becker's anthropology

8/13/2019 Becker's Anthropology

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BECKER'S ANTHROPOLOGY:THE SHAPE OF FINITUDE

Jane KopasUniversity of Scranton

ABSTRACT

This article examines the anthropoloy of Ernest Becker through themedium of his notion of creatureliness which represents a dominantfocus, especially in his later work. Two elements stand out in thisconsiderationself-esteem, which as a motivation disguisescreaturehood and makes it bearable, and the fear of death, which isthe final confirmation of creaturehood. After examining Becker'streatment of these elements, the article explores several dimensionsof a religious view of creatureliness which have not been taken up inorder to show that Becker is dealing with finitude rather thancreatureliness. A fuller treatment of creatureliness would require anapproach that does justice to these dimensions, and, if one wishes asBecker does to demonstrate a convergence between religion and thesocial sciences, it would require a more coherently developed methodof correlation. The article concludes with an examination of thespirituality that emerges for Becker out of his perspective on the

human.

Ernest Becker's knowledge of his impending death presented himwith a rare opportunity and challengeto put to the test his owntheories about human nature. Creaturehood, as finitude, was one of thecentral themes in his theory, reflecting both his assessment of a dominant characteristic in human nature and a major emphasis in his ownspirituality. His view deserves further examination for the insights itmay offer to contemporary theologians who are concerned with a re-

vitalization of the concept of creaturehood in theological anthropologyand for its illumination ofaspirituality strongly influenced by contemporary currents.

Becker, who died in 1974atthe age of49,spent the betterpartof hisacademic career working toward the development of what he called a"science of man." In the process of working out his theory, his careersuffered the vicissitudes of the scholar in search ofacommunity. Afterteaching at Syracuse University, he moved to the University of Califor

nia at Berkeley in 1965. His considerable popularity with students therewas not matched by acceptance from his colleagues, and, despite a


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24 HORIZONS

students' petition and the allocation of student government funds toretain him as a visting scholar, Becker took a position in 1967 at SanFrancisco State teaching social psychology. He finally moved in 1969 to

Simon Fraser University in Vancouver where he taught until his death in1974. During this time his work was steadily shaped by the convictionthat an adequate understanding of the human would be attained onlythrough the integration of a variety of disciplines, especially thoserooted in the social sciences.

Becker's belief in the importance of the social sciences for thearticulation of a theory of the human is exemplified in a statement hemade shortly before his death in an interview with Sam Keen. Beckerstated with agreatdeal of satisfaction that because he began with sciencehe believed he had accomplished what Paul Tillich had not, namely toshow that religion and science converge in their discoveries of themeaning of creatureliness as a fundamental human condition.1 Thiscondition, whose analysis brought Becker through the awareness ofearthly creative influences to the brink of an acceptance of a divineCreator,reflectsaspiritual attitude thatisdetermined not to be deceivedby human securities whether they are protections for fragile self-esteemor assertions of autonomy. It will be useful, therefore, to examine Beck

er's work to see how he understands creatureliness, whether he hasdemonstrated a convergence of science and religion on this point, andwhat contribution his ideas maketocontemporary theology and spirituality.

I. Becker's Analysis of Creatureliness

Though Becker began in the field of anthropology, his analysis ofhuman existence draws from sociological, psychiatric, psychological,

and philosophical sources as well. Of all these sources, it appears thathis insistent desire to synthesize a "science of man" takes its strongestimpetus from psychology, particularly from the questions and issuesraised by Freud and the alternatives posed byRank.As an indication ofthe centrality of his dialogue with Freud, he notes in the preface to TheBirth and Deathof Meaningthat he has made his peace with Freud andhas cometoterms with whatisvital in Freudian theory.2But as we see inTheDenial of Death, the dialogue has not ended, and Freud has notceased to provide insights for Becker, or at least to provideafoil for theworking out of his ownideas.3Inparticular, the notion of creatureliness,which becomes a dominant element in Becker's anthropology, seems to


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Kopas: Becker's Anthropology: The Shape of Finitude 25

take its inspiration from Freud who is concerned preeminently with theformative influence ofotherson the development of individuals as well

astheir resistancetothose influences.Inspite of the positive debt BeckerowestoRank,the influence ofFreudstill strongly affects his work and itstonality.

The theme of creatureliness is not the main focus of any single workof Becker's, but the idea comes through in indirect ways in a number ofhis early works and assumes greater prominence in his later works,especially in The DenialofDeathand EscapefromEvil.The theme ofcreatureliness, significant by Becker's own admission at the end of hislife, can be viewed best for him through two motivating influences. Theyare self-esteem, which as a motivation disguises and makes creaturehood bearable, and the fear of death, which is the final confirmation ofcreaturehood.

Becker's analysis of self-esteemasthe dominant human motive restsupon the universality of human beings' dependence upon society. Having affirmed in one of his earliest works that every individual in everyculture must experience the self asaprimary locus of value inaworld ofmeaning, Beckercarriesoutthisnotion in greater detail inThe Birth and

Death ofMeaning where he sees self-esteem as the basic law of humanlife developed out of human interactions which are the source of meaning.4InEscape fromEvil, where he observes that human beings' anxieties are the consequences of the urge to hold on to the meanings givenin one's society, Becker concludes that self-esteem may be so bound upwith the motive of avoiding anxiety due to loss ofasecure place in theworld that it paradoxically can increase conditions of evil in the world.5

The paradox arises from society's promotion of values that enhanceself-esteem while at the same time having to defend those values whichare fragile and subject to threats. The more dogmatically values arepromoted and defended, the more they can contribute to their owndemise when their character as social fictions is not recognized.

From the earliest stages ofanindividual's life, self-esteem dependsupon others. The mechanism for acquiring self-esteem grows morecomplexasthe ego develops. At first, the child acquires self-esteem or itsrudimentary equivalent through physical satisfactions of nourishmentand comfort. As the socialization process proceeds, the acquisition of a

sense of worth is built through the approvalorreinforcing responses ofadults who are responsible for the child's survival and development.Th h th h f b li f f i ti th


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26 HORIZONS

The socialization process, then, is essential for humanization and for theestablishment of self-esteem. The Enlightenment, according to Becker,discovered the problem of alienation, "the problem of social constraint

on human freedom," but it lackedatheory of how society causes alienation.6Itwas Freud who gave the clue to the source of alienation when heshowed that self-esteem is dependent upon symbolic satisfactions.7

In his various works, Becker repeatedly makes the point that theindividual is dependent upon society for meaning, and, therefore, forself-esteem, yet the hero-systems or meanings provided are social fictions. Freedom from the undue influence of society and knowledge ofthe relativity of society's hero-systems do not come easily. Human be

ings are strongly conditioned by early training and the world view oftheir society. Yet, one way or another, human beings in the modernworld come to feel uncomfortable and alienated with this molding ofcharacter, developingaresistance to imposed meanings as they grow inautonomy. The anxiety that results is a symptom of the Oedipal complex.

Becker reinterprets the Oedipal complex as an inevitable accompaniment ofthesocialization process, rather thanas aconsequence of sexualtensions. The Oedipal complex for him is the neuroticism that is built

into each person by the formative influences in human development.The relativity of the meaning that infusesaperson's life is heightened bythe realization that onehasnot chosen the meanings that have been mostinfluential, yet they have become essential to one's self-esteem.Inaddition, anxiety is created when objects or loci of meaning are threatened.8

The humanization process itself is the source of neurosis. Movingbeyond Freud who maintained that moral dependence upon anotherresulted from the individual's primal sexual dependencies epitomized

in the Oedipal complex, Becker holds with Rank that dependency underthe Oedipal complex is supported not so much by primal dependencyitself as by the continuing refusal to acknowledge creatureliness or thehelplessness that is exemplified in the need for others as a source andconfirmation of meaning.9

Itbecomes evident as we uncover the dimensions of Becker's workhow compatible with Freud's is his assessment of the salvific functionsof knowledge. Having asserted that creaturehood is a fundamental condition of being human as well as a source of human beings' anxiety or

neurosis, Becker maintains that the way toattainauthentic existence andto avoid the cycle of protecting vested interests and meanings is to


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cultural creations are. One learns to control one's thought and behavior,or at least to avoid illusion, through the knowledge of critical reason.

Thus,the modernherofor Becker is the one who supports contradictionswithout becoming disillusioned or bitter, the one who recognizes personal and societal defenses and self-deceptions. It is the knowledge ofhuman conditioning that will liberate persons so they do not fall prey tothe seductions of self-important in any culture.10In fact, Becker proposes in BeyondAlienation that this goal should be the focal point of aneducational philosophy, that the curriculum should be designed touncover progressively the individual, social, historical, and theologicaldimensions of alienation.11Though Becker seems optimistic about this

project and its potential for initiatingatrue community of freedom, it isnot clear where the resources will be found to overcome what he describes as a natural resistance to surrendering defenses of self-esteem.We can only assume that the critical function of rationality represents apreeminent form of knowledge with a certain measure of autonomy.Without denying the value of the critical function of rationalityas aformof self-transcendence, one must recognize that it is not the only form ofhuman transcendence or the only one relevant for dealing with

creaturehood, though it is the only one apparent in Becker's treatmentofself-esteem.12It should be noted, however, that while Becker is close toFreud in his reliance on this form of knowledge and his suspicion ofculture, he goes beyond Freud in accepting the validity of a religiousdimension of experience.

Becker's conclusion that the individual is "created" and limitedthrough social interactions and the meaning systems they provide is nothis last word on creatureliness. He asserts that even the "quintessen-tially" free person needs others, and, in recognizing the limits of all

human endeavors, ultimately needs God to make sense ofafree horizonof meaning. It is at this point that Becker distinguishes between scientific creatureliness and religious creatureliness. Scientific creaturelinessis exemplified in the kind of assessment Freud made of socialization. It isthe human condition of having been created by others and of beingreluctant to acknowledge that condition. Religious creatureliness, onthe other hand, involves recognizing and accepting these limits alongwith the final fact of limits, one's own death and the possibility of a

transcendent ground of limits.

13

In their basic creatureliness, human beings center on their ownenergies in order to assure victory over life Once one exposes the


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28 HORIZONS

weakness and emptiness of human efforts, oneisforcedtoreexamine thewhole problem of power linkages in order to uncover a real source ofcreative and operative power. It is here that Becker says one begins to

consider creatureliness vis--visacreator who is first cause of all createdthings, not merely the second-hand intermediate creators of society, theparents and panoply of cultural heroes.14But from his description, itappears that the process by which one comes to this realization isprimarilyarationalrather thanexperiential one. He does not begin withthe individual's apprehension ofacreaturely relation to a transcendentpower such as may be perceived in religious experience, but insteadadvances toward it by inference.

In addition to the social conditions that promote self-esteem as anevasion of creaturehood, the second major area in which Becker considers creatureliness is the final limit situation of death. Ultimately, awareness of creaturehood reaches its peak in the various forms of the denialofdeath which are disguised in even the loftiest human achievements.Since the quest for self-esteem is at the same time a quest for power, thedenial of death will be demonstrated as the individual seeks to avoidwhat threatens power and self-esteem.

Becker sees the denial of death as an exercise of power consistent

with his basic understanding of power. "All power is in essence powerto deny mortality."15For Becker this is the power than humankind isobsessed with, and it expresses itself most generally in the desire toincrease oneself. With death the power to increase oneself is clearly at an end. It should be made clear, if it is not already, thatBeckerisnot merely concerned with physical death.Like anysignificanthuman experience,theanticipation of death is dominated by concerns ofself-esteem. He observes, therefore, that it is not merely deathperse that

human beings fear, but death with insignificance.

16

If powertoincrease oneselfisfundamental,itwill call forth expressions of fear as well as of power. The threats to self-esteem which occurinavariety ofways,from daily personal encounterstothe disintegrationof one's meaning system, find their most vivid exemplification in theindividual's confrontation with his or her own death. For Becker, theintensity of response that is generated by the final fear liesatthe heart ofthe evil and violence of which human beings are capable. The atrocities

14ibid., p. 90."Becker,Escape fromEvil,p. 81.16Ibid., p. 4. Joseph Scimecca, "Cultural Hero-Systems and Religious Beliefs: The

Id l R l S i l S i f E t B k " R i f R li i R h 21 (F ll 1979)


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that scar human history can only be explained by Becker in terms of athreat strong enough to call into question the individual's source of

power and meaning.

17

Since human beings as individuals are powerless over death, theylook to a meaning system which will point to a transcendent powercapable of allaying their fears. Societies are constructed to provide themeaning system that will perform this function, but only religion represents a meaning system that is cosmic and can satisfy the deepestlongings of human beings. Religion accomplishes this task by takingindividuals out of narrow self-serving frameworks and liberating themfor service to larger purposes, while at the same time it offers an oppor

tunity to tame self-protective instincts that lead individuals to actdestructively against others.Inaddition, religion brings individuals intocontact with a transcendent power that can redeem their own loss ofpower in death.

Becker admits that he does not get at the actual fear of death as anobject of empirical investigation, but he believes his conclusions arevalid because repression of what is threatening has been seen to be anormal function in human existence. He repeats the great lesson of

Freudian psychology that repression is normal self-protection and creative psychology.18By exploring repression's forms, one may discoverboth the fear of life and the fear of death.Oneneed not assume that if thefear of death is not apartof consciousness it is absent, for the fear of deathrarely shows its true face. Fear of death, for Becker, must be presentbehind normal functioning if the individual cares about self-preservation. Beyond physical self-preservation, both the needtomakeaname for oneself and the quest for and deification of heroes are signs ofthe attempt of individuals to deny their ultimate death and to participate

vicariously in the immortalization of their values.Having seen the main elements in Becker's view of creatureliness,

we may now move toward a closer examination of the notionitself.Butbefore we do that in the next section, it is important to note severalproblems that arise in relation to Becker's general approach. Becker seesthe convergence of religion and science to be in their functions ofshowing"manhis basic creatureliness" and of exposing the illusion thatsurrounds the denial of the final limits of creatureliness. in death.19Oneproblem that arises with this functional approach is that it is not basedon a full description of the meaning of religion or creatureliness. Religion involves the function he cites, but it must be seen in a larger sense as


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30 HORIZONS

transcends functions. Even in treating religion as an ideal hero system,Beckerrefrains from dealing withafuller view of religion that includesreligious experience or religious tradition.

20Hisapproach may not pre-

clude experience of a religious dimension, but it does not look to it toelucidatecreatureliness,nor does he indicate why hedoesnot.Taking amore comprehensive viewofreligion might have enabledBeckertotakeamore comprehensive view ofcreatureliness,for in a religious contextcreatureliness is concerned with both positive and negative aspectsinvolved in limits. His functional problemcentered approach tends tominimize positiveaspectsof limits in both nonreligious and religious

views. Thus it makes it difficult todiscern an adequate point ofcontact

between religious and nonreligious views and at the same time to seewhat are the points of nonconvergence.21

Another problem which surfaces inBecker'streatment of scientificand religious creatureliness is the way he describes the movement fromoneframeofreferencetothe other.Hesuggeststhatonemovestofaith inatranscendent Creator by discovering the limits of othercreators.But

becoming aware of the relative power of secondhand creators, eventhrough careful analysis, may not necessarily lead to belief in a trans-cendentCreator, though it may bringone closer to such a stance or

provideconfirmation for the faith one alreadyhas. Becker suggeststhatonearrives at an acceptance of creaturehood by honestly facing all ofone'sselfdeceptions,moving fromasenseofwormlikenessto asenseofawe and celebration.

22UsingSt.FrancisofAssisiasarareexampleof the

new perception attained through religiouscreatureliness,heattemptstoshow howonewouldactwithatransformed outlook.Butwhatisneededis a clearer justification of the epistemological framework in which areligiously symbolic perception of reality occurs. Otherwise, fact and

valueseemtoremainatodds, whichBeckerdoes not wishtomaintain.

In other words, the dynamic of the movement Becker seeks todescribe is notclear.The shiftseemsprimarilydependent uponasinglefactor,theindividual'sletting go ofanxietyand repression:"Ifwe werenotfearstricken animals who repressed awareness of ourselves and ourworld,then wewouldlive inpeaceandunafraidof death, trustingtotheCreator God and celebrating his creation." Facing all of one's selfdeceptionsin the mannerBeckerdescribes mayaseasily leadtodespairasto faith and to a sense of absolute finitude as to trust in an Infinite

Creator. In both his treatment of religious creatureliness and in his20

Becker Birth and Death of Meaning pp 18182


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description of arriving at it Becker has identified some important elements but the problem remains as to what kind of a framework of

perception accommodates religious creatureliness and whether the attempttorelate scientific and religious views is not a muchmorecomplexand nuanced matterthan hasbeen evident sofar.While the resolution ofthese issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to clarifyseveral underlying differences in the creaturely problem Becker is dealing with in order to point toward a more comprehensive exposition ofthe notion of creatureliness.

II. Finitude and CreaturelinessA Critique

The adequacy of Becker's view of creatureliness needs to beevaluated on the basis of its ability to illumine human existence and tofill out our understanding of creaturehood by bringing the social scientific perspective and the religious perspective into dialogue with eachother. This will require that sufficient attention be given not onlytowhatBecker perceives as their mutual concernsbut also tothe distinctivenessof the perspectives. Regarding the religious perspective on creatureliness, it is important to observe several qualities peculiar to religious

consciousness of creaturelinessthat arenot present in either scientificorphilosophical perspectives.ToclarifyandevaluateBecker'sview, it willbe useful to examine these qualities by distinguishing between finitudeand creatureliness, for although Becker tends to equate finitude andcreatureliness, a closer examination of the concepts reveals they are notsynonymous.

First, finitude is an analytic concept while creatureliness is ananalogical concept which involves the naming of an identity. Becker'spurpose is evidently analytical, but he uses an analogical term as anintegrating expression without attending to its characteras afundamental metaphor of identity. Self-esteem and its frustrations may be dealtwith analytically, as can the hero systems which function to provide akind of identity. But there is a depth of identity in the creator-creaturerelationship that is not plumbed in analysis. Facing limits and experiencing radical finitude in contemplating one's own death may furnish an inventory of limit situations and partial rolesapersonplays,butit will not reveal what it means to be a creature who is such by having a

particular creator. It does not get at the core identity by which one findsultimate self-esteem not just by having a hero system but by being a

t B k ll d t th di f lf t i th li it f


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Second, finitude accents limits as limits while creaturehood focuseson the limits inherent in the creator-creature relationship and by implication in other relationships. In almost all of Becker's references to

creatureliness, he accents limits as limits and as negativecreatureliness as insecurity, as weakness and emptiness, as helplessness, as orientation toward death, as evasion of one's true center, asanimal appettion with infinite yearning,asinferiority, as partial knowledge,asinsignificance and vulnerability,asself-deceptiveness.24From areligious perspective, however, creatureliness is not the same thing ashuman limitation, although it can include the notion of limits as limitsor asnegative. Aboveandbeyond finitude,to becreature impliesasense

of limits that comes from relationality to a creator and to other creaturesof the creator (along with the possibility of gratitude for what the relationship gives). In providing a context for viewing relationship as anessential component in the notion of creatureliness,areligious perspective enables one to see the resources as well as the limits in creaturelyexistence.

In bypassing the relationality of creature to creator as a resourcewithinalimit situation, Becker gives usalimited view of creatureliness,weak in positive aspects and lacking the peculiar intensity that comes

from recognizing the tension in relationality.25This is especially apparent when one considers the ways that finitude and creatureliness callforth different responses. To accept finitude, one must accept all personal limits including death; to accept creatureliness one must acceptnot only personal limits but also dependence upon and responsibility forothers.Inaccepting creatureliness the individual is faced with the additional limit of submitting to the limitations of selfandothers. Yet this isprecisely the condition for self-transcendence or overcoming ego. Onetranscends self not simply by denying ego but by surrendering to theconditions that create as well as limit ego.

Finally, finitude is a negative philosophical concept derived fromfocusing on a particular aspect of experience while creatureliness is apositiveandnegative religious symbol which reflects a reconciliation ofpositiveandnegative within experience. Awareness of finitude emergesfrom analysis of the limit conditions of existenceits boundedness, itstentativity, its incompleteness. Awareness of creatureliness arises fromthe intuition ofasense of relatedness to powers other than one's ownto

God, to environment, to culture, to others. Thus creatureliness repre-MIbid., pp. 89, 90, 107, 124, 279; Escape from Evil, pp. 1, 94, 147, 151, 163.


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sents an integrating symbol, reflecting a state of dependence and interdependence. The dependence is not onlyalimiting factor.Itmay also be

a positive resource. The complexity of this symbolic situation leads to achoice whereby the creature may be resentful or grateful for the existential condition, but not unaware of the needtocometo termswithboththelimits and the possibilities of situations. The response will be indicativeofanintegrative dimension of the individual's self-understanding. It ispossibletorespondtofinitude by resisting limits or striving to overcomethem. But one cannot resist creaturehood without denying one's humanity and its source. To strive against finitude may beavaliant human act.To strive against creatureliness is to sin.

In summary, these considerations of the differences in approach tocreatureliness and finitude show the former to be analogical, relational,and integrative, while the latter is analytical, individualistic, and selective. Because Becker's analysis relies on the qualities characteristic offinitude, his description of the human condition as individuality-within-finitude inThe Birthand DeathofMeaning appears more appropriate for his purposes than his treatment of it as creatureliness inThe

Denial ofDeath.26Onemight ask if this is merelyaquestion of semantics.

Should Becker have referred to the human condition of the scientificperspective as finitude and to that of the religious perspective ascreatureliness? More careful language would have helped but it is morethan a matter of semantics.

A distinction would have helped to clarify the grounds on whicheither dialogueorconvergence might occur. Tillich, for one, has offereda means of understanding the relationship:

It (creatureliness) answers the question implied in man's finitude

and infinitude generally.Ingivingthisanswer, it discoversthat themeaning of finitude is creatureliness The character of existenceis that man asks the question of his finitude without receiving ananswer.27

Becker, who is admittedly sympathetic to Tillich's position, might havewell followed Tillich's example in adopting a more explicit and developed method of correlation. On finitude he is perceptive and provocative, exposing the dark side of human motives and offering fresh in

sights into the human condition. On creatureliness he is less effectivebecause he does not deal with resources within finitude or provide a


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tionship between scientific and religious modes of understanding.Without suchaframework one does not do justice to what is positive inthe scientific perception of limits, and one is hard pressed to demon

strate either that the finitude uncovered in the scientific perspective isnot the final answer or that the religious solution is not an evasion ofrationality.

Becker rightly recognizes that the conditions discovered by the twoperspectives are not mutually exclusive. But he does not spell out thequalifications involved in dealing with two different modes of understanding and two different sets of assumptions. If the capacity for acreaturely response is present within the experience of finitude, and ifthe experience of finitude is transformed inareligious view of creaturehood, it is not apparent how this can be dealt with satisfactorily througha functional view of religion. If creaturehood is empty, helpless andself-deceptive, and if faith is trust in ultimate meaning "in spite of"conditions, faith seems radically opposedtoreasonand Godappears as adeus ex machina whose relation to ordinary human powers is not evident. A satisfactory resolution of the matter of convergence mustawait the clarification of these issues.

III. Becker's Spirituality

Though Becker's approach to creatureliness leaves some mattersunresolved, it did not diminish the intensity of his spirituality or jeopardize his own religious convictions. In fact, his lived response to thehuman condition as he perceived it provide a good example of whatcontemporary spiritual response to the scientific awareness of finitudemight look like. Becker does not discuss his own religious values orspirituality in his works, but from comments in letters and interviews as

well as from ideas we have considered we can discern several elementsin his spirituality that were strongly influenced by the problems he facedand his particular orientation toward them.28His spirituality is expressive of both the social scientific endeavor in which he was engaged andhis growing determination to take seriously the alienation and isolationhe saw in the world.

Becker's spirituality emphasizes the individual rather than the social. Indeed, given the anxiety, inhibition, and alienation that he sawresulting from social interaction and inherited hero systems, he upheldthe ideal of standing as an individual critical of authoritarian religion aswell as of one's own tendency to be seduced by the authority and


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onstrates a stoic heroism sustained by his belief that meaning is finallyrecovered only in God.29Individuals cometothis realizationby aradical

confrontation with their own aloneness and insufficiency.Another element of spirituality reflected in Becker's ideas is aself-

critical attitude that comes not just from the impossibility of graspingand holding on to truth permanently but from the impossibility ofestablishing oneself as a locus of meaning by one's motivations andself-perceptions. Honesty calls for the continual unmasking of motivesand the destruction of illusions of ego and power. Though it is notclearly connected with a psychology or theology of sin, Becker's approachtothis kind of introspection parallels the tradition of the spiritualtask of cure of soul through the catharsis of self-scrutiny.

Becker's description of the ideal hero as one who can face uncertainty and ambiguity without bitterness reveals a third aspect of hisspiritualityhis acceptance of the needtoface one's false power sourcesand to live defenselessly with the insecurity that results. Becker's realizationthathe was living under delegated powers, with idolsthathe hadgiven power overhimself,created an anxiety that was made endurableby the discovery of a new power source in God. His conviction that

authenticity required the acceptance of the finitude of knowledge andpower led him not to search for a more secure human order or for amystical or religious experience. It led to a leap of faith.

Though Becker's spirituality is austere and demanding, it is notdevoid of hope. He cites the birth of his sonas anevent which turned himfrom atheismtobelief in God. He observes that appreciation of the worldas being in God's hands is a joy that overcomes sadness. He admits theinspiration he obtains from reading the psalms in the midst of professional frustrations, his deepening awareness of the need for grace ineverything, his rediscovery of his Jewish heritage.Butthese bright spotsare not to be trusted unless one has gone through the depths ofthedarknight. Anything less suggests a preliminary or false security.

One might describe Becker's spirituality as he did himself in termsof William James' sick soul or as one twice-born. In his evaluation ofhonesty, openness, and searching as the important measures of humanstature, he knew he revered a rigorous ideal that was probably notpossible or desirable for most people. But it was an urgent and pro

foundly impressive expression of the values that shaped who he was.Whether his spirituality reflected a religious vision and an interpreta


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36 HORIZONS

ity but also to the realization that he has highlighted some importantissues that needto betaken account of in the formulation ofatheology ofcreaturehood.

First, Becker's emphasis on self-esteemasa basic human motivationdeserves to be incorporated intoatheology of creaturehood. Though heconcentrates on social influences, individual protection of self-esteem,and the function of religious heroism, the notion admits of fuller application to religion. Brought into dialogue with the idea of the humanimaging of God, it would provideavaluable elucidation ofanimportantaspect of creaturehood. Second, while areas of genuine freedom need tobe better illuminated in his work, he has deliveredauseful preliminary

critique of post-Enlightenment attitudes toward autonomy. He pointsout a direction in which to explore more fully the place of dependenceand interdependence in the transcendence of ego and acceptance ofcreaturehood. Third, his persistent examination of motives in relation tothe maintenance of self-esteemgivesusafreshbasisfor looking at forms ofresistance to creaturely acceptance of God and God's world. Thoughmotive scrutinization can becomeaself-centered preoccupation, it is anindispensable aspect in the development of a mature spiritual outlook.By framing self-examination in terms of resistance to creaturehood,

Becker reintroduces an idea that has been neglected and stimulatesexploration of other aspects of creaturely resistance.

Above all, Becker presents a challenge to theologians, particularlyby the kinds of questions he asks, to deal withasymbol thathasbecomeproblematic in our time. As his spirituality has shown, creaturelinesswas not merely an academic issue with Becker but the intersection ofintellectual and existential concerns for which he had to find a crediblescientific explanation. But even with his solution to that issue he leaves

us with an open question: "How does one lean on God and give overeverything to Him and still stand on his own feetas apassionate humanbeing?"30He is asking nothing less than how onecan be acreature and acreator at the same time or how one can surrender control withoutsurrendering responsibility. If his thought is dominated by finitude, it isbecause the answer that resounds is "renounce and renounce again."Becker's last and ultimate opportunity to test his own response in deathwas a distillation of the response that dominated his life. The answerstands stark in its sincerity. If one wishes to deal with the question in a

way that acknowledges Becker's courage in facing it and carries it moredeeply into the realm of interpersonal relations, the question needstobe


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