Chapter 4

Necessary Being and Possible Being:

Reflections on Ibn Sina's

Emanationism

Introduction

Ibn Sina is probably the most significant philosopher in the Islamic tradition

and arguably the most influential philosopher of the pre-modem era. He is primarily a

metaphysical philosopher of being. He was concerned with understanding the selfs existence

in this world in relation to its contingency. Ibn Sina's philosophy is an attempt to construct a

coherent system ofthought that accords with the religious doctrines of Islam. He is generally

considered as one among major Islamic philosophers.

Ibn Sina's conception of God as the Necessary Being lays the foundation for

his systematic accounts for notions like soul, intellect and cosmos. In his attempt to establish a

relationship between Islam and philosophy, Ibn Sina invokes philosophical notions to explain

religious terms and vice versa. Ibn Sina emphasizes that God cannot be regarded as the central

subject matter of metaphysics.273 However, for him, metaphysics can only give proofs for the

existence of God.

Like Al-Farabi, ibn Sina can be located within the Neoplatonic Aristotelian

tradition. He embraces the emanationist cosmology of Plotinus, despite the challenging

appropriations from his side. However, he rejected Neoplatonic epistemology and the theory

of the pre-existent soul. Like Aristotle, Ibn Sina views that logic and metaphysics share a

concern with the study of secondary intelligible, abstract concepts such as existence and time.

Ibn Sina: Life and Works

Ibn Sina was born in around 980 in Afshana, a village near Bukhara in

Transoxiana. His father was a local Samanid governor. At an early age, his family moved to

Bukhara. There he happened to study Hanafi jurisprudence and medicine. Bukhara was far

quite far from Bagdad. But it remained a specific location of cross-cultural influences. 274

273 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989) op. cit, p.lSO. 274 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p. 87

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He worked at the Samanid court of Nuh ibn Mansur (r. 976-997) as a

physician. The Amir allowed him to use the Saminid's library. 275 The excellent library of the

physicians at the Samanid court helped him to develop a philosophical and scientific outlook.

He kept himself away from the court politics. Ibn Sina wrote his two earliest works in

Bukhara under the influence of al-Farabi. The first, Compendium on the Soul (Maqala fi '1-

nafs), is a short treatise dedicated to the Samanid ruler. The book upholds the incorporeality of

the rational soul without resorting to Neoplatonic insistence upon its pre-existence. The

second is his first major work on metaphysics, Philosophy for the Prosodist (al-Hilana al­

'Arudiya) penned for a local scholar. It can be considered as his first systematic attempt at

Aristotelian philosophy.

Later on, ibn Sina fled to Gurganj in Khwarazm, after the Qarakhanid's take

over ofBukhara in 999.276. Later, he moved further to Jurjan in Khurasan. He met his disciple

and scribe al-Juzjani at Jmjan.277 He worked as a physician under Majd al-Dawla in Rayy.

Later, he became vizier of Shams al-Dawla. After the death of Shams al-Dawla in 1021, he

became the vizier of the Kaykuyid 'Ala' al-Dawla. He found a reliable patron in Ala al­

dawla. He lived in Isfahan under the patronage of Ala al-dawla for thirteen years.

Ibn Sina wrote many books in Arabic. He wrote three encyclopedias of

philosophy. The first of these is Kitab al-Shifa' (The Cure). Following Aristotelian model, he

deals with the natural sciences, logic, mathematics, metaphysics and theology. This work

shows his close allegiance to Aristotle. He completed the other two encyclopedias in Isfahan

itself. The first one is entitled Danishnama-yi 'Ala 'i (The Book of Knowledge for 'Ala' al­

Dawla). This philosophical work is aimed at common man. It was written in Persian. It is a

short encyclopedic work of essential philosophic knowledge. 278• The Book of Knowledge

was the basis of al-Ghazali's criticism on the philosophic tradition. The second is Kitab al­

Isharat wa '1-Tanbihat (Pointers and Reminders), a work that reflects his mature thinking on a

275 Ibid, p. 88 276 Ibid 277 Ibid 278 Ibid, p.89

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variety of logical and metaphysical issues. For a scholar, Kitab al-Isharat wa 'I- tanbihat is his

masterpiece. 279

His work entitled al-Insaf (The Judgement) seeks to represent a separate

philosophical position. This work transcends Aristotle's Neoplatonism. This is not extant

now. One further work that had inspired much debate is The Easterners (al-Mashriqiyun) or

The Eastern Philosophy (al-Hikma al-Mashriqiya) which he wrote at the end of the 1020s.

This is also almost lost. He wrote Kitab al-qanum fi al-tibb to defend philosophers from the

intrusion of physicians. 280 Ibn Sina's Kitab al-hudud (Book of Defmitions) is the second

known philosophical book on defmitions. 281

Ibn Sma inherited the Neoplatonic emanationist scheme of existence from al­

Farabi. He rejected creation ex nihilo. According to him, cosmos has no begirming. Cosmos is

a natural logical product of the divine One. The cosmos succeeds God merely in logical order

and in existence. It is impossible to have infinite series of causes and contingent beings.

Hence, God is the necessary being.

Ibn Sina is not distancing himself from the fundamentals of theology. He uses

philosopher's intellect for a theological purpose. The argument runs as follows: There is

existence; or rather our phenomenal experience of the world confirms that things exist, and

that their existence is non-necessary because we n·,tice that things come into existence and

pass out of it. Contingent existence cannot arise unless it is made necessary by a cause. A

causal chain in reality must culminate in one un-caused cause because one cannot posit an

actual infinite regress of causes (a basic axiom of Aristotelian science). Therefore, the chain of

contingent existents must culminate in and fmd its causal principle in a sole, self-subsistent

existent that is Necessary. This, of course, is the same as the God of religion.

279 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1976), op. cit. p. 23 28° Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.89. 281 ibid, p. 90

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The roots oflbn Sina's doctrine are entrenched in classical Islamic theology or

kalam. Oneness of God is at the heart of ibn Sina's philosophy.282 His theory of essence

posits three modalities: essences can exist in the external world associated with qualities and

features particular to that reality; they can exist in the mind as concepts associated with

qualities in mental existence; and they can exist in themselves devoid of any mode of

existence. This fmal mode of essence is quite distinct from existence. Essences are thus

existentially neutral in themselves.

Existents in this world exist as something, whether human, animal or inanimate

object. They are 'dressed' in the form of some essence that is a bundle of properties that

describes them as composites. God on the other hand is absolutely silnple, and cannot be

divided into a bundle of distinct ontological properties that would violate his unity.

Contingents, as a mark of their contingency, are conceptual and ontological composites both

at th'.! first level of existence and essence and at the second level of properties. Contingent

things in this world are mentally distinct composites of existence and essence bestowed by the

Necessary. According to ibn Sina, every causal series ends in the being who necessarily

exists by virtue of Himself. 283

Despite his strong allegiance to Islamic theology, ibn Sina's metaphysics is

generally expressed in Aristotelian terms. For him, the quest to understand being qua being

subsumes the philosophical notion of God. The Necessary being is the foundation of his

metaphysics. Divine existence bestows existence and hence meaning and value upon all that

exists.

His theory of Existence addresses some of the basic debat{:S on causality. First,

theologians such as al-Ash 'ari was adamant in denying the possibility of secondary causality.

For them, God W:iS the sole agent and actor in all that unfolded. Ibn Sina's metaphysics,

although being highly deterministic because of his view of radical contingency, still insists the

importance of human and other secondary causality.

282 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op cit, p.l52. 283 Ibn Sina.(l957) Kitab al-Isharat wa i-Tanbihat (ed.) Sulayman Dunya, Dhakhair al-Ara.l, Cairo: Dar al-Ma' arif, pp.26-27

107

He also addresses the Problem of evil. Divine providence ensures that the

world is the best of all possible worlds. He distinguishes between universal evil and particular

evil. Some universal evil does not exist since evil is the absence of good. Good is synonymous

with the necessary being in Ibn Sina. Particular evils in this world are accidental

consequences of good. The problem of moral evils and particularly 'horrendous' evils

remains.

Ibn Sina' main contribution is to offer a philosophical system ingrained in the

theological Islam. His philosophy remained a bone of contention for the debaters in the east

and west. His metaphysics and theory of the soul had an insightful impact on scholastic

philosophy of the west. In the east, his conception brought in further enquiries in the direction

of theology and philosophy. Al-Ghazali considered Ibn Sina as the principal representative of

philosophy in Islam

The Book of Definitions

AI-Kindi did not differentiate between definition and description in his treatise

On the Defentions and Descriptions of Things. According to ibn Sina, definition is a statement

indicating the essence of a thing. 284 It does .'lot relate to an individual, but to a class.

Description "is a statement composed of a genu:> of a thing and the accidents concomitant to

it, so the description becomes equivalent to the thing In absolute terms, description is a

statement which defines a thing in terms of ine1;sential knowledge-but which is particular to

it. .. 285

[n the Book of Defmitions, Ibn ~:ina considers the relationship of matter and

form as one of the basic philosophical problems. For him, both form and matter form the

essence of a thing. Like al-Kindi and al-Farabi, ibn Sina uses the word al-jawhar for

substance. Substance is the essence of every existent. Substance is self-subsisting in ibn Sina.

284 Kennedy-Day. Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l23 285 Ibn Sina. (200J), The Book of Definitions, translated Jy. Kennedy- Day Kiki., The Books of Definition in Islamic Philos:,phy: The Limitation of Words, p.l 02

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Ibn Sina adds that it is subsisting in actuality. There is a primary distinction between actuality

and potentiality in ibn Sina.

According to ibn Sina, there must be some science which studies substance.

Substance has a being which is in some way separated from matter. According to ibn Sina,

existence of a substance does not depend up on matter. Every reality has a nature by which it

is what it is. For instance, a triangle has a nature whereby it is a triangle. He distinguishes that

nature from existence. He generally speaks of the nature of a thing in three different ways.

First of all, he considers essence as existing in the individual thing. Secondly, it is conceived

as existing in the individual soul. Thirdly, it is conceived absolutely. An essence taken

absolutely in itself, cannot exist without being realized either as actually existing in an

individual or in the mind. A thing's individual existence is also something happens to it. It is

something accidental to that thing's essence. The existence of the thing and its essence differs

as everything receives its existence from another. Thomas Aquinas also agrees with Ibn Sina

that essence and existence differ in created beings. But he refuses to see existence as a n

accident.

The term al-hayula refers to matter.286 Some times he uses the term madda.

Absolute matter is a substance which exists in actuality only when it receives a corporeal form

from the potentiality of matter to receive forms. Absolute matter does not have in itself any

form particularizing it, except in the sense of potentiality. The meaning of his statement that

'there is a substance belonging to matter' is that the existence which comes to matter belongs

to everything from the point of view that it receives certain perfection or something which it

did not have. Therefore it will be matter, in relation to what is not in it and it is a subject in

relation to what is in it.

Matter comes in to actuality when it receives form. Aristotle also denies

separate existence to form. Ibn Sina calls God the necessary being. 287 His approach to God is

very similar to mu 'tazilite position. He tried to prove that there is no tension between reason

and revelation.

286 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l33. 287 Ibid, p.l 02.

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Both mu 'tazilites and ibn Sina deny that God has any accidents. For ibn Sina

God has no definition, no description, no genus. Similarly, Mu 'tazilites argued that God is not

connected with a body. He doesn't have a form or shape. By accidents, al-Kindi calls God the

first cause. Ibn Sina takes God as the necessary existence. He describes his ideas on God in al­

Illahiyyat. He distinguishes between necessary being and possible being. Necessary being is

that brings possible beings in to existence. Possible things are not necessary in themselves.

Obviously, there is a difference in theological conception of accidents and

philosophical conception of accidents. Philosophy takes colour, shape, taste etc are accidents.

Ibn Sina distinguishes philosophy from religion through the use of specific vocabulary. Al­

Farabi has used the term 'The necessary existence' to refer to God.288 Al-Farabi did not

explain what he meant by the necessary existence. Ibn Sina, on the other hand, deals with the

necessary existence of God in detail. He explains philosophical significance of the term. He

explains this on the basis of causal relation, A necessary being does not depend on any other

to cause it to exist. A contingent being or possible being depends on another to cause it to

exist. The necessary being exists without a cause. According to Ibn Sina, there can be only

one necessary being that can exits without a cause. 289

Secondly, for ibn Sina, the necessary existence is an ultimate and indivisible

entity. The essence of God is his existence. In other words, God has an essence of different

kind. Through the uniqueness of his essence, God is separated from the rest of creation. He

has both essence and existence. Ibn Sina calls this singulars situation aniyya290. His view

echoes the Mu'tazilites doctrine that there is nothing like God. God's existence is unique.

Ibn Sina defines cause on the basis of his rejection of infmite regress.291

Every being which exists has existence from another essence in actuality. This being has

existence in actuality and existence of this being in actuality is not from the existence of

that one in actuality. The caused is every being whose existence in actuality comes from

the existence of another being, but the existence of that other being is not from its

m Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.126 289 Ibid, p.l27 290 Ibid 291 Ibid, 136

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existence. In his metaphysics, ibn Sina recogruzes four causes. They are formal,

elemental, efficient and final causes. 292 In the Book of Definitions, Ibn Sina prefers ilia

over sabad. Illa is the word for cause used by al-Kindi. Sabab is the word used by al­

farabi.

The issue of cause is foregrounded in the distinction between actuality

and potentiality. His first premise is that nothing comes in to being by itself. In Aristotle,

final cause is regarded as the most important. But both in Islamic philosophy and in

scholastic philosophy the efficient cause is stressed this emphasis exists in ibn Sina also.

Ibn Sina follows Aristotle in asserting that knowledge of things comes from knowledge

of causes.

Ibn Sina logically argues that there is only one necessary existence. If there

were two necessary existences, an infmite regress would again exist. Things come in to being

when necessary existence wills something. The possible beings constitute a different order

from that of necessary existence. He strongly denies the preexistence of possible beings. God

indicates perfection. God is pure actuality.

Mu'tazilites were interested in atomists of pre-socratic era. Ibn Sina's notion of

physical world also reflects pre-Socratic ~Jomist views. 293 Mu' tazilites believed that bodies

were composed of atoms. Accidents were attached to these atoms. According to Abu al­

Hudhyal, smallest body requires six minimum atoms to constitute it.294 Another theologian

Muammar feels that a body requires minimum six atoms. Democritus th0ught that atoms have

different size. 295

One major point of atomists is that accidents adhere in 1 he individual atoms.

Sum of accidents form a substance. Substance is not just an underlying ;tratum of accidents.

Ibn Sina put forward his views in tandem with these basic points. Islamil~ theology considers

creation as continuous act of God. God is continuously creating the world. This recreation

292 Ibid 293Ibid, p. I 38 294 Fakhry, Majid. (1958), op. cit., p. 23 295 Kirk, G.S and J.E. Raven. (I 962),The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, p. 409

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moves from one instant to another.296 The created world cannot sustain itself. It requires the

continued will of God.

Emanation Theory of Ibn Sin a

Ibn Sinha's scheme of emanation replaces the Qur'anic doctrine of creation.

He conceives a cosmology which is very similar to al-Farabi. 297 The universe is an emanation

from the The One. The world is not directly intended by The One. The unity of The One is in

no way affected by the production of many from the one. The First intellect emanates from

The One. The prime motor of creation is the First intellect. It is the product of the

contemplation of the one. The plurality of the world is derived from the First Intellect. God

cannot produce multiplicity. However, first Intellect can do it.

According to ibn Sina, all things that emanate from Necessary Being would

desire to return to that Being. S.H Nasr opined that there is no much differences between

emanasionism and Islamic doctrine of creation According to Nasir, "it is neither in his unified

vision of the cosmos nor in the doctrine of divine intellection that Ibn Sina differs from the

Islamic perspective. It is more in limiting the power of God to a predetermined logical

structure and in diminishing the sense of awe o;~ the fmite before the infmite that he came to

be criticized by certain authorities of Islamic tradition."298 Morewedge feels that Nasir's

argument is not in tandem with the facts. According to him, there is a difference in producing

something from out of nothing and producing sC'mething by emanation from one's thought. In

the latter case there is a resemblance between the agent and the product: this resemblance is

not to be found in the fist case.

Ibn Sina explicitly asserts that Necessary existent does not produce the world

in terms of Islamic creation. Islamic God produces the world ex nihili. Here, the view that Ibn

Sina's Emanationism upholds Islamic Theology is open to serious objection. According to

Ibn Sina, the Necessary being produces a single intellect. The First intellect is produced out of

296 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l40 297Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op cit, p.l63 298 S.H Nasr. (1976), op.cit, p.214.

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Necessary being's contemplation on its own essence.299 The necessary being is not contingent.

However, first intellect is contingent. It can produce multiplicity. The multiplicity has a triadic

structure as the first intellect focuses both on the God and on itself in the process. Some

commentators term First Intellect a necessary bridge between the necessary one and the rest of

the universe. 300

Ibn Sina employs the theory of emanation to account for the multiplicity of the

universe. First intellect is a link between transcendent God and the rest of the universe. The

hierarchy of emanations is emanated eternally. The emanation process takes place by

intellection. The world of being is eternally emanated from God. They are co-eternal with the

God. Here lies a logical problem. The world of beings is not wholly transcendent like God.

There are some striking similarities between Ibn Sina's emanasionism and

Plotinus's cosmology. Ibn Sina elaborates the triad of Plotinus. According to Plotinus, "the

first remains the same even if other things come in to being from it."301 For Plotinus, good

transcends all things. Good let all things exist by themselves. But. good remains above all of

them.302 Similarly, the necessary being remains intact. However, some commentators feel that

the whole theory of emanation is designed to bring God with in the cosmos. Emanation tries

to connect God organically to the whole. It is not about the transcendence of God. According

to Armstrong, the relation between the absolute and the derived beings remains a mystery.

One cannot form a general concept on this relation. 303

The First intellect is the link between God and the rest of the universe.

Similarly, tenth intellect is the next major link between the celestial and sublunary world.304 It

is an active intellect in the sense that it send out an undifferentiated range of forms and

thoughts. The Tenth Intellect, by its own activity, reduces the dependence on God. Ibn Sina is

299 Ibn Sina. (1960), "Al-Shifa: al-llahiyyat", in Moussa, M.Y., S. Dunya, and S. Zayed (eds.), Cairo: OrganizaTion Generate des Imprimeries Gouvernementales, vol.2, pp. 402-03. 300 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op. cit, p.l67. 301 Plotinus·. (I 966), Enneads, voi.S, trans. Armstrong, Cambridge, Loeb Classical library, p. 169 302 Ibid 303 Armstrong, A.H. (1940) ,The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy ofPlotinus, p.ll9 304 Netton, Ian Richard. (I 989), op. cit, p.169

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of the opinion that it is Active intellect that directs our souls. 305 The Active intellect assumes

the function of a creator. It is rather a necessary implication of active intellect's essence.

According to Davidson, in its operation, the active intellect is, as it were, an eternal cosmic

transmitter, sending out an undifferentiated range of forms and thoughts, as well as the

substratum that can receive them.

According to Ibn Sina, every existent is either a necessary being or a possible

being. A possible being receives actual existence from something outside itself. In that

process the possible being becomes a necessary being. A possible being is actually given

existence by some other being. In other words a possible being is necessitated in its existence.

A possible existent may be rendered a necessary existent either eternally or only at some point

in time. Eternally produced intelligences are not composed of matter and form. Only one

being- God- is free from all potentiality and possibility. According to Ibn Sina,, the only effect

that immediately produced by God is the highest separate intelligence. It is called the first

intelligence. It is eternally and necessarily produced by God. It is a possible ceing in and for

itself It is a necessary being by reason of God.

According to ibn Sina, the first produced intelligence knows three objects. It

understands its source, which is God. Se ::ondly, it understands itself as a possible being in

itself. Thirdly, it understands itself as a necessary being by reason of God. The first

intelligence necessarily and eternally produces a second intelligence. It happen•; on account of

first intelligence's thinking in God. It also produces the soul of the first heavenly sphere in so

far it thinks of itself as a necessary being. It produces the body of the outer most heavenly

sphere in so far as it thinks itself as a possible being.

The second intelligence thin::s of three objects. It thinks ofthe first intelligence

that produced it. It thinks of itself as a possible being in itself It thinks of itself as a necessary

being by reason of the first intelligence, which eternally produced it. Consequently it

produces three effects. It produces a third intelligence, and the body and the soul of the second

heavenly sphere. The same process is being continued till one reaches the tenth intelligence.

305 Ibn Sina, (1985), Kitab al-Najat, ed. Majid Fakhry, Beirut, p.278

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The tenth Intelligence is the separated agent intellect. Separate agent intellect enables us to

think. It is the producer of the forms of material things on earth. It plays an important role in

flourishing of life on earth. The agent intellect does not produce another lower intelligence.

The creative power of the necessary being cannot be communicated indefmitely to ever less

perfect beings. 306

Ibn Sina is strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic view that from one only one

effect can proceed immediately. He says the God directly or immediately produces only one

effect, the first intelligence. Ibn Sina doesn't compromise on divine simplicity of God. He is

strictly against introducing some multiplicity in to God. But he is of the view that the

emanation is eternal. The first effect and all other effects are necessarily produced. The

universe, according to ibn Sina, is necessarily eternal in its existence. 307 Thomas Aquinas, in

his treatise on separate substances, rejects ibn Sina's view that created things necessarily

proceed from God. Thomas Aquinas asserts that God produces effects external to himself on

account of the decision of the divine will. He rejects ibn Sina's theory of mediate creation.

God is the immediate creative cause ofwhatever is created.308

According to Aquinas, many effects can be directly produced by God. He

rejects the view that only one effect can be produced from God. Aquinas argues that this

position has nothing to do with divine simplicity of God. In contrast to Ibn Sina, Thomas

Aquinas rejects the notion of a universe that existed from eternity. Aquinas links revelation

with the eternity. 309

Ibn Sina explains his position in Metaphysics IX. For him, every effect, when

taken in relationship to its cause, is necessary. The effect necessarily follows given a

sufficient cause for that effect. God is the sufficient cause for the existence of the universe.

God always existed since God always existed. For Thomas Aquinas, the God is the cause of

the universe by the necessity of his nature. God is the cause of this universe by reason of his

will. He argues that God produces things in the world freely through his will. God acts in so

306Wippel, John F. (2007) The Latin Avicenna as a source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics, p. 75 307 ibid, p.76 308 Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, pp.46-47 309 Wippel, John F. (2007), p.79

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far as he is good. Goodness results in production by means of the divine will. Will is not

constrained to choose things which are only means to its end.

Proofs for the Existence of God

Ibn sina classifies beings in two- necessary and contingent beings. He defines

contingent being as that whose non-existence does not produce impossibility. A necessary

being is that whose hypothetical nonexistence would result in impossibility. A contingent

being depends up on the necessary being310• God himself is the necessary being.

Ibn Sina sees that there exists an infinite incorporeal power. He is the origin of

the first movement. The necessary being is an uncaused Being.311 The world owes its

existence to this uncaused being. Ibn Sina writes about this uncaused being: "Every totality

formed successively of causes and effects in which there is a cause, which is not an effect

must have that cause as its outermost point: because if it were in the middle, it would be

caused. Every chain which comprises causes and effects is fmite or infmite. It is clear that, if

it only comprised what is caused, it would need a cause external to it, to which it would be

attached, without any doubt, by an outermost point. So every series culminates in the Being

necessary by His essence. "312

There is a mystical dimension to Ibn Sina's conception of God. Here, he is

very much closer to Sufi paradigm of God. The necessary being is the beloved of the various

intellects and sublunar beings. God is the sublime object of love. Love is the essence of good.

It is the being of the good. In Ibn Sina, God is synonymous with good. It shows his C·Jnceptual

similarity with Plotinus.

His work The Easterners has some striking similarity with intuitive philosophy

expounded by Suhrawardi. His work Pointers expounds the terminology of mysticism and

Sufism. Some con,mentators locate ibn Sina only in the rationalism of the Aristotelian

tradition. His conception of intuition does not entail mystical disclosure at all. It is just a

310 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op. cit, p. I 72 311 Ibid. p.l73 312 Ibn sina. (I 957), op.cit, pp. 26-27

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mental act of conjunction with the active intellect. Some of the mystical commentators of Ibn

Sina have relied upon Pointers to demonstrate their points. They argue that Ibn Sina accepted

some key epistemological possibilities that are present in mystical knowledge

For ibn Sina, it is not the act of creation which is the main event which proves

God's existence. Rather, the existence of the world demonstrates that it must have a first

cause. 313 The first cause stands as a first impulse which brought about existence. Ibn Sina was

strongly influenced by Greek philosophy. But his vestiges of Islamic influence can be traced

in his metaphysics emphatically. It is evident in his works such as al-Shifa and al-Najat314• It

is evident in his Treatise on love. Ibn Sina perceives God as absolute transcendent; God is the

source of existence, love and knowledge. In some parts of his works, he depicts God as the

necessary existent. In some other parts, God is portrayed as the source of knowledge, beauty,

goodness and love.

Plato believed in the existence of transcendental world which contains

universal ides and concepts. God is one of these ideas which stand above all of them. He

believed in the real existence of these ideas as a kind of divine intellect. In contrast, Aristotle

believed that ideas exist in the mind. Rational concept does not have existence in reality.

Aristotle, however, offered a defmition for God in terms of genus and species. Aristotle

explains that genus and species do not exist in reality. They are only rational descriptions ..

They do not violate the unity of God. One can describe the unity of God in terms of genus and

differentia by identifying His genus and differentiating him from others.

Philo tried to assimilate Greek thought in to Jewish philosophy. He stresses the

unknowability of God. God is unnamed and incomparable. For Philo, God is the creator of all

ideas. God created the world through logs. 315 One can describe God in negative terms, for he

transcends all descriptions. Plotinus also believed that it is not possible to perceive the essence

of God. One can only know the existence of God through the things proceeded from him. One

313 Elkaisy- Friemuch, Maha. (2006), Relationship with God through Knowledge and Love, 'Ishq, in the Philosiphy of Ibn Sina, Routledge, p. 79 314 ibid 315 Ibid, p.81

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can speak of God in different ways. But all these things show the unlikeness of God to all

things.

Ibn Sina, like Philo and Plotinus, upholds the unity of God. His essence is

simple and indivisible. Any attempt to describe it may violate his unity. The essence of God is

indivisible in to matter and form or in to soul and body.316 Ibn Sina considers attributes of

God as his properties. 317 Properties can describe, but it cannot defme essence. Ibn Sina

attributes qualities to God without violating His absolute unity and simplicity Ibn sina writes

in al-najat:

"The first attribute of God is that He exists and all other attributes manifest this

existence either by addition or with negation and none of them imply

multiplicity or anything contradictory in His essence. The ones (attributes)

which express negation are such as when some one said about the first (God

forbid) that He is a substance; he did not mean other than that his Existence

was not in a subject. And if some one said that He is one, he did not mean other

tyhan abstracting from this existence numeral or logical division or association.

And if it is said that (He is) Intellect and knowable and knower, it does not

truly mean other than abstracting from this Existence the possibility of its

being mixed with matter or its relations, in considering a certain addition."318

The attributes describe the nature of existence of God. The descriptions are of

three kinds. Firstly, there is description through negation. It means abstracting from him what

cannot be applied to his existence. Second description involves adding what can be applied to

his existence. Third way is describing through adding and abstracting.

According to ibn S ina, God is the only being whose essence is identical with

his existence. 319 His existence comes from within his essence. The existence of all other

beings is added to their essence. This also means that existence of all other beings is

316 Ibid 317 ibid 318 Ibn Sina. (1985), op.cit, p. 126 319 Elkaisy-Freimuch, Maha. ( 2006), op.cit, p. 82

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dependent on another. The existence of God comes from within Himself. 320 In his treatise on

love, Ibn Sina attributes to God pure love. In Risala fi al-Ishq, he explains that love is

implanted in all things. Love emanates from God. It is the cause ofthe existence of all things.

Love emanates from God first to the Intellects and indirectly to all other things. 321 Love is the

manifestation ofEssence and Existence. He explains that love is the essence of God.

According to ibn Sina, the same can be said about goodness also. Goodness

flows from God to all existence and nurses the world to be well ordered. According to ibn

Sina, knowledge has its origin in God. Ibn Sina writes in Kitabal-Insaf (Thelogica Aristotelis)

that all intellects receive an overflowing of knowledge. This knowledge makes them know

themselves and know God. Love, goodness and knowledge flow from God to all humanity.

Ibn Sina's conception of God is very close to Qur'anic verses. God, in the view oflbn Sina, is

pure intellect, pure goodness and pure love. At the same time, he is absolutely one.

Epistemology and Theory of soul

Ibn Sina's theory of knowledge has an Aristotelan starting point and a highly

neoplatonized superstructure. According to ibn Sina, the human intellect is a tabula rasa. It is

a pure potentiality that is actualized. Knowledge is the result of empirical familiarity with

objects in this world. Abstract universal concepts develop from empirical understanding. It is

further supplemented by a syllogistic method of reasoning.

Ibn Sina explores the validity of knowledge. Transcendental intellect

guarantees knowledge. Knowledge comes about by abstraction. All the essences ofthings and

all knowledge reside in the transcendental intellect. It is otherwise known as Active Intellect.

It illuminates the human intellect through c Jnjunction and bestows upon the human intellect

true knowledge of things. Conjunction only occurs to human intellects that have become

adequately trained and thereby actualized. Ibn Sina expbiins both inference and intuition. A

syllogistic inference draws a conclusion from two prepositional premises the middle term.

Inference is felicitated through intuition inspired by the active intellect

320 Ibid, p.83 321 Ibid

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Ibn Sina's epistemology deals with God's knowledge. The divine is pure and

immaterial. It cannot have a direct epistemic relation with the particular thing to be known. He

opinions that God knows things only in a universal manner. It occurs through the universal

qualities of things. God only knows kinds of existents and not individuals. Al-Ghazali

discards Ibn Sina's epistemology as a heretical denial of God's knowledge.

Ibn Sina's epistemology is premised upon his theory of soul. According to him,

soul is independent of the body and capable of abstraction. His notion of soul is Neoplatonic

and Aristotelian. This notion of rational self begins with Aristotle and develops through

Neoplatonism. He affirms the independence of the soul from the body. He is an advocate of

dualism. He upholds self-awareness of the soul and its substantiality. Following Aristotle, Ibn

Sina gives the definition of the soul as the perfection of the body. Soul is non-corporeal

substance. 322

He is of the opinion that a soul is particular to each individual.323 He locates

intellect in the soul only. There are three sorts of soul -vegetal, animal and a rational.

Reproduction, growth and nutrition are the function of vegetative souls. Motion and

perception belong to animal soul. Reason is the function of rational soul. In higher creatures,

lower functions co-exist with higher functions. However, ibn Sina locates the operation of

rational soul in humans only. 324 According to ibn Sina, a unique individual is constituted by

soul's attraction for the body.325 Both soul and body act as a unit.

Ibn Sina answers the question whether souls pre-exist bodies. He asserts that

unembodied souls by their very nature cannot have an individual identity. Souls are separate

non-corporeal substance. They cannot pre-exist the bodies326• Ibn Sina did not believe in

reincarnation. But he states that soul is resurrected.

322 Ibn Sina. (2003), op. cit, p.l 04 323 Ibid p. I 04 324 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l28 325 Ibid, p.129 326 Ibid, p. 130

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Ibn Sina considers intellect as the locus of thought occurring in the soul. Like

Aristotle, he says that ideas come to the intellect. Knowledge is not innate. The Arabic term

aql is referred to intellect. Islamic philosophy recognizes both intuitive and scientific

(acquired) knowledge. Ibn Sina places intellect as an intrinsic nature of human being. He fmds

eight different senses ofintellect.327 Theoretical intellect is a faculty ofthe soul to understand

the essence vfuniversal things. The practical intellect actualizes or moves the soul by desire.

The materia~ intellect reveals essence of the material aspects. The habitual intellect enables the

soul to gain knowledge. The actual intellect is the faculty of thinking. The acquired intellect

receives aEd processes the data from the external world. The active intellect brings things

from potentiality to actuality. Ibn Sina makes a distinction between universal intellect and the

intellect of the cosmos. The universal intellect is the some total of expressions of the intellect

of all people. It does not have a real separate existence.328 Its existence is manifest in all

individueJs.

Existence and Theory of Predication

In advancing his theory of predication, ibn sina departed from al-Farabi. Al­

farabi's theory of predication accords with Aristotle's theory of predication. Aristotle believes

that copula is predicated in addition. Accordin.~ to al-Farabi, copula is not itself predicated.

Copula is not principally intended to be predicated. It is predicated only for the sake of

something else. 329

Ibn sina asserted that Arabic does not have an explicit copula. In S is P, ibn

Sina claims that copula is not itself predicated. Copula just indicates the relation of

predication between S and P. Here, the copula is predicated incidentally, not additionally. Ibn

Sina presents tables of opposites for simple categorical propositions. Ibn Sina follows al­

Farabi in giving true conditions for each proposition in those tables. It is premised on the

notion that grammatical subject remains constant for each table. The predicate may be

rositive, metaethic, or privative. It may be affirmed or denied. Ibn Sina gives more truth

327 Ibid, p. 131 328 Ibid, p.132 329 Kutsch. W. & S.Morrow. (1960) eds. A I-F arabi's Commentary c,n Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, Beirut, p. 105

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conditions in those tables. According to Allan Back, "each horizontal pair are contradictories,

and any item in the column is opposed (at least contrary) to any item in the other, except in

the tables for indefinite and particular propositions. In the column of the left, propositions

below follow from propositions above, but not vice versa; in the column on the right,

propositions above follow from propositions below, but not vice versa."330

Ibn Sina is ofthe opinion that every subject ofproposition is existent either in

individuals or in the intellect. This view is close to al-Farabi's implicit position. 331 The only

truth condition for S is P is that S exists somehow. He says that quiddity may exist either in

the individuals or in the mind. For ibn Sina, 'Homer is a poet' is true. However, 'Homer

exists' is false. Ibn Sina holds the view that Sis P entails claiming that Sexists somehow. Ibn

Sina adds this existence condition to the truth conditions of tables of opposites given by Al­

Farabi. He distinguishes the forms "S is not P (ie, S is not existent asP) and the metathetic S

is not P (Sis existent as not-P).

The truth conditions that ibn Sina gives for singular categorical affirmative

propositions are singularly uninformative. Zayd is just is true only when Zayd is just, and is

false otherwise. Ibn Sina analyses indefinite and qnantified simple categorical propositions in

the same fashion. 332 He also recognizes true stcttements about things that are not real at

present. He recognizes two kinds of existence -the real and existence in the intellect. 333

The task of ontology is to find being qua being. This cannot be reduced to

being in one of its special categories. According to Ibn Sina, the common ground of being is

naturaUy tied to the theory of predication. This explains how essence becomes instantiated.334

The Quran offers many specific illustrations of the theory of creation. One

cannot trace striking correspondence between the Qura'nic and the Biblical accounts of the

creation of the world. The relationship between God and man is also characterized in

33'' Allan Back. (1987) "A vicenna on Existence", Journal of th9 History of Philosophy 25:3, p.356

311 Ibid 3J2 Ibid, p. 358

m Ibid, p.360 334 Ibid, p. 366

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numerous passages in the Quran and Bible. The doctrine of creation has also been upheld by

many philosophers. Philosophers have expressed some reservations about it. These

reservations have given rise to their peculiar versions of the creation theory.

Some of the essential features of the creation theory are (i) the ultimate being is

the God of monotheistic religions. (ii) God has created the world ex nihilo; nothing is co­

eternal with Him. (iii) God is logically independent of the world; hence, it is possible for the

world not to exist while God exists. (iv) In one sense or another God is conscious by being

aware of the thoughts of persons. (v) God can intervene in man's life (vi) There is nothing in

God's nature that is also an essential constituent of man's nature.

According to S. H. Nasr, there is a marked affmity between the creation theory

and ibn Sina's emanationism. 335 In ibn Sina's philosophy, creation itself takes place as result

of God's inte:lection of His own essence. Intellection, in conjunction with the knowledge of

His own esserce, brings about the existence of all things. The act of intellection is eternal. The

manifestation of the Universe is God's eternal knowledge ofHimself. Creation is the giving of

Being by God as well as the radiation o:f intelligence. Each being is, therefore, related to God

by its being as well as by its intelligence

Ibn Sina has even identified God with the source of overflowing light in some

of his less well-known works. The being and light are ultimately the same. To give existence

is to illuminate them with the Divine Light which is the same as His Being."336 Nasr opines

that Ibn Sina, who upheld the emanation theory, actually adhered to the religious doctrine of

creation. Accordingly, he argues that ibn Sina offered his views as a rejection of the

Aristotelian co-eternity theory in support of the Islamic doctrine of creation.

Creation, according to Nasr, is like emanation. In his opinion, Ibn Sina does

not step out of the Islamic perspective in his vision of the cosmos or in the doctrine of divine

intellection. He diverges somewhat from orthodox Islamic doctrines in viewing the power of

335 Seyyed Hossein, Nasr. (1964) An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, Cambridge: Mass, pp. 212-13 336 Ibid, p. 213

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God as existing in a predetermined logical structure. ·In the Islamic doctrine God is absolute

determination as well as absolute freedom. He is the source of all qualities. Hence His will

cannot be limited to finite systems. The God produces the world ex nihilo. In Ibn Sina's

philosophy there is an explicit assertion that the Necessary Existent does not produce the

world in such a manner. On the other hand, it emanates the first intelligence.

Ibn Sina affirms that the will of the Necessary Existent cannot in any sense be

changed by consciousness, choice, or deliberation337 (DAI chap. 33). This will is equated with

His knowledge of the good universal world order, or of the general laws that best regulate the

order of the universe (DAI chap. 33). According to ibn Sina, the Necessary Existent is

governed by the physical and moral laws of the universe. The Necessary Existent cannot act

in an arbitrary manner .It remain at the same time necessarily good.

The structure of the laws governing the universe is independent of the will of

the Necessary Existent. Ibn Sina's view of the Necessary Existent resembles Leibniz's view of

God's righteousness. 338 .Here arises a controversy between the Islamic theory of creation and

the Ibn Sinian view. It is not only in terms of the interpretation of intellection. It is extended

over the issue of determinism. It results from different views on whether or not this

intellection is determined. Within Ibn Sina's metaphysical system, the intellection itself is

determined by the quality of the absolute perfection attributed to the Necessary Existent. Ibn

Sinian determinism includes intellection. It can be argued that this determinism undermines

the notion of the Necessary Existent that created the world.

In this sense, Ibn Sina's Necessary Existent does not satisfy the criteria for the

creation theory. It questions both God's logical independence of the world and God's

constitution which differs totally from that of man. For Ibn Sina, Necessary Existent is not

directly related to persons and the world. It acts only through intermediaries. This questions

God's ability to intervene in the order of the world. The discrepancy between the Necessary

337 Ibn Sina.(1952), Danashanamah-I Ala'I Ilahiyat, in Muhammad Muin (ed.), Tehran, chapter 33 338 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), "The Logic ofEmanationism and Sufism in the Philosophy oflbn Sina", Journal of American Oriental society, vo1.92, (Jan-March, 1972), p.3

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Existent and the God of creation is evident in Ibn Sina's views on non-resurrection of the

body and the lack of punishment and reward after death.339

Emanation theory also challenges idea of co-eternity. Doctrine of co-eternity

states that the ultimate being and the world are co-eternal. The major difference between this

theory and the emanation theory lies not in any temporal dimension of emanation. Emanation,

as explained by ibn Sina, need not take place at a specified time.

According to the co-eternity theory, matter exists and has always existed

indeper.dently of the ultimate being.340 In ibn Sina's emanation scheme, the Necessary

Existen,: can act only through the supra-lunary mediators. It does not have the ability to

intervene in particular events. Ibn Sina's Necessary Existent differs from the Islamic God in

lacking knowledge of particulars. Particulars are capable of generation and corruption.341

Similarly, ibn Sina's view ofthe relation of man to the Necessary Existent conflicts with the

relatic;n of harmony formulated within a religious frame.

Ibn Sina's Emanationism is more or less a mystical system. The ultimate being,

in mystical system, is related to persons by the emanation of the contingent realm. Secondly,

it is possible for persons to relate to the ultimate being by means of a mystical union. The

ultimate being in the ibn Sinian system is the Necessary Existent from which the world has

emanated. But in the very process of mystical union entails a return to the Necessary Existent.

Here, the Necessary Existence is not portrayed as a substance. However, it is not separated

from the realm of contingent. It constitutes the ground for their actualization. Ibn Sina also

upholds that there is a multiplicity of substances in the contingent world342. For Ibn Sina, "it

was (analytically) discovered that in the first realm of the realization of existents only one

existent can come from the Necessary Existent. Here in this world, however, we observe

many existents."343 Ibn Sina consigns to each kind a special science which corresponds to it.

339 Ibid 340 Ibid 341 Ibid, p. 6 342 Ibn Sina. {1952), op.cit, p.ll2 343 ibid

125

Moreover, ibn Sina arranges these substances and the Necessary Existent

according to a ranking system where rank is determined by criteria of value. 344The basis of the

ranking is the amount of actuality that entities possess. Their type of motion or lack of motion

constitutes an important criterion for Ibn Sina. He assigns a higher rank to a being that

possesses a greater amount of actuality. Similarly, whatever is composed of elements which

move in r straight line is accorded a lower rank than that which moves in a circular motion. 345

He classifies entities into supremely perfect entities, sufficient entities deficient

entities and absolutely deficient entities. Supremely perfect entities are those which are both

self-sufficient and constitute a source of other entities. The supremely perfect entity is

conceived as the Necessary Existent. Sufficient entities are those who persist being self­

sufficient. Deficient entities are those. lacking a feature that has yet to be realized. Absolutely

deficient entities are those in need of an external entity in order to persist.

According to ibn Sina, evil is a by-product of this actual world and a

consequence ofemanation. He undertakes another classification on the basis of the goodness

or the evil of entities. "Absolutely good is that entity from which only good can come.

Predominantly good is that from which more good comes than evil; and predominantly evil is

that from which more evil comes than good."346

The flow of emanation effuses from the Necessary Existent towards the world.

In this flow, the first intelligence emanates from the Necessary Existent. Considered from the

aspect of contingency, a body emanate·; from the intelligence, whereas intelligence emanates

from the aspect of the necessity of th1s intelligence. The initial emanations are followed by

similar series of.emanations in which intelligences and heavenly bodies are generated.347

In some texts, ibn Sina asserts th1t the emanation of the heavenly sub-stances

terminates wher: that heavenly intelligence is generated from which no heavenly body can

344 Parviz Morewedg~. (1972), op. cit, p. 9 345 Ibn sina. (1952), op.cit, p. I 64 346 Parviz Morewedg<'. (I 972), op.cit, p. 9 347 Ibn Sina. (1952), c•p.cit, pp. I I 2- I 3

126

emanate348. On some occasions he refers to this last heavenly intelligence specifically as the

active intelligence349. More-over, he identifies the heavens with the stars and the 73

The doctrine that exactly one entity can be emanated from the Necessary

Existent appears in several passages350. There are some other important aspects to this

doctrine. Being simple, the Necessary Existent cannot concurrently contain two causes for

two distinct effects. The simplicity of the Necessary Existent implies having only one effect.

As the most perfect being, the Necessary Existent must be the source of some other entity.

Consequently, its emanation is determined. The doctrine of the generation of intelligences is

found in many works oflbn Sina.

According to the Emanationism, elements are receptive to both generation and

corruption. 351 Since it is not able to generate a heavenly body, the active intelligence emanates

the substratum-matter. From these differences four kinds of primary, simple bodies are

derived which are capable of composition: fire, air, water, and earth. The active intelligence

emanates three different kinds of souls, the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the rational

soul. No other kind of entity can be emanated after the emanation of the rational soul. 352

Ibn Sina emphasizes an ascent towards a mystical union.353 Every entity,

according to Ibn Sina, has a desire to reach its perfection. This desire is expressed in the form

of love for this perfection. In the Risala ft 1-'isq, for instance, this desire is expressed in terms

of 'isq', or love. Discussions of the nature and function of love appear in many other writings

oflbn Sina. Ibn Sina explains this ascent on the basis ofthe pleasure principle.354

Ibn Sina explains this desire in his descriptions of the activities of the

intelligence of persons. There is an aspect of the soul which he calls 'aql. The desire of the

348 Ibn Sina. {I 957), p. 214 349 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), op .cit, p. I 2 350 Ibn Sina. (1952), p.l I 1-12 351 Ibn Sina. Sifa II, pp.393-94 352 Ibn Sina. (I 957), pp.23 I -40 353 Parviz Morewedge. (I 972 ) op. cit, p. I 2 354 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, pp. 102-106

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intelligence towards a higher realm represents a longing to return to its source.355The

intelligence finds its highest pleasure in the act of receiving the greatest of intelligibles,

namely the Necessary Existent. For ibn Sina, the Necessary Existent is the common beloved

of the intelligences. In this context he explains that the intelligences are in voluntary motion

for the sake of imitating the Necessary Existent. Similar views of love as a force explaining

motion are expressed.356 He mentions that man's soul has reached its highest stage when it is

in love with the greatest beloved, namely the Necessary Existent. 357

In contrast to Plato, Ibn Sina holds the view that the soul does not exist prior to

the body as an individual. 358 Ibn Sina distinguishes between sensible and intelligeligible

pleasures. 359 In the first case the degree of pleasure that can be experienced is limited. But

intelligences can receive unlimited pleasure since intelligence is not destroyed by the

intelligible. 360

It is observed that many powers of the soul, as explained by Ibn Sina, are

related to bodily functions and disappear, therefore, with these functions. The intelligence

('aql) persists after its separation from the soul. It is that aspect which can be separated from

the soul. It seems to participate in the mystical union. Ibn Sina describes the soul as a

substance. He states that subsequent to its realization, the soul remains a substance and

continues to be the fundamental source of the person's substantiality. And when the body, the

soul's instrument, is destroyed, the soul is not destroyed. As its instrument is destroyed, its

instrumental [physical] powers, such as sensation, memory-imagination, lust, anger, and

whatever resembles these, are also destroyed and separated from it. 361 For ibn Sina, the

greatest pleasure and the highest happiness and fortune are found in union with the Necessary

Existent.

355 Parviz Morewedge. ( 1972), op. cit, p.l3 356 Ibn Sina. (1957), op.cit, p.195 357 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, p.l 06 35

R fbi d, pp.l 02-106 359 Parviz Morewedge. ( 1972), op cit., p. 13 360 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, pp.102-106. 361 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), op cit, p. 13.

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