caesar 11 - resignation of malenkov

8/4/2019 Caesar 11 - Resignation of Malenkov

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12 September 1955CAESAR 11

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2 0 0 7

RESIGNATION OF MALENKOV

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Of3ce of Current IntelligenceCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

en by anyof any advantageapproved by the


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CAESAR 11

' TAB4. OF CONTENTS* ',

2 .2 . .INTRODUCTION. 0 2

MALENKOV'S RESIGNATXON AND "OFFICIAL"4XPLANATIONS GIVEN 0 0

KHRUSHCHEV 'S RISE IN PBOMINENCE SINCE11TALIN'S DEATH. 0 . .I

CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY14223242

IN 1953--TEE NEW COURSE. 0THE AGRICULTPAL CONTROVERSY.FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY 0 o. . . . . . . . . . .ERSONAL RIVALRY AND STRUGGLE FOR POWERMALENKOV'S ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN

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MANAGERIAL ABILITIES. .DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MALENKOV

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The Soviet Leadership Since. . . . . . . . . . . . . 47alenkov.Post-Malenkov Trends in Soviet 53

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Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . .Economic Policy After Malenkov . . . . . . .

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .


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RESIGNATION OF MALENKOV

I3,(i ,'$ 1 ..i

INTRODUCTION.

e A number ox,d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s hav e b een advancedto e x p l a i n t h e demotion of G o bf, Yalenkov i n Februa ry 1955from h i s p o s i t io n as Chairman of t h e USSR Counc i l of M i n i s t e r s .A t one end of t h e spect rum of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is th e v i e w t h a tMalenkovqs demotion represented h i s defea t i n a s t r u g g l e forp e r s o n a l power, w i t h l i t t l e o r no c o n f l i c t ov er matters ofdomestic or f o r e i g n p o r i c y i n v o l v e d , A t t h e o t h e r extremei s t h e view t h a t s h a rp c o n f l i c t ex i s t ed or developed overpo l i cy p rob lems , t h a t i n some manner t h e c o n f l i c t on t h e se ,problems came t o a c r i s i s , and Malenkov 's ou s t e r r ep re sen t edt h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s c r i s i s , A t h i r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i nv ol ve sa "scapegoat" theo ry , a c c o r d i n g t o w hic h co n ti n ue d f a i l u r e s i nS o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r e or consumer goods p r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e d t h a tsomeone be %erved uptt as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e s ,

There are numerous var iants of t h e s e bas ic hypotheses .Va r ia nts of th e power s t r u g g l e t h e o r y r a n g e from r i v a l r y oft h e i n d i v i d u a l s t o r i v a l r y of c l i q u e s a nd g r ou p s ; from deve l -opment of r i v a l r y f o r h e r i t a ge of S t a l i n ' s m a n t l e t o t h e work-ing o u t of l ong- s t and ing enmi t i es rooted deep i n t h e p a s t .O f t h e pol icy c o n f l i c t hy po th es is , d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o ns a t t r i b -u t e p r i m a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e t o fore ign pol icy i ssues- -Germany,Communist China, ov er -a l l ass ess men t of t h e con temporary s i tua -t i o n ; t o domestic i s s u e s - - a g r i c u l t u r a l problems and po l i c i es ,l i g h t ver s us heavy Indu s t ry , S h o r t - r U D m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t sv e r s u s l o ng e r- r un s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e economy; and so on.Under t h e %capegoa t tt t he ory , one ver s io n i s that t h eregime f a i l e d i n i t s "new coursett program for t h e consumer;a n o t h e r is that c on ti nu ed f a i l u r e r a d i c a l l y t o improve agr i -c u l t u r e r e q u i r e d t h a t someone ,be blamed.Some an al ys ts have a t tem pted t o avoid a t t r i b u t i n g u n d u eS i g n i f i c a n c e t o any one factor o r s e v e r a l f ac t o r s , a n d i n s t e a dview t h e ouster of Malenkov as r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e i n t e r a c t i o nof a l l of t h e v a r i o u s factors . The problem, i n t h i s view,i s t o at tempt t o trace o u t t h e p a t t e r n a n d m u tu a l l y rec iprocali n t e r a c t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s c a u s a l factors .

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Each of t he a b o v e v i e w s c o n s t i t u t e s a hypo t hes i s anda problem.f a c t o r a c t u a l l y o p e r a t e i n t h e Malenkov upset, and how importantThe;.following paper assembles and re-examines t h e p r i n c i p a l

Given a f ac t o r or t k ~ , "o what e x t e n t d i d t h a ta ~ o 1 - e . i dI i t plax? ..2; , sevidenck bel ieved, ,p e r t i n e n t t o t h e l e a d e r s h ip problem i n heUSSR.va1;dity of various causa l e lemen ts i n Malenkov's upset.paper i s n o t , tliarefors, an h i s t o r i ca l * ' recons t ruc t ion t t ofMalenkov's ou st er and of Khrushchev's r i s e , a t op i c which i ni t s e l f o f f e r s prom$siag o p p o r t u n i t i e s fo r f u r t h e r zesearch.

The re-examinat ion w a s d i r e c t e d a t a s c e r t a i n i n g t h eThe

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YALENKOV'S RESIGNATION AND "OFFICIAL" EXPLANATIONS GIVEN

The " res i gnat ion" of G. M. Malenkov as Chairman'of t h eUSSR C o w c i l of l i ' n i s t e r s on 8 February 1955-c i imaxed a l o n gp e r io d $ i t n e s s i n g t h e rise 'of N. S. Khrushchev t o pre-eminenceamong *he So v ie t leaders , and more immedia te ly , a p e r io dm a n i f e s t i n g signs of con t rove rsy among t h e t o p leaders of t h eSo v ie t Union.i '

Spec i f i c6 l l y , th e mon th p re ced ing Malenkov ' s demotionwas marked by a u t h o r i t a t i v e P a r t y a t t acks a g a in s t " p e r v e r s io n s "of gr owth i n l i g h t i n d u s t r y as compared w i t h heavy indus t ry .A " S t a l i n i s t " t o n e had developed i n t h e poli t ical atmosphere:of t h e P a r t y l i n e , a l l e g e d l y f a v or i n g e q ua l or h ig h e r r a t e sRefe rences were made t o " r i g h t i s t d e vi a ti o n" i n t h i s connec t ion .

, there w a s t h e emphasis on heavy indus t ry ; t h e r e f e r e n c e s t o" r i g h t dev ia t ion" ; numerous re f e re nce s t o a fo re ign dangert o t h e USSR and t h e So v ie t bloc; and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h eheavy i n d u s t r y l i n e on t h e grounds of i n c r e a s i n g t h e m i l i -t a r y m i g h t of t h e USSR. A l s o , l a t e i n J a n u a r y a P l e n a r ySess ion o f t h e Centra l Commit tee w a s h e l d , and i t w a s announcedt h a t t h e Supreme Soviet was t o convene on 3 Februa ry . Thedate se t f o r t h e Supreme Soviet w a s a month ea r l i e r t h a nu s u a l , a n d t h i s f a c t , c o n j o i n t w i t h t h e o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n sno ted , created an e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t impor tan t dec i s ions wou ldbe announced.

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Th e Su p r e m e So v ie t s e s s io n i t s e l f f i r s t witnessed i m -p o r t a n t r e v i s i o n s of t h e USSR budge t , as compared w i t h . t h e1953 and 1954 budgets .inc rease in ove r t de fense expend i tu res , ' a l e v e l i n g - o f f ofc a p i t a l i n v es tm e nt , a nd a s u b s t a n t i a l r et r en c hm e nt i n a l l o c a -t i o n f o r l i g h t i n d u s t r y .

S i g n i f i c a n t c ha ng es were a s u b s t a n t i a l

In t h i s s e t t i n g , t h e world w a s e lec t r i f ' i ed on 8 Februaryby t h e p r e s e n t at i o n t o t h e Supreme S w i e t of a l e t t e r of"re sig nat ion " from Malenkov. T h i s l e t t e r is o f c o n s id e r a b l ein te res t i n i t s e l f , and the t ex t i n v i t e s c e r t a i n commentary.a. Malenkov based h i s t ' reques t" on " the neces-s i t y of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e l e a d e r s h ip " of t h e C o u nc i lo f Mi n is te r s and " the exped iency of having /Tnth is7 . . .pos t . . . another comrade who h a s greaxer ex-perxence." Further, Malenkov admit ted t h a t h i s 'per- '

formance was "nega t ive ly affected" by " i n s u f f i c i e n texper ience in loca l work" and by t h e fact . t h a t hed i d n o t ear l ie r "effect d i r ec t guidance of i n d iv f d -u a l b r a n c h e s of the na t ional economy."


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The above remarks, w h i l e n o t e x a c t l y f a l s e , are n ot f u l l yt r ue . Malenkov, a l th ough he never possessed t h e formal t i t l eof M i n i s t e r , d id i n f a c t di rec t " ind iv idua l b ranches" of t h ena t i on al economy: dur ing t h e w a r he was r e s p o n s i b l e fo r air-c r a f t produc t ion ; 'from 19 43 u n t i l a t l e a s t 1946 he was re-s p on s ib p e f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n in war- .devas ta ted areas; from1947 tof 1953 he he l d h igh- leve l responsibility f o r a g r i c u l t u r e .A l s o , from 1948 t o March 1953, he was t h e t o p S e c r e t a r y , u nd erS t a l i n t h a t is , of t h e C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e .a v e r r e d t h a t Ma le nk ov 's p o W ic a l d e c l i n e i n 1 94 6 r e s u l t e d from Icharges by h i s p o l i t i c a l en em ie s o f i n e f f i c i e n c y and lack off o r e s i g h t i n S o v ie t a i r c r a f t manufac tu re , p lann ing and develop-ment. Also, Malenkov's l e a d e r s h i p in r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of wardamage i s b e l i e v e d t o have invo lved him i n s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t sw i t h o t h e r to p S o v i e t l eaders i n 1945 and 1946 and t o havebeen one of t h e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s1946.i n d i r e c t in g '*branches1'of the economy w i t h B u lg a n in ' ssucceeded him as Pre mier . Although Bulganin had been a di rec-t o r of Gosbank and was M i n i s t e r of Defense from 1947 t o 1949,he has had no more exper ience a t t h e USSR Counci l of Min i s t e r slevel than Malenkov,

e ' .I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o r e c a l l t h a t s e v e r a l s o u r c e s ha ve

connected w i t h h i s d e c l i ne i nI t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare Malenkov 's exper iencewho

b. Malenkov in h i s n e x t s e c t i o n p ro c ee ds t oc o n t r a d i c t h i s own preced ing s t a t e m e n t by admi t t ingt h a t "for s e v e r a l y e a r s p r e v i o us l y ( v t e c h e n i e r y a d al e t do etogo)l ' he had t h e assignment I f to co n t ro land guide t h e work of c e n t r a l a g r k u l t u r a l o rg an sa n d t h e work of local p a r t y a nd a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or-g a n i z a t i o n s in t h e sphere of a g r i c u l t u r e . * ?admitted " g u i l t and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e u n s a t i s -f a c t o r y s t a t e of a f f a i r s which has a r i s e n i n a g r i c u l -t u r e .

Malenkov

This is t h e o n l y s p e c i f i c f a i l i n g Malenkov d i s c u s s e s .I t very p robab ly refers t o t h e period 1947 t o 1955, and makes.v e r y s t r o n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t he w a s invo lved in t h eI?agrogorod" dispute of 1951, t h e p r i n c i p a l figure of whichw a s N. S. Khrushchev. I t w i l l be recalled t h a t a t t h eOctober 1952 P ar ty Cong ress, Malenkov i n h i s rev iew of domesti cpol ic ies remarked t h a t " c e r t a in o f o u r l e a d in g c om ra de sv t hadadvanced and supported t h i s l l i n c o r r e c t l l p o l i c y .

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I t w i l l a l s o be recalled t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l charges aga i ns tBeria i nc l uded a ' r e f e r ence to opposing reforms in a g r i c u l t u r e .c. Yalenkov s t a t e s , r eg a rd in g t h e a g r i c u l t u r a ltax$f$eform, lfit is opgbrtune t o s a y t h a t i t wasc a r r i e d o u t on t h e i n i - t i a t i v e of and in accordancew i t h th e proposals of t h e Central Committee of t h eCPSU,and i t ' i s now evident what an impor tan t ro let h i s ref orm h a s played. .. '

T h i s s ta tement , a t l eas t t e c h n i c a l l y , is probably f a l s e .T h e a g r i c u l t u r a l tax reform was proposed and approved a t t h eAugust 1953 Supreme Soviet session; t h e Plenum of t h e C e n t q a lCommittee held i n J u ly 1953 concerned i t s e l f , so f a r as isknown, with t h e Beria case. More important f o r our purposehere i s a s tatement made by Khrushchev a t t h e September 1953Central Committee session on agr icul ture . Khrushchev s a i d ,concerning1,the Supreme Soviet actions on obl iga tory procure-ments and t a x reform, t h a t " the USSR Counci l of Minis tersand t h e Presidium of th e P ar ty C ent ral Committee. . .consideredJthese measures/ necessary. . 1

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-r e p o r te d i n 1 954 t h a t t h e t a x r eformeen very popular ong t h e peasantry and t h a t theyte nd ed t o i d e n t i f y t h i s reform w i t h Malenkov.very l i k e l y , an d would ex pl ai n t h e con t r i ved e f f o r t to d i s -s o c i a t e t h i s measure from Malenkov.

Th i s seems

d . Malenkov finds i t necessary twice t o s a yt h a t Ifon t h e i n i t i a t i v e a n d u n d e r t h e guidance oft h e C e n t r a l Committeev1s e r i o u s a n d ) l a r g e scalee f f o r t s for su rmoun t i ng ag r i cu l t u r a l de f i c i enc i e swere bei ng un der tak en. Malenkov s ta tes t h a t t h i sprogram is "based on t h e only correct foundat ion:t h e fu r t he r development by eve ry means of heavy in=dustry." Malenkov adds t h a t only t h i s course can re-s u l t i n a real "upsurge" i n production of " a l l corn- .m o d i t i e s e s s e n t i a l fo r popular consumption."I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e above reference t o heavy industry i st h e o nl y r e f l e c t i o n , i n t h e whole o f f i c i a l public documenta-t i o n of Malenkov's demotion, of a presumed inner-Party con-t rove rsy concern ing the r e s p e c t i v e rates of growth of l i g h t

and heavy industry. As w i l l appear l a t e r , there is no rea leason not t o be l i eve t h a t Yalenkov personal ly espoused. theso-called-"consumer goods" program.advocates of preferent ia l deve lopment of l i g h t i n d u s t r y as- . - . . _ . . . . Y e t Khrushchev had tagged..

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" r i g h t d e v i a t i o n i s t s . " Thus t h e Malenkov tex t appears d e l i b -e r a t e l y to avoid t h i s i s s u e , so as n o t to equate Malenkov, a tt h i s s tage a t any rate, w i t h t h e l t t r a i to ss T1 ukhar in and Rykov.*Sevq'pa l spec u l a t iv e po in t s can be made r e g a r d i n g t h i sl e t t e r df r e s i g n a t i o n . Thd f i r s t c on ce rn s t h e emphasis onin e x p e r i e n c e and l ack of l e a d e r s h i p . One c a n l e g i t i m a te lyask : were t hese ' " fac ts" not known when Yalenkov w a s f i r s tmade Chairman of t h e Counci l of Min i s t e r s ? The im p l i c a t i o n isthaLt Malenkov.s,hould never have received t h i s p o s t a t a l l , w i t ht h e sugges t i on t h a t some unusual f a c t o r s mus t have ope ra ted t oe l e v a t e him t o t h i s p o s t . T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n p ro vo ke s re-newed s p e c u l a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e ro l e of B e r i a in t h e p e r i o df ol lo wi ng S t a l i n ' s dea th .Asecond po in t is ' t h a k t h e s e same re fe rences may be t a k e nt o s i g n i f y an element of re sen tmen t , an d perhaps even revenge,

on t h e p a r t of t h e older m e m b e r s of the' P r e s i d i u m , s e v e r a lof whom are e 'o ld B o l s h e v ik s , " a g a in s t t h e younger lvups ta r t fTMalenkov.f r i c t i o n a n d animosity between Malenkov and t h e s e n i o r S o v i e tleader .

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T h i s would imply a c e r t a i n e l e m e n t of p e r s o n a l

The a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s of Malenkov ' s o u s t e r are unknown.I t seems a lm o s t c e r t a in , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e matter w a s d e c i d e da t t h e Central Committee plenum. h e l d from 25 th rough 31January . For example, on 6 February t h e US Embassy reportedt h a t members of the Hearst p a r t y , which a r r i v e d i n t h e USSRon 25 Janauary , were t o l d they would be rece ived by Bulganini f they c ou ld s t a y u n t i l t h e c o n c lu s io nmee t ing .Malenkov were a p p a r e n t l y i g n o re d ' by the' R u s s i a n s .t h e Jhbassy no ted on 6 Feb rua ry t h a t MaPenkov's name had n o tbeen mentioned once by s p e a k e r s a t the Supreme Sovie t , whichbegan on 3 February , whereas more than hal f of t h e s p e a k e r shad referred t o Khrushchev i n one way or a n o t h e r . T h i s a p p e a r s

of the Supreme Sovie tTh e i r nu mer ous r e q u e s t s f o r a n i n t e r v i e w w i t hFurthermore ,

shed s h i f t i n p ower r e l a t i o n s h i p s .have r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e11 known in c e r t a i nS o v i e t c i rc les b e f o r e t h e Supreme S ovi e t me et ing took p la c e .P i e r r e C o ur t a de , s p e a kin g on a Csminfonn b r o a d c a s t t oFrance on 3 May, g a ve a n i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s io n of Malenkov'sdemotion, The d i s cus s i on p resen te d h i s as aprime example of t h e workings of t h e ' t s u p e r i o r l *S o v i e t "democ-

racy . " Knter a l i a , C ou rt ad e s t a t e d t h a t " the q u e s t i o n hadbeen d i s c u s s e d w v i o u s l y f i o i t s announcement7 by t h e C e n t r a lCommittee of t h e CPSU, and- the deput ies of thZT S o v i e t p a r l ia m e n thad r e c e iv e d e x a c t i n f o r m a t io n on t h e whole s i t u a t i o n . "% The Hungarian comrades were n o t so t ho ug ht fu l i n t h e i rt r e a tm e n t of Nagy.


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e i gn e d i t o r of L'Humanite, ear l i e r hadan account of Malenkov ' s8 ' ' ana , wn=Le enying t h a t there had beenany d i f fe , rences w i t h Malenkov on fo re ig n pol ic y, added t h a tMalenkov4,'had been pr e pa re d $t o l t sacr i f ice t h e E a s t German com-ra de s" . Fhough "not i n t he same sensie" as B e r i a . *

Ambassador Bohlen repor t ed on 9 February a v e r s i o n of t h eMal enkov ous t e r c i r cu l a t ed by Ralph Parker, co r re sponden t ofthe London D a i l Worker, According t o t h i s s tory , Malenkovproblems, and only a f te r t h i s a c t i o n was t h e d e c i s i o n made t or e p l a c e h i m .March. According t o Parker , who a l l e g e d l y r e c e i v e d t h e informa-t i o n from a S o v i e t s o u r c e , it had been Fo re i gn Mi n i s t e rMolotov who at tacked Malenkov a t t h e Central Commit tee; 'Khru-shchev was a l l e g e d l y ab- thatday. Molotov charged t h a tMalenkov as Pr ime Mini s t e r . i brough t con fus i on i n t h e Sovieteconomy by overemphasis on consumer goods pr od uc tio n. The i m -p o r t a n t matters were apport ionment of v i t a l raw materialsand of ' s k i l l e d t e c h n i c a l w or ke rs . M olo to v a s s e r t e d t h a t , i ne f f e c t , Malenkov was d i s r e g a r d i n g or exceeding the i n s t r u c t i o n sof th e Ce nt r a l Commi tt ee . Fur thermore , accord ing t o t h i ss t o ry , Mol o t ov s a i d t ha t Yalenkov had encouraged governmentworkers i n v a r i o u s ec ono mic m i n i s t r i e s t o d i s r e g a r d t h e P a r t yr e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .Ma l enkov ' s po l i c i e s , a t which point Malenkov l o s k h i s temperand walked out ,**

walked o u t -8f t e m a l Commi tt ee d i sc us s io n of economicE l a b o r a t i o n of t h i s s t o r y was reported on 10

The Plenum then repor t ed ly voted a g a i n s t

Yuri Zhukov, a Central Commit tee mem b e re d i t o r of Pravda , took some p a i n s to impresswere n o t t r e s u l t of "mere clashr i v a l r i e s . Zhukov ass en t ed "empha t h a td i f f e r e n t p e r s o n a l i t i e s r e f l e c t e dphilosophy# e t cetera. Zhukov a l s oplayed down t h e idea t h a t "the m i l ed i r e c t i o n of e v e n t s .

he i dea tha t deve lopment s such

* See below, page 9 , on Ber ia ' s al leged views on Germany.** Ambassador Bohlen, w h i l e i n t e r e s t e d i n the i d e a t h a t i t w a sM al en ko v' s r e c a l c i t r a n c e t h a t forced * t h e i s s u e , n o n e t he l e s sn o t e d t h 8 t ' : P a r k e r ' s v e r s i o n does n o t , e x c e p t on t h e p o i n tof m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , c o i n c i d e in any r e s p e c t w i t h t h eo f f i c i a l o v e r t So vi et l i n e on the demot ion.

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A 31 January 1955 Cen t ra l Committee Reso lu t ion , s igned\ t o have con ta inedby ' ?a l l of t h e members of th e Pres id ium" ( i nc l ud in g Malenkov?)w a s . r e p o r t e d 1t h e follo,wing accqsa ' t ions : .'

I?. a. Malenkov lacged dec is iveness and experbenceto ' di rec t the government.o f impor tan t fo r e ig n and domestic p o l i c y matters in=H e had handled a numberr' competent ly .

4 ,b. Malenkov had been p o l i t i c a l l y *!near-sighted. I'H e had been under t h e i n f l u e n c e of Beria, suppor tedhim, and had been blind to t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e ofB e r i a ' s proposal to h a l t e f f o r t s t o socialize E a s tGermany and t o permit r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany asa "bourgeois" buffer s ta te . Malenkov permi t tedB e r i a ' s l l a d v e n tu r i s t i c l l schemes to take place:s p e c i f i c a l l y the "Leningrad A f f a i r " and th e "YakovlevAffa i r . "gram t o be carr ied o u t .p l i e d a r e t a r d a t i o n of t h e tempo of h e a v y i n d u s t r i a lproduct ion .

H e l ikewise permi t ted Beria's r u r a l pro-c. Malenkov's emphasis on l i g h t i n d u s t r y i m -

T h i s was a " r i g h t i s t d e v i a t i o n .d. Malenkov attempted t o seize complete con-t r o l of t h e Party and government.

The on ly i i lpe l io ra t ing s ta temen t was: t h a t when Beria 'sa c t i v i t i e s were exposed, Malenkov took a prominent and decis ivero le in denouncing and removing h i m , ,Anothe r d i scuss ion of t h e background of Malenkov's de-motion took place. betweenand P a r t y F i r s t usncnevy ami n t h i s i n t e r v i e w was outspokenly C ~ X ~ ~ C P L1 wnaz

3 T h i s s e c t i o n i s replete w i t h q u a l i f i e r s l l ap p ar e nt l y" and' l r epor ted ly . l lp a r t s of it, are avai lable , and one cannot be t o o suree x a c t l y what ghrushchev d i d s a y .f i r s t hand, an d one n o te d t h a t . Su b a n d r io '!was not b e in gcoherent t1 in h i s account of the interview. However, t h e.large measure of agreement on t h e basic i d e a s expressed makesi t p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e s en se , i f n o t t h e exact words, of th ec o n v e r s a t i o n is a c c u r a t e ly r e n d e r e d .

Four d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s of t h i s i n t e r v i e w , o rNot a l l of t h e reports are

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T

he termed "the previous government ," u n m i s t a k a b l y r e f e r r i n g t oMalenkov. T h i s polemic w a s s t a r t l i n g and p r a c t i c a l l y unp rec-e d e n t e d , , i n ! t h a t one Sov i e t l e ade r d i scussed ano t he r Sov i e tl e a d e r w i t h a f o r e i g n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .H e appakently accused Malenkov of ' Ibureaucra t i c methods," anda l so o f p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s , r a the r t hanupon t h e Par t y and Pa r t y channe l s . *a do pt ed i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e problem of demand.created demands i n t h e Sovie t people wi thout hav ing createdt h e c a p ac i t y f o r s a t i s f y i n g them.on l y p rope r method of r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g w a s throughcont inued emphasis on the development of heavy indust ry.**

1' I ,',IKhdushchev w a s q u i t e k r i t i c a l of Malenkov ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .c

* IKhrushchev reportedly s t a t ed t h a t a wrong co ur s e had beenMalenkov hadI t w a s now clear t h a t t h e

On fo r ei g n matters, so it i s reported , Khrushchev s t a t edt h a t Malenkov had n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y " st r o ng . t t He d i d n o tknow e x a c t l y what he wanted; he was u n c e r t a i n , weak and con-fused. ghrushchev asserted t h a t t h e firmer t o n e of t h e S o v ie ta t t i t u d e i n f or ei gn a f f a i r s , as compared w i t h t h e "previousgovernment," sh ould not be t aken to ref lec t aggressive i n t en -t i o n s , b u t was des igned t o '%sober" a gg re ss iv e c i r c le s abroad,. e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e United Sta tes . Khrushchev re por t ed ly addedi n t h i s connec t i on t ha t the S o v i e t Union was n o t a f r a i d ofUS b a s e s , s i n c e t h e US must be aware t h a t t h e USSR cou l dd e s t r o y t h e s e bases w i t h 'la blow."Other lesser S o vi e t o f f i c i a l s have a l so on occas i on"frank lyf1 dis cus se d Malenkov ' s a l l eg ed ,manager ia l and execut i ve

d e f i c i e n c i e s w i t h f o r e i g n e r s .* T h i s a c c u s a t i o n has n o t f i g u r e d i n any overt d i scuss i on o fth e Malenkov a f f a i r . Again , what t h e R u s s i a ns d i d n o t s a y ,Rakosi i n Hungary did--i .e . , t h a t Nagp at tempted t o d i s -r ega rd the Party and t o e l e v a t e t h e r o l e of t h e s t a t e ap-p a r a t u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e P a r t y .** T h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g r e v e r sa l of g h r u s h c h e v ' s r e p l y t oMacDuf fi e' s ques t i on r ega rd i ng t he re turn t o heavy in-d u s t r y .such l l r e tu rn , l l s i nc e t h e Pa r t y had never removed emphas i sfrom heavy i nd us t ry i n t h e f i r s t p lac e.

t h a t Sovi e t s t a t eme nt s had been "mis i n te rpre t e d" in t h eWest.

ghsushchev said on t h a t o c ca s io n t h a t t h e r e was noKhrushchev s a id

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During t h e s p r i n g , K h ru sh ch ev 's p e r s o n a l p u b l i c i t y fa ro u t s t r i p p e d t h a t of t h e other S o v i e t leaders an d reached ap o i n t where it threatene'd tn s ha t t e r t h e facade of c o l l e c t i v el e a d e r s h i p . He w a s a c t i v e i n many a s p e c t s of domestic a f f a i r sand l e d t h e S o v i e t d el e g a ti o n t o t h e Polish and Czechoslovakianp a r ty c o n g r e s s e s .fe r s l i g h t l y . C o n t r a r y t o p r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e , h e a p p a r e n t l y d i dn o t g i v e a r e p o r t on a g r i c u l t u r e t o t h e C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e meet-ing and was n o t p u b l i c l y a s s o c i a t e d w i th i t s d e c i s i o n s .

I n June , however , Khrushchev ' s pos i t io n appeare d t o suf-

11

KBRUSHCHEV'S RISE IN PROMINENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH

In t h e 23 months s in ce S t a l i n ' s d ea th , Khrushchev movedfrom f i f t h p o s i t i o n in t h e ; L i s t i n g s of t h e a l l - p o w e r f u l Pa r tyPresidiufi t o a p o s i t i o n o f ' t o p i n f lu e n ce i n t h e USSR.when Malenkov resigned from t h e P a r t y S e c r e t a r i a t , l e a v i n gX hr us hc he v a s s e n i o r man on t h e body t h a t e x e r c i s e s immediates u p e r v i s i o n o v er t h e - p o w e r f u l Pa r ty a p p a r a tu s and c o n t r o l smost personnel appoin tments . I t was t h e v e hi c le f o r S t a l i n ' s

>The s t age f o r . h i s r a p i d r i s e wa s s e t i n March of 1953,

r ise to power i n the 1920 ' s .Following the purge of Beria i n J u l y of 1953, Khrushchevmoved up t o number t h r e e p o s i t i o n i n t h e l i s t i n g of t h e P a r t yPresidium, Then, i n September of t h a t y e a r , a p lena ry mee t ing

of t h e Par ty Cen t ra l Commit tee made h i m F i r s t S e cr e ta r y of t h ePa r ty a n d heard h i s r e p or t d e t a i l i n g t h e impor tan t new ag r icu l -tural program.During t h e l a t t e r months of 1953, Khrushchev continued tor e c e i v e c o n s id e r ab l e p u b l i c i t y i n c o n ne ct io n w i t h th e a g r i c u l -t u r a l p r o g r a m , and in Februa ry 1954 h e made a n o th e r h ig h ly -p u b l ic i z ed r e p o r t t o t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o u t l i n in g t h e re-s u l t s and p r o s p ec t s of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l program. By t h i s t i m e .Khrushchev was r e c e i v i n g more p e r s o n a l p u b l i c i t y t h a n a n y o t h e rt o p S o v i e t leader and had d e f i n i t e l y o u t s t r i p p e d Molotov t obecome number-two man i n t h e h i e r a r c h y .The ex ten t of Khrushchev's rise was f u l l y r e ve a le d i n

A p r i l of 1954 when he and Malenkov each'gave a p r i n c i p a l a dd rq sst o one of t h e houses of t h e Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev ap-p e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e s l i g h t l y more im p o r t a n t C o un c il of t h e Union.


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Khrushchev 's po si t i on ag ain improved markedly i n Sep-tember of 1954, however. H e l e d t h e w e l l- p u b li c i z ed S o v i e t' 'government" de leg a t i on t o China and s igne d t he impor tan tSino-Soviet agreem,ent concluded a t t h a t time. On h i s way backfrom Chapa, Khrushchev made' an e x t en s i ve i n s p e ct i o n t r i pthrough;' t he Sov ie t Fa r E a s t a nd fol lowed t h i s w i t h a t r i pt h rough Tadzhik i s t an and Uzbeki s t an . These j ourneys gaveKhrushchev a va l u ab l e oppor t un i t y t o make c on t ac t s i n manyareras:of t h e USSR and cast him i n t h e ro le of p r i n c i p a l P a r tyspokesman for-many lo ca l Par ty and government o f f i c i a l s .p e r i o d i n connec t ion w i t h these t r i p s and h i s o t h e r a c t i v i t i e sa s P a r ty F i r s t S e c r e t a r y. H e w a s i nc l uded i n l i s ts of L e n i n ' sco-workers and " l e a d i n g c e n t r a l c om mi tte e wo rk er s s e n t d i r e c t l yt o war work" which pointedly excluded Malenkov, and h i s namea p pe ar e d i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t h e S o v ie t p r e s s .

Khrushchev 's personal p u b l i c i t y idcreased dur i ng t h i s

During t h e l a t e f a l l K hr us hc he v' s p u b l i c a c t i v i t y i n -creased. H e acted as p r i n c i p a l regime spokesman i n an in -cr ea s i ng number of f i e l d s a n d , on 7 December he made aspeech t o a conference of c o n s t r u c t i o n workers which fore-shadowed t h e i n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s o f f i c i a l l y accorded t h e im -por tanc e of heavy ind us t ry l a t e r i n t h e month. I n a speecht o a g a t h e r i n g of Komsomol members, K hrushchev, co n t r a ry t op r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e , stressed hlls close p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i pw i t h S t a l i n , a n d o n 10 January 1959, Khrushchev's name wasl i n k e d w i t h Lenin's when he signed a C e n t r a l Committee decreechanging t h e date and character of t h e c e l e b r a t i o n o f L e n i n 'smemory .A s t r i k i n g s i g n of K hr us hc he v' s L p o r t a n c e came o u t oft h e Ce nt ra l Committee meeting commencing on 25 January. H i sreport t o t h e plenum on i n c r e a s i n g l i v e s t o c k p ro d u c ti o n h e a v i l ystressed t h e i m por tance of heavy in du st ry and equa?ted t h e po si -t i o n of tho se "woe-begone th eo re t i c i an s" who had underest imatedi t s importance w i t h t h a t of Bukharin and Rgkov, p o l i t b u r o mem-bers who were f i r s t demoted and then s h o t in 1938 for " r i g h t i s tdevia t io ns . " Th i s speech , which occupied s i x pages of Prsrvdaon 3 February, t h e opening day of th e Supreme Soviet s e ms e t t h e t one for t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e "New Course" effectedat t h a t se s s i on and made Khrushchev t h e pr inc ipa l spokesman fort h a t i m p o r t a n t s h i f t .d e l e g a t e s as t o K hrushchev' s l e ad i ng pos i t i o n was evidenced

by t h e f ac t t h a t o v e r h a l f of t h e spe aker s ment ioned h i s namein t h e i r r e p or t s , while none of them c i ted Malenkov.

.

The awareness of the,Supreme Sovie%

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Sin ce th e February 1955 changes, Khrushchev's predominantp o s i t i o n w it h i n t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p has been confirmed. Hehas fo l lowed a very aggr ess i ve course i n implemen ta t ion of h i sa g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s , a n d , has p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i n t e r n a -t i o n a l q b n f e r e n c e s u n d e r t a k e n by t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . Of 'par t i cUlar . i n t e r e s t here was h i s e x p l i c i t d es i gn at i on as headof t h e Sov i e t governmen tal de l ega t i on t o Belgrade .immediately a i f e r Malenkov's demotion were somewhat incon-c l u s i v e , t h e s i t u a t i o n h ad c l a r i f i e d by mid-July 1955, a twhich t i m e t h e US Charge in Moscow reported t h a t he was" p a r t i c ul a r l y s t r u c k , , , b y t h e deference which members of t h ele ad er sh ip , inc lud ing Bulganin , showed t o Khrushchev, par-t i c u l a r l y when t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n was on r ea l substance . ' '

While in d i ca t i on s of Khrushchev' s pe r so na l power po s i t i on

In h i s v ar i ou s p u b l i c c o nt a c t s , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e S t a l i n ' sf a l l , Khrushchev has r e v e a l e d himsel f as a n a g g r e s s iv e ,en er ge t i c , dynamic and demagogic pe rs on al i t y , A t r e c e p t i o n sand d inners , he has seemed bl un t , uncompromis ing and gene ra l lyt a c t l e s s , a l t h o u g h s i n c e l a l e n k o v ' s f a l l he h as been on "be t te rbehavior" than he was e a r l i e r . Khrushchev h a s been descr ibedas p o s s e s s in g i n o r d i n a t e a m b i ti o n and c o n f id en c e , n o t i n t h epersona l sense b u t r a t h e r i n t h e s e n s e of a n e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o rc o m p l e t e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h h i s v a s t a n d c o m p le x e n t e r p r i s e ,

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. -

A large volume of evipence f rom1publ i shed Sovie t document s s h b w sc o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t a s i g n i x i c n t change i n t h e USSR's economicp o l i c y o c c u r r e d d u r i n g 1953 and 1954 wb il e Malenkov wasPremier . In b r i e f , t h e s e changes cons i s t ed of a r e a l thoughmapgihal i n c r e a s e i n the p r o p o r t i o n of economic re sou rc esd ev ot ed t o r a i s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d uc t i on a nd e x pa nd in g o u t -p u t of i n d u s t r i a l consumer goods , and a l e v e l i n g o f f ( p o s s i b l ya n a c t u a l decrease), of m f l i t a r y e x p e n d i tu r e s . A t t h e samet i m e , t he r egi m e p lanned t o m a i n t a i n a r a p i d r a t e of heavyi n d u s t r i a l g rowth.

be l abo red t h i s new emphasis on welfare of t h e popu l a t i on ve ryh e a vi l y , s h i f t i n g in 1954 t o emphasis on a g r i c u l t u r a l p ro -duc t i on .v i e t g a v e t h e f i r s t comprehensive survey of t h e program underwhich t h e o u t p u t of ag r i c u l tu r e and consumer goods w a s t o bera p i d l y expanded " in the n ex t two or three years ,"p u b l i c decrees were i s s u e d ' i n September and October 1953 t oimplement t h e i n d i v id u a l s e c t i o n s of t h e program.documents i ssued by t h e regime, t h e p u b l i s h e d v e r s i o n s oft h e Sov i e t annua l budge ts f o r 1953 and 1 954 , reve a l th e p lannedl e v e l i n g o r p o s s i b l e decrease of m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , andt h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l growth.'Four major t y p e s of ev i dence show t h a t d u r i n g t h e l a s t

h a l f of 1953 and most of 1954 th e S o v i e t Union s e r i o u s l y i n -tended t o i mp lement t h e c ha ng es i n p o l i c y c a l l e d f o r by i t spropaganda.implement t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l and consumer goods programs con-t a i n e d a v a s t q u a n t i t y of s t a t i s t i c a l d e t a i l s conce rn i ngplanned ou tput of i n d i v i d u a l items and s p e c i f i c measures t obe unde r t aken . Pub l i ca t i on of t h i s mass of informat ion wouldhave been unnecessary i f t h e regime had no t i n t ended t o c a r r yo u t i t s promises t o t h e popu l a t i on o f a be t te r l i f e and greatermaterial i n c e n t i v e s .

In l a t e 1 9 5 3 , S o v i e t i n t e r n a l and fo re i g n p ropagandaMalenkov's August 1953 speech b e f o r e t h e Supreme So-

VoluminousOthe r

(1) The decrees i s s u e d i n September and October 1953 t o

(2) During 1953 and 1954, Sovie t economic journa l s pub-l i s h e d numerous scholar ly a r t i c l e s a t t e m p t i n g to prov i det h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e plannedag r i cu l t u r a l and consumer goods o u t p u t , which would inev i t ab lyr e s u l t i n a l ow er i ng of t h e p r o p o r t i o n ( th ou gh n o t n e c e s s a r i l y

s h a r p rises i n

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t h e a b s o l u t e l e v e l ) of economic r e so u r c e s d e v o t e d t o t h ed e f e ns e i n d u s t r y sec to r of t h e economy. These a r t i c l e s , b ysuch economis t s as Ost rov i tyan ov , Vekua, and Ms t i s l av sk i ,were d e f i n i t e l y n o t i nt en de d as propaganda t o m i s l e a d t h eWest ori:Bven th e S ov ie t pdpu la t ion , because of t h e i r h i g h l ytechn iGa1 , t h e o r e t i c a l na tu re . They were a p p a r e n t l y e f f o r t sto b u t t r e s s w i t h po l i t i co -economic theory ac tua l po l i c i esa l r e ad y in t rodu ced by th e government .2 .(3) The' i m p r e s s i o n s g a i n e d b y US Embass pe rso nne l i nr"----1h e So vi e t Union, and r e p o r t s received fromand f rom pr i soner s of war released by t h e USSR1954, almost u n i f o r m l y show t h a t t h e government was a t t e m p t -i n g t o implement t h e consumer goods and agr i cu l tu ra l programs.In many cases achievement w a s l ag g in g beh ind p lanned g o a l s ,b u t s e r i o u s e f f o r t s te re being made,

.,, w e uwin not o n l y i n c r e a se d p l an n ed goalsn s u m e E o d s p r odu ct io n i n 1953 and 1954, b u t a l s oordered a much h i g h e r p r i o r i t y %or h e , a l l o c a t i o n of mate-r i a l s n e c e s s a r y t o achieve these goals , Before S t a l i n ' sd e a t h , messages of t h e t y p e d e sc r i b e d above were r e c e i v e dv e r y i n f r e q u e n t l y . Before 1953, t h e USSR r e g u l a r l y a nn ou nce dp l a n s fo r a n n u a l i n c r e a se s i n c o n su m e r goods o u t p u t , b u tt h e r e q u i s i t e p r i o r i t i e s t o implement t h e t a s k f u l l y weren e v e r g r a n t e d .

While the changes of S o v i e t ec on om ic p o l i c y i n mid-1953were n o t of large magnitude i n terms of economic aggregates ,and w h i l e t hey caused on ly mar g ina l changes ia t h e p r o p o r t i o nof t o t a l r e s o u r c e s devoted t o d e f e n se , h e a v y i n d u s t r y , a n dconsumption, t h e d i r e c t i o n of change w a s v e r y important.The c h an ge a p p a r e n t l y r e f l e c t e d a des i r e by t h e then dominantf a c t i o n o f t h e regime to devote i n c r e a s e d e f f o r t s t o w a r dexpanding t h e n a t i o n ' s basic economic and s t r a t e g i c p o t e n t i a la n d i n d i c a t e d a s e r i o u s c o n ce rn r e g a r d i n g bas ic economicweaknesses such a s l o w food p r o d u c t i o n an d l a g g i n g g r o d u c t i v -i t y , which , i n t h e f u t u r e , might h inder g rowth of t h e USSR's

_-- -- - .- -- - ___


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s t r a t e g i c power. I n 1953 and 1954, t h e l e a d e r s h i p seemed t of e e l t ha t . t h e se ' goals were more i m p o r t a n t t h a n c o n t i n u i n g t oi n c r e a s e t h e a l r e a d y h i g h p r od u ct i on of m i l i t a r y end. itemsa n d expand t h e s i ze of i t s armed forces .i f

'/ I ,L'Ma/fenkov's I d e n t i f i c a k i o n w i th t h e Consumer Goods Program.The emergence i n t h e Soviet press i n J a nu ar y 1954 of theoret-c a l polemics concern ing t h e ' ' in c or r ec t " v ie w t h a t l i g h t i n-du9 tr .y shou ld , i n con temporary con d i t ion s , en jo y p re fe ren-t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t r e l a t i v e t o heavy indus t ry , engendered wi d es p e c u l a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g a "po l i cy s p l i t " be tween top Sov ie tleaders . IR t h i s view, Malenkov was i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e p ro -ponent of t h e " l i g h t i n d u s t r y " program, and t h e "defea t" oft h i s program was h e l d t o be a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he had l o s to u t . T h i s argument was based o n t h e f a c t t h a t Malenkovr i g i n a l l y s e t fo r th t the program i n August 1953; t h a t h i s ownp o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s a p pe a re d t o coincide w i t h t h e u ps a n dd o w n s of t h e program i n S o v i e t p ro p ag a nd a; t h a t Malenkov, t h e" r e a l i s t , " w a s more i n c l i n e d t o apprec ia te t h e impor tance ofi n c e n t i v e s , whereas Khrushchev had made o p e n s t a t e m e n t s whichf o r m u l a t i o n s . This p o i n t of view w a s g i v e n a p p a r e n t c o o f i r -mation by t h e v t r e s i g n a t i o n " of Malenkov i n Feb rua ry 1955,by t h e r e v i s e d Sovie t propaganda l i n e emphasizing t h e heavyi n d u s t r i a l d e ve lo p me nt , a n d b y t h e c h an g es i n t h e 1955 budget ,t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . They h av e a r g u ed t h a t no re l i ab le s o u r c eh a s e v e r made s uc h a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t i t had never beeni m p l i e d by S o v i e t p r e s s mate r ia l , and t h a t a l l S o v i e t leaders ,on a p p r o p r i a t e o c c a s i o n s , made approprkate statements r e a f f i r m i n gsupport . o f . . t h e . m su m e r goods program.:. Th ese . a n a l y s t s a r ~ u e k t h e rt h a t there is DO reason n o t t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e program re-f l e c t e d a v l c o l l e c t i v e " d e c i s i o n , a n d t h a t it is thereforehazardous t o assume t h a t Malenkov advocated t h e program anymore than any other leader . F i n a l l y , i n a t h i s view, t h e d i s -c u s s i o n s i n t h e S o v i e t press i n J a nu a ry 1 95 4 were d i r e c t e daga i ns t " m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s" of t h e Party l i n e by c e r t a i no b sc u r e and l i t t l e knowd economis t s , and the re fo re s hou ld no tbe t aken as i n d i c a t i o n s of p o l i c y c o n t r o v e r sy .

t ended t o q u a l i f y t h e consumer goods approach , and which werel a t e r i n more or less o p e n c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h t h e e a r l i e r

O t h e r s e r i o u s s t u d e n t s of S o v i e t a f f a i r s have ques t ioned

There are a number of p e c u l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n regardt o t h e consumer goods program, I t was propounded by Malenkovb e f o r e t h e Supreme S o v i e t i n A ug us t 1953, T h i s i n i t s e l f w a sa n un pr ec e de nt ed a c t i o n , i n t h a t t h e Supreme Sovhet had neverp r e v i o u s l y been the forum fo r announcement of an impor tan tpo l i cy change. Fur thermore, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t some16


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I t seems f a i r l y c l ea r t h a t t h e consumer goods program 'a_s not p r e s e n t e d t o t h e C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e a s was t h e a g r i -c u l t u r a l program. There i s DO i n d i c a t i o n w ha te ve r t h a t t h eJuly Plenum of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , which c o n s id e r e d t h eB e r i a mat te r , d i s c u s s e d or passed r e s o l u t i o n s on consumergoods produc t on .Even more i n t e r e s t i n g are i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e Sep-tember Plenum, which c on si de re d a g r i c u l t u r a l problems, a l s od i d not conce rn i t s e l f w i t h t h e o v e r - a l l program. Khru-

shchd* .gpeech at t h i s Plenum o n ly b r i e f l y n o t e d t h e e x i s t e n c eof t h i s program. L a t e r i n h i s speech , Khrushchev not ed , i nc o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n c e n t i v e c o n c e s s i o n s g r a n t e d t o t h ep e a s a n t r y a t t h e Augus t Supreme So v i e t s e s s i on , t h a t t h eGovernment "and t h e Pres id ium of t h e P a r t y C e n t r a l C omm i t t e ehave cons ide red i t necessary... ' 'In September 1953, a f t e r t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e s e s s i o n ,s e v e r a l im p le m e n t in g d e c r e e s were i s s u e d , o v e r t h e j o i n ts i g n a t u r e s of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e and t h e Counci l ofM i n i s t e r s , s e t t i n g f o r t h and e l a b o r a t i n g d e t a i l s of t h e7 September Centra l C o m m i t t e e r e s o l u t i o n on a g r i c u l t u r e ,which was i n t h e n a t u r e of a broad p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e . Eachof these implementing decrees , as is cys tomary , c i t e d th e

* Some d i s t i n c t i o n s n e e d t o be drawn OD t h i s poin t . vToncerrI t 'f o r e n t i n th e S o v i e t pressand as e a r l y as A p r i l 1953,and by June 1953 i t w a s e v i d e n t t n t a CoDcerted program ofexpansion of consumer goods p r o d u c t i o n was under way. T hi sprogram, however, d i d n o t i n v o l v e an y b a s i c changes i n t h eeconomy:i n e f f i c i e n c y and by a c o n c er t e d d r i v e t o r e du c e and r e u t i l i z es c r a p a nd waste, and was t o be carr ied o u t p r i n c i p a l l y byl o c a l and co-operative e n t e r p r i s e s and a s s o c i a t i o n s . The pro-expanded p r o s t i o n w a s t o b e i e v e d by i n c r e a s e

ram o u t l i n e d b y


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a u t h o r i t y of t h e 7 September C e n t r a l Committee r e s o l u t i o n ,Y e t t h e r e . i s n o ' i n d i c a t i o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a s i m i l a rC e n t r a l C omm i t t e e decree on manufactured consumer goods.Se ve ra l Jo in t Gdvernment and C e n t r a l Committee decrees of animplemen-nature were % sued i n October on manufacturedconsumer goods and l i g h t and food i n d u s t r i e s , b u t i n con:t ras t '-to h e a g r i c u l t u r a l d e cr e e s , no c i t a t i o n or s u g g e s t i o nof a broad p o l i c y - a u t h o r i z a t i o n decree w a s ev i den t . Fu r t he r -rnoSe, i n n o n e of th e speeches g i ven OD t h e consumer. goodsprogram was there r e f e r e n c e t o o r s u g g e s t i o n o f a bas icC e n t r a l Committee decree on t he subde c t .T h e s e i n d i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e over-a l l consumergoods program w a s conceived and d e c i d e d upon so l e l y w i t h i nt h e small t o p group of P a r t y l eaders , and t h a t it was neve rp re sen t ed t o t h e broader C e n t r a l C omm k t t e e Plenum, even f o r

1 r a t i f i c a t i o n .T h i s p o i n t has been developed a t some l e n gt h , s i n c e t h ec r i t i c i sms of Malenkov, as reported by some s o u r c e s , i n c l u d et h e charge t h a t he placed r e l i a n c e on th e s t a t e a p p a r a t u sr a t h e r than upon t h e P a r t y an d P a r t y c h a n n e l s ; o n e s o u r c ewent so f a r a s t o charge t h a t Malenkov at tempted t o s e t t h es t a t e a p p a r at u s i n o p p o si t i on t o t h e P a r t y a p p a r a t u s . Khru-shchev, on tb other hand, has been s a i d t o have made t h e Cen-t r a l C omm i t t e e h i s base of s u p p o r t , b y a p p e a l i n g t o i t andp r e s e n t i n g h i s p r o p o s a l s t o i t . T he h i s t o ry of t h e develop-ment of t h e New C ou rs e , an d i n p a r t i c u l a r of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a lprograms, tends to s u p p o r t t h i s a n a l y s i s .I t is q u i t e t r u e t h a t t h e g o v i e t p r e s s has never e%-p l i c i t l y i d e n t i f i e d M a l e n k o v or anyone e l s e as t h e o r i g i n a t o ror i n s p i r e r of t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p o l i cy or e c o n o i i cprogram. The n e a r e s t t h i n g t o s u c h an a t t r i b u t i o n may befound i n Khrushchev ' s i n t e rv ie w w i t h Professor B e r n al i nSeptember 1954, publ i shed by t h e Sovie t p r e s s i n December,and in Khrushchev's Janua ry 1955 s p e e c h t o t h e Komsomo l , i nwhich he claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y #!or a tax law of t h e S t a l i npe r i od . I n t h e B e r n a l i n t e r v i e w , Khrushchev merely f a i l e dt o deny B e rna l ' s sugges t i on t h a t he , Khrushcbev, was per-s o n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e for th e New Lands program.Both Mikoyan and Kosygin, in t h e i r s p e e c he s i n October1953, made l a u d a t o r y r e f e r e n c e-n l y t o Malenkov i n connec t ion

w i t h t h e over-a l l consumer goods program, E q u a l l y , b o t h re-fe r red t o Khrushchev, bu t on ly i n c o m e u L ~ o nw i t h ag r i cu l -t u r e , The a l t e r n a t i v e s were t o c i t e *'the Party and Govern-ment" or th e " w i s e c o l l e c t i v e ? ? of l e a d e r s , and f o r t h i sr ea son t h e a t t r i b u t i o n s t o Malenkov and Khrushchev are thoughtt o have some s i g n i f i c a n c e .18


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-. .

. .

The publ ic i t ,y f n t h e S o v i e t press a t t h e t i m e of Malen-k o v 's o u s t e r c a r e f u l l y a v oi d ed a ny s u g g e s t i o n t h a t Yalenkovhad f a v o r e d or advoca ted the l i g h t indus t ry a rgumen t . I t hasa l r e a d y bqe n n o t e d , t h a t h i s , l e t t e r of r e s i g a a t i o n a v oi de d t h eproblem &nd concentra ted oli h i s a l l e g e d e r r o r s i n a g r i c u l t u r ea n d a d q @n i s t r a t i o n . S in c e the l i g h t i n d u s t r y p o i n t of viewhad been proscribed d u r i n g t h e previous month as " r i g h t d e -v i a t i o n i s m , * ' close t o i f no t ac tua l ly synonymous w i t h t r e a s o n ,i t i s .'clear t h a t , a s e r i o u s e f f o r t was made t o a v o i d i d e n t i f y i n gMalenkov w i t h ' i t .S o v i e t an d Communist sources have been less r e t i c e n t i nt h e i r p r iv a t e c o n t a c t s , h o w e v e r . The 31 J a n u a r y C e n t r a l Com-mit tee R e s o ~ u t i o n D Malenkov e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t he hadf a v o r e d t h e p r e f e r e n t i a l d e v e lo p m e n t of l i g h t i n d u s t r y ands p e c i f i c a l l y branded ' t h a t as a " r i g h t i s t d e v ia t i on T hi sev idence is of p a r t i c u l a r importance, s i n c e t h e document wasi n t e n d e d fo r t h e i n f o r m a t io n of h igh Sovie t government andp a r t y o f f i c i a l s , many of whom were undoubtedly at l e a s tp a r t i a l l y aware of t h e t r u e f a c t s ,w i t h S u b a n d r i o , i d e n t i f i e d Malenkov w i t h t h e **erroneous** o l ic y ,*and London Daily Worker c o r r e s p o n d e n t Ralph Parker r e p o r t e d a

Khrushchev , in h i s in te rv i ew

source. Yuri Zhukov, 7 1t h a t p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s' A n o th e r i n d i c a t i o n of Ma le n k o v ' s r e s p o n s ib i l i t y f o r t h econsumer goods approach is th e f a c t t h a t he a l o n e of t h er e a l l y impor tan t l eaders d e s c r ib e d t h e program i n a glowinga n d e n t h u s i a s t i c m ann er. O t h e r l e s s i m p o r t a n t leaders whoused s i m i l a r language were Mikoyan, Per-vukhin, Sabu rov andKosygin. These leaders , i n t h e i r speeches, spoke of t h e prob-l e m i n terms of g r e a t u rg en cy a n d tremendous import ance. Noneof t h e o the r t o p leaders , i n t h e i r r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e program,exh i b i t ed t h i s same **enthusiasmff or it. Khrushchev, i np a r t i c u l a r , c o n c e n t r a t e d on h i s own a g r i c u l t u r a l schemes as ofp r i n c i p a l a n d foremost importance .

The ro le o f t h e manufactured consumer goods program'inc o n n e c t i o n w i t h Malenkov's emphasis on % at e r i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t * *i s im p o r t a n t , Sovie t s o u r c e s have d i s c u s s e d t h i s a t s u f f i c i e n t

*t h e . v e r y b e g in n in g of h i s downfa l l in March.Nagy i n gungary w a s o p e n ly b r a n d e d a * * r i g h td e v i a t i o n i s t " at,

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l e n g t h t o permit t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e t w o programs werei n $ e g r a l l y r e l a t ed . T h i s p o i n t i s s t a t e d more e x p l i c i t l y byeconomist Vekua,* who, i n h i s a r t i c l e i n Problems of Econom--c s i n September 1 9 5 4 , s a id :, I..; "Under socialismi i t is im p o s s ib l e t o deve lopproduc t ion wi thou t a c o r r e s p o n din g g ro wth i n t h emate r ia l wel l -be ing of t h e workers, , . . Without ac o n s t a n t g r o w th i n the material and c u l t u r a l l e v e lof the Uf,e of t h e workers it would be imposs ib let o e n s u r e t h e r e p r o d u ct i o n of s k i l l e d manpower, andconsequen t ly , t h e mas te ry of advanced technology.In t h e a b se n c e of s u ch g r o w t h a n i n c r e a s e i n t h ec rea t ive i n i t i a t i v e o f t h e workers, and an i n c r e a s ei n labor product iv i ty . , .woul d be unth inkabl e ."

land :" I n c r e a s in g t h e mate r ia l s e l f - i n t e r e s t ofworkers i n th e r e s u l t s of t h e i r labor is p o s s ib l eo n ly u nd e r c o n d i t i o n s of maximum develapment ofS o v i e t t rade. I n t h e a b s e n c e of development of S o v i e tt rade , economic s t imulus by means of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o ni n t h e pa y s c a l e . . , c a nn o t y i e l d i t s proper e f f ec t . "* I , . ,In p r o p o r t i o n as t h e t i t a n i c program cur-r e n t l y p l a n n e d by t h e P a r t y and Government f o r i n -c r e a s i n g t h e p r o d u c t i o n of consumer goods is imple-m e n t e d , and as S o v i e t t r ade is developed and t h er e s u l t i n g f u r t h e r r a p i d i n c r e as e i n t h e purchas ingpower of t h e r u b l e is e f f e c t e d , t h e mater ia l s e l f -

in te res t of s o c i a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n piorkers i n t h er e s u l t s of t h e i r labor w i l l i n c r e a s e s t i l l f u r t h e r . "I t is a noteworthy f a c t t h a t , i n t h e polemical l i t e r a t u r eof December 1954 and January 1955 s u p po r t in g p r e f e r e n t i a l de-velopment of heavy indus t ry , l i t t l e or no r e f e r e n c e is madet o "material se l f - i n t e r e s t " as a n i m po r t an t p r i n c i p l e ofP a r t y p o l i c y .While the ev idence is t h us s u f f i c i e n t t o w a r r a n t t h ec o n c lu s io n t h a t Malenkov probably w a s p r i n c i p a l l y r e s p o n s i b l efor t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e consumer goods approach, i t is s t i l l

4

3Pravda i n January 1955 f o r h i s t h e o re t i c a l- . lterrors.r*Vekua was s e v e r e l y cas t iga ted i n a r t i c l e s i n P a r t y-i f e a n d20


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c l e a r l y u nr e as on ab l e t o suppose t h a t he was alone i n i t sadvocacy, or t h a t he brought t h e program i n t o ex i s te nceover any s t ro ng and unanimous o bj ec t io ns of h i s co l leagues .As has bgen made o p ly too c lea r by subsequent events , Mal-enkov hifl self never had t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h s in gl e ha nd ed l yt o p u s h ; ' t h r o u g s u c h a basic r e v i si o n i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h eSoviet economy. , N o r d i d Malenkov a lo ne have the s t r en gt h ,a f t e r h i s d e c l i ne i n l a t e 1953 and in 1954 ( r e l a t i v e t o KhrU-shchev), tDmain ta in t h e consumer goods program through / 1

%.. . _.

I

I t therefore seems e v i d e n t t h a t Yalenkov w a s suppor tedby a t l e a s t a m a j o r i t y w i th i n t h e P r e s idiu m , a l t h o u g h therea p p a r e n t l y were d o u b t s a n d r e s e r v a t i o n s on t h e p a r t of someof t h e membe r s .I t t h u s may very w e l l have been the case that Malenkov'sprogram ( l i k e Khrushchev's l a t e r ) was adopted on something ofa t r i a l b a s i s b y t h e o th e r l eade r s and t h a t opinion swunga ga i ns t Malenkov's * 'platform" as i t w a s over takep and super-s e d e d by the New Lands program and as d i f f i c u l t i e s and p r i -o r i t y c o n f l i c t s emerged ove r th e ,course , of t i m e . This view

%e suppor ted by Khrushchev's remark t o , Su b a n d r io t o t h e e f f e c tt h a t **we now know** t h a t t h e only way t o i n c r e a s e s u p p ly o f consumer g o o d s i s by continued forced heavy i n d u s t r i a l developmen-t .

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THE AGRICULTURAL CONTROVERSYI t i s , ge n e ra l L y a g r e e d , t h a t t h e s t a t e of S o v i e t a g r i c u l -t u r e a nd I g i f f e r e nt approach& t o t h e s o h i o n of t h i s problemwere ke ,x !' i s sues i n t h e Malenkov ous te r . One a na ly s i s no te st h a t " on ly i n t h e case of ag r i cu l t u r e d i d Malenkov and h i schief co nte nde r , Khrushchev, openly a d o p t p o s i t i o n s which. were c o n t r a d i c t o r y , a n d these were on i s s u e s e x t e n d i n g b ac k

' t o S t a l i n ' s l i fe t ime."I t , w i l l be r eca l l ed t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e w a s t h e o n l ys p e c i f i c economic problem area di sc usse d i n Malenkov 's l e t -te r of r e s fgna t i on . A nd , a s n o t e d a b o v e , . q g r i c u l t u r e is t h eo n l y area i n which o v e r t l y c o n t r a d ic t o r y i n d i c a t i o n s appeared.I t is an i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a lproblems have f igured e i the r n o t a t a l l o r o n l y m a r g i n a l l yi n t h e several " p r i va t e pt d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e Malenkov de-motion by Commu%nisto r Sovie t s o u r c e s .

t u r e , are l i s t e d here for convenience:The p r i n c i p a l e v e n t s of t h e p e r i o d , a s related to a g r i c u l -a . The inaugura t ion of t h e so-cal led "NewCourseTtby t h e August 1953 Supreme So vi e t se ss io n ,and Malenkov's major po l i cy speech a t t h a t s e s s i o n .Major concess i ons i n p rocu rem ent s , p r i c e s , andtaxation w e r e g r a n t e d t o the p e a sa n t ry , e s p e c i a l l yas rega rded l i v e s to c k r a i s i n g and f r u i t and vege-t ab l e growing;b. The speech of N e S . Khrushchev a t t h eSeptember 1953 P l e n a r y S e s s i o n of the C e n t r a l Com-mittee, and t h e P a r t y decrees and Government decreesC . The r e v e l a t i o n i n J an ua ry and February 1954

fo l l ow i ng;of t h e so-called **New Lands" program a t a ser ies ofa g r i c u l t u r a l c o n fe r en c es in Moscow, and t h e e v i d e n tpr imary r o l e of Khrushchev, who spoke a t each ofthese con fe rences ;

d. The Plenary Session of t he Ce nt ra l Commit teeh e l d i n February and March 1954, a t whgch Khrushchevd e l i v e r e d a major r e p o r t , and at which a r e v e r s a l ofemphasis from t h e August-September 1953 p o l i c y w a sfo rm a l i zed . Major emphasis s h i f t e d t o g r a i n pro-d u c t i o n , and t h e New Lands program was formalized.22


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e , The Plenary Sess ion of June 1954, a t whichKhrushchev apparently d i d -o t speak, and a t whichconcess ions in procuremen ts and p r ic ing were g r a n t e dt o t h e product+ion of g r a i n , s i m i l a r t o those g r a n t e din Apgust-September 19#3 t o animal husbandry and t of r u i t and vegetable growing;f . A C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e decree of August 1954; e x t e n d i n g th e goals of t h e New Lands program By as u b s a n t iaE amount;g. The Plena ry Sess ion of t h e C e n t r a l Com-mit tee of January 1955, a t which emphasis was re -s t o r e d t o h ea vy i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u ct i o n, and a t whicht h e llcorn and f o d d e r " program was formalized. Khru-shchev spdre at t h i s C en tr a l Committee Plenumo The

t u r e : Su b S ta D t i a l areas i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l -t u r a l areas of t h e USSR were t o s h i f t from t r a d i t i o n a lcrops t o corn, r e p r e s e n t e d as a cheap and ea sy way ofi n c r e as i n g t h e f o d d e r base of t h e l i ve s t oc k economy.I t w a s a t t h i s C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e Sess ion , presumably ,t h a t the demotion of Malenkov was arranged.

p rogram aga in s igna l ized a s h i f t i n a g r i cu l -

Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e a p p a r e n t respect ive p o s i t i o n s ofMalerrkov and Khrushchev on agriculture, i t is worthwhile f i r s tt o dispose of s e v e r a l s u b s i d i a r y i n di c at k on s 'of d i f f e r e n c e s be-tween the two leaders.th e t'agrogorodft p o l i c y of 1951 i n , h i s speech a t th e 19thPa r t y Congress in October 1952.s t a t e d :

The f i r s t of these w a s t h e remark by Bdaleakov concerningIR t h i s speech, Malenkov

" F i r s t of a l l ; i t shou ld be noted t h a t cer-t a i n of o u r l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s h ave i n du lg ed i n ai n c o nn e c ti o n w i t h ca r ry ing ou t the amalgamat iont h e pace of mass i n t e g r a t i o n , o f v i l l a g e s i n t o l argec o l l e c t i v e farm s e t t l e m e n t s , s u gg e st i ng t h a t a l l t h eo l d c o l l e c t i v ehomes be pulled down and large ' co l l ec t i ve farmc i t i e s ' be b u i l t OR new s i t e s , and viewed t h i s ast h e most imp ort ant task. .. ,The Pa rt y took t im e lymeasures t o overcome the se mis taken te nden cie s int h e s p h e r e of col l ec t i ve farm development....

wrong approach, a consumer 's approach, to prob-lems of c o l l e c t i v e farm d e v e lo p m e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l yof small c o l l e c t i v e farms. They proposed f o r c b g

farm b u i l d i n g s and c o l l e c t i v e farmers's e t t l e m e n t s , ' ' c o l l e c t i v e farm towns' or 'agro-

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" I t must be f u r t h e r n ot ed t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e ofs e t t i n g u p a u x i l i a r y e n t e r p r i s e s f o r m ak ing b r i c k s ,t i l e and o t he r manufactured goods has become wide-sp read OD many co l l ec t i ve a nd ' s t a t e f arms ,. ..Th iss i t y ' a ' t i o nI must be rect$fied... ."Tli6se refereqces unmis takably refer t o Khrushchev, t h e

8 0 - 2 t op- l ev e l sponso r and spokesman f o r t h e *vagrogorodtvconcep:t and a l s o f o r t h e s u b s i d ia r y d e t a i l of l oca l c o n s t r u c t i o nt h a t i n h i s Sep t em ber 1953 speech , Ehrushchev re ve r t ed t ot h i s idea of l o c a l co ns t r uc t i on , and agai n recommended i t .t han they were a t t h e t i m e . T h e a l l e g a t i o n in t he J anua ry1955 decree on Malenkov i s worth r e c a l l i n g i o t h i s connec t i on ,viz., t h a t Malenkov **permi t ted" Ber ia ' s * * r u r a lprogram" t obe carr ied o u t . T h i s c r y p t i c a nd o b s c u r e s t a t e m e n t , t a k e ni n c o nn e c ti o n w i t h t h e above quota t ione and w i t h t h e sub-s e q u e n t e v o l u t i o n of S o v i e t a g r i c u l t u r a l p o li c y , s t r o n g l ysugg es t s t h a t Malenkov and B e r i s col labora ted i n o p p o s i n gKhrushchev i n 1951.

? ,

y 6o l l ec t i ve -and state farms, I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e

Th e above statements a re of c o u r s e clearer i n r e t ros pec t

The s ec on d s u b s i d i a r y i n d i c a t i o n of Khrushchev-Malenkovd i f f e r e n c e s on a g r i c u l t u r e is t h e f a c t t h a t n o t o n ce i n h i sspeech ofSeptember 1953 d i d Khrushchev make r e f e r e n c e t oMalenkov, who less than one month e a r l i e r had expounded t h e"new co ur se gt i n domestic economic po l i c y , i n c l u d i n g a g r i c u l -t u r a l po l i cy . L a t e r , K hrushchev became i n c r e a s i n g l y i d e n t i -f i e d w i t h a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , e xp ou nd in g t h e "New Lands"program in January and February 1954. Curious ly enough,Malenkov i n tu rn made no r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s l a t t e r programin h i s e l e c t i o n speech i n March 1954.

One f i n a l p o i n t t o dispose of before s e t t i n g forth t h e .r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s o f hdalenkov and Khrushchev i s . t h e matterof K hrushchev ' s a s se r t i on of p re do min an ce i n a g r i c u l t u r a lp o l i c y i n September 1953 and subsequent ly . H e was, as a l r e a d ynoted , r a p p o r t e u r a t t h e September 1953 Plenum of t h e C e n t r a lCommittee. In h i s speech of February 1954, however, Khrushchevr e v e a l e d t h a t , f o l l o w i n g t h e September Plenum, numerous' P a r t yBureaux of t h e Republ i cs and O b la s t s were r 'equired t o submi t re-p o r t s o n a g r i c y l t u r e to tb C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e , s a d tbsy were c a l l e d t o3 See Project CAESAR Chapter 8 , pp 7-11, for d i s c u s s i o n Oft h e tpAgrogorod" prob lem and Chapter 10, p I 2, 4, 11 f o rd i s c u s s i o n of th e a g r i c u l t u r a l r e f e re n c e s i n t h e B er i a case.

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Moscow t o d i s c u s s t h e i rAccording. t o Khrushchev , "we d i s c lo s e d s ho r tc o pl i ng s an d a r r i v e da t b r o a d c o n c lu s io n s , b u t d i d n o t adopt d e c i s i o n s ; we agreedt o c a l l a p l e n a r y s e s s i o n of t h e g i v e n P a r t y committee t otake, up;khe que s t ion s which had a r i s e n , A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e oft h e C e n ih a l C omm i t t e e a t t e b d e d th e p l e n a r y s e s s i o n s an dpo i nt e d out...shortcomings..,.Yaf;ch 1954 Plenum and t h e January 1955 Plenum of t h e C e n t r a lC omm i t t e e . H e spoke a t each of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l c o n f er e nc e sh e l d i n January and February 1954, as a l r e a d y n o t e d. Bespoke on o th e r o c c a s i o n s a l s o , p r i n c i p a l l y on a g r i c u l t u r e .I n September 1954, i n h i s i n t er v i ew w i t h Bernal , Khrushchev d i dn o t d e ny B e r n a l ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t he, Khrushchev, w a s p e r s o n a l l y* ' l ar g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e ? f o r t h e "New Lands" program.

repor t s w i t h " t h e Central Committee.*'*

l t

Khrushchev was, a f t e r t h i s , t h e r a p p o r t e u r a t t h e February-

While Malenkov-and Khrushchev agreed t h a t d r a s t i c ad-v an ce s i n a g r i c u l t u r e were c e n t r a l t o s u c c e s s of one whole"new cours e" i n consumer goods p r o d u c t i o n , ce r t a i n . f a i r l yf un da me nta l d i f f e r e n c e s are e v i d e n t i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v eapproaches t o a g r i c u l t u r e .The f i r s t and major d i f f e r e n c e is Malenkov 's apparentgreater r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e importance of i n c e n t i v e s , asopposed t o Khrushchev's more *forthodox** o l s h e v i k r e l i a n c e

OD b u r e a u c r a t i c a nd o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m ea su re s. Th i s s u p p o s i -t i o n is b as ed p r i n c i p a l l y , a l t h o u g h n o t c o mp l e t el y , on, n a l y s i sof t h e p u b l i s h e d speeches of t h e two leaders; t h e c o n c lu s io nd e r i v e s i n p a r t from th e im p r e s s io n s of t h e two men carriedleaders .

, away by d ip lomats and o ther s who have observed t h e S o v i e tb

Malenkov, a s is known, p ub l i c l y inau gura ted t h e *'con-sumer goods" c o u r s e i n h i s 8 August 1953 speech.marks on a g r i c u l t u r e i n t h i s speech , Malenkov almost com-p l e t e l y c o n f in e d h imse l f t o d i s c u s s i o n of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a ltax reform; decrease i n o b l i g a t o r y p r oc ur em en ts a nd i n c r e a s e si n s t a t e purchase pr i ces ; and t h e encouragement of p e r s o n a lga rden p l o t s and of per son a l l y owned l iv es t ock .

In his re -

* Th e s e d i s c u s s io n s m u s t have been h e l d w i t h t h e A g r i c u l t u r a lDepartment of t h e C e n t r a l Committee a p p a r a t u s , w i t h theSecre ta r i a t , and/or w i t h t h e P a r t y P r e si d i um . Khrushcheva l l u d e d o n l y t o t h e " C e n t r a l Committee," im p ly in g O D ~rb o th of th e f i r s t two bodies ment ioned above. These groupswould have been l a r g e l y under Khrushchev' s pe r son a l co n t ro l .

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. . .,,,. . .

. .

In Malenkov's view, "the Government a nd t h e Party C e n t r a lComm i t t e e v ' found i t n e c e s s a r y " f i r s t a n d foremost...to r a i set h e e con omic i n t e r e s t of c o l l e c t i v e farms an d c o l l e c t i v e'farmers" in developing t h e l a g g i ng b r a nc h es o f a g r i c u l t u r e .(unde r l i ne added .,)creasi 'ng t h e "mater ia l s e l f - i n t e r e s t " of t h e peasan t ry was"of great importance,11 b u t a d d e d i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s :

" H QW E V e r , these measures must be p r o p e r l yeva l ua t ed . T he i r i m por tance a n d n e c e s s i t y a t t h epresent t i m e is obvious, b u t t h e y do no t de t e rm i nethe main p a t h fo r d e v e l op i n g c o l l e c t i v e f ar mi ng ."

I ':I,f OKdkushchev, i n h i s speech a month l a t e r , noted t h a t in-

c

According t o Khrushchev, "hundreds and thou sand s of ad-v an ce d c o l l e c t i v e farms" were s u c c e s s f u l l y m e et in g t h e oldde l i ve ry no rm s a t t h e o l d d e l i v e r y p r i c e s a nd were never the-less showing a profit. Thus, " t h i s means t h a t t h e matterrests n o t s o l e l y on t h e r a i s i n g o f p ro cu re me nt and purchas ingp r i c e s b u t p r i n c i p a l l y o n t h e l e v e l of economic development70f a given c o l l e c t i v e farm&/" (unde r l i n e added.and i s , t h e problem of managementand manager ia l personnel .-

To Khrushchev, t h e p r i n c i p a l problem i n a g r i c u l t u r e was,"In order to c o n v e r t /cur7 p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n t or e a l i t y . , . e a c h c o l l e c t i v e Tarm must be s t r e n g t h e n e di n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and managerial aspect a n d , abovea l l , i n t e l l i g e n t organizers. . . must be pu t i n admin-i s t r a t i v e p o s t s on each c o l l e c t i v e farm."

F u r t h e r : /"The S t a t e has prov i ded eve ry t h i ng neces sa ryt o handle work w e l l OD e v e r y s t a t e . f a r m , but farmingr e s u l t s d i f f e r completely , depending on t h e q u a l i t y ofleadership . '*

And :"One has o n l y to place and u t i l i z e p eo pl e cor-r e c t l y ; t h e a p p a r a tu s i n p ro v in c e, t e r r i t o r y an dr e p u b l i c c e n t e r s m us t be reduced... and good o f f i c i a l smust be t r a n s f e r r e d t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e d i s t r i c t sec-

t o r , t h e c o l l e c t i v e a n d s t a t e farms and machinet rac to r s t a t i o n s *'

26

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The second major difference between Malenkov and Kburushchevconcerned. the matter of grain p r o d u c t i o n , Th i s is i n t e g r a l l yr e l a t ed to t h e t h i r d problem area , t h e "New Lands" program,which i s , , p r inc ipaJ ly d i r ec te d a t i a c r e a s i ~ g r a i n o u t p u t .

I ', IA:,"the 19th P a r t y Co&ress, Ahlenkov said:

i

,*The grain problem, fo rmer ly cons i de red th emost acute a n d s e r i o u s problem, has b e e n s o lv e d ,s o lv e d d e i i n i t e l y and f i n a l l y . *IIn h i s 8 August 1953 speech, Malenkov s t a t e d f l a t l y :

"Our country i s f u l l y s u p p l ie d w i t h gra in . "K hr us hc he v, i n c o n t r a s t , s a i d a month * l a t e r :for g r a i n crops, i n t h e sense t h a t our c o u n t r y isw e l l s u p p l i e d w i t h breado.. ."i n grain y ie lds . . . t h i s i s n e c e s s a r y n o t o n l y t os a t i s f y the p o p u la t i o n ' s growing d e m a D d for breadb u t a l s o fo r r a p i d advances i n a l l branches ofa g r i c u l t u r e . "

*'We are in general s a t i s f y i n g t h e c o u n t r y 's need"

"W e m u s t e n s u r e f u r t h e r and more r a p i d growth

In h i s February 1954 speech , Khrushchev repeated t h e s e n s eof the above excerpts , b u t t h e n proceeded t o remark o n ly f o u rparagraphs l a te r :" I t s h o u ld be no ted t ha t t h e l e v e l of g r a i np roduc t ion so fa r h a s n o t m e t a l l the r e q u i r e m e n t sof t h e n a t i o n a l economy... . I t c a n n o t be over lookedt h a t u n t i l r e ce n t ly some of our p e r s o n n e l d i d n o twage a s u f f i c i e n t s t r u g gl e to i n c r e a s e g r a i n pro-duc t ion . The gross g r a i n crop is inadequate,*,*

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e i n c e n t i v e measures adopted i n Augus t1953 t o i n c r e a s e p o t a to a n d v e g e t a b l e growlag a n d l i v e s t o c kproduct ion-- i .e . , decrease i n o b l i g a to r y p ro cu re me nt s a n d i n -crease i n p u rc h as e prices--were n o t recommended for g r a i DgrOdUCtiOD a t t h a t t i m e , or fo r t h a t matter e i the r i n t h e

* In h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h Berna l i n Sep tember 1954, Khrushcheve x p l i c i t l y d en ie d t h a t he had i o any way con tr ad ic te d Malen-kov, b u t r a t h e r t h a t he, Khrushchev, discussed over-a l lgr a i n requir emen ts , whereas Malenkov had t a l k e d only ofbread g r a in r e q u ir e m e nt s .27


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September 1953 o r February 1954 Plenums which Khrushchevseemed t o dominate. They were- owever, adopted a t t h e June1954 Plenum of t h e Cen t ra l Commit tee , t h e o n l y C e n t r a l Com-mittee s e s s io n c o n c e r n e d w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e whereat Khrushchevw a s =,:,the r a p p o r t e u r . :j'respect t o th e e n t i r e "New Lands" program. Malenkov viewedt h e a g r i c u l t u r a l problem c h i e f l y , i f n o t comple te ly , as t h eand s t a t e farms t o a c h ie v e t h e ' p r od u c t i o n l e v e l s of t h e ad-program of expansion of c u l t i v a t i o n i n t o m ar gi na l or remoteareas. A t t h e 1 9 t h P a r t y Congress, a t i m e when Malenkov w a ss t i l l t h e to p Po l i t b u r o man r e s p o n s ib l e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e , hes a i d :

A ' f i n a l area of d i f f e r e n c e v e r y probably ex i s t ed w i t hpr6blem of indu cing t h e backward an d i n e f f i c i e n t c o l l e c t i v ev a n c e d c o l l e c t i v e s . H e a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t e n v i s a g e a n y great

"Now t h a t t he prewar l e v e l of sown acreage h a sbeen reached a n d s u r p a s s e d , t h e o n l y c o r r e c t c o u r s ei n i n c r e a s i n g farm o u t p u t is t o i n c r e a se y i e l d scomprehens ive ly. Ra is ing y i e l ds is t h e p r i n c i p a lt a sk i n f ar mi ng . I n order to meet t h i s t a sk i tis n e c e s s a r y t o r a i se t h e q u a l i t y of f i e l d worka nd r e d u c e t h e l e n g th of t i m e f o r i t , t o improveu t i l i z a t i o n of t r ac t o r s a n d farm machinery , t ocomplete t h e mechaniza t ion of t h e basic o p e r a t i o n si n f a rm i ng , t o e n s ur e t h e q u i c k e s t p o s s i b l e de-velopment of crop r o t a t i o n aDd t h e sowing of peren-n i a l grasses on c o l l e c t i v e an d s t a t e farms, t oimprove seed s e l e c t i o n , t o make proper s o i l c u l -t i v a t i o n u n i v e r sa l , t o i n c r e a s e u s e of f e r t i l i z -ers a nd e n l a r g e t h e i r r i g a t e d area. I t is neces-s a r y t o h e ig h t e n t h e o r g a n i z in g r o l e of t h e ma-ch ine and t r a c t o r s t a t i o n s i n t h e c o l l ec t i v efarms', r a i s i n g th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of these s ta-t i o n s for f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e p l a n f o r y i e l d s a ndgross h a r v e s t s a n d f o r development of a n im a lhusbandry.*'F u r t h e r , on 10 June 1953, a f t e r S t a l i n ' s d e a t h a n d s h o r t l ybefore B e r i a ' s p ur ge , a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e a r t i c l e i n P r a v d a ODthe Communist Party had t h i s to s a y of a g r i c u l t u r e :

"The Soviet State c o n s t a n t l y a ug me nt s c a p i t a li n v e s tm e n t s i n a g r i c u l t u r e . Much work has beenunder taken f o r the mechan iza t ion of a g r i c u l t u r a lp r o d u c t i o n , for i ac re as in g t h e f e r t i l i t y of t h esoil..., a n d t h e r e a re a l s o other great measures

28 .


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for a dv an ci ng a g r i c u l t u r a l p ro d uc t io n , e s p e c i a l l y i nt h e c e n t r a l , dense l y popu l a t ed areas of t h e c o u n t r ywhere c a p i t a l i nvest m en t may g i ve t h e g r e a t e s te con omic r e s u l t s i n t h e * s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e p e r i od oft i m e . " Wnde r l i ne added . )-.ID h i s 8 August 1953 speech, Yalenkov recommended measurestowsrd t h e above ends , a l t hough , as e a r l i e r n o t e d , h e d i d n o td w e l l a t a n y l e n g t h OD t h i s aspect of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l problem.Khrushcheir's September 1953 program was on t he abovel i n e s , a lt ho ug h it elaborated e v e r y p o i n t t o a c o n s i d e r a b l eex ten t . Khrushchev d i d ment ion expansion of sown areas ,however, and t h e C en t ra l C om m i t t ee r e so l u t i on of 7 Septemberi n c o r p o r a t e d a br ie f s t a t e m en t on expans i on of sown areas.

. f r o m t h e speeches a t a number of a g r i c u l t u r a l c on f er e nc e s i nthe Kremlin t h a t expansion of sown acreage was be i n g unde r -t aken on a massive sca le .Khrushchev to t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e a t its p l e n a r y s e s s i o nin l a t e February , and was approved.w a s 13 m i l l i o n hectares . This a p p a r e n t l y w a s an i n c r e a s efrom t h e t a rge t revealed in ea r l i e r speeches.*w a s merely t h e beg i nn i ng of s u c h a program.t h a t "du r ing t he nex t t w o y e a r s w e must p r e p a r e t o c o n t i n u edeveloping new and more d i f f f c u l t t rac t s i n th e East.. . "a c t u a l f a c t , t h e goals were agaLn r a i s e d , t o 30 m i l l i o nhectares, by a C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e decree i n August 1954.a n u r g e n t a nd r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n g r a i n p r od u ct io n w a s basic toa r ap i d advance i n a l l o t h e r branches of a g r i c u l t u r e a nd i nth e e n t i r e c on su me r goods program. Th is n ot e of urgency runsthrough a l l of Khrushchev ' s d i scuss ions of t h e problem, and

In January and February 1954, however, i t became e v i d e n tThis program was t hen p re sen t ed by

The expansion t a r g e t approved by the C en t r a l C o m m i t t e e

I t was s t a t e d t h a t t h e proposed i n c r e a s e of sown areaKhrushchev s a i dI n

The new lands program w a s j u s t i f i e d on th e grounds tha t

3 N s pec i f i c t o t a l s are a v a i l a b l e . However, t h e comparisoncan be made by p l ans for t h e RSFSR.and 1955 4.7 m i l l i o n hectares of new l a n d s were t o be t i l l e d .RSFSR wasl a t t e r f i g u r e t h a t was i n c o r p o r a t e d I n t h e Central Commit-tee r e s o l u t i o n .

On 27 January 1954,Lobanov, RSFSR A g r i c u l t u r e M i n i s t e r , s t a t ed t h a t i n 1954n 22 F e br u a ry , L obanov s t a t e d t h a t , i n 1954 and 1955, t h eto deve l op 6 .7 m i l l i o n hectares. I t was t h i s

29 J


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was f o r c e f u l l y ' e x p r e s s e d i n h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h B e r n a l inSeptember 1954. A l s o , t h e new l an ds expansio n was claimed tobe t he cheapes t way of b r i n g i n g a b o u t a r a p i d increase.Fur , t he rm ore , ' de sp i t e ;K hsushchev 's a s se r t i o ns i n h i sspeech& a nd i n t h e B e r na l i n t e r v i e w t h a t more i n t e n s i v e u s eof e x i St i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l areas r em ai ne d a n e s s e n t i a l p o i n tof a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , he a l so t o l d B e r n al t h a t a g r i c u l -t u ra l .m ac h i ne ry p roduced i n 1954 and 1955 would be s e n tc h l e f l y t o t he ,new l ands .

V o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e number of c a te r p i l l a r t rac-tors t h i s year and nex t on $he o l d c u l t i v a t e d l a n d sw i l l n o t be i n c r e a s e d ; t o these l a n d s w i l l be s e n tin ter-row t r a c t o r s , c u l t i v a t o r s a n d o ther imple-ments t o c u l t i v a t e t h e s o i l , as w e l l as s p a r e p a r t sf o r e x i s t i n g t r a c t o r s .An es s en t i a l po i n t both of Malenkov's recommendations .and of Khrushchev's program was t h e d i s p a t c h t o t h e count ry-s i d e , e s p e c i a l l y t o t h e machine t r a c to r s t a t i o n s , of s k i l l e dworkers and mechanics from schools and from i n d u s t r y as w e l l .The new lands program upped the requi rement s f o r s u c h per-s o n n e l , as w e l l as for a g r i c u l t u r a l s p e c i a l i s t s and farmmanagers , cons ide rab ly . Thus per son nel f o r t h e new la nd s havebeen drawn from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l areas as w e l las from Indus t ry . While it is i m p o s s i b l e a c c u r a t e l y t oestimate t h e impact of these w i t h d r a w a l s OD both t h e t r a d i t i o n a lag r i cu l t u ra l e conom y and on i ndus t ry , i t i s almost c e r t a i n l ygreat .F i n a l l y , in January and Feuruary 1955, t h e C e n t r a l Com-mittee fo rm a l l y adopt ed a f u r t h e r e l e me nt of Khrushchev's pro-gram, a s i g n i f i c a n t e xp an si on of corn growing, in t ende d t oprovide a f o d d e r base f o r l ives tock expans ion . The expansiono f c o r n c u l t i v a t i o n is t o take place l a r g e l y , t ho ug h nbt comple te ly ,a t th e e x p e n s e o f area sown t o g r a i n i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i -c u l t u r a l areas.O n e i n t e r e s t i n g l i t t l e t h r e a d r u n s t h r o u g h t h e documents

T h i s remark was i n -co nce rn ing ' th e new l ands : a c o nt i nu e d p r o t e s t a t i o n t h a t t h eprograms are l* rea l i s t ic l* nd r ea sonab l e .c luded i n t h e f i r s t C e n t r a l C omm i t t e e d e c r e e OD t h e s u b j e c t ,in March 1954,whereas speeches d u r i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l c r i s i sSa January and February 1955 made t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e 1954s u c c e s s e s had proved the realism and r ea sonab l enes s of t h eprogram, d e s p i m d o u b ts a nd t r e p i d a t i o n of some of t h ellcomrades.

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In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e can be read i n t o Khrushchev's twospeeches i n January 1955--to t he Komsomol and to the CentralCommittee-a certain triumph over the doubters who had questionedthe new '{'Iands program.I ,.$.

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.. . .If ,

,I

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. ...

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FOREIGN A N D DEFENSE POLICY

One of t h e most d e b a t a b l e a nd o b s c u r e a s p e c t s of t h eYalenkov(taffa$r i s th e r o b t h a t f o r e i gn p o l i c y problems andissues.@tay have played i n ) i t , a nd t h e i m p l i c a t io n s t h a t d i f -9 e r i p g ) e s t i m a t e s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n may h av e had 'for t h e l e v e l of d e f e n s e e x p e n d i tu r e s of t h e Soviet government.2 "For t h e ,six weeks or so prec edin g Malenkov 's res ign a-t iq n , Sov ie t propaganda emphasized t h e need for heavy in-d u s t r i a l de ve lo pm en t, j u s t i f y Ln g i t by a marked increase i nemphasis OD b u i l d i n g t h e might of t h e S o v i e t s t a t e , t h e re-quirements of n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , and h e i g h t e n e d i n t e r n a t i o n a lt e n s io n

on f o r e i g n p o l i c y matters was t h e c e n t r a l a nd f u n da m en talfactor i n Malenkov's ou s t er . Is t h i s view, t h e leaders d i f - efe red i n t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n s of t h e degree o f s e r i o u s n e s s oft h e w o r l d s i t u a t i o n ; these d i f f e r e n c e s l e d t o c o r r e s p o n d in g lyd i f f e r e n t estimates of the de fense requ i remen t s of t h e USSR;and t h e d e f en s e re q u ir e m en t s i n t u r n af fec t ed the whole r a n g eof domestic i s s u e s , b u t most p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e problem of t h er e l a t i v e p r i o r i t y to be accorded heavy in d u s t r y .Another l ine of a n a l y s i s a r g u es t h a t foreign p o l i c yi s s u e s , w h i l e im p o r t a n t , were n o n e th e l e s s s e c o nd a r y t o morefundamental domestic i s s u e s a n d t h e i s s u e of power.

One l i n e of a n a l y s i s a r gu e s t h a t a s p l i t in t h e Pres id ium

A t h i r d l i n e of argument denies t h a t fore ign p o l i c y m a t -ters had much i f a n y r e l a t i o n to t h e l eade r sh ip problem.A a a ly s t s h o ld in g t h i s v ie w p o in t b e l i e v e t h a t Malenkov's ousterwas t h e r e s u l t of e i t he r a s e r i o u s domestic i s s u e or a p u r es t r u g g l e fo r power.c o ur s ef f i n S o v i e t f o r e i g n policy has b een c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e dby both Maleokov and Khrushchev, r e f l e c t i n g s imi l a r app ra i sa l sof t h e world s i t u a t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e y have pursued fo re ignp o l i c y aims w i t h a c o n s i s t e n c y and dec$s iveness which woulda rg ue a g a i n s t s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i c y o u t l o o k.On t h e other hand, Ambassador Bohlen OD a number ofoccasions commented OD an a p p ar e n

caesar 11 - resignation of malenkov

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