british railways and the war

BRiTISH RAILWAYSAND TUI~\X~R

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f A.Mc Kenzie

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LONDON

THE MENPES PRINTING & ENGRAVING CO.. LTD.

1917

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~! BRITISH RAILWAYSAND THE WAR

BRITISH RAILWAYSAND THE WAR

BY

F. A. McKENZIE

LONDON:THE MENPES PRINTING & ENGRAVING CO., LTD.

1917

BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE WAR

B RITISH railways have played a great andsplendid part in the war. Working withdepletedstaffs under war conditions, they

have enabledEngland to move millions of menandmillions of tonsof munitionswith the utmostrapidity and with an éñtire absenceof confusion.

~ They have met to the full every demand. They• havesent their trained workersto the coloursby

~ the manyscoreof thousands. They have torn up~ their lines and given their locomotives and~ rolling stock for the serviceof theArmy in France.~ Sinkingancientrivalries, theyhavecometogether,~ working as one for the common good. The~ Governmenttook controlof thelines when hostili-~ tiesbegan,butGovernmentcontrolmerelyprovided

the agencythrough which the railwaymenthem-selves rallied to employ their resourcesas aneffective instrumentof war.

The British and Germanrailway organisationsbefore the war presenteda striking contrast.Germanrailwayswerealmostwholly Stateowned.Many of them were built primarily for pur-posesnot of commerce, but of strategy. Tothe GermanGreat GeneralStaff the railway wasone of the foundations of national war prepara-tion. The railway staffs were selectedfrom theArmy, andwere virtually managedasa branchof


thecentralmilitary organisation.Theveryrailwaycars were built to a size that could be employedfor transportingthe maximum number of men.Goods trucks were plannedso as to be suitablewhen the moment camefor the carriageof gunsandwar material.

The British railwayswereprivately owned,andwere built solely for commercialpurposes. Thecontrol of the principal lines wasdivided betweenforty companies. These maintained only aminimum of co-operationamongthemselves,andwherever they ran through the same territorythere was keen rivalry. British lines were laid,the size of railway carriages and goods trucksdecided, and the staffs selectedsolely for theordinary work of peace time. It was the busi-nessof the railways to provide for the needsofthe communitiesthey servedand to obtain a fairreturn for their shareholders,and nothing else.They were peace lines laid down not wherestrategydictated,but where businesswas likelyto be best.

One thing, however, had been done, a thingthat was to prove of vital importancewhen warbroke out. In 1871, following the Franco-Prussianconflict, the British Governmenttook power byAct of Parliamentto acquireby Royal Proclama-tion any or all of the railways of the UnitedKingdom in time of war. A committeeof railwaymanagerswas already in existenceto deal withsucha situation. This body, known first as theWar Railway Council and afterwards as the


Railway Executive Committee, was to act as acentral organisation,to give instructions, and toco-ordinatethe activities of the different railwaysin war time. Working in co-operationwith it wasthe Engineerand Railway Staff Corps—avolun-teer organisation of railway workers whosePurposewas to develop schemes,methods, andpersonnelfor the War Railway Service. It wascomposed of general managersof the leadingrailways,leadingcontractors,engineers,andotherrailwaynien.

Month by month, and year by year, the StaffCorps worked out schemesfor the utilisation ofour lines underany contingency. It plannedhowto carry out greatmovementsof troops from onepart to theother. Few,if any, thencontemplatedmore thanhandlingbodiesof menrunning into atotal figureof from four to five hundredthousand.When,later, the needsof thewar raisedthe totalto ten times the old maximum,the plansprovedto have been so soundly laid that the greaterdemandswere easilymet.

The Railway Executive Committee and theRailway Staff Corps,working in conjunctionwiththe Director-General of Military Transport,gradually completed,during the years precedingthe war, their plansof operations. Thesecoveredmore especially the movements of .a Britishexpeditionaryforce to its ei~nbarkationport, thequick concentrationof men at any point to repelan invading army, and the evacuationof invadeddistricts. By 1912 all was in readiness. Every

3


railway managerhad in his safe a confidential,sealed, unopeneddocument, detailing a schemeof mobilisation. In it he wastold exactlywhat todo, the trains to he moved, their starting-pointsand destinations, and the entire schedule ofrunning, if war came. So far as the operationofour railways was concerned, England wasprepared.

THE MEANING OF GOVERNMENT

CONTROL

On the same day that war was declared(August 4th, 1914) the railways of England,Wales, and Scotland—not Ireland—were takenover by the Government. The managersopenedtheir sealedinstructions and proceededto carrythem out. It had been provided in the Act of~87I that full compensationshould be paid tothe ownersfor any loss incurred. The Govern-ment, however,did not at thebeginningannounceany termswith the companies~This was left fora later date. Governmentcontrol, it is importantto note, did not mean Governmentownership.The linesremainedthepropertyof the companies.They retained the managementof their ownconcerns, subject to the instructions of theExecutive Committee, and the whole machineryof administration went on as before. The solepurpose at the beginning was to facilitatethe movements of troops. But as the wardeveloped,as economy becamemore and more

4


essential, the scope of the Railway ExecutiveCommittee, now in supreme control, becamegreatly extended.

The official chairmanof the Railway ExecutiveCommittee was the Presidentof the Board ofTrade,but the realpresidingchief was the actingchairman, Mr. H. A. (afterwards Sir Herbert)Walker, general manager of the London andSouth-WesternRailway. Working in co-operationwith the acting chairman were twelve generalmanagersof leadingBritish lines. They were Mr.J. A. F. Aspinall, of the Lancashireand York-shire; Mr. Guy Calthrop, of the London andNorth-Western; Mr. C. H. Dent, of the GreatNorthern; Mr. (afterwardsSir) F. H. Dent, ofthe South-Easternand Chatham; Sir Sam Fay,of the Great Central; Mr. (afterwards Sir)William Forbes, of the London, Brighton, andSouth Coast; Sir Guy Granet, of the Midland;Sir A. Kaye-Butterworth,of the North-Eastern;Mr. Donald A. Matheson,of the Caledonian; SirRobert Turnbull, of the London and North-Western; and Mr. A. Watson (assistant togeneral manager), Lancashire and Yorkshire.The secretary was Mr. Gilbert L. Szlumper.Under the central body were groups of corn-mittees, eachmade up of railway experts. TheWar Office and the Director-Generalof Transportwere in touchwith the CentralCommittee. Therewasa constantinterchangeof ideas,but from thebeginning therewasno attempt to supersedetherailwaymenin carrying out their work.

5

BRITISH RAILWAYS ANb THE WAR

The main plansof thewarpolicy of therailwayshad, of course, to be approvedby the Govern-ment, andannouncementsweremadein the nameof the Presidentof the Board of Trade. But theplan uniformly adoptedwas for the, authoritiesto tell the Railway Executive Committee whathad to be done,and then to leaveit to plan thedetailsof how the work shouldbe completed. Inother words, the expertswere allowed to carryout their own work in their own way, so far aswas possible, under war conditions. And theygot the thing done. Sir Guy Granet, generalmanagerof the Midland Railway,becameDeputyDirector-Generalof Military Railwaysin the WarOffice. Mr. Eric C. Geddes,’ deputy generalmanager of the North-Eastern Railway, wasappointedDeputy Director-Generalof MunitionsSupply; he was knighted in 1916, and madeDirector-Generalof MovementsandRailways,andDirector-Generalof Communicationsin France.His history from then is one of the romancesofthewar. Having donegreatwork on therailwaysat the front, he moved to the Admiralty, wherehe shortly becameFirst Civil Lord anda memberof the Government. He was succeededat theWar Office by Sir Guy Granet. Sir Sam Fayassumedresponsibility in the War Office for thedirectorateof movements. Mr. Thornton,generalmanagerof the Great EasternRailway, becameHon. Lieut.-Colonel of the Engineerand RailwayStaff Corps, and Deputy Director of Inland,Waterwaysand Docks.

6


The first task before the Committee was,onecalculatedto tax its resourcesto the full. TheTerrjtorials—the volunteer forces of the UnitedKingdom—had been called to the Colours, andhad to be distributed to their training groundsand their defence areas all over the country.Simultaneouslythe Expeditionary Force, num-bering 120,000 men, with a vast amount ofmaterial of war, had to be transported in aminimum of time to Southampton—theport ofembarkationfor France.

SEVENTY-THREETRAINS INFOURTEEN HOURS

The Government gave the railways a time-~ limit of sixty hoursto makereadyfor dispatchto~ Southamptonof 350 trains of about 30 vehicles~ each; In addition, close on 1,200 other trains~ Were necessaryfor conveying the equipment,

munitions, and food suppliesof the forces. ThereWere about 6o,ooo horses to be carried—7 to atruck; there were 5,000 tons of baggageand6,~oovehicles. Sir Herbert Walker, over whoseSystem_flueLondonandSouth-WesternRailway—the trains had to travel’ to Southampton,de-scribedwhat was done in a speechshortly after-wardsat the AmericanLuncheonClub in London.He told of the Governmenttime-limit of sixtyhours. “We ‘deliveredthe goods,’ asyou Ameri-cans would say, in forty-eight hours. AtSouthampton,for practically every day of th~

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first threeweeksof the war, we handledduring aperiodof fourteenhoursno fewer than 73 of thesetrains, including the running of them to ‘the boatside and the unloading of the full equipmentofguns, ammunition, and horses.

“The trains arrived at intervals averagingtwelve minutes. It was a matter of specialprideto all therailwaymenconcerned—andwe generalmanagersgive credit for the feat to the efficiencyof our disciplined staffs—that practically everytrain without exception came in to scheduledtime. - Some of them came from remoteparts ofthe kingdom—Walesand the North of Scotland.

Among the audience on that occasion wasMr. (afterwardsLieut.-Colonel) H. W. Thornton,general managerof the Great EasternRailway,a distinguishedAmerican railway organiser,whohad come to England from the United States.He said that so far as his knowledge of greattransportationachievementswent, there was noevent in railway history to comparewith whatthe British lines hadaccomplishedin that monthof August, 1914. Certainly in America, the landof “big stunts,” there had never been anythinglike it. It may be addedthat this rapid traiis-portation of the troops to Southamptonwasonlypossiblebecausethe docks there had been care-fully planned by the railway company for thehandling of large massesof men and quantitiesof material. The trainsconveyingthe troops andfreight wererunright down to oneof theberthingstations; they were emptied there with the

S


greatestexpedition,andat oncesentback. Eachtrain had a permanentlydisplayedindex numberOn it, by which it was known throughout itsJourneys; its exact time of arrival anddepartureat eachplace were scheduled,and the schedulehad to be kept. What is still morenoteworthyisthat while this rapid concentrationof troopswasproceedingat Southamptonthe ordinary trafficof therailwayswasmaintainedwith comparativelylittle alteration. Here andtherea section of lineWasclosedfor a fewhours,particularly sectionsofSome of the junction lines across London; butthe general public scarcely realised what was

~ happening. Such precautionswere taken that

even the elaborateespionagesystemmaintained~ at that time by Germany in England failed to~ convey to the enemy full details of what was~ going on. TheBritish Army hadlandedin France~ and was marching into Flanders before the~ Germansrealisedwherethey had landedor what~ their numberswere.

“The railway companies,”said Lord Kitchener,three weeks after the outbreak of war, “in theall-important matter of transport facilities havemore than justified the complete confidencereposedin them by the War Office, all gradesofrailway service having laboured with untiringenergy and patience.”

The termsunderwhich therailways were beingtaken over for the period of the war were pub-lishedin September.The Governmentguaranteedto the proprietorsof the railways that. their net

9

I3IilflStI 1~AILWAYS AND THE WAR

revenueshould be the same as in11913, exceptwhen the net receipts for the first half of 1914were lessthanthe first half of igi~ ; in that casethe sum payablewas to be reducedin the sameproportion. The entire Governmenttraffic—menand freight—wasto be carried without any directchargebeing made for it or any accountsren-dered. This plan was consideredsatisfactorybyboth sides. In the majority of cases therehadbeen a reduction of earningsin the first half of1914 over the previous half-year, and companieswere contemplating a still further reduction.The interestsof their shareholdersbeingassured,they were ableto devotethemselvesto the workof economical and efficient distribution, quiteapart from the usual financial problems. The oneweak side of this agreementwasthat it madenoallowancesto cover increasedinterest paymentson account of new investments, new capitalexpendituresincethe war began. This point wasafterwards met by an arrangement that theGovernmentshouldpay interestat 4 per cent. onall new capital invested by the railways sinceAugust 4, 1914, on new lines, branches,terminals,equipment,or other facilities put into use sinceJanuary I, 1913.

SOME EFFECTS OF COMBINED ACTION

The conclusion of the financial agreementbetween the Government and the companiesautomaticallybrought about a great economyin

I0


the system of railway accounts. Hundredsofclerkshadbeenemployedat the Railway ClearingHouseat Euston,London, in dissectingpaymentscoveringdifferent lines, so that eachline shouldhave its proper share. This work was no longerrequired. Thevastamountof competitionmain-tained before the war for traffic at onceceased.British railways, particularly those competingWith othersfor thebusinessof particulartowns,hadmaintained staffs of canvassersnot only forfreight, but evenfor passengertraffic. Their com-petition went so far that, in somecases,if it wasannouncedthat a visitor was coming to one ofthe Midland townshe would promptly receiveathis homeaddresscallerson behalfof rival railwaysaskinghim to buy his ticket by their line. Therewas still more acutecanvassingfor goodstraffic.All the great companieshad extensivepublicitydepartments,which, by posters,pamphlets,andnewspaperarticles,sought to bringhometo peoplegenerallytheattractionsof their lines. In theyearsbefore the war this publicity had tendedto growmore and more elaborate and more and morecostly. Now it was sweptaway at a stroke. TheWeekly traffic returns of the different lines wereno longer required,and soceasedto bepublished.The reportsof the companieswere cut down to abare minimum, and in many caseseven thesereducedreportswere not sentto the shareholdersunlessthey speciallyaskedfor them. The ticketsissuedby variouscompaniesfor the samepointsWere made for a time available by the trains of

II


any railway running betweenthe points to whichthe tickets were issued. This concessionwasshortly afterwards withdrawn.

The great strain of the dispatch of the firstExpeditionaryForce passed,but it soon becameclear that the railways would be faced by adouble problem. They would all the time haveavast amount of military traffic to handle—thetransferenceof troops, the carriageof munitions,the assembling of different sections of warmaterial. Simultaneouslywith this great increaseof work, they had a very serious reductionof staff. A number of railwaymen had beencalledup at once asArmy Reservistsand Tern-tonials, while many others volunteered to jointhe Colours. It was estimateda few monthsafter the outbreakof war that 66,ooo men, outof a total of 643,135,had joined the Army. Thisfigure rapidly grew, until at the end of 1916nearly 150,000 men had been releasedby therailways for war duty—close on 50 per cent. ofthe menof military age. This shortageof labourquickly grew into one of the most seriousissues.Thecompanieshadno desireto keepbackrecruitsfrom the Army, but they realised that it wasessentialfor the welfare of the nation that therailways should be maintained in an efficientmanner and be preparedto meet any militarydemandswhich might be placed on them. TheKing, in a messageto the skilled workersin theshipbuilding and armament firms, emphasisedthis latter point in words that applied equally to

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railway workers: “His Majesty greatly admiresthat spirit of patriotism which arousesin them(the skilled workmen) the desire to enlist andfight at the front, but His Majesty wishes toremind them that by work that they alone canmost successfullycarry out they are assistinginthe prosecution of the war equally with theircomradesserving by land or sea.”

The Railway ExecutiveCommittee,which nowwas the main body for making financial arrange-ments,announcedthat therailway companieshadarrangedto supplementthe Army pay andallow-ancesof Army Reservistsand Ternitonialsin therailway servicewho joined the Coloursin suchamannerthat the families would be maintainedincircumstances which should avoid hardships,during the absenceof the breadwinner of thefamily. Certain privileges, suchas the supply ofcheap coal, would be continued. Occupantsofthe companies’ houseswould not be disturbed,and when the men returned positions would befound for them on the railways equal to thosethey formerly occupied. The generalplan adoptedwas to makea grant to augmentthe income ofthe wife and family to at least four-fifths of theman’s standardwage.

THE COMPANIES AND THEIR STAFFS

At the time of the outbreakof war the railwaycompaniesand the men’s unions—theNationalUnion of Railwaymenandthe AssociatedSociety

13


of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen——wereengagedin a controversy on the question ofwages. A railway conciliation schemedraftedbya Royal Commission had come into operationearly in 1912. This was to continueuntil Novem-ber 6, 1914, but either side could terminateit onor after that dateby twelvemonths’ notice. Themen had given notice in November, 1913, towithdraw; they wanted the conditions revised.When war broke out the negotiationsbetweenboth sideswere in a very forward state. A tem-porary arrangementwas arrived‘at in October,1914, by which the conciliationschemewasto becontinued,but to beterminableby eithersideat sixweeks’ notice. Many railway employeeswereconvinced that since the Governmentwas nowvirtually in control of their lines their demandsfor increasedwagesshould be met. The rapidrise in the cost of living had made it obvious,after a time, that somethingmust be done. Therailway companiesfelt that, from their point ofview, any ‘rise in wages, even though wholly ormainly made by the Government,might havethe serious result of putting on them a heavyburden to be borne after the war and afterprivate ownership was resumed. It is alwaysdifficult to reduce wages, whatever the con-ditions may have been under which they areraised. ‘

On February13, 1915, termsof settlementwerearranged. A weekly bonuswas to be paid to allwage-earningemployeesof eighteenyearsold an4

I”


upwardsengagedin the manipulation‘~ftraffic;all whose standardrate of wageswas under 30s.

a week wereto receivea weeklybonusof 3S., andthose earning 3os. or more were to be paid 2s.

The cost of this bonus was divided, one-quarterbeing paid by the companiesand three-quartersby the Government. Modifications of theoriginal agreementbetweenthe Governmentandthe railway companies were made in orderthat this might be done. This agreementwas revised afterwards in 1915, and in its

~ final form all employeesof eighteen years or~ Upwardswere given a bonus of 5s. per week,~ those of under eighteen 2s. 6d. The under-?~ standing at the time was that this arrange-

ment was finally to settle the wages question:~until the end of the war. A definite under-~ taking was given on that point by the men’s~ organisations

The National Union of Railwaymenand theAssociated Society of Locomotive Engineersand Firemen undertakethat during the pen-dencyof this agreementtheywill notpresenttothe railway companiesany fresh demandsforincreasedbonusor wages,or generalalterationsin conditionsof service,and that they will notgive countenanceor supporteither to a demandon the part of any of their membersto reopenthe settlementnow made or any strike thatmight be enteredupon in furtheranceof suchdemand.


Here, however, war conditions proved astrongerfactor than formal agreements.The costof living generally, and particularly the cost offood, continued to mount up. A second warbonusof 5s. was addedto the first, coming intoforce in September,1916, and in April, 1917, afurther agreementwas come to between theRailway Executive Committee and the varioustradeunions of the menby which the war bonuswas increasedto 15s. per week for all employeesover eighteen and 7s. 6d. per week for thosebelow that age. It was estimatedthat the totaladditional expenditure on account of the warbonuswould be £23,000,000. The whole of theselatter increaseswere borneby the Government.

Theserapid risesin the wagespaid to the mencame in for much criticism. It was pointed outthat the increase of 1916 was nearly equal towiping out the dividendson the ordinary stock.The Railway Magazine declared: “Under noother system but State control would a warbonus be paid on an all-round basis alike to‘lads of eighteen years of age and the oldestemployee, and single and married men placedon the same plane, no matter what may betheir financial responsibilities or comparativewages.” But herecertain considerationshave tobe borne in mind. This rise in wageswas notpeculiar to the railways, but was general inindustry. The railwaymenunder the war labourregulationswere not to leave their employmentfor other work. It was felt that they could not

II)

BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE. WAR

reasonably be expected to continue under farlower wagesthan othermen in allied industriesinthe samedistricts. Above all, therewas the out-standing fact that the old scale of wages wasinadequateunder war prices. The averagecost offood of the kind mainly purchasedby workingmen had doubled; clothing was much dearer;all the incidental expensesof living, exceptrentand rates, had gone up; and men could notmaintain their families decently on the old wageScale. The idea of making the rise the sameforall rankswas to benefit most thosewho neededitmost—thelowest paid men.

Up to thebeginningof thewar British railways~ had been very reluctant to employ women~ labour, even for office details. Booking clerks,~ head office staff, ticket~collectors, attendantsin~. diningcars,were in nearly every casemen. But~ the shortageof men and the desireto releaseas~ many as possible for service with the Colours

Causedthe introduction of women workers early~ in 1915. The experimentwas a great success.

Womenwere employedon an ever-growingscale,not only for purely clerical duties,but for manualWork of many kinds. SooneverywheretherewereWomen cleaners, women porters, women ticketCollectors, women booking clerks, and manyOthers besides. The trade unions pressedfor adefiniteunderstandingaboutthewagesthewomenWere to receive, and further askedfor assurancesthat the employment of women in capacitiesWhere they were not formerly ‘employed was an

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BRITISH RAILWAYS AND TIlE WAR

emergencyaction arising out of circumstancescreatedby the war, and would not prejudice inany way the undertakinggiven by the’ railwaycompaniesas to the re-employmentof men whohad joined the Colours, on the conclusionof thewar. The pay of womenin gradesin which theywere not engagedin August, 1914, was fixed atthe minimum pay of the grade. At first womenwerenot granteda war bonus; but in November,1916, it was arranged that women of eighteenyearsof ageand over should be given a bonusof 3s. a week and those under eighteen yearsof age Is. 6d. This amount was later increasedto 5s. 6d. a week for the seniors and 2s. gd. forthe juniors.

No statementshave been issued showing thefinal balance-sheetof the railways under Govern-ment administration, and any such statementwould be very difficult to makeout, since a vastquantity of Government traffic not creditedunder the war arrangementswould have tobe chargedup in attempting to make any fairbalance-sheet.

In December,1916, Mr. Bonar Law, speakingofficially in the Houseof Commons,said that theGovernmentagreementwith the railway com-panies, notwithstanding the grant ‘of the warbonus to railway employees,had “involved nofinancial loss, but probably some gain.” Whenwe contrast the working of the railways underGovernmentsupervisionwith the working of theBritish shipping independently,the gains of the

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I3RITIsH RAILWAYS AND THE WAR

Government control become evident. Therailways under Government direction keptfreights even, directed their operations onan organised plan, gave undue profits to noman, and were worked for the sole purposeof benefiting the country. The merchantshipping trade, left largely under privatecontrol, was used in many directions forthe accumulation of individual fortunes—fortunes earned out of the necessitiesof theCommunity.

The eraof economyin administrationextended.At first the railway companies,believing that thewar would possibly be short, attemptedto carryon asusual,to maintainasmanyof their ordinaryservicesas they could, and to give the public allthe facilities to which they had beenaccustomedin daysof peace. After a time it becameevidentthat this course was impossible. Step by step,restrictionscamein force. Restaurantand sleep-ing car services were cut down or suspendedaltogether. Excursion and week-end tickets,formerly a very prominent feature in Britishrailways, ceased. The serviceof passengertrainsWas reduced. Minor stations were closed, andSome branch lines were abandoned. The“luggage in advance” system,by whjch passen-gerscould sendtheir luggageon a small paymentbefore they themselvesleft andhave it deliveredby the railway company to their destination,Was ended, and passengerswere asked to takeaslittle baggageaspossible. Later on passenger

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baggagewas definitely limited to ioo lb. per

head.

FURTHER BENEFITS OF THE “POOL”

Among the most importanteconomiesin hand-ling traffic was, first, the establishmentof thecommonuser of railway companies’ open goodswagons. Undertheold systemthewagonreceivedloaded’ by one companyfrom anotherhad to bepromptly returned to the owning line, eventhough therewas no freight for it on its return.Under the commonuserarrangementit becameavailable for loading in any direction, thusreducing the haulage of empty vehicles to aminimum. This system of pooling luggagecarscameinto force on January2, 1917. Thepool didnot include the very large number of privatelyownedwagons,estimatedfrom 6oo,oooto 700,000,which are a distinct feature of British railways;but the benefits of the pooi were soon seentobe so real that steps were pushedforward totake over the control of the private wagonsalso.

A minor economyintroducedearly in the warwasan agfeementby the railways to accepteachother’s “paid” and “to pay” stampsand labelson parcel traffic. This savedvery much labour,and it led to a further developmentin January,1917, when the Railway Executive Committeeannouncedthat from a given date “the carriagechargesfor all descriptionsof traffic for convey-

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anceby passengertrain or other similar servicemust be paid by the sender at the forwardingstation.” The whole systemof bills and accountsfor passengergoods traffic was thus swept away.Somereformerseven,proposedthat the railwaysshouldgo further, andinsist upon the prepaymentof all small traffic by goodstrains. Still anotherstepwas a decisionthat claimantsfor the loss ordamageof goods traffic should be dealt with bythe companyon which theclaim wasmadewithoutany division, suchashad formerly takenplace, ofthe amount paid between the companies con-cernedin the route over which the traffic hadbeenconveyed.

The saving in printed matter was so extensivethat at leastone large companywas ableto turnout many tons of paper which had beenstoredfor office useand to put this on the market at atime when paperwas scarcest.

In January, 1917, in addition to the changesalready described, passengerrates were raised50 per cent., and Irish railways, which hadformerly been outside the Governmentcontrol,were takeninto it. The rise in passengerratesWas instituted not to increaserevenue, but toreduce the amount of travelling. The Britishauthoritiesopenly appealedto the peoplenot totravel except when necessary. It was urged onthe public in every way possible that pleasuretravelling under existing conditions was un-patriotic. The railwaymen were wanted forother work. Thus at the Christmasseasonof

2X


1916 the Board of Trade issued an appeal as

followsCHRISTMAS TRAINS.

JOURNEYS OF REAL URGENCY ONLY.The Board of Trade desire to urge upon the general

public the necessityof avoiding all travelling by trainat Christmastime.

No journey which is NOT of REAL URGENCYshould be undertaken,and the public are warned thatthe passengertrain serviceduring the ChristmasHolidayswill be greatly reduced in comparison with previousyears,and that the Railway Companiescannotundertaketo CONVEY PASSENGERS to ANY PARTICULARDESTINATION. The Military Authorities propose torestrict the leave of soldiers stationed in this country,and, in the interestsof the nation, civilians shouldregardthemselvesas under a like restraint. Soldiers on leavefrom the front will be given a preferenceover otherpassengers.

The increase in passenger fares did notapply to workmen’s tickets, season tickets,traders’ tickets, or zone tickets, nor to thelocal traffic in towns. Moreover, shortly after-wards the Board of Trade announced thatthe increase of ~o per cent, would not applyto tickets issued to relatives desiring to visitwounded soldiers or sailors in hospitals, onproducing the hospital authority to do so.The rise was generally borne with equanimity,but it caused some protests. One deputationappealed to the Railway Executive Committeefor considerationin the matter of railway faresfor watering-places and health resorts. Thedeputationwas told that, so far from the Increas?

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BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE WA~

being modified, a still further increasemight be

necessaryin the future.

TRANSPORTINGSTOCK TO THE

WAR ZONE

Late in 1916 a fresh considerationcameto thefore. In the early stagesof the war the Britishhad relied mainly for the transportof their goodsin France on the service of large numbers ofPowerfulmotor wagons. Experienceproved thatwhile a motor service might answer as a tem-porary measurefor a comparativelysmall body ofmen, it was impossible to provide for very largearmiesby road traffic. It wasparticularly impos-sibleto bring forward with sufficient rapidity theenormousquantities of shells required and thenumerousheavygunswithout the useof properlybuilt railroads. The companiescould not wellmanufactureafresh the rails, locomotives, androlling stock necessary,or educateoutside mento operatethemin France. To meetthis situationlargesectionsof line were torn up in EnglandandSent over to France,andevery sparelocomotiveand sparebit of rolling stock was also sent over.These rails were quickly laid down by the Rail-road Construction Corps, drawn largely fromrailroad builders from the Dominion of Canada.Ihe new lines were operated by the RailroadCorps, recruited from practical British railway-men, This of necessity still further reducedtravelling facilities in England. Speaking at

23


Carnarvon on February 3, 1917, the PrimeMinister dealt with this matter

“The Germansdiscoveredearly in the warthat the railwaysarea greatmilitary machine.As usual,we comea little later.

“When I wasSecretaryof Statefor War oneof my first dutieswasto appointa greatrailwaymanagerto take over the questionof railwaytransport. The Commander-in-Chiefin Francenot merely welcomed his appointment, butinstantly appointedhim as chief railway repre-sentativebehind the lines. He is one of theablestrailway men in the world, and the rail-way systemtherehasbeentakenin hand. Butyou neededlocomotives, you neededwagons,you neededdrivers,you neededsteelrails, andeven if these had been times of peace youcould not have had them without taking noend of time in manufacturing for a greatdemandof that kind. The Presidentof theBoard of Trade had to take the matter inhand. He thought it was common knowledgethat therewas infinitely more travelling on thepart of the generalpublic in this country thanin any fighting country in the world—non-essential travelling—and he advised theserestrictions in order to cut down unnecessarytravelling.

“What hasbeenthe result? He hasalreadysaved hundreds of locomotives—I could tellyou how many—for the Army in France,andtheir drivers are volunteeringto go there. TheUnion of Railway Servantshasbeenextremelyhelpful to us in engagingthem. He savedtensof thousandsof wagons; he savedscoresof

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thousandsof tons of steel rails, that we couldnot possibly get manufacturedfor at least ayear, andnot even thenexceptat the expenseof steel,which we requiredfor building againstsubmarines.Now this is what I want to put toyou. The next time you find that the time-table is inconvenientto you, the next time youhave got to pay an extra fare, do not forgetyou are helping the Army in Franceby thatmeansmore than if you had sent three fresharmycorpsthere. Thosearesomeof the thingsthat we want the public to do.”

Still further economies were necessary. Themenorganisingtherailway servicesof the countryever kept in mind the purposeof effecting theseeconomieswith the minimum of inconveniencetothe public. In July, 1917, an important scheme,going far beyond anything yet attempted, wasannounced,for the coal trade. The carriage ofcoal was one of the big problemsof the railways,for it involved much labour. In the winter of1916—7, owing partly to delaysin railway transitand partly to difficulties in local delivery, con-siderable numbers of people—partiCUlarlY thepoor—had been unable to obtain supplies ofcoal with any regularity. It was feared thatconditions might be still worse in the ap-proachingwinter. This the authoritiesplannedto prevent.

The Controller of Coal Mines published ascheme,datedJuly 4, 1917, for the purposeofreorganisingthe transportof coal by railway ‘forinland consumption. Under this schemeEngland,

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Wales,andScotlandwere divided out into twentyareas,andeachareahad to takeits suppliesfromcertain fixed districts of production. It Was

estimatedthat the plan would effect a saving inrailway transport of not less than 700 millionton miles annually. The schemewas basedonfour main issues:—

(i) That consumption of coal should takeplace as near the producingpoint as possible;

(2) That in view of the superior facilitiesofferedby the main traffic lines the movementoftraffic should follow these routes whereverpossible

(3) That the movementof coal should, as faras possible, be in well-defined directions—northto south, north to south-east,north to south-west,easttO west;

(4) That an area producing less coal thansuffices for , its own need should not sendany portion of its output to other areas.That an area producing more coal than itrequires for consumption within the area itselfshould only distribute to adjacentor convenientareas.

This scheme did not affect water-bornecoal,anthracite,or coke of any description.

It was the precursor of other schemeswhichwere to reduceunnecessarytraffic in goodsto theminimum.

No descriptionof the work of the British rail-ways in the war would be completewithout somereferenceto the servicein handling the wounded.

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Soonafter the outbreakof hostilitiesseveralof therailway companies began the construction ofspecialambulancetrains. Oneof thefirst of thesewas equippedat the Great EasternWorks atStratford. It was madeup from vehicles takenfrom service,andconsistedof eight cars. ThefirstWas a five-compartmentbrake composite. Theguard’s compartmentwas fitted up as a mess-room for doctorsand nurses,the first classcom-partmentsin it were reservedfor two nursesandtwo doctors, and the two thirds were converted,one into a pantry, onea stores,andone asa roomfor two ‘men on the staff. Next camea ward car,With one sectionfor four officers and a ward forsixteenmen. This was followed by a ward fortwenty men. Then camefour cars—apharmacycar and treatment room, three more cars withWards for twenty men each—adining car, and alast car with three third class compartmentsadaptedeachto accommodatetwo men, and twofirst classcompartmentsconvertedinto storesanda small guard’scompartment. This wasan excel-lent exampleof the quick conversionof existingStock for war purposes. Other lines did muchthe same.

As soonaspossiblespecialtrainswerebuilt, newthroughout,for hospital requirements,and werePut on the line both in Englandand in France.Oneexcellentexampleof thekind usedin EnglandWas built by the Brighton Railway. It consistedof sixteen bogie coaches, two kitchen cars, a

Pharmacycar, four ward cars, five sitting-up cars27

BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE’ WAR

(one for infectious cases),a staff car, a personnelcar, and two brake vans. Accommodationwasprovided for 144 bedsand 384 sitting-up cases.Thetrain was930 feet 8 incheslong, with buffers,and it weighed429 tons. Its equipmentwas thefinal word in comfort and convenience. Theabsenceof vibration, the easewith which casescouldbetakenin andout, thefacilities for carryingpatientsto the treatmen,~troom, and the arrange-mentsfor thestaff excitedthegreatestadmirationin the numerousplaceswhere the train was puton show beforeit wasbrought into service. .Notthat the Brighton Railway was exceptional inthis. All thegreatEnglishrailway works devotedtheir utmost skill and care to the ambulancetrains, and eachpitted itself againstthe othersinprovidingthebestfor ourwoundedmen. Hewouldhavebeena bold judge to decidewhich did best.

PROBLEMS AFTER THE WAR

The responsiblemen on our railways recognisethat the problems in railway managementandcontrol raisedby the war will not altogethercometo an end whenthe war is over. A newera hasbegun in railway management,and it will beimpossible to go back completely to pre~warconditions. Even if it were possibleit would behighly undesirable. While no definite schemeshaveyet beenarranged,it can safelybe foretoldthat therewill be greaterunity of administratioflwhen peacereturns than in the old daysbefore

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war came. Co-operationhasproved to be betterthan cut-throatcompetition. In the old daystheRailway Clearing Houseat Eustonprovided themachinery for a limited amount of co-operation,but one dissentientcould often hold up greatreforms. The Railway Executive Committee ofto-day is almost certain to develop into a per-manentcentralbody which will act asthecoherer,the organiser,and the SupremeCourt of Appealamong railways themselves,when rival schemesthreatenconflict. This centralbody will promote

~ economyof effort. It will prevent extravagant~ and excessivecompetition, and it will, if wisely~ guided,hold the scalesevenly betweenthe triple~ Claims of the railway proprietors, the railway~ employees,and the generalpublic.

The secondproblemis that of wages. Practical~ railwaymen maintain that under normal condi-

tions it will be impossible to pay, when the~‘. companiesemerge once more from Government

Control, anything like the war bonusof 15s. perWeek per man now received. Any attempt torevert, to the pre-war wages would probablyPlungeus into a labourwar. What will be a fairand practical wage for the men after the war ,isOver? How can it be’ paid? If a substantialincreaseon the pre-war ratesis found necessary—as many think it will be—how are the com-panies to meet it? Are they to be allowed tomaintain higher passengerrates or to increasefreight charges? If so, will thesehigher chargesmean increased revenue? It is an axiom ‘of

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BRITISH RAILWAYS AND~THE WAR

managementthat low fares meanheavy traffic.Here is a matter which will demandthe most,careful considerationof both railway manage-ments and the men’s leaders.

The third problem is that of the future ofwomen’s labour on the railways. The companieshave promisedthat menwho haveleft them toservewith the Colourswill be reinstatedon theirreturn in positionsequal to thosethey left. Thatpromisemust bekept, andkept to the full. But,unfortunately,manyof the menwill neverreturn.Women have been found such efficient railwayservants that they are certain to be retained.Many branchesof railway employmentbefore thewar exclusively held by men will, a few yearshence, be wholly or almost wholly in women’shands. How can the changewhich has alreadytaken place be made permanent withoutstrife?

The changed conditions‘after the war may,of course, provide in themselvesa solution forall thesepossible problems. In the great rushof work to be done when the world is to berepaired, when ruined countrysidesare to berebuilt, great cities re-equipped, and the wasteof war made good, there will be for a timeat least a demandfor labour greatereven thanthe supply afforded by’ a gradually demobilisedarmy. It hasbeenthe experienceof othergenera-tions that a successful nation emerging trium-phantly from a hard-foughtwar hasin itself suchsprings of hope, enthusiasm,and inspiration that

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the impossibilities of other daysare tackledandovercome. The British railways may at leasthope that, having solved the problems of wartraffic and employment in unequalled fashion,theywill masterthe lesserproblemsof the comingdaysof peace.

Of the many high tributes paid to the Britishrailways by the responsibleheadsof the nation,only two needbe quotedhere. The first is fromSir William Robertson,the Chief of the ImperialGeneralStaff, on May 12, 1917 :—

During the last five or six weeks, I suppose,we have expended some 260,000 tons of

~ ammunition, which have had to be movedby~ road, rail, andseafrom thefactoriesin England~ to the guns in France, and man-handled~ probablynot less than half a dozentimes. As~ you can imagine, this hasentaileda great deal~ of railway work at the front as well as in~ England, and the skilful and determinedway~ in which the work has been executedby the~ railway managersand employees who have

assistedus is beyondall praise.

The Earl of Selbornenearly two years earlier,on August 26, 1915, said :—

Have you thought of what the railwaymenare doing? An immensenumberof menhavebeen taken from the railways. The railwaysare carrying now a volume of trade,such asnever hasbeencarried on our railways before,and the strain on those men is very great.That is nothing but silent heroism; as neces-

3’


sary and as greata contribution to victory asthe work of the seamenor the work of thesoldier.

No tributes’ were more richly deserved.

?UULiC U~V.F~QrY~cTQRlA

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british railways and the war

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