bohman_communication, ideology, and democratic theory

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COMMUNICATION, DEOLOGY,AND DEMOCRATICTHEORYJAMESF. BOHMANSt. LouisUniversity

sing Habermas' heory of communicative ction and his remarkson thelegitimacyof thestateundermodern ocialconditionsasa startingpoint,I combinenor-mative democratic heorywith the critiqueof ideology. I first outlinefour necessary-but-not-sufficientonditionsof communicationor democraticdecision making:suchagreementsmust(1) be formallyandprocedurally orrect,(2) be cognitivelyadequate,(3) concern ssues on which consensusor compromise an be reached,and (4) be free ofideology.Thefirst threeconditions orm the core of a normativedemocraticheory, onethatis notpurelyprocedural,as manyhaveargued t is. I then discussthefourthcondi-tion and establishthe relationbetween deologyand democracy.Taken ogether,theseconditionsnot only providean answerto troublingquestions or democratic heorybutalso delineate he extentto whichpoliticsis rationalandpoliticalclaimsare truthlike.

Since the earlymodem period,the experienceof democ-racyhas beenthe sourceof both greatex-pectations and bitter disappointments.Many Enlightenmenthinkershad hopedto link democracywith moraland intel-lectual progress.These aspirationsgavebirth to strongly normative theories ofdemocracy,mostespecially hoseof KantandRousseau,who saw democracyas thepolitical and collective norm of humanautonomy. But when these same normswere more thoroughly and consistentlyapplied in the following century, itbecameclearthatdemocracyalonecouldnot fulfill all the promisesof the Enlight-enment. What proved inadequatewerenot the norms and ideals of autonomybut, instead,the practicaland institution-al bases by which these ideals could berealized.It is thisproblemthatconcernedMarx when he argued that politicaldemocracydid not preventone grouporclass from acquiringenough power togain control over decision makingin so-calleddemocraticpolitical nstitutions;healso exposedthe many discrepanciesbe-

tween the ideal rights of citizens and theliving realityof modem humanbeings.Asa centuries-old xperiment, hen, democ-racy has shown mixed results, leadingsome to reject t, others to declare t fun-damentally rrational,and still otherstominimize our hopes for it by definingitnarrowlyas merelegalandelectoralpro-ceduresratherthan as a normative dealor a formof life.It might seem difficult to put togetherthese two strandsof the legacy of democ-racy-the affirmation of its norms andthe suspicionof its particular orms. Yetmany philosophersn whatmay be calledthe radicaldemocratic raditionhavedone so, including Marx, Mill, andDewey. Theirtheoriesof democracyhavetypically favored participatoryinstitu-tions. John StuartMillclaimedthat insti-tutions remain democraticonly throughparticipationand that rightsbecomerealonly if theyare exercised. nthis sametra-dition,JohnDewey tried to show that in-sofar as democracy embodies a publicprocedure for testing and modifyingnorms and ends in light of common ex-

AMERICAN POLITICALSCIENCEREVIEWVOLUME 84 NO. 1 MARCH 1990

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American Political Science Review Vol. 84

perience, t is as mucha rationalpracticeas scientific inquiry is. However, likePopper, both Mill and Dewey were attimes ed astrayby an overlynarrowcon-cept of rationality modeled on sciencethat could not directly serveas the basisof politics.Butit is preciselythis expansionof theconcept of rationality to fit the demandsof a participatory politics that JurgenHabermas develops in his concept ofdemocracyas rational will formation,aconcept that is normativeand critical atthe same time.First,he attempts o estab-lish a minimal cognitivist ethics-atheory of the rational justification ofnorms-on the basis of which one canjudge institutions and forms of life. Thecentralclaim of this normativetheory isthat political institutions and practicaldecisionmakingcan be governedby dis-cursiverationality and truthlike, publicclaims to validity. This means that ques-tions of justice,as much as questionsoftruth, can be settled discursively, hatis, in an institutionalized, controllableprocess of communication, throughwhich membersof a society arriveat ra-tionally bindingdecisions about both therulesand goals of their common life.This reinterpretation f democracyinterms of discursivecommunicationgivesriseto the secondmain elementof Haber-mas' democratic heory:a revisedtheoryof ideology, which becomes the criticalself-reflective lementof democratic usti-fication. The theory of ideology can berecastso thatit may now describerestric-tions and barriers o social processesofcommunication,barriers hat originate nstructuresof domination and that affectsocial processesof decision makingandbelief formation. Thesebarriers unction,in turn, to help maintain hesesame rela-tions of poweranddomination,as well asthebeliefsnecessary o sustain hem,evenwithin democratic nstitutions.I shall try hereto show the fruitfulnessof Habermas' ewinterpretationf demo-

cratic norms and their violation. I willalso try to show that by relating thesecritical and normativeaspects of demo-cratic theory, a better set of necessaryconditions for truly democraticdecisionmaking emerges,going well beyond theproblems of proceduralismthat plagueRousseau and some of Habermas'defenders. I systematically reconstructHabermas' remarks on legitimation inmodem society as outlining four condi-tionsof communicationhat are necessarybut not sufficient or genuinedemocraticdecision making: such agreementsmust(1) be formallyand procedurally orrect,(2) be cognitively adequate, (3) concernissueson which either consensusor com-promise is possible, and (4) be free ofideology.I firstexplore he first threecon-ditionsas the core of a normativetheoryof democracy, then discuss the fourthand the relation between ideology anddemocracy. In setting out these condi-tions, I shall show that it is possible toreconstruct Habermas'theory so as toavoid many of the problemsthat criticsfindin his views, namely, pure formalismand proceduralism, he exclusionof cer-tain interestsand claimsin advance, theimposition of generalizablenterests,andthe impractical possibility of citizens'merelyagreeing o disagree.If theseprob-lems are avoided, then the result is thatthe conditions of democratic politicalagreementscannot be judged purelyfor-mally but rather must be evaluated interms of their communicativeprerequi-sites and conditions; it also means that ademocracy,no matterhow well ordered,cannotentirelyeliminate hepossibilityofcommunicativefailures and must there-fore develop ways to correctideologicalcommunication.Thus, while I first dealwithphilosophicalproblemsof democrat-ic theory proper,I latertreat nstitutionalproblems, includingbureaucracy,exper-tise, education,complexityandparticipa-tion.The significance f Habermas' heory is

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that it offers a systematicreconstructionof democratictheory in communicativeterms. Like empiricaldemocratictheo-rists uchas Dahl and Neubauer,Haber-mas is concernedwith the social condi-tions and prerequisiteshat make democ-racy possible-except thatnow thosecon-ditionsconcern hestructure f communi-cation and discourse. Second, like eco-nomic theorists of democracy such asDowns or Schumpeter,Habermas s con-cernedwith the failures o achievedemoc-racy-except that now these failures arenot put in market terms but rather intermsof communicationbetweenpartici-pants. But unlike either of these twotheories, Habermas'reconstructionaidsand empowers, rather than undermines,agents'searchfor greaterdemocracyandan adequatecivic discourse (Ball 1988,chap. 6).

The Normative Conditions ofDemocraticAgreements

IfHabermaswere to developanexplicittheoryof democracy,it would be cogni-tivist in its ethicaldimensionand partici-patory in form, having its origins inMead, Rousseau,andMarx.Unfortunate-ly, Habermas'discussion of democracyhasnot, as of yet, beensystematicbut re-mainsscatteredhroughouthiswritings nother contexts. The closest Habermascomes to such a treatment is his firstwork, StructuralTransfornationof thePublic Sphere(1961), where he analyzesthe historicalemergenceof a normativeidea of publicopinion and its depen-dence on new forms of association likeunion halls, coffeehouses, salons, andclubs;the publicspacesof modem cities;and new communicationsmedia such asnewspapers,publishinghouses, and evenconversation.In his sociologicalwritings,Habermas enerallycastshis discussionofdemocracy in terms of the concept oflegitimationrather than in terms of apoliticaltheory.But it shouldnonetheless

not be too hard to reconstructhe conceptof democracy implied by his socialtheory, since the concept of legitimationfor Habermas ocuses on the relation ofreason and social organization. Legiti-macy is, after all, the worthinessof apoliticalorderto be recognized Haber-mas 1978, 178) or, alternatively, he cor-rectnessof its claim to be right and just.What does the legitimacyof a demo-cratic order entail? Legitimacyrefers tothe convincingcharacterof reasons thatjustifypoliticaldecisionsor, moregener-ally, validate practicesand institutions.Indeed, t is truefor anymeaningful ocialactionthat agentsare able to give an ac-countof what theyare doing by appealingto reason,if only to a stockof traditionalorcommonsenseknowledge.Historically,the stateemergedas an institutional olu-tion to a numberof problemsof complex-ity, such as geographical separation,social conflict,and theorganization f ac-tivities;thistypeof organization equirednew legitimating reasons, which weresupplied by expanding mythical narra-tives into cosmologies and, finally, on-tologies. The advancein social organiza-tion requireda corresponding dvance incognitive abilitiesand the acceptanceofnew types of convincingreasons. How-ever, the ability to give reasons canalways be taken one reflectivestep fur-ther: we can also discuss the reasonsthemselves, in what Habermascalls adiscourse. Such reasons attach tospeechacts, in their claims to be acceptedby hearersasvalid. Habermas eneralizedFrege'sdeaof truth conditionsto includethree types of validity claims : utter-ancesmay be true,normatively ustified,or the truthfulexpressionof intentionsand desires(Habermas1984, 276). Suchclaims can themselvesbe made the sub-jectof communication n varioustypesofdiscourses-theoretical, aesthetic, andpractical-each with its own aims andprocedures,Self-reflectivecommunicationin dis-

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courses typically involves public argu-mentation of various sorts. Argumentsarenot simplyto be interpreted ogicallyas inferencesbut also pragmaticallyasself-reflective, reason-giving activities,whose social function is to give hearersrationalmotivation o accepta claim asvalid. So accepted, the claim then ac-quires intersubjectively inding force,in that actorsmay appealto it in creatingagreements, n coordinatingplans of ac-tion, in repairing ntersubjectivebonds,or any of the other myriad uses of lan-guage.Thus, in order o facilitate hese n-tegrativeand reproductiveunctions, dis-courses and patterns of justificationbecome institutionalizedn variousprac-tices, suchas jurisprudence, rt criticism,science,and democracy.Indeed, democ-racy has a special self-referential ualityas a formof practicaldiscourse; n it, asHabermasputs it, the formalpropertiesof justificationthemselvesobtain legiti-matingforce (Habermas1978, 84). Thismeans thatin democratic nstitutions,dis-cursiverationality tself becomesthe nor-mative basisof its now-reflective laimtolegitimacy.Oncethislevelof justificationis achieved,previousnondemocraticegit-imatinggroundsare no longerconvincingorbindingandhencebecome ncapableofestablishing eflectivepatternsof interac-tion or recognizedusesof politicalpower.This shiftawayfrompreviouslyaccept-able,nondiscursive easonshas enormousconsequences,some of which Rousseauelucidated n his conceptionof the moraltransformationof the self in the SocialContract.Democraticnstitutionsrequirea new type of moraland social identity,which Habermasaffirmsas the rationalcontent of modernity. ForHabermas,asfor Durkheim, society is a symbolicallystructured,moralrealitysuchthat eachofits members nternalizes his structureaspart of their acquisitionof identity. Inmodemsocieties,members anonlyinter-nalize these structuresreflectively,morefrequentlyas reasons and less often as

causes, as theyaffirm herationalbasisofpractices and institutions. Thus, theshared, identicalset of beliefs and atti-tudes, those thatmakeupwhat Durkheimcalled the collective onscience f tradi-tional societies, contrast quite sharplywith the modern general r rationalwill; the latter is collectivelysharedyetnot identical or each, a unity with manyvoices. George HerbertMead describedthisnew, morefluididentity quitewell asfollows: A highly developed society isone in which individualmembersare in-terrelatedn a multiplicityof different n-tricate and interrelated ways (Mead1934, 268). This very individuation isboth an achievementand a problemoncognitive, moral,and emotional evels;itis constantly threatenedby a loss of thecognitive perspicuity,the moral identityand the emotional identification hat arenecessary o sustaina common life undermodern conditions.How is this problemof individualandcollective dentityto be solvedon thissideof modernity?Democracy s one solutioninasmuchas it does not presuppose hatsharedbeliefs and common interests al-ready exist. Rather, it is a process bywhicha general nd nonidentical ollec-tive will is generated nd formed.Democ-racy is therefore a practical hypothesisabouthow convincingreasonsandcollec-tive identitiesmay emergeout of a publicprocess of deliberation. As Habermasputs it, democracy ties the developmentof social systems to control through apoliticallyeffectiveinstitutionalization fdiscourse (Habermas 1973, 393). Itspropergoalis not simplyto maintain ndi-vidualfreedomor the peaceand securitynecessaryfor commodiousliving but toestablishintersubjectiveagreements reefrom domination, violence, and simpletradition. For this to occur, the topicunder discussion must itself be that ofhow to arrive at a conscious, rationaldecisionaboutthe structure nd futureofsociety.

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DemocraticTheoryIfdemocracy s such a progressof form-ing a new type of collectivewill, it is nec-

essary to specify the conditions underwhich thiswillmay be rational ndhowtheinterestswhichemergemay be gener-al. This effort makes up the core ofHabermas'theory of legitimacy. How-ever,as he hasarticulated t so far,Haber-mas' conception is rather limited. Heoften seems to indicate that certainfor-mal-that is, merelyprocedural-condi-tions of communicationare sufficienttoguarantee he rationality of the will andconsensus ormed n a practicaldiscourse.Forexample,Habermas sserts omethinglike this in his 1975postscriptto Knowl-edge and HumanInterests: Thediscur-sivelyformedwill canbe called'rational,'because he formalproperties f discourseand the deliberative ituationsufficientlyguarantee that a consensus will arisethroughappropriatelynterpreted, ener-alizableinterests Habermas1975, 100).Habermasfurtherspecifiesthese formalpropertiesn his idealspeechsituation,perhapsthe best known but least under-stoodaspectof his theoryof practicaldis-course. This counterfactual onstructionpresumesto permitus to judgehow thepropertiesof actualdiscourseanddeliber-ative situationsmightfail to issuein gen-uine, well-considered greements.Hence,its primarypurpose s purelyprocedural,in that it setsout constitutiverulesof suc-cessful practical discourse for consensusformation,suchas thatall speakersmusthave an equalchanceto speak, raise ob-jections, or employ arguments.Is thisconstructiona sufficientbasis for a demo-cratictheory?Most of Habermas' ritics and defend-ers alikestophere,seeinghisethics of dis-courseasyet another,perhapsbetter,ver-sion of what Rawlscalls a pureprocedur-alist theory (Baynesn.d.). Indeed,thereare strengthsto a strictly proceduralistposition.As RichardBernstein ointsout,it is easier to defendsuch a modest andweak claim for the theoryof communica-

tive action. It is also more relevant topoliticaldecisionmaking n democracies,since therequirement f autonomymeansthat participantsdo not lay out a blue-print for the good life in advance. Thesame s trueof modemcommunicative a-tionality in general.As Bernsteinputs it,Sucha communicativereason is onlyconceptualizedas a proceduralrational-ity; it is not sufficient o judgeordictateasubstantive ormof life (Bernstein 983,191). But even such a weakened claimdoes not escapebasicphilosophicaldiffi-cultiescommonto any purelyproceduraltheoryof rationality.Firstof all, therearedoubtsabout the completenessof such atheoryas a basisfor democracy:proced-uralrequirementsannotdefinetheirownconditionsof adequacy.Forexample,thecondition that all participants get achance to speakcouldbe institutionalizedin a ruleaboutturntaking.Yetevenwiththisrule,someturnsor chances o partici-pate may be inadequate,as they areper-formedwithout the propercapacitiesormade in a situation n whichthey cannotbe effective. Rules and procedures,too,must be interpretedand appliedappro-priately; and both interpretation nd ap-plicationrequire heirown criteriaof cog-nitive adequacynot specifiedby formalrequirements lone.A second set of objections o purepro-ceduralistdemocracyconcernsthe claimthatprocedures an be the basisor foun-dation of justification.Procedural ustifi-cation is not only too weak to supportdemocraticinstitutions, it is also para-doxical in two senses. First,justificatoryappealsto proceduresareparadoxicaln-sofar as they are self-reflexive: he rulesand proceduresof public practicaldis-course can only themselves be justifiedthrough a public practical discourse.However, this paradoxof self-reflexivitydoes not make procedural justificationself-defeating,only circular, and hencenever self-sufficient.AgainstBernstein,would arguethat the turn to communica-

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AmericanPolitical ScienceReview Vol. 84tion and discoursealone cannot save aprocedural theory of rationality ordemocracy,so long as it is a pure ro-ceduralism.Second,it is obvious thatthesameparadoxes xist forformalcriteriaofcommunicationas for formal criteria ofvoting, such as majorityrule: just as ma-joritydecisionsmaybe undemocratic, o,too, all the formalconditions of commu-nication could be satisfied and the out-come of the collective discussion couldstill be a nongeneralizablenterest.Here,again, this objection does not mean thatproceduralrules are irrelevant;indeed,they stillmakeup the core of any discur-sive theory of democracy,butonly as oneof several necessaryconditions of com-munication.To give them any strongerjustificatoryweight would eliminate theneed fordiscourse tself.Ifprocedural ndformalconditions were all that were re-quiredfor a democraticconsensus, thendialogue and discussion would not beneeded. Like the Kantianagent, a singlespeaker could anticipate the results ofsuch a constraineddiscourse.Proceduralcorrectnesscan thereforenever have thesame role in democracy hat truth has inscience.Unlikescience,which is a form ofpublic justificationbasedon groundsthatdo not haveto do directlywiththe discus-sion itself and how it is conducted, poli-tics is doublyself-reflective.As BenjaminBarberpoints out, it is itself a political,not a theoretical, question as to whatpolitics even is (Barber1984, 154). Thisdoublereflexivitydoes not, however,ex-cludethepossibilitythat theconditionsofdiscourseandcommunicationan takeona normativerole. Rather, f politicsis notto become arbitrary, these conditionsmustregulate,and cannotdetermine, heformation of beliefs and desires n politi-cal discourse.

If we look more closely at Habermas'own descriptionof legitimacy,he clearlyindicatesthat he is not a pure proce-duralistwhen he uses thephraseappropri-ately interpreted,generalizable nterests.

Whatmakesan interpretation appropri-ate must be that it fulfills certaincogni-tive, as well as formal, conditions. It isalso important hat it be an explicit nter-pretation of an interest or a need ormotive. Such conditions, however,should not be too strongor specific,as isoften the case in pure proceduralistandliberal theories of democracy. Proce-duralist theories typically use variousdevices, rangingfrom the veil of ignor-ance to impartiality,in order to con-strainthe types of needsand desiresthatcan be expressed n democraticdiscourse.It may be possibleto interpretHabermas'phrase n the sameway or to construe heideal speech situation as just such adevice, and some critics have done so(Walzer1987, 10). The problemis onceagain that such proceduralist onstraintson content would restrictthe scope ofdemocracy and decide in advance whatthe process of public discussion will beandthe typeof needor desire hatmaybedecidedupon. This is exactlythe modelofliberal democracythat BruceAckermandevelops as constrainedconversationunder the limits of neutrality.Neutrality,Ackermanargues, is necessary becausepoliticaltalkis aboutpower.At thesametime, however, he admits that thebreadth of exclusionit requires s quiteobvious (Ackerman 1980, 10-11).Understooddiscursively,neutrality s toostrong a constrainton self-expressionndemocraticdiscourse.Itwouldreduce hescope of political conversationto emptyformal rules or to issues about whichthere is alreadywidespreadagreement fnot unanimity.Against liberal heories, Habermasgives a broaderaccountof cognitive con-tent.No interest,no need,andno desire sexcludedin advance so long as partici-pantsare willingto subjectthemto whathe calls post-conventionalmoral justifi-cation and public reinterpretation.Ratherthan using norms of discourseasexclusionaryprinciples, as liberals like

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DemocraticTheoryRawlsor Ackermando, Habermas' ogni-tive, postconventional conditions ofdemocraticdiscourse erve only to specifythe class of reasonsand motives that canformthe basisof a processof reachingra-tionalagreements.Partof giving a postconventional usti-fication requiresthat these interests andneeds must be formed post factum,throughthe processof communication t-self. Otherwise, the proceduralist fallsinto the dilemma Walzer constructs tocriticizeHabermas: ither he discussion sso limited as to make dialogue super-fluous or-if one may say anything atall-the results may turn out to be quiteundemocraticand even immoral(Walzer1987, 11). Habermas scapes hefirsthornof the dilemmasince he neitheremploys apure proceduralistprinciple like Rawlsnor employs an exclusionary principlelike Ackerman. But the noncognitivist,relativistictheory of democracy cannotescape the other horn, as is the case withBenjaminBarber's onception of strongdemocratic talk. For Barber, strongdemocracy s supposed o transform on-flict and disagreementsnto cooperationand agreement.But this is to be doneunder the basic epistemic condition ofpolitics: the absence of an independentground Barber1984, 129). TheproblemwithBarber's roposal s that this absencethreatensdemocraticpracticewith arbi-trariness,since it has no epistemicbasis.Withoutcriteria or norms, any de factoresolutionof conflict or emergingagree-ment would count as democratic, nomatter how distorted or ideological.Habermasescapes this problem by ap-pealingto cognitivestandardsof postcon-ventionalinterpretation ndjustification:the requirementof subjectingone's ownneedsand desiresto postconventionaln-terpretationmeans that only the needsand desires that can be justifiedpubliclymay be adopted. This cognitive require-ment admits a wide range of needs anddesiresand does not exclude even self-

interest n advance.WhenGeusssaysthatHabermasso constrainscommunicationthat it may only dealwith thoseopinionsalready destinedto converge, he missesthe point. Priorto the discoursethereisno factof thematter. As fordemocraticdiscussion'spermittingstrange and im-moralresults,thisobjectionmisconstruesthe political purpose of a normativetheory of democracy, which no moreassures that actual democraticpracticeyields just results than a theory of truthwill guaranteethat all of our statementswill be true. Thus, the alternative o thetwo horns of Walzer'sdilemma (proce-duralismor anythinggoes) is a normativetheoryof democraticdiscourseservingtoarticulatea regulativeideal for commu-nication n collectivedecisionmakingandnot excludingor determining ny needordesire n advance.Postconventional,cognitiveconditionsnot only resolve the dilemmasand prob-lemsof proceduralparadoxesbut also theintractabledifficulties of trying to orderfixed, incommensuratepreference rank-ings, somethingArrow showedto be im-possible. Problemsof rankingdiversesetsof preferencesand conceptions of thegood canbe solvedonly if participationndemocraticdiscourse s an activeprocessof forming one's will and judgments nrelation to others. As Habermasputs it,distinguishinghis view explicitly fromRousseaubut also implicitly romRawls,Discursivelyedeemable orms orgener-alizable nterestshave a non-conventionalcore; they are neither empiricallygivennor simply posited;ratherthey are in anon-contingent way, formed and dis-covered Habermas 975,175).Thus,theproblemof democracy s not how to findsome optimal solution or standardrulefor ranking incommensurate values.Rather,democracy s the politicalmeansof forming a postconventionalidentitywhere everyone affected by a decisionmust be able to participate n the agree-ment. In so doing, participantschange

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 84their beliefsand desiresand formtheirwill,seethevalidity fthe mplied orms,and thereby begin to transform heirneedsanddesiresn lightof them.Mansbridge'sasestudiesof participa-tory democraticnstitutions eveal justsucha processn free andopendecisionmakingMansbridge983,163-82).HereAckerman'sonstraint n participantsnneutral ialogue-namely, hattheymaynot assertthat theirconception f thegood is superioro thatof their fellowcitizens-is too weak: t wouldminimizerevision o suchan extent hatunder uchcognitiveconditions, hanges n beliefsanddesireshrough ractical iscourse fthe sortMansbridgeeportswouldbe im-possible. Barber's strong democratictalk s also too weak, sinceparticipantsare eftwithno clear pistemologicalasisforpublicattemptso convince thersofthe correctness f judgments bout thevariouspossibilitiesor cooperation ndagreement.Buteventheaddition f cognitive on-ditions s not enough.Thereare at leasttwo furtheronditionsordemocratic illformation hat areonlyhintedat in thephrase appropriately interpretedinter-estsbut that arenonethelessmplicitnHabermas' ormative iew of communi-cation.First, hetypeof issueunder on-sideration eeds o be specified:s it onecapableof consensus r one for whichcompromise s the only possibility?Second-andperhapshisis a subcondi-tion undercognitiveaspectsof democ-racy-the communicationn democraticdeliberation ustnot beideologicallyis-torted.Bothof theseconditionsmustbespelledout furtherf a fullycommunica-tive interpretation of participatorydemocracys to dealwith all theaspectsof thehistoricalxperiencef the imits odemocracy.Evenwithhisformal ndessentiallyn-dividualisticoncepts,Rousseau lreadyrecognizedhat not everything an bedecidedby the generalwill. For Haber-

mas, the point is not-as it was for Rous-seau-to separate the general will fromthe will of all but to decidewhich issuescan and cannot be settled in a consensualmanner. There are certain imitationsonpracticaldiscourse hat are not present ntheoreticaldiscourse,since participantsnit are involved actors, not just reflectivespeakers. Failing consensus, however,participants in democraticcommunica-tion canstill seek compromises; nd theirproductionmay be the purpose of manydiscursive, participatory institutions.Even hen,thecourseof public nteractionis not to be left to strategy and conflict.Consensus s not the only formof demo-cratic agreement.But becauseof the con-straints on strategy and conflict, it doesseem that consensusand compromiseex-haust the possible forms of democraticagreement. In democracy, the issue athand mustbe decided n sucha way thatageneral will is formed.In theoreticaldis-courses, other forms of agreementarepossibleshortof a generalwill. As is oftenthe case in science, problemsand claimsmay remain suspended.However, in apractical discourse, if we agree only todisagree, no common will is formed,problems and conflicts remain unre-solved, and politicaldiscourse ails.Institutions riented o compromise analso be designeddiscursively. Compro-misesmay be formedthroughmediationand negotiation, not just by balancingpower or tradingoff unresolvedprivateinterests (Dryzek 1987). Compromises,too, can be democratic ndundemocratic,rationalandirrational,arrivedatby forceor by argument. Their communicativeconditionsarejustas rigorous,havingtodo with the creation of conditions ofequal power, especially in relation toagenda settingand turntaking. First,theissueat hand must be concernedwith in-terestsand needs that aregenuinelynon-consensual.Second,theremustbe an in-stitutionally secured effectiveness ofagreements, o that the processof reach-

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ing a compromise tself is not only for-mally legitimatebut actuallycarriedout.Third,self-interestalone would not sup-ply a secure-enoughcognitive basis forthe sortof sustained ommunicativenter-actionthatmakes up the settingfor mostacts of bargainingand negotiating.It isobviousthat the appealto the necessityofcompromisedoes not remove either thedecision or the decision-makingprocessfrom democratic criteria. Nor shouldcompromisebe seen as final, in that theoutcomescould unintentionally ndangerthepossibilityof further onsensus orma-tion. In a democracy,agreement eemstobe more desirablethan compromiseandbargaining,at least as a goal or a regula-tive ideal,althougha varietyof discursiveinstitutions or conflictresolution,media-tion, and negotiation are necessaryforproblemsolvingand the formationof ac-ceptableagreements.Ifthese constraints xhaustedhe condi-tionsfor democraticagreements,t wouldstill not be entirely possible to escapeproblemsof the tyrannyof majoritiesandof emptyformalism;nor could we makesense out of Habermas'own criticismofmerely formal democracy n Legitima-tion Crisis(1973,36-37). The fourthandfinal conditionfor democraticcommuni-cation is that it be free of ideology, thatthe process of deliberationbe uncon-strained by restrictionsand causalinflu-encesof whichparticipantsn democraticinstitutionsmaynot befullyaware.Inop-position to Daniel Bell, Habermasbelievesthatdemocracydoesnot rule outideology any more than sciencedoes; infact, like science,democracycreatesnewpossibilities orideology,as Marxpointedout. Traditionalheoriesof ideologyhavefocused on truthcontent, definingideol-ogy in termsof actors' alse beliefsabouttheirsociety.Suchtheoriesrequire trongcausal explanations hat are often so en-compassingas to involve the theoryin aself-referentialcontradiction(as in thecase of the reductionof cognitiveclaims

to interests).But what is really explana-tory in such theories s not so much whatthey show about the content of such abelief as how the beliefaffectssocialrela-tionshipsin society. Despite the institu-tion of various reflectiveforms of dis-course,the social processof communica-tion withinactual nstitutionsmay still beaffectedby relationsof power and domi-nationin society. Suchinfluencesncludebarriersand restrictionsconnectedwithgender, class, social structure,and rela-tions of power, all of which may under-mine theconditions or the successof suchpublicpracticesof justification nd agree-ment. The potentialfor ideology in suchpracticess seeninthefact thatboth scien-tific theories and democraticdecisionsmaybe fully correct n thatthey passpro-ceduraltests of verificationor the actualagreementof all those involved-and yetbe ideological because those tests andagreementswere conductedundercondi-tions thatrestricted ommunicationn therelevantscientificand politicaldiscoursecommunities. f this is true,reflectivepar-ticipantsmust make use of social-scien-tific explanatorytheories to create testsfor distortedcommunication, hat is,explanations hat test for restrictionsandbarriersaffectingdecisionsand outcomesand limitingthe full participationof all.One role that the critiqueof ideologycanplay in a normative heoryof democracyis to explainwhy democracy s as limitedas it is in contemporary ociety, despitethe cognitive achievementsof postcon-ventional attitudesand the institutionalachievementsof universal suffrage andthe ruleof law.

Ideology and DemocracyIn the classicalMarxisttradition, thediscussionof ideologyanddemocracyhasbeenlimitedby thequite-narrowcopeofthedefinitionsof bothconcepts.InMarx-ism, as in much of recent iberalpolitical

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theory, democracy is usually identifiedwith Western, liberal, capitalistinstitu-tions. Ideology,too, is oftenconceivedofin termsof a specific,historical form ofideology, the religious-metaphysicalworldviews that lost theirsocial integra-tive force in early modernity. It is themirrorimage of this conceptual map ofMarxism hatallows a theorist ikeDanielBell to speakof the end of ideology' indemocracyand science even while bothpracticescontinue to have greatideologi-cal potential.This potential is found in the fact thatappeals to the results of both practicesmay undertake he sameideological unc-tion of justifyingsocialpractices hat ap-pealsto religionandmetaphysics ormer-ly filled. Forexample,underpresentcon-ditions of an administrativetate, claimsabout scientificrationalitymay becomejustificationsor certainpoliticalarrange-ments of powerrelations,as in thecaseoftechnocraticnterventions.The socialuseof scientific ruthmay bring abouta con-fusion between theoreticaland practicaldiscourses and their forms of validity.Ideological unctionscan betaken overbyappeals to democracyitself, as when aresult s justified implyby the fact thatitfollowed a certainrule. Similarly,withinexisting democraticinstitutions, restric-tions on communicationmay occur de-spite the existenceof proper procedures.

Take, for example,the treatmentof inter-ests within a processof democraticdeci-sion making. Often a consensusmay bereachedon thepresupposition f a widelyshared,common nterest hat doesnot ex-ist. Sucha consensusmay be a false oneandmerelyencode relationsof powerun-thematizedby the discourse.Conversely,in some institutionalsettings, the rules,proceduresand styles of discussionmaysimply presupposethat interestsalwaysconflict and thus inhibitthe formationofstrongforms of agreement. tmay alsobethe case that due to social circumstancesof restrictedinformation or expressive

capacity, some participantsdo not yetknow their own interestsand needs.Inallthese cases, suchdemocracies estrictanddistort communicationwithin their insti-tutions, despitethe achievementof someformof public,reflective ustification.Ofcourse, the absenceof distortionsdoesnotguarantee he truth or correctnessof theresults of such practices, which mustundergocontinuous self-testingand revi-sion. Ingeneral he absenceof ideologyis,however, a necessary-but-not-sufficientcondition for the validityof the resultsofa discursivepractice.Unlike the case ofscience,the self-reflectivity f any practi-cal discourse makes it impossible to berightfor the wrong reasons.If Bell and others are wrong, what,then, is the relation between ideologyand democracy? Here, too, Habermas'own writings are not entirely helpfulsince,for various reasons,he hasfailedtodevelop a theoryof ideologyas distortedcommunication.Seen n the framework fHabermas' heory of communicativeac-tion, it is clear that they should stand ascontrast classes. For Habermas, bothideology and democracy refer to proc-esses and structuresof communicationwithinmodem societies.According o thenormativetheory developed in the pre-cedingsection,democracyrefers o an in-stitutionalizedprocessof communicationin a society,throughwhichmemberspub-licly deliberateand arriveat bindingcol-lective decisions. Ideology, by contrast,restrictsor limits socialprocessesof com-munication by structuresof dominationor power. Such distortionscertainlycanaffect both the conditions under whichdiscourses akeplaceandtheprocessesofcommunicationwithin them. The theoryof ideologythereforeanalyzestheways inwhich linguistic-symbolicmeanings areused to encode, produce, and reproducerelationsof powerand domination,mostsignificantlywithin institutionalspheresof communicationand interaction.Typically,sociallydistortedcommuni-

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Democratic Theorycation is also systematic, hatis, partici-pants may not be awareof the restrictionsin communication in their societies(Habermas 970, 205-18). This is particu-larly apparent n democratic nstitutionsthat aresupposed o be freeandopen.Itisprecisely within these institutions, how-ever, that restrictions n communicationundermine he very possibilityof collec-tive self-determination.The theory ofideology, then, must analyze the varietyof dimensionsin which communicationcan be systematicallyrestricted,down tothe details of interactionwithin the insti-tution-such aswho participates ndwhocounts, how they participateand deliber-ate, and why certainissuesmay or maynot be discussedor decided upon. Anylimits not strictlyrelated o conditions orreasoned public discussion distort theprocess of communicationand can skewthe decisionsreachedby suchdiscussion.Such barriers o rationalagreement ndi-cate the presenceof ideologyin a democ-racy. The critiqueof ideology, therefore,does not deny the positive achievementsof democraciesn institutionalizingormsof communication elated o practicaldis-course;but it strives to push them in thedirection of even more democracy. Itcould be argued hatthecritiqueof ideol-ogy is an integralpartof democratic om-munication tself, so that its institutionalform may be correctedaccordingto in-sights into its own limitations.Withoutsuch self-criticalreflection, democraciescould not learn;and practicaldiscoursescould not reflecton the communitywidebiases that occur in the structuresandconditions of institutionalized ommuni-cation. Self-correctionpermits greaterdemocracyand problem solving as self-correction n the sciencespermitsgreatertruthandefficiency.

If ideology and democracy can berelated n thisway, it would be fruitful odevelopa systematic et of all thepossibleideologicaldistortionsand restrictions npractical discourses. Generally, Haber-

mas has had a limitedmodel of distortedcommunication, as speech involving anunavowedstrategic ntention. As he putsit, all distortionin communication canbe seen as the resultof the confusion ofaction oriented to understanding nd ac-tion orientedto success,of strategicandcommunicativeaction (1984,373). Sucha limitedconceptwould not very easilyfulfilltheempiricalpurposeof uncoveringthe full range of possible restrictions ncommunication n practicaldiscourses.Aspeaker's intention will not bear thisdescriptiveweight, even in the case ofself-expression.Thenonavowabilityof anintentionmakesit particularlyunsuitableeven for describinga speaker'sown un-consciouslimits on self-expression, incethey do not always involve such confu-sions in any obviousway. Theinability oexpressa need or desire can distortcom-municationas much as unavowed strate-gic intentions.Herethe formalapparatusof the theory of communicationcan beputto a usefulempiricalpurposeand savethe theory from Habermas' limiteddescription.According o most theoriesof commu-nication from Biihler to Jakobson toHabermas, ommunication ccurs nvari-ous typesof acts, eachreflectinga differ-ent social functionof the use of symbolicmedia ikelanguage.Symbolicmediamaybe usedto constitutesocialinteraction, oexpress ntentionsanddesires,or to repre-sent states of affairs in the world. Whilethe theoreticalunderpinningsf suchdis-tinctions n pragmatics re stillessentiallydisputed, there is, nonetheless, wide-spreadagreementhat a descriptively de-quate theory must account for at leastthese three functionsof communication:interaction,expression, and representa-tion. Using these descriptivedistinctionsas our heuristicguide, we can developasystematic account of ideology as dis-torted communication n each of thesedimensions Bohman1986).I will confinemyselfhere to discussinga few such dis-

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American Political Science Review Vol. 84tortionsn thepractical iscoursehat isdemocracy ndshow how recent ocial-scientificriticisms f democraticnstitu-tionscanbeaccountedor in thisgeneralframework.If democracys definedas an institu-tionalized form of communicationthrough which actors determine themeans,ends,andrulesof theirassocia-tion,thefirstplace o look for distortionsis in themostdirect ffectsof poweranddominationon interactions eading todecisionmaking.Muchof classical emo-cratic heory,particularlyhat of Rous-seau, is concernedwith the conditionsunderwhich his nteractionan ssue nageneral ill n collectiveelf-determina-tion. Theseconditions an be translatedinto communication-theoreticerms. Ingeneral,deological arriers n practicaldiscourse estrictacts of self-expressionandmutualunderstandingy undermin-ingtheconditions f their uccess;heydothis by usingconsensualmeans o estab-lish, justify,and reproduce elationsofdominationn a manner onsistentwithdemocratic rocedures.deologythere-forerestrictsommunicationnd nterac-tion nordero produce he effectof con-sensuswherenone canbe produced is-cursivelyexceptby forceor self-decep-tion.Let me furtherspecifythis abstractcharacterizationy layingout conditionsof communicationn democraciesmoreprecisely.Often, proceduralndformalaspects f the nstitutionaletting f com-municationre in further eedof demo-cratization. orexample, ertainnstitu-tionalarrangementsake effectivepar-ticipation f thoseaffectedby a decisionimpossible,not merelypracticallybutbecause he institution ails to createaframeworkn which all have an equalchance o be heardandto affect he deci-sion. This reductionof the scope ofdemocracyanoftenbe done tructurally,rather hanby mere orce.One way to limit such scope is to

remove eydecisionsrom hedemocraticprocess,oftenat theagenda-settingevelbeforediscourse as everbegun.Baratzand Bachrachhave pointed out howbureaucraticrganizations ithindemo-cratic politiesundermineonditionsofdemocracy y filtering ssuesout of thedecisionmakingprocess.This mobiliza-tion of bias esultsnanondecision,hatis, in thesuccessfulxclusion f a wholerange fpossibilitieshatmightotherwisebe rationalbut challenge he existingsocialstructuresndrelationsof power(BachrachndBaratz 970,39-51). Ifanissueordemands preventedromreach-ingthepublicarena ordiscussion,herehas beena successful ondecision.Non-decisionsunctiono distort ommunica-tionbydisallowingegitimateonflict ndcreating pseudoconsensus.ll thismaybedone n termsof theexistingesourcesof the political-legalystems-throughnorms,rules,andprinciples, s well asthroughhe useof noneffectivearticipa-tion like publichearingsafterthe fact(Edelman967,57). BachrachndBaratzgosofaras to asserthatmostpublicpol-icy decisions nvolvenondecisions.Forexample,Bachrachand Bergmanhaveanalyzed he bias of population ontrolpolicies towardtechnologicalnterven-tions n thefertility ateand found hemto be hardlythe most efficientway ofloweringpopulation rowth 1973,7-8).Rather,heprevailingolicy s a strategymore consistentwithbureaucraticnter-ventionand with the moreprimary oalof preservingxisting elations f powerthanof redistributingealthor life op-portunities.Thus,not only do nondeci-sionsviolate ormalconditions f demo-cratic participation, hey also revealseriousdeologicaliasesonthecognitivelevel, leading o the repeatedailureofnondemocraticnstitutionso solve basicsocialproblemsand to understandnddistributenformation.tmaywellbethatnondecisionsrethefocusof conflicts e-tweenbureaucraticnddemocraticrga-

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DemocraticTheorynizations.Socialmovementsoften try toturnnondecisions nto decisionsby usingthe public sphere in a noninstitutionalway. In such cases political institutionsneed to be expandedby extrainstitutionalmeans, since the institutionsthemselvesrevealconsistent tructural iases.Buttherole of ideologycritiques alwaysto showthat somemechanismof reflective,directpublicdeliberationcan take the place ofundetectedstructural imits and therebyshowthatdemocracycan be increased.Ageneralform of democraticchangeis thereopeningof decisionsmade in closedin-stitutional discourses by using theresourcesof themore-open,publicsphereof communication. This proceduremayeven increasethe problem-solving apac-ities of political institutions (Dryzek1987).Itmay alsobe true thatonce a con-sensus s reached,the delegationof its ex-ecutionto expertsandadministratorsmaybe effective, subject o thecontinuedexis-tenceof an already-establishedndwide-ly sharedgeneralizablenterest.Whilenondecisionsprovide a good ex-ampleof criticismsnternal o theprocessof communicationanddeliberationtself,externaland materialconditionscan alsoinfluenceandrestrictcommunication ndconsensus ormation.Rousseauremarkedlong ago that enormous inequalitiesofwealthandstatusmakethe generalwillimpossible.Here,too, the same is trueofgenuine consensus. If participantsenterinto the practicaldiscourseof democracywith large-scale nequalities,the difficul-ties of reachingconsensusand the neces-sity for ideologyincreasen proportion othe degreeof inequality.As many criticshave pointed out, capitalismand patri-archyareinconsistentwith democracy nthat both organizesocietyin radically n-egalitarianways, down to structuresandpatternsof communication.RobertDahl'srecentcriticismsof economicinequalitiesshow how they createpolitical inequal-itiesamong citizens(Dahl1985,54-55). Itis important to note that inequalities

themselves re not ideologicalbut thattheyproducedeologicalestrictionsnddistortionsnprocessesfcommunicationandtheiroutcomesn a varietyof ways.As the classicalcritique of ideologyshows, hey end oinstrumentalizeoliti-cal institutions y making hemtakeonextrapolitical, conomicfunctions,thepoliciesof whichconsistentlyervethepurposeand long-termnterestsof spe-cific,privilegedroups.Evenmoredirectly,nequalitiesffecttheabilities ndcompetences ithwhichpeopleenterpublicdiscussionnddelib-eration.BasilBernstein'sritings nclassdifferences elatedto speakingoffer agood exampleof how publicdiscoursetypically equireshe elaborated odesof privilegedgroups (Bernstein 967).Suchdifferencesncodesmaybecomehebasis orasymmetriesn effective xpres-sionandtheexclusion f somefrom ullandadequatearticipationnapublicdiscourse.By constitutingherangeof dis-courseavailableo speakers, codes rethe resultof theway socialrelationshipsactselectivelyo delimitwhat s saidandwho says t. To showhowdifferencesncodesreflectand maintain ocialstruc-tures,Bernstein xamined he differentmodesof expressionf lowerandupperclasses.He discoveredhatthe languageuse of theupper lasses ended o be lessindexical ndmoreuniversal, s wellasmore exically ndgrammaticallylabor-ate.Whether rnotthisparticularxam-pleis empiricallyorrect,t is easy to seehow sucha differenceouldgiverisetodifferencesn effectiveparticipationnpracticaldiscoursesand to structuralassumptionsbouthowonetakeson therole of an expressive peaker.Hence,codesmayembodynoninstitutional,re-discursive arrierso self-expressionorthosewhodiffer n competence,tylesofexpression,ocabulary,ndeven,in thecase of multilingualocieties,the verylanguagepoken.Under heseconditions f communica-

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tion, a purelyprocedural, liberal otionof democracy, based on majorityrule,ends up privilegingmembersof genders,strata,and classeswho knowwhat theywant andhow to get it (Offe1985,295).The acquisitionand exerciseof certainpolitically significant competences andabilities surely requiresprior access tosocial goods. The lack of any effectivemeansof participation ndself-expressionhas a stabilizingeffect on relations ofdominationn democracies, incethe onlyway to develophigher-orderommunica-tive and social abilities s alreadyto par-ticipate in public discourse. Distortedcommunication n democraciesputs thepowerlessin a double bind. Democraticjusticerequiresnot justprocedurally or-rect communicationbut also egalitarianstandardswith regardto the conditionsand socialgoods necessary or the devel-opmentand exerciseof expressivesocialcompetences.Publiceducation s only thebeginning,since it may only reproducethesesame nequalities f competenceandexpression.In democratic societies, reproduciblepatternsof dominationrequirethat thedominatedgroupremain narticulate,hatits needsrarelyand ineffectivelybecomethemesof publicdiscourse.For he sakeofsomeequalityof self-expression, certaindegreeof both materialwelfareandcom-monly possessedsocialgoods is necessaryif every citizenis to developcommunica-tive and expressiveabilities. Poverty byitself is exclusionary in a democraticsociety, since it not only inhibits thedevelopmentof complexsocial andcogni-tive abilitiesbut excludespeoplefromin-formation,opportunities, ndexperiencessharedby many. Educationalnstitutionsshould thus be more clearlyorientedtodemocraticgoals of effective citizenship,like the development of capacities ofpublic self-expressionand sharedunder-standing. Teaching autonomous andauthentic elf-expressions a difficult askunderany conditions;and it is a potential

settingfor furtherdistorted communica-tion, as vanguard theories of politicalchange have long demonstrated. ndeed,such education s a political act that, if itis not itself to become a form of domina-tion by the educators, must be under-taken under the same conditions of willformationas democracy n general.Here Habermas' emphasis on newsocial movementscan be placed within abroad understandingof the educativeeffects of participation, somethingemphasizedby many within the radicaldemocratic radition.Such effects ncludenot only the development of abilitiesrelated to self-organizationbut also theacquiringof a wide range of discursivelyformed interests, ideals, and norms.Manyof the social movements oday arecitizens' initiatives, insofar as theyemerge as subinstitutional associationsbased on shared nterestsandideals, oftenwith the political goal of demandinggreater participation of citizens in thedecision-making rocessesof the state. Ademocratic ocietyshouldfoster the con-ditions necessary for the formation ofsuchgroups,sinceit is only in the contextof suchassociationsthat citizensdevelopthe skills and experiencesnecessaryfordemocraticwill formation. Such organi-zationsalsoprovidea much-neededpacefor experimentation nd innovation, forwhat Habermascalls social learning.Opposition to such groups is typicallygreatest romthenondemocratically rga-nized institutionsthey oppose, such asbureaucratic and capitalist enterprises.Exceptwhen sanctionedby generalizableinterests,such institutions are the mainbarrier to the continual expansion ofdemocratic institutional structuresthroughacts of democraticcommunica-tion within the subinstitutionalpublicsphere.Finally, there are also ideologicaldis-tortions of democratic communicationdue to false beliefs about the nature ofdemocracyitself. These beliefsare ideo-

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Democratic Theory

logical not only in being false but also infunctioningso as to restrictcommunica-tion in democratic nstitutions.Given theenormous inequalities in contemporaryWestern ocieties,it is not surprising hatbeliefs about democracy n them tend tobe highly ideological. Indeed, the pre-dominant interpretationof democracyboth in popular culture and in muchpolitical science is noncognitivistandeconomic ratherthan rational and politi-cal. WilliamRiker, for example, arguesthat participatoryor populist oncep-tions of democracyareincoherent.Basedon rationalchoicetreatments f theprob-lems of collective action and decision,Rikershowsthat no procedureor rule foraggregatingpreferences ould arriveat aconsistent or nonarbitraryset of out-comesor decisionsfor all distributions fpreferences Riker1982, 36). If this is true,no popularwill can ever be found, sincefor any suchprocedure hereexistdemon-strable paradoxes and inconsistencies.The result s thatpracticalquestions,suchas moral and politicaldecisions,are notrationally decidable or subjectto reflec-tive tests.On thisview, democracy s nota discursivepracticeof publicdeliberationbut rather s concernedwith institutionalways of aggregatingfundamentallyun-changeableand nonrationalpreferences.Democracy s seen in the modelof votingrather handiscussingorparticipatingnacollectiveprocess;Arrow's heorem eemseven to lend mathematicalupportto theimpossibilityof furtherdemocratization,sincetherecan be no optimalor even con-sistentorderingof random,given, prefer-encerankings.WhileI do not in any way disputethevalidityof Arrow's nsight nto the possi-bilities of preferenceaggregation,I ques-tion Riker'snterpretation f theseresultsas demonstratinghe impossibilityof col-lective, democratic decisions. All thatRiker has shown is the incoherenceof aproceduralistheory of democracycom-bined with eLnotivism bout norms and

values. To be coherent, a conception ofdemocracy as collective will formationmust be cognitivist, that is, one orientedto normative tandards f correctness ndnot to the simplebelief that theopinionof the people must be right Riker1982,14). Rather,needs andpreferences re notperse valid or invalidbut must be formedthrough the process of public discussionand interpretationof them. The initialopinionorpreference f the majority-oreven of all-may turnout to be incorrect.Democraticdiscussionought to be guidedby idealpreferences nd ideal consensus,which makesany given agreement, venifunanimous, subjectto the criticismof abetter and more adequateinterpretationand judgmentshould one emergeout offurtherpublicdebate and deliberation.Acognitivist, normativetheory of partici-patorydemocracywould not be incoher-ent in Riker'smodel, even though theoutcomes of different discussions mayvary according o differencesn informa-tion, self-knowledge,and competenceofparticipants.The ideologicalcharacterofRiker'sargumentsbecomes clear in thatthey provide the basis of limiting thescope of democratic institutions. Sincedemocracy is a self-reflectivepractice,beliefsaboutthepractice tselfhave a con-stitutive role and affecthow it is carriedout. Hence,the self-interpretationf par-ticipants is yet another example of theideological potential of democracy, nomatterhow well structuredts institutionsor how well formulated its procedures.The truth of civicrepublican iews ofpolitical nstitutionss theirrecognitionofjust this active role of citizens and theirself-interpretations.The problemwith such noncognitivistinterpretationsof democracyis not justtheir theoretical one-sidedness. Rather,such beliefs become ideological by howthey are used to justify restrictionsondemocraticparticipation,particularlyheestablishmentof leadershipelites. Rikeruses rational choice theories reduction-

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AmericanPolitical ScienceReview Vol. 84isticallyn this way to justifyvotingasavetoto leadershiplites atherhanasoneway to expressjudgmentsabout thecourseof commonpubliclife. Becausedemocratic nstitutionsand leadershipcannotbe rationallyustified,heyare n-stead nvestedwitha civil-religioushar-acter. Loyaltyis based on some non-rationaldentificationikenationalismr,failing hat, self-interest,owthat legiti-macy s no longer onceivablen terms fthe intrinsic haracterf the institutionsthemselves.Onthismodel,politicaldeci-sion makings confined o voting,as aveto to nondemocraticecisions ndas ameans of engenderingmass loyalty-whileactualdecisions re madeby tech-nocraticelites (Schumpeter950;Riker1982,243).Politics tselfbecomespurelysymbolicritual or spectacle(Edelman1988,111).Whilebothrequire articipa-tion,no longer s an effectiveprocessofpracticaldecisionmakingsubjected oreflective, ationalcontrol.Under heseconditions,democracys pure deology,unrelatedo thepracticalourseof sociallife and thedistributionf power.

ConclusionThis reconstruction f a normativetheory of democracy, inked with atheoryof ideology,has shown hepoliti-calsignificancef someof Habermas'e-cent work,aswellas a wayout of sometroubling roblems f proceduralismndpolitical ationality.ucha systematice-interpretation oes well beyond thetheories f KantandRousseaunspecify-ing a basic set of conditions or validdemocraticgreements.heemphasis ncommunicationrovidesa fruitfulwayfordemocraticheory o incorporatehecritique f ideology,nowconstrueds a

means of self-reflectionnd self-correc-tionofcommunicationnpoliticalnstitu-tions.As a whole,Habermas'escriptionofcommunicationmplies conceptionfthe publicsphereas an ever-expanding

space for social learning,criticism, andautonomy-all of which may now bedefinedcollectively as well as individual-ly. While its particular orms may varyaccording to social and historical condi-tions, democracy n this senseis a neces-sary political componentof a free socialorder.Evengranting he limitationsof histori-cal circumstances, the conception ofdemocracy argued for using a theory ofcommunicationmust ultimatelybe radi-cally participatory. For Habermas,democracymarksone of the basic thresh-olds of social evolution and is at least oneof the necessary conditions of humanemancipation.It is still an open questionwhether thesestrongconditionsfor com-munication n practicaldiscoursescan beadequately institutionalized.Some havearguedthat the demand for participationis inherently mpractical, hat the demandfor moredemocracy eadsto social insta-bility. Under present circumstances,par-ticipation is destabilizing,in that it isinconsistentwith the unequaldistributionof power that now exists. One can, how-ever, easily imagine a future society inwhich participation and communicationare self-sustaining. f adequateparticipa-tion is made the centralcriterionof legiti-macy, it will have the oppositeeffect inthe future to that which it has today: itwill further ts own empiricalconditionsof possibility by cultivating the veryrational attitudes and critical abilitiesnecessary or it to exist. The morea soci-ety is based on participation,he better tsmembers are able to rule themselves.Problemsof complexityandnumbers,nothuman irrationality, are the strongestpractical objection to pursuing radicaldemocracy under contemporarycondi-tions. Habermashimselftakes theseprob-lemsvery seriously,often to the point ofalmost Weberianpolitical pessimisminrecent political essays. However, com-plexity may be an even greaterlimit tonondemocratic institutions, which lack

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DemocraticTheorytheresourcesof competentandmotivatedcitizens.Whatever herealpractical imitscomplexity places on the process ofdemocratization,heycannotbe setin ad-vance but can only be discoveredexperi-mentally hroughsociallearning n demo-craticinstitutionsthemselves. Until theselimitsarereached, hegoal of a democrat-ic theory is moredemocracy.Suchexpan-sion is possiblein modem democracysolong as citizensfind in thepublicsphereadiscursivespace for criticism, learning,andnew forms of association hatcan testthe limits of theirpolitical nstitutionsandbeliefs.

NoteI wouldlike to thankBillCaspary,BufordFarris,and Thomas McCarthy for helpful suggestions,manyof which wereincorporated.

ReferencesAckerman,Bruce.1980. SocialJustice n theLiberalState. New Haven: YaleUniversityPress.Bachrach,Peter, and MortonBaratz.1970. PowerandPoverty.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Bachrach,Peter, and ElihuBergman.1973. Powerand Choice.Lexington:LexingtonBooks.Ball, Terence. 1988. TransformingPolitical Dig-course. London:Basil Blackwell.Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.Baynes,Kenneth.N.d. TheLiberal/Communitar-ian Controversy and CommunicativeEthics.

Philosophyand SocialCriticism.Forthcoming.

Bernstein, Basil. 1967. Class, Codes, Control.London:Routledge& KeganPaul.Bernstein,Richard.1983. BeyondObjectivism ndRelativism.Philadelphia:Universityof Pennsyl-vania Press.Bohman, James. 1986. 'Tormal PragmaticsandSocial Criticism. Philosophy and Social Crit-icism11:332-52.Dahl, Robert.1985.A Preface o EconomicDemnoc-racy. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.Dryzek, John. 1987. DiscursiveDesigns:CriticalTheory and Political Institutions. AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience31:656-79.Edelman,Murray.1967.TheSymbolicUsesof Poli-tics. Urbana:Universityof IllinoisPress.Edelman,Murray.1988. Constructinghe PoliticalSpectacle.Chicago:University f ChicagoPress.Habermas, Jiirgen. 1961. Strukturwandel derOffentlichkeit.Darmstadt:Luchterhand erlag.Habermas,Jurgen.1970. Systematically istortedCommunication. nquiry13:205-18.Habermas,Jiirgen.1975. Postscripto KnowledgeandHumanInterests. hilosophyof the SocialSciences3:157-89.Habermas,Jurgen.1978. Communication nd theEvolutionof Society. Boston:Beacon.Habermas, iirgen.1984. Theoryof CommunicativeAction. Vol. 1. Boston:Beacon.Mansbridge, ane.1983.BeyondAdversaryDemoc-racy. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.Mead, GeorgeHerbert.1934. On Social Psychol-ogy. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.Offe, Claus. 1985. DisorganizedCapitalism.Cam-bridge:MITPress.Riker,William.1982. Liberalism gainstPopulism:A Confrontation etween he Theoryof Democ-racyand the Theoryof Social Choice.San Fran-cisco:W. H. Freeman.Schumpeter,Joseph. 1950. Capitalism,Socialism,and Democracy.New York:Harper& Row.Walzer, Michael. 1987. Interpretation nd Social

Criticism.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.

JamesF.Bohman s AssistantProfessorof Philosophy, St. LouisUniversity,St. Louis,MO 63103.

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