being and hayah_ariga tetsutaro

8/13/2019 Being and Hayah_ARIGA Tetsutaro

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Being and Hayah

A RIG A T etsutaro

CHRISTIANITY AND WESTERN CULTUREIn discussions of the historical relationship between Christianity and Western culture, comparisons of Hebraism andHellenism are of ten ut iliz e dChr ist ianity being identified

w it h Hebraism and g eneral Weste rn cultur e being seen as a

cross - curr ent betw een Hebraic and Hellenistic thoug ht. Butthis is an oversimplified approach to the question of thecontrast and conflict between Hebraism and Hellenism andquickly falls into error.

First of all, it is simply inaccurate to view Christianitysolely as an extension of the development of Hebraism, forGhristianity was also formed from a concurrence of otherGreek and atin cultural and ideolog ical fact ors . Secondly ,although one may speak of an interchange between Hebra

ism and Hellenism, it is a mistake to regard them asinsepara ble. T his is proved by the faile d attem pts toe l i m i n a t e C h r i s t i a n i t y f r om W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n(entchristianisieren), a trend not uncommon to the West,nor to J apa n. A consider ation of the bre adth of theirinter re lations hip should obvia te this misunders tanding. Forex ample, even the e stablishment of the anti- Chris tian,atheistic ideology of Marxism is indebted in large degree toJudeo- Christian es chatological theories (via the f orms theytook in a Schwaben- like piet ism ).1

There have been repeated attempts to clarify this

T ranslate d by 3an Van B rag t. See Co ntributor s, p. 289.

L. Be nz 1955. See es pecially S ection II: "Das pietis tis che Erbe in der

Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus."

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historical question by going beyond the usual historicalcomparison between Hebraism and Hellenism to a morebasic and fundamental dilemma: the theolog ical co nfr onta

tion of "r ev el atio n and reas on." In this case, the problem isnot limited to the issue of Christianity and its relationshipto Wes tern culture , but also encompasses Chr is tia nity ^r elat ionship to cultur e as such. T he contr as t is madebetween Christianity as a revealed religion based on supernatural revelation and culture as the product of humanreason. The diffe re nces between Ca tholic and Pr otes tantthinkers do not affect this comparison, for thosedifferences are related to the question of the area in

w hich tha t rev ela tio n is located, and not to the reali ty of

the rev elation itse lf. A lthoug h these diffe re nces arepre se ntly being re- ex amined in the curr ent ecumenicalatmosphere, the basic Catholic position has been that thelocus of supernatural revelation is found in the Church

w ith its eccles ia s tic al hierarchy , w hile or thodox Protes tanttheology holds that tha t locus lies in the B ible. T heimportant point for our present discussion, however, is thatthe action of accepting revelation is understood to be oneof fa ith rather than knowing. K now ing is a function of

reason and cannot make supernatur al r e v e la tio n. its objectof unders tanding. Furthermore, this contra rie ty betwee nfaith and reason is maintained even if one admits thepresence of a deep wisdom based upon that f a ith . In other

words, reas on and rev elatio n, knowing and f a ith, are seenas discrete and discontinuous.

T heolog ical accuracy is indeed cr ucial in tr ea ting thisquestion of the relationship between Christianity andculture, but the desire for such accuracy has frequentlyissued in an inappropriate simplification that reduces the

question to a matter of the locus or object of revelation.Then the argumentation often devolves toward such unfortunate results as the following:

( 1 ) T heologians take stands upon their own particular"domain" of revelation, devote themselves exclusively tobuilding a stronghold around it, and totally neglect the

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problems of human society and culture.(2) T he two "spheres" of the natur al and the super

natural ar e under stood as ex ter nal one to the other and inneed of some formal harmonization to bring them into

co mpat ibility . B ut, even though brought tog ether in suchfashion, they remain essentially in opposition, for theirtr ue, inter nal re lations hip is over looked. In this case also,theolog ians can be self- rig hteous and aloof from theproblems of human culture.

(3) It is not at all ra re to f ind tha t such a detachedattitude on the part of theologians serves to drive theadvocates of human reason to harbor resentment against,indifference, and disregard for Christianity.

When such cr itics as sert tha t C hr is tianit y holds nomeaning for (at least the future of) human culture, theircriticism cannot be attributed simply to their own arrog ance. One can easily make a case that they a re onlyreversing the same segregation between revelation andreason alre ady taug ht by the theologians. Since the theologians themselves have already stated that there is no realconnection between revelation and reason, how can theypossibly censure secularists who employ the same argumentto negate Chris tianity? If they were to face the facts,

theologians would realize that at least half of the responsibility for bringing about this state of affairs rests squarelyupon their own shoulders, for human arrogance must alwaysbe condemned, no matter where it occurs.

REVELATION AND REASONThe foregoing remarks might give the impression thatsomehow I reject all notion of any discrimination orcontrast that might apply to the question under consid

eration. This is, of course, not the case. Although the ideasinherent in Western culture have been historically interwov en w ith the basic pr inciple s of C hr is tianity , it cannotbe denied tha t they ar e, in f a c t, quite dis tinc t. It is s till arather common assumption that Christianity is the religionof Western culture, but this is really no more than the

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legacy of nineteenth- century cultura l philosophy (Kultur-phdlosophie)j and any impartial investigator will find thatthe tw o cannot be equated so eas ily. Western culturecannot be identif ied w ith Chr is tian cultur e. If such a

des cr iption is made, it must be quali f ie d. T here is no doubtthat Christianity played a formative role in the historicalprocesses of Western civilization, but, as it exists withinestablished Western culture itself, it is placed in oppositionto that culture . Our question is whether or not thisconfrontation can be explained adequately either throughan historical comparison between Hebraism and Hellenism,or through a theological comparison between revelation andre ason. It is my opinion that it cannot.

However, although these comparisons are not adequateto the tas k, ther e is tr uth in each. As the need arise s,thes e comparat iv e cons tr ucts of Hebraism- Hellenism andrev elation- re ason w ill be employed in the follow ing discussion. There is no need to hesitate in stating that Christianity is rooted in Hebraic faith and it cannot be denied that

Western philos ophy and scie nce are deeply indebted to theGr eek concept of "logos .11 But these fa cts do not precludeus from going further in our consideration of the question.To distinguish clearly the main causes of Christianity and

culture does not clarify the internal relationships of thosecauses. To declare the one side to be only revelation stresses its discontinuity with the other side of reason. What weare looking for is a method that, while contrasting the two,

w il l tr e at the ir interna l relatio ns hip accur ate ly .Before we embark upon this endeavor, we must first

stress that revelation is itself beyond discussion, for, of itsvery natur e, it transcends reason. If Chr is tianity did notcontain such a dimension, it would not have become Chris

tia nit y . B ut, based though it be on this fa ith in re v elation,it is possible to examine the thought structure of Christianity, for to do so does not imply the abandonment of its"r ev elation- fa ith" dimension. Instead, by clar ify ing itsideological structure, we may be led to a deepening of ourunders tanding of this re v ela tion- fa ith dimension. If we term

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the Hebraism- Hellenism comparis on "his to r ica l," and therev elation- reason comparison "theo log ica l,11 then we candesignate this third model of comparison as "philosophical"(or re ligio- philosophical).

However, even though this be termed a philosophicalmodelther e w ill be no at te mpt to dispose of the questionsimply by setting up a philosophical theory and arguingconceptually upon the terms of that theory. The subsequentinvestigation will be based on historical analysis, upon

which founda tio n the essentia l s truc tur e of the issue w il lbe delineated. The question remains whether this model willreally serve to clar ify the essence of rev elation- faith.Reason can, of course, criticize itself, but does it notoverstep its competence in trying critically to examinefa ith? Is this not in f a c t v entur ing the impossible?

There is no doubt that in itself revelation does notallow for rational criticism, for if it could be made theobject of such thinking, then either it would cease to berevelation, or would from the beginning not have beenr ev ela tion. Y et we must ques tion w hether a re v elation thatdenies a ll c r itic a l discussion is truly re v ela tion. If it reallyis a revelation, it must be beyond all controversy andtherefore have no need to obstruct the proper exercise of

reason. A ctually , a re jection of ra tional cr iticism comesfrom the fact that material that cannot withstand criticismlies hidden under the name of r ev ela tion. T he modern aw akening of reason that led to critical research on Christianity was, for a time, accompanied by a rationalism that didthre aten to ex ter minate the rev elation- faith dimension.But, looking back on this today, by distinguishing that

which was not rev ela tio n w ithin tha t which was calledrevelation, this research has served to clarify the nature of

re v ela tion. In this sense, re v elation its elf demands ra tionalcr iticism , for such is the self- criticism of rev elation.

Being and Hayah

GOD AND BEINGCritical research into Christianity has shown tremendous

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progress, but there are elements that have not yet beenful ly s tudied. T he point I would like to focus upon is mostfundamental to Chr istia nity : its theory of God. T he propositions, "God is the hig hest being ," and "Go d is being its e lf 11

are, apart from the different nuances between them,g enerally taken for gr anted. But it is precisely these propositions I would like to cal l into ques tion. No doubt thesethemes have been discussed before, but generally theargument has centered upon the question of the possibilityof proving the validity of these theses, i.e., debating

w hether to af f ir m or deny the ir tr ut h. T her e is l itt leconcern about the establishment of the propositionsthemselv es. A theists deny the ex iste nce of God as being,

w hile theis ts recog nize the ex is tence of such a God, or atleast affirm the truth of these propositions in some manner.When Buddhists cr it ic ize C hr is tianity , the y often raise theproblem of Christians adopting a theory on the existenceof God. From this per spectiv e, Chris tianit y as a re ligion of"Be ing11 is contrasted w ith Buddhism as a r eligion of"Non- Being.11 B ut, if C hris tianity does not aff irm both Godand Being in parallel, then this argument becomes untenable, for such a critique presupposes the proposition (inChristianity) that God is Being.

If is precisely here that the questions we must askbecome obvious: A re these propositions (leav ing aside theirtruth claims) really something that can be put forward inpropositional for m? Can the God of Chris tianity truly becalled Being (ipsum esse)? What is the bas e meaningascr ibed to the God of Chris tian f a ith? What is themeaning of Being (esse)?

In searching for the original meaning of God in Christia n fa ith, we have no other path to follow than the Bible.

One need hardly mention that the Bible contains anextremely large number of passages concerning God in bothT es taments. But where ex actly can one find the words thatsay "God is Being11? T he usual answ er is that these w ordscan be found in Ex odus 3:1 . T he King J ames tr ans lationhas: 1 am tha t I am," w hile the New English B ible (Ox ford

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and Cambridg e) has: "I am, tha t is who I am." From thesepassages, it is argued, it is possible to derive the proposition tha t God is Being. A lthough this inst ance is the onlyone in the Bible to record such an expression, it can beargued that it is significant, even if mentioned only once,for the meaning of this name of God, revealed to Moses, iscertainly decisive for the faith of the Hebrew people.

Howev er, the ques tion remains. Does this s ingle , oneoccurrence of this phrase in the Bible (hapax legomenon)re ally mean that God is Be ing? T here are, of cours e, those

who deny tha t "I am tha t I am1' is ident ical w it h thes tate ment, God is Be ing. Neither do I immediately identifythe one with the other. In the phrase, "I am,1' the ver b "to

be" does not indicate an abstract concept like being.Rather, here, it would appear to be expressing the state ofbeing a subject. Howev er, when this s tate of being subjectis further determined by the expression "that I am," furtherproblems arise. Rather than a philosophical or a theologicaldilemma, those problems are in the first place a matter oflinguis tics . T he ques tion is w hether a part icularinterpretation actually transmits correctly the originalmeaning of the Hebrew.

The Latin Vulgate translation is "Ego sum qui sum,"w hich can be understood to present a meaning quite closeto the orig inal Hebrew. However, in the nex t sentence the

words, "qui est," replace the previous "qui sum." It is thisthat prompted Thomas Aquinas to theoretize that this "quies t11 is the most basic name for God (Summa Theologicaq.13, a . l 1 ) . In the German translation of the Summa Theolo-gica this becomes "der Seiende" (Deutsch-lateinischeAusg abe, B .l, s. 301). T his inter pre tat ion of God as Beingcan be tra ced f urther back beyond A quinas to the Septua-

gint itself, for there it becomes "Ego eimi ho on," and inthe nex t se ntence the "Ho 5n" is ag ain re peated. Here Godcalls himself "Ho on," the one who is. T he Japanes e translation of Exodus 3:1 actually strengthens this tendency ofthe Gr eek r endition: "W atak ushi wa atte- aru mono," whichcan be rendered into English as either "I am one who is

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being ,1' or as "I am tha t which is." The Hebrew or ig inalreads " ehy eh iasher ehy eh" and in the nex t sentencenehyeh" is again re peated. We must as cer tain the ex actmeaning of !,,ehyeh.n

M,Ehyeh!l is the f ir s t person s ingular imper fe ct form ofthe ver b "hay ah,11 and means HI hay ah,'1 w hich is neithersimply pres ent nor simply future . A lway s incomplete , it isan open "ha y ah.n In this se ntence M,ehy eh" is repeate dtwice with the indeclinable particle l,iasher" insertedbetw ee n. This partic le can be take n either as a re lativ epronoun or as a conjunction* T he for mer case would yield:,!I hay ah tha t I hay ah," w hile the latte r would mean: "Ihay ah because I hay ah." In either case, it is dif f ic ult to

regard the ter m, Mhay ah," as a copula, and thusinappropr iate to inter pret the phras e as meaning: MI am who"hay ahs " or nI am w hat I am." Howev er, in the Gree ktr ans latio n, this does become a possibility . It was a quitenormal procedure to replace the Hebrew word nehyeh" with"eimi" in Greek, and there can be no criticism on thispoint. Nevertheless , the Greek word !'eimi!' does dif fe r fromthe Hebrew !l,ehyeht! inasmuch as it does have the functionof a copulat iv e. T his is not solely a matter of linguisticconvention, for the differences in the Greek and Hebrew

way s of thinking are ref lected herein. What remains now tobe examined is how these differences can be clarifiedthrough philological investigation,

H A Y A T O L O G Y I have g iven the name "hay atolog y 11 to the Hebraic way ofthinking , meaning of course the "logos 11 of "hay ah." Incontrast to this attitude, the Greek way of thinking may becalled "ontolog y ." Ontology ex presses the "logos " of the

Gr eek concept of ,!to orun It should be str ess ed tha t todayit is of central importance that we recognize the differences betw een these two. From the age of HellenisticJudaism to the present day, Judaic thought has been translated and interpreted through the Greek language (or alanguage of a related group), and therefore through the

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Gr eek manner of conc eptua lizing . Chr is tian thought andontology are so tightly linked together that no one wouldquestion the statement that Christian thought is one formof ontolog y . Howev er, if we historica lly tra ce back this

closely linked unity, it becomes clear that the union ofJudeo- Christian thinking and the Greek ontolog icalapproach came about through the combining of twotheological attitudes that were originally different.

T he most enlig htening work on the subjec t is T horleifBoman's Das hebraische Denken im Vergleich mit demGriechischen,2 which is a most useful aid in the study ofthe Hebrew languag e. One fe atur e of that language is thenature of movement in its ver bs. A lthoug h it is natura l for

verbs to contain a sense of movement, we should also payattention to those stationary situations, such as "sitting" or"ly ing down,'1 whose s tat ic meaning can only be conceivedin relationship to the action leading up to the settleds tate . For ex ample, the Hebrew word, "y as habh" means "tosit down11 (sich setze n), as w ell as "to be seate d'1 or "tores ide." lik e w is e , "sk ak habh'1 means "to lay onese lf down1'or "to be ly ing down'1; and the word "qOm" can mean both,fto sta nd up'1 and "to be standing up." Such ex amples canbe multiplied indefinitely from Borman's book, but the point

here is w hat is sig nified by this type of ver b. A nd thatsignificance lies in the fact that in the Hebraic mind,movement and stillness (or motionlessness) are not seen incontr as t one to the other . Rat her they are conceiv ed asone fundamental unity, for, by tracing movement back toits origin, one arrives at stillness, while a stationarys ituat ion is thoug ht to be the end result of movement. Inthis manner, stillness refers to the point where movementceases, as well as its point of depar ture . T his is also

explained by saying that stillness is thought of as apote ntia l movement. T hus, in Hebrew, w hether it be"yashabh" or "shakhan," words that mean reside are linkedto people res iding . In Ger man, howeve r, "to res ide" (das

2. Boman 1952. Es pecially V olume UPa rts l- lll.



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Wohnen) is thought to be related to static concepts like"residence" (die Wohnung). Ev en in Gr ee k, "oik eo " iscor r ela tiv e w ith "oik ia11 and noikos .n The re lationship inEnglish betwee n "dw ell11 and "dwe lling (or, like the

Ge rman, "re sidence") is also quite s imilar. Nevertheless,words like "reside*1 in Hebrew ar e thoug ht of s ubjectiv elyand actively.

This observation can be further illustrated through alook a t verbs which indicate a s ituation or quality . Forex ample, ni6r" can mean either ,!to become br ig ht,1' or ntobe br ig ht." "G abhar " is "to become s trong,'1 as we ll as ntobe str ong ." T he word "gadhal11 can mean "to become lar g e,"and "to be larg e." T here ar e said to be as many as 209

examples of this type of verb in Hebrew, and significantlythey are all thoug ht to embody a unity of !lto become1' and!lto be.'1

However, even more important to the understanding ofHebraic thoug ht is the natur e of s o- called noun sentences(Nominalsatz). For example, meanings expressed in Greek bythe use of copulas or verbs indicating stationary situationsare ex press ed in Hebrew w ithout them. In other words, thefinite verb that would normally link subject and predicatein such se ntences is abs ent. In co ntr as t to such nounsentences are the verb sentences (Verbs2satz)j which doemploy finite verbs as predicates. Interestingly, fixed situations in Hebrew are expressed not with the latter, but withthe former, that is, they employ the Nominalsatz, and it isvital that we recognize the relevance of this special cha acteristic in the problem confronting us and incorporate itinto any e lucida tion of tha t problem. Normally when weencounter sentences where finite verbs are missing, we findit easy to think that they have been omitted, but such a

conclus ion would be erroneous in the case of Hebrew . Inthe Bo o k o f E zekie l1:22 we find the phrase "hammizbeahg cM composed of the w ords "altar " and "w ood,11 but

w ithout the use of a copula. It does not say "the altar iswood,11 but only "the alt ar . . . wood1' w it hout any copula.T he follow ing phrase in the tex t is, similar ly , "then, the

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w alls . . . wood." T ak ing a look at the Re v is ed StandardV er sion of the B ible , we find: "The altar was of w o o d , . . .and the walls there of wer e of wood." But in the orig inalthe words, "was," "were," and even the nofn in "of wood"

are not found. T hey were added to the tr ans lat ion simplyfo r the sake of good English. T here is no ques tion that thealtar was indeed constructed of wooden materials, but forthe Hebraic person this was ex press ed as "T he alt ar , v iz.

w o o d.Taking yet another example from Psalms 23:10 we have

"kol- 'ar hSth Y ahweh hesedh we iemeth," or "all the pathsof the Lord ar e mercy and tr uth." Howev er, the subject,"all the paths of the Lord" and the predicate, "mercy andtruth," are in Hebrew not joined together by the

inter v ening copula "to be.1' Ra ther the under ly ing conceptis that the contents and function of nall the paths of theLord" are none other than mercy and truth themselves. 3ustas in the previous example, an agreement of essence orcontent establishes an identification between subject andpredic ate. T his way of thinking puts w eig ht on essence asopposed to the Greek attitude which clearly discriminatesbetween form and matter, often seeming to emphasize theformer over the latter.3

THE BEING OF YAHWEHIn this manner the subject and predicate of a Hebrewsentence can be joined without an intervening copula.

A lthoug h one cannot say tha t the word "ha y ah" is notusable as a copula, even when it is so employed, its

3. On this acc ount we could also of fe r an ex planat ion of w hy a word

that appears to be a copula, "hayethah", is inserted in Genesis 1:2.

For the P chronicler, the "earth" (ha'areg) as it is, is not "chaos,"

rathe r the earth means cosmos. In order to express the fa ct that

this cosmos used to be (in) chaos, the word Hhay e tha h,! is needed.This is rendered into English simply as "was," which appears to be

no diff e r e nt from the "was " of E zek iel 1:22. But in the Hebrew the

lat te r ex ample does not require a copula. This is also the ex plana

tion of B oman, but his furthe r ex planations of "hay ahn and its con

jug a tio ns in Gene sis 3: 129:17 and 39:6b do cause some diff icu lty .

Nevertheless, Boman concludes that even in these instances,"hayah" has the meaning of "to bring about a result" (so wirkte).



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orig inally a ctiv e meaning is not lost. Ge nerally speaking,"hayah" must be thought of as embodying full verbale f fe ct . It carries the meaning of becoming, being, working,etc., but, significantly, all these meanings function

together in a fundamental unity and hence are notconsidered separ ately . This point can be illus tr ate d by thef a c t t hat nhay ahn is ofte n used in apposition w ith otherverbs. For ex ample, both in Isa iah 7:7 and in 1:2"hayah"is place d in appos itio n to nqQmn (to or ig ina te ), andconsequently car rie s the same meaning. In this case,,!hay ah,! means "to come to pass11 or nto oc cur .1' Thismeaning of the term can often be found, especially insentences that begin w ith "w ay ehT."

Thus in Hebrew , "to be1' is never thought of apar t fr om"to become'1 or "to ar ise ." It is true that w hat has becomeor what has arisen is none other than something thatexists, that which is, but this is not an existence that hasdiscar ded and lost its meaning of becoming or occurr ing, Anoteworthy passage dealing with this point is Ecclesiastes7:24. Boman does not make ref er ence to this passage, butit should not be overlooke d. A ccor ding to the Rev isedStandard Vers ion, the passag e reads: "T hat which is, is faro f f , and deep, very deep.11 T he Ja panese tr ans lation of "T he

reas on for things is far aw ay , et c. . . pres ents noproblems, but the English translation, containing thephrase, "tha t w hich is can lead to conf usion. T he or ig inalhas: nra hoq mah- shehay ah we 'amoq fam6qn; in other w ords,"mah- shehay ahn (tha t which has nhay ahn- ed) has beentr ans lated into English as "tha t w hich is.1' If this wer etranslated literally, it would come out as "that which hascome into being .1' The German tr ans latio n of nA lles , was daist,!l although adroit, does not fully reveal the meaning of

the orig inal e ither . T his is because the word "hay ah inthis case is fully endowed with the results, as expressedhere in the perfect tense, of the working inherent in theconcept of "hay ah." T he se ntence re ally says, "G ener atedthing s all phenomenaar e f ar things , deepening and deep.11T heref ore, even if !,mah- shehay ah,, is tra nslate d as "that

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which is ,'1 it would be a mistake to think tha t this impliesbeing that transcends phenomena, for in fact it indicatesall phenomenal affairs.

The words from Exodus where God has the name "I

"hayah" (ehyeh), when viewed in light of the above discussion, have their meaning cla r if ie d. As phenomena are pastthings, in the sense that they have already occurred, intheir case, "hay ah11 is appropriate ly used in the per fe cttense. Howev er, as God is something alway s ac tiv e , it isnatural that the imperfect form, nehy ehn be used, and,moreover, in the first person, because God is active as theabsolute subject. A nother point worthy of our at te ntion isthat the subject, i.e., God, is hidden within the verb,nehy ehn nota bly in tha t the pronoun "1,11 "'ano k ht'1 is not

used. T he s itua tion is not conce iv ed of as one in whichfir s t the subject ex ists and then is activ e, et c. Rathe r it istha t within his ac tiv ity the subject reveals himself. Onemight say that the subject is none other than the activityand tha t the ac tiv ity is none other than the subject. However, one must not take this to mean simply that Godexists within phenomenal processes. It is instead that divine

work means something ent ir ely di f fe r e nt than the pas t- likeac tiv ity of phenomena. Such work is fore v er or iented

toward future creativity and always maintains the sense ofthe imperfect form of n,ehyeh.nA

A lt houg h the usual way of presenting the rela tions hipbetw een cr eat or and cr ea ture in the Old T es tament iseither representational or symbolic, it should be clear fromthe above tha t this is not the only way it is pres ented. It

was to tr ans late these symbols and repr es entationa l ex pressions into theory that many considered the adoption of theGr ee k "logos " necessary . Now, howev er, we can re cog nizethat Hebraic thought itself has its own logic, the reasoningof nhay ahn i.e ., "hay atolo g y ," A nd this Hebraic log ic is not

k O f course, Hebrew verb conjuga tions do not fall into the three

time categories of past, present, and future, but with respect to

time have only the two forms of perfect and imperfect.

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to be replaced by an ontolog y . Y e t one must not tak e thisto mean that these two models of logic are always andneces sar ily ex clusiv e one of the other. T hey have becomelinked in history and they could become so linked again, forit is advantageous for both that they should be correctlyconjoine d. Y e t we wonder if the manner of their prev iousco njunctio n has been tr uly suita ble. It has been thisconcern that has necessitated the examination of theprocess of their interrelationship and the clarification ofthe differences between the two models, Hebraic andHellenistic.

Here it is imperative that we include a consideration ofthe relationship between nehyeh" and "Y ahw eh." L et us

begin speculatively by saying that the word Yahweh is atransfor mation of "hay ah.11 Should this inter pretation becorrect (and it is highly probable that it is), then Yahwehis sy nomyous w ith y ahy eh,n a form of "hay ah which iscausative (hif.U)imper fe ct, thir d person, and masculine,and which means "he makes (someone or something)"ha y a h/1 "Ehyeh" is first person, but Yahweh is in thethird person. T his loss of or ienta tion to the subjectinvolved in the change from the first to the third person iscompensated for by a shift to the causative construction.The absolute subject, who is creative, through his ownMhay ah- ing ,n is, a t the same time , thought of as the subjectthat makes all "hay ah11 perfor m "hay ah Moreover , becausethe imperfect form is also used, it implies that this primal

work is alw ay s in the present and fut ur e, rather thansomething completed in the pas t. T he name ",ehy eh" andthe name "Yahweh" are thus not merely given an etymological relationship, but can be understood as having someintrinsic correlation. Thereby the purest form of hayatology

comes to life.

HA Y A - O NT OL O GY n,Ehyeh- Y ahweh*1 cannot be ex press ed in English simply as"one who ex ists ." S till less is it s uff icie nt to render it as"one who is 1 or "to be.11 Ev en if one att em pted to render

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"hayah" as "to be," it would not be the same as the copula"to be,'1 pres upposed in !'ther e is" or "is ." T his point can beelucidated further by studying what is meant when God isnegated in Hebraic thought. For example, in Psalms 10:^ we

find: "In the pride of his counte nance, the wicked does notseek him (God); all his thoughts are, 'There is no God"1(Rev ise d Standard V ers ion). T he phras e, "T here is no God"(Jen ,e16htm) does not really deny the existence of God, nordoes it deny the being of G od. Ra ther it disreg ards onesex iste ntial re lationship to G od.5 The fa ct tha t this "denialof God1' is not a denial of the ex iste nce or being of Godshows by contrast that the affirmation of God is not anaffirmation of his existence or being, for this is not anaffirmation of some kind of intellectual knowledge, but anex iste ntial aff irmation of fa ith. The aff irmation of God isan af fir ma tion of cre ativ e and rev elatory "w ork ,11 as thedenial of God is a denial of the same.

This point is directly related to the fact that, insteadof the issue of "ex istence and non- ex istence,'1 "being andnon- being,1' the proble matic occupy ing Hebraic thoug ht ingeneral is rather that of "truth and falsehood," or "powerand powerless ness." In Hebrew , that w hich is tr uly (orac tua lly ) ac tiv e is called nda bha r n and that w hich is not

truly activ e is called "lS- dabhar." L inguistic ex pression ofthis active "thing" is, of course, in words, but it so happensthat in Hebrew !'wordsn are also called "dabhar.11 Forexample, lies or insincere words (what we colloquially calllip service) are expressed by using the special phrase,!dabhar " of the lips1' (debhar shephathaim) (II King s 18:20;Psalms 1^:23). In Psalms 52:3, nlies or falsehood" (sheqer) isset in opposition to "w ords of tr uth1' (debhar cedheq). Inthe same vein, "the glory of Israel" Le_Y ahw eh, is said to

be one who "does not lie1' (lo* y eshaqq&r) (I Samuel 15:29).

5 See also Psalms 1 :1 and 53:1 . [ T rans lator's note: Inter es ting ly , theA ut ho r iz e d V ersion rende rs this pas sag e as "God is no t in a ll his

thoughts."]

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The antithesis of this is an idol or image, which is a "lie"(sheqer) (J er emiah 10:15). Co nce r ning idols, words used toexpress the idea of "v anity are "shaw e " (Psalms 31:6;89:7), mwen" (Hosea 15;10:5; 12:12) "hebhel"(II Kings

17:15; Psalms 31:6; 62:10; Jeremiah 2:5; and Ecclesiastes1:1) and "tShQ" (Isaiah 9: 59:) . The "word" of Yahweh(debhar Yahweh) is without any of the above vanities andis ther ef ore w hat is known as a true "thing ." Preciselybecause of this, it is the power of creativity (as in Psalms33:6).

A lt houg h the abov e dis tinction owes a g reat de al toBoman!s research, in his own work Boman does not alwaysstress the opposition between Greek and Hebraic thought.

Despite many inherent points of difference, he insteadfocuses upon the essential commonality of thought betweenthe tw o. Y e t, when we consider the ce ntr al importance ofHellenist- Judaic thought to the Church Fathers , the presence of areas of basic difference is forced upon ourattention, for by the time Greek ontology had entered intoHebraic and Christian thought, it had already undergone atrans for mation from the orig inal Gre ek ontology . To w it, ithad now become an ontology that included hayatology atits foundatio nal lev el. T he result was neither pure ontologynor pure hay atolog y and it mig ht best be termed "haya-ontolog y .11 In other words, our analy sis w ill never completely grasp the specific characteristics of this system ofthought unless we clearly and analytically comprehend thattwo different ways of thinking are at work here.

BEING AND NON- BEING IN THE FA T HERSA sple ndid ex ample of the inter r e la tion of hay ato log y andontology is found in J ustin Marty r. A conv er t from Pla ton

ism to the Chris tian f a ith, in his Dialogus cum T ry phone hespeaks of what he had considered the purpose of philosophyto be during his Pla to nic days : "Philosophy is the knowledge of "to on" (that which is), a clear grasp of truth'1(Dialog us, 3). He goes on to say that this Mto on11 is noneother than God, for "to on" is the source of everything

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ideal . It has no color, shape, or s ize and cannot be seen asany thing. It transcends all essences (ousia)j and accordinglytransce nds all linguis tic express ion. It alone is bea utifuland good (Dialogus) . This is clearly a Platonic notion.But, upon his conversion to Christianity, 3ustin!s God wasno longer an impersonal "to on," but instead clearly becamea personal God, indicated by the personal pronoun "autos."

A ttr ibut e d to God were such v ir tues as "mode ration,righteousness, and a love of man" (sophrosun, dikaiosuni,

philanthropia) (Apologia I 10). Indeed this is a God whoca nnot be named (ibid.), and anthropomor phic re presentations cannot be applied to him in their originalmeaning (Dialogus 11 and 127). Nev er theles s, this is a

personal God fr om the beg inning . T he namelessness of God,ac cording to J us tin , is because God is the "unborn one1'(agenntos) and can therefore have no christener. After all,it is natural that the christener must be born before he

who is to be chr is te ned (ApologiayII, 6). Fur ther more, this"unborn" God has giv en birth to "logos": "in the beg inning,even earlier than the creatures, God gave birth from withinhimself to a reasoning power (dunamin tina logikn)(Dialogus, 61).

Justin then tries to demonstrate dialectically the case

for Christian faith to the world of Greek thought byborrowing anew the help of Platonic and Philonic speculation. He is herein ty pical of the ideolog ical inclina tion ofthose Church Fathers who have converted from Greekphilosophy . Y et not all the Church Fathers ar e as clear as3ustin in ex press ing their move to the Chris tian f a ith. Forexample, in Athenagoras, Greek ontology is preservedalmost inta ct . For Athenagoras God is s till "to on," just as

was the case be for e his conv ersion. "To on" knows no

becoming , for only "to mei on1' (that which is not) becomes(Supplicatio pro Chnstianis,) . In this conception, God isalso called the "eter nal nous (mind).11 This nous- Godcontains "logos" within himself and that "logos," as issuedforth (proelthon) from the "eter na l nous,1' is the Son(Supplicatio, 10). In such manner , because A thenag ora s

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A R IG A T e ts ut ar 5

translates Christian faith almost entirely into Platonism,the hayatological element becomes almost unrecognizable.However, despite his line of reasoning, we cannot call

A the nag oras a mere P latonis t. We should not for g et tha this Platonism is permeated with the intention to provide adiale ct ic proof of Chris tian fa ith. Y e t it is ex actly on thispoint that we are made to appreciate the problematicinher ent in apolog y . It was through jus t such apolog eticactivity that ontology deeply entered Christian thought.For, although God in Christian thought may be conceivedas equiv ale nt to "to on,1' the or ig inal s ta r ting point is not"to on, but rather faith in a ehye hn- like God (who isboth creator and savior).

This fact is also understood by looking into the contextin which the co nce pt of nto mei on'1 has been pres ented inChr is tian thoug ht. T he equiva lence of God and "to on11 isalready suggested by the time of the Septuagint (Exodus3:1and in T he Wisdom of Solomon it is w r itt en tha t Godis "ho 5n" (Sapientia 13:1). In addit ion, acc or ding toGod is precise ly Mto on." Howeve r, in both The Wisdom ofSolomon and in Philo, this same God is also the Creatorthe cause of existence for all things (eis to einai)

(Sapientia9 1:1 Philo, Vita Mosis, II 20 100). In thisreg ard Philo then speaks of "ta mei onta ." A ccor ding tohim, cr ea tion takes "w hat is not11 and "makes it to be"(Philo, ibid cf. De oplficio mundi26, 81). T his means thatall things are formed "out of those things which are not"(ek m ont3n). (Philo, Legum allegoriae, III, 3) It is w el lknown that this same idea had already been expressed inThe Second Book of Maccabees 7:28, except that there itappears in the form of "ouk ex ont5n.n

T he words Mta mei onta11 are f ound in the New T es ta

ment in Romans :17 and I Corinthians 1:28, but nowhere isthe concept of "cr ea tion out of non- being" ex plicitlys tated. A passage from Chris tian w ritings that clearly callsfor fa ith in a "cr ea tion out of non- being" is the fir s t"Manda te " in T he Shepherd of Hermas, Here it is said ofGod tha t "(He) made ev er y thing (pass) from non- being to

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Being and Hayah

being" (kai poiSsas ek tou m ontos eis to einai ta panta).T he w ords used in this s entence to ex press this ,!non- beingnare "to mei on.1' What is the re lat ionship betw ee n this "tamei on11 and "ouk on" or "ouk o nta? 1' Was a dis tinc tio n

draw n betwe en the tw o? If not, and if they indeed meanthe same thing , then w hat ex act ly is that meaning? In bothThe Wisdom of Solomon and in 3ustin, the world is createdfrom "formless matter," (Sapientia 11:17; Apologia I , 10; cf .59) and it is not impossible to take "to mei on to meansome thing like this type of "hule," However, sinceaccor ding to 3udeo- Christian fa ith there is nothing notcreated by God, the idea that any "hule" could possiblyex ist prior to cr ea tion is proble matic. In f a c t, we find thatIrenaeus, T heophilos and T er tullian all str enuously re ject

the concept of the eter nal nature of matter . T hereforewhen T heophilos speaks of creatio n "from those which ar en o t" (ex ouk onton), this ,!ouk onta" is tantamount to totaJnon- being (Ad Autolycum I , II ) . A ls o, in T e r t ullia n! sex planation of "cr ea tio de nihilo," the meaning of "nihilumHis again tot al non- being. (Adversos Hermogenem)

Following this line of thought, one could presumablyaffirm that the authors of The Second Book of Maccabeesand The Shepherd, and even Philo, all believed in creation

from non- being.6 Since this non- being conce pt is onlyex press ed w ith the words "ouk- on" or "mei onn instead ofw ith the ex act Greek word for "non- being," we can onlyassume "tha t which is not" to mean non- being as the neg ation of being.

Nevertheless, Hebraic thought is originally that ofhayatology, not ontology, and thus the fundamental issue ofbeing vis- a- vis the neg ation of being does not arise and issimply not re lev ant. T herefor e, only af ter God was fir stHellenized as "to on" did the negative of "to on" in the

forms of flouk onta" and "to mei orV1 then come under

6 W ithin this group, Philo's theory of cre ation admits of two inter

pretat ions. Professor Wolfson, Philo, I , p. 300ff, attributes the

theory of the creation of matter to Philo.



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cons ider at ion. T hus when at te mpts were made to prov e andclar ify the pre- ex istent belief in a hay atological creationby means of an ontological construct, concepts like nktisisek ouk o nton11 (cre ation from non- being) and "cr ea tio ex

nihilo had to be adv oca ted. T here seems no other w ay toexplain why, although the Christian creation belief is saidto mean "cr ea tion from non- being ,11 nowhere w ithin eitherthe Old or the New T es tament can this ex pres sion befound. Of cours e, as mentioned above , the New T es tamentdoes conta in the words "ta mei onta11 in Romans : 17, buthere the degree of Abraham's faith is said to be a God who"gives life to the dead and calls into existence the thingsthat do not ex ist.11 Despite some sugges tion of "cr ea tio ex

nihilo " the bas ic theme here is the co ntr as t of lif e anddeath. T he ce ntra l core of cre ation thought here liesclear ly in the fa c t that the liv ing God cre ates life . In theGospel a ccor ding to 3ohn it is w r itte n tha t ther e was "lif e 11in the "logos 11 of cr ea tion (1:) .7

It is extremely important that one grasp this relationship cor r ec tly . T he init ia l problem in Chr is tian thought isnot tha t of "to on" and "to mei on," or "to ouk on." Whensomething re lat ing to nothingnes s or non- being is raised asan issue, it is, properly speaking, as Nichtigkeit rather than

Nichts* T his is ac tually a problem of nihil ity , not ofnon- being, and as such, it is precis ely w hat is indicate d bythe term "hebhel=mataiots" (v anity ). A nd, as s tated above,nihility corresponds to falsehood.

HA Y A T OL OGY AS BA SIC T O CHRIST IA N THINKING1 hope tha t the above essay has made clear t hat hay atology constitutes the basis of Christian t hi n k i n g . 1 have alsoattempted to demonstrate the significance of the permea

tion of Chr is tianity by ontology from ancie nt Hellenist-Judaic thought through the early eras of Christianity,

7 T his passage can also be unders tood as "in the cre ate d things

logos' was lif e ." Or as, "the cr ea ted things w ere lif e in the

Mogos."'

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par tic ular ly in the thoug ht of the Churc h Father s. Inev itably the influence of ontology arose together with the useof the Greek language and it was consciously adoptedbecause of the need generated by apology, dispute, and

debate. Moreover , historica lly it was the borr owing ofGreek thought that rendered possible the formation of adoc tr inal sy stem. Not only in the ideas about "ex oukonton,n but also in the !lhomoousios" of the Nicene creed,

we f ind concepts that were in or ig in ont olog ic al. A nd y et,the content of what was "proved" by these (ontological)ideas is hay atolo g ical. For this reason Ha r nac k ^ ass ertionthat dogma was shaped by means of Greek minds workingupon the ground of the Gospel must be said to be correct

as long as it is limited to pointing out the large role playedby Gre ek ways of thinking in doct rina l for mation. But theproblem arises when he gives the impression that this is the

whole story (Harnack , p. 20). In response to his cr it ics ,Harnack shov'ed that he stressed equally the element of"upon the ground of the Gospel" (auf dem Boden des Evan-geZiums). But ther e s ti ll remains a problem in the use of hismetaphor, "ground" in regard to the Gospel (Harnack, p.2f), for as indicated here that ground, indeed the Gospelitself, is a Hebraic ground, upon which Hebraic ways of

thinking wer e at work. Indeed, the for mativ e process ofdoctrine as doctrine began precisely when it was attemptedto prove hayatological concepts by means of ontological

way s of think ing , but this does not mean tha t the hay atological way of thinking ceased to work thereby.

Even when it seems that all hayatological dimensions ofChristian thought have been entirely replaced by ontology,as long as it remains Christian thought, some measure ofhay ato log ical thinking should ye t be work ing at its base. In

other words, if we affirm the possible existence of a Christia n ontolog y , i t is only possible in the form of a "hay aM-ontology . A ccordingly , one must be wary of the attempt torealize ontology everywhere in Christian theology, for thisrisks de- Chris tianizing that theology . In my opinion, fullygr asping this two- tiered str ucture of Christian thoug ht and

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recognizing the priority and original nature of that whichis hayatological within it will give us the correct startingpoint for our theological thinking,8

8 Further gr amma tical res earch is necessary both to inve stig ate thepar ticiple and infin itiv e forms of "hay ah" and the meaning and

usage of "yesh," '"ain" Cen), but I do not think such efforts would

bring about a major revision of the main points of this paper.


References

BENZ, E.1955 ScheUing: Werden and Wirken seines Denkens.

BOM A N, Tho r le i f

1952 Das hebraische Denken im Vergleich mit dem

Griechischen. Gottingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

BULTMANN, R.

Das EvangeMum des Johannes.HA R NA CK, A d o lph vo n

1931 Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschlchte4th ed., Tubingen.

288 Ja panes e J our nal of Relig ious Studies 11/2- 3 198

being and hayah_ariga tetsutaro

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