
is an association of government employees duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of Executive Order No. 180, duly accredited as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals, with
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office address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M. Orosa Street, Ermita,
Manila. (Rollo, p. 2)
The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it no
longer enjoys the support of the rank-and-file employees. ACAE claims that it
has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered names numbering 88
are all deducted from the 303 listed names for UCECA, there would actually be
215 members only left. Even assuming, therefore, that the petitioning union has
satisfied the required percentage of signatures (20%) according to section of
Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the
incumbent bargaining representative still has the clear majority.
It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the majority
status of the petitioner that a petition for certification election was filed.Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a petitioning union to
prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent representative or who
among its listed members are not actually affiliated with it. What is merely
required for a petition for certification election to be granted is the filing of a
verified petition which is supported by the signatures of at least twenty (20%)
percent of the covered employees. It is also essential that it is not filed within
one (1) year from the date a declaration of a previous final certification election
result was issued.
The BLR has satisfied