bett richard - immortality and the nature of the soul in the phaedrus

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Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the "Phaedrus"

Author(s): Richard BettReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1986), pp. 1-26Published by: BRILL

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Immortalityand the Nature of the Soul in the

Phaedrus

RICHARD BErr

"Firstwe must nquirewhat kindof soulthediscussion sabout".So begins

Hermeias'commentaryon the argument or immortalityn the Phaedrus

(245c5-246a2).' t is a pieceof advicethathasnot, I think,beensufficiently

heeded by modern scholars.There has been some discussionof various

textualproblemsand pointsof translation, nd this has,of course,involved

some scrutinyof the argument's tructureand presuppositions; ut I am

not aware of any really detailed, step by step analysisof the argument

otherthan Hermeias'own.2As a result,the preciserelationbetweenPlato's

views on immortalityand the nature of soul in the Phaedrusand in other

dialogueshas not received as close attentionas it could. In particular, he

questionof whatconceptionof soul Plato soperatingwith n thisargument

has tended to be dealt with too superficially by examinationof single,

I HermeiaeAlexandrini n PlatonisPhaedrumScholia, ed. P. Couvreur Paris, 1901) ad.loc.2 The most detailed discussionsI am aware of are in R. Hackforth,Plato's Phaedrus,(Cambridge, 1952), pp. 64-8, and T.M. Robinson, "The Argument for Immortality n

Plato'sPhaedrus",EssaysinAncient GreekPhilosophy,ed. J.P. AntonandG.L. Kustas

(Albany, 1971). But both of these, while they do cover the main steps of the wholeargument, deal with most of them extremely briefly; in addition, Robinson'sanalysisseems to me mistakenin severalplaces. Among other writersandcommentatorson thePhaedrus, W.J. Verdenius ("Notes on Plato's Phaedrus", Mnemosyne, Series 4, 8

(1955), 265-89) and G.J. de Vries (A Commentaryon Plato's Phaedrus,Amsterdam,

1969) offer only isolated remarks,mostlyon passageswhere the text is in doubt. I.M.Crombie (An Examinationof Plato'sDoctrines,London, 1962) in a long and exhaustivechapter on Plato'sviews on the soul (Vol. I, ch. 7, "ThePhilosophy of Mind"),devotesonly a pageanda half(325-7) to the argument,mostly at a veryabstract evel; andMartha

Nussbaum, in a discussionof the Phaedruswhichcovers almost every major topic in thedialogue ("'This Story Isn't True'; Poetry, Goodness and Understanding in Plato's

Phaedrus", Moravcsik and Temko (eds.), Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts,Totowa, N.J., 1982), dismissesit in literally a sentence (pp. 106-7).

Phronesis1986. Vol. XXXIII (AcceptedJuly 1985) 1







troublesomephrases, rather than by assessment of the argumentas a

whole.

My purpose, then, is to analyse he Phaedrus' rgument or immortality

asminutelyas I can. Thisargumentsof considerable ntrinsic nterest,and

Ishallbeginbytreating t largelyas an isolatedpiece of logic, examining he

natureand cogency of the variouspremisesandinferences.However, the

argumentmust also, of course, be seen in its context. By examining t in

detail, I hope also to clarify, to some degree, the place of the Phaedrus

among Plato's works - or at least, among those works that deal with

questionsabout the souland immortality. naddition,I hopeto arriveat a

better understanding f the argument'splace in the Phaedrus tself. For

another neglected issue, I believe, is that of the relation between the

argument or immortality nd the mythof thecharioteers hat immediately

follows it. Typically,the two sections have been discussedtoo much in

isolation from one another;yet clearly the natureof the soul is a central

topic for both of them.

That Plato intends the argumentas a rigorousproof, and hence as

admittingof the detailedexamination intend to give it, is not, I think,in

doubt. In this respectit contrasts harplywiththe myththatfollows, and

Plato purposely signals the contrast in two ways.3 First, there is the warning

at 246a6(immediatelypreceding he myth) that whatfollows is a descrip-

tion of the soul onlyT

EOLXEV,ot o[ov {GTL;the proof has no such

qualificationsattachedto it. Secondly,the stylesof the two passagesare

very different. The proof is presented n extremelyspare, choppy prose;

Platohere seems to be aiming or maximum larityand ogicalperspicuity.4

3 This contrastshouldnot be taken to implythat the proof is more importantthan themyth,or thatthe mythis not "realphilosophy". In thisconnection, it is interestingthatPlato uses the word &x6bettg (245c1,4; cf. &no6eLXtwoV,b7) to refernot simplyto the

proofof immortality,but to the entireensuingdiscussion; he "demonstration"s of thefact that the madness of the lover is divinelyinspired,andso encompasses the myth aswell as the proof. InPlato'sview, then, mythandproofareequallyvalidwaysof showingthings- though of course, each may be appropriate n differentcircumstances.4 Some (e.g. de Vries, op.cit., followingDenniston) have likenedthe style of the proof(in addition to its thought butthat isanothermatter)to that of certainPresocratics.Thesimilaritymay be there, andmaybe intentional;butthisdoes not, I take it, detractfromthe plausibilityof my suggestion here - there may be more than one reason for hisadoptingthe style that he does. RaphaelDemos (in "Plato'sDoctrine of the Soul as aSelf-MovingMotion", JHP 6 (1968), 133-45)goes so far as to suggest, largelyon thegroundsof thisstylisticdifference,thattheargument s a later nsertion.Thisseemsto mequite unnecessary; t is not at all unusualfor Platoto change his style radicallybetweenadjacentpassages.

2







When he embarkson the myth, his language loosens up, and seems

positively florid compared with the rigor and economy of the previouspassage. In fact, of all the arguments or immortalityn Plato, this one ismuch he closestto what wewouldconsidera formalproof.So indissectingit, we are notapproachingt in aspiritanydifferent romthat n whichPlato

composed it.

I

The basicshapeof the argument s as follows:

1) Soul s thatwhich is its own source of motion.

2)Thatwhich s its ownsourceof motion s immortal.Therefore ) Soul s immortal.

Platopresents t, though, nthe reverseorder.Theconclusion3) isstatedatthebeginning 245cS); heargument or 2)occupieshimfrom hereuntile2,and2) is stated at e2-3; 1) is thenargued or between245e3and246al; andfinally,at 246al-2, the conclusionof the whole arguments restated.Theargument or 1) is relatively traightforward,ndwe shalldealwith t later;2), however, is established n a muchmore complexfashion, by meansoftwo independentsub-arguments.The premisesof the firstsub-argument(which I shall label A) are as follows:

Ai) Thatwhich s itsownsourceof motion salways inmotion.Aii) That which is always in motion is immortal.

The premisesof the secondsub-argumentB are:

Bi) thatwhichis its own source of motion is a source of motionfor everythingelsethat moves.

Bii) that which is a source of motion for everything else is ungenerated andimperishable.

A is alsopresented nthereverseorder,but B occurs n theorder nwhichIhavejustexhibited t.5I shallnowanalyse he stepsone by one, inthe orderin whichPlato gives them, beginningwithsub-argumentA.

I Thisanalysisof the argument'sbroadoutlineagreesmostcloselywiththat of Hackforth(op. cit.). The only point at which I would take issue with him is that he regardsthesecond of the two arguments or2) as subordinate o the first; t seemsto me thatthe twoare paralleland equally important.Hermeias'sreconstruction s also roughlyin agree-ment with my own (see p. 104.4-12for his introductorystatementof the premises). Hethinksthat the argumentas a whole dividesinto two; in hisview, the firstsub-argument

runs(usingmy symbolism)1), Ai), Aii), therefore3), andthe second (roughly)1), Bi),Bii), therefore 3). (This is not quite right, since he furthersubdividesmy Bii), and his

3







We begin with a statement of Aii) - TO yaQ a'ELXLVTOV aOtvacVov

(245cS). No argument s offered for this premise; it seems to be simplytaken for granted.6Presumably he underlying hought s that something

which is alwaysin motion must always exist, and so must be immortal.

Provided "always n motion"means "in motion for eternity"(on which

morebelow), thisseems hardto quarrelwith. It is onlywhen we move to

Ai) that the real argumentation egins.

The effect of Ai) is to identify that which is always in motion with that

whichmovesitself;given Aii), this establishes he main premise2). Plato

now states Ai) at 245c7-8 - "only that which moves itself . . . never ceases

moving" prefacing t withwhatamounts o astatementof its converse

"that which . . . is moved by something else, since it admits of a cessation

of movement,admitsof a cessationof life" (c5-7).7 At the sametime, he

offers a reasonfor the assertion; his is contained n the terseandcryptic

phrased-E o"ux unoXkiLnovTr6O c7-8).

viewof the logicat thatpointis slightlydifferentfrommine;on this,see furthernote 14.)

The main difference, then, is that he does not include Plato's statement of my main

premise 2); but this difference is not important,except froma strictlyformalpoint of

view. The analysisof Robinson(op. cit.) is rathermoredistantfrommine. Partly orthis

reason, itwouldbe asomewhatarduous askto criticise tdirectly;Iprefersimply o offer

my own rivalinterpretation,and hope that it prevailson its own merits.6 Therehasbeen muchdivisionof opinionover the alternativereadings&ELXt(v-Tovnd

aU1roxLvrlrovn 245cS. It seems to me that the mattercannot be decidedon the basisof

theirrelativeappropriatenesso the argumentas a whole; either readingwould yield a

closely-knitlogical progression.It is truethat the readinga1'Tox'vToV makesfor some

repetition;but this would be quite tolerable - it by no means suffices (as J.B. Skemp

thinks- see TheTheoryof Motionin Plato'sLaterDialogues,Cambridge,1942,p. 3, n.

2) to rulethat readingout. Hackforthdefends &ELXCViTov on the grounds hatit givesus

a statementof an ?vbo?ov - that is, a premisewhichcould be expected to find general

acceptance;butagainst his, Ackrill(Mind62 (1953),p. 278)seemsright o pointoutthat

an argument does not need to begin with a statement of some premise that is

uncontroversial.Logical considerationsaside, however, the evidence for &ElXiVoTOV

seems to me entirely superior. The mss. agree on &etx(v-9TOV; aUToxLvTjTov is found

only in one Oxyrrhynchus papyrus (1017). In addition, Hermeias clearly had

&tLXLvItOV in frontof him, and so did Cicero when he translatedthe passage for the

SomniumScipionis(a section whichhe also quotes in TusculanDisputations,1,54); the

Latinis "quodsempermovetur, aeternumest". Fora fulldiscussionof the issue, which

supportsthis generalposition, see F. Decleva Caizzi, 'AEIKINHTONo AYTOKINH-

TON?', Acme 23 (1970), 91-97.

7Thus c5-7 (T0 b'&Xo xtvoi3v, etc.) seems to me to look forwardto the following

sentence, rather than back to T6 y'Q &ElLX1VqTOV &06vaTov, despite the evident

parallelism between the pairs &eLx(v1qTov/&0aTov and 7tafOav XLV'EJOW QVa

4X95. Burnet'spunctuationsuggeststhe opposite. (Translations,here and elsewhere,are my own.)

4







What is meant byalE oUx &3toXkE'Lov'vTo? Literally, he phrasemust

mean somethinglike "in as much as it does not abandon tself";and thenaturalway to understand his is as sayingthat for a self-moverto cease

movingwould be for it to abandon ts own nature.It is, then, an essential

propertyof a self-moving hing (to speak in a later, but surelyan appro-priate,terminology) hatit be moving tselfatany given time;self-moving

things are necessarily n constantself-motion. Two questionsnow arise.

First,whydoes Plato thinkthat thisis so?Andsecond,ifwe acceptthat t is

so, does thissufficeto show thatself-moving hingsareeternallynmotion?

On the firstpoint,Platooffers usnofurther nlightenment; utperhaps he

underlying dea is something ike the following.Supposethata self-moverwere to cease to move itself. Then it could not start movingitself again

unlessgalvanised nto motioneitherbyitselforbysomethingelse. But if itwere galvanised into motion by itself, this would have to occur by the

agencyof some partof itself thatwas already n motionin whichcase,contrary o hypothesis, he thingwouldnot reallyhaveceasedto move itselfafterall. But if bysomethingelse, it couldno longercount as aself-mover.Thussomethingwhich trulymoves itself must move itself continually.8

Supposethatwe acceptthisconclusion whetherornotPlatoarrivedatit

inthewayIjustproposed).The otherquestion s whether his isequivalenttosaying hatsomethingwhichmoves tselfdoes soeternally;andto this the

answeris clearly "no". As we saw, a straightforward nderstandingofpremiseAii) requires hat we take &ELXiLVTOV in c5 as meaning"eternallyin motion";so if the argument s to work,oThnoTE XT'1yELLVOV?CVOV in c8

mustpresumablyhavethesamesense. However, it is not in thissense thatPlato has shown us that self-movers"nevercease moving". If being in

constant self-motionis an essentialpropertyof a self-mover, then a self-movercannotcease to be in motionandstillbea self-mover;butthisis not

8 If this were the line of thought thatwas motivatingPlato- and it is my best conjecture

on the subject- then it would in one respect anticipateAristotle's ideas on self-motion.

Foron this conjecture, Plato is led very naturally nto thinkingof self-movers as consis-

ting of (at least) two parts, the activeand the passive part,so to speak. Aristotle'sanalysisof the concept of self-motion (Physics Bk. VIII, ch. 5) makes central use of just such a

division; a thingwhich moves itselfmust, he thinks, consistof a partwhich ismoved and a

part whichcauses this motion. Aristotle arguesconvincingly hat this latter partcannotitself be in motion, which leads him to the concept of the unmoved mover; it turns out,

then, that, contrary o Plato, the ultimatecause of motion isnot a self-mover.However,a

picture n whichAristotle developedbeyond Plato, havingbegun by holding deassimilarto his, is presumablyone we are boundto adopt in anycase; and the developmentwould

perhaps be a little smoother if Plato'sviews were of the type I suggest. But of course, all

this is pure speculation.

5







to say that t willnecessarilykeep movingforever andso existing or ever).

There is, then, a gap in the argument.At the same time, however, it isquite understandable hat Plato should not have been aware of it. The

trouble s that "X never ceases to be F" (of which"thatwhichmoves itself

never ceasesmoving" s an instance)can mean either"It is impossible hat

there shouldbe an X which s not F" (i.e., F is an essentialpropertyof Xs)

or "Xs areeternallyF"; the second entails thatXs are immortal,but the

first does not. It is only the first that Plato is really entitled to in this

instance; or as I understand t, &TEotUx&doXntXEovaiavi6makes a point

about an essential property, not about the eternal possession of any

property.But it

isnot

surprising hatthe

ambiguity hould haveescapedhim.

It is interesting hat precisely he sameillegitimatemove is made in the

finalargument or immortalityn thePhaedo anargumentwithwhich his

one is often compared; ndeed, I take thisparallelas confirming vidence

for my readingof whatis goingon here in the Phaedrus.9 n the Phaedo

Plato moves from "The soul always comes bringing ife to whateverit

occupies" 105d3-4),and itscorollary dlO-11)"Thesoulmayneveradmit

theoppositeof thatwhich t alwaysbringswith t"(i.e. death,as hegoeson

to say)to "Thesoulisimmortal" e6). Again,it isin one senseuncontrover-

sial, given thecommonsenseGreekview of the soul, that "the soulalways

brings ife".That s, anythingwhichhasasoul istherebynecessarily live; t

is anessentialpropertyof souls thattheyare notpresent norganismswhich

have died. But thisisnotto saythatsoulsexisteternally.Nothingcancease

to bring ife andstill be a soul; this followsfrom the essentialpropertyof

soulswehavejustnoticed,and n this sensewemayagree hat the souldoes

not "admitdeath".It doesnot follow thatthe soulmustcontinue opossess

this life-givingcapacitythroughout ime, and so be immortal.As in the

9 That there is an errorcommon to the two passages is noted in passingby Demos (op.cit., p. 135). The standardview of the relationbetween them seems to be that they areargumentsof essentiallythe same kind, but that the argument n the Phaedrusis of amore empiricalnature;see Hackforth,op. cit., p. 68 and Robinson,op. cit., p. 347. 1agree about the similarity,but I cannot see that the Phaedrusargument s more empiri-cal. It is truethatthe Phaedoargumentmakesuse of theterminologyof Forms;butas faras I can see, this is not really essential to it. The crucialpoint is simply that the soulnecessarilybrings ife. In the Phaedrus,the crucialpoint is that the soul is necessarily nconstantself-motion.Eachargumentrests,then,on averybasicfeatureof thesoul, andIdo not see thatone of these features s anymoreempirical,orobservable,thanthe other.It is alsotruethatthe Phaedrusargumentowes moreto Presocratichought(on whichseealso Skemp, op. cit., pp. 3-10);but to equate "Presocratic"with"empirical" as Robin-son, at least, appearsto do) seems to me highlyinadvisable.

6







Phaedrus, he difficulty temsfromPlato'suseof thewords&drandoVU'OTE

- words whose primary enseshave to do withtemporalduration to talkaboutwhatwe wouldcallessentialproperties. 0 t is hard o knowhowelse

he could have expressedhimself,given the vocabulary vailable o him;but

the resultingambiguitywas a treacherousone."I

So much, then, forthe argumentgivenin the phrase&TEOVX 0koXELetoV

EaTO6.While the argument s notone we canaccept,it is significant orthe

pictureof the soul thatit obligesPlatoto hold. He mustembracea viewof

the soul as not simply a self-moving hing, but as necessarily n unceasing

self-motion. We will returnto this point later; for the moment, let us

continue withthe analysis

of theargument.Sub-argument

A forthe

main

premise 2) is now complete, and Plato moves on to sub-argumentB; the

discussionhere is somewhatmore lengthy.

Premise Bi) is stated in the same sentence we have been looking at for

some time; "only that which moves itself . . . is a source and first principle

of motion for the other things that move" (c7-9).'2Bi) is not arguedfor10 Fora similaruse of 6e( and o'vnoxe,considerone of the waysinwhich Platocommonly

contrastsFormsandparticulars.Formsare frequentlysaid to be "always" hesame;each

Form "always" possesses the property which makes it the specific Form that it is.

Particulars are sometimes one way, sometimes the opposite way; but the Form of

Beauty, for example, is "never" other than beautiful. Examples of this usage are Rep.479a2-3, A,. 74b7-c3, and Symp. 21 1a3,bl-2.11Curiously enough, Plato appears to recognise the error in the Phaedo immediately

after he has committed it. (Curiously, because the interlocutorsare made to regardthe

argument we have been discussing as entirely conclusive - 105e9.) He continues by

pointing out that it needs to be shown that the soul is imperishable.He appearsto be

sayingthat to establishthat the soul "does not admitdeath"- i.e., that nothingis both

dead anda soul - is not to establish that it never ceases to exist;andthis is essentiallythe

pointthatIhavejustbeen making. (See inparticularhe paragraph106b1-c7.)However,

his way of closing this gap is rather lame; he simply says that of course that which is

6d6varogs also imperishable 106d2ff.). If "the soul is e0dvatos" means only that the

soul does not admit death, ina sense which is compatiblewith the soul'sceasingto exist-as he appears to have just conceded- then this is plainly begging the question.12 Indeed, this sentence is dense to the point of being very confusing; it contains a

premiseforsub-argumentA - aswell as a reason for it- anda premiseforsub-argument

B; moreover, the same wordsg6vov bh lb abTr6 Lvo!Bverve as subject in the statement

of both. I was originally tempted to think that what I am now calling Bi) was a second

supporting consideration, parallel with &rEoOx&okoEinov taUT6,in favorof Ai). But

while this would reduce the numberof differentthings going on in the sentence, it cannot

be the rightway to read it; for no mention is made, here or anywhere,of the firstprinciple

of motion being always in motion- as would be needed if the assertion n question (that

that which moves itself is a first principleof motion) were to constitute support for Ai).

Instead, this assertion leads directly into claims about an d4e s freedom fromyiveoLtandWoQ&-claims eading to what I now call Bii); the idea of constantmotion, which s at

the center of sub-argumentA, is left behind.

7







directly. Instead, Plato immediatelystates one half of Bii) -a'X be

&ykvrltovdl) - and the argumentorBii) takeshim fromthere to 245e2.(Bii) is stated in full at d7-8; "it is not possiblethat this [i.e., thatwhich

movesitself]shouldeitherperishor cometo be".) However,thefirstpoint

he presentsin favorof Bii) - namely,that everythingwhichcomes to be

must do so from a first principlewhichdoes not itself come to be from

anything lse (dl-2, repeatedat d6)- is alsoapoint n favorof Bi) (provided

we understandyeveovL s a species of xLvroLg - I shall return to this

later). Indeed, as if to signalthathe has been confirmingBi) at the same

time as he has been arguingfor Bii), Plato restatesBi) at d6-7; "thus

thatwhichmoves itself by itself is a first principleof motion".Theargument or Bii) is asfollows.(I havejustmentioned hefirststage

of it, butI shallrepeatthisfor clarity's ake.) A firstprinciple s ungenera-

ted (ay'v-qTov),ince everything hatcomesto be comesto be outof a first

principle, and it (i.e., the first principle)does not come to be out of

anything lse (dl-2); if a firstprincipledidcometo beoutof something lse,

then"it wouldno longerbe outof afirstprinciple hatall thatcomesto be

comesto be" (d2-3) 1 This astpoint ssomewhatobscure,andthetextmay

be faulty. But the general idea, that a first principleis necessarilynot

generatedfrom somethingelse, seems clear enough;and it does follow

plausibly noughthata firstprinciplesungenerated, ssuminghatnothing

can generateitself. Hence, Plato continues,it mustalso be imperishable

(d3-4);for (inviewof whathasjustbeensaid)if it wereto perish,nothing

elsecouldbring t back ntobeing,norcouldanything lsecometo beoutof

it (d4-6). One mightstill askwhythis showsthatit couldnot perish.Plato

giveshis answerat d8-e2, in conjunctionwith his explicitstatementof the

premiseBii)withwhichwe arenow concerned.Essentially, he point sthat

if it were to perish(so bringing o an end all possibilityof yEvFotg),the

universewould collapseinto immobility.4 However, it is not statedwhy

13 Reading*t &?XQlgn d3, and taking JC&V8 yLyv6Rtevovs the subject of yLyvoLo; in

this I follow Verdeniusandde Vries (opp. cit. ad loc.). Buttmann'sconjecture tTL?x1i

would make for much better sense (and for a closer fit with Cicero'stranslation),if we

could understand ytyVOLTos equivalent to dl; but this is surely impossible.

"4The balance of opinion now seems in favor of the mss. yEvrotv n el (also found in

Hermeias - see p. 117.24), and against Bumet's reading yfv d; Ev (following

Philoponus). It is generally agreed that yfvEotv can be taken as equivalent to tca

ytyv6pEva,and this gives good sense.

Hermeias'view of the logicat thispointis puzzling.He saysthat once it hasbeen shown

that a first principleis ungenerated, that by itself suffices to show its imperishability

(p. 117.17). In his view, therefore, the considerationsoffered in d4-e2 form a supple-

mentary, and strictlyspeaking superfluous, argumentdg &biGvactovp. 117.17-25;cf.

8







this, in turn,couldnot happen.'5

This concludessub-argumentB for the mainpremise2); immediatelyafter, ate2-3, 2) is explicitly tated. Whatare we to make of sub-argumentB? There are two points about it which I find of interest. First, theargumentrequires that we think of yEVEOLgas a species of XIVaCLg. ForPlato introduces the notion of an aQxi XLV9(aWo;, and then immediately

goeson to say(bywayof arguing orBii)) that"everythinghatcomes to becomesto be"out of an a'QxTI.or the argument o work,it mustobviouslybe the same kind of aQxqunderdiscussion hroughout; nd it follows that

XLVYiOLannotsimplymean"(loco)motion",but must referto anykind ofchangewhatever.However,there is

nothingverystartlingn this. We

findjust such a broad notion of xivqcL;explicit in the Laws (again in thecontext of a discussionof soul as self-mover);at 893b6-894c8en kinds of"motion" (xLvivtL, also interchangeablyRETcaokX)re distinguished,two of which are yEVEFLg and pOoQasee, e.g., 894bll).16 Similarly, nPhysics I11.1 Aristotle gives his definition of motion (xivrJoL;) as the

fulfilment of a potentialityqua potentiality,and immediatelygoes on todistinguishvariousspecies of motion, amongwhichare yEVEOL;and aoQd(201alO-16). And indeed, a strong connection between yEvrOL; and

xivroL; occurs as early as Parmenides:"Thatwhich is" in Parmenides sexplicitlysaid to be bothaye'- ov and&xLvTTov, nd thesetwopropertiesappear to be seen as closely connected - see especially DK B8.26-8.Parmenides does not appear to treat y~VEGL; as actually a species ofxLvrloGL;ut in his use of these notions, he certainly eems to foreshadow

103,11.3-6,wherehe saysthat the argumentas awhole consists of twosyllogismsplusonefurtherargument ?i5 dEbivvaTov).fail to understandthis; it seems to me that d4-e2 isintegral to the main argument, and builds very directlyupon the demonstrationjust

above that an &pxQis &yv og. Robinson (op. cit.) claimsagreementwithHermeiasonthis issue, but seems to me also to misconstrue Hermeias'view as to the extent of theargument ErigM6vvaTov,ocating it from d8-e2 only.15 The best comment on this point may be Hackforth's(op. cit., pp. 66-7) who simplysays"ThatwasapossibilitynevercontemplatedbyanyGreekthinker".As hepointsout,the possiblity in question is that there should be no yvEaLg whatever, not that someparticularcosmos should perish. The Greeks had no trouble conceiving this latterpossibility;Plato himselfsuggests in the Timaeus 41a) that it is possible (though in fact,since the creatoris good, it will not happen to this cosmos), and many PresocraticandHellenistic schools held that it actuallyoccurred.16 The Theaetetuss also relevanthere; in the context of the "secretdoctrine"associated

with Protagoras, Heraclitus and others, the words nactvtayLyvETaL and nacvTaXLVELttaLppear to be intended as equivalent (compare 152d8with 183a5).

9







those who do. There are, then, respectableparallelsfor the idea that

"comingto be" is a kindof x(vrt'Cg.'7On the otherhand, thisdoes notmean we shouldsimplygrantPlatothe

idea and moveon. It may be understandablehat he shouldhave regarded

y?vws1; as a species of xUvroLV; ut I think that questionscan still be

raisedabout the role this assimilationplays in the argument.Recall that

Plato has just claimedthat a self-mover s a firstprincipleof motionfor

everythingelse that moves. We have now discoveredthat "motion"in-

cludes"coming o be";but presumablythoughthis is notexplicitly tated

here) it includesother thingsas well - at least some of the otherkinds of

"motion"mentioned nthe Lawsand inAristotle'sPhysics.Butif thisis so- if thereareseveraldifferentkindsof x(V1OL; - one mightwonderwhy the

same thingshouldhave to be a first principle or allof them. If we accept

that there are suchthingsas self-movers,we can also acceptthat these are

responsible orthe "motion"of everything lse. But it is notclearwhyany

one self-mover houldhave to be responsible or everyone of the different

species of xCvrioM.For example, why should not one thing (or kind of

thing) be a first principleof yCvFsog,and some other thing (or kind of

thing) a first principle of locomotion? Plato's argumentrequires that

anythingwhichis a self-mover s a first principlespecificallyof y'vECtL;

but it is not obviousto me whythis shouldbetakenfor granted.Needlessto

say, Plato does not respond o thisquery;andin view of theparallels just

adduced romParmenides,Aristotleand elsewhere n Plato, this shouldno

doubt not surpriseus. Amongotherthings,these parallelsdemonstratea

pervasivetendencyin Greek thoughtto see all the processessubsumed

underthe headingof xivrjo5L, n the broad sense we have examined,as

being very intimatelyrelated. (In Parmenidesand Plato, at least, this

tendencyresultsfrom the central contrast n both their philosophiesbe-

tween the worldof changeand the worldof thechangeless, he worldof To

ov;someonefor whomthis distinctionwasprimarywouldnaturallyendto

grouptogetherall speciesof change,as beingon a par.)

Here, then, is one assumption,or set of assumptions,n thispartof the

argument. move now to the secondof mytwo observations.Notonlydoes

the argumentrequirethat "motion" ncludes"comingto be", and that

anythingwhich is a first principleof "motion"is a first principleof all

17 Hermeiasseemsquite unruffledbythis idea;in discussing his partof the argument,he

simply remarks in passing iy y4p ytvEaL x(vT)o;t tOrtLV (p. 116.13), as if this is

entirely commonplace.

10







speciesof "motion";'8t alsoappears,at least at first sight, to require hat

thereis just oneprinciple f motion n the entireuniverse.Fortheargumentfor the indestructibility f the principleof motion rests,as we saw, on the

assertion hat allyFVetLgwouldcease with its destruction.But if there was

more thanone principleof motion,it is notclearwhythedestruction f any

individualprinciplewouldresult nthe collapseof theuniverse; o longas at

least one principlewas in operation at any given time, it seems (given

Plato'sother assumptions)as if yFVEOLtcould continue. Apparently, hen,

Platois simplytakingforgranted hat thereis not more thanone principle

of motion.

But there is somethingvery peculiaraboutthis. Recallthat Platois just

about to identify hat whichmoves tselfwith soul(this s step1) of the main

argument,according o my analysis).Sincesub-argumentB has identified

that which moves itself as the principleof motion, we are led to infer, by

simpletransitivity, hat soul is the principleof motion.But now,if the logic

of sub-argumentB requires hat there be just one principleof motion, it

appears o followthat there must be justone soul. And this, besides being

plainly contrary to any commonsenseview of the soul, seems flatly to

contradict the myth which immediately follows the proof, in which a

pluralityof individual ouls is discussed.Somethinghas gone wronghere;

and since,on thisview of the matter, heinconsistency eemsso blatant,we

should probablyconclude that the fault lies not in Plato, but in our in-

terpretationof him.

Oneway to eliminate his apparent ontradictionmightbe to suggest hat

Plato is implicitlyoperatingwhith some notionof a World Soul. That is,

perhapshe is thinkingof individual oulsas beingall ultimatelyaspectsof

somelarger,unitary oul of cosmicproportions. nthis waythe plurality f

individual ouls wouldbe only superficial,and wouldbe consistentwiththe

principle of motion in the universe being in a deeper sense one, as the

argumentfor imperishability equires. Besides making Plato's train of

thought coherent, this proposal seems to have at least some historical

plausibility.First, a doctrine of World Soul certainlywas adopted by

various later philosophicalschools - by the Stoics and, perhaps more

significantly,by the Neo-Platonists and it is hardnot to see the present

passageas in some way prefiguring hese later ideas.Second, the Timaeus

makeslarge use of the concept of a WorldSoul (though t lookshere as if

individual ouls exist in their own right, n addition o the WorldSoul, not

18 This is perhaps too strong. Strictly, all that the argumentrequiresis that anythingwhich is a first principle of any species of "motion" is also a firstprincipleof yE'VEGLg.

11







as aspectsof it'9).Despite these parallels,however,I do not think his is the

right way to understand his part of the Phaedrus. t wouldnot be surpri-

sing, in viewof theparallels, f Platowere operatinghere with a conception

of WorldSoul;butthe parallelsdo not provideany positiveevidence that

he is doing so. And the fact is that there is absolutelyno hint of any such

conception n thePhaedrus tself. We findno suggestion,either n the proof

of immortality r in the succeedingmyth, that all our souls are ultimately

aspectsof the same thing, or that our ultimategoal, in striving o escape

from the cycle of rebirth, is reabsorption n some largerunity. On the

contrary,I wouldsay, it is the individuality f our souls, the differences

between them, thatis emphasised n the myth.20

Iconclude hatwe are not entitledto readthe hypothesisof a WorldSoul

into the Phaedrus; nd the problemremainsasto howwe areto makesense

of Plato's apparentassumption that there is just one self-mover. But

perhaps hereis anotherwayto understand hematter.Possiblyhe isusing

"VPuX"s a mass term, analogousto "water"or "electricity".2'n this

case, it wouldnotbe that therewas one soul- the WorldSoul;rather, here

would be a single kind of stuff (just as water is a single kindof stuff), of

t9 The creationof individualsouls (or rather, of those souls and partsof souls that areimmortal)is describedat 41d4ff. The creator is said to fashion these souls out of theremainderof theelementspreviouslyusedto fashionthe WorldSoul,mixingtheminthesame bowl, and in the same manner (except with some dilution), as was used for theWorldSoul. Obviously,it is hardto know how, if at all, this is to be cashedout literally.Butit isat leastimplied, I take it, thatindividual oulsarenotsimplyaspectsof theWorldSoul; they enjoy a separate existence.

It is sometimes saidthat a WorldSoul is also to be found in the Laws, but this is muchlessclear;as far as I know, a WorldSoul is neverexplicitlyreferred o in thatdialogue. Ishallbrieflytouch upon this point againnearthe end.20Think,for example,of the distinctionbetweengods' soulsand human souls (246a-b);between the twelve companiesof souls, each led by a differentgod (246d6-247a4);andbetween the ten types of human lives, correspondingto variousconditions of humansouls at birth(248c2-e3). While none of these distinctions s formally nconsistentwiththe notion of a World Soul, they do indicate that Plato is choosing to focus on thedifferencesbetween souls, not on their fundamentalunity;and this, I think, makes itimplausibleto suppose that he has a WorldSoul in mind- given that there is nothingwhatever in the text to suggestit.21 In what follows, I am expandingon a suggestionby Tony Long. This is perhapsanappropriateplace also to thank him more generally for much helpful criticism and

encouragementas thispaperwasdeveloping- especially on the mattersI amnow aboutto introduce.

12







which individual souls (like individualpools of water) consist.22Now,

anythingwhich is true of water as such (for example, that its chemicalcomposition s H20), orof electricityassuch, is alsotrueof any individual

pool of water,or of anyindividual lectrical urrent;andsimilarly, f soulis

being conceived of along the samelines, anythingwhich is trueof soul as

suchwill alsobe trueof individual ouls. But thepropertywhich,bythe end

of the argument,we discover o be true of soul as such is precisely mmor-

tality.Thus it will follow, on thisunderstanding, hat anygivenindividualsoul is immortal a conclusionwhichPlato obviouslywants to uphold.Moreover,if thisis right, we canrespectboththe logicof sub-argumentB

and the pluralityof individualsouls. Sub-argumentB requires,in somesense, thesingularity f soul. Butthis does notmeanthatwe need to ascribeto Plato theview that, out of allthe particularsin theuniverse,onlyone is asoul. If "soul" is a single kindof stuff, the argumentwill work perfectlywell. For if this stuff is responsible for all y'4veOLg in the universe, thedestructionof this stuffwould indeedresult n the universe'scollapse;and

22 Myuse of the term"stuff" s perhapsa littleunusual,and Ishoulddefine it aspreciselyas I can. To begin with what is uncontroversial,all stuffsare designatedby massterms,but not all mass termsare the namesof stuffs. For abstractnouns, such as "hunger"or"wisdom", qualify as mass nouns (they do not occur in the plural, nor can they bequalifiedby numericaladjectives); yet it would be bizarre to call hungeror wisdom astuff. Now, this might suggest that stuffs are by definitionmaterial;and in this case Iwouldnot, of course, want to suggest that Platothinksof soul as a stuff. But however itmaybe inordinaryusage, I intendto use the word"stuff" n sucha waythat there canbesaidto be non-materialstuffs.Inmyusage, the referentof anymassnounwhich s not anabstractnounwillcountas astuff. (Here I amassuming ome intuitivesense of whatis anabstractnoun; I admit that it is very hard to give a foolproof definition. On this andseveral other complications in the notion of a stuff, see V.C. Chappell, "Stuff andThings", PAS 71 (1970-1)61-76- an articlefromwhichI have profitedin writingthis.)Thuselectricity,thoughnot inanyobvioussense material, s a stuff;andso, too, is soul-if it is truethatPlatoisusing"pu " as amassterm.Forthisreason,electricity sperhapsthe most useful analogy to keep in mindin what follows.

Another parallel whichmaybe helpfulis the concept of "spiritual ubstance" n earlymodernphilosophy;a famouspassagewhichmakesuse of thisconcept is the chapter onidentityin Locke'sEssay(Bk. II, ch. XXVII, "OfIdentityandDiversity").Here Lockeraises the possibilitythat some contemporaryperson's soul mightbe composed of thesame spiritual substance as that which made up the soul of Socrates (though thispossibility is, accordingto him, irrelevantto questions about identity) - just as twomaterialobjects existing in non-overlappingperiodsof time mightbe composed of thesame materialsubstance. In myusage, we mightsaythatspiritualsubstance, like Plato'ssoul, is a kindof immaterial tuffof whichsouls arecomposed (thoughI do not wanttotake the parallelany furtherthan that); while we may find such a picturehighlyalien,Locke's account (even if it is not offered in an entirely serious spirit) does, I think,illustratethat the concept of an immaterialstuff is a perfectlycoherent one.

13







nebulous o admitof certainty,I thinkwe are entitled at least to a tentative

conclusion namely, that the underlyingpictureof soul with whichPlato isoperating s indeedthislatterone, and not the one which nvolvesa World

Soul.25

I have dwelt at some lengthon the presuppositions f sub-argumentB,

both because of their interestfor our broaderunderstanding f Plato (a

matter o whichI shallreturn hortly),and becauseof the greatdifficultyof

elucidating hem. The remainderof the argument an be dealtwith much

morebriefly.Ouranalysishad reached245e2. Thefollowingsentence(e2-

4) containsa statementof both the mainpremises2) and 1) (in that order).

To recall, premise 1) states that soul is that which is its own source ofmotion; and Platonow offersus a considerationn favor of this assertion.

The argument s simplythat any bodywithan externalsourceof motionis

"soulless" (&ivXov), whereasone with an internalsource of motion is

"ensouled" EtVuXov)e4-6). On its own, this seems somewhat limsy; t is

not at all clear thatit justifiesthe conclusion hat"soul" s a self-mover n

the very strong sense used above. We may certainlymake a distinction

between bodies that needto be pushedor pulledby somethingelse in order

to move, and bodiesthatdo not; andthese two classes do seem to corres-

pond with the classes of soulless and ensouledbodiesrespectively.Butit is

surelyquite possible, forall that Platohas said, thatbodiesof the latterclass

should have received some initial propulsion nto motion from outside,

even if they need no further propulsionafter that. And this, of course,

woulddisqualify hem as self-movers; or as we saw, Plato is thinkingof a

each individualsoul is immortal;so that the sense "every soul", while less suited to the

tenor of the argumentitself (and to the usage of "Vux" elsewhere in the argument),

cannot be decisivelyruledout. Hackforthmay be rightto conclude (op. cit., p. 64) that

"the distinctionbetween collective and distributivesenses is not here before his mind";

see his discussionfor several other useful insights.

25 I should perhaps briefly allude at this point to Hermeias' views on how Plato isconceiving of soul- sinceit waswith his adviceon thissubjectthatI began. While he cites

Posidonius as having thought that Plato had in mind the World Soul (apparentlyas

distinct rom individualsouls), he himself rejects the idea. Relying heavily on 0ecag mE

xai &vOQ(w;ivTSn 245c3, he says that Plato must be thinkingof the rationalsoul -

since this is the kind of soul possessed by gods and humans,but not by other ensouled

beings (p. 102.15ff.). This seems to me acceptableas far as it goes; but as the last few

pages should have made clear, I do not think it goes far enough. Plato's logic raises

deeper problems,whichI have triedto address;neitherHermeiasnoranyone else seems

to have faced these problems. Robinson (op. cit.) follows Hermeias, but then makes

matters worse by suggesting that Plato is perhaps thinkingnot of the rational soul in

toto, but of the rationalpart of the soul. This seemsto me obviously wrongin view of themyth, where the immortalsoul is clearly protrayedas tripartite;more on this in sec-

tion II.

15







self-moveras a firstprincipleof motion.26His argument s far fromshowing

that soul is responsible or the motion (including he ycvEoLg)f everythingelse that moves. His first premise and with it, a key point in the striking

conceptionof soul the argument or immortality eveals is more assumed

than argued or. Thisconcludesmy detailedexamination f the argument;

for the remaining ines 245e6-246a2merelycontain a restatementof pre-

mise 1), followed by 3), the conclusionof the entire argument.

II

Let us now shift our approach omewhat.As I said, Plato intendsthat the

argument houldconvinceus by the force of its logic;we are not to take ontrustwhat he says, but to give our assent if and only if we are rationally

compelled.This is nothingunusual or Plato- though he densityand rigor

of this particular assage s unusual;he constantly xhortsus, through he

mouthof Socrates,to "followthe argument"where it leads us, and not to

base our views on anything lse. So far, I have been trying o approach he

argument n precisely this spirit, attemptingboth to understandexactly

what Plato is saying, and to determinehow much of it we can reasonably

accept. For the rest of the paper, I shall adopt a more exclusivelyhistorical

attitude. As we haveseen, the argument ontainsvariousassumptionsor

presuppositionswhichwe might verywell question;havingengagedwith

him inthe fashionwhichhe himselfapparently nvites, we find that he fails

toconvinceus of his conclusions.Thereare no doubtmanyreasonswhythis

is not surprising,and to discuss them would take us far afield into more

generalissues in philosophyand in intellectualhistory.However,I prefer

to stick moreclosely to the argument tself, and to see how it canhelp to

increaseourunderstandingf Plato's hought.Theassumptions rpresup-

positionsthatI just mentionedare of great nterest n themselves.Foras I

havesuggested, hey reveala certainunderlying onceptionof the natureof

soul;and it is instructive o compare hisconceptionwithother, generally

more explicit, conceptionsof soul, both in otherdialoguesandelsewhere

in the Phaedrus.This is whatI now intendto do.

The underlying onceptionof soul has severalfeatures,andwe should

brieflyreviewthem. The most obviousfeature,and the one scholarshave

noticedmostoften, is that soul, and soulalone,moves tself; ndeed,thisis

simply my premise 1). But Plato'sview is stronger hanthis alone would

imply. Recall the feature of soul whichwe uncovered n examiningthe

26 Here it is instructive o compareAristotle'sapparentvacillationon the issueof what it

is forsomethingto be a self-mover.On this, see D.J. Furley,"SelfMovers",Aristotleon

Mindand the Senses, ed. G.E. R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen, Cambridge,1978.

16







phrase &TEoIUx &oXeikitov EaT6O,Plato's support for premise Ai) -

namely, that soul, the self-mover, is in unceasing self-motion, andnecessarily o. Further,wediscovered, nconnectionwithpremiseBi), that

soulhas a cosmicsignificance;or asself-mover,soulmoves notonlyitself

but everything lse - where"moves" snot restrictedo whatwewouldcall

".motion",but includes(probablyamongother things) generation.Andfinally,therewas the puzzlingpoint raisedby premiseBii), that "soul" s

beingconceivedof as insome sense unitary.While heissue sveryobscure,

we concluded that it was best to understand"soul" as a unitary (non-

material)stuff, of whichoursoulsconsist. How does a conceptionof soul

containing hese featuresrelateto otherconceptions hatwe findinPlato?I shallbegin by summarising few familiarpointsfrom the Phaedo and

the Republic.In thesetwo dialogues,a strictdivision s madebetweentworealms,the realm of the changeableandthe realmof the changeless.The

former s the realmof sensibleobjects,the latterof intelligibleobjects;andin the Republic,at least, it is the latterclassof objectswhich, just because

they are changeless, alone fully warrantthe title of "things that are"

(v&Ta).Now, inthe Phaedo hesoulisargued o be akinto theForms that

is, to the objects granted to belong to the non-composite,changeless,

intelligible class; and from this it is deduced that the soul, too, is non-compositeandchangeless,andtherefore mmortal 78b4ff.).Orat least, itis claimed, the soul in its essentialnature s non-compositeandchangeless.

However,becauseof itsassociationwiththebody,it isbound, nthis ife, to

partakeof the changeable o some extent- though this taintis somethingwe should striveto minimise.

In the Republic, he pictureof the soul is morecomplicated; or in BookIV we are told that the soul consistsof three parts, and that our task is toachievethe appropriate armonybetweenthem. Now, the two lower partsof the soul, at least, appear o be very much subjectto change;27nd so it

27 This is not, as far as I know, explicitlystated. But there is much emphasis, in thedescription of the inferior states and inferior souls in Bks. VIII and IX, on theprogressivelygreaterinstabilityand variabilityof the various kindsof life. The less theinfluenceexerted by the rationalpartof the soul, and the greater the powerof the twolower parts (particularly R1LORLa, which is throughout seen as standing in starkeroppositionwith the rational),the morethe person, orthe state, issubjectto change. Alsorelevant s the discussion,againin Bk. IX (580d-588a),of thedifferenttypesof pleasuresassociatedwitheach partof the soul. Here the pleasuresof EhI&RLeVareidentified as thepleasuresof the body, andas suchintrinsically hangeable;by contrast,the pleasuresofthe rational part come from its communion with that which truly is - that which is

changeless- and so are themselvesnot subjectto change. Platohassome troublefittingthe OVUtOeLEbUnto this discussion, but he does place it in the same category as the

bALOlURilltLXoV586c7-d2).

17







might seem that the Republic'sview of the soulwas a fundamentaldepar-

ture from that of the Phaedo. However, a strongcase can be made forsayingthat the two dialoguesare reallyconsistentwithone another.For

one thing,the idealstatefor the soul in the Republic thoughmostpeople

are incapableof attaining t) is still rationalcontemplation;and this is a

state where the lower two partsof the soul, andchangeitself, appearto

have no place. But more importantly, he argument or immortality n

Book X seemsto implythat, as in the Phaedo,the soul in its truenature s

non-compositeand changeless.As we see it, it is "composedout of many

elementsandnot enjoying he finestcomposition"611b5-6),and s "fullof

variability ndunlikenessanddifference"b2-3).However, his sdueto its

associationwiththebody; f we were to see the soulas it really s, freefrom

such association,we wouldprobably ind thatit wasjust theopposite.It is

hardnot to readthis as suggesting hat in its true nature,the soul is not

tripartite thatthe divisionargued or inBookIV pertainsonly to the soul

as embodied.18To be sure, the tone is tentative; but the view being

expressedseems clearenough.

Let usreturn o thePhaedrus.How doesthePhaedo/Republiciewof the

soul compare with the underlyingconception we discovered in the

Phaedrus'argument or immortality?The first featurein that underlying

conceptionwasthat soul was that whichmoves itself;andsince"motion"

hereincludesallkindsof change,thisappears o stand nsimplecontradic-

tion withthe view Ihavejustbeen describing.Now, if we restrictourselves

to the bare assertion"soul is that which moves itself' (which was my

premise1)), it is not, infact,clearthat thetwo viewsare formallynconsis-

tent. For the Phaedoand the Republicallow that the soul does undergo

changewhenin thebody;and ndeed,the evidence or premise1)concerns

the distinctionbetweenensouledandsoullessbodies.The issue snot, then,

assimpleas it mightseem. However,as we saw,theunderlying onception

inthe Phaedruss notjustthatsouls do at timesmove themselves,butthat

soulis necessarily lways nmotion.In otherwords,soul mustbe inmotion

both in andout of the body;in the Republic'serminology, he soul "inits

true nature" s inunceasingmotion.Andthisconceptiondoes undoubtedly

standin oppositionto that of the Phaedoand the Republic.Instead,it is

alignedwith views whichwe can confidentlyplace at the end of Plato's

career. I am thinkingin particularof the Laws, where the definition

28The disclaimerat the beginningof the Bk. IV argument, o the effect thatthe present

methods are inadequate for a precise understanding 435c9-dS), may be intended to

accommodate this point.

18







(Xoyog)of soul is saidto be "thatmotionwhich scapableof moving tself'

(896al-2); exceptthatsoul is here seen not as the thingwhichmovesitself,but as itself a species of motion,29 his is identicalwith whatthe Phaedrus

refers o as theoia'Cv TExaa X6yovof soul (246e3). But another mportant

passage s Sophist248a4-249d4.Here Plato argues, against he viewof the

Republicand elsewhere,that "thatwhich s" isnotrestrictedo thechange-

less, but encompasses the changeable as well; in fact, it is plausible to

suppose that the putative targetof the argument, ome people called the

"Friendsof Forms", is really his own earlier self. Most interestingly, he

key point in the argument s that if the Friendsof Formswere right, then

"life, soul and thought" (248e6-7) could not belong to the realmof thatwhich is. Obviously t is assumednot only that soulis a "thingwhich s"-

which, I take it, Plato assumedat every stage 0- but also that soul belongs

to the classof changing hings. This argument, hen, is highlycongenial o

the underlyingconceptionof soul in the Phaedrus.For there, as we saw,

soul is in constant self-motion;and by the PhaedolRepublic riterion or

Being, this would entail that soul was not a "thingwhich is". So far,

therefore, the matter appears relatively straightforward;he Phaedrus

seems to squarewith Plato's ater thought,not with what is usuallyseen as

his middle period.

Let usnow turn rom he Phaedrus' rgumentorimmortalityo the myth

whichfollows. At first sight, this seems to run against he conclusionI just

reached.For themyth ncludes everalelementswhichare clearlyreminis-

cent of the Phaedoand the Republic.First,the image of the charioteerand

two horses, one of which is obedient to the charioteerand the other not,

evidentlyrecallsthe tripartite oul in the Republic;at 247c7-8, ndeed, the

charioteer s explicitly dentifiedas vouv. Again, the supremevision the

soulcanexperience sthe "vision"of theForms;andas in theRepublic, he

Formsconstitute he realmof "thatwhich s" (247d3),and are the entities

of which rue knowledge s possible as contrastedwith the sensiblerealm,

the realm of yCvVEGL,f which one can have only opnion. Moreover, t is

through ecollection f the Formsbeheldbefore birth hat understandingn

this life is said to be possible(249b-c); his doctrinegoes backto the Phaedo

and to the Meno. Finally,of course, as in the Phaedo, the goal of life is to

escapefromthe cycleof rebirthas soon as possible, and themeans s to live

as a philosopher.

29This differenceis noted by Demos, op. cit., p. 136.

30 Except in the Timaeus.For the Timaeus'very peculiarviewof thecomposition of soul,

see furthernote 36.

19







We cannotdeny, then, that thereare many continuitiesbetweenthese

other dialogues andthe Phaedrus.31 t the same time, though,thereareseveralcrucialdifferences,which makethe continuitiesmuch ess signifi-

cantthanthey mayseem. Onepointwhichhasoftenbeen noticed sthat in

the Phaedrus,unlikethe Republic if my own andothers' readingof it is

correct), all three partsof the soul are immortal; ven the gods'souls have

three parts, thoughin their case the differentpartsare not in conflict.32

Again, the end-pointof the soul's progress s not changelessand eternal

contemplationof the Forms, but an eternal traversingof the heavens,

punctuatedby contemplationof the Forms at intervals.Moreover, f we

takethe detailsof the mythseriously as I thinkwe should thelowertwopartsof the soul (representedbythe horses) playan indispensable ole in

this eternaltraversing,and in transportinghe charioteer,reason,to the

31 My wording here and elsewhere assumes the standardview that the Phaedrus s later

than the Phaedo and the Republic; this seems to me justified by precisely the kinds of

comparisonswith other dialogues to whichthis entire half of the paper is devoted.

32 Pace Guthrie, who thinks that the soul is tripartiteonly during the cycle of rebirth.

(See "Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul", reprinted n Vol. 11of Plato, ed. G.

Vlastos, New York, 1971; and Vol. IV, pp. 421-5 of Guthrie's A History of Greek

Philosophy, Cambridge,1975.) Because the gods' souls arefree from nternalconflict, he

thinks that they must be unitary; and the same goes, he believes, for those originallyhumansouls who have escapedthe cycle. In this way he is able to hold thatthe Phaedrus

is fundamentally onsistentwiththeRepublic.That the gods' soulsconsist of acharioteer

and two horses he puts downas just part of the machineryof the myth.Thisseemsto me

quite untenable. It is true that Plato switches to the mythicalmode here because, as he

says, it is beyond humanpowersto give a fully accurate iteraldescriptionof the soul; the

picture conveyed, therefore, is only tentative and only partial.But this does not mean

that we are free to discardany element of the myth thatwe choose. He composedthe

mythashe didbecause he felt that this was theclosestapproximationo the truthofwhich

he was capable. If he had meant to suggestthat the gods' souls did not consist of three

parts, he could very easily have composed that part of the myth differently. Nor,

incidentally, does he ever suggest that the blackhorse of the humansoul becomes whiteon thesoul'sescape fromthe cycle; rather, t becomes progressivelymore obedientto the

charioteer.Guthrie'sinterpretation hus involves a furtherdeparturefrom what Plato

actuallytells us.

Another author who seeks to show that Plato's views on the compositionof the soul

remain essentially the same is Robert W. Hall, "4u'

as Differentiated Unity in the

Philosophyof Plato", Phronesis8 (1963) 63-82. As the title suggests, Hall arguesthat in

the Republic, the Phaedrusandevery other dialogue thatdealswiththe subject, the soul

is viewed as a differentiatedunity. This seems to me almosttrivially rue, but obviously

inadequate to show that Plato's views did not change. For the question now simply

becomes "into what aspectsis this unity differentiated?"And to this question, as Hall

seems quite ready to admit, different dialogues returndifferent (and incompatible)answers.

20







myth and the proof wereat odds with one another.In fact, however,both

viewthe soulas being n eternalmotion;and this setsthem both apart rom

the earlierdialogues,where the soul is in its true naturechangeless,and

alongsidecertain ater dialogues.33 here is, then, a deep connectionbe-

tween the proofand the myth aconnectionwhichhas rarelybeen noticed.

I have so far said nothingaboutthe placeof the Timaeus.Thereis, of

course, muchin the Timaeusabout the soul; and since it is usuallycon-

sidered a late dialogue, one mightexpect that it, too, would be naturally

groupedwith the Phaedrus,Sophist and Laws. Now, the datingof the

Timaeushas beenthe subjectof muchheateddebate, andI cannotattempt

to deal with this thornyquestion here. However, it is striking hat, with

regard o the matterswe have looked at so far, the Timaeus s in several

respects closer to the Phaedo and the Republic han to the later group.

First, the Timaeus, ike those two dialogues,makes a strictdivision be-

tween the realmsof Being andBecoming,with changelessness including

motionlessness)repeatedlycited as a feature of the formerrealm and

changeas a featureof the latter.34 hisclearlyseparates he Timaeusrom

the Sophist and the Laws, and separates it to some extent from the

Phaedrus though, aswe saw,the Phaedruss not entirelystraightforward

about the relation between change and Being. Second, the Timaeus

employs he notion of a tripartite oul; however,here Plato squiteexplicit

thatonly therationalpart s immortal,whichplaces t withtheRepublic nd

against he Phaedrus.Again, at 69c8ff. thereoccursa listof "terribleand

necessaryaffections"associatedwith themortalpartsof thesoul;theseare

pleasure,pain, rashness, ear,anger,hope,sensationand ove. Theimmor-

tal parthas none of these, except in so far as it is polluted by the mortal

parts; nfact,it is to minimise hispollution hatthe mortalpartsarehoused

inseparatepartsof the body.35 ut this isthas much n commonwith he list

of "motions"of the soulin theLaws,whichI quoteda littlewhileago;and

those "motions"are certainlynot regardedas merely temporary,or as a

pollutionof anykind. Once more, the Timaeus ppears o fit lesswith the

33 For a fullerdiscussionof ways in whichthe Phaedrusmyth departsfromthe Phaedo

and the Republicwithregard o the natureof the soul, see Nussbaum,op. cit., section II

("MoralPsychology"),pp. 92-107.34See, for example, 27d5ff., 29b5ff., 35al-3, 48e5ff., 51e6ff.

3S It is curious, however, that at 42a-b most of the items on this list are apparently

assignedto the immortalpartof thesoulalso. ButPlatodoes say thatthisis whathappens

to it when it is "implantedof necessity in bodies" (a3-4), andthat the goal shouldbe to

overcome these states as much as possible. Perhaps, then, this is a reference to the

pollution by the mortal partsthat we find in the other passage;if so, however, it is aconfusingone, since the mortalpartshave not yet been introduced.

22







later dialoguesthan with the earlier ones. Finally,the Timaeusdoes not

definesoul as thatwhichmoves tself,orsuggest hat t isresponsibleorthemotion of everythingelse. It is true that the World Soul does undergocertainharmonious osmic revolutions 35alff.); but these are initiatedby

its creator,notby itself,andtheyare not whatcausesmotion n otherthings- though they do appear o playsome kind of regulating unction.36

Whatwe seem to have foundso far is that there areroughly wo sets of

ideas about the soul in Plato- one of whichappears o be earlierandone

later - and that the Phaedrus,both the proof and the myth, displays

essentially the later set. Now, it may look as if the introductionof the

Timaeusdoes not importantly hangethis picture.Formy remarks n thelastparagraphmightsuggest hat we could retain he twofolddivision,and

simplygroupthe Timaeuswith the earlierset. There are someoddities,to

be sure; but the Timaeus' iew of the soul, it mightbe said, is basically he

same as that of the Republicand the Phaedo. However,the situation s not

so simple. Recall that the underlying onceptionof soul that I detected in

the Phaedrus' rgumentorimmortality ad several eatures.Two of these

featureswe have not yetdiscussed; ne was that soul playsa vitalroleinthe

operation nthe cosmos, andthe other was that soul is in some sense one -

probablya singlekindof stuff. These featurescomplicate he picture n twoways. First, they alert us to the fact that what I have been callingthe later

conception s actuallya lot less unified than I have implied. And second,

they inclineus to group he Timaeuswiththe laterset of dialogues,andnot,

as we were doing just now, with the earlierset. I shall brieflyexpandupon

these points.

In the Phaedrus'proof, Plato regardssoul as having a cosmic signifi-

cance;for it turnsout thatsoul is responsible or the motion, including he

yEVEOL;, f everything that is not soul. This agrees with the myth; at 246b6

we are told that "all soultakes care of all that is soulless".Now, this idea is

not present in the Phaedo or the Republic.In both dialoguesthere is the

suggestionthat the universe s orderedfor the best, and this may suggest

some beneficentordering orce. But Platodoes not tell us aboutanysuch

ordering orce, and he certainlydoes not suggestthat it is soul. Again, the

Phaedrus marks a departurefrom those dialogues; and in this respect,

again, it is in agreementwith the Laws. As the "motionwhichmoves itself

by itself', soul is said in the Lawsto "'directverything n heaven, earthand

36Given the Timaeus'criteria orBeing, the factthat the WorldSoul is in motionshouldmean that it is not in the full sense a "thingwhich is". This is indeed the case; for the

mixtureoutof whichthe WorldSoul is formed(as well asothersouls) is a mixtureof T6 ovand T6 yLyv6otcvov35al-3). As far as I know, this idea is perfectlyunique in Plato.

23







sea" (896e8-9). But the other dialoguewhichmakessoul a cosmicforce is

the Timaeus.As we saw recently,the view is not the sameas that of thePhaedrusand the Laws. It is not suggestedthat the WorldSoul initiates

motionin otherthings,northat it is self-moving.In the framework f the

Timaeus, he originof motioncan be accounted or in otherways;there is

the Craftsman,who creates andsets in motion the WorldSoul itself, and

there is also the disorderlyprecosmicmotion in the Receptacleof Beco-

ming.Instead,the WorldSoulis saidto be the "mistress nd ruler" 34c5)

of its body, the cosmos; and its functionis apparently n some way to

preserveorder. A further difference(if I was right earlier) is that the

Phaedrusdoes not employthe notionof a WorldSoul. (The positionof the

Laws in this respectis not clear to me, for reasons whichI shall go into

shortly.)But despitethese differences, he Timaeus eems in at least one

way closer to the laterdialoguesthan the earlierones.

The final feature of the conception of soul we extractedfrom the

Phaedrus' proof - albeit tentatively - was that soul is a single kind of stuff

(in the sense explained see note 22); how does this comparewithother

dialogues?The Phaedoand the Republic ontainno hint of sucha concep-

tion, though they do not obviouslyexclude it. The one other dialogue

wheresoul definitely s regardedas a stuff inmysense, and a singleone, is

the Timaeus.As we havenoted, the Craftsmanmixesa certaincompound

substance,and out of this substanceall souls are formed.Now, the sub-

stance put together n the mixingbowlclearlyqualifiesas a stuff;thisstuff

couldverywell be designatedbythe mass term "soul"(thoughPlatodoes

not appearto do so). Individual ouls (both the WorldSoul and human

souls) consist,then,of portionsof the stuff"soul";and this isprecisely he

picture foundto besuggestedbythePhaedrus.Onemight aythatthis s a

far too literalreadingof the Timaeus'mythical pparatus.But I believethat

one shouldalwaystake seriously he detailsof Platonicmyths. Obviously

some features,suchas themixingbowl,will be factoredout whenwe tryto

penetrate o the coreof doctrinePlatois trying o present.But if Platohad

not meantto conveythe impression hatthere is a kind of stuff of which

souls are composed,he could havewrittena differentmyththat did not

have these implications;he was not forcedto write it as he did. (On this

point, see also notes 3 and32.)

Here, then, is anotherapparentpointof contact betweenthe Phaedrus

andthe Timaeus.37Let us see, finally,whetherwe canrelate the Lawsto

3' I have throughoutbeen cautious about attributing he notion of soul as a stuff to thePhaedrus;andit will be rememberedthat the alternative,whichI consideredbutfound

24







thesetwo. Plainly, heevidenceforanynotion of soul asa stuff nthe Laws

will be indirect;but thereis one pointthat seemsto me suggestive.Thisisthat Plato is strikinglyevasive about the number of souls that run the

cosmos. He is clear that this is done by one or moregood souls; but he

refuses to commithimself as to how many. (This is why it is hard to tell

whetheror not he has in mind a WorldSoul.) Mostlyhe uses the singular4uxiwithoutarticle,as inthe Phaedrus'proof;buthe speaksalsoof "soul

orsouls"(899b5,cf. 898c7-8),andhe neverdecideswhether hesingular r

the pluralis more appropriate.He seems, then, to be either uncertain

about,oruninterestedn, the individuation f souls; yet thisappearsnotto

detract nany wayfromhisconfidence nthedoctrineof soulasactivatorofthe cosmos. Now, this does not, of course, show conclusively hat he isthinkingof soul as a stuff. On the otherhand,if he wasconceivingof soul

(or simplyof good soul) as a uniform tuffdistributed bout the universe,

this insoucianceaboutthe numberof goodsoulswouldbe entirelyunder-

standable.If there is a certainkindof stuffwhosenature t is to activate hecosmos,then it is indeedof minor mportance supposing hat the motionsof the cosmos arewhatwe areseekingto understand howportionsof this

stuff are to be individuated.However,this is as far as we canpursuethe

question. It is possiblethat the Laws as well as the Timaeuss in line withthe Phaedrus n thismatter;butthe evidence stoo slender or usto decidewith anyconfidence.Moreover,even ifall this s correct and I amfarfrom

insistingon it- itstill leavesoutof account he Laws' diosyncratic otionofevil soul. The one thing Plato isclear about n the Laws, withregard o the

numberof souls, is thatthere areatleast two.Thesoul or souls thatactivate

the cosmos aregood; however, theremustalso be one or moreevil souls

(896e4-6), to accountfor the presenceof evil in the world. Of course, it

mightstill be thatthere was a singlestuff "soul"(whoseessencewasself-motion)encompassingbothgood andevil soul. But it is obviously mpos-sible to tell whetheror not this is Plato'sconception; he remarkson evilsoul - indeed, on soul in general - in the Laws are just too sketchy.

Whatgeneralconclusions, f any,canwe draw romthisinvestigation? tissometimes uggested hatthe Phaedruss a "transitional" ialogue.Now,we haveexaminedonly a tiny fractionof the dialogue;and it may well be

that, concerning opics whichwe did not touchupon, this verdict s a fair

less likely,wasthatthe Phaedruspresupposesa notion of WorldSoul. It isworthpointingout thateven if I waswrong in my choice between these alternatives even if we should

read the Phaedrus as implyinga World Soul - the closest parallelwould still be theTimaeus.

25







one. But with regard o the natureof the soul, I believe, it needsat least to

be substantiallyqualified.Forto

saythatthe dialogue s transitionals toimply hat there s an earlier et of doctrinesand a laterset of doctrines,and

that the Phaedrus s between the two. Thisis not entirelydevoid of truth,

but it is misleading n two ways. First, as we have seen, in as muchas one

canspeakof two groupsof dialogues,anearlierand a later, the Phaedrus

seems in most respects again, of those thathave been the subjecthere) to

belongsolidlywith the latergroup; he transition, or the mostpart, occurs

before the Phaedrus,notduring t. But second,thereare not just two views

of the soul in Plato. The Phaedoand the Republicmaywithsome justicebe

considered as expressinga single view - though even this is perhapsan

exaggeration;but amongthe laterdialogues, hereis farless homogeneity.

In particular, he position of the Timaeus,on this as on so manyother

issues, is baffling. It is dangerous,then, to speakof "transitions"n this

context. We can certainly indvarious rends nPlato'swritings nthesoul;

andwe cantryto describe he positionof the Phaedrus mong hese trends.

But we shouldnot think n termsofstablebodiesof doctrinebetweenwhich

the Phaedrusmight be consideredas intermediate.Thisconclusion s no

doubtnothing urprising; eoplehave oftentoldusnot to forcePlato ntoa

straitjacket. Much more interesting - or so I hope - are the detailed

considerationswhich have led us there.

University f California

26

bett richard - immortality and the nature of the soul in the phaedrus

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