"BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: IMPLICATIONS OFPRIVATISATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE POLITICAL

ECONOMY OF THE CARIBBEAN

PRESENTED TO THE

CARIBBEAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

KINGSTON, JAMAICA - MAY '93

by

FELIPE NOGUERA*

1. Introduction: The Macro Economic Context

1.1 SHIFT IN SOCIAL FORMATION

Most contemporary economic theory is devoid of developmentperspective. Conventional economics becomes an apology for astatus quo reproduction of colonial-type dependencies.

If we accept the epistemological view of philosophy which recognizeshistorical economies in terms of social formation, it is not difficult tograsp the notion that the present conjuncture is characterised byprofound and fundamental change. The change is producing a newsystem for wealth creation. It is not unlike the transformation fromAgrarian Society, with its attendant ( and co-existing) slavery andfeudal modes of production.

*SECRETARY GENERALCARIBBEAN ASSOCIATION OF NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONORGANIZATIONS (CANTO)

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Similarly Industrial Society was heralded by an IndustrialRevolution, with major social & economic convulsions in Europe,Japan and North America. Of course the dominant productive modein the age of industrialism was capitalism, challenged unsuccessfullybut definitely by centrally - planned economic and social systems. 1(Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century - Alvin Toffler, Bantam Books 1990)

The social formation referred to by scholars M.I.T's Ithiel De SolaPoole, Havard's Anthony Ottoenger, Columbia's Eli Noam etc. as theInformation Society, continues to witness forces resemblingcapitalism and socialism contending for predominance. But therelations of production already evolving are unlike any whichpreceded them. As early as 1980, Anthony Smith, in hisGeopolitics of Information. 2 identified a social and economic changein the metropolitan countries which he perceived as being on anorder of magnitude of the Industrial Revolution. More than adecade later, a book edited by H.M. Sapolsky, R.J. Crane, W.R.Neuman & ELi Noam. (The Telecom Revolution Past. Present. & Future (Rontledge 1992) 3 offers much greater empirical evidenceto support the view that indeed a new social formation isexperiencing birth pangs and consequent dramatic economicrestructuring on the basis of accelerating innovations in information technology.

For Industrial-Society labour was the principal creator of value(use or exchange) in both capitalist and socialist modes ofproduction. Newly emerging social relationships in productionof goods and services, rely to a greater extent on the reorganizationof labour given impluse by a key factor of production - Information.It is information, incarnated in both human beings and the storedprograms of computers and networks which access them asknowledge, which adds or enhances value in the InformationSociety. Where Marx described the producer class in IndustrialSociety as the proletariat, Toffler has coined the phrase'cognitariat' as the army of knowledge workers with the onus ofresponsibility for "mind-work".

Trade in services has comes to rival trade in goods in globaleconomic activity. The use of computers by farmers to calculategrain feeds; of telephones by fishermen in remote villages toascertain the market in town; the dependence of hotel and airlineworkers on remote, centralized data bases; all demonstrate howextensively information technology is embracing modernmodern society. As this supersymbolic economy unfolds, theproletariat becomes the cognitariat". 4 (P 74 Toffer Ibid)

Where and how is the Information Society manifest in developingcountries? More specifically and necessarily, focusing on thepossibilities offered by the Information Revolution to theCaribbean, how do Caribbean people, described by formerJamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley as having "always beenambivalent about their possibilites, " 5 ("The Integration movementthe CBI and the Crises of the Mini-State" Michael Manley

Caribbean Affairs January - March, 1988 Val No. 1) steer aprogressive course in the midst of restrictions on developmentinherent in structural adjustment conditionalitiesand trade liberalization?

Neutralizing some of the missionary zeal with which "instantdemocracy", accompanied by IMF & World Bank Economicintervention in the South imposes creeping conditionalitiesdebilitating to the realization of Caribbean development possibilites,is one aim of this work. Posing viable, pragmatic alternatives tostructural adjustment policies, with telecommunications as astrategic fulcrum is another.

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1.2 DEBT & DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES OF THE '70's & '80's

An examination of the national debt patterns of Caribbean countries(see Appendix I) over the past decade is illuminating in the context

of comparison with:a) the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and New World

Information & Communication Order (NWICO) of the 1970'sand '80's on one hand,

b) the privatisation of Caribbean Telecommunications networkinfrastructure in the 1980's and 90's on the other

The rise in interest rates had a devastating impact on LatinAmerican and Caribbean economies. A great proportion of thisdebt was of the floating rate variety and was subject to debilitatingcapital supply interruptions, as voluntary lending by Internationalbanks was abruptly halted or curtailed in the mid-1980's. (SouthLetter Winter No. 15 1992 - '93).

'Prescribed 'Third World' development policies of the '60's and '70'swere characteristic of an era in which social/democratic leaders andHeads of State: Mwalimu Nyerere, (Tanzania), Carlos AndresPerez (Venezuela), and Michael Manley (Jamaica) were themost well-known spokesmen. These figures were among theprominent members of the Non- Aligned Movement, who in the1970's called for the establishment of a New InternationalEconomic Order, (NIEO). In the United Nations, UNESCO played amajor role in conscienticizing* the G.77 nations to the extent thatthey also called for the establishment of a New World Informationand Communications Order.

*To make people aware. conscious of their inherent possibilities so as to act to realizethem. See Paulu Freire Education for Critical Consciousness

Preceding George Bush's 'New World Order' by 2 decades. NIEO'schampions advocated strategies for development based oncollective self- reliance, regional integration and the transfer andadaptation of appropriate technology. Implementing thesestrategies wmg., more difficult than advocating them. Open doorinvestment was encouraged by multi-lateral lending institutions,foreign aid was sought and technological dependence wasengendered, 5 (Harvey W. Wallendor III Technology Transfer & Management in Developing Countries 1979 Ballinger Publishing Cambridge. Mass.

UNESCO's Director General M'Bow underscored the callfor a New World Communications and Information Order witha rally for 'Third World' or developing countries to collectivelydevelop means of combatting foreign "cultural penetration" andelectronic imperialism". The "supply -side" monetarists in the USled by Pres. Reagan and in the UK by Prime Minister Thatcher,bitterly opposed the UNESCO bias toward the Third World and inparticular M'Bow's placing in context US calls for a "freeflow of information", by adding "free and balanced flow ofinformation". The period of the 1970's was moreover, aperiod in which developing nations of the Non-Aligned Movementnominally espoused nationalist philosophies in which the State was asignificant player in the economic life of the nation.

Interestingly, of the 1970's protagonists, former PresidentJulius K. Nyerere now leads the Non-Aligned Movement's SouthCommission, which continues to grapple with problems of debtand underdevelopment. President Carlos Andres Perez, re-elected adecade after the ascendance of neo-liberal, supply-sideeconomic philosphy, introduced draconian structuraladjustment policies which escalated the price of foods andbasic commodities, increased unemployment, produced cuts insubsidies for health, education other social services. These policiesproduced two (2) coup attempts by the military and social unrestwhich continues to threaten Perez' Government. The attendantprivatization producing both investment and some technologyproliferation, if not transfer, carries a dear social cost.

Jamaica's former Prime Minister, Michael Manley, also felt compelledto alter, if not reverse his first term's democratic socialistorientation, to the extent that Jamaican macro-economic policyunder Prime Minister Manley's last administration from1987 — '90differed only in degree and perception from that of his predecessorand political rival, Edward Seaga. The IMF and the World Bankhad become the new economic overloids of Third World, and theCaribbean joined other developing nations as IMF protectorates.Newly acquired notions of sovereignty were already beingseriously challenged by the weight of debt and the pressure forprivatization and trade liberalisation.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's the nationalist policy orientationin most of the Caribean was a manifestation of popular discontentamong growing ranks of economically marginalized people.Caribbean governments' policy was to enter the economy in asignificant way, with the prime intention of saving existing jobs andcreating additional jobs. By the late 1970's unemployment levelshad fallen considerably (from mid 1960's level of 14-16%) to 9% or10% 7 (Michael Harris Sunday Express Trinidad & Tobago, Aug 2,1992 p. 34)

Divestment of state assets is one of the lynch-pins of structuraladjustment policy. In the telecommunciations sector, the impactof national debt, resulting in a haemorrhage of Caribbeancapital, has yet to be fully appreciated by policy makers.

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1 . 3 CARIBBEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Telecommunications has became the production technologyeconomic sectors. Financial institutions for example, whichinformation from Paris to Singapore 5 seconds faster thancompetitors, win all, not some arbitrage profits. In 1991,Brothers hired as many computer programmers andtelecommunication experts as they did financial experts.invests USD $1 billion per year in telecoms 8. (Sapolsky, Cra ne,Neuman Noam Ibid).

of manycan bringtheirSalomon

Citibank

The telecom revolution has not yet produced the degree of economicdecentralization that was expected. For example, major citiesin most countries of the world concentrate about 40% of theirpopulations. Technology tends to consolidate centralization. Theratio of productivity to technology tends to suggest a decline in theformer due in part to soaring maintenance costs. Labourrequired for maintenance tends to offset productivity gains fromtechnology introduction. "The process of absorption of radical techologychange can involve an initial shock and even nose-dive in productivity".

(Dra Carlota Perez Keynote Address at CANTO 1989 Conference71 ePiblic"Equipment Services and Organizational Change: Three Moving Frontiersfor Telecom Managers to Handle.")

Yet in the Caribbean, in spite of the growing presence of privateforeign monopolies, which are replacing governmenttelecommunication monopolies, counterveiling trends can beobserved. The University of the West Indies Direct TeachingExperiment (UWIDITE) provides distance learning via satellite whichlinks all three (3) campuses (Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad) inteaching programs, teleconferences and debates. Computers are nowused to provide on-line information exchange for hotel reservationand airline bookings to make the Caribbean tourism industry moreefficient and competitive.

"Other benefits of telecommunications in the area of industry wouldinclude the reduction of travel expenditure, less wastage ofvaluable managerial time and decreased consumption of energy.Telecommunications also permit access to the economic area ofservices". 9 (TRINCOM '89 Caribbean Media and Telecommunciaitons in the Information Age. Conference Proceedings paper presentedby Henry B.D. Forde). At a time when its economic survivalnecessitates that the Caribbean diversify its productive base andfollow the injunction "export or perish", the critical importance oftelecommunictions in enhancing economic activity cannot be over-emphasized.

In a 'borderless world' consisting of interlinked economies, theCaribbean fishing industries' export trade can be boosted bytelecommunications. Ship-to-ship VHF radio-communications whichallow the ships of a fleet to assemble where fish have been located;electronic detectors which locate the fish; ichtyoscopes make itpossible to identify commerically important fish, electronic systemswhich control the location of nets; ship-to-shore communicationspermit harmonisation of catches with market requirements andtelecom facilities on shore put fish producers in contact with fishimporters. 10 (Ibid Henry B.D. Forde p. 17). The aqua culture andfishing industry's application of telecom technology illustrates thelinkage to just one important economic sector for the Caribbean.In Caribbean telecoms the issues of debt and privatisation as asolution to cash strapped governments in the mode of structuraladjustment brought finance to the sector , without necessarilyproviding intended economic development.

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One result of the borrowing practices of Caribbean governments inthe early 1980's is a modern (digital) telecommunicationsinfrastructure. In 1985, it was observed that seven (7) Caribbeannational - Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Guyana,Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, had expended in excess of USD $1billion between 1980 and 1985 on telecom plant and equipment .(paper presented by Winston Millett at CANTO Inaugurgal Conference April

1985, Port of Spain, Trinidad). The issue of econometric impact ordownstream economic and social linkages of this expenditure byCaribbean governments was queried since the hard currencyrepresented a flight or flow of capital outside the Caribbean.

Ironically, the state-of-the art telecom infrastructure and humanresource expertise that resulted from debt-financed investmentin telecoms could not be sustained in the short-run fromgovernment equity or internally-generated funds. This, along withthe pervasive neo-liberal ideology of state divestment andprivatization as the only option 12. (see article by economist DennisPantin on Structual Adjustment Trinidad Guardian July 1992) open todebt-saddled governments became the principal raison d'etrebehind the wholesale denationalization of telephone companies andcarriers that were soon to become the cash cows (for foreigninterests) and primary hard currency revenue earners in theCaribbean.

2.1 COLONIAL MERCANTILISM VS INDEPENDENCE

In most Caribbean territories, telecommunication legislation,providing regulatory guide lines for posts and telecommunicationswere developed during the pre-independence, colonial period of theregions's history. Wireless Telegraphy Ordinances enactedprincipally in the 1930's, and updated in the 1960's, essentiallyoutline the terms and conditions under which individual operatorsqualified and paid fees to receive wireless radio licences.

- 1 0 -At this time, Basic Telephone Service typified thetelecommunication services publicly available given the limitedextent of the networks, which were oriented more for externalcommunications with the colonial home offices than for local publicservices. These were invariably offered under monopoly franchisesowned by the colonial government administrations. This was thepoint at which colonial mercantile policy came into conflict withCaribbean strivings for independence.

2.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION IN THE POST INDEPENDENCE ERA: NATIONAL VS PRIVATIZATION

During the 1960's, or the decade of independence for manyCaribbean territories, several local telephone Companies werepurchased by the United States-based company ContinentalTelephones. Step by step switching and transmission systems wereinstalled and maintained in Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica andTrinidad & Tobago; until Contel's shares in the local operatingcompanies were purchased by Caribbean Governments in the late1960's and early 1970's. Except for the Heads of Agreementsbetween governments and the Companies, which created statutory,state-owned national telephone companies, regulatory policies werenot fundamentally altered from the pre-independence era.

Around this time, a peculiar phenomenon began to occur which laterwould characterize the separation of internal and externaltelecommunications' ownership of entities which providedtelecommunication services in the Caribbean. In the late 1970's hard-wire, stored programme control switches were introduced.Discussion in the Caribbean then focused around the separation ofinternal and external telecommunication policies and the importanceof distinguishing where external traffic went and where internaltraffic went. External gateways were privatised first, but withoutmuch cost to the buyer or correspondingly, without great revenueaccruing to the selling Caribbean governments. Trinidad & Tobago,Jamaica and Barbados sold extensive shares in their externaltelecommunications systems to Cable and Wirless around the sametime.

Initial investments were approximately US $20 million. Externallinks were upgraded from 600 to 960 circuits. The changes weretherefore not changes due to the need for capacity and additionaltraffic, but because of the conversion of technology in order to becompatible with what was then state-of-the-art; that is, spot beams,pulse code modulation (pcm), and full TDMA (Time DivisionMultiple Access).

One reason for the technological change thrust was to keep abreastwith changes internationally; South America would at this time makejoint representations with the Caribbean to INTELSAT. Other reasonswere political and not necessarily economic. At the time, there wereno local personnel with the capacity to handle the new technology.The investment far exceeded GNP percentages that were needed, butthis was not properly rationalized and there was extensive capacityand underutilization of it. *

The digital equipment in the region is not totally maintained in theregion. Remote diagnostic centres in Toronto or Miami often makechanges in Caribbean Central office exchanges without the knowledgeof local technicians and engineers. The result is increaseddependence and no transfer of technology. The process continues.

Although tremendous hard currency expenditure isproviding the Caribbean with new telecom technology, valuableforeign exchange continues to leave the region unnecessarily.**Insights of CTU - Mr. Deoraj Ramnarine, CaribbeanTelecommunications Union

Antigua/ Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad &Tobago Governments in the late 1960's and early 1970's signedHeads of Agreements with Cable & Wireless PLC, which either totallyconceded international telecommunication services, or accepteddivisions of revenue from overseas calls which greatly favoured thetransnational carrier from the United Kingdom. Anguilla, Dominica,Montserratt, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St.Lucia, which were still British colonies, accepted the tax regimeswhich gave both domestic and international ownership of thetelecommunications services to Cable & Wireless.

- 1 2 -Exceptions to this trend could be observed in the Bahamas, Cuba,Guyana, Haiti, Curacao, Puerto Rico and Suriname, which integratednational and international telecommunications services undergovernment control or outright ownership. The other note worthyexception to the trend outlined above is the Dominican Republic,which also integrated national and international telecommunicationsservices under private, foreign ownership of the USA-based company- GTE. This is the phase of Caribbean economic history during whichthe political nationalism which emerged following independenceand black nationalist upsurges through out the region becamesubsumed by economic dependence, debt incursion, privatisationand structural adjustment.

2.3 TELECOLONIALISM : MONOPOLY VS COMPETITION

The transfer of ownership of telecommunication companies in theCaribbean from government to foreign private shareholdersoccurred just after financial institutions such as World Bank &IDB had been exhorting Caribbean governments to prioritizeinvestment in telecommunications.

These institutions have never been able to explain or justifywhy they would advise developing country and particularlyCaribbean governments to invest public tax payers' funds intelecommunications infrastructure, only to pressure them todivest ownership of these infrastructures two years later underthe banner of Structural Adjustment. The map of the structure oftelecommunications companies in the Caribbean was transformedqualitively and quantitively between 1985 and 1990 as the tablein appendix II illustrates. What the table cannot adequately depictis that costly, capital intensive local operating companies owned bygovernments bore the brunt of development costs while the foreignowners of external telecommunications facilities reaped the lion'sshare of the profits of telecommunications revenue without havingto finance investment in network expansion.

The Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica governments between 1988and 1991 divested all shares in the local operating telephonecompanies and under a 20 year agreement which combined theinternal and external telephone companies, ceded ownership andcontrol to Cable & Wireless Plc. Although it only divested 49%of its shares, the Trinidad and Tobago €overnment also concededmanagement and effective control of the Telephone Companyto Cable & Wireless for approximately 80 million US$ in 1990. Inall cases, the local government monopoly was transformed intoforeign private monopoly combining internal and externalservices. Comprehensive legislation, telecom policies or authoritiesto oversee the regulatory environment of countries in the region arelargely non-existent. (an interesting footnote is that 2years afterpurchasing 49% of the shares in TSTT Cable & Wireless had fully recoveredits return on investment)

This abdication of regulatory responsibliity, coupled withdivestiture of shares in state monopolies which had been funded bytaxpayers money, provide the basis for a nascent phenomenon wehave termee telecolonialsim. Not to be outdone by the re-establishment of British supremacy in the West Indies, the Spanishcame to Puerto Rico purchasing 80% of Tellonica Larga Distancia in1992. The French, which maintained political departments orcolonies in Guadeloupe, Martinque and French Cayene, had beenmoving feverishly to acquire Teleco D'Haiti until the Coup d'tataborted their efforts in 1991. Meanwhile the Dutch PTT is veryhard at work in implementing their plans to privatise telephonecompanies in Curacao, Bonaire , Saaba and even Suriname.

Interestingly, with the exception of Cable & Wireless PLC, FranceTelecom, Telefonica de Esparia and the Dutch PTT are governmentowned monopolies, who have gone on record as being opponents ofprivatization in their own lands, while being champions ofpriviliation but not competition in the Caribbean. For its part,Cable & Wireless which has lobbied Caribbean governmentsextensively to retain their monopoly position as providers of basicand value - added telecommunications services, have lobbied the USAFederal Communications Commission just as intensely to be allowedequal access as competitors in the US long distance market.

The architects of struct01 adjustment did not appear to anticipateor did not articulate these incongruities in the policies ofprivatization which they impose. Our depiction of the phenomenondescribed above as telecolonialism is not an ideological positionjuxtaposed against privatization. It is a critique of the subversionof the tecAlogical independence, cultural identity and economicdevelopment of the Caribbean.

When;-state monopoly is replaced by foreign private monopoly,burgeoning research and development efforts such as thosein Trinidad & Tobago are curtailed. 14( Trinidad & Tobago R&DDepartment which had since 1983 been involved in applications - orientedresearch and development had designed an indigenous technology called the

Subscriber Pair Identifer - SPI - which has bee& iarketed throughout theCaribbean and Canada, The Research & Development,Was uncere' moniously

closed down in 1992). — Senior managers and executives expressingnationalist patrPitic sentiments are retrenched or sent home. Thescientific and technological future of the Caribbean in theInformation Age is indubitably imperiled.

Our analysis of the above situation concludes that only pressureexerted on regional governments by the cognitariat and otherinterested publics can produce the type of regulatory environmentessential to safe- guard the public interest now and for futuregenerations.

In this regard/ governments in the Caribbean can provide theopportunity for Caribbean entrepreneurs to compete in theprovision of basic and enhanced telecom services as one of the fewways to avoid the dangers of cartel management . Regulators mustlay fair ground rules for such competition. In the era of anubiquitous digital environment, it will soon make no sense todistinguish between basic and enhanced services, from the networkprovider's perspective. Rather than precluding the attainment ofsocial objectives, regulated competition can facilitate them. Ratherthan stifling techno-innovation, regulated competition willexpedite flexibility in the use of new technologies. VolumeDiscounts for interconnection charges, optimization of the use of local

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network resources and toward effective spectrum planning andpricing; are regulatory steps that can redound to the benefit ofthe regional economy. 15 ( At The World Administrative RadioConference, WARC '93 in Malaga, Spain, developing countries atfirst in disarray when trying to deal with the demands of the metropolitanNorth) whose designs for military applications of the Ku-band of the spectrumcould have overwhelmed them, were able to rally at the last minute aroundcommon positions on the use of C-band for digital satellite sound broadcastingand use their numerical strength to win strategic support for spectrumallocations which will benefit their people socially and economically for thenext twenty (20) years). For corroboration see World Space report NoahS amara)

Other means of galvanizing the Caribbean from deliterious impactsof telecolonialism include:

a) Independant regulation ie avoiding the player/refereeposition;

b) Price cap regulation (where quality of services is key butcompanies are allowed to earn higher profits to improveefficiency) without discriminating in the provision of basicservices for low-income and rural subscribers.

c) Quality of services and customer compensation for poorservice ie cut over and restore service within two daysfor enhanced customer choice.

d) Billing intregrity and confidence

e) Network security to safeguard privacy and protect customerfrom nuisance calls

f) Social equity and low income access to telecommunicationservices.

g) Training and aggressive technology transfer and adaptationpolicies disaggregating technology packages.

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3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONJUNCTURE

As we intimated in the last section, the main challenge to theCaribbean telecommunity in the present period is to devisea coherent and sustainable telecommunications policy wherethe region faces the formidable political and economic taskof creating a level playing field in the national, regional andinternational telcommunications arena. This is easier said thandone. One of the most important, most complex, and leastunderstood challenges facing not only the Caribbeantelecommunity but the regional political economy is the highlycontentious international call accounting rates issue.

3 . 1 DECLINING INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING RATES IMPACT ON REGIONAL ECONOMIES

The Caribbean Association of National TelecommunicationsOrganization (CANTO) whose involvement in the areas andissues described above has informed this analysis, has been atthe fore front in envisaging the Caribbean telecom sector as a wholewith its member telephone companies, carriers hasdemonstrated an ability to provide measurable results. U.S.Telecommunications carriers are working hard to lower theInternational Accounting Rates viz-a-viz, the rest of the world,and they have targeted the Caribbean;

The international call accounting rate is the amount of moneythe carrier originates and an international caller is obligated to payto the foreign carrier which terminates the call. The agreementbetween two international carriers which governs revenue sharingbetween them and the amount charged by the orginatinginternational carrier to the end user who places the call, is at thecenter of an issue which has produced a 2billion US dollar tradedeficit for the United States and its telecommunications carriers .

US Carriers led by AT&T have been exerting pressure on the US FCCto impose a unilateral reduction of the Accounting Rate on allcountries with whom the United States has a balance of paymentsdeficit. In this regard, the FCC is acting less like a domesticregulator for the United States and more like a political andeconomic.advocate of US carriers. AT&T has charged and theFCC seemed to accept the notion that settlement payments fromUS carriers are used to subsidise developing countries' economies.16 (See AT&T letter to the FCC document 90-337 Phase 2 in the matter ofregulation of International Accounting Rates AT&T's Progress report ofJanuary 1993).

The implications of CANTO Members' construction of digital highwaysbased on CCITT and FCC standards escaped neither the StateDepartment, nor the US Trade Department. This is especially so sinceUS Manufacturers export in excess of US $5 Billion dollars per year intelecommunications hardware, software and services to theCaribbean. Obviously then, the US trade deficit cited by AT & T asthe result of accounting rate imbalances has another dimension.

The North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), whichCARICOM and other Caribbean nations have been invited to ratify,helps to bring the issue of balance of trade, and balance of paymentsmore clearly into focus. The dichotomy between the United States'$2 Billion dollar accounting rate trade deficit of which theCaribbean's contribution is small ( 11.4% or US $227 m) relative toEuropean, Asian and Pacific nations, and the export of scarce foreignexchange from the Caribbean to purchase US manufacturedequipment, results in an untenable position for us (see comments byAT & T 02/05/93, page 5).

The difference between telecommunication cost structures of the USand the Caribbean is readily apparent. Even after expending billionsof dollars in network infrastructure modernization, the averageteledensity of 6.5 per 100 inhabitants in the Caribbean will requirean increase of total line installation of 5 Million lines in the comingeight (8) years, at an average cost of US $1,000.00 per line.

It is interesting to note that CANTO Members have yet to receivefrom FCC or AT & T a clear economic cost allocation methodologyamong service categories to serve as a basis for establishingaccounting rate bench marks for the Caribbean. Moreover, assovereign nations it is an affront to imply that the accounting ratearrangements US Carriers pay for the service of transiting orterminating US-originated calls in Caribbean countries are "foreignaid" or "cross-subsidies."

REVIEW OF INTERIM PERIOD - AUGUST '91 TO FEBRUARY '93

In September 1991 a delegation of Caribbean nations assisted by theCANTO Secretariat visited Washington D.C. and met with theChairman and his Aides as well as other Commissioners of the FCC,the US Trade Representative, the head of NTIA and high levelOfficials of the State Department. These meetings were instrumentalin sensitizing US policy makers with regard to the unique position ofthe Caribbean relative to International Accounting Rates. As a result,the FCC seemed to become more circumspect in relation to theCaribbean situation, and the threat of a uni-lateral lowering ofaccounting rates or more draconian measure of "sender take all"appeared to have been arrested.

Many CANTO Members have, during this time been negotiating(September '91 to present) in good faith with US Carriers long-termagreements for lowering the International Accounting Rates. It wasmost disconcerting therefore to note in AT & T's Progress Report ofJanuary 4th, 1993 that:"AT & T has included a list of problematic countries basedon objective criteria described below, and a list ofegregious countries. The problematic list includesdeveloped and developing countries, many of which havereceived significant settlement payments from AT & T overthe last decade The egregious list reflects primarilydeveloping countries, selected from the problematic listbased on the additional criteria that the correspondenthas indicated an unwillingness to consider furtherreductions or has otherwise failed to bargain in goodfaith."

-19-CANTO is astounded and takes umbrage at the fact that AT & T, inspite of the clear evidence that our members have been negotiatinglower rates on a long-term basis, could be described as "egregious"and "problematic." The Concise Oxford Dictionary describes egregiousas "shocking, blunder, remarkable i.e. standing out from the flock."Roget's Thesaurus offers synonyms for the word egregious as "exceptional, absurd, exaggregated, quality by comparison with astandard, quantity by comparison with a similar object, superiority,preponderance, predominance and sovereignty."

Specifically, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico and Suriname fromamong CANTO's Members have been identified by AT & T as"problematic"; based on allegations which can not be substantiatedby evidence of actual discussions and negotiations with AT & T.CANTO Members Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago have been describedas "egregious": for their supposed "unwillingness to consider furtherreductions or bargain in good faith."

CANTO MEMBERS' POSITIONS:

3.2.1 Belize - Position is as follows: "Belize supports the prinicple ofcost based accounting rates and bilateral negotiations. At the sametime, however, it must be recognized that the costs incurred bydeveloping countries must form an integral part of rate negotiationsbetween a developed and a developing country. Said costs wouldnecessarily be unique to the relation concerned, and this factorneeds to be recognized by the developed country involved in theparticular negotiations. Furthermore, it is in the best interest ofboth negotiating parties that negotiations be on a bilateral basis.

It is our view that, in the long term, it is in the interest of bothparties to ensure that sufficient revenue continues to be availableto fund telecommunications expansion and to ensure that theapplication of cost oriented accounting rates, does not jeopardizethis development of telecoms infrastructure.

-20-CANTO MEMBERS' POSITIONS - cont'd:

3.3.2 Dominican Republic - Position can be summarized as "...in supportof the FCC's decision in the order to refrain from conditioningSection 214 authorizations or taking uni-lateral action, to establishset rates, or imposing additional regulations to foster lower netsettlement outpayments until the Commission evaluates the impactof the CCITT recommendation D.140..."

N.B. CANTO respects the fact that the negotiation of accountingrates is a bi-lateral process which works best in an atmosphere ofgood will where both parties have relatively equal power.Notwithstanding this position, because of the renewed threat of theUS uni-laterally lowering accounting rates of the Caribbean, CANTOhas been asked to intervene on behalf of several of its members.

3.2.3 Guyana - Position can be summarized as follows:

a. "...Guyana feels that the present accounting rate accuratelyreflects the company's particular circumstances at thistime, and is not in excess of costs...."

b. "...GT & T charges Guyanese consumers far less for calls tothe US than AT & T charges US consumers for calls to Guyana.GT & T has enquired whether AT & T would commit tolowering its collection rate for calls to Guyana if GT & T wereto agree to lower the accounting rate. AT & T has respondedthat it will not make any such commitment..."

c. "....AT & T's claim that GT & T discriminates against the US asregards the accounting rate is baseless. Indeed it may berelevant to note that AT & T maintains a lower accounting ratewith Guyana than with many other countries..."

- 2 1 -CANTO MEMBERS' POSITIONS - cont'd:

d. "...GT & T is 80% owned by US company Atlantic Tele-NetworkInc. (ATN) so that settlement payments are, for all practicalpurposes, being made from one US company to another. Suchsettlement payments are being used to fund GT & T's extensivecapital improvements program, which has involved purchasesof U.S. manufactured telecommunications equipment totallingmore than $20 million..."

2.4 Haiti - Because of Haiti's unique political situation where aninternational embargo is in effect, it constitutes a special case inthis regard. Looking at pre-embargo Haiti, and post-embargo Haiti interms of accounting rate policy, their treatment by AT & T isexemplary of a small country being bullied and cajoled intoaccepting terms and conditions which are clearly unfair anddisadvantageous to them.

In October 1990, Teleco D'Haiti was informed by AT & T that a newaccounting rate structure would be put into effect from January 1st,1991. This new structure forsees a decrease in the accounting rateby five cents every year for 5 years. When Teleco D'Haiti attemptedto explain that such measures would be financially devastating to it,AT & T threatened a "Sender Keep All" arrangement.

This is not an example of negotiation, but of intimidation. AT & Ttold Haiti that its "Sender Keep All" policy was being implemented inother Caribbean countries, and this is simply incorrect. With apopulation of 1.5 Million Haitians in the United States, calls fromthem to Haiti are simply the price they pay for maintaining contactwith friends and relatives in their motherland. It was only throughCANTO that Teleco D'Haiti became aware of the fact that AT & Tdoes not have the authority to uni-laterally impose a "Sender KeepAll" policy in the absence of negotiations.

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3.3 The position of the Caribbean Association of NationalTelecommunication Organizations (CANTO) in support of cost basedaccounting is consistent with the study conducted by the ITU's CCITT(1990), the International Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG),COMTELCA of Central America and Aseta. CANTO supports andrespects the principle of bi-lateral negotiations as the basis forachieving mutually acceptable thresholds on the contentious issue ofinternational accounting rates. Neither AT & T nor the FCC have everdisputed the obvious fact that the costs for developing countries ofthe Caribbean with less than 10 telephones per 100 population onaverage greatly exceed the costs of providing overseas telephoneservice from the United States. It is ludicrous to think that benchmarks reflecting costs could be ascertained other than by a case bycase basis.

When small nations states find not only the financial well being oftheir telephone companies but in many instances the major foreignexchange earner of their national economies threatened by policydecisions of the U.S Federal Communications Commission under thedirection of AT & T, they have little recourse but to conclude thatthey are confronting telecolonialism in full force and to turn to multi-lateral approaches, such as this one being led by CANTO to protecttheir interests.

This creates two reactions. One is fear and intimidiation that byhaving the audacity to raise such a concern, they put themselves inthe spotlight and risk the danger of reprisals for even mentioningthe problem. Secondly, it charges the atmosphere with a sense offoreboding that the tremendous progress achieved by dint of bothpublic and private investors in telecommunications over the pastdecade could be reversed, catapulting our region back to the dayswhen neither equipment nor service was readily available, and onehad to wait for hours to get a circuit free to make an internationalcall.

CANTO's intervention was made in the spirit of CaribbeanTele-Integration and premised on the mutual benefits thesis that theUnited States and its Carriers including AT & T have nothing to gainfrom a hault in telecommunications infrastructure investment anddevelopment. On the contrary, by continuing the process of bi-lateral negotiations toward the inevitable evolution of loweraccounting rates, in accordance with the ability of each country andits pecular circumstances, both the Caribbean and the U.S. Tele-communities stand to benefit strategically.

As indicated in earlier sections of this paper, the Caribbean inspite of its enormous debt burden and the economic devastationbeing wrought by structural adjustment policies, is doingremarkably well in developing and maintaining atelecommunications programme which compares favourablynot only with the developing countries but with theinternational telecommunity.

It is precisely because of the billions of dollars of Caribbeantax payers' money invested in telecomunications infrastructure,allowing Caribbean people to receive and make telephone callsthat international call accounting rates is both an economic anda political issue. Moreover, it is the opinion of this author thatthe revenue associated with the International. Call Accounting Rate,with strategic management and investment , is sufficientlysubstantial to constitute a financial solution. Therein lies the meansto raise the Caribbean out of the clutches of structural adjustmentdependency.

-24-

3.2.5 TIIE STATE AND PRIVATISATION

The super structure, state or government is a concept which willcontinue undergo profound transformation in the InformationRevolution. In Agrarian Society) Kings, Chiefs & Iadal Lords viedwith the church as the repository of state power, providing rulesor laws to govern civil society and control the acquisition (taxation)and allocation of society's resources - always with the threat of arepressive apparatus ie, police force, military etc..

Industrial Society saw a duplication of the role and functionsof the state as played in earlier social formation, with the addedresponsbility of acting as regulatory author....ity over infrastructuresuch as water ; electricity and eventually telecommunications, whichcame to be known as "public utitilies".

In the Information Age, the role of the state continues to evolve.Whether governments are elected via parliamentary democraraticpractices (ie, representative elections) or installed by military coupsde'tat, the state continues to reinforce the status quo of class orsocial relationships of production. Where the state, in developingcountries embrace or accept the imposition of structural adjustmentpolicies, privatization and divestment of the state's economic role ascontroller and owners of commanding heights of the economy,changes radically. Usually a large employer of public servals, thestate begins to be responsible for the generation of structuralunemployment. Unless it intervenes with incentives to create jobs inthe private sector, more of its diminishing resources must beinvested in police and prisons.

-25-Whereas in Industrial Society the State is the major economic andpolitcal actor in the mediation of class conflict, in the InformationSociety, under structural adjustment programmes, the states'seconomic role "withers away" in very much the manner predicted by

, Max in a "classless society". Where the political objective of theproletariat was ownership or control of the means of productionand control of the state, in Information Society, state power isreally vested in the repressive apparatuses and the aspirationof the cognitariat can be no loftier or more banal than control(if not ownership) of the means of communciation,

4 HAITI. CUBA AND THE POLITCAL ECONOMY OF CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION

With the advent of cellular telephony and the wireless explosionexemplified by personnel communications systems (pcs )and personnel communication networks (pcn), a plethora ofbusiness opportunities are opening up on the Caribbeantelecommunications land scape.

4. 1 CUBA

Cuba, which has been the victim of a trade embargo and economicblockade imposed by the United States Government for the past 30years, has discovered a window of opportunity from which to breakits isolation via telecommunications. Specifically, their entry intoCANTO in 1992 provides them with access to millions of dollars involume discount credits and rebates from international technologyand equipment suppliers, which they would not have otherwisebeen able to enjoy. More recently, the establishment of a jointventure business agreement between the Cuban Ministry ofCommunications and IUSACELL, the largest manufacturer of cellulartelephony in Mexico, has resulted in the formation of CUBACELL, thefirst Cellular Telephony Company in Cuba. Furthermore, this allianceis providing the Cuban people with greater accessibilty to

- 2 6 -international telephone circuits to receive calls than they have hadsince before the revolution in 1959. With communication comeschange. In this case, Cuba's society can experience progressivechange without the ignominious loss of the social benefits in areasof health, education, housing and culture which they have enjoyedfor the past three decades. What this means for the old debatebetween capitalism and socialism is unclear. However, the marketwill continue in the foreseeable future to play a critical role in theglobal economy. This does not however, preclude the establishmentof equal exchange or terms of international trade which do notreinforce telecolonial dependence and underdevelopment. To a greatextent the architecture of such terms depend upon alliances formedin the South which project strategic mutual interests and are noteasily fragmented by enticements designed to divide and rule.

4.2 HAITI

The position of Haiti, which is also a member of CANTO, ismore complicated with respect to the integration process andtheir role in the economic development of the region since theCoup d'tat which toppled President Aristide in 1991. Theinternational community has been at a loss to determine howit could sanction the Haitian military and Tonton Macoutes foralleged human rights abuses, without simultaneously imposinggreater social and economic suffering on the Haitian people.We in CANTO are clear on this question. Telecommunicationshas been recognised by the United Nations General Assemblyas a basic human right. Whether these human beings be Haitiansor Cubans, they are members of the Caribbean family. There is nojustification for the exclusion or victimization of a people from theCaribbean telecommunity or integration process because of mattersover which they have no control.

- 2 7 -It should be remembered that, while war raged in Central Americafor a decade and a half, the telecommunications network sharedby Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Ricajointly owned and administered through their telecommunicationorganization COMTELCA, - remained intact. It was neither amilitary nor a political target. This was because all partisansrecognized the common and useful value of telecommunications, andthat none of their interests would be served by disruptingcommunication lines.

At this very bleak hour in our region's history, Haiti has come underattack by interests recognizing its current vulerability on theAccounting Rates Issue. CANTO has also stepped into the cross-hairsfor daring to come to the aid of one of our members.

The Caribbean owes an histroric debt to Haiti which far exceedsthe more recent financial debt owed to the IMF and othermultilateral institutions financial. The first independentCaribbean state; the first people to abolish slavery by a war ofliberation; the Haitians continue to suffer for the sacrifice that theymade so that all of us could be free. The response of the Caribb e a ncannot be ideologically prescribed. It must be a solution which islasting, pragmatic and brings with it freedom, justice anddevelopment. Communications breaks down barriers and fostersregional integration but no integration of the Caribbean can bethorough or lasting which does not include the people of Cubaand the people of Haiti.

5 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT & DEEPENING DEPENDENCE: A CHALLENGE TO UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The Caribbean Sea is a sea which has divided more than it hasunited the people of this region. Although our languages maydiffer, our culture is fundamentally the same.Withtelecommunications, opportunities for the improvement of humancommunication, for sharing of information, for dissipation of thesense "otherness" between people the world over, a demolition ofthe barriers to understanding that otherness creates, lies within thegrasp of Caribbean people.

We must bear in mind that "over 70% of the world's population and20% of gross domestic product possess only 7% of the world'stelephones. 17 (The Missing Link Maitland - Sir Donald Maitland . Report on the Indepedent Commission on World Wide Telecommunication Development ITU - Geneva 1984)

Three quarters of the world's 600 billion telephones are locatedin nine (9) industrialized countries. The cities of New Yorkand Tokyo each have more telephones than all of Africa.A miniscual amount of telecommunications equipment andtechology is manufactured in developing countries. and few ofthese countries outside of the Caribbean have devleoped thehuman resources and expertise to operate, maintain orenlarge upon these systems without having to pay for foreignconsultants with scarce foreign exchange. Still, in 1984 the WorldBank was encouraging developing countries to spend 12 billion USdollars a year to improve and expand their public telecommunictionsnetworks. 18 (Ibid - The Missing Link).

Having invested billions of dollars, the telecommunicationsrevolution in the era of structural adjustment and telecolonialismhas not bye-passed us, but it certainly has not touched the lives ofthe majority of our people. The adverse implications of thisbye-pass affect not only our people but our society and thescience and technology culture that has made thetelecommunications revolution a reality.

This means that in spite of the promise of telecommunicationsin the aftermath of privatization, the lack of incentives forinvestment in rural areas restricts the capacity for economic growthand development in large areas of the Caribbean. By extension,there are diminished possbilities of generating new economicactivity and enhancing employment opportunities. 19 ("Communityneeds Communication" Keynote address by Sir Sharidath Ramphal ofCaribbean Association of National Teleocomunication Organization(CANTO) - ST. Thomas, US Virgin Islands 1991)

-29-

We have shown above)that telecommunications is one sector whichholds a promise for Caribbean development beyond structuraladjustment . But telecommunications is no panacea. Withouttrenchant and criticial analysis, without a forthright airing of ourviews; without the education and conscientization of the Caribbeanpeople including a mobilization of techno-literacy campaigns, whichcan help to exert pressure to enlighten and activate policy makers,Telecommunications operators and carriers; telecommunicationcould be converted from a tool for human development andliberation to a weapon of dependency and underdevelopment.

What is the purpose of structural adjustment policies whichclamour for privatization of telecoms in the Caribbean withoutmultilateral lending agencies providing financing for therehabilitation and expansion of networks? Since the IMF andWorld Bank as well as commercial banks are reluctant toprovide financing for privatization projects of telecom in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, local private investors are ruled out.This means that privatization of Caribbean Telecoms is becomingsynonomous not as it should be, with competition and operationof market forces; but with monopoly and dominance to thedetriment of competition - the antitheisis of nominal privatizationphilosophy .

6 CARIBBEAN CULTURE: LEADING TECHNOLOGICALADAPTATION AS A BASIS FOR INTEGRATION

Where telecommunications networks represent the hardware,Caribbean culture holds promise as the software component of astrategy to move this region beyond the grip of structuraladjustment. Calypso, Reggae, Pan, Soca, Salsa, Rapso TumbaMerrengue, Zouk, Caseco, Caribbean Poetry, Novels and Dramaare powerful and appealing manifestations of this region'sculture. Properly packaged and marketed, one need only lookat the examples of Bob Marley, Mighty Sparrow, Shabba Ranks.Juan Lurs Guerra, Beryl Mc Burnie and Alicia Alonzo. We mustappreciate not only the wealth of talent of that exudes from this

region but that this talent must be projected to minimise the on-slaught of cultural penetration from the North. This demands astrategic response from the Caribbean. We are in a position tomake such a response.

The Caribbean broadcasting Union, The Caribbean NewsAgency, CANTO and the Caribbean Telecommunications Union are onthe ramparts of the struggle to develop a proactive purposefulapproach to moving our region out of the quagmire ofdebilitating structural adjustment. We can make an impact,mindful of the challenge posed by the ubiquitousness of foreignmedia, but vigorous in exploiting our own talents and technicalfacilities to broaden intra- Caribbean communications. TheCaribbean Studies Association can also support these effortsintellectually and otherwise.

Where the rest of the world is making tremendous strides incombining telecommunications, computer and broadcastingtechnology a/a HDTV, Cable television linked to the Public Switchedtelephone Network, the comparative advantage of the Caribbeanis in software development. The explosive cultural and musicaldevelopments in the Caribbean have an earning capability which iscomparable to Michael Jackson, Ma Donna or Prince this talent canproperly managed, earn this region billions of dollars not only inrecording contracts, but in concerts, tours and ultimately in thedevelopment of the tourism sector.

Located beneath the geo-stationary orbit, our Caribbean countriesneed not be content with being passive receivers. We can beassertive transmitters and beneficiaries. Where there have beendown links, in Barbados, St. Lucia, Suriname and Cuba, televisionproducers have acquired uplink capabilities .

-31-

7 CONCLUSION

In the preceeding pages, we have mapped the shift in socialformation from the industrial to the information age, illustrating howthis shift has embraced the Caribbean. We have tried to show how inthe strategies of the 1970's and '80's third world leaderspursuit of a New International Economic Order and a New WorldInformation Order via non- alignment was in effect undermined bymassive debts they incurred during the same period . We have alsotried to demarcate the growing influence of telecommunications inthe global economy.and to highlight in that context the politicaleconomy of the Caribbean telecommunication paradigm referred toas the "borderless world".

In examining the structure of ownership and control patternsof telecommunications product and service offerings in theCaribbean, we reviewed the historic evolution of these structures.In the colonial period we saw the tension between mercantilism andindependence with the latter finally prevailing. In the postcolonial period, we reviewed the counterveiling trends ofnationalisation vs privatisation; where the privatization ofCaribbean telecommunications became the prodominant tendency.Then we advanced the concept of telecolonialism, an historicalphase in which the Caribbean and other developing regionsnow find ourselves; the dialectic between monopoly and competition,in which the victor is yet to be determined.

Finally, in looking at the implications of the present conjuncture,we provided a detailed analysis of the impact of declininginternational accounting rates on regional telecommunicationscompanies and the affect of the outcome of that controversial issueon the Caribbean economy .

In this regard, the particular cases of Cuba and Haiti wereunderscored in terms of a political economy of Caribbean integration.

We concluded our analysis with the view that acceptingstructural adjustment policies as fait a'compli' is a myopia which willonly deepen the dependence of the Caribbean and furtherentrench our underdevelopment. This decline weconclude as inevitable for the Caribbean unless the endeavoursof regional governmental and non-governmental organizationsto foster and promote teleintegration and cultural integration arebolstered and supported by a critically conscientious Caribbeanpopulation and leaders sensitive and responsive to their highestaspirations.

In closing we are mindful of the words of the immortal, BobMarley Rastafri who said, "the answer to our problems lies atour finger tips. We have only to reach out and grasp the solution".

iir?ewb oivcs

DEBT SERVICE AS PERCENT OF G.D.P.

COUNTRY 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

BAHAMAS 6.8% 2.3% 2.6% 2.1% 1.6% 0.0%

BARBADOS 5.7% 7.3% 5.8% 4.6% 7.0% 6.9%

GUYANA 0.0% 7.4% 6.1% 6.9% 25.7% 15.2%

JAMAICA 24.6% 23.6% 22.1% 16.9% 16.0% 17.5%

TRINBAGO 4.0% 5.4% 0.0% 8.4% 8.9% 8.6%

AVERAGE 8.2% 9.2% 7.3% 7.8% 11.8% 9.6%

DEBT SERVICE AS PERCENT OF CURRENT REVENUE

COUNTRY 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

BAHAMAS 35.6% 12.2% 15.5% 12.4% 9.0% 16.5%

BARBADOS 22.3% 29.2% 20.5% 16.0% 25.5% 23.7%

GUYANA 0.0% 20.3% 14.6% 23.3% 76.7% 49.4%

JAMAICA 76.7% 71.8% 70.3% 46.3% 49.5% 51.1%

TRINBAGO 12.7% 17.7% 0.0% 32.1% 35.0% 28.6%'...,,

AVERAGE 29.5% 30.2% 24.2% 26.0% 's, 39.1% 33.9%

COUNTRY

EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

BAHAMAS 216 193 171 220 268 412BARBADOS 432 465 479 469 467 439DOM. REPUBLIC 3,812 3,899 3,883 4,090 4,499 4,586GUYANA 826 1,087 1,226 1,379 1,708 1,724HAITI 696 752 778 803 861 826JAMAICA 3,576 4,013 4,009 4,038 4,153 3,874MEXICO 100,500 102,400 100,900 95,100 99,700 105,800TRINBAGO 1,062 1,249 2,403 2,400 2,520 2,431VENEZUELA 33,839 34,833 34,684 33,195 33,902 34,037

144,958 148,891 148,533 141.694 148.077 154,129

APPENDIX 2 -20-

TABLE 1STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

COUNTRY COMPANY

SECTOR IN WHICH PARTICPATIONFOREIGN COMPANY

SECTOR IN WHICH

CO. OPERATES

IN SHARE

(FOREIGN/COMPANY OPERATES IN SHARESNAT'L INTL. (GOVERNMENT) NAME NATIONALITY NAT'L. INT'L. PRIVATE)

Anguilla C & W 0% C & W English 100%

Antigua/Barbuda A.P.U.A 100% C & W English 100%

Aruba SETAR 100% 0%

Bahamas BATELCO 100% 0%

Barbados BARTELCO 35% C & W English 65%

Belize B.T.L. 51% B.T. English 24%

Br. Virgin Islands C & W 0% C & W English 100%

Cayman Islands C & W 0% C & W English 100%

Colombia TELECOM 100% 0%

Comm. Dominica C & W 0% C & W English 100%

Curacao SETEL 100% Lands Radio Neth. Antilles 100%

Cuba TELCO / / 100% 0%

Dom. Republic CODETEL 0% GTE USA 100%

Grenada GRENTEL 30% C & W English / / 70%

Guyana GUYTELCO 20% ATN USA 80%

Guadeloupe DGT 100% F.T. France 0%

Haiti TELCO 100% 0%

Jamaica T.O.J. 20% C & W UK 80%

Mexico TELECOM 100% 0%

Montserratt TELCO 0% C & W UK 100%

Puerto Rico P.R.T.0 100% 0%

St. Vincent TELCOS 0% C & W UK 100%

St. Kitts/Nevis SKANTEL 0% C & W UK 100%

St. Lucia C & W 0% C & W English 100%

Suriname TELESUR 0%Trinbago T.S.T.T. UK 49%

Turks & Caicos C & W 0% C & W English 100%

US Virgin Islands US VITELCO 0% ATN USA 100%

Venezuela CANTV 49% GTE / AT&T USA 45%

47% 59%

SOURCE : CLERC (CANTO LIBRARY EDUCATION RESOURCE CENTRE) 1990/91

COPYRIGHT : 1991 P.O.S.

NETWORK OVERVIEW - 1993

COUNTRY ORGANIZATION

•

POPULATION

CENTRALOffICE

CAPACITY

MAINTELEPHONE

LINES

PHONESTATIONS /TEL SETS

MAIN TELEPHONES EXTENSIONS

PAISSYSTEMS

KEYSYSTEMS

COIN BOXTELEPHONES

CARDPHONES

LEASEDPRIVATECIRCUITS

DATA-TERMINALEQUIPMENT ONPUBLIC PHONE

& TELEXNETWORKSRESIDENCE BUSINESS RESIDENCE

•BUSINESS

Anguilla C 8 W 6290 N/A , . 3.053 N/A 2,056 748 N/A N/A 12 78 25 22 3 N/AAnligua APUA 65.000 29.740 •:19.000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91 N/A 70 61 90 N/AAruba SETAR 70,684 34,304 23.858 N/A N/A N/A N/A 11,916 127 812 364 44 17 N/ABahamas BATELCO 254,685 110.339 79.516 207,837 52.595 26,921 24.153 39,417 275 2,146 703 12 399 N/ABarbados BARTEL 258,655 102.400 79,543 110.404 61,405 16.855 5,437 25.424 241 N/A N/A 63 1,024 N/ABelize BTL 200.000 24,964 23.495 N/A 17.068 6,427 1,321 3,539 202 311 84 N/A 37 N/ABermuda TELCO 56,000 46.540 39.390 75,000 24.800 14,590 28,094 25,273 179 1,040 719 15 4.134 N/ABolivia N/A 6,808,824 N/A 277.800 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/ABr. Virgin Islands! C & W 17,000 20,000 7.200 N/A 5,000 2,200 N/A N/A N/A N/A 55 - 43 N/A N/ACayman Islands C 8 W 27,000 N/A 13,500 17,650 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AColombia N/A 28,940,390 N/A 3,038,741 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AComm. of Dominica C & W 71,794 N/A 13,700 N/A 11,835 1.865 N/A N/A 35 203 102 48 6 N/ACuba 1•41/114 Comm. 105347000— 4...40.67Cr 1,19.067 . 24 218:987 .47;9113 7}1961 3p275r1 paw ...Ha Au,- NIL XI< N/ACuracao SETEL 171,000 60,600 49,000 76,000 37,000 12.000 41,000 34,000 272 728 171 9 357 N/ADom. Republic CODETEL 7,470,533 657.852 479,840 600.000 344,105 125,909 66,245 31.309 4.190 3.555 4.403 N/A 993 64Ecuador N/A 9,930,599 N/A 696,135 N/A N/A N/A . N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AGrenada GRENTEL 100,000 25,056 15,026 17,615 14,444 3,171 2,121 466 32 190 129 44 28 , 34Guadeloupe FT 389.000 145,000 138,000 159.000 123.000 15.000 17,000 4,000 250 0 10 750 1.250 0Guyana GTT 7311.000 41,899 27,812 N/A 16.687 10.965 N/A N/A 115 52 160 N/A 16 N/A

Halli TELECOd'Halli6.000.000 70,000 45.010 N/A 30.815 14.195 N/A N/A 141 84 42 N/A N/A N/A

Jamaica TOJ 2,360.000 238,051 150.073 • 272,336 93,045 57.028 73,776 45,218 1,251 937 NIL 1,653 2.155 281Mexico TELMEX 86,100,000 N/A 5,700,000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AMonts offal C & W 11,000 4,517 4,286 4,987 3.502 784 574 121 19 69 26 22 7 N/APeru N/A 20,750,197 N/A 630,806 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ,

__....•N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Puerlo Rico PRTC/TLD 3.600,000 1,170.382 912,593 1,175,213 687,707 229,236 66.237 36,442 N/A N/A 19,700 N/A 3,064 N/ASI Kills/Nevis SKANTEL 41.860 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIASI Lucia C 8 W 145,000 N/A 17,000 N/A N/A N/A . N/A N/A N s, N/A N/A 130 27 N/A N/ASI VIncenUGrdns. C & W 110,000 15,232 13,118 16.837 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 80 N/A 9 NILSuriname TELESUR 450,000 N/A 44,900 57,700 46,500 4.600 4.235 11.068 549 578 • 180 N/A 39 2Trinidad E. Tobago TSTT 1,273.738 252.318 180,108 235,004 154,860 24,407 10,824 11.020 370 1,125 841 25 1.330 N/ATurks & Caicos C & W 12,000 N/A 3,095 N/A 1,763 949 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 38 N/A N/AUS Virgin Islands VITELCO 100,000 70,000 64,258 N/A 38,072 13.918 7,872 3,251 N/A N/A 426 N/A 743 N/AVanswels CANTV 20,720,505 2.300,109 1,904,220 N/A 1,235,122 533,493 N/A N/A N/A N/A 28.487 16,513 18,820 NIA

Ct...b a 14,4. 6,,n . to,7133oo 11T34° KiLlos £14,212 11 2,858 i0a,860 110,641 108,115

3,G06 x63 I AI sJ I S. Loo6

xfq

NETWORK OVERVIEW - 1993 (Cont'd)

COUNTRY

DATA-TERMINALEQUIPMENT

CONNECTED TODEDICATED DATA

NETWORKS

TELEX .PUBLIC FAX STATIONS

/ALL GROUPS • 2,3 & 4) CELLULAR TELEPHONY

EMPLOYEESIN TELECOMPROVISION

TELEPHONEPENETRATION

•CALL

COMPLETIONRATE

TELEPHONESTATIONS /

100 PERSONS

ANNUAL %GROWTH RATEMAIN • LINES

EMPLOYEESPER 1000

MAIN ...LINES

VOLUMEDEMAND

TELEPHONESERVICELINES

.

SUISCRISERS SETS SUISCRIIIERSSETS /

SUBSCRIBERSDATE:SERVICE

INCEPTION

Anguilla N/A 8 8 `• 157 157 Fluctuates October, 1990 NIL 75% N/A NIA N/A N/A N/AAntigua 383 N/A 56 ,... 350 350 400 (1991) October, 1909 150 29% NIA N/A 20% N/A 3,000

Aruba N/A 512 54 N/A N/A NIL 2nd. Chi 1993 407 33% 70% N/A 32% 17.0 3.500

Bahamas N/A 046 480 ' 30 1,188 2,600 October, 1988 2.320 31% 61% 82 14% 29.0 10,752Barbados N/A 142 142 N/A 1,932 661 December, 1990 773 30% 70% 42.68 5% 0.1 2.859

Belize N/A 42 42 8 235 121 1993 398 13% 64% N/A 23% 17.0 750

Bermuda 1,000 N/A N/A 10 140 2.069 March. 1987. 408 95% 71% 134 3% 1 1,500

Bolivia• N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Br. Virgin Islands N/A 29 29 N/A N/A 1,500 1985 202 42% 75% N/A N/A N/A N/A

Cayman Islands N/A 120 N/A N/A N/A 800 November, 1987 250 40% N/A 73 N/A N/A N/A

Colombia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA N/A N/A • 11% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Comm. of Dominica N/A 32 28 N/A 289 NIL 1993 214 19% N/A N/A N/A 18.0 311

Cuba >I"( 8.748 yor .260- )RA' ..1,0C ...roK" IketTir 3% '46 4fe. St' 3R N/ACuracao N/A 244 • N/A 3.500 N/A 2,400 April, 1990 366 33% 52% 50 7% 0.0 7.100

Dom. Republic 365 245 235 87 2.355 7,642 1986 7.110 7% 67% 8 17% 14.0 123.076

Ecuador N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Grenada 216 30 32 3 240 200,

January, 1990 N/A 15% 65% 17 23% 15.0 . 1.074

Guadeloupe 400 750 700 0 0 200 1992 600 36% 70% 36 0% 6 0 5.000Guyana 6 199 140 4 N/A 893 1991 621 3% 45% N/A 30% 2 0 10.000

Haiti N/A 1,024 314 N/A N/A N/A NIA 2,040 0.8% 70% 0.6 NIA 47.0 22.000

Jamaica 965 N/A 530 1.337 . 1,337 5,999 ' August, 1991 3.622 6% 3% 12 IN% 24.0 41,752

Mexico N/A N/A N/A • N/A N/A NIA NIA 50,000 7• N/A N/A N/A NIA . NIA

Montserrat 9 8 4 1 N/A 36 December, 1992 106 39% 75% 45 4% 3.0 365

Peru N/A N/A NIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Puerto Rico 1,257 N/A N/A N/A N/A 53.728 N/A 7 `14/A 95% 48% 32.65 5% 0.82 131.000St K Ins/Nevis N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Fluctuates October. 1989 ''..;14/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

St. Lucia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 500 October, 1969 301i,L 12% 60% N/A N/A 19.0 N/A

SI VIncent/Grdns. N/A 59 N/A 155 N/A . Fluctuates 1990 N/A 12% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Suriname 1 360 330 6 500 • 1.600 February. 1993 1,256 10% 95% 10 10% 35.0 11.400

Trinidad & Tobago 187 137 N/A 6 N/A 1,010 December. 1991 2.842 14% 85% 10 0% 1.6 20.270

Turks & Caicos N/A 10 18 N/A N/A N/A N/A 102 25% N/A N/A N/A 3.3 N/A

US Virgin Islands N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,000 ' . 1991 435 54%. 70% 5 6% 1.0 BOO

Venezuela ' 450 10.700 11.859 N/A N/A 45,400 October, 1989 22,594 0.7% N/A N/A 13% 1.25 3.399.773

CAA. 6 a tot 83-4B .451t 10Z LI-0 234 Fla-rtiN 1993 12,355 3.1i Ye 25 V. 6". 69 Z 35.9 I.1 A

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