Sociological Paradigmsand OrganisationalAIlalysisElements of the SocioloRY of Corporate L({e

Gibson BUlT'H'eBmlecturer in the Department of Behaviour in Organisations,University of lancaster, EnglandGareth MorgalmAssociate Professor of Organisational Behaviour andIndustrial Relations, York University. Toronto

ASHGATE

PART II: THE PARADIGMS EXPLORED~ Functiollllalist Sociology

Introduction

This boole, which has devoured the last two years of our lives, isthe product of a friendship and intellectual partnership. It began asan innocuous idea which grew with such strength that it developedinto a 'way of seeing'. It has changed the ways in which we thinkabout social theory, and we hope that it will do the same for others.

The book is intended to clarify and help overcome what seem tobe some of the major sources of confusion within the socialsciences at the present time. Initially it had a fairly specific objec-tive: to attempt to relate theories of organisation to their widersociological conteJlt. In the course of development, however, thisendeavour widened in scope and evolved into an enterpriseembracing many aspects of philosophy and social theory in gen-eral. As such it now stands as a discourse in social theory ofrelevance to many social science disciplines, of which those in thegeneral area of organisationstudies - industrial sociology, organ-isation theory, organisational psychology and industrial relations- are but special cases by which we illustrate our general themes.

Our proposition is that social theory can usefully be conceived interms of four key paradigms based upon different sets ofmetatheoretical assumptions about the nature ofsocial science andthe nature of society. The four paradigms are founded upon mutlll-ally exclusive views of the social world. lEach stands in its ownright and generates its own distinctive analyses of social life. Withregard to the study of organisations, for example, each paradigmgenerates theories and perspectives which are in fundamentalopposition to those generated in other paradigms.

Such an analysis of social theory brings us face to face with thenature of the assumptions which underwrite different approachesto social science. It cuts through the surface detail which dressesmany social theories to what is fundamental in determining theway in which we see the world which we are purporting to analyse.It stresses the crucial role played by the scientist's frame ofreJfer-ence in the generation of social theory and research.

The situation with regard to the field of organisation studies atthe present time, as in other social science disciplines, is that a vast

Introduction ix

proportion of theory and research is located within the bounds ofjust one of the four paradigms to be considered here. Indeed, thebulk of it is located within the context of a relatively narrow rangeof theoretical possibilities which define that one paradigm. it is noexaggeration, therefore, to suggest that the social-scientific enter-prise in general is built upon an extremely narrow set ofmetatheoretical assumptions. This concentration of effort in arelatively narrow area defines what is usually regarded as thedomimmt orthodoxy within a subject. Because this orthodoxy is sodominant and strong, its adherents often take it for granted as rightand self-evident. Rival perspectives within the same paradigm oroutside its bounds appear as satellites defining alternative points ofview. Their impact upon the orthodoxy, however, is rarely verysignificant. They are seldom strong enough to establish themselvesas anything more than a somewhat deviant set of approaches. As aresult the possibilities which they offer are rarely explored, letalone understood.

Yn order to understand alternative points of view it is importantthat a theorist be fully aware of the assumptions upon which hisown perspective is based. Such an appreciation involves an intel-lectual journey which takes him outside the realm of his ownfamiliar domain. It requires that he become aware of the bound-aries which define his perspective. h requires that hejourney intothe une"plored. h requires that he become familiar with paradigmswhich are not his own. Only then can he look back and appreciatein full measure the precise nature of his starting point.

The work presented here is an attempt to take the student oforganisations into realms which he has probably not exploredbefore. It is a journey upon which we, the authors, unwittinglyembarked as a result of certain nagging doubts and uncertaintiesabout the utility and validity of much contemporary theory andresearch in our subject. We were concerned about the way inwhich studies of organisational activities had generated mountainsof theory and research which seemed to have no obvious linksoutside narrow discipline areas. We were concerned about theessentially ephemeral nature of our subject. We were concernedabout the academic sectarianism reflected at various times in openhostility, ostrich-like indifference and generally poor-qualitydialogue and debate between essentially related schools ofthought. Yn short, we felt that our subject area called for a closee1tamination of the assumptions upon which it is based with a viewto seeing it in a new, and hopefully refreshing, light. Our book inessence presents an account of our journey and a record of the

J( Introduction

conclusions and insights which have emerged.We began our enterprise by considering how we could dis-

tinguish between different approaches to the study oforganisations. The view that 'all theories of organisation are basedupon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' seemed torecur time and again in our conversations and we soon found itdefining two major dimensions of analysis. Although organisationtheorists are not always very explicit about the basic assumptionswhich inform their point of view, it is clear that they all take a standon each of these issues. Whetller they are aware of it or not, theybring to their subject of study a frame of reference which reflects awhole series of assumptions about the nature of the social worldand the way in which it might be investigated.

Our attempt to explore these assumptions led us into the realmof social phi losoph y. We were confranted wi th problems of ontol-ogy and epistemology and other issues which rarely receive con-sideration within the field of organisation studies. As weinvestigated these issues we found that they underpinned the greatphilosophical debates between social theorists from rivalintellectual traditions. We realised that the orthodoxy in our sub-ject was based in essence uponjust one of these traditions, and thatthe satellite perspectives which we had observed as surroundingthe orthodoxy were, in fact, derived from quite a separateintellectual source. We realised that they were attempting toarticulate points of view which derived from diametricallyopposed assumptions about the basic nature of the social world;accordingly they subscribed to quite different assumptions aboutthe very nature of the social-scientific enterprise itself.

In investigating assumptions with regard to the nature of societywe were, at first, able to operate on firmer ground. The sociologyof the 1960s had focused upon the 'order-conflict debate' -whether sociology emphasises the 'problem of order' or the'problem of conflict and change'. By the late 1960s the debate hadbeen pronounced dead, and these two views of society were seenmerely as two aspects of the same problematic. In reviewing theliterature relevant to this debate we became increasingly con-vinced that it had met a premature death. Whilst it was clear thatacademic sociologists had convinced themselves that the 'problemof conflict' could be subsumed under the 'problem of order',theorists outside this tradition, particularly those interested inMarxist theory, were actively engaged in the development ofsocial theories which placed the problems ofconflict and change atthe forefront of their analysis. Although academic sociologists and

Introduction xi

Marxist social theorists appeared content to work in isolation,ignoring the contradictory persp.ectives w~lich they. presented, itseemed that any adequate analySIS of theones of society must takethese rival perspectives into account. .

Our journey into Marxist literature took us mto yet another newrealm as far as our initial interests were concerned. We weresurprised to find striking parallels betwe.en i~tellectualdevelopments within Mandsttheory and academiC soc~olog~. Wefound that the assumptions about the nature of SOCial sCiencewhich had divided academic sociologists into different schools ofthought also divided Mantist theorists. In that realm, too, t~edominant theoretical framework was surrounded by satelliteschools of thought offering rival explanations. Pursuing thes~ tra-ditions to their source, we found that they emerged from prec~selythe same bounds of social philosophy which had underWrittendivergent elements within sociology itself. It became clear that therival traditions emphasising 'order' as opposed to 'conflict' sharedthe same pedigree as far as their roots in social philosophy wereconcerned. Deriving from similar assumptions about theontological and epistemological status of social science, they h.adbeen wedded to fundamentally different frames of reference Withregard to the nature of society. ., ..

Given these cross linkages between nvalmtellectual traditions,it became clear to us that our two sets of assumptions could becounter-posed to produce an analytical sch~me for studying soci~1theories in general: the two sets of assu.mpllons de~ned fo~r baSICparadigms reflecting quite separate vlew.s of .soclal. reahty. Onattempting to relate this scheme to the SOCial sCience hteratu~e :vefound that we possessed an eKtremely powerful tool.for negottatmgour way through different subject areas, and one which made senseof a great deal of the confusion which characterises much con-temporary debate within the social scienc.es. Th~ schem~ offereditself as a form of intellectual map upon which SOCial theones couldbe located according to their source and tradition. Theories rarelyif ever appear out of thin air; they usually have a well establishedhistory behind them. We found that our i~tellectual map all.owedus to trace their evolution. Theories fell mto place accordmg totheir origins. Where rival intellectual traditions had been fused,distinctive hybrid versions seemed to appear. What had firstoffered itself as a simple classificatory device for organising theliterature now presented itself as an analytical tool. It pointed ustowards new areas of investigation. It allowed us 10 appraise andevaluate theories against the backcloth of the intellectual tradition

xii lfllroductioll

which they sought to emulate. It allowed us to identify embryonictheories and anticipate potential lines of development. it allowedus to write this boole.

in the following chapters we seek to present our analyticalscheme and to use it to negotiate a way through the literature on

soci~1 theory and org~nisationalanalysis. We have aimed to pre-sentlt as clearly and directly as we can whilst avoiding the pitfallsof oversimplification. But the concepts of one paradigm cannoteasily be interpreted in terms of those of another. To understanda new paradigm one has to explore it from the inside in terms ofits own distinctive problematic. Thus, whilst we have'made everyefforlto present our account as plainly as possible as far as the useof the English language is concerned, we have necessarily had todraw upon concepts which may at times be unfamiliar.

. The r,emaining chaJ;>ters in Part i define the nature of our two keydimenSIOns of analysIs and the paradigms which arise within theirbounds. In this analysis we polarise a number of issues and mancemuch use of rough dichotomisations as a means of presenting OUfcase. We do so not merely for the purposes of classification but toforge a working tool. We advocate our scheme as a heuristic devicerather than as a set of rigid definitions.

in Part II we put our analytical framework into operation. Foreach of our four paradigms we conduct an analysis of relevantso.cial .theory and then proceed to relate theories of organisation totillS wider background. lEach of the paradigms is treated in terms~onsistentwit.h. it,S own distinctive frame of reference. No attemptIS made to cnticise and evaluate from a perspective outside theparadigm. S.uch criticism is all too easy but self-defeating, since itIS usually directed at the foundations of the paradigm itself. Ailfour paradigms can successfUlly be demolished in these terms.What we seek to do is to develop the perspective characteristic offthe paradigm and draw out some of its 'implications for socialanalysis. in so doing we have found that we are frequently able tostrengthen the conceptualisations which each paradigm generatesas far as the study of organisations is concerned. Our guiding rulehas been to seek to offer something to each paradigm within theterms of its own problematic. The chapters in Part II thereforeare ~ssentially eJ\pository i~ nature. They seek to' provide ~detailed framework upon which future debate might fruitfully bebased.

Part. m. pre~ents a slJ(~rt conclusion which focuses upon some ofthe prinCipal Issues which emerge from our analysis.

PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK

10 Assumptions about theNature of Social ScienceCentral to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories of organisation arebased upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' .in thischapter we wish to address ourselves to the first aspect of thisthesis and to examine some of the philosophical assumptionswhich underwrite different approaches to social science. We shallargue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in termsof four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology,human nature and methodology.

All social scientists approach their subject via eJ\plicit or implicitassumptions about the nature of the social world and the way inwhich it may be investigated. First, there are assumptions of anontological nature - assumptions which concern the very essenceof the phenomena under investigation. Social scientists, foreJ\ample, are faced with a basic ontological question: whether the'reality' to be investigated is eJ\ternal to the individual - imposingitself on individual consciousness from without - or the product ofindividual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective'nature, or the product of individual cognition; whether 'reality' is agiven 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind.

Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set ofassumptions of an epistemological nature. These are assumptionsabout the grounds of knowledge - about how one might begin tounderstand the world and communicate this as knowledge tofellow human beings. These assumptions entail ideas, for eJ\ample,about what forms of knowledge can be obtained, and how one cansort out what is to be regarded as 'true' from what is to be regardedas 'false'. Indeed, this dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' itself pre-supposes a certain epistemological stance. It is predicated upon aview of the nature of knowledge itself: whether, for example, it ispossible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge asbeing hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form,or whether 'knowledge' is of a softer, more subjective, spiritual oreven transcendental kind, based on eJ\perience and insight of a

!Figure 1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science

Assumptions about the Nature oj Social Science 3social world as ifit were a hard, external, objective reality. then thescientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relation-ships and regularities between the various elements which it com-prises. The concern. therefore. is with the identification and defini-tion of these elements and with the discovery of ways in whichthese relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues ofimportance are thus the concepts themselves. their measurementand the identification of underlying themes. This perspectivee){presses itself most forcefully in a search for universal lawswhich explain and govern the reality which is being observed.

If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality. whichstresses the importance of the subjective experience of individualsin the creation of the social world. then the search for understand-ing focuses upon different issues and approaches t?em in differe~tways. The principal concern is with an understanding of the way Inwhich the individual creates. modifies and interprets the world inwhich he or she finds himself. The emphasis in extreme cases tendsto be placed upon the explanation and understanding of what ~sunique and particular to the individual rather than of what ISgeneral and universal. This approach questions whet~er thereexists an external reality worthy of study. In methodological termsit is an approach which emphasises the relativistic nature of thesocial world to such an extent that it may be perceived as 'anti-scientific' by reference to the ground rules commonly applied inthe natural sciences.

2 SocioloRical Paradi/?ms and OrRanisational Analysisunique ~nd .essenti~lIy personal nature. The epistemological~ssumptlOnsIn these Instances determine extreme positions on theIssue of whether knowledge is something which can be acquired on

~he one hand. or is something which has to be personally exper-Ienced on the other.

Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues. butconcept~ally separate from them. is a third set of assumptionsconcermng human. nature an? in .particular. the relationshipbetween human beings and their environment. All social science.clearly .mu.st be predicated upon this type of assumption. sincehuman ~Ife IS. essentially the subject and object of enquiry. Thus,we can Identify perspectives in social science which entail a viewof human beings responding in a mechanistic or even deterministicfashion to the situations encountered in their external world. Thisview tends to be one in which human beings and their experiencesare regarded as products of the environment; one in which humansare conditioned by their external circumstances. This extremeperspecti~ecan be contrasted with one which attributes to humanb~i~gs a m~ch more creative role: with a perspective where 'freewill OCCUPI~S the ~entreof the stage; where man is regarded as thecreator of hiS environment. the controller as opposed to the con-trolled, the master rather than the marionette. In these twoext~emeviews of the relationship between human beings and theirenvironment we are identifying a great philosophical debatebetween the advocates of determinism on the one hand andvoluntarism on the other. Whilst there are social theories whichadhere to eac~ of t~ese.extremes,as we shall see, the assumptionsof many SOCial SCientists are pitched somewhere in the rangebetween.

The three sets of assumptions outlined above have directimplications of a metJlOdoloRical nature. Each one has important

cons.eq~encesfor t~e way in Which. one attemp~s to investigate andob~aln kn0':'Vledge about the social world. Different ontologies.epl~temo.logl~sand models of human nature are likely to inclineSOCial sClent!sts. t?wards different methodologies. The possiblerange of ch?l.ce IS Indeed so large that what is regarded as scienceby ~he tradl~lOnal '.natural scientist' covers but a small range ofoptIOns. nt. IS p~sslbl~, for, example, to identify methodologies~mployed In social sCience research which treat the social world~Ik~ ~he natural world. as being hard. real and external to theindividual, and others which view it as being of a much softerpersonal and more subjective quality. '

If one subscribes to a view of the former kind. which treats the

The subjectivistapproach tosocial sci0nce

Th0 subjective-objective dimensionThe objectivist!IIpproach tosocial science

4 Sociological Paradigms and OrKaflisational AnalysisHn this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological,

human and methodological standpoints which characteriseapproaches to social sciences, we have sought to illustrate twobroad and somewhat polarised perspectives. !Figure 1.1 seeks todepict these in a more rigorous fashion in terms of what we shalldescribe as the subjective-objective dimension. Hi identifies thefour sets of assumptions relevant to our understanding of socialscience, characterising each by the descriptive labels under whichthey have been debated in the literature on social philosophy. Hnthe following section of this chapter we will review each of tile fourdebates in necessarily brief but more systematic terms.

The Strands of DebateNominalism-realism: the ontological delbateRThese terms have been the subject of much discussion in theliterature and there are great areas of controversy surroundingthem. The nominalist position revolves around the assumptionthat the social world external to individual cognition is made up offnothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used tostructure reality. The nominalist does not admit to there being any'real' structure to the world which these concepts are used todescribe. The 'names' used are regarded as artificial creationswhose utility is based upon their convenience as tools for describ-ing, making sense of and negotiating the external world. Nominal-ism is often equated with conventionalism, and we will make nodistinction between them. 2

Realism. on the other hand. postulates that the social worldexternal to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard,tangible and relatively immutable structures. Whether or not welabel and perceive these structures, the realists maintain, they stiliexist as empirical entities. We may not even be aware of theexistence of certain crucial structures and therefore have no'names' or concepts to articulate them. 1F0r the realist, the socialworld e)(ists independently of an individual's appreciation of it.The individual is seen as being born into and living within a socialworld which has a reality of its own. It is not something which theindivi~ualcreates-it ex~sts 'out there'; ontologically it is prior tothe eXistence and conscIOusness of any single human being. 1F0rthe realist, the social world has an existence which is as hard andconcrete as the natural world.]

Assumptions about the Nature of Sodal Science 5Anti-positivism-positivism: theepistemological delbate4

Hi has been maintained that 'tille word "positivist" like the word"bourgeois" has become more of a derogatory epithet than auseful descriptive concept'. S We intend to use it here in the lattersense, as a descriptive concept which can be used to characterise aparticular type of epistemology. Most of the descriptions ofH)ositivism in current usage refer to one or more off the ontological,epistemological and methodological dimensions of our scheme foranalysing assumptions with regard to social science. It is alsosometimes mistakenly equated with empiricism. Such confiatiolllscloud basic issues and contribute to the use of the term in atderogatory sense.

We use 'positivist' here to characterise epistemologies whichsede to explain and predict what happens in the social world bysearching for regularities and causal relationships between its con-stituent dements. Positivist epistemology is in essence based uporllthe traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences.Positivists may differ in terms of detailed approach. Some wouldclaim, for eRailllple, that hYlPothesised regularities can be verifiedby an adequate experimental research programme. Others wouldmaintain that hypotheses can only be falsified and neVer demon-strated to be 'true'.6 However. both 'verilficationists' and 'fal-silficatioll1lists' would accept that the growth of Imowledge is essen-tially a cumulative pmcess in which new insights are added to thee,dsting stock of Imowledge and false hypotheses eliminated.

The epistemology of anti-positivism may talee various forms butis formly set against the utility of a search for laws or umderlyill1lgregularities in the world ofsocial affairs.lFor the anti-positivist. thesocial world is essentially relativistic and can only be understoodffmm the point of view of the individuals who IlIre directly ill1lvolvedin the activities which are to be studied. Anti-positivists reject th(\';

st~ndPoiDlt off the 'observer'. whidu charactenises positivisten>nstemology, as a valid vantage poillllt for understlllndinll1l RmmaB1l

activiti~s. They maintain that one can only 'understand' byoccupymg the frame olfreferelfllce olfthe Pllllrticipall1t ilfll action. OnelInllls ao Ulll1lderstamll from the inside rather than the olUtside. lFromthis point olf view social scielOlce is seenn as beillbg essertlltiatny allsubjective rather tnUaln llUIll objectiV

6 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational A.nalysis

Voluntarism-determinism: the 'human nature'debateThis debate revolves around the issue of what model of man isreflected in any given social-scientific theory. At one extreme wecan identify a determinist view which regards man and hisactivities as being completely determined by the situation or'environment' in which he is located. At another e"treme we canidentify the voluntarist view that man is completely autonomousand free-willed. Insofar as social science theories are concerned tounderstand human activities, they must incline implicitly orexplicitly to one or other of these points of view, or adopt anintermediate standpoint which allows for the influence of bothsituational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities ofhuman beings. Such assumptions are essential elements in social-scientific theories, since they define in broad terms the nature ofthe relationships between man and the society in which he lives.o

Ideographic-nomothetic theory: the method-ological debateThe ideographic approach to social science is based on the viewthat one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It thus placesconsiderable stress upon getting close to one's subject ande"ploring its detailed background and life history. The ideographicapproach emphasises the analysis of the subjective accountswhich one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involvingoneself in the everyday flow of life - the detailed analysis of theinsights generated by such encounters with one's subject and theinsights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries,biographies and journalistic records. The ideographic methodstresses the importance of letting one's subject unfold its natureand characteristics during the process of investigation.9

The nomothetic approach to social science lays emphasis on theimportance of basing research upon systematic protocol andtechnique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employedin the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testinghypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour. It ispreoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the use of

A.ssumptions aboul the Nature of Social Science "Iquant.itativ~ tedmiques .for the analysis of data. Surveys,questIOnnaires, personality tests and standardised researchinstruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools whichcomprise nomothetic methodology. 10

Analysnng AssumptnoJnls about the Nature ofSocial ScieJnlcel~ese four s~ts of assumptions with regard to the nature olf social

sCI~nce prOVide an e"tremely powerful tool for the analysis ofSOCial theorr. in mU~h of t~e literature there is a tendency toconti.ate the Issues which are mvolved. We wish to argue here that

con.slder~ble.~dvantagesaccrue from treating these four strands ofsoclal~sclentdlcdebate as ~naly~ically distinct. While in practice

ther~ IS often a strong relatIOnship bet.ween the positions adoptedon each. of the ~our strands, assumptions about each can in factvary. qUite considerably. It is worth ex.amining this point in moredetail.

The extr~me.posi tions on each of the four strands are reflected inth~ two major mtellectual traditions which have dominated socialsCience over .tlhe last two. hundred years. The first of these isusually descnbed as 'SOCIOlogical positivism'. in essence thisreflects th~ attempt to apply models and methods derived from thenatural s~l~nces to the study of human affairs. h treats the socialworld as If It wer.e t~e natural world, adopting a 'realist' approachto o~tology. TIus IS backed up by a 'positivist' epistemology~elatlvely :d~terministic' yiews of human nature and the use ofnomothetiC methodologies. The second intellectual traditioR1l

that of '

Notes and! References

8 Sodolo~kal Paradigms and Organisational Analysisexposure to the basic tenets ofGerman idealisr~.Social scienc~ forthem is seen as consonant with the configuration of assumptionswhich characterise the objective e"treme of our model. ~owev~r,over the last seventy years or so there has been an mcreasl,nginteraction between these two traditions, particularly at a SOCIO-philosophical level. As a result intermediate points of viey-r haveemerged, each with its own distinctive configurafion ofassumptions about the nature of social science. T~ey have 31.11spawned theories, ideas and approaches cha~actenstlc of theirintermediate position. As we shall argue m later chapters,developments il1l phenomenology, ethnomethod.ology and theaction frame of reference are to be understood In these terms.These perspectives, whilst offering their ?wn special brand ofinsight, have also often been used as launchlOg pa~s for attacks onsociological positivism and have generated a c~nslderable a~ou~tof debate between rival schools of thought. fhe nature of thiSdebate can only be fully understood by grasping and aprrecia~ingthe different assumptions which underwrite the competing pomtsof view.

It is our contention that the analytical scheme offered hereenables one to do precisely this. It is offered not as a ,m~reclassificatory device, but as an important tool for negotiatingsocial theory. It draws attention to key assumrtions. I~ alloy-rs ~neto focus on precise issues which differentiate soclo-sclentlficapproaches. It draws attention to the degre~ of ,congrue~cybetween the four sets of assumptions about SOCial sCience whichcharacterise any given theorist's point of view. We offer it here asthe first principal dimension of ~ur ,theoretical .sche~e foranalysing theory in general and orgamsatlOnaltheory m pa~tlcular.For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to It as the'subjectivc>--objective' dimension, two descriptive labels whichperhaps capture the points of commonality between the fouranalytical strands.

2.

For a further discussion of the nominalism-realism debate,see Kolakowski (1972), pp. 15-16.Kolakowski (1972), PI'. 158-9. In its most extreme formnominalism does not recognise the e"istence of any worldoutside the realm of individual consciousness. This is thesolipsist position, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter6.

Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 93. For a comprehensive review of 'realism', see Keat and Urry

(1975), pp. 27-45. They make much of the distinctionbetween 'positivism' and 'realism' but, as they admit, theseterms are used in a somewhat unconventional way.

4. For a further discussiol1l of the positivism-anti-positivismdebate, see, for e"ample, Giddens (1974) and Walsh (1972).

5. Giddens (1974), p. l.6. See, for e){ample, Popper (1963).7. For a good illustration of 31111 anti-positivist view of science,

see Douglas (l970b), PI'. 3-44.8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves many

other issues which we have l1Iot referred to here. The precisemodel of man to be employed in any analytical scheme,however, is underwritten by assumptions which relflect thevoluntarism-determinism issue in one way or another. Wehave isolated this element of the debate here as a way oftreating at its most basic level a necessary assumption of allsocial-scientific theories which purport to account for humanactivities. Detailed propositions with regard to the precisee){planation of human activities elaborate in one way oranother this basic theme.

9. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the ideographicapproach to social science, see Blumer (1969), ch. I.

10. It is important to emphasise here that both nomothetic andideographic methodologies can be employed in a deductiveand inductive sense. Whilst the inductivc>--deductive debatein science is a subject of considerable interest andimportance, we do not see it as being central to the fOUirdimensions suggested here as a means of distinguishingbetween the nature of social science theories. That notwith-standing, it remains an important methodological issue, ofrelevance to both sociology and organisational analysis,within the conte". of the assumptions e){plored here.

20 Assumptions about the Natureof Society

All approaches to the study of society are located in a frame ofreference of one Idnd or another. Different theories tend to reflectdifferent perspectives, issues and problems worthy of study, andare generally based upon a whole set of assumptions which reflecta particular view of the nature of the subject under investigation.The last twenty years or so have witnessed a number of attemptson the part olf sociologists to delineate the differences whichseparate various schools of thought and the meta-sociologicalassumptions which they reflect.

The Order-Conflict DebateDahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956), for example, havesought to distinguish between those approaches to sociologywhich concentrated upon e)(plaining the nature of social order andequilibrium on the one hand, and those which were more con-cerned with problems of change, conflict and coercion in socialstructures on the other. This distinction has received a great deal ofattention and has come to be known as the 'order-conflictdebate'. The 'order theorists' have greatly outnumbered the 'con-flict theorists', and as Dawe has observed, 'the thesis that socio-logy is centrally concerned with the problem of social order hasbecome one of the discipline's few orthodo)(ies. It is common as abasic premise to many accounts of sociological theory whichotherwise differ considerably in purpose and perspective' (Dawe,1970, p. 207).1

Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as havingbeen a somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place (Cohen,1%8; Silverman, 1970; van den Berghe, 1969). Influenced by thework of writers such as Coser (1956), who pointed to the functionalaspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor-ate conflict as a variable within the bounds of theories which are

Assumptions about the Nature of Society IIprimarily geared towards an explanation of social order. Theapproach advocated by Cohen, for example, clearly illustratesthis. ]He takes his point of departure from the work of DahrendOifand elaborates some olf the central ideas in the order-cordlictdebate to present two models olf society, which are characterisedin terms of competing sets olf assumptions which attribute to socialsystems the characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity,cons.ensus, reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability andpersIstence on the one hand, and the characteristics olf coerciondivision. hostility. dissensus, conflict, malintegration and chang;on the other (Cohen, 1968, Pl'. 166-7).

Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorf is mistaken in treat-ing the order and conflict models as being entirely separate. He ineffect suggests that it is possible for theories to involve elements ofboth models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or theother. From this point of view, the order and conflict views of

societ~ are but two sides of the same coin; they are not mutuallyexclUSive and thus do not need to be reconciled. The force of thissort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attentionaway from the order-conflict debate. In the wake ohhe so-calledcounter-culture movement of the late I%Os and the failure of the1968 revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have becomemuch more interested in and concerned with the problems of the'individual' as opposed to those of the 'structure' of society ingeneral. The influence of 'subjectivist' movements such asphenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory, which wereferred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended tobecome much more attractive and more worthy of attention. As aresult, interest in continuing the conflict-order debate has sub-sided under the iQfluence olf issues relating to the philosophy andmethods of social science.

Our contention here is that ilf one reviews the intellectual sourceand foundations of the order-conflict debate, one is forced toconclude that it has met a premature death. Dahrendorf and

lo.c~(wood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through theirwntmgs and to restore it to a central place in sociological theory.For. the. most p~rt Marx had been largely ignored by leadingSOCIOlogIsts, the mfluence of theorists such as Durltheim, Weberand Pareto having been paramount. Interestingly enough, theselaHer three sociologists are all very much cOlClcemed with tDu~problem ofsocial order; it is Marx who is preoccupied with the roleoff conflict as the driving force behind social change. Stated in thisway, therefore, the order-conflict debate is underwritten by a

Assumptions about the Nature of Society B3'ftlllb>HIe 2.11

As Dahrendorf admits, this conceptuaiisatimll is something off anoversimplification. and whilst providing a very useful tool fOB'coming to grips with the differences between the two standpoints,it is open to the possibility of misintelfJPretatioffll, in that the differentadjectives mean different things to differet]t peo[ple. Nowhere isthis more evident than in the way in which tine notion of cml/licdhas been tn':ated in the sociological literature. Since Coser'sdemonstration of the functions of social conflict, for e"ample, therole of conflict as an integrating mechanism has received a greatdeal of attention, nn effeCt, the whole notion off 'conflica' llDas oftefi1lbeen incorporated within the notion of integration. Dahrendorfsintegration/confllict dimension has been conveniently telescopedso that it is brought within the bm.ll1lllds off sociology's traditiona8concel'll1l for the eRplanation of order. TIne fallacy off this [positionbecomes dear if one considers certain e,(treme forms of conflict,such as class conflict, revolution aUlld war, which can only beincorporated in the integrationist model by the wildest stretch oftone's imagination. ]Examples such as these suggest tIDat it is mis~leading to equate this type of macrostmcturnl collll.flict with thefunctional conflict identified lby Coser. There is an importalIl\tquestioll1l olfdegree involved here, which emphasises the dalIl\gers olfthe dichotomisation of integrntion and con1f1ict; realistically thedistinction between the two is much more off a conailfmum tIDarrn ahemajority olf writers have recognised.

Another strand of the Dalhllrendorlf scheme which caun lberegarded as somewhat problematic lies ilIl\ the distinctioUll lbetweelll1conumU$ all1ld coercion. At first sight the distincti0ll1l appearsobvio,us and clear-cut, focusing UpOIIl\ shared va811.11es 01Il\ the orrneInall1ld and tine impositiolIl\ off some sort of Iforce on the other. OU1Icloser iUllspectioUll there is at certain ambiguity. Where do the sharedvalues come lfrom? Are they acquired all.lltoR1Iomousiy or imposedon some members ofl'socnety by ot8u~rs?ThisI[]luestiolfn identifies the

ChangeConflict

DisintegrationCoercion

rhe 'conflict' or 'coercion'I-iew of society empJwJises:

SiabililyInlegralion

lFunclional co-ordinalionConsensus

rhe 'order' or 'inte/?rationis,'I'iew of society emphasises:

The opposing adjectives which Dahrendorfs schema suggests fordisuinguisinilllg approaches to the study olf society can be conve-unielIl\u8y brought together ill'll the fform olf a table, as follows:

The integration theory of society, as displayed by the work of Parsonsand other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number of assump-tions of tine following type:(I) IEvery society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of ele-

ments.(2) IEvery society is a well integrated structure of elements.(3) IEvery element in a society has a function, i.e., renders a con-

tribution to its maintenance as a system.(4) IEvery lfulJlctiornng social structure is based on a consensus of

values among its members ...., ..What Hhave called the coercion theory of society can also be

D"4;ducedl to a small number of basic tenets, although here again theseassumptions oversimplify and overstate the case:(I) IEvery society is at every point subject to !processes of change;

social change is ubiquitous.(2) IEvery society displays at every point dissenslls and conflict;

social conflict is ubiquitous,(3) IEvery element in a society renders a contribution to its disin-

tegratiolJl and change.(4) IEvery society is based on the coercion of some orits members by

others. (Dahrendorf, 1959, IPn>. 160-2)

H2 SociologicallParadigms and Organisational Analysis

differell1lce between tRne persl>ectives alIId concerns ofleading socialURneorists of the nineteell1lth and early twentieth centuries. ModemsocioBogy has done Biule more than articulate and develop the basicthemes initiated Iby these pioneers of social analysis. To state thatthe order-con1f1ict debate is 'dead' or a 'non-debate' is thus toIImderpBay, if not ignore, substantial differences between the workof Marx and, for example, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. Anyonefamiliar with the work of these theorists and aware of the deepdivision which exists between Mandsm and sociology is forced toadmit that there are fundamental differences, which are far frombeing reconciled. 2 nn this chapter therefore, we wish to re-evaluatethe order-conflict issue with a view to identifying a key dimen-sion for analysing the assumptions about the nature of societyreflected in different social theories. In order to do so, let us returnto the work of Dahrendorf, who seeks to set out the opposingissaJIes in the following terms:

D4 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

possibility that consensus may be the product of t~e use ~f someform of coercive force. for example, as C. Wnght Mills haspointed out, 'What Parsons and other grand theorists call "valueorientations" and "normative structure" has mainly to do withmaster symbols of legitimation' (1959, p. 46).

A normative structure here - what Dahrendorf would view asCOIllSei1lSUS - is treated as a system legitimising the powerstructure. from Mills's point of view, it reflects the fact ofdomination. Hn other words, shared values may be regarded not somuch as an index ohhe degree of integration which characterises asociety as one which reflects the success of the forces ofdomination illl a society prone to disintegration. from one point ofview, extant shared ideas, values and norms are something to bepreserved; Ifrom another, they represent a mode olf dominat~onIfrom which man needs to be released. The consensus/ coerciondimension cam thus be seen as focusing upon the issue of socialcontrol. Consensus - however it may arise - is identified inDahrendorf's scheme as something independent of coercion. Thiswe believe to be a mistaken view since, as suggested above, itignores the possibility olf a form of coercion which arises throughtllhe control olf value systems.

Hn distinguishing between stability and change as respectivefeatures olf the order and conflict models Dahrendorf is again opento misinterpretation, even though he explicitly states that he.d

i6 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysisto thdr frame of reference within the conte){t of their order-ornientated mode of thought. In order to illustrate this point, let usreturn to the work of Cohen (1968) referred to earlier.

Hn advocating his viewpoint Cohen appears to be misinterpretingthe distinction between the two models. His interpretation ofconcepts telescopes the different variables into a form in whichthey can be seen as consistent with each other. In effect his wholeanlalysis reflects an attempt to incorporate the conflict modelwithin the bounds of the contemporary theory of order. He thusloses the radical essence of the conflict perspective and is able toconclude that the two models are not mutually exclusive and donot need to be reconciled. He argues that the two models are notgellluine alternatives and in effeca suggests that each is no morethan the reciprocal of the other. He is therefore able to leaveDahrendorfs analysis with the central concern of his book - thefi1'roblem of order - largely intact. 'fhe incorporation of conflictilllto the bounds of the model of order de-emphasise itsimportance. S

Un line with the analysis which we presented earlier, we arguetUnat the attempt to reduce the two models to a common base ignoresthe fundamental differences which e"ist between them. A. conflicttlDeory based on deep-seated structural conflict and concernedwith radical transformations of society is not consistent with afUlOlctionalist perspective. 'fhe differences between them,therefore, are important all1ld worthy of distinction in any auemptto analyse social theory. With the benefit ofhindsigh,t, it is possibleto see that many of the misinterpretations which have arisen haved]ouDe so becallDse the models Dun Dahrendorf's analysis were notsufficiently differentiated. We wish to propose, therefore, thatcertain modifacations be made illl order to articulate the differencesiUl a more eJ{piicit and radical form. Since much of the confusionhas arisen because of the ambiguity of the descriptions associatedwith the two models we wish to suggest the use of a somewhatdifferent terminology.

Our analysis has shown that the ou'der-conflict distinction is inmall1lY senses the most problematic. We suggest, therefore, that it$hoold be replaced as a central theme by the notions of 'regulation'aIumd 'rndical cRnannge'.

Assumptions about the Nature of Society 17We introduce the term 'sodology ofregulation' to refer to the

writings of theorists who are primarily cOll1cemedl to providee){plaraations of society in terms which emphasise its underlyil1lgunity and cohesiveness. H is a sociology which is essentially Con-cerned with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basicquestions which it asks tend to focus upon the need to understandwhy society is maintained as an entity. H attempts to explain whysociety tends to hold together rather than fall apart. It is interestedifl1ufI1derstal1lding the social forces which prevelf1lt the lHlobbesiautnvision of 'war of all against all' becoming a reality. 'fhe worl, ofDurldleim with its emphasis upon the nature ofsocial cohesion andsolidarity, for e,mmple, provides a clear and comprehensiveillustration of a concern for the sociology of regulation.

'fhe 'sociology ofradical change' stands in stark contrast to the'sociology of regulation', in that its basic concern is to finde){planations for the radical change, deep-seated structural con-flict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which itstheorists see as characterising modern society. na is a sociologywhich is essentially concemed with man's emancipation from thestructures which limit and stunt his potential for development. 'fhebasic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of maUl,both material and psychic. Hi is often visionary and Utopian, in tilatit looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concernedwith what is possible rather than with what is; with altemativesrather than with acceptance olfthestatus {luo. In these respects it isas widely separate and distant from the sociology of regulation asthe sociology of Man{ is separated and distant from the sociologyof Durkheim.

'fhe distinction between these two sociologies can perhaps bebest illustrated in schematic form; extreme points of view arecounter-posed in order to highlight the essential differencesbetween them. 'fable 2.2 summarises the situation.

We offer this regulation-radical change distinction as thesecond principal dimension of our scheme for analysing sociafttheories. A.long with the subjective-objective dimensiondeveloped in the previous chapter, we present it as a powerfuftmeans for identifying and analysing the assumptions which I.mder-lie social theories in general.

'fhe notions of 'regulation' and 'radical change' have thus farbeen presented in a very rough and e){treme form. 'fhe two modelsillustrated in Table 2.2 should be regarded as ideal-typicalformulations. nne seven elements which we have identifBed lell1lrllthemselves to a much more rnigorous and systematic treatment in

I\!@Qeglit By 'consensus' we mean voluntary and 'spontaneous' agree-ment of opinion.t The term 'need satisfaction' is used to refer to the focus uponsatisfaction of individual or system 'needs'. The sociology ofregulation tends to presume that various social characteristics canbe explained in relation to these needs. It presumes that it ispossible to identify and satisfy human needs within the conte"t ofe,dsting social systems, and that society reflects these needs. Theconcept of 'deprivation', on the other hand, is rooted in the notionthat the social 'system' prevents human fulfilment; indeed that'deprivation' is created as the result of the status quo. The social'system' is not seen as satisfying needs but as eroding thepossibilities for human fulfilment. It is rooted in the notion thatsociety has resulted in deprivation rather than in gain.

us Sociological Paradigms tmd Organisational Analysiswhich their overall form and nature is speh out in detail. We delaythis task until later chapters. Here, we wish to address ourselves tothe broad relationships which e"ist between the sociologies ofregulation and radical change. We maintain that they presentfundamentally different views and interpretations of the nature ofsociety. They reflect fundamentally different frames of reference.They present themselves, therefore, as alternative models for theanalysis of social processes.

To present the models in this way is to invite criticism along thelines of that levelled at Dahrendorfs worl. For eUffiple, it couldbe suggested that the two models are the reciprocals of each other- no more than two sides of the same coin - and that relationships

TlllllBe 2.2TUne ll"egunDmQnmll-ll'ad!ficaD cDnaJl1lge IlIbimemD@un

TIlt' socio/OIlY of REGULATIONis cOflc('Y/Ied ",ith:

(a) The status quo(b) Social order(c) Consensus*(d) Social integration and

cohesion(e) Solidarity(0 Need satisfactiont(g) Actuality

111e soci%!?y of RADICAL CHANGEis concerned lIIith:

(a) Radical change(b) Structural connict(c) Modes of domination(d) Contradiction(e) Emancipation(0 Deprivation(g) Potentiality

A.uumptimRS about tJue Nature of Society U9between the sub-elements of each modd need not be congruent,that is, an analysis may pay attention to elements of both.

The answer to both criticisms follows our defence ofDahrendorf's work. To conflate the two models and treat them asvariations on a single theme is to ignore or at least to umierplay thefundamental differences which exist between them. Whilst it maybe possible to use each model in a diluted form and thus obtain twoanalyses of the middle ground which apprmdmate each other, theymust remain essentially separate, since they are based upon oppos-ing assumptions. Thus, as we have illustrated, to discuss the'functions' of social conflict is to commit oneself to the sociologyof regulation as opposed to that of radical change. lHIowever closeone's position might be to the middle ground, it would seem thatone must always be committed to one side more than another. Thefundamental distinctions between the sociologies ofregulation andradical change will become clear from our analysis of theirintellectual development and constituent schools of thought inlater chapters. We conceptualise these two broad sociologicalperspectives in the form of a polarised dimension, recognising thatwhile variations within the context of each are possible, theperspectives are necessarily separate and distinct from each other.

Notes and ReferencesI. Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with the

problem of order, Dawe cites Parsons (1949), Nisbet (1967),Bramson (1%1), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968).

2. For a discussion of the Mar"ism versus social sciencedebate, see Shaw (1975). The division between Mantisttheorists and orthodm( sociologists is now so deep that theyeither ignore each othelf completely, or indulge in anexchange of abuse and accusation regarding the politicallconservatism or subversiveness commonly associated wiilitheir respective points of view. Debate about the intellectualstrengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoints isconspicuous by its absence.

3. lLater in this chapter we sllIlggest that the descriptions of'concern with the status quo' and 'concern for radicalchange' provide more accurate views of the issues involvedhere.

:W Sociological Paradigms and Organisatimwl Analysis

4. Dahrendonf acknowledges Merton's distinction betweenlatent and manifest functions but does not pursue the con~sequence of 'dysfunctions' for the concept of integration(Dahrendorf, 1959, pp. 173-9).

5. Other 'order' theorists who have addressed themselves toDahrendorf's model tend to follow a similar path in theattempt to embrace conflict theory within their perspective.See, for e1\ample, vall1l den lBerghe (1%9).

30 Tvvo Dimensions:Four Paradigms

Un the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of then,ey assumptions which characterise different approaches to socialtheory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse theseapproaches in terms of two I(ey dimensions of analysis, each ofwhich subsumes a series of related themes. h has been suggestedthat assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of illlterms of what we call the subjective-objective dimension, andassumptions about the nature of society in terms of a regulation-rndical change dimension. Un this chapter we wish to discuss therelationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher-ent scheme for the analysis of social theory.

We have already noted how sociological debate since the late1960s has tended to ignore the distinctions between the two dimen-sions - in particular,how there has been a tendency to focus uponissues concerned with the subjective-objective dimension and toignore those concerned with the regulation-radical changedimension. Interestingly enough, this focus of attention hascharacterised sociological thought associated with both regulationand radical change. The subjective-objective debate has beelficonducted independently within both sociological camps.

Within the sociology of regulation it has assumed the form of adebate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. Un thewake of Berger and Luckmann' s treatise on the sociology of Imow-ledge (1%6), Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology (1967) and ageneral resurgence of interest in phenomenology, the questionablestatus of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of thefunctionalist perspective have become increasingly exposed. Thedebate has often led to a polarisation between the two schools ofthought.

Similarly. within the context of the sociology of radical chalfigethere has been a division between theorists subscribing to 'subjec-tive' and 'objective' views of society. The debate in many respectstaB'es its lead from the publication in france in 1966 and Britain in

!Figure 3.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory

Before going on to discuss the substantive nature of each of theparadigms, it will be as well to pay some attention to the way inwhich we intend the notion of 'paradigm' to be used. We regardour four paradig~s as being d.efined by very basic meta-theoreticalassumptions which underwnte the frame of reference, mode oftheorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who ~peratewithin them. It is a term which is intended to emphaSise thecommonality of perspective which binds the work of a group oftheorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regardedas approaching social theory within the bounds of the sameproblematic. .

This definition does not imply complete umty of thought. hallows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigmthere will be much debate between theorists who adopt differentstandpoints. The paradigm does, however, have an underlyingunity in terms of its basic and often 'taken for granted' assump-tions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamentalway from theorists located in other paradigms. ~he '~nity' of theparadigm thus derives from reference to alternative views of real-

Two Dimensions: Four Paradif!.ms 23twO independent dimensions which resurrect the sociologicalissues of the early I960s and place them alongside those of t~e .IateI%Os and early 1970s. Taken together, they define four d~stmctsociological paradigms which can be utilised fo~ the analySIS of awide range of social theories. The relationship between theseparadigms, which we label 'r.adic~1 ~u~~nist', 'radi.cal ~tructuralist', 'interpretive' and 'functIOnalIst, IS Illustrated In figure ~.I.

It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigmsshares a common set of features with its neighbours on the hori-zontal and vertical axes in terms of one of the two dimensions but isdifferentiated on the other dimension. for this reason they shouldbe viewed as contiguous but separate - contiguous because of theshared characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is,as we shall demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warranttreatment of the paradigms as four distinct entities. The four para-digms define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysisof social phenomena. They approach this endeavour from con-trasting standpoints and generate quite different concepts andanalytical tools.

The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms

'Radicalatructurlllli13t'

'Functionllllilllt'

'Rllldicalhumlllnist'

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGEr---------- ----------1

IIIIIII

SUBJECTIVE;--------+------~I OBJECTIVEIIIIIIIL. J

THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION

22 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis1969 of Louis Althusser's work For Marx. This presented thenotion of an 'epistemological break' in Marx's work and emphas-ised the polarisation of Marxist theorists into two camps: thoseemphasising the 'subjective' aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and thefrankfurt School, for example) and those advocating more 'objec-tive' approaches, such as that associated with Althusserian struc-turalism.

Within the context of the sociologies both of regulation andradical change, therefore, the middle to late 1960s witnessed adistinct switch in the focus of attention. The debate between thesetwo sociologies which had characterised the early 1960s disap-peared and was replaced by an introverted dialogue within thecontext of each of the separate schools of thought. Instead of'speaking' to each other they turned inwards and addressed theirremarks to themselves. The concern to sort out their position withregard to what we call the subjective-objective dimension, acomplicated process in view of all the interrelated strands, led to aneglect of the regulation-radical change dimension.

As a consequence of these developments, recent debate hasoften been confused. Sociological thought has tended to be charac-terised by a narrow sectarianism, from which an overall perspec-tive and grasp of basic issues are conspicuously absent. The time isripe for consideration ofthe way ahead, and we submit that the twokey dimensions ofanalysis which we have identified define criticalparameters within which this can take place, We present them as

24 Sociololfical Paradixms and Or/?anisational Analysisity which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarilyeven be recognised as existing.

In identifying four paradigms in social theory we are in essencesuggesting that it is meaningful to examine work in the subject areain terms of four sets of basic assumptions. Each set identifies aquite separate social-scientific reality. To be located in a particularparadigm is to view the world in a particular way. The four para-digms thus define four views of the social world based upon differ-ent meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature ofscience and of society.

It is our contention that all social theorists can be located withinthe context of these four paradigms according to the meta-theoretical assumptions reflected in their work. The four para-digms taken together provide a map for negotiating the subjectarea, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basicsimilarities and differences between the work of various theoristsand, in particular, the underlying frame of reference which theyadopt. It also provides a convenient way of locating one's ownpersonal frame of reference with regard to social theory, and thus ameans of understanding why certain theories and perspectivesmay have more personal appeal than others. Like any othermap, itprovides a tool for establishing where you are, where you havebeen and where it is possible to go in the future. It provides a toolfor mapping intellectual journeys in social theory - one's own andthose of the theorists who have contributed to the subject area.

nn this work we intend to make much use of the map-like qual-ities of the four paradigms. Each defines a range of intellectualterritory. Given the overall meta-theoretical assumptions whichdistinguish one paradigm from another, there is room for muchvariation within them. Within the context of the 'functionalist'paradigm, for example, certain theorists adopt more extreme posi-tions in terms of one or both of the two dimensions than others.Such differences often account for the internal debate which goeson between theorists engaged in the activities of 'normal science'within the context of the same paradigm. 2 The remaining chaptersof this work examine each of the four paradigms in some detail andattempt to locate their principal theorists in these terms.

Our research suggests that whilst the activity within the contextof each paradigm is often considerable, inter-paradigmatic'journeys' are much rarer. This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970)notion of 'revolutionary science'. For a theorist to switch para-digms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, some-thing which, although manifestly possible, is not often achieved in

Two Dimensions: Four Paradif?ms 25practice. As Keat and Urry put it, 'For individual scientists, thechange of allegiance from one paradigm to another is often a"conversion experience", akin to Gestalt-switches or changes ofreligious faith' (1975, p. 55). When a theorist does shift his positionin this way, it stands out very clearly as a major break with hisintellectual tradition and is heralded as being so in the literature, inthat the theorist is usually welcomed by those whom he has joinedand often disowned by his former 'paradigm colleagues'. Thus wewitness what is known as the 'epistemological break' between thework of the young Marx and the mature Man, - what we wouldidentify as a shift from the radical humanist paradigm to the radicalstructuralist paradigm. At the level of organisational analysis, adistinct paradigm shift can be detected in the work of Silverman -a shift from the functionalist paradigm to the interpretive para-digm. We will analyse such intellectual journeys in more detail inlater chapters.

Before we progress to a review of the four paradigms, one pointis worthy offurther emphasis. This relates to the fact that the fourparadigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views ofsocial reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to under-stand four different views of society. They offer different ways ofseeing. A synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms theyare contradictory, being based on at least one set of opposingmeta-theoretical assumptions. They are alternatives, in the sensethat one can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time,but mutually exclusive. in the sense that one cannot operate inmore than one paradigm at any given point in time. since in accept-ing the assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all theothers.

We offer the four paradigms for consideration in these terms, inthe hope that knowledge of the competing points of view will atleast make us aware of the boundaries within which we approachour subject.

The FunctionaHist ParadigmThis paradigm has provided the dominant framework for the con-duct of academic sociology and the study of organisations. lItrepresents a perspective which is firmly rooted in the sociology ofregulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivistpoint of view. Functionalist theorists have been at the forefront of

26 Sociological Paradif?ms and Orf?anisational Analysisthe order-conflict debate, and the concepts which we have usedto categorise the sociology of regulation apply in varying degreesto all schools of thought within the paradigm. It is characterised bya concern for providing explanations of the status quo, socialorder. consensus. social intef?ration, solidarity, need satisfactionand actuality. It approaches these general sociological concernsfrom a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, deterministand nomothetic.

The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in itsmost fully developed form. In its overall approach it seeks toprovide essentially rational explanations of social affairs. It is aperspective which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned tounderstand society in a way which generates knowledge which canbe put to use. It is often problem-orientated in approach, con-cerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems. It is

usu~lIy firmly committed to a philosophy of social engineering as abaSIS .of social cha~ge and emphasises the importance of under-

sta~dlng order, eqUilibrium and stability in society and the way inwhich these can be maintained. It is concerned with the effective'regulation' and control of social affairs.

As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter I theappro~ch to soci.al science characteristic of the functionalist para-digm IS rooted In the tradition of sociological positivism. Thisreflects the attempt, par excellence, to apply the models andmethods of the natural sciences to the study of human affairs.Originating in france in the early decades of the nineteenthcentury, its majo~ influen~e upon the paradigm has been throughthe work of social theonsts such as Auguste Comte, HerbertSpencer, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto. The functionalistapproach to social science tends to assume that the social world iscomposed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relation-ships which c~n be identified, studied and measured throughapproaches denved from the natural sciences. The use of mechan-ical a~d biological. analogies as a means of modelling and under-stand!ng !he socl.al world is particularly favoured in manyfunctIOnalist theones. By way of illustration consider, for exam-pie, ~he work of Durkheim. Central to his position was the idea that'social facts' exist outside of men's consciousness and restrainmen in their everyday activities. The aim was to understand therelationships between these 'objective' social facts and to articu-

~ate the,soci.ology whi~h e~plained the types of 'solidarity' provid-Ing the SOCial cement which holds society together. The stabilityand ordered nature of the natural world was viewed as characteris-

Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 27

ing the world of human affairs. for Durkheim, the task ofsociology was to understand the nature of this regulated ordcu:.

Since the early decades of the twentieth century, however, thefunctionalist paradigm has been increasingly influenced by ele-ments from the German idealist tradition of socialthoughl. As willbe recalled from our discussion in Chapter I, this approach reflectsassumptions about the nature of social science which stand inopposition to those of sociological positivism. As a result of thework of such theorists as Max Weber, George Simmel and GeorgeHerbert Mead, elements of this idealist approach have been util-is~d within the conte"t of social theories which have attempted tobndge the gulf between the two traditions. In so doing they haveforged theoretical perspectives characteristic of the least objectiv-ist region of the paradigm, at its junction with the interpretiveparadigm. Such theories have rejected the use of mechanical andbiological analogies for studying the social world and haveintroduced ideas which place emphasis upon the importance ofunderstanding society from the point of view of the actors who areactually engaged in the performance of social activities.

Since the I940s there has been also an infusion of certain Manistinfluences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. Thesehave been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to'radicalise' functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that

THIE SOCIOlOGV OF RADICAL CHANGEf---------- -----------1I iI II IVllJlntis~ ,: th~or\l :I II IISUIlllJIECTIVIE OBJECTIVEI II I

G0rmlllllid00lism

tl1lIEGULATION SOCi?~o~icllllPO!lI~IVI$m

!Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionaiisl paradigm

28 Sociolo/:ical Paradi/:ms alld Or/:allisatiollal Allalysis

functionalism is essentially conservative and unable to provideexplanations for social change. These attempts underwrite thedebate examined in the previous chapter as to whether a theory of'contlict' can be incorporated within the bounds of a theory of'order' to provide adequate explanations of social affairs.

Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of the functionalistparadigm can be understood in terms of the interaction of threesets of intellectual forces, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Of these,sociological positivism has been the most influential. The compet-ing traditions have been sucked in and used within the context ofthe functionalist problematic, which emphasises the essentiallyobjectivist nature of the social world and a concern for explana-tions which emphasise 'regulation' in social affairs. These cross-currents of thought have given rise to a number of distinctiveschools of thought within the paradigm, which is characterised bya wide range of theory and internal debate. By way of overview,again somewhat crudely, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the fourparadigms in terms of the constituent schools of sociological andorganisational theory which we shall be exploring later on. As willbe apparent, most organisation theorists, industrial sociologists,psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach their sub-ject from within the bounds of the functionalist paradigm.

The li nterpretive ParadigmTheorists located within the context of the interpretive paradigmadopt an approach consonant with the tenets of what we havedescribed as the sociology of re/:ulation, though its subjectivistapproach to the analysis of the social world makes its links withthis sociology often implicit rather than explicit. The interpretiveparadigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is,to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at thelevel of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within therealm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within theframe of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer ofaction.

In its approach to social science it tends to be Iluminalist, anti-pO.l'itil'iJf, volulltarist and idl'ographic. It sees the social world asan emergent social process which is created by the individualsconcerned. Social reality, insofar as it is recognised to have anyexistence outside the consciousness of any single individual, isregarded as being lillie more than a network of assumptions and

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Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 31

intersubjectively shared meanings. The ontological status of thesocial world is viewed as extremely questionable and problematicas far as theorists located within the interpretive paradigm areconcerned. Everyday life is accorded the status of a miraculousachievement. interpretive philosophers and sociologists seek tounderstand the very basis and source of social reality. They oftendelve into the depths of human consciousness and subjectivity intheir quest for the fundamental meanings which underlie sociallife.

Given this view of social reality, it is hardly surprising that thecommitment of the interpretive sociologists to the sociology ofregulation is implicit rather than explicit. Their ontologicalassumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involved in theorder-conflict debate as such. However, their standpoint isunderwritten by the assumption that the world of human affairs iscohesive, ordered and integrated. The problems of conflict,domination, contradiction, potentiality and change play no part intheir theoretical framework. They are much more orientatedtowards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively createdsocial world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process.

interpretive sociology is concerned with understanding theessence of the everyday world. in terms of our analytical schema itis underwritten by an involvement with issues relating to thenature 9f the status quo, social order, consensus, social integra-tion and cohesion, solidarity and actuality. 3

The interpretive paradigm is the direct product of the Germanidealist tradition of social thought. its foundations were laid in thework of Kant and reflect a social philosophy which emphasises theessentially spiritual nature of the social world. The idealist tradi-tion was paramount in Germanic thought from the mid-eighteenthcentury onwards and was closely linked with the romantic move-ment in literature and the arts. Outside this realm, however, it wasoflimited interest, until revived in the late 1390s and early years ofthis century under the influence of the so-called neo-idealistmovement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber, Husserl and Schutzhave made a major contribution towards establishing it as aframework for social analysis, though with varying degrees ofcommitment to its underlying problematic.

figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the paradigmhas been explored as far as our present interest in social theory andthe study of organisations is concerned. Whilst there have been asmall number of attempts to' study organisational concepts anlisituations from this point of view, the paradigm has not generated

32 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

much organisation theory as such. As will become clear from ouranalysis, there are good reasons for this. The premises of theinterpretive paradigm question whether organisations exist in any~thing but a conceptual sense. Its significance for the study oforganisations, therefore, is of the most fundamental kind. Itchallenges the validity of the ontological assumptions whichunderwrite functionalist approaches to sociology in general andthe study of organisations in particular.

The Radical Humanist ParadigmThe radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to developa sociQlogy of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Itsapproach to social science has much in common with that of theinterpretive paradigm, in that it views the social world from aperspective which tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntar-ist and ideographic. However, its frame of reference is committedto a view of society which emphasises the importance of over-throwing or transcending the limitations of existing socialarrangements.

One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of thisparadigm is that the consciousness of man is dominated by theideological superstructures with which he interacts, and that thesedrive a cognitive wedge between himself and his true conscious-ness. This wedge is the wedge of 'alienation' or 'false conscious-ness', which inhibits or prevents true human fulfilment. The majorconcern for theorists approaching the human predicament in theseterms is with release from the constraints which existing socialarrangements place upon human development. It is a brand ofsocialthe

34 Sociological /Paradigms and Organisational Analysisapproach to science which has many similarities with that offunc-tionalist theory, it is directed at fundamentally different ends.Radical structuralism is committed to radical change, emancipa-tion, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structuralconflict, modes of domination, contradiction and deprivation. Itapproaches these general concerns from a standpoint which tendsto be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic.

Whereas the radical humanists forge their perspective by focus-ing upon 'consciousness' as the basis for a radical critique ofsociety, the radical structuralists concentrate upon structural rela-tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the fact thatradical change is built into the very nature and structure of con-temporary society, and they seek to provide explanations of thebasic interrelationships within the context of total social forma-tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, anddifferent theorists stress the role of different social forces as ameans of explaining social change. Whilst some focus directlyupon the deep-seated internal contradictions, others focus uponthe structure and analysis of power relationships. Common to alltheorists is the view that contemporary society is characterised byfundamental conflicts which generate radical change throughpolitical and economic crises. It is through such conflict andchange that the emancipation of men from the social structures inwhich they live is seen as coming about.

This paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work of themature Marx, after the so-called 'epistemological break' in hiswork. It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade ofactive political involvement and as a result of his increasing inter-est in Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy.Man's basic ideas have been subject to a wide range of interpreta-tions in the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead.Among these Engels, J?lekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin have beenparticularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radi-cal structuralist position outside the realm of Russian socialtheory, the names of Althusser, Poulantzas, Colletti and variousMarxist sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst theinfluence of Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm isundoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a strongWeberian influence. As we shall argue in later chapters, in recentyears a group of social theorists have sought to explore the inter-face between the thought of Marx and Weber and have generated adistinctive perspective which we describe as 'conflict theory'. It isto this radical structuralist perspective that the work of Dahren-

Two Dimensions: Four /Paradigms 35

dorf belongs, along with that of other theorists such as Rex andMiliband. .

figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a ge~erai o~ervlew of theschools of thoughllocated within the paradigm, which w~ ~hall beexamining in some detail in Chapters 10 ~nd 1.1. In Bntlsh .andAmerican sociology the radical structuralist vle~ has recelve.drelatively little attention outside the r~alm .of conflict the.ory. ThiSparadigm, located as i.t is ~ith!n a realist view of the socl~1 w?rld,has many significant ImplicatIOns for the study of organisatIOns,but they have only been developed in the barest forms. In Chapt~rII we review the work which has been done and the embrYOniCradical organisation theory which it reflects.

Exploring Sodal TheorySo much, then, for our overview of the four paradig.ms. Su~sequent chapters seek to place flesh upon t~e bones of thiS analyti-cal scheme and attempt to demonstrate ~ts po~er a.s a t~ol ~orexploring social theory:1 Hopefully, our dlSc~sslonWill do Justiceto the essentially complex nature of the pa~adlgms ~nd the net~orkof assumptions which they reflect, and will ~stabllsh.the.relatlO.nships and links between the various perspectJ.ves dommatmg SOCialanalysis at the present time. Whi.'st the focus m C~la~ters 5,7, ?and11 is upon organisational analysIs, the general pll1nclples and Ideasdiscussed in the work as a whole clearly ~ave ~e1evan~e .fo~ theexploration of a wide variety of ot~er SOCial sCience diSCiplines.The scope for applying the analytical scheme to other fields ofstudy is enormous but unfortunately lies beyond ~he scop~ of our

resent enquiry. However, readers interest~d m applmg the~cheme in this way should find little difficulty m proceedmg fromthe sociological analyses presented in Chapters 4,~, 8.. an~ 10 toananalysis of the Ii terature in their own sphere of speCialised mterest.

Notes and! Referencesfor a full discussion of the role of paradi~ms in s~iell1tjficdevelopment, see Kullm (I970). ~n his a~aly.sis, lPar~(bgms aredefined as 'universally recogmsed SCientific adn~vementsthat for a time provide model problems and soh.!tlons to a

36 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

community ofpractitioners' (p. viii). Paradigms are regardedas governing the progress of what is called 'normal science',in which 'the scientist's worlc is devoted to the articulationand wider application of the accepted paradigm, which is notitself questioned or criticised. Scientific problems areregarded as puzzles, as problems which are known to have asolution within the framework of assumptions implicitly orexplicitly embodied in the paradigm.llfa puzzle is not solved,the fault lies in the scientist, and not in the paradigm' (Keatand Urry 1975, p. 55). 'Normal science' contrasts with rela-tively brief periods of 'revolutionary science' , in which 'thescientist is confronted by increasingly perplexing anomalies,which call into question the paradigm itself. Scientific revolu-tion occurs when a new paradigm emerges, and becomesaccepted by the scientific community' (ibid., p. 55).

We are using the term 'paradigm' in a broader sense thanthat intended by Kuhn. Within the context of the presentworl, we are arguing that social theory can be convenientlyunderstood in terms of the co-existence of four distinct andrival paradigms defined by very basic meta-theoretical!assumptions in relation to the nature of science and society.'Paradigms', 'problematics', 'alternative realities', 'framesof reference', 'forms of life' and 'universe of discourse' areall related conceptualisations although of course they are notsynonymous.

2. Some inter-paradigm debate is also possible. Giddens main-tains 'that all paradigms ... are mediated by others' and thatwithin 'normal science' scientists are aware of other para-digms. He posits that: 'The process of learning a para-digm ... is also the process of learning what that paradigm isnot' (1976, pp. 142-4).

nnterestingly, he confines his discussion to the mediationof one paradigm by another one. We believe that a model offour confllicting paradigms within sociology is more accurateand that academics' knowledge of 'scientists' within theother three paradigms is m,ely to be very sketchy in somecases. Relations between paradigms are perhaps betterdescribed in terms of 'disinterested hostility' rather than'debate' .

3. The notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of abiological analogy of an organism and plays no part ininterrpretive sociology.

4. The sociological concerns of recent years have resulted in a

Two Dimensions: /Four Paradigms 37

number of works which have aimed ~o chara a jpaah througllnahe social science literature by reducing the variables ofsociological analysis to a number off Icey dimensions. TIwseof Dahrendorf (959), Wallace 09(9), Gouldner (1970),Friedrichs (1970), D'

~;:l~i]\H(,C

111111 JBlilblinogn.R/lpilll Y

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