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Research Project

Philip Manning 12504697

Q) To what extent could issues in British politics have prevented Britain from entering

into World War I?

There can be no doubt that there were several issues in British politics that threatened to

prevent a British entry into war in Europe, however, these arguments were not of sufficient

strength to prevent Britain from declaring war on Germany on 4 August 1914. The British

decision to declare war on Germany is a pivotal moment in international history and is an

area which is often overlooked when examining the historiography of World War I. On 4

August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. However, the declaration of war on

Germany by the British parliament was a decision that had generated some debate and was

not a foregone conclusion. Several issues and groups were attempting to prevent a British

entry into World War I. This essay shall examine the various issues and arguments against

British entry into the war that were prevalent in British politics at the time and outline clearly

how these issues while important were ultimately never going to prevent a British entry into

World War I. The arguments against entry into the war were manifold. Firstly, there were

pressing domestic concerns in the shape of the situation in Ireland. Secondly, there were

growing and prominent groups present in British society that were vehemently opposed to

Britain going to war. This anti-war movement is best exemplified by the rise of the Pacifist

movement in Britain. These elements combined with debate centred on whether Britain

should maintain its isolationist policy and stay removed from conflict in mainland Europe

meant that for a time there was some doubt as to whether Britain would risk getting involved

in a war between the Great Powers in mainland Europe. This essay shall then examine the

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overriding issues that allowed for the arguments outlined above to be dismissed and for

Britain to eventually declare war on Germany in August 1914.

Without doubt the Irish Question was a major issue in British politics that could have

prevented a British entry into World War One. The Irish Question refers to an expression

used principally by members of the British ruling classes from the early nineteenth century

until the 1920s. It was used to describe Irish nationalism and the calls for Irish independence.1

The Irish Question came sharply into focus in British domestic politics in the early years of

the twentieth century particularly after the General Election of 1910 in Britain. In this

election the Liberal Government held power in Britain by virtue of support from John

Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party. As a result of this it became increasingly clear that the

Liberal government would push a Home Rule Bill onto the Statute book.2 However, the

Home Rule’s Bill passage into legislation was fraught with protests and controversy with

many in British politics protesting fiercely against the Bill. Many British officials in the

foreign office and in the diplomatic service were gravely concerned with the effect that the

proposed Irish Home Rule Bill might have on Britain’s position abroad with the instability

and indecisiveness possibly facilitating German aggression abroad and causing the British

Entente allies, France and Russia to doubt the strength of Britain. In addition, granting

concessions to a British colony was viewed as poor practice due to the fear that this might

encourage other British colonies to revolt against Britain.3 Throughout the early part of 1914

there was only one issue on the agenda of British politicians – what to do with the situation in

Ireland. The British Cabinet had little time for foreign policy; with even the Anglo-Russian

negotiations being pushed to the background.4 By examining the British parliament debates

1 Stephen Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918 (New York, 1987), pp. 4-5.2 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918, pp. 2-3.3 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918, pp. 7-8.4 Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 153; Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1977), pp. 215-216.

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in August 1914 it is clear to see just how much prominence and time was diverted towards

dealing with the Irish Question. For example, in the month of July alone, the Government of

Ireland Bill was discussed on sixteen different days in British parliament.5 The growing

tensions in Europe were rarely discussed within British parliament despite the assassination

of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the escalating tensions between the major powers in

Europe. It is only after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia on 29 July 1914

that the British parliament begin to discuss the growing tensions in Europe. An Amendment

to the Government of Ireland Bill was then introduced on 30 July 1914 with the Prime

Minister, Herbert Asquith declaring to parliament that discussing the Irish Question at such a

precious time ‘…might have injurious, and lastingly injurious, effects on the international

situation’.6 Certainly the Irish Question was an issue in British domestic politics that

threatened to prevent British entry into World War I. The amount of time spent debating and

deliberating on the Irish Question within the British parliament highlights just how big an

issue this was in British politics. Up until the end of July, the British Government had little

time for foreign affairs. Maurice Hankey stated that Britain was ‘…being preoccupied with

the Irish crisis and the danger of Civil War, to the exclusion of almost everything else’.7 The

British Government could only begin to fully focus on the growing tensions in Europe at an

incredibly late stage, 30 July 1914 when the British Government and all parties agreed to

postpone the pending Home Rule legislation till after tensions in Europe had been negated.8

However, while the Irish Question was one that certainly took up the majority of the British

Cabinet’s time in the weeks and months leading up to World War I, it was never an issue that

was going to prevent a British entry into war. In order to understand why the Irish Question 5 British Parliamentary Debates, 01/07/1914 – 30/07/1914.6 British Parliamentary Debates, 30/07/1914.7 Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918: Volume I (London, 1961), pp. 150-151.8 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918, pp. 15-17.

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took such pre-eminence over European affairs in the lead up to war, it is necessary to look at

the atmosphere in Europe during 1914. The European scene in the early months of 1914 was

from the perspective of the British government, unusually peaceful. The British Foreign

Secretary, Sir Edward Grey had a visit to Paris that was deemed a great success. The issues in

the Balkans were no more pressing than usual and Anglo-Russian dialogue had begun. British

relations with Berlin had been better than they had been for over a decade.9 Another factor

that led to the British Cabinet concentrating more of its time on the situation in Ireland was

the fact that after many years of uncertainty and threats, the spectre of war, while always

present, could be ignored. The reasoning behind this was the fact that all the previous crises

in Europe e.g. the Agadir Crisis in 1911, had been successfully resolved without conflict. The

volatility of the Balkans and tension between Russia and Germany and other such tensions

within the international system became seen as just another part of the diplomatic scene.10

Undoubtedly, the Irish Question, while being a prominent issue in British politics throughout

the early stages of 1914 was never an issue that could have prevented British entry into

World War One. It was because of this seemingly peaceful situation in mainland Europe that

the British Cabinet could afford to focus its attentions on the troublesome situation in Ireland.

Indeed when it became clear that tensions in Europe had boiled over to unprecedented levels

with Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, the British Cabinet was quick

to push the Irish Question to the side with a deal being announced in parliament on 30 July

with Prime Minister Asquith stating that ‘…in the hope that by a postponement of the

discussion the patriotism of all parties will contribute what lies in our power, if not to avert,

at least to circumscribe, the calamities which threaten the world…’.11 All discussions on

issues related to the Government of Ireland Bill were deferred until there was an end to the

tensions that were afflicting Europe.

9 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, p. 153.10 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 215-217.11 British Parliamentary Debates, 30/07/1914.

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The issue of whether Britain should stay removed from affairs and conflicts in mainland

Europe was another strong factor that could have prevented British entry into a conflict in

mainland Europe. Between 1865 and 1875 the old order on the European continent was

transformed. The traditional power vacuum that existed in the centre of Europe was replaced

by united and formidable force, a German Empire under Prussian leadership.12 This

transformation on the European continent was highly significant for European politics.

However, Britain during this time maintained a policy of non-intervention. The most obvious

reason for this policy of non-intervention enacted by the British government was the fact that

previous military and diplomatic interventions on the continent had been wholly

unsuccessful. The Crimean War which lasted from 1853 to 1856 and was a conflict in which

Russia lost to a coalition consisting of France, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia for

example, had been ineffective in terms of both its military and naval action.13 Moreover, there

was also the reality that Britain would be unable to intervene in a conflict in mainland Europe

quite simple because they did not possess sufficient military might to contend on the

continent. The British navy could play no role in a conflict in central Europe and the British

army was small by continental standards. In addition to this, British forces were required

elsewhere. Sixty-five thousand British troops were required to quell rebellion in India and

other troops were held in readiness to deal with possible troubles in other colonies such as

Ireland, the Maoris and the Abyssinians.14 Furthermore, there was a belief within Britain that

a strong German nation-state in the centre of Europe would actually strengthen the balance of

power for Britain as a strong Germany would act as a restraint upon the colonial activities of

both France and Russia and thus ease Britain’s position in the global sphere. Britain’s

12 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 74-75.13 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 74-75.14 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 75-76.

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‘splendid isolation’ lasted up until 1902 when Britain signed a diplomatic treaty with Japan

pledging mutual aid in the event of the other being engaged in a conflict over China or Korea

with two or more countries and with benevolent neutrality if it was a conflict with only one

country.15 While this diplomatic treaty ended Britain’s isolation within the international

system, and proved to be a precursor to a Triple Entente alliance with Russia and France,

Britain still possessed a policy of non-intervention in conflicts in mainland Europe that held

up until the British declaration of war on 4 August 1914. There can be no doubt that Britain’s

policy of isolation was a strong factor that could have prevented a British entry into World

War One as despite the various diplomatic treaties signed by Britain and the formation of the

Triple Entente alliance bloc, Britain still possessed a flexible position within the European

power structure and could remain neutral from any conflict in mainland Europe because

while Britain was associated with France and Russia, Britain was not bound by any legal

treaty to automatically give military assistance to one or any of the alliance blocs and could

still remained isolated and uninvolved in affairs in mainland Europe.16

While the British policy of remaining uninvolved in events and conflicts occurring on the

European continent could have led to Britain remaining uninvolved in a conflict between the

major powers in mainland Europe, a declaration of British neutrality was never likely happen

due to the German violation of Belgian neutrality and due to a fear of what might happen if

Britain was to remain neutral during such a conflict in mainland Europe. Firstly, the German

violation of Belgian neutrality ensured that the British Cabinet would declare war on

Germany. The Liberal Party, headed by Asquith, were divided on the issue of a declaration of

war against Germany. However, a compromise was reached on 2 August 1914. Sir Edward

Grey was authorised to tell Cambon, a French diplomat, that the German fleet would not be

15 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 116-117.16 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136.

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allowed to attack the French northern coast but no further pledge of assistance was given. It

was thus agreed upon in the British Cabinet to make a German violation of Belgian neutrality

a casus belli (a case for war).17 On 4 July 1914, Britain issued an ultimatum to Germany

directing Germany to respect Belgium’s neutrality which Germany refused to adhere to in

light of ‘French menaces’.18 Germany failed to respect Belgium’s neutrality and on 4 August

invaded Belgium. This ensured an entry into the war by Britain. However, Britain was not

obliged to enter the war to protect Belgian neutrality due to the international treaty signed by

Britain in 1839 as this treaty stated that the ability to uphold the treaty fell on all the

signatories collectively, but not on any single signatory individually.19 It was rather the fact

that a German violation of Belgian neutrality would allow for a near full backing of the

British parliament on the declaration of war. The German invasion of Belgium ensured that a

British declaration of war received the backing of the British Cabinet as Belgian neutrality

had been agreed upon already by those in cabinet as a casus belli. This ensured that it was

much less difficult for Asquith to convince the rest of his Liberal party colleagues and the

country to declare war on Germany. Belgian neutrality proved to be an issue that resonated

loudly with those who were uncertain in Cabinet and indeed, with the public in general.20 The

Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George summed it up in his memoirs stating that

‘The invasion of Belgium put an end to all of these possibilities (of non-intervention)’.21

Secondly, Britain was also likely to enter the war due to a fear of what might happen if

Britain was to stay out. Decades of facing various challenges, anxiously wading through

crisis after crisis had drained much of the confidence and assurance felt by Britons that they

17 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, pp. 162-163; Imanuel Geiss, July 1914 - The Outbreak of the First World War: selected Documents (London, 1967), pp. 274-275.18 British Parliamentary Debates, 04/08/1914.19 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, p. 225.20 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 232-233; Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 138-139.21 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume I (London, 1936), p. 44.

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were strong enough to remain aloof and distant from European conflicts, if Britain so

wished.22 There was a realisation that it was becoming increasingly difficult to preserve the

vast and extensive empire and influence that Britain had gained and maintained in the

preceding one hundred and fifty years. Therefore, to opt out of a European conflict and

potentially see a challenger to the British Empire emerge was not an option for many British

politicians and imperialists.23 A lack of confidence in the strength of the British Empire meant

that to most, remaining on the side-lines of a conflict taking place in Europe was simply not

an option. Many in the Foreign Office and in the upper echelons of British politics were

afraid of what might happen to Britain in the case of a Russian victory, however, most were

afraid that the Germans would emerge victorious from a European conflict and then with

hegemony in Europe secured, resume their naval challenge to Britain with greater vigour,

energy and resources than ever before. Britain in this scenario would be more isolated and

vulnerable than ever before.24 The Conservatives felt that joining the war was a critical aspect

of the self-preservation of the British Empire. Even, the British Foreign Secretary, the Liberal

Party member, Sir Edward Grey, fearing a German victory on the continent was gravely

concerned with being isolated in a Europe that was dominated by one single power.25 Sir Eyre

Crowe, a British diplomat in the Foreign Office went even further in a memorandum on 31

July 1914, when he stated in the opening line that ‘The theory that England cannot engage in

a big war means her abdication as an independent state’.26 There can be no doubt that while

Britain’s isolationist policy can lead to an argument that Britain could have remained neutral

22 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136; G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914 (Oxford, 1971), p. 27.23 C.J. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1989), pp. 1-2; Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, pp. 224-225.24 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 138-139; Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 22-23; Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, p. 131.25 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136.26 Geiss, July 1914 - The Outbreak of the First World War: selected Documents, Document No. 164, pp. 330-331

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throughout World War I, British neutrality was an event that was never likely to happen due

to the violation of Belgian neutrality on 4 August 1914 which allowed the Cabinet to put

forward and pass a British declaration of war. Furthermore, the fear of what might happen to

Britain and its empire if Britain remained aloof in a European conflict also played a major

role in ensuring that Britain would not remain neutral in a conflict between the great powers

in Europe.

Certainly a strong factor that could have prevented Britain from declaring war on Germany in

August 1914 was the large scale opposition to war that was present in many spheres of

British society. The anti-war movement contained many supporters within the incumbent

party in British politics, the Liberal Party. A Liberal government had been in power in Britain

since 1905 and there were many among its members who were anti-war such as Richard

Cobden and John Bright.27 The strength of the anti-war sentiment in Britain however, is best

exemplified by the growth of the pacifist movement in Britain. There was a growth in the

support for the peace movement throughout Europe in the late nineteenth century and early

twentieth century. The French statesman and lawyer Leon Bourgeois, who was an advocate

of the peace movement remarked in 1909 that the world had been ‘…witness for half a

century to a magnificent movement in favour of peace’.28 The beginning of the twentieth

century the organised peace movement or pacifist movement in Britain was the largest and

best organised in the world. In 1905, leaders of peace organisations in Britain created a

central coordinating committee to perform as a British National Peace Council. Britain

possessed a broader network of affiliated societies that advocated pacifist ideals than

anywhere in Europe.29 The British National Peace Council was composed of twenty-nine

branches in the British Isles and four in Australia. This was in addition to the International

27 James Joll, The origins of the First World War (London, 1992), pp. 93-94.28 Leon Bourgeois, ‘The Conditions of Peace’, The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) Vol. 71, No. 11 (1909), pp. 253. 29 William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 141-143.

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Arbitration and Peace Association which was chaired by Felix Moscheles. Furthermore, there

were fifteen other independent peace societies also present in Britain.30 British activism was

also enhanced by the active and robust anti-militarism and anti-imperialism campaigns that

were undertaken by the radical branch of the Liberal party and the emerging alliance between

the Liberal Party and the Labour Party in the House of Commons. Peace activists also

enjoyed the support of high profile statesmen such as David Lloyd George, then Chancellor

of the Exchequer, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who served as the Prime Minister of

the United Kingdom from 1905 to 1908 and as leader of the Liberal Party from 1899 to

1908.31

Certainly while there were many anti-war groups and a strong and vibrant pacifist movement

in Britain prior to the outbreak of war in twentieth century Britain, these groups were not

influential on policy in British parliament and did not hold much influence over public

opinion in Britain. While there were several anti-war movements which are described above

that were prominent in British society there was also many navalist and militarist associations

that attracted reasonable support from the British population. The Navy League, founded in

1895, claimed to have eighteen thousand members by 1900. By 1908, one hundred and

twelve British MPs were members of the Navy League. This can be juxtaposed with the fact

that in the same year, there was only thirty-two British MPs involved in the London

Universal Peace Congress. Following the South African War, the National Service League

which pushed for universal conscription was formed. The League claimed to possess two

hundred thousand members in 1912, of which one hundred thousand were active.32 While the

significance of these numbers is open to dispute as many of these members may have been

influenced by other factors such as social and political influences, this same hypothesis can

30 Sandi E. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914 (Oxford, 1991), pp. 70- 71.31 Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914, p. 71.32 Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, pp. 141-144.

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also be applied to members of anti-war groups and pacifist movements. For example,

Conservative MPs were prominent in the National Service League, while members of the

Liberal Party were conspicuous in pacifist groups and anti-war movements.33 Furthermore,

even those anti-war figures within government had little power when it came down to foreign

policy. Due to the distraction of domestic issues such as the Irish Question, the conduct of

foreign policy was not left to the government but rather to the Foreign Office and the

professional diplomats and as such the anti-war element within government had little

influence and could not have prevented a British entry into the war.34 Even though the Liberal

anti-war group within government had a vote, by the time the issue of whether to declare war

came around, they were without any real choice as if they rejected the Declaration of War

Bill then the Liberal party would have split and power would have been transferred to the

Conservatives who would certainly have voted for war. In addition to this, the German

violation of Belgian neutrality gave the British government the moral grounds they required

to persuade some of the anti-war group and those Liberal followers who were undecided to

support the war.35 Without doubt, while there were many pacifist groups and anti-war

movements in Britain in 1914 before the outbreak of World War I, these groups had little

influence or power to impact on British policy and could not have prevented Britain from

entering into World War I.

Conclusively, there were several issues in British politics that threatened to prevent a British

entry into war in Europe. However, these arguments were neither strong enough nor popular

enough to prevent Britain from declaring war on Germany in August 1914. On 4 August

1914 Britain declared war on Germany. The declaration of war on Germany by the British

parliament was by no means a straightforward decision for the British Cabinet. There was a

33 Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, p. 143.34 Joll, The origins of the First World War, p. 95.35 Joll, The origins of the First World War, pp. 95-96.

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variety of different factors prevalent in British politics that could have potentially prevented

Britain from entering the war. This essay looked at the extent to which these issues could

have in reality prevented British involvement in World War I. This essay examined the

various arguments against British entry into the war that were prevalent in British politics at

the time such as the Irish Question, the large number of people and groups that were opposed

to war and the British isolationist policy. While these issues were important they were

ultimately never likely to prevent a British entry into World War I in August 1914. Firstly,

there was such debate on the Irish Question within British politics due to the seemingly

peaceful nature of affairs in Europe. As soon as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on

28 July, an agreement was reached by all leaders to shelve all discussion of the Irish Question

until after the tensions in Europe had died down. Secondly, while there were growing and

prominent groups present in British society that were vehemently opposed to Britain going to

war they were never likely to have any influence on the British Cabinet. Indeed, the threat of

another rift in the Liberal Party together with the German violation of Belgian neutrality

ensured that the anti-war movement in Britain and within British politics had little chance of

preventing a British entry into World War I. Finally, the debate on whether Britain should

maintain its isolationist policy and stay removed from conflict in mainland Europe was never

likely to occur due to the balance of domestic politics swinging towards war after the German

invasion of Belgium and due to the fact that there was a fear in the British psyche of what

might happen to Britain, chiefly of greater isolation and vulnerability, if they did not get

involved in the war.

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