democratic theory and public opinion

8/11/2019 Democratic Theory and Public Opinion

1/19

merican ssociation for Public Opinion Research

Democratic Theory and Public OpinionAuthor(s): Bernard BerelsonSource: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1952), pp. 313-330Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion

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2/19

emocratic

Theory

n d

u b l i c

pinion

BY BERNARDBERELSON

Public

opinion

research has sometimes

been

neglectful

of both

the

political

content of

its

data and the

extent

to which

it could

vitalize

the

theory

of democratic

politics.

In

this,

his

Presidential Address before

the

seventh annual convention of the

American

Association

for

Public

Opinion

Research,

Ber-

nard Berelsonrestatesthe

fundamental

require-

ments of a

democratic

politic

and

points

out

how

opinion

research can

help

a

democracy

to

know

itself,

evaluate

its

achievements,

and

bring

its

practices

more

nearly

in

accord

with

its own fundamental

ideals.

Mr.

Berelson's interest in

this

topic

has

de-

veloped

out

of,

and is

expressed n,

the Elmira

study

of

opinion

formation

during

the

Presi-

dential

campaign

of

1948.

In the

preparation

of this

paper,

he has benefited from discussions

with Edward

Shils,

his

former

colleague

at

the

University

of

Chicago,

and

from

his

reading

of Mr.

Shils'

manuscript

on

Consensus

and

Liberty:

The Social and

Psychological

Condi-

tions

of

Political

Democracy.

At

present,

Mr. Berelson

is Director of the

Behavioral

Sciences Division of

the Ford Foun-

dation.

THE fieldof

publicopinion

research as had a numberof intellectual

godparents.

sychologists

ave contributed heir

experience

with

atti-

tude and

intelligence

ests

and

measurements,

s

well as

substantive

concepts

and

propositions.

ociologists

ave

providedexperience

with

field

and

community

tudies

and

ideas about

social structure nd the

place

of

opinion

within

it.

Market

research

has

developed

new

tech-

niques

and furnished

a

variety

of

practical

problems

on

which to

try

them.

The

statisticians

ave workedon such

problems

s

sampling

and

scaling.

But

my subject

s the claim of

political

heory

o contributeo

the character

f

public opinion

research.

It

would be

too

much to

say

that it

has

played

no

role

thus

far.

For

a

good many

years

he

political

scientists

ave been

discussing

he

natureof

public

opinion

and the role

it

plays

in

the

political

process.

But

somehow,

n recent

years,

we have tendedto overlook

he related

facts that there is

a

political

content

n

what we call

public opinion;

that thereexists

a

long

and

elegant

ntellectual

radition

in

the

form

of

the

political

heory

of

democracy)

or

dealing

with

opinion

prob-

lems;

and

that

this

theory

provides

helpful

framework

or

the

organi-

zation and

conduct

of

opinion

studies.The normative

heory

of

polit-

ical

democracy

makes

certain

requirements

f

the

citizen and

certain

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3/19

PUBLIC OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL 1952

assumptions

bout

his

capacity

to

meet

them. The tools of

social

research ave made it possible, or the first time, to determinewith

reasonable

recision

and

objectivity

he extent

to which the

practice

of

politics

by

the citizens

of a

democratic tate

conforms

o

the

require-

ments

and the

assumptions

f

the

theory

of democratic

olitics (insofar

as

it refers o decisions

by

the

electorate).

The

closer

collaboration f

political

heorists

and

opinion

researchers

hould contribute ew

prob-

lems,

new

categories,

nd

greater

refinementand

elaboration o

both

sides.

The theorists ell us how a democratic lectorates supposed o

behave

and

we

public opinion

researchers

laim

to

know

something

about

how the democratic

electorate

n

this

country

actually

does

behave.

The task

I

have

taken

on

myself

s

figuratively

o

confront he

one

with the other.

Such an

analysis

should

be

useful

not

only

in

organizing

the

results of

opinion

studies in terms

of

an

important

body

of

theory,

but

also

in

revealingneglected

and

promising

areas

for

further

nvestigation.

bespeak

he interestof both theorists

and

researchersn extending,refining,and, in general,improvingthis

formulation.

For

even on

the

basis

of

my

preliminary

xploration,

am

convinced hat each

side has

a

good

deal

to

learn from

the other

and that

joint

work on this common

problem

can be valuableboth

for

socialscienceand for

public

policy.

Such

collaboration,

ike most

cross-disciplinary

ork,

is

not

easy,

but

it is

necessary

ince neither side

can

solve

the

problem

alone.

In

this

connection,

he deficienciesof

the

present

formulation

on

the

theoretical ide will be

particularly

lear

o

the

political

heorist;

can

only

hope

that

the

representation

f

theory,

drawnas

it is

from

a

variety

of

sources,

has

not been

caricatured,

nd that

the theorists

will

them-

selvesundertake he indicatedcorrections.

What,

then,

does

democratic

olitical

heory

assume

or

require

of

the

democratic

itizen,

and

to what extent

are

the

assumptions

r

re-

quirements

ealized?There

are a number

of

ways

of

identifying

and

classifying he requirements, ependingupon which politicalphiloso-

phers

are

given

primary

onsideration.t has seemed

most

appropriate

in

this

preliminary

nalysis

o

present

a

composite

et

of

requirements,

even

though

they

may

overlap

at

various

points

and

thus not

present

a

coherent

ystem.

While

not

all

of them

may

be

required

n

any single

3I4



4/19

DEMOCRATIC

THEORY

AND

PUBLIC OPINION

political

heory

of

democracy,

ll

of them are

mentioned

n

one

or

another heory.

THE

PREREQUISITES

OF

ELECTORATE

DECISIONS

There

appear

o

be

two

requirements

n

democratic

heory

which

refer

primarily

o characteristics

emanded

of the electorate

as it ini-

tially

comesto make a

political

decision.These are the

preconditions

for

electorate ecisions.

The first is

the

possession

of a suitable

personality

structure:

within

a

range

of

variations,

he electorate

s

required

o

possess

he

types

of

character

which

can

operate

effectively,

f

not

efficiently,

n

a

free

society.

Certain

kinds of

personality

tructures

re

not

congenial

to a

democratic

ociety,

ould

not

operate

uccessfully

within

it,

and would

be

destructive

f democratic alues.Othersare more

compatible

with

or even

disposed

oward he

effective

performance

f the

various oles

which

make

up

the democratic

political

system.Among

the

charac-

teristics

equired-and

this

is

not

intended

as

anything

more

than an

illustrative

ist-are a

capacity

or

involvement

n

situations

remote

from

one's

ace-to-face

xperience; capacity

o

accept

moral

responsi-

bility

or

choices;

a

capacity

o

accept

rustration

n

political

affairswith

equanimity;

elf-control nd self-restraints

reins

upon

the

gross

opera-

tion

of

self-interest;

nice

balance

between

ubmissiveness

nd assertive-

ness;

a

reasonable mount of freedomfrom

anxiety

so

that

political

affairscan

be attended

o;

a

healthy

and

criticalattitude

toward

au-

thority;

a

capacity

or

fairly

broad

and

comprehensive

dentifications;

fairlygoodmeasure f self-esteem; nda senseof potency.

The distribution f

such

personality

haracteristics

n the

popula-

tion,

let

alone

their

relationship

o

political

behavior,

s

not

known.

What is more or less

known

is

only

a

beginning

of

the

problem.

We

know,

for

example,

hat

contrary

o

common

belief

the incidence

of

psychosis

as

not increased

n

this

country

overthe

past century

Gold-

hamer and

Marshall);

on

this

score,

at

least,

we

are not less

capable

than

past

generations

f

governing

ourselves.

We

know that

the

au-

thoritarian ersonalitys associatedwith socialprejudice ndrestrictive

politics

(the Berkeleystudy

of

Adorno,

Frenkel-Brunswick,

t

al.);

that neuroticismimits attention o

political

matters

(Elmira

study);

thata wide

discrepancy

etween

aspiration

nd achievement

eadssome

persons

o

over-aggressive

cts

against

the

political

environmentand

3IS



5/19

3I6

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

lowers their

respect

for

political

leaders

(Bettelheim

and

Janowitz);

thatthe democraticcharacter s more flexible and adaptablethan the

authoritarian

haracter

(Lewin

and

Lippitt).

There

is a

great

deal of work

to

be done

on this

problem;

and

it

is

here

particularly

that

the

psychologists

can

make

an

important

con-

tribution to

the

study

of

political

behavior. The influence of

character

on

political

democracy

has been

perceived

n

general

terms

by

a

number

of

theorists,

and

some

psychologists

and

sociologists

have

begun

to

work on

the

topic.

The

dependence

of

democratic

processes upon

the

democraticcharacter seems clear in general, but the nature of this

relationship

has been

only

slightly

documented

in

the

literature.

With-

out

doubt,

a

sympathetic

and

imaginative

study

of the literature of

democratic

theory

will

generate

many important

hypotheses

for em-

pirical

investigation.

The second

requirement

is

not

only

a

prerequisite

but

also

an

out-

come

of

electorate

decisions. This

is

the factor

of

interest

and

partici-

pation

the electorate

is

required

to

possess

a certain

degree

of

involve-

ment in the process of political decision, to take an appropriateshare

of

responsibility.

Political

democracy requires

a

fairly strong

and

fairly

continuous level of interest from

a

minority,

and from

a

larger body

of

the

citizenry

a

moderate-to-mild

and

discontinuous interest

but with

a

stable

readiness to

respond

in

critical

political

situations. Political

dis-

interest

or

apathy

is not

permitted,

or

at least not

approved.

Here

the

descriptive

documentation

provided

by

opinion

studies

is

relatively

good.

The

amount of

political

interest

in

the

community,

its

fluctuations

through

time, its incidence

among

various

population

groups,

its causes and

its

consequences-on

all these

topics

we have

reasonably systematic

data.

Less

than one-third

of

the

electorate

is

really

interested

in

politics,

and that

group

is

by

no means

a cross-

section

of

the total electorate.

The

more

interested

people

are

more

likely

to affect

others

and

thus

to

exercise a

greater

influence

upon

the

outcome of

elections.

The

decreasing

political

interest

in the

population,

viewed

with

alarm

by

some

people

who

are distressed

by

the fact that

a

smaller

proportion

of

eligible

people

vote now

than

did

fifty years

ago,

1

Included here

is

acceptance

of the

political

sphere

as one

of the

legitimate

elements

of social

life.

In a

democratic

society

the

political

sphere

must not be

widely

viewed

as unclean

or

degraded

or

corrupt.

Opinion

studies have

produced

some data

on

the

image

of

politics

and

of

politicians among

the

citizenry.



6/19

DEMOCRATIC

THEORY AND

PUBLIC OPINION

is to someextent

due to the

increasing eeling

people

have

that

they

areimpotent o affectpoliticalmatters n the face of the complexity

and

magnitude

f

the issues.

Participation

n the

actualelection

s

not

only

segmental

but

also

partial;

f

everybody ligible

to vote

actually

did

vote,

he distribution

f

support

n recent

nationalelectionswould

have been

measurably

ifferent.

Finally,

interest

s not a

simple

uni-

dimensional

actor.

A recent

analysis

dentified hreekinds of

interest:

spectator

nterest

(regarding

he

campaign

as

a dramatic

spectacle);

citizen nterest

deciding

how

to

vote);

and

partisan

nterest

securing

the electionof one's own candidate).Of these, only the second is

pure

nterest

according

o some

theorists.

The

majorquestion

raised

by

this

requirement,

oth for

political

theory

ndfor

opinion

research,

s

the fundamental

ne of

its universal-

ity

and

ntensity.

People

have

alwaysargued

whether

he

vote is

a

duty

or

a

privilege,

and

there

have

always

been

advocates f

an

unlimited

and

continuous

equirement

f interest.

As

early

as the Atheniande-

mocracy

t

was said that

we

regard

a man who takes no interest

n

publicaffairsnot as a harmlessbut as a uselesscharacter. ut is he

really

so

useless

o

the

operation

of

democracy?

ome

recenttheorists

andstudies

ave

suggested

hat

a

sizable

group

of less

nterested itizens

is

desirable

s a cushion o absorb

he intenseaction

of

highly

moti-

vated

partisans.

or

the

fact is that the

highly

interested re

the most

partisan

nd

the least

changeable.

f

everyone

n

the

community

were

highly

and

continuously

nterested,

he

possibilities

of

compromise

and

of

gradual

solution

of

politicalproblems

might

well be

lessened

tothepointof danger. t is an historical xiomthatdemocracyequires

a middleclass

or its

proper

operation.

Perhaps

what

it

really

requires

is a

body

of

moderately

nd

discontinuously

nterested itizenswithin

and

across

ocial

classes,

whose

approval

f

or

at least

acquiescence

n

political

policies

must

be

secured.

THE COMPONENTS OF ELECTORATE

DECISIONS

The

political

heory

of

democracy

lso

makes

requirements

egard-

ing the components f electoratedecisions; hatis, the contentof the

decision.

The

first

requirement

of

electorate

decisions is

the

possession

of

information

and

knowledge;

the

electorate must

be

informed

about

the mattersunder consideration.nformation

efers

to

isolated

317



7/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL 1952

facts and

knowledge

to

general propositions;

both of them

provide

reliablensight nto the consequencesf the decision.This is a require-

ment

nearly

everyone

etsdown for a democratic

lectorate;

oliticians

and

statesmen,

dult

educators,

ournalists,

rofessors

f

political

sci-

ence-all

of them

pay

deference o

the

need

for

enlightened

ublic

opinion.

This is another actoron

which

opinion

researchersave assembled

a

good

deal

of

data.

What

do

they

show? One

persistent

onclusion

s

that the

public

is

not

particularly

well

informed

about the

specific

issuesof the day.A recentsurveyof the current tatusof American

publicopinion

states hat testsof information

nvariably

how at least

twenty

per

centof the

public

otally

uninformed

and

usually

he

figure

is

closer o

forty

per

cent).

And at

that,

most of the

studieshave been

based

upon

simple

and

isolated

questions

of fact

(i.e.,

information)

and

only

seldom,

f

at

all,

upon

the historicaland

general

propositions

(i.e., knowledge)

which underlie

political

decisions.

Perhaps

he

pro-

portion

of

the

knowledgeable

would

be

even lowerthan

the

proportion

of the informed.At the sametime,it mustbe recognized hat there s

a

significant

middle

ground-a

kind of

vaguelyperceived

mpression

which reveals to the

possessor

certain

relationships

which

are

very

real o

him,

which

form

reasonable ases for

his

decision,

yet

which cannotbe

explicitly

articulated

y

him in

any

detail.

An

obvious

example

is

the

difference

between the

Republican

and

Democratic

parties,

a difference isibleto

many

partisans

f

both.

Thus it often

appears

hat

people

express

opinions

on

issues

when

they seemto know very little about them. Lack of informationmay

be

a bar to the

holding

of an

opinion

n

the

minds

of the

theorists

but

it

does

not seem to

be

among

the

electorate

where,

of

course,

t is

not

experienced

as lack

of

informationat

all).

In

most

campaigns,

whether

political

or

informational,

he

people

best

informed

on

the

issue are the ones

least

likely

to

change

their

minds. Much

of this

represents

ttitudinal

tability;

ome

of it

may

represent

igidity.

Information

nd

knowledge

are

required

of

the

electorate

n the

assumption hat they contribute o the wisdom of the decision;in-

formed

citizens

make

wiserdecisions. n this

country

t is clear

hat the

better-educated

eople

are

the

best

informedand

most

knowledgeable,

yet

it

is also clearthat

othervariables re involved

n

the

development

of

wise

decisions,

e.g., flexibility

of

predispositions,

wide

range

of

3I8



8/19

DEMOCRATIC THEORY

AND

PUBLIC

OPINION

identifications,

a

low

level of

aggressiveness,

etc.

Finally,

it

appears

frommost studiesthat informationand knowledge are sought and used

more often

as rationalization and

reinforcer than as data

to

be used

in

making

what

might

be called a

free

decision.

The

requirement

thus does not

seem

to be

met

in

any

direct

way.

But

this

is

really

an

oversimplified

statement of the

requirement.

How

can an

electoratebe

expected

to

be informed

on

the

wide

range

of

issues

which

confront

the modern

public?

For

example,

the

front

page

of

The

New

York

Times

for one

day

alone

recently

contained

stories

on

the following events, in each of which is embedded an issue on which

the

public

might

be

expected

to inform

itself:

price ceilings,

the

Korean

war and

the

British

position

in

it,

the

American

defense

build-

up,

Communist

riots

in

France,

the Berlin

crisis,

a new disarmament

proposal,

American

military

aid to

France,

official Soviet

spies

in

this

country,

and

the

Mutual

Security

Aid Bill.

Clearly

there is

too little

time for

simply getting

the relevant

information,

let

alone

digesting

it

into

a

generalized

system

of

political

opinions.

Actually

the

major

de-

cisions the ordinarycitizen is called upon to make in a modern repre-

sentative

democracy

involve

basic

simplifications

which

need

not

rest

upon

a

wide

range

of

information

so

long

as

they

are

based

upon

a

certainamount

of

crucial

information,

reasonably

nterpreted.

After

all,

the voter's

effective choice

is

limited;

he can vote

Republican,

he

can

vote

Democratic,

or

he can

refrain

from

voting,

and

becoming

in-

formed

on

a

number

of

minor issues

usually

does not

tip

the

scales

against

the

weight

of the

few

things

that

really

matter-employment,

social

security,

the

cost

of

living, peace.

If

the

theoretical

requirement

s

full information

and

knowledge,

then

democratic

practice

does

not

conform.

But for some

theorists

the

requirement

is

more

differentiated

than

that.

Representative

govern-

ment with

large-scale

political

organization

does

not

require

that

everyone

be

equally

informed

on

everything

all

the time. To such

a

differentiated

standard,

actual

practice

may

conform

reasonably

well.

Opinion studies should not only document this requirement,but

also

refine

their

inquiries

into

the actual

ways

in which information

and

knowledge

are

held and used

by

the citizen

in his vote decision.

At

the

same

time,

theorists

should

differentiate

and elaborate

their

conceptions

of

the

intellectual

requirements

for a democratic

citizenry.

3I9



9/19

PUBLIC OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

The

second

component

required

of

decisions

s

the

possession

of

principle;he electorates requiredo possessa bodyof stablepolitical

principle

or moral

standards,

n

contrastwith

fluctuating

mpulses

or

whims,

to

which

topical

questions

can be referred

or evaluation

and

decision.

Such

principles

are

of

two kinds. In

the first

place,

there

are

the

principles

which

refer

o

democratic

rocedures

as

distinguished

rom

the contentof

democratic

ecisions)

and on

them

there

must

be con-

sensus.

Everyone,

or

nearly everyone,

must

agree

on

the

rules

of

the

politicalgameand accept hem in advanceof the controversyo that

they

will

obtain even in defeat.

Among

such

principles

are the

rules

thatviolence

must

not

be

involved

n

the

making

of electoral

decisions;

that the

majority

decisionmust be

accepted

as

final in

any

particular

instance,

until

legitimately

appealed

o

a

court,

a

legislative

body,

or

the

citizenry;

that the

citizen must have

due

respect

or

constituted

authority;

hat

the

citizen must share

respect

with other

parts

of the

community

and

thus be

ready

for

politicalcompromise.

ew data

on

suchquestionshave beencollected n opinionstudies,perhapsbecause

their wide observance

eems so

obvious.

It

would

be instructive o

describemore

precisely

he

citizenry's

mage

of

desirableand actual

processes

f

democracy

nd

to

analyze

he

factors

responsible

or

it.

The other

kind

of

principle

refers

to

the

substantivebases

of

political

decisions-the

underlying

moral

or

political

ends in

terms

of

which

particular

ssues are

determined

at

particular

imes.

Just

what

they

are for different

parts

of the

population

s

difficult o

say

in the

absenceof more systematic esearchdevotedto this purpose.At this

time,

however,

it

would seem

at

least

likely

that the same

avowed

principles

underlie

political

positions

at

every

point

on the continuum

from

left

to

right.

Full

employment,

a

high

standard

of

living,

free-

dom,

a better

life

for

one's

children,

peace-these

are the

types

of

answers

we have

now,

and

we

get

them

from

persons

of

every

political

persuasion.

ow

this is not

so

empty

as

it

sounds.

Democratic

heorists

have

pointed

out

what

is

often

overlooked

ecause

oo

visible,

namely,

that an effectivedemocracymust rest upon a body of politicaland

moral

consensus.

f

splits

n the

population

re too

sharp

or too

great,

democratic

rocesses

annotbe

maintained

ecause f

actual,

hreatened,

or

suspected

onflict

among

partisans.

n this

circumstance,

seeming

consensus

which

is

accepted

t

its

facevalue is far better han no

con-

320



10/19

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PUBLIC

OPINION

sensus-and a

seeming

consensus s sometimesreflected

n

loyalty

to

thesamesymbols venthoughthey carrydifferentmeanings.A sense

of

homogeneity

s

often an

efficient

ubstitute or the

fact

of

homo-

geneity.

Thus it is not an

empty

assertion

o

say

that the

role

of

sub-

stantive

rinciples-like

that

of some information-is both to rational-

ize

andto

guide

the

choice

simultaneously.

ationalization as

a

social

function,

oo.

What

this

means, hen,

is that

the selection

of means

to

reach

agreed-upon

nds

is more

likely

to divide

the electorate han the

selection

f the ends

themselves.

At the sametime, however, he principlesmust be applicableo

current

political

life.

Political decisions

made

today

in

the

light

of

principles

which

support

or

oppose

he

major

social

reforms

dentified

as

the New

Deal or the welfare

tate are

relevant.But decisions

made

simply

in

conformity

o

an historical

regional

loyalty

or

to

a

primary

roup

oyalty

areof dubious

elevance;

nd

thosemade

only

in

conformity

o an ancestral

oyalty

or

a

religious oyalty

are of

no rele-

vance

at all. When

theorists

insist that

public

decisions

in

a

democracy

must be baseduponprincipleand doctrine, hey mean principleand

doctrine

which

can

confront

and

cope

with

the

major

problems

of

the

age.

Yet

the

studies

how that

a

large

proportion

f the

party

vote

today

is

by

this

test

unprincipled.

If

it is

nothing

more,

hen,

the

requirement

f

principle

or

doctrine

means hat

the electorate

must

genuinely

accept

he

procedures

ndrules

involved

n

democratic

rocesses,

hat

t

must

at leastshare he

symbols

describing

he substantive

nds to

which

political

action

s

directed

and

intermsof whichit is justified, nd that t mustmakepoliticaldecisions

on

the basis

of relevant

tandards.

he firsttwo

requirements

re

met

to a

greater

xtent

than

the third.

THE

PROCESS

OF

ELECTORATE

DECISION

The third

set

of

essentials

n democratic

heory

refers

o the

process

by

which

decisions

remade.Here thereseem

to be three

requirements.

The

first

of

the

requirement

elatesto the

process

of

perception

of which informationand knowledgeare the end products.This is

the

requirement

f accurate

observation;

he

electorate

s

required

o

perceive

political

realities

clearly

and

objectively,

with an absence

or

only

a

small

amount

of

subjective

istortion.

t

is difficult

ndeed

to

see

life

steadily

nd

see t

whole,

and

n

politics

clarity

of

perception

s made

32I



11/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL 1952

doubly

hard on the

one

hand

by

the

predispositional

trength

which

the citizenbrings o thematterand,on theother,by thedeliberate nd

in

many

cases

inevitable

ambiguity

which

the

political

eader

brings

there.

There

is

no need

to

labor this

point.

Walter

Lippmann

made

a

reputation

or

himself

thirty yearsago by

elaborating

he

differences

between

he world outside

and the

pictures

n

our

heads.

For the

most

part,

he

said,

we

do

not

first

see and then

define,

we definefirst

and

then see. Recent studies

provide

some

documentation

which

refines his generalobservation.According o data from the Elmira

study,

not

only

is the

citizen's

mage

of the candidate nd

the

campaign

subject

o the

influenceof

preconception,

ut

so

is

his view of

group

support

or

the

candidates nd even

of

the candidates'tand

on

political

issues.Given

just

a

minimumof

ambiguity

o work with-and

that is

usually

available-people

tend to think their candidate

agrees

with

them,

or

at least

they manage

not

to

know

where he

stands on the

particular

ssue

when

they

stand

on

the other side. The

stronger

he

partyaffiliation,he greater he misperception.

The

consequences

f such

misperception

re

nteresting

o

speculate

about.

It

seems

to

decrease he tension within

the individualsince it

enableshim

to

bring

his

opinions

nto an

internal

consistency

without

disturbing

is

basic

position.

At the

same

time,

it increases

he internal

solidarity

f

the

parties

and thus increases

olitical

ensionwithin

the

community

by

seeming

to

sharpen

he differences etween

he

parties,

particularly

nder

the

stressof

a

political campaign.

Thus

political

perceptions by no meanssimplya matterof concreteobservation;t

also involves

protective

coloration rom a

total

position.

And

hence,

that

democratic

heory

which

assumes

larity

and

objectivity

f

political

perception

must

be

qualified

at the outset.

The second

mportant

equirement

f democratic

rocess

s

com-

munication

and

discussion;

he electorate s

required

to

engage

in

discussion

nd communication n

political

affairs.

Democratic ecision-

making requires

ree

examination

of

political

ideas,

and

this

means

discussion.Democratic itizensaresupposedo listen to theirpolitical

leaders

arguing

with

one

another,

o

listen to

them

when

they

speak

directly

o the

electorate,

o talk

back

to

them,

and to

discuss

among

themselves

he

public

issues of the

day.

According

to

many

modern

theorists,

his

requirement

tandsat the

heart

of

the

democratic

rocess.

322



12/19

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PUBLIC OPINION

Above

all,

if

it

is

to

be true to its own

peculiar

nature,

democracy

must

enlist the

effective

thought

of the whole

community

in

the

operation

of

discussion.

Now

here

again,

as in

the

case

of

information,

public

opinion

researchershave assembled a

sizable

body

of

data,

not

only

on

the

amount

and

kind

of

communication and discussion

within the com-

munity

but

also on

the

conditions under

which it

takes

place.

The

overall

picture presented by

the

opinion

studies looks

something

like

this:

There

is

a

20

per

cent nucleus

of

people

who are

active

and

regular

politicaldiscussants,

another

group

of

25

per

cent

who

engage

in

politi-

cal discussion on

occasion,

another

25

per

cent

who

are

activated

into

discussion

only

by

dramatic

political

events,

and

a

residual

group

of

25

or

30

per

cent who

do

not

engage

in

political

discussion

at

all. Fur-

thermore,

t

is

particulargroups

within

the

community

that

give

most

attention to

politics:

the

better-educated,

the

men,

the

joiners -in

short,

those

groups

most

subject

to

social

pressure

translated into

expectations

of how our kind of

people

should

behave

in

this

respect.

And the people who read and listen to political content in the mass

media

also

talk

and listen

to

other

people,

and thus the concentration

of

political

communication

and

discussion

is

carried one

step

further.

To

complete

the

picture

we

need

to

ask two other

questions

which

together

bring

into consideration another

aspect

of this

requirement.

Democratic citizens

are

required

not

simply

to discuss

politics,

but to

discuss

political

alternatives in

a

genuine

effort to

clarify

and

refine

public

policy.

The

first

question

is,

Who talks to

whom? ,

and the

answer is that people mostly discuss politics with other people like

themselves- like

in such characteristics

s social

position,

occupation,

and attitude.

Mainly

this

goes

on

inside

the

family,

but even outside

it

there is

a clear

tendency

for

political

discussions

to

be carried

out

intra- rather

than inter-social

groups.

The

second

question

is,

What

do

they

see

and hear

and

talk about? The broad answer

is,

What

pleases

them ;

i.e.,

what

is

congenial

to

their own

point

of view.

People

usually

read

and listen

to their own

side.

In

person-to-person

discus-

sion of politics, about a third or more of the talk centers upon topics

not

directly

involving

political

preferences-for

example,

predictions

of and

arguments

about

who will

win an

election-and the

remainder

consists

overwhelmingly

of

exchange

of

mutually

agreeable

remarks.

What

this

all means-and

this

is

clearly

documented-is

that the

people

323



13/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

who do

the most

reading

and

listening

and

talking

are

the

people

who

change heirmindsthe least.Lowell did not sayit firstbut he saidit

well: To

a

great

extent,

people

hear what

they

want to hear

and

see

what

they

want to see.

They

associate

y

preference

with

people

who

think

as

they

do,

enter

freely

into

conversation

with

them,

and

avoid

with others

opics

that are

controversial,

rritating

or

unpleasant.

This

is

not

less true

of what

they

read.

To

most

people,

that

which

runs

counter

o their

ideas

s

disagreeable,

nd

sought only

from

a

senseof

duty.

In summary, hen, genuinepoliticaldiscussion-not acrimonious

argumentation

n

the

one

hand or mutual

admiration

or

right

think-

ing

on the

other,

but free

and

open

discussion

devotedto

finding

a

solution o a

problem

through

the clarification nd

modificationof

views-this

is not marked

by

its

magnitude.

Perhaps

t is naiveto

point

this out once

more;

perhaps

t is naive to

require

t in the first

place.

We

cannot

nquire

here

into

what

the

requirement

f

discussion an

really

mean in

a modern

democracy;

whether

self-interested

rgument

is improper,whethergenuinediscussiongoes on a different evel in

the

politicalprocess.

But

certainly

democratic

practice

does

not con-

form

fully

to the

requirements

f

some

theorists:

The

person

or

party

formulating

political principles

or

policies

in

advanceof

discussion,

and

refusing

o

compromise

nder

any

circumstances;

r

settling

such

principles

r

policies

before he

process

of

discussion s

completed

and

refusing

o

compromise

urther;

renders

discussion farce in

the first

place,

and in the

second,

imits

its

usefulness.

The thirdrequirement nderprocess s rationality;he electorate

is

required

o

exercise ational

udgment

n

political

decisions.

Philosophers

nd

economists till talk

professionally

bout

rational

behavior,

ut

sociologists

ever

really

used

the

concept,

psychologists

have

given

it

up,

and

political

scientists eem

to

be

in

process

of

doing

so.

The

problem

of

giving

the term

a

clear

meaning

acceptable

o

others s

partly responsible

or this

state

of affairs.

The

term,

says

a

recentwriter

on rational

conduct,

has

enjoyed

a

long

history

which

hasbequeathedo it a legacyof ambiguity ndconfusion.... Any man

may

be excusedwhen

he

is

puzzled

by

the

question

how he

ought

to

use

the word

and in

particular

ow

he

ought

to use it in relation

to

human

conduct

and

to

politics.

The

difficulty,

f

course,

s

not

that there

is

no

reasonably

lear

324



14/19

DEMOCRATIC

THEORY

AND PUBLIC

OPINION

definition

or the

term

but that there

are several

definitions

describing

several ifferent inds of rationality.Andtheconformity f democratic

practice

aries

with

eachdefinition.Let us review

a

few

major

meanings

and

their

relationship

o democratic

practice.

n the

first

place,

we

may distinguish

between the rational

decision

as

outcomeand

the

rational ecisionas

process.

n

the former

case

we

speak

of

rationality

as

equivalent

o a

right

decision.This

assumes hat

there s one

right

answer o

everyproblem,

and that the

power

of

reason

can

arrive

at

truths

f

policy

which

should

be

evident o

all-all,

that

is,

except

hose

ruledbyprejudice r emotion.When this is not simplya euphemism

for

describing

ecisions f

which

we

approve,

t

presumably

efers o

a

decision aken n

conformity

with

an estimate f desirable

nds

(it

thus

assumes

a valid

analysis

of

whose interest

lies

where)

and also in

conformity

with

a

correctestimateof

which

means

will

achievethe

given

ends.

If

we

leave

determination

f self-interest

p

to the

individ-

ual

involved,

hen

virtually

all electorate

decisionsare rational

by

this

definition;

f

we leave it

up

to

the

objective

bserver hen

the

pro-

portionwill vary arbitrarilywith his estimateof the presentsituation

and the

future.

Even in

philosophy,

his

meaning

appears

o

be

so

ambiguous

hat

t is difficult o

see

how

we

can

design

empirical

esearch

to

test

the extent

of

its

observance

y

the

electorate.

If we

take

rationality

s

referring

o

the

process

f decision-a more

likely

definition-then

various

possibilities

re

available.One

meaning

requires

a

certain

ndependence

f the rational

process

rom the

in-

fluence

f

predispositionsroadly

defined.Here

rationality

ecomes

he

freedecision -free from coerciveimposition;free from blinding

institutional

oyalties;

free from

personalposition

(such

as

class

or

race);

free from

passions

and

impulses;

ree,

in

short,

from

any

dis-

torting

or

distracting

pressures

which

prevent

clear observation

nd

calm,

soberreflection.Here the

term refers o

logical,

syllogistic

atio-

cination.

But

this seems

to

be

an

impractical,

ntenable,

undesirable,

and

quite

unreasonable

efinition;

t takes the

content

heart

out of

politics

and leaves

the

voter

with

no

real

basis on which

to

evaluate

politicalproposals. ythisstandard, tleast n itsextremeversion,here

are

almostno rationalvoters.As

a social

philosopher ays,

individuals

who

on

their

own

initiative

orm or

change

their

fundamental

beliefs

through

genuine

critical eflection

re

so

rare

that

they

may

be

classed

as abnormal.

325



15/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

A

second

meaning

of

rationality

s

close

to,

if

not identical

with,

our

requirement

f

informationand

knowledge:

the

voter should

be

awareof the

correctstate of

public

affairs

at the

present

and

of

the

reasonable

onsequences

f

alternative

roposals

or

action.

By

this

definition

someonewho

made

up

his

political

mind on

the basis

of

ends

for which

there are no

present

means of

attainmentwould be

making

a

non-rational

ecision,

and

so would the

person

whose

esti-

mates

of

the

present

ituation r of

the

futurewere

wrong.

Also

by

this

meaning

the

voter

should

be

capable

of

indicating

some

relevant

grounds or his decision,and most voterscancite suchgrounds.Here

we meet the

difficult

question

of

rationalization,

s

against

rationality,

but we can

suggest

a

partial

answer.

Rationality

s

limited

by

the

indi-

vidual's

ncapacity

o

dealwith

the

real

world

n

all its

complexity,

o it

must allow for the

legitimacy

of

dealing

with

simplified

models

of

reality.

n

politics,

he

voter

may

really

ecide

on the basis

of one

or

two

issues

which

are

dominant or

him

(for

example,peace

or the

New

Deal)

and use

other ssues

as

reinforcing

ationalizations

for example,

the militarybackground f a candidateor corruptionn the Federal

administration).

A

third

definition

requires

he

presence

of

convincibility

r

open-

mindedness n

consideration f

political

ssues.This

does not

require

the

citizen to

change

his mind

but

only

to

be

genuinely open

to

a

change

of

mind. Here

the

time

involved

seemscrucial. f

this

means,

for

example,

hat the

citizen

should

be

open-minded

etween

June

and

November

of

an

election

year,

then

probably

ewer than

half

the

electorates rational,and veryfew indeedin the Southand partsof

New

England.

f it

includes

he four

years

of

a

presidential

dministra-

tion or the natural

history

of

a

major

political

ssue,

from birth

in

controversy

o

death

n

near-unanimity,

hen the

figure

would become

quite

higher.

It

is hard

for

the researcher

o be more

specific

because

f

the

difficulty

of

determining ust

when

genuine

consideration,

s

against

ationalization,

oes

on.

Still

another

meaning

of

rationality

as

process

requires

hat the

decisionbe made in a state of low psychictension;that is, that the

decisionnot

be an emotional ne but

be

marked

by

a certainamountof

detachment

and freedom

from

passion.

This

poses

a nice

democratic

dilemma;

the

people

most rational

by

this

definition

are the

people

least nterested

n the

politicalprocess

nd

least

nvolved

n

its outcome.

326



16/19

DEMOCRATIC

THEORY

AND

PUBLIC

OPINION

The more

nterested

eople

are the

more

emotional,

n

this

sense,

and

the

least

detached; hey

are the ones

who ascribe

mportant

conse-

quences

o the outcome

of

the

decision

and

thus

find

enough

psychic

energy

o

be active

about

the matter.Here

the

rational

voter

is

the

independent

oter,

hat

is,

the

one

without

sufficient

nterestor invest-

ment n the election

o

get

excitedabout t.

Still

other

meanings

are available.

There

is

the

meaning

n which

rationality

efers to the

presence

of

deliberately

irected

behavior o

consciously

ormulated

purposes.

Here

again,

almost all voters

could

qualify.There

is

the meaning

in

which rationality efers

to a

choice

of

behavior

hat

is

optimal

in some

sense,

and this

definition

can

be

readily

satisfiedon

the

grounds

of

a

subjective

optimum

if

nothing

more.

There s the

meaning

n

which

a rational

decision

s

a self-con-

sistent

decision.

There

are

undoubtedly

ther

meanings.

If

it

is not

easy

to

say

what

is

meant

by

a rational

decision,

t

is

somewhat

asier o

say

what is not meant

by

it. A

rationaldecision

s

not a

capricious

ecision,

or

an

impulsive

one,

or

an

unprincipled

ne,

or a decision uidedbycustomor habitortradition r sentimentalone.

But

the

central

problem

s

to

relate the demandof

rationality

o

the

analysis

of

decision-making

n

terms

of such

sociopsychological

on-

cepts

as

the reference

group;

that

is,

to

see the rationaldecision

as

imbedded n

a

social contextwhich

limits

it at the same

time

that it

gives

it

politicalmeaning.

While the

types

of

rationality

re

not

easy

to

defineandwhile

they

are

certainly

ever

present

n a

pure

or extreme

form,

they

can be isolated

empirically,

clarified,

and

investigated

as

to

their frequency,their functions, and their preconditions.

THE OUTCOME

OF

ELECTORATE

DECISIONS

Finally,

there

is one basic

requirement

which

might

be

included

under

the need

for

principle

but

which

seems

to

deserve

independent

treatment

in view

of

its central

importance

with

reference to

the

out-

come of the decision.

This

is

the

requirement

of

community

interest;

the

electorate

s

supposed

to come to

political

decisions on

consideration

of the common good ratherthan, or in addition to, self-interest.

In

several formulations

of

democratic

theory,

the

electorate is

required

to devote

thought

to what

is

good

for

the

community

as a

whole instead

of

relying

exclusively upon

calculation

of

what

is

good

for

oneself

or

one's

own

group.

The

classical formulation

comes from

327



17/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

John

Stuart Mill:

In

any

political

election

. . .

the

voter is under an

absolutemoral

obligation

to

consider

the interests of

the

public,

not his

private

advantage,

and

give

his

vote,

to

the best of

his

judgment, exactly

as

he

would

be

bound to

do

if he were the sole

voter,

and

the

election

depended upon

him alone.

Now here

again

the

problem

of

definition

is

a

central

one.

How

is the researcherto

distinguish

between

honest

conclusion

and forced

rationalization,

as

in

the

slogan,

What's

good

for me

is

good

for the

country ?

How

distinguish

the immediate

and

apparent

interest

from the ultimate and real interest ? Does self-interest

refer

only

to

the criterion

of

direct

self-gain

or to that

of

benefit

to one's

group

or

class,

and

over what

period

of time? Does

community

interest refer

to

agreement

on

procedures,

or

to an outside

criterion

(and

if

so,

what),

or to

the residual decision

after the various self-interests

have balanced

themselves

out,

or

to

genuine

concern for

other

groups,

or to restraint

upon

self-interest,

or

to deviation

from

the

predominant

vote

of

one's

group?

The more one

looks into the

matter,

the more

it

appears

that

one man's self-interestis another man's community interest,

and that

many

people sincerely

identify

the one with

the other.

Nor have the

theoristsoverlooked this.

Men

come

easily

to

believe

that

arrangements

agreeable

to themselves are

beneficial

to

others,

said

Dicey.

A

man's

interest

gives

a

bias

to his

judgment

far oftener than

it

corrupts

his

heart.

And

from

Schumpeter:

To

different

individuals

and

groups

the

common

good

is bound to mean

different

things.

This

fact,

hidden

from

the

utilitarian

by

the narrowness

of

his

outlook

on the world of

human valuations,will introduce rifts on questionsof principle which

cannot

be

reconciled

by

rational

argument.

In

a current

study

of

opinion

formation

(the

Elmira

study),

we

concluded

that

it is more

satisfactory

o

analyze

this

question

in

terms

of

the forces

making

for

political

cleavage

and

political

consensus

within the

community.

The

health of

a democratic

order

depends

on

achieving

a nice

balance

between

them:

enough

cleavage

to

stimulate

debate

and

action,

enough

consensus

to

hold the

society together

even

under strain. Political partiesin a democracyshould disagree-but not

too

much,

too

sharply,

nor too

fundamentally.

The

evidences of

cleavage

are clear to

everyone.

Cleavage along

class

and

religious

and

regional

lines

in addition

to

direct

attitudinal

differences

on basic

issues

of

foreign

and

domestic

policy-these

are so

familiar as to

require

no

328



18/19

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PUBLIC

OPINION

elaboration. t the same time

there are

important

evidencesof con-

sensus,of political cohesion, which deserve more attention than they

usually

get.

In

the

first

place,

there is the basic fact

that

group

member-

ships

and

identifications

overlap political

choices;

sizable

political

minoritiesare found in

various

social

groups

and this

provides

a

kind

of

glue

to hold the

community together.

In

addition,

even

at

the

height

of

a

presidential

campaign

there are

sizable attitudinal minorities

within

each

party

and each

social

group

on

political

issues,

and

thus

sizable

attitudinal

agreements

across

party

and

group

lines.

Such

over-

lappings link various groups together and prevent their further

estrangement.

All

of

this means

that democratic

politics

in

this

country

is

happily

not total

politics-a

situation where

politics

is the

single

or

central

selector and

rejector,

where

other

social

differences

are drawn

on

top

of

political

lines.

Cross-pressures

n

political

allegiances,

based

upon

a

pluralistic

system

of

values,

are

thus

highly

important

to the

society.

So the

question

of

self and

community

interest

may

best be seen

as the question of cleavage and consensus. The multiplicity and the

heterogeneity

of identifications

and associations in the

great

society

develop

an

overlapping,

pluralistic

social

organization

which both

sharpens

and

softens

the

impact

and the

consequences

of

political

activity.

CONCLUSION

The

political

theory

of

democracy,

then,

requires

that the electorate

possess

appropriate

personality

structures,

that it be interested and

participate n public affairs,that it be informed, that it be principled,

that it

correctly

perceive

political

realities,

that it

engage

in

discussion,

that

it

judge

rationally,

and that

it consider the

community

interest.

Now this

combination of

requirements

sets

a

high-an

ideal-

standard

for the

political

process.

And

since this

is a

composite

list,

from a

variety

of

sources,

it

is not

necessarily

a

matter for

disillusion-

ment

or

even

disappointment

that the democratic

electorate

does

not

conform to

every

requirement

in

the full

degree.

There is

always

an

appropriateobservationfrom Lord Bryce:

Orthodox

political

theory

assumes

that

every

citizen

has,

or

ought

to

have,

thought

out

for himself

certain

opinions,

or

example,

ought

to have

a

definite

view,

defensible

by arguments,

f

what

the

country

needs,

what

principles

ught

to be

applied

n

governing

t,

of the

men

to

whose

hands

329



19/19

PUBLIC

OPINION

QUARTERLY,

FALL

1952

the

government ught

to be

entrusted.There are

persons

who

talk,

though

certainlyvery

few

who

act,

as

if

they

believed this

theory,

which

may

be

compared

to

the

theory

of some

ultra-Protestantshat

every

good

Christian

as

or

ought

to

have,

by

the

strength

of his

own

reason,

worked

out for

himself

from

the Bible

a

system

of

theology.

Opinion

studies n

recent

years

have done

much

to

fill

in

the

pic-

ture

of what

actually

happens

n democratic

decision-making.

As

is

evident

even from

this

brief

survey, hey

have done

so in

three

ways:

first,

by

documenting

he theoretical

assumptions

with

facts about

actualpoliticalbehavior;second,by clarifyingthe conceptsand as-

sumptions

f

democratic

heory,

f in no other

way

simply

by

insisting

upon

researchable

ormulations;

and

third,

by

differentiating

and

reformulating

he

general

heoretical

ropositions

n

more

exact

terms.

Further

systematic

xploration

f this

subject

within a

sharper,

more

valid,

and

more

sophisticated

rameworkof

political

theory

should

make a rich

contributiono each

side. The

difficulties

f collaboration

between

political

heorists

n

the

one hand and

opinion

researchersn

the othermustnot beallowed o stand n thewayof jointwork,forthe

theorists

an

provide

a

systematic

tatement

n terms

of

which

public

opinion

studies

can be

meaningfullyorganized,

and

the

empirical

researchers an document he

theoretical

equirements.

he theorists

can

suggest

new

concepts

and

hypotheses

o the

researcher,

nd the

researcher

an

force

the

theorists

o

sharpen

nd

differentiate-yes,

and

quantify-their

formulations.

Of course

there are

problems

but

they

should

be

negotiated

or

overcome.For example, he theoristsend to use descriptiveategories

(e.g.,

rationality)

and

the

researchers

prefer

predictive

categories

(e.g.,

group

memberships)

in

explaining

political

preferences.

Hard and

joint

thinking

on such

problems

should

bring

returns.

The

investigation

of the

realities of democratic

processes

at

the

level

of

the

electorate

s a

useful

service

and it should be carried

orward.

Opinion

studies

can

help

a

democracy

not

only

to know itself in

a

topical

and

immediate

way

but

also

to evaluate its achievement and

its

progressn moregeneral erms.In thisframework,he studyof public

opinion

can

make

a

telling

contribution

n the

basic,

continuous

trug-

gle

to

bring

democratic

practice

more and

more into

harmony

with

the

requirements

nd the

assumptions-that

is,

with the

ideals-of

democratic

heory.

330

democratic theory and public opinion

Documents