book vii chapter 3

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CALO VS. FUERTES

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16537 June 29, 1962

FRANCISCO C. CALO,Petitioner-Appellant, vs. DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDSand SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.

PADILLA, J.: chanroblesvirtuallaw library

In Bureau of Lands Claim No. 224 (N), Lot No. 143-A, Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitledFrancis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. H.A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-

respondent, the Director of Lands rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying a dismissingformer's claim and contest against the Homestead Application No. 86871 (E-40476) of Delfin C.Fuertes, was ordering him to vacate the premises within sixty days from receipt of a copy of theopinion, and stating that upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C.Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands on 25January 1957, Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thecase, docketed as DANR case No. 1549. On 28 February 1958 the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources modified the opinion of the Director of Lands -

. . . in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should reimburse Francisco C. Calo of the difference

between the value of the improvements the latter introduced on the land in controversy and thevalue of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom within thirty (30) days from adviceby the Director of Lands who is hereby directed to determine the aforementioned difference withinsixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

Still dissatisfied with the above opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources to reconsider it but the latter denied a reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1August 1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines (Annex A Answer, p.54, rec. of case No. 55), but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew it before the President of thePhilippines could act thereon (Annex A to memorandum of the petitioner, p. 64, rec. of case No.55).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for

writs of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of theopinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources beenjoined; that if a bond be needed for the purpose he was willing to file it; that after hearing theinjunction be made final and permanent; that the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes pay him P18,000 asdamages and attorney's fees and costs of the suit; that he be declared the owner entitled topossess the parcel of land subject of the litigation; and for any other just and equitable relief(special civil case No. 55). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

On 24 December 1958 the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes filed an answer and, on 27 December1958, an amended answer to the petition; on 29 December 1958 and 3 January 1959 therespondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands, respectively,filed their answers. After a preliminary hearing as provided for in section 5, Rule 8, of the Rules ofCourt, on 31 July 1959 the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which is -


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WHEREFORE, for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting allthe administrative remedies available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Courtresolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the herein petition with costs against petitioner.

The petitioner appealed, but as only a question of law is raised, the Court of Appeals certified theappeal to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

This appeal has not been perfected within the reglementary period, as provided for in section 17,Rule 41, for although the notice of appeal was filed on 31 August 1959 (p. 77, record of case No.55) or on the 13th day from the receipt of case No. 55) the appeal bond was filed on 18September 1959 (p. 78, record of case No. 55) or on the 31st day after notice of judgment. This isenough to dispose of the case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need notappeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, afterhe had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision oropinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, isuntenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to notappealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the laststep he should take in an administrative case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallaw library

Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Courtlies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequateremedy available to the petitioner.1 chanroblesvirtuallaw library

The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal isdismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala andMakalintal, JJ., concur.Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

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Endnotes:

1Diego vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 54 OFF. Gaz. 956.


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ABE-ABE VS. MANTA

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-4827 May 31, 1979

GERARDO D. ABE-ABE, FELICIANO MADRONA, LORETO VALDEHUEZA, MELECIOPEALOSA, PELAGIO BABIA, JUANITO TUMILAP, TIMOTEO CHAN, RICARDO BACOR,JESUS DORIA, VITELIANO DORIA, PABLO SIMITARA, VIRGILIO TARDE, POLICARPORAGAS, EMILIANO EDULAN, DORICO LAGUNAY, FELICIANO MADRONA, JR., CARMEN L.BALBAS, SERVANDO TARDE, JOSE DAGONDON, ANGEL OCLARIT, ULDARICO BABIA,DIOGENES DIOLANTO, ARISTON BABAEL, LEONCIO DORIA, PLATON BACOR, LORETODIZON, JORGE PAHILANGCO, JESUS BARLAAN, TELESFORO EDULAN, SEGUNDO

JACULAN, ANTONIO BARCELONA, LORENZO SILAGAN, AGUSTIN PABELLORE, ISIDRODAGOPLO, MAMERTO SIMITARA, CONRADO MAHINAY, BEN NUEZ, IGNACIABABALCON, EPIFANIA ABE-ABE, DONATO LLOPEZ, ANGEL TORINO, HILARIOLLANASA, TRANQUILNO PURO, IYONG LASAY, INES MEJOC, ROQUE SABIDO,HOSPICIO LLOPEZ, BERNARDA ABE-ABE, JOSE LAGUNAY, MARCELA BABALCON,SEVERINO ABE-ABE, MAGDALENO BACOR, ROBERTO CHAN, ROBERTO BADANA,MACRINA P. ECOBEN, SERGIO DAYPUYAT, FAUSTINO DAGONDON, ALFREDOPAHILANGCO, ULPIANO OCLARIT, CORNELIO CABASAGAN, BONIFACIO DAGONDON,RUFO DALWAG, MIGUEL TARDE, CESARIO EDPAN, LUISA CHAN, IGNACIO PEALOZA,ALFONSO ARADO, ISAAC LABOR, TEOFILO LAWRETE, FRANCISCA BABAEL, MAXIMOHUERBANA, FELIX DAGUPLO, TEODORO DAGONDON, NEMESIO HONCULADA,PANCRASIO DAGONDON, ROBERTO ABADAJOS, BEN PAGA, RAMON RAGO, NARCISOSANCHEZ, IIGO DAGONDON, ISIDRO SIMITARA, BALBINO PABELLORE, CRESENCIOPABELLORE, DEDING PABELLORE, TUAN TIA, LEON LIGAN, FILOMENO GAMUTAN,EMILIANO BIWANG, CECILIO AWATIN, PEDRO GOMONIT, AVELINO TIRARIRAY, DODOGOMONIT, TEOGENES GOMONIT, FELIMON PABELLORE, DOMINGO IGNILAN, MARIOPABELLORE, ROSA IPANAG, ALFREDO BABAYRAN, VICENTE EXCHAURE, AMBROSIOOCLARIT, MELECIO PUTOL, ARTEMIO GUIRITAN, JUSTINIANO DAGONDON, PATERSONBACLAYO, LAURO DAGONDON, EUGENIO TAGOD, LAZARO DAGONDON, JAIMEDAGONDON, ANSELMO ABIAN, IRENEO INGUITO, JOSE GAERLAN, CATALINO JARDIN,CORAZON CALUB, PEDRO BAJAO, FELIPE UPPOS, SOLEDAD NERY, FELIPE JARDIN,PLACIDO JARDIN, CONSTANCIO AGBU, CANDELARIO LADIO, EDUARDO JARDIN,URSULA DAGUPLO, MATIAS DAGUPLO, ISABELA NOGUERA, DEMOCRITO APARTE,APOLONIA CIMACIO, VICENTE TAJALE, FEDERICO RAGO, ALBERTO ESTANILLA,RUFINO LAGRIA, GERONIMO RAGAS, EMILIANO SONGCO, EPIFANIO NOGUERA,

FELOMINO BACOR, NICOLASA DAGONDON, LUISITO DAGONDON and SALVADORCORRALES,petitioners,vs.JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin and PEDRO P.ROMUALDO,respondents.

Pedro R. Luspo, Jr. for petitioners.

P. P. Romualdo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:


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The legal issue in this case is whether the Court of First Instance of Camiguin has jurisdiction toadjudicate a dispute over water rights for irrigation purposes even if the controversy has not yetbeen passed upon by the National Water Resources Council the agency vested with original andexclusive competence to resolve conflicting c on the appropriation of water resources.

On August 20, 1976, the one hundred thirty-seven petitioners (farmers and owners of ricelands)filed an injunction suit in the Camiguin court against Pedro P. Romualdo (a lawyer and delegateto the 1971 Constitutional Convention).

The purpose of the suit was to secure a judicial declaration as to the petitioners' prior vestedrights under article 504 of the Civil Code to use the water of the Anibungan Inobo Ablay andTajong Crocks to irrigate their ricelands located upstream in Barrios Lumad and BaylaoMambajao, Camiguin The petitioners sought to enjoin Romualdo from using the water of thecreeks at night to irrigate his two. hectare riceland located downstream. That nocturnal use wasallegedly prejudicial to the petitioners.

Their version is that their use of the water of the creeks started in 1938; that in 1952 or after thevolcanic eruption, the waters of the creeks were made to converge in a single channel and twodiversion dams were constructed with the help of the municipal government and the PresidentialArm on Community Development PACD The National Irrigation Administration allegedlycontributed money for the improvement of the dams. The petitioners wanted to convey theimpression that the communal irrigation system was established primarily for the benefit of thericelands located upstream.

In July, 1976, respondent or defendant Romualdo started using the water of the creeks byopening the diversion dams at night. That act provoked the filing of the injunction suit alreadymentioned.

Romualdo's version in his answer is that at a conference held on July 29, 1976 among thepetitioners (with their counsel), the provincial commander, the district engineer, the mayor, themembers of the Sangguniang Bayan and Romualdo, it was agreed upon that the water of thecreeks would be used on a rotation basis: the petitioners would use it in the daytime andRomualdo and the other landowners downstreamwould use the water at night. The opening andclosing of the dam would be under the control of the provincial commander.

Romualdo alleged that on June 21, 1976 he filed a water permit application with the districtengineer's office as required in Presidential Decree No. 424 so that he could use legitimately thewater to irrigate his riceland locateddownstreamnear the seashore in Sitio Boloc-Boloc. Theregional director of the Bureau of Public Works issued to Romualdo on October 5, 1976 atemporary authority to use the water of the creeks. In contrast, the petitioners did not file anywater permit applications although required to do so by the district engineer's office.

Romualdo interposed the defense that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matterof the suit. He contended that the petitioners' remedy was to file their complaint with the districtengineer's office pursuant to Department Order No. 245 dated September 29, 1958 of theUndersecretary of Public Works and Communications regarding the determination of water rightscontroversies.

Romualdo also invoked Presidential Decree No. 424, which took effect on March 28, 1974 andwhich created the National Water Resources Council (to replace the Water ResourcesCommittee) and vested it with powers to coordinate and integrate water resources developmentactivities or, according to its section 2, to "determine, adjudicate, and grant water rights" (70 0. G.2912). Romualdo argued that Presidential Decree No. 424 repealed article 504 of the Civil Codewhich allows the acquisition of the use of public waters by prescription for ten years Article 504 is

the statutory basis of petitioners' alleged preferential water rights.


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After the lower court found that on January 14, 1977 Romualdo's temporarily permit to use thewater of the communal irrigation system was cancelled, as directed by the executive director ofthe National Water Resources Council, it issued on February 11, 1977 an order enjoiningRomualdo from diverting the water of the creeks to his two-hectare farm.

In the meantime, the Water Code of the Philippines or Presidential Decree No. 1067 waspromulgated on December 31, 1976 (730. G. 3554). Romualdo urged the trial court to dismissthe injunction suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the controversy should first bepassed upon by the National Water Resources Council, as allegedly required under PresidentialDecree No. 424 and under the following provisions of the Water Code which confer originaljurisdiction upon the Council to decide controversies on water rights and which vest appellatejurisdictionin the Court of First Instance to review the Council's decisions:

ART. 88. The Councils half have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating toappropriation, utilization exploitation, development, control conservation andprotection of waters within the meaning and context of the provisions of thisCode.

The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be immediatelyexecutory and the enforcement thereof may be suspended only when a bond, inan amount fixed by the Council to answer for damages occasioned by thesuspension or stay of execution, shall have been filed by the Appealing party,unless the suspension is by virtue of an order of a competent court.

All disputes shall be decided within sixty (60) days after the parties submit thesame for decision or resolution.

The Council shall have the power to issue writs of execution and enforce itsdecisions with the assistance of local or national police agencies.

ART. 89. The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies may beappealed to the Court of First instance of the province where the subject matterof the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from the date the partyappeal receives a copy of the decision on any of the following grounds: (1) graveabuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law.

For lack of jurisdiction and for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the lower courtdismissed the case in its order of July 18, 1977. Instead of Appealing that order of dismiss to thisCourt, as prescribed in Republic Act No. 5440, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in theCourt of Appeals which dismissed the petition because the issuance of the writ of certiorari wouldnot be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction Abe-Abe vs. Judge Manta, CA-G. R. No. SP07103-R,March 31, 1978).

On August 19, 1978, the same 137 petitioners filed the instant certiorari case for the belatedreview of the lower court's order of dismissal .

We hold that the petition is devoid of merit. It is incontestable that the petitioners' immediaterecourse is to ventilate their grievance with the National Water Resources Council which, asalready noted, is the administrative agency exclusively vested with original jurisdiction to settlewater rights disputes-under the Water Code and under Presidential Decree No. 424.

That jurisdiction of the Council under section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed insection 88 of the Water Code and in section 3(d) thereof which provides that the utilization,exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to thecontrol and regulation of the government through" the Council.


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It should be noted that article 100 of the Water Code repealed the provisions of the Civil Codeand the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 "on ownership of waters, easements relatingto waters, use of public waters and acquisitive prescription on the use of waters, which areinconsistent with the provisions of the Water Code. Article 100 also repealed the Irrigation Law,Act No. 2152.

It is also noteworthy that section 3(e) of the Water Code recognizes that "preference in the useand development of waters shall consider current usages and be responsive to the changingneeds of the country".

Article 95 of the Water Code recognizes vested rights but requires that such rights should beregistered on or before December 31, 1978.

The Code in its article 20 acknowledges that "the measure and t of appropriation of water shallbe beneficial use", a rule found in the Philippine Bill of 1902 (See Sideco vs Sarenas 41 Phil. 80,82-83).

The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to entrust to an administrativeagency the settlement of water rights disputes rather than require the claimants to go directly tothe court where the proceedings are subject to unavoidable delays which are detrimental to theparties.

It is patent that the petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedy. Their complaintshould have been lodged with the National Water Resources Council whose decision isreviewable by the Court of First Instance as indicated in the aforequoted sections 88 and 89 ofthe Water Code.

If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing his administrative remedies, his action ispremature or he has no cause of action to ventilate in court. His case is not ripe for judicialdetermination (Aboitiz & Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, L-29466, May 18, 1978, 83 SCRA265, 271).

"When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, butnevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline tointerfere This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on conveyance but likewise onrespect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co equal office in the goverment If aremedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resortcan be made to (the) courts." (Cruz vs. Del Rosario, 119 Phil. 63, 66.)

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to the court means that thereshould be an "orderly procedure which favors a pre administrative sifting process, particularlywith respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidanceof in. interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action untilthe administrative process has run its course, and prevention of attempts 'to swamp the courts bya resort to them in the first instance'" (2 Am Jur 2nd 428; Antonio vs. Tanco, Jr., L-38135, July25, 1975, 65 SCRA 448, 454).

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Antonio, Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are abroad.


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ANTONIO VS. TANCO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

July 25, 1975

G.R. No. L-38135

HILARIO C. ANTONIO, petitioner,vs.

HON. ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., in his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, substituted for by HON. JOSE LEIDO, JR., in his capacity

as Secretary of Natural Resources; FELIX R. GONZALES, in his official capacity

as Director of Fisheries, and HON. MANUEL DELIMA, in his official capacity as

the person acting as Regional Director of Region IV of the Bureau of Fisheries,

respondents.

Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito E. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.

Ramirez and Solicitor Nathaneal P. de Pano, Jr. for respondents.

Aquino, J.:

On September 5, 1973 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 6, which amended certain rules on discipline of government

employees (68 O. G. 7971), and upon the recommendation of the Acting Director of

Fisheries, charged Hilario C. Antonio, the Regional Director of Regional Office No. IV of

the Bureau of Fisheries, with incompetence and conduct highly prejudicial to the best

interest of the service. The complaint was embodied in a "formal charge with order of

suspension" which was served upon Antonio on September 14, 1973. The suspension

took effect immediately.

In that indictment it was alleged that Antonio on May 31, October 31 and November 30,

1972 issued to eleven persons closely related to, or associated with, each other twelve

seaweed permits covering the whole seaweed areas of Manila Bay despite his knowledge

that the official policy was that no exclusive rights over the whole seaweed areas in

Manila should be awarded under exclusive seaweed licenses. It was further charged that

Antonio on May 24, 1973 became a witness for the said eleven permitees, who had filed

a case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio and the Acting Director of

Fisheries, so, that in effect Antonio testified against himself. Other glaring

inconsistencies committed by Antonio were recited in the complaint.


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Antonio through counsel filed an answer which was not under oath. He justified the

issuance of the seaweed permits by citing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 45 and

45-1, which require permits for gathering seaweeds, and by invoking a precedent

established by Acting Director Felix Gonzales, who, when he was Supervising Fishery

Technologist, issued a seaweed permit to Francisco Hilvano for the Manila Bay area.

Some weeks after his suspension, or on October 24, 1973, Antonio sent the followingtelegraphic request for reinstatement to the President of the Philippines (capitalization

supplied):

His Excellency

President Ferdinand Marcos

Malacaang, Manila

Requesting His Excellency my immediate reinstatement as Fisheries Regional Director

Region IV. Arbitrarily suspended indefinitely without investigation before suspension by

Secretary Tanco since September 14 for implementing existing fisheries laws and

Presidential Decree 43, section 6B, paragraph 5, regarding issuance seaweeds permits,

Manila Bay area.

Secretary Tanco for free seaweeds gathering without first amending seaweeds laws.

Present seaweeds controversy caused filing injunction case due to suspended permit

with Pasig CFI Judge Navarro, preliminary hearing anti-graft practices Fiscal Puno,

Manila, deportation proceeding against Chinese seaweeds dealer and administrative

charges incompetency and ignorance of law against Acting Fisheries Director.

Referring His Excellency to Secretary Raquiza (for) more information.

HILARTO ANTONIO

Regional Director

The Assistant Executive Secretary referred the foregoing telegram to Secretary Tanco on

December 18, 1973 for appropriate action or comment. Secretary Tanco on April 17,

1974 informed the Assistant Executive Secretary that:

Hilario Antonio stands charged by the undersigned for: (1) incompetence in theperformance of official duties, and (2) conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of

the service, and is presently suspended while case is being heard by the DANR Special

Committee on Investigation chaired by Fiscal Ramon Tuason of the Department of

Justice.

Enclosed are the comprehensive comments and recommendations of the Acting Director

of the Bureau of Fisheries, Felix R. Gonzales, to which we fully concur, containing the

facts and circumstances resulting in the formal charge with order of suspension dated

September 5, 1973....

It is our considered opinion and recommendation that Mr. Antonio's appeal to the

President for reinstatement should be denied.


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Up to this time no final action has been taken on Antonio's request for reinstatement and

on the Secretary's recommendation.

On November 16, 1973 or sixty-three days after his suspension, Antonio informed the

Director of Fisheries that by virtue of section 35 of the Civil Service Law he was going to

return to duty as Regional Fishery Director.

The Secretary in his reply of November 21, 1973 informed Antonio that his

reinstatement could not be given due course under Presidential Decree No. 6 and that

the charge against him was serious and the evidence of guilt was strong MdCS.

On January 29, 1974 Antonio, without awaiting the decision of the President on his

request for reinstatement, ventilated his grievance in the judicial forum by filing the

instant petition for mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition against the Secretary, the

Director of Fisheries and Manuel Delima who was designated to take Antonio's place as

Regional Director for Region IV.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of respondent officials, has advanced the contention

that mandamus would not lie in this case because under Presidential Decree No. 6 and

Letter of Instruction No. 14-A a respondent in an administrative case may be summarily

dismissed or suspended. He opines that those martial law measures rendered

inoperative the legal provision that a suspended employee should be reinstated after the

expiration of sixty days from the date of his suspension.

He argues that the suspended employee can be reinstated only after he is exonerated

and that, therefore, he can remain under suspension indefinitely. For that reason, he

concludes that Antonio has no cause of action for mandamus.

The respondents also contend that Antonio has no cause of action for quo

warranto because in 1964 Antonio was appointed Regional Director without a

specification in his appointment of any region or district. He was assigned to Region IV.

The Solicitor General argues that Antonio's suspension does not mean that he ceased to

be a Regional Director. His assignment to Region IV was simply revoked. Delima did not

usurp Antonio's position as Regional Director.

The respondents point out that Antonio has no cause of action for prohibition because

the law empowers the Secretary to initiate the filing of charges against his erring

subordinates and to refer the charges to the proper agency for investigation. In

Antonio's case, a committee of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources was

assigned to investigate the charges about him. As the Secretary and the investigating

committee have jurisdiction over Antonio's case, the investigation cannot be enjoined.

The respondents further contend that Antonio's instant actions were premature because,

as already noted, his telegraphic request to the President for reinstatement was referred

to the Secretary who on April 17, 1974 recommended that Antonio's appeal for

reinstatement should be denied. The respondents assume that Antonio should have

awaited the Presidential action on his request for reinstatement before going to court.


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On August 28, 1974 the investigating committee submitted its report to Secretary Arturo

R. Tanco, Jr. In view of the creation of the Department of Natural Resources, headed by

Jose Leido, Jr., that report presumably was referred to the new Secretary. At this writing

Secretary Leido has not yet decided Antonio's case.

The issue is whether Antonio is entitled to the writ ofmandamus to compel the Secretary

of Natural Resources to reinstate him, it appearing that his suspension has lasted for

more than twenty-one months, and, under section 35 of the Civil Service Law, as applied

in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L-19748, September 13, 1962, 6 SCRA 1, when the

administrative case against an employee under preventive suspension is not finally

decided within sixty days after the date of the suspension, the respondent should be

reinstated in the service. The quo warrantoand prohibition aspects of Antonio's petition

are of no moment.

We are of the opinion that the mandamus action was prematurely filed, or, as the

respondents put it, the case is not yet ripe for adjudication in a court of justice in view of

the pendency in the Office of the President of Antonio's request for reinstatement. As

long as that request is pending, the matter of his reinstatement is not justiciable.

A mandamus action against administrative officers should not be entertained if their

superiors can grant relief (Ang Tuan Kai & Co. vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil.

143; Resolution in Subido vs. Sarmiento, L-5322, December 14, 1951; 3 Moran's

Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 196). A mandamus action against the

Director of Private Schools was dismissed because the matter involved in the case was

still pending before the Secretary of Education. (Peralta vs. Salcedo, 101 Phil. 452. See

Dajo vs. Padilla, 63 O. G. 3579).

Parties asking for a judicial review of administrative official action must first exhaust

their remedies in the executive branch (Mandrian vs. Sinco, 110 Phil. 160; Gonzales

vs. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo, L-20568, December 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 711; Garcia vs.

Teehankee, L-29113, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA, 937).

The purpose behind the policy of requiring a party to first exhaust all administrative

remedies before resorting to the court is to provide "an orderly procedure which favors a

preliminary administrative sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly

within the competence of the administrative authority" (42 Am. Jur. 581 cited in

Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil. 168, 173).

Where, as in this case, the President might be able to grant the remedy sought by the

petitioner, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that his decision be awaited

before resort to the courts can be had (Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101

Phil. 490, 493).

"When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the

government but nevertheless a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the

judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only

on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect

for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative

machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only


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to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly but

also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to" (the)courts (Cruz vs. Del Rosario,

L-17440, December 26, 1963, 9 SCRA 755, 758).

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Antonio, by requesting the President to

revoke Secretary Tanco's suspension order, precluded judicial intervention in his casewhile his request is pending consideration (Compare with Kordovez vs. Carmona, L-

21473, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 678 and Romero vs. Municipal Mayor of Baljoon,

Cebu, L-22062, March 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1374, where the petition for reinstatement

after the expiration of the sixty-day period was denied because the petitioners had

contributed to the delay in the disposition of their administrative cases by appealing to

the Commissioner of Civil Service) IrVvc0.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED Xj9rlJ.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Concepcion Jr. and

Martin, concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but, to my mind, the more correct basis for dismissing the instant petition is

failure to state a cause of action or, in fact, obviously indubitable lack of merit thereof,

rather than prematurity. I am not for leaving any suggestion no matter how remote that

in the event the President should act unfavorably on petitioner's telegram-request forreinstatement, he would have any ground to seek judicial remedy. He has come to Us

not because respondent Secretary has gravely abused his discretion in suspending him

but because the period of such (preventive) suspension has already exceeded the 60-

day limit fixed by Section 35 of the Civil Service Law which this Court held to be

mandatory in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 6 SCRA 1. In other words, the only issue

for Our resolution is whether or not Presidential Decree No. 6, has repealed, as

contended by the Solicitor General, the procedure in administrative cases prescribed by

the Civil Service Law, including said Section 35. In this respect, there is no doubt in my

mind that the Solicitor General's contention is well taken. It is thus clear to me that even

if the President should deny his telegraphic request, petitioner would not be entitled to

reinstatement by judicial order, as there could be no legal basis for such a relief.


12/106

Presidential Decree No. 6 pertinently provides as follows:

WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 23, 1972, the Integrated

Reorganization Plan was adopted and made part of the law of the land;

WHEREAS, in the reorganization of the Government, it is necessary that we clean thepublic service of undesirable officials and employees; and

WHEREAS, it is essential that administrative cases against such officials and employees

be disposed of in the most expeditious manner;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,

1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby promulgate the

following amendatory rules on the administrative discipline of government officials and

employees:

SECTION 1. Grounds for disciplinary action. The following shall be grounds for

disciplinary action:

xxx xxx xxx

h. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.

xxx xxx xxx

aa. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 2. Disciplinary jurisdiction. The Department Head shall have authority to

remove, separate, suspend and otherwise discipline officers and employees under their

jurisdiction, except presidential appointees. Their decisions shall be final, except in the

case of removal. In case the penalty imposed is removal, the respondent may appeal the

decision to the Civil Service Commission. An appeal shall not stop the decision from

being executory, and in the event that the respondent wins on appeal, he shall be

considered as having been under suspension during the pendency of the appeal.

Chiefs of bureaus and offices shall investigate and decide administrative complaints

against employee under their jurisdiction. Their decision shall be final if the penalty

imposed is suspension without pay for not more than 30 days or fine of not more than

30 days' salary. If the penalty imposed is higher, the decision may be appealed to the

Department Head, and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the

penalty is removal.

An investigation may be entrusted to regional directors or similar officials who shall

make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office within

five (5) days from termination of the investigation which shall be finished within ten (10)

days.


13/106

SEC. 3. Summary proceedings. No formal investigation is necessary and the

respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following

circumstances is present:

a. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.

b. When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is

reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.

c. When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

SEC. 4. Repealing clause Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations in

conflict with this Decree are hereby modified or repealed accordingly 8iS4n.

Having been issued on September 27, 1972, before the ratification of the present

Constitution, this decree has become part of the law of the land. Without discussing in

this case, because it is not necessary to do so, whether or not said decree has acquired

constitutional status, and assuming it has no more than the character of a legislative

enactment, there can be no question that it could validly repeal, as it does expressly

repeal, all existing laws in conflict therewith, and this includes Section 35 of the Civil

Service Law, which by no means is of any constitutional level mjcQ.

The complete overhaul of the system of administrative investigations relative to

personnel discipline of public officers and employees is readily evident from a cursory

reading of Presidential Decree No. 6. It has made the procedure thereof drastically

summary, doing away with the time-consuming, elaborate and multi-steppedinvestigation outlined in Section 32 to 37 of the Civil Service Law and the implementing

Civil Service Rules, particularly those found in Rule XVIII thereof, more specifically

Sections 22 to 33. I cannot reconcile the apparent intent of the decree to expedite such

investigations with the theory seemingly relied upon by petitioner that his preventive

suspension should be deemed limited to only sixty (60) days. In respondent Secretary's

reply, dated November 21, 1973, to petitioner's manifestation of November 16, 1971

that he would return to duty, petitioner was informed that the charge against him is

serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. Upon this predicate, the Secretary could have

even immediately removed or dismissed him by virtue of the power conferred upon him

by aforequoted Section 3 read together with Section 2 of the decree, which if it had been

done, would have rendered the issue being raised here futile, since in the event ofexoneration even after removal immediately executed, he would be considered only as

under preventive suspension.

After all, preventive suspension is practically inherent in every disciplinary action when

demanded by the circumstances thereof in the public interest. As was aptly held in Nera

v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031: .

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the

administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was nota punishment or

penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive

measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after

such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found


14/106

guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the

penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his

investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity

to prove his innocence.

And then in Bautista vs. Peralta, 18 SCRA 223, the Supreme Court added: "Preventivesuspension in administrative cases is not a penalty in itself. It is designed merely as a

measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for

obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged malfeasance while the same is being

investigated. (at p. 825.)

It should be borne in mind that Presidential Decree No. 6 is a follow-up of Presidential

Decree No. 1 providing for the integrated reorganization of the executive branch of the

national government and is designed to expedite the cleaning of the public service of

undesirable officials and employees. Any happenstance which may cause any hindrance

or delay in the accomplishment of such objective infringes the spirit of said decrees and

should be treated as legally untenable.

It is now history that this Court has not found any constitutional infirmity in Proclamation

1081 which placed the Philippines under martial law. We have also considered it to be

constitutionally permissible that the existing martial law administration utilize its broad

powers for the purpose of instituting reforms tended to prevent the recurrence of the

causes that brought martial law forth. Indeed, to my mind, the power to reorganize the

government and maintain one in such form as would best promote the purposes for

which the proclamation has been issued is probably among the first inherent

prerogatives of the martial law administrator. Such being the case, I cannot perceive any

legally valid objection to the drastic modification of the procedure for personnel disciplinein the civil service ordered by the President in the decrees. Accordingly, until the formal

declaration by the President of the lifting of martial law, the employees and officials of

the government have to resign themselves to the fact that it is Presidential Decree No.

6, together with Letters of Instruction Nos. 14 and 14-A, that constitute the civil service

law of the Philippines insofar as personnel discipline is concerned dSFyXWwf.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but, to my mind, the more correct basis for dismissing the instant petition is

failure to state a cause of action or, in fact, obviously indubitable lack of merit thereof,

rather than prematurity. I am not for leaving any suggestion no matter how remote that

in the event the President should act unfavorably on petitioner's telegram-request for

reinstatement, he would have any ground to seek judicial remedy. He has come to Us

not because respondent Secretary has gravely abused his discretion in suspending him

but because the period of such (preventive) suspension has already exceeded the 60-

day limit fixed by Section 35 of the Civil Service Law which this Court held to be

mandatory in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 6 SCRA 1. In other words, the only issue


15/106

for Our resolution is whether or not Presidential Decree No. 6, has repealed, as

contended by the Solicitor General, the procedure in administrative cases prescribed by

the Civil Service Law, including said Section 35. In this respect, there is no doubt in my

mind that the Solicitor General's contention is well taken. It is thus clear to me that even

if the President should deny his telegraphic request, petitioner would not be entitled to

reinstatement by judicial order, as there could be no legal basis for such a reliefzkYLbTGqPH.

Presidential Decree No. 6 pertinently provides as follows:

WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 23, 1972, the Integrated

Reorganization Plan was adopted and made part of the law of the land;

WHEREAS, in the reorganization of the Government, it is necessary that we clean the

public service of undesirable officials and employees; and

WHEREAS, it is essential that administrative cases against such officials and employees

be disposed of in the most expeditious manner;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,

1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby promulgate the

following amendatory rules on the administrative discipline of government officials and

employees:

SECTION 1. Grounds for disciplinary action. The following shall be grounds fordisciplinary action:

xxx xxx xxx

h. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.

xxx xxx xxx

aa. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 2. Disciplinary jurisdiction. The Department Head shall have authority to

remove, separate, suspend and otherwise discipline officers and employees under their

jurisdiction, except presidential appointees. Their decisions shall be final, except in the

case of removal. In case the penalty imposed is removal, the respondent may appeal the

decision to the Civil Service Commission. An appeal shall not stop the decision from

being executory, and in the event that the respondent wins on appeal, he shall be

considered as having been under suspension during the pendency of the appeal.

Chiefs of bureaus and offices shall investigate and decide administrative complaints

against employee under their jurisdiction. Their decision shall be final if the penalty

imposed is suspension without pay for not more than 30 days or fine of not more than


16/106

30 days' salary. If the penalty imposed is higher, the decision may be appealed to the

Department Head, and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the

penalty is removal.

An investigation may be entrusted to regional directors or similar officials who shall

make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office withinfive (5) days from termination of the investigation which shall be finished within ten (10)

days 0I5bTV.

SEC. 3. Summary proceedings. No formal investigation is necessary and the

respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following

circumstances is present:

a. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.

b. When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is

reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.

c. When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

SEC. 4. Repealing clause Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations in

conflict with this Decree are hereby modified or repealed accordingly ujQFbk7.

Having been issued on September 27, 1972, before the ratification of the present

Constitution, this decree has become part of the law of the land. Without discussing in

this case, because it is not necessary to do so, whether or not said decree has acquired

constitutional status, and assuming it has no more than the character of a legislativeenactment, there can be no question that it could validly repeal, as it does expressly

repeal, all existing laws in conflict therewith, and this includes Section 35 of the Civil

Service Law, which by no means is of any constitutional level.

The complete overhaul of the system of administrative investigations relative to

personnel discipline of public officers and employees is readily evident from a cursory

reading of Presidential Decree No. 6. It has made the procedure thereof drastically

summary, doing away with the time-consuming, elaborate and multi-stepped

investigation outlined in Section 32 to 37 of the Civil Service Law and the implementing

Civil Service Rules, particularly those found in Rule XVIII thereof, more specifically

Sections 22 to 33. I cannot reconcile the apparent intent of the decree to expedite suchinvestigations with the theory seemingly relied upon by petitioner that his preventive

suspension should be deemed limited to only sixty (60) days. In respondent Secretary's

reply, dated November 21, 1973, to petitioner's manifestation of November 16, 1971

that he would return to duty, petitioner was informed that the charge against him is

serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. Upon this predicate, the Secretary could have

even immediately removed or dismissed him by virtue of the power conferred upon him

by aforequoted Section 3 read together with Section 2 of the decree, which if it had been

done, would have rendered the issue being raised here futile, since in the event of

exoneration even after removal immediately executed, he would be considered only as

under preventive suspension.

After all, preventive suspension is practically inherent in every disciplinary action when


17/106

demanded by the circumstances thereof in the public interest. As was aptly held in Nera

v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031: .

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the

administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was nota punishment or

penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventivemeasure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after

such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found

guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the

penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his

investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity

to prove his innocence.

And then in Bautista vs. Peralta, 18 SCRA 223, the Supreme Court added: "Preventive

suspension in administrative cases is not a penalty in itself. It is designed merely as a

measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for

obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged malfeasance while the same is being

investigated. (at p. 825.)

It should be borne in mind that Presidential Decree No. 6 is a follow-up of Presidential

Decree No. 1 providing for the integrated reorganization of the executive branch of the

national government and is designed to expedite the cleaning of the public service of

undesirable officials and employees. Any happenstance which may cause any hindrance

or delay in the accomplishment of such objective infringes the spirit of said decrees and

should be treated as legally untenable.

It is now history that this Court has not found any constitutional infirmity in Proclamation

1081 which placed the Philippines under martial law. We have also considered it to be

constitutionally permissible that the existing martial law administration utilize its broadpowers for the purpose of instituting reforms tended to prevent the recurrence of the

causes that brought martial law forth. Indeed, to my mind, the power to reorganize the

government and maintain one in such form as would best promote the purposes for

which the proclamation has been issued is probably among the first inherent

prerogatives of the martial law administrator. Such being the case, I cannot perceive any

legally valid objection to the drastic modification of the procedure for personnel discipline

in the civil service ordered by the President in the decrees. Accordingly, until the formal

declaration by the President of the lifting of martial law, the employees and officials of

the government have to resign themselves to the fact that it is Presidential Decree No.

6, together with Letters of Instruction Nos. 14 and 14-A, that constitute the civil service

law of the Philippines insofar as personnel discipline is concerned.I vote to dismiss the petition. .


18/106

DELOS SANTOS VS. LIMBAGA


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15976 January 31, 1962

APOLONIO DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant,vs.BENJAMIN V. LIMBAGA, defendant-appellee.

T. de los Santos for plaintiff-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General and G. S. de la Pea for defendant-appellee.

DE LEON, J.:

This an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City dismissing a petitionfor mandamusto compel Benjamin V. Limbaga, the engineer of that city, to authorize Apoloniode los Santos to construct a residential house on the land described in the petition..

It is alleged in the petition that on November 19, 1952, Apolonio de los Santos applied with therespondent city engineer for a permit to construct a residential house on his land situated inLamitan, Basilan City; that the respondent without any lawful cause refused to grant said permit;and that in view of this refusal, petitioner suffered damages in the amount of P18,000.00.

In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied the allegations of

the petition and interposed the following affirmative defenses: that after a fire which occurred inLamitan that razed down a major portion of the market site therein, the city government approvedthe purchase of an additional area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot claimedby the petitioner was included in the area; that by virtue thereof, expropriation proceedings hadbeen instituted thereon, hence, the denial of the permit applied for by petitioner. 1wph1.t

On December 5, 1958, the city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: thatmandamus will not lie since the issuance of the permit applied for was a discretionary and not aministerial duty on the part of the city engineer; that petitioner's application for a permit toconstruct a residential building, of strong material, on the lot in question had to be denied by thecity engineer for the lot was within the area of the proposed market site which was already underexpropriation proceedings instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution approved by the City

Council; and in view of the fact that on March 24, 1958, while this case was pending, petitionerfiled an application in the name of another person (Marcial Quilaton) to construct a temporarymovable store on the same site in question, which was approved and thereafter a mobile storewas actually constructed thereon and consequently, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned hisapplication to construct the building of strong material and necessarily the remedy of mandamusbeing sought by petitioner had lost its merit.

On March 11, 1959, the trial court issued an order of dismissal based on the following grounds:that mandamus could not be granted as it was not a ministerial duty on the part of the cityengineer to approve petitioner's application for construction of buildings but approval of the sameneeded sound discretion in the said engineer's exercise of his official functions; and that the sitein question, which petitioner wanted for the construction of a building as per his application, has

already been utilized by him for the construction of another building which now exists thereon -an act which purports of an abandonment of his petition for mandamus.


19/106

From the order of dismissal, petitioner has appealed direct to this Court raising only questions oflaw.

Without touching on the various issues raised, We would say that mandamus cannot prosper inthis case for the simple reason that, as the record shows, the land in question is already thesubject matter of expropriation proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolutionapproved by the City Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court of First Instance ofBasilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies availableto him. Petitioner should have first brought the matter to the Director of Public Works who, underthe law, exercises supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities (seeCommonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not satisfied with the Director's decision he shouldhave appealed to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Miguel v. Reyes, G. R.No. L-4851, July 31, 1953). The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision ofan administrative official should, before coming to court, apply for review of such decision byhigher administrative authority (De la Torre v. Trinidad, G. R. No. L-14907, May 30, 1960; Perezv. City Mayor, et al., G. R. No. L-16786, Oct. 31, 1961). This principle rests on the presumptionthat the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decidethe same correctly.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes. J.B.L., Barrera, Paredesand Dizon JJ. concur.


20/106

PACANA VS. CONSUNJI


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41088 October 30, 1981

ARTEMIO B. PACANA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE DAVID M. CONSUNJI, in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works,Transportation and Communications, and THE HONORABLE POSTMASTERGENERAL, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The authoritative force of Antonio v. Tanco, Jr. 1 calls for application in this certiorari andmandamus petition. It is essentially the latter proceeding as what is sought is the reinstatementof petitioner Artemio B. Pacana who, by virtue of a decision of the then respondent Secretary ofPublic Works, Transportation and Communications, David M. Consunji, was dismissed from theservice on March 11, 1974. The allegations on their face more than suggested that petitioner wasnot on the best of terms with the then Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, resulting in the auditexaminations not once but three times of his accountability as Acting Postmaster of Cagayan deOro City. 2 On a charge of dishonesty for using a mail car personally, he was cleared by the thenSecretary Baltazar Aquino. 3 He was, however, found guilty of the charge arising from the

shortage in the funds, resulting in the order of dismissal.4

He filed a motion for reconsiderationbut it was denied. 5 That led him to devote the matter through an appeal to the Civil ServiceCommission, and, which appeal is still pending for consideration. 6 As was pointed out in theComment of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, considered as the Answer, with the availabilityto petitioner of an adequate administrative remedy such as the appeal taken by him, this "civilaction for certiorari and mandamus certainly will not lie. 7 The admission of the pendency of theappeal is thus fatal to petitioner's invocation of a judicial remedy at this stage. So the above-citedcase of Antonio v. Tanco Jr. ruled in language explicit and categorical: "As correctly observed bythe Solicitor General, Antonio, by requesting the President to revoke Secretary Tanco'ssuspension order, precluded judicial intervention in his case while his request is pendingconsideration. 8

It needs only to be pointed out that the formulation in the ponenciaof Justice Aquino is arestatement of a well-settled doctrine. The reason is quite evident. It is true that the judiciarycould be appealed to to set aside or nullify official action that runs counter to a legal norm. So therule of law prescribes. At the same time if a remedy may be afforded by the executive branch,with respect to matters peculiarly within its competence, it should be given the opportunity tocorrect the error or deficiency in the order or determination thus assailed. For one thing, it is in amuch better position to set matters right. For another, it is likely to develop an orderly andefficient procedure as to such matters. The Antonio opinion thus finds support in a number ofcases. 9 In the traditional administrative law terminology, the stage of ripeness for adjudicationhas not been reached.

An attempt, albeit unsuccessful, is made by petitioner to blunt the

authoritative force of the Antonio ruling by alleging a procedural due process question. Reyes v.Subido10 could then be relied upon to seek judicial relief without resorting to exhausting anobvious administrative remedy. As was made clear in Reyes from Lacson v.


21/106

Romero11 to Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice, 12 there are at least ten such decisions. It is not tobe ignored, however, that in Reyes, there was no appeal taken, the matter being brought to thisCourt immediately. There is another consideration that argues against a favorable outcome ofthis petition. In the decision of respondent Consunji dated March 11, 1974, it was specificallystated: "Formally charged with the aforecited offenses, respondent in each individual caseelected a formal hearing which was granted. During the formal hearing, involving the amount of

P58,681.72, it was established that respondent incurred the shortage. 13In his motion forreconsideration dated April 26, 1974, he pointed out that the investigation had not as yet beenterminated primarily because of the denial of the opportunity to him to confront the witnessesagainst him. When the said motion for reconsideration was denied on March 4, 1975, it wasstated categorically by respondent Consunji "that facts and evidences on record undoubtedlyindicate that he incurred the shortage of P58,681.72."14 In the dispositive portion of suchresolution, it was explicitly stated "that petitioner Artemio Pacana failed to submit any new andmaterial evidence to warrant a modification of the decision sought to be reconsidered, [hence]the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of merit. " 15 Such motion for reconsiderationafforded him the opportunity to submit the evidence that would clear him of the charges of theshortage of funds but he failed to do so. Under the circumstances, and with the pendency of hisappeal, this Court is of the opinion, as stated at the outset, that the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 L-38135, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 448.

2 Amended Petition, pars. 6-8, 10-11.

3 Ibid, pars. 5 and 12.

4 Ibid, par. 14.

5 Ibid, pars. 15 and 16.

6 Ibid, par. 17. The paragraph reads in full: "On April 26, 1975, your petitionerfiled his appeal to the Civil Service Commission, and which appeal is still pendingfor consideration. A copy of the said appeal is hereto attached, marked as Annex'F' and made an integral part hereof but notwithstanding this pending appeal,

your petitioner comes before this Honorable Tribunal to rest his cause."

7 Comment of Solicitor General, 11. He was assisted by Assistant SolicitorGeneral Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Edgardo L. Kilayko.

8 65 SCRA 448,4,55.

9 Cf. Ang Tuan Kai v. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil. 143 (1952); Santiagov. Cruz, 98 Phil. 168 (1955); Peralta v. Salcedo, 101 Phil. 452 (1957); Montes v.Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490 (1957); Cruz v. Del Romero, 119Phil. 63 (1963); Gonzales v. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo 120 Phil. 1508 (1964).These are the decisions cited by Justice Aquino.


22/106

LUZON DEV. BANK VS. ASSOCIATION


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,vs.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S.GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association ofLuzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the followingissue:

Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreementprovision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers onDecember 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, receivedALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit itsPosition Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decisiondisposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to theCollective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreementon promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorariand prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the VoluntaryArbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person fordetermination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who havebound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as eithercompulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the

government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of theirdispute through arbitration by a third party. 1The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution


23/106

of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final andbinding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed bythe government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made,pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial thirdperson for a final and binding resolution. 2Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be compliedwith by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator,nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they arepresumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute.Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decidetheir case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision.

In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required toinclude therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from theinterpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. 3For this purpose,parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators,or include a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National

Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides forexclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) theinterpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of companypersonnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, toexercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over thefollowing enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shallhave original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without

extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following casesinvolving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers mayfile involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions ofemployment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising fromthe employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questionsinvolving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare andmaternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amountexceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompaniedwith a claim for reinstatement.

xxx xxx xxx


24/106

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel ofsuch arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and theappellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4Thestate of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision ofthe Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receiptof the copy of the award or decision by the parties," 5while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of

the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or bothparties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 6Hence,while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No.6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not,elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, 7in effect equating the voluntaryarbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical andimposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8on the settled premise that the judgments ofcourts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court

ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, theirdecisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW),etal. v. Romero,et al., 9this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functionsacts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator,whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agencybutindependent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court ofAppeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and ExchangeCommission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil ServiceCommission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippinesunder Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, andof subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourthparagraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendothat the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may notstrictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panelare comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be statedthat it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntaryarbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under theConstruction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" waspurposely included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus, the terms governmental"agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means bywhich a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. 13 Theword "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state

delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. 14 An individual person,like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate, 15 in the


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same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of thecourt,16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. 17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental powerdelegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, withinthe contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The factthat his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within theexceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. Itwill be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in theLabor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised AdministrativeCircular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court ofAppeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewisebe appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in RevisedAdministrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards andcommissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 toprovide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicialentities 18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either theConstitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisionsof the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within theadjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of theNLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, alsoknown as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the courtspecified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the

province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitrationis held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) monthafter an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the awardand the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. 19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regionaltrial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorarifrom that award or decision, the Court ofAppeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter ofpolicy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature forproper disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco andHermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J. are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Seide, A Dictionary of Arbitration (1970).


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2 Ibid.

3 Art. 260, Labor Code.


5 Art. 262-A, par. 4, Labor Code.


7 Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 130 SCRA 392(1984); Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 180 SCRA 177(1989).

8 98 SCRA 314 (1980).

9 Supra.

10 Art. 262-A, in relation to Art. 217 (b) and (c), Labor Code, as amendedby Sec. 9, R.A. 6715.

11 Executive Order No. 1008.

12 Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina TaxCommission, 112 S.E. 2d 716, 719, 236 S.C. 2.

13 Govt. of P.I. v. Springer, et al., 50 Phil. 259, 334 (1927).

14 Ciulla v. State, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 545, 550, 191 Misc. 528.

15 In re Turncock's Estate, 300 N.W. 155, 156, 238 Wis. 438.

16 In re Brown Co., D.C. Me., 36 F. Supp. 275, 277.

17 Gagne v. Brush, D.C.N.H., 30 F. Supp. 714, 716.

18 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, et al., 231 SCRA 30 (1994).

19 Section 23, R.A. No. 876.


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DARIO VS. MISON


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,vs.HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG,JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, andExecutive Secretary,respondents.

G.R. No. 81967 August 8, 1989

VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner,vs.HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG,JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, andExecutive Secretary,respondents.

G.R. No. 82023 August 8, 1989

ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. AZARRAGA,RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES, FELICITACIONR. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE

B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMINRODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO LONTOK, PORFIRIOTABINO, JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN, PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIODAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE, ROBERTO ABADA,petitioners,vs.COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OFCUSTOMS, respondent.

G.R. No. 83737 August 8, 1989

BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,

vs.PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commissionand SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau ofCustoms, respondents.

G.R. No. 85310 August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, JOSEP., ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA, AURORA M., AGBAYANI, NELSON I.,AGRES ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR, AGUILUCHO MA. TERESA R., AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO

T., ALANO, ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT B., ALCANTARA, JOSEG., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS


28/106

F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES, RICARDO S., ANOLIN, MILAGROS H., AQUINO,PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M., ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON, ULPLIANOU., JR., ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P., ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.,ASCA;O, ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R., ATANGAN,LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO C., BA;AGA, MARLOWE, Z.,BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B., BARROS, VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE

A., BAYSAC, REYNALDO S., BELENO, ANTONIO B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS,MARCIANO S., BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO, VICTOR M., BULEG, BALILIS R.,CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO, HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V., CAMPOS,RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO G., CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B.,CARRANTO, FIDEL U., CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO,ROGELIO B., CATURLA, MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0,JOSE C., JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO S.,CRUZ, EDUARDO S., CRUZ, EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B., CRUZADO, MARCIAL C.,CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M., DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL, EDENF., DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA, DE GUZMAN,ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ,FRANCISCO C., DE LA PE;A, LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO

P., JR., DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON, FELICITAS A., DOCTOR,HEIDY M., DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J., DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.,DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR, ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO,LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA.LOURDES H., ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO, RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.,FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M., FERRAREN, ANTONIO C., FERRERA,WENCESLAO A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR., FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG,RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO R., GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R.,GARCIA, GILBERT M., GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA, JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V.,GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK R.,GREGORIO, LAURO P., GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN C.,HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES, LORETO N., HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H., HULAR ,

LANNYROSS E., IBA;EZ, ESTER C., ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO C.,ISAIS, RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR L.,JAVIER, ROBERTO S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V.,JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F., KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH,NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.,LAGLEVA, PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.,LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE, REYNALDO A., LICARTE,EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., LUMBA,OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C., MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA,FERNANDO P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C., MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZAROV., MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S., MANUEL, ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B.,MARCELO, GIL C., MARI;AS, RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIOA., MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.,

MATUGAS, ERNESTO T., MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA,NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S., MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA, POTENCIANOG., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L., MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G.,MONTANO, ERNESTO F., MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.,MORALES, CONCHITA D.L., MORALES, NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S., MUNAR,JUANITA L., MU;OZ, VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL,HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B., NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS,REYNALDO S., NIEVES, RUFINO A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q.,ORTEGA, ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO, FLORENTINO T.II, PASCUA, ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PE;A, AIDA C.,PEREZ, ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., PRUDENCIADO,EULOGIA S., PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N., PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I.,

QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P., RA;ADA,RODRIGO C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA,


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PONCE F., REYES, LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES,TELESFORO F., RIVERA, ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE, TERESITA S.,ROSANES, MARILOU M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA,PASCASIO G., SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITAC., SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO,COSME B., JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., SORIANO, ANGELO L.,

SORIANO, MAGDALENA R., SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T., TABIJE,EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S., TECSON, BEATRIZ B.,TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO E.,VASQUEZ, NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA, AVELINO A., VERAME, OSCARE., VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS A., VILLAR, LUZ L.,VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR., ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B.,AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C., CALO, RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMINR., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C ., DONATO, ESTELITA P., DONATO, FELIPE S., FLORES,PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO, MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M.,OMEGA, PETRONILO T., SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA,JAIME B., and VALDEZ, NORA M., respondents.

G.R. No. 85335 August 8, 1989

FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA. J. ANGELINA G.MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA, LEONARDO A. DELA PE;A, ABELARDO T.SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO T.MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE B.ORTIZ, ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA, ANTONIO A. RARAS,FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y. QUINONES, MANUEL B.CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C. RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO, ALBERTO I. GAN,EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR.,ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R. MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDOELEVAZO, VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners,

vs.COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION, respondents.

G.R. No. 86241 August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE BERNARDO S.QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C. BADILLO respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Court writes finisto this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several months. It does soout of ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a consequence of the governmentreorganization and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of thebureaucracy. The Court is apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rulesare settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment on the constitutional crisis for the nation, itselfbiset with grave and serious problems.


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The facts are not in dispute.

On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARINGA NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, ANDPROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEWCONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:

SECTION 1. ...

The President shall g

book vii chapter 3

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