caesar 18 - aftermath of malenkov's resignation

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COPY N O *12 March 1958

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FROM THE JANUARY PLENUK TO THE JULYFLENUK (1955) - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH

@F EALENKCV' S , R E S I GN A T I ON FRGM THE PREMIERSHIF(Reference t i t l e : CAESAR 1-58)

O F F I C E GF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CZPJTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS MA- CONTAINS INFORMATION AF'FECT-INGCTHENATIONAL DEF ENSE OFTHEUNITED STATESWITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,TITLE 18,USC, ECTIONS 793 AND 794,THETRANSMIS.SIONOR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO



CONTENTS PAGE

,..'

I c. Page

Prefatory Note.......................................... i2 '

Introduction..'.:.....................................,.. 1

The Post-Stalin.Experiment Domestic and ForeignSetting ................................................ 2

Miscarriages In The New Course - The Malenkov Government'sForeign Policy . . . . . . ..................................

Heavy vs. Light Industry ..........................Confusion In The Ranks .............................

The Political Problem..............................

A New Tone To Policy ...................................Economic Readjustment I n 1955 ..........................

Continuation Of The Agricultural Effort.................

Revision Of Agricultural Planning ......................i

The Search For New Economic Stimulants .................

.Renewed Diplomatic Activity ............................."Collective Leadership'' After Malenkov - Promotions AndDemotions.... ...........................................The Khrushchev-Bulganin Visit To Belgrade ..............

The July Plenum.............................,..........,

Conclusion .............................................

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12

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53

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PREFATORY NOTE I

I t mas o r i g i n a l l y i n te n de d t o begin t h i s s tudy a t t h epo in t vhe re Caesar 11, Resignat ion of Malenkov, l e f t o f f .I t seemed t o t h e au thor as h e progressed, however, tha t i twould be useful to go over some of t h e chronologica l groundcoaered i n t h e ea r l i e r s tudy f o r two reasons : i n o r d e r t oin t rod uce infodrnation re l a t i n g t o Malenkov's demot ion ob-

t a i ned on ly subsequen t ly , and i n o rde r t o p rov ide somep e r s p e c t i v e for a d i scuss ion o f p o l i c y changes undertakeni n th e m onths a f t e r February 1955,f o r e , t h a t p o i n t s a l r e a d y d i s c us s e d i n c o n s i d er a b l e d e t a i lin ear l ie r chapters- :as, , f o r ins tan ce , t h e numerous changesin government and party appointments made between the t i m e

of S t a l i n ' s d e a th and Malenkov's re si gn at io n and t h e pro-cedura l c i r cum s tances o f . the l a t t e r event--are treated hereon ly s k e t c h i l y o r not a t a l l ,referred t o Caesar c h a p t e r s Nos. 2, 5, 10 and 11.

I t w i l l be seen, thgre-

On these p o i n t s t h e reader is

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FROM THE JANUARY PLENUM TO TEIB JULYPLENUM (1955) - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH

OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMI ERSHI PI

4 :

. ? I n t r o d u c t i o n

The January 1955 plenum of t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l c om mitt eeand, t h e Supreme Soviet session which fo l lowed i n Februa rymarked t h e end of a phase i n S o v ie t p o l i c y a s w e l l a s i nt h e p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s d ev elo ped a f t e r S t a l i n ' s d ea th .A t t h a t p o i n t t h e t w o f ac to r s , power and policy, w e r e i n -sepa rably l inked. Wilenkov's " res ignat ion" denoted h i s de-f e a t i n t h e s t r u g g le f o r p o l i t i c a l dominance which had goneon uni nte r ru pte dly among Sta l inO s succ esso rs , b u t it - w a s ,a t t h e same t i m e , a d e v i c e for dem ons t r at ing pub l i c ly and ,emphat ica l ly t h a t impor t@ntparts of t h e New Course, w i t hwhich Malenkov's name w a s commonly linked, had been scrapped.The r i t u a l of p o l i t i c a l p e n a n c e w a s surrounded by a s t r i d e n tpropaganda campaign against the consumer goods heresy which,by pa in t ing a p i c t u r e i n b l ac ks and w h i t e s , tended, perhapsd e l i b e r a t e l y , to concea l the complexi ty of t h e p o l i c y p ro b-l e m s w i t h which t h e regime w a s confronted and t h e s o u r c e sof p e r s o n a l r i v a l r y w i t h i n t h e p a r t y p re si di um .

Given t h e imm ensi ty of S t a l i n P s power, i t would havebeen remarkable if " c o l l e c t i v e l eadership" and a coheren tbody of po l i c i e s capable of advancing t h e regime domestical-l y and abroad had emerged i ns t a n t ly i n March 1953.per iod which folqowed a l mo s t i n e v i t a b l y i n vo l ve d a c e r t a i n

amount of t r i a l and e r ro r . By t4e end of 1954 a number ofp o l i c y d i f f i c u l t i e s had developed and there had a r i s e n w i t hi nt h e par ty p res id ium a f a c t i o n w i t h t h e power t o i n s i s t onchange. Th er ea ft er , however, though c e r t a i n of t h e r em ediesap p li ed under Malenkov were discarded a s f r u i t l e s s o r i n -j u r i o u s a nd t h e r e i n s were t aken ou t of h i s hands, t h e p o l i -c i e s . l a i d down by t h e regime continued t o t e s t i f y t o a recog-n i t i o n t h a t S ta l i n ' s pe r sona l despo t ism had been bur i ed w i t hh i m , and that t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic sy ste m which hehad se t u p i n t h e S o v i e t e mp ir e, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e populara t t i t u d e s which it had engendered, needed reform. Thoughl a t e r even t s were to show t las i r t many s e r i o u s problems re-mained or t h a t new o nes had been created, by t h e t i m e t h e2 0 t h p a r t y c o n g r e s s opened i n e a r l y 1956, t h e regime seemst o have f e l t many of t h e s o l u t i o n s i t w a s s e e k i n g had beenfound and t ha t i t was w e l l on t h e way t o overcoming i t sS t a l i n i s t h e ri ta g e.

The



The Post -Sta l in Exper iment - Domest ic and Fore ign Set t ing

The view of t h e USSR's s t r a t eg i c p o s i t i o n whichshaped t h e bro ad l i n e s of p p s t - S t a l i n p o l i c y had a l r e a d yemerged a t t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y c o n gr e ss in October 1952. I ta pp ea re q i n S t a l i n ' s l a s t t h e o r e t i c a l pronouncement , Eco-nomic Problems of S oc ia li sm i n t h e USSR, which r e c o g n mn b n t h e tme of C o m m u n ~ t ~ r ~ r i a lxpansion andd i a n i ' s h i n g l i k e l i h o o d of t h e immediate overthrow ofcapi ta l i sm th2ough subvers ion or armed aggress ion .seems l ike ly , however , t h a t S t a l i n ' s s u cc e ss o rs knew on lyin g e n e r a l t e r m s where they wanted t o go.of pub l i c "pan ic , I 1 a g a i n s t which the new regime had ap-pealed in i t s f i r s t communique, had passed, t h e f i r s t or-der of b u s i n e s s w a s t o a gr ee on and p u t i n t o prac t ice somear rangement for t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e enormous powers whichhad been concent ra ted a lmost s o l e l y in S t a l i n ' s hands.T h i s was a p r e r e q u i s i t e to t h e launching 6f a N ew Coursedesigned t o release t h e ' Ih idden rese rves " i n t h e Sovie teconomic machine and i t s human cogs--reserves which hadbeen he ld back under Stal in-and t o crea te new opportuni-t i e s f o r t h e USSR i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . But groupr u l e had only t h e dimmest prospec t s u n t i l s om et hi ng w a sd on e t o e l i m i n a t e t h e t e r r o r f a c t o r from t h e p o l i t i c a leq ua tio n. By ex ecu tin g B e r i a a n d c l i p p i n g t h e wings of t h ep o l i t i c a l p o l i c e , t h e c o l l e c t i v e leaders hoped t o f r ee them-s e l v e s f ro m t h e greates t hazard of p o l i t i c a l i n t e r c o u r s eamong themselves (which, i n t h e "Doctor 's P l o t , I dev i sedtoward t h e end of S t a l i n ' s l i f e , t h r e a t e n e d t o p ro du ce a ' .new purge) and, a t t h e same t i rne, , 'ko :beg in a. eform oi€ popu-l a r a t t i t u d e s by o f f e r i n g t o e n d , S t a l i n ' s u nd ec la re d wara g a i n s t h i s own people.

I t

Once t h e danger

T h i s withdrawa l from p r i m a r y r e l i a n c e on enforced con-s e n t a t home had i t s analogy elsewhere i n t h e b loc , in a na tt e mp t t o e l a b o r a t e g ra d u al l y a new Sov ie t - sa t e l l i t e r e l a -t i o n s h i p , in which economic dependence and id eo lo gi ca l a f -finity were i n t ended to s u b s t i t u t e p a r t l y f o r d i r e c t m i l i -t a r y - p o l i ce c o n t r o l a nd t h e cement of S t a l i n ' s u ni qu e au-t h o r i y .

However, t h e dep ar t ure of S ta l in from t h e scene and t h ereduct ion- in-grade of t h e p o l i c e a p p ar a t us on which he had

r e l i ed so heav i ly , l e f t a l a r g e g ap t o b e f i l l e d . D e sp i tet h e c i t a t i o n s of p r ec e de n t a nd dogma, t h e q u e s t io n of how,i n d i r e c t , everyday terms, power w a s t o be shared w i t h i n t h el ead ing g roup and of how and through which channels consentto t h e c o l l e c t i v e w i l l w a s t o be obta ined , remained t o be

worked out in practice. The working ou t promoted personal

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r i v a l r i e s a n d p o l i t i c a l i n - f i g h t i n g a t t h e t o p a s w e l las some ju r i sd ic t i on a l confus ion be tween t h e f r e q u e n t l y

over - l app ing o rgan iza t ions of t h e p a r t y a n d t h e g ov ern -ment.

&byan t o l d t h e 20 th 'pa r ty congress that a f t e r thep r e vi o u s co ng re sg i n 1952 " c e r t a i n o s s i f i e d forms of ourdiplomacy. .were discarded, and " t h e l e ad i n g c o l l e c t i v eboqy of th e par t y in t roduced a new, f r e s h cou rse , pursuinga h i g h po l i cy 'o f h i g h p r i n c i p l e s , a c t i v e a nd e las t ic ,maintained on a calm l e ve l , w i thou t abuses , p roceed ingfrom Lenin's f i r m inj,uncltions on t h e peaceful c o e x i s t e n c eof c o u n t r i e s with d i f f e r en t s o c i a l sys tems ... ." Althought h e beginnings of t h e "peaceful coex isten cev1 ampaign canbe traced back t o abou t the t i m e of t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y con-gress, as Mikoyan do& here, S t a l i n ' s death , n e a r l y s i x

months l a t e r , gave t h e successor r eg im e an opp or tun i ty ,which i t r e a d i l y g r a s p e d , t o push ahead on a new footing.Malenkov took t h e f i r s t s t e p , i n one of the e a r l i e s t pub l i cs t a t e m e n t s of t h e new regime, when he t o l d t h e USSR Su-preme Soviet on 1 5 March 1953: "There i s n o t a s i n g l ec o n t r o v e r s i a l or u n s e t t l e d q u e s t io n which c o u l d n o t be

so lv ed by pea cef ul means on t h e bas i s of t h e mutual agree-ment of t h e i n t e r e s t e d c o u n t r i e s s vT The f i r s t importantr e s u l t of t h i s profess ion w a s t h e Korean armis t ice , onwhich n e g o t i a t i o n s were r eo pe ne d i n A p r i l 1953 on t e r m sre jec ted b y S t a l i n ( i . e . , exchange of p r i s o n e r s ) .

of a l l , t o r e d u c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n a n d t h e s t r a i n

p laced on t h e Sovie t bloc from the dangerous level of t h eKorean war a nd t o ease t h e Soviet Union out of t h e hardenedp o s i t i o n s of t h e c o l d w a r , pos i t ions which allowed l i t t l eroom f o r maneuver and had had the e f f e c t of promoting cohe-s i o n ' i n t h e non-Communist world. I t s assumption was tha t ,w i t h t h e removal of t h e cement of common danger, b u i l t - i nr i v a l r i e s w ould soon d e s t r o y t h e s t r u c t u r e of non-Communistal ignments . By s e t t i n g i n m ot ion t h e d i v i s i v e forces espieda t t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y c o n gr e s s, t h e USSR hoped, i n t h e s h o r tterm, t o p re ve nt t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of a rearmed Western Germanyi n t h e W este rn a l l i ance ; i t s longer range object ive was t oi s o l a t e t h e United Sta tes f rom i t s major a l l i e s , and, thus ,t o r u p t u r e t h e w hole f ab r i c of Western defense.

I

In genera l , t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h i s p o l i c y w a s , f i r s t

But , w h i l e i t s t r o v e t o appea r more c o n c i l i a t o r y , t h eregime d i d n o t r e l i n q u i s h i t s claims of s t r e n g t h , l e s t t h eWest conclude t h a t i t was le ad in g from weakness. Apr inc ipa l pu rpose o f t h e "peac eful coex isten ceq1 ampaign

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power and material r e s o u r c e s i n t o t h e economy. The under-ly in g purpose of po st- Sta l in economic po li cy , under Malenkovand a f t e r , h a s been somehow t o f i n d a c u r e f o r t h e sorem p o ~ x LO W prouuc;LAVA ~y ariu anerrrcieucy AII U ~ A - A G U A u i - u

n n A +n f i n d n n w pniirfin5p nf u r n w + h i n t h o r a + in n s l l f% . a + .i n n

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of t h e economic s t r u c t u r e and i n i nc r e ased l abor p roduc ti v -i t y - - t o be ach ieved by s t i r r i n g t h e worke r ou t of h i s psych-

o l o g i c a l t o r p o r , by a p p e a l t o h i s material i n t e r e s t , a nd by.tec hno log 4ca l improvement. *

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M i sc a rr i ig e s i n t h e New Course --The Mblenkov Government's Foreign Policy

The t h reads of t h e Sovie t Union 's domest ic and fo re ig no b j e c t i v e s crdss a n d r e c r o s s so t h a t i t is n o t r e a l l y pos-s i b l e t o u n ta n g le t h e t w o . )In t h e program which developeddur i ng t h e near ly two years of Malenkov's premiersh ip , h o w -e v e r , t h e focus seems t o have been mainly inward. I t mayhave been one of t h e shortcomings of t h e New Course tha t i ta t t e m p te d t o enjoy t h e f r u i t s of d e t e n t e before d e t e n t e hadbeen assured.

Tlae s l ogan of "peacefu l coexis tence" w a s given someconcrete meaning in t h e Korean armis t ice and i n t h e Indo-China set t lement , and some progress w a s made toward easingt h e s u s p i c i o n w i t h which t h e non-Communist worl d viewed t h eSoviet Union. Under t h e phrase "normal iza t ion of r e l a t i o n s "a cau t i ou s beg i nn ing w a s made toward kealing t h e breach w i t hYugoslavia--a breach which, i n S t a l i n ' s l a s t yea r s , had be-

come wider and wider and had f i n a l l y l e d T i t o t o seek a l -l i a n c e w i t h . Greece and Turkey. I n numerous smaller ways--by lowering s o m e w h a t t h e c u l t u r a l barrier between E a s t andWest, and by emerging from t h e shadows of t h e Kremlin--theregime, besides p u t t i n g on d i s p l a y t h e new model of Communistl eade rsh ip , sought t o demons t ra t e that i t w a s not

casti n t h e

same forbidding mold a s S t a l i n . ,

' * A pos t - l a lenkov s ta tement on one aspect of t h i s problem, andevidence of i t s pe r s i s t e nce , appea red i n P ravda on 12 January1957. Denying t h a t t h e December-1956 plenum was symptomaticof economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , Pravda asserted: "'I38 p o i n t /Ef t h eplenum's decgsions7 is n o t . . . r e t r e a t , b u t a movement to-a high-e r l e v e l af econoEic development, i n which a rap id growth r a t ei s made p o s s i b l e - n o t o n l y, or so much, by b ig new investments,

bu t r a the r by better us$ of e x i s t i n g p ro du ct io n p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,by a more r a t i ona l o rgan i za t i on of t h e j o b cor responding t ot h e p r es e n t s t a g e i n t h e b u i l di n g of Communism."

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S h T



However, when compared w i t h t h e g a mb it s a t t e m pt e d i n

1955, a f t e r Malenkov's resigna t ion -- th e So vie t disarmamentprop osal s , of May 1955, t h e Au st r ian t re a t y , t h e Belgradereco nc ih ia t io n , and th e Suhmit conf e seace - - these s t ep s ap-p e a r c a p t i o u s a nd t e n t a t i v e .

A former o f f i c i a l S

d e s s r f b e d t h e p o l i c y o enkov lnterregnum a s a pro-gsamless progPam," which le d t o t h e l o s s of the l ' s p i r i t ofattack.ll Having discarded c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of S t a l i n i s tp o l i c y , he a r g u e s , t h e AUalenkov gov ern men t's f a i l u r e t o de-

v e l o p a s u b s t i t u t e o f fe n si v e? p ro g ra m ga v e t h e impress ion ofa g e n e r a l re t rea t on a l l f r o n t s .d e n t , , h e c o n t in u e s , i n t h e concept of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c ewhich, t o h i m , seemed to i nvo lve no th ing more t han a p e r i o d

of res t d u r i n g which t h e S o v i e t s t a t e r e o r g a n i z e d i t s e l fi n t e r n a l l y . We are, of course , dea l ing here w i t h g e n e r a limpress ions . I t does seem t o be t r u e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a tt h e Malenkov government, w h i l e s t r iv in g t o appear m ore con-c i l i a t o r y t ha n S t a l i n ' s , t oo k f e w r i s k s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a lare na and, by t h e end of 1954, w a s i n d an ge r of l o s i n g t h ei n i t i a t i v e . Perhaps Malenkov labored, throughout h i s pre-miership, under c e r t a i n impediments: presumably, he wasobl iged f rom t h e beginning t o de fend h i m se l f a g a i n s t t h e en-croachments of h i s r i v a l s in t h e pres id ium and thu s unab let o e s t a b l i s h unequivocal ly h i s own l i n e ; there is a l so somereason t o i n f e r t h a t Malenkov, through temperamhtm i n t e l -l e c t , leaned more toward d i sc re t i on and a l e ss conf ident v iewof th in gs th an Khrushchev (c f . Malenkov's blarch 1954 s ta te -ment w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e p o s s i b i J i t y of, mutual nuclear de-s t r u c t i o n ) . I n a ny e v en t , a f e e l i n g tha t S o v i e t f o r e i g npol icy needed a new edge and d r i v e may w e l l h av e f i g u r e d i nth e change of management i n e a r l y 1955.Khrushchev had in mind when he complained t o a f o r ei g n er a f t e rMalenkov 's res ignat ion t h a t t h e l a t t e r had n o t b e en s u f f i c i e n t -l y "strong1* in h i s f o r e i g n p o l ic y .

T h i s w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i -

I t seems t o be w h a t

I t i s n o t u n l i k e l y that g e n e r a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h ed r i f t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v en t s. w as s h a r p l y a c ce n te d , j u s t be-

f o r e M alenkov's r e s ig na t io n , by th e r e a l i z a t io n t h a t a primeo b j e c t i v e of Sovie t d ip lomacy--the de ni a l t o t h e Western a l -l i a n c e of t h e s t r e n g t h of a rearmed Western Germany--was ont h e verge of defeat . Unquestionably, Germany fi g u re d l a rgei n S o v i et t hi n k in g , n o t only because of t h e memories of t h et w o world wars which i t evoked, but a l s o because i t s weightw a s c r uc ia l i n th e European ba lance o f power.the P a r i s accords by t h e French assembly i n December 1954,

R a t i f i c a t i o n of

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which cleared away t h e l a s t r e a l h u r d l e t o West German re-armament, presented Soviet diplomacy w i t h one of i t s most

s e r i o u s setbacks in t h e postwar per iod and added a n impor-t a n t new ingrediem$ t o t h e s t r a t e g i c p i ct u re .

Weegave no evidence that Malenkov was e v e r c a l l e d t oaccount ' f o r t h i s development. N e i t h e r i n h i s r e s i g n a t i o nl e t t e r nor i n th e av ai la bl e summary of t h e cent ra l com-mitteeJs e x p l a n a t o r y c i r c u l a r w a s t h i s p o i n t raised. Never -the less , i t wastvery probably a c o n t r i b u t o r y , if i n d i r e c t ,cause of h i s r e s i g n a t i o n i n that i t forced t h e regime tolook t o i t s d e f e ns e p o s i t i o n a nd d r e w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e sev-e ra l problems which were then fa c i ng th e Sovie t economy. Asugges t ion of t h i s appeared i n Khrushchev' s i n t e rv iew w i t ht h e Hearst group in February 1955, when he complained t h a t

"Churchi l l and DPlblescby p o s i t i o n s of s t r e n g t h do not mean

a balance 00 power but r a t h e r t ha t one pos i t ion shou ld bes t r o n g e r t h a n a n o t he r i n order t o e n fo r ce i t s w i l l on t h eo ther s ide ." This, h e cont inued, " l ed to an armaments racew i t h a l l i t s danger s and unf or tu na te economic consequences."The poin t appeared again a year l a t e r when Khrushchev t o l d afo re ign d ip lom at that Malenkov's demotion had been accompaniedby c e r t a i n economic adjustments, which , he impl ied , had beens t im ula ted by Western agreement on German rearmament.

Economic Problems a t Ho me

The New Course was conceived a s a dev ice f o r putt ing newmomentum i n t o t h e Soviet economy and f o r drawing popula r sup- '

p o r t t o the new regime. From its s t a r t i n g p o i n t a nd pr op a-

ganda h ighl ight - - the promise t o rJaise t b e o u t p ut of consumergoods and, thus , t h e S o vi et l i v i n g s t a n da r d s u b s t a n t l a l a y"wi th in t w o or three years"--the program led through a numberof exped ien t s t o t h e discovery that it had raised a wholeser ies of unf ores een problems. Within less than two years i t slnost conspicuous elements were discarded, and w i t h them t h eman who w a s m o s t near ly t h e p u b l i c symbol of i t s o r i g i n a l ob=

j e c t i v e s . The p u b l i c was encouraged t o b e l i e v e that t h e Ne wC o u r s e had t o go because i t had come i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h a basicaxiom of Sovie t economic theory , t h e primacy of heavy ind us tr y,but t h i s was a p r o p a ga n d i st i c o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of t h e problemand, i n any case, deal t w i t h r e s u l t s n ot c a us es . The New Coursef a i l e d because, a t t h e o u t s e t , i t overes t imated t h e c a p a c i t ya nd r e s i l i e n c e of t h e Soviet economy, e sp ec ia l l y i t s a g r i c u l t u r -a l s e c t o r , b ec au se i t tended t o i n t e n s i f y c o m p e t i t i o n f o rscarce material and manpower re so ur ce s, be ca us e i t c r e a t e d ideo-lo gi ca l and oper a t i ve confus ion among Sovie t cadres, and because,by s t im ula t ing expec ta t io ns which i t w a s , in t h e end, unableto f u l f i l l , i t t h rea tened t o damage rather t han t o s t r e n g t h e npopular mora1 .

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The N ew Course expected t o f i n d "new p roduction pos-s i b i l i t i e s " p r i m a r i ly by a r o u si n g the "material i n t e r e s t "of t h e urban worker and t h e peasant . The goa ls of r a i s i n g .t h e produc t ion of consumer, goods and inc r eas ing ag r i cu l t u r a lo u t p u t were interdependent. :goods was i n t ended t o s t i m u l a t e a g r i c u l t u r a l p ro du ct io nwhich, i n tu rn , would p rov ide t h e f o o d s t u f f s an d a g r i c u l t u r -a l raw materials on which i nc re ased consum pt ion l a rg e l y de-pended .

been achieved, i n pract ice , by g i v i n g l i g h t i n d u s t r y ah i ghe r p r i o r i t y in t b e a l l o c a t i o n of materials, by d ive r s i -f i c a t i o n of produc t ion i n c e r t a i n heavy i n d u s t r i e s , by wi th -drawals from s t a t e r e s e r v e s a nd i n v e n t o r i e s , by some i n -crease in imports t o 'be f i n an c e d l a r g e l y from g o l d r e s e r v e s ,bu t , p r im ar i ly , t h rough t h e expansion of l i g h t i n d u s t r yp l a n t s on t h e b a s i k of i n c r e a s e d s t a t e inves tment . The re-s u l t w a s t h a t , a c c o rd i n g t o S o v i e t s t a t i s t i c s , in 1953 and1954, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e s i n c e 1947 (when heavy i nd us tr y wass t i l l under r econs t ruc t ion) t h e o u t p u t of consumer goods in-c r e a s e d a t v e r y n e a r l y t h e same r a t e as t h e ou tpu t of pro-ducer goods. **

Measures were i n t roduced t o g i v e t h e consumer t h ewherewi tha l f o r t h e purchase of t h e promised consumer goodsby ra i s i n g h i s money income.scaled down by one h a l f and t h e a n n u a l c u t in r e t a i l pr i ceson consumer goods w a s t w i c e a s l a rg e a s those p u t i n t o e f-f e c t in t h e previous seven years. The peasant, who w a s sov i t a l t o t h e s uc ce ss of t h e N e w Course,. w a s given a d d i t i o n a lf i n a n c i a l c o n c es s i on s t h ro ug h a r e d u c t i o n of t h e t a x on t h ep r i v a t e p l o t , t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n of tax ar rears , and t h e reduc-t i o n o f ob l iga to r y de l iv e ry norms and inc re ased p rocurementp r i c e s on those commodities whose outputes pe ci a l ly wanted t o encourage .

A n i n c r e a s e d flow of consumer

4 ,

Inc rea sed out pu t of consumer goods a p p e ar s t o h av e

I n 1953 t h e s t a t e l oan w a s

t h e government

*Agr icu l tu re is estimated t o prov ide t h e b a s i s f o r a b o utt h r e e f o u r t h s of Sov iet consumption.

of approx im ate ly 12 pe rcen t i n 1953.In

1954 t h er a t e ofgrowth i n heavy in du s t ry w a s approximate ly 14 percent and i n

l i g h t i n d u s t r y , a p pr o xi m at el y 13 percen t .

**These f i gu re s show a r a te of i n c r e a se i n b oth categor ies

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B e s i d e s o f f e r i n g t h e peasan t t h e inducement of moreconsumer goods and f inancia l r e l i e f , t h e government attacked

t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l pr ob le m by i n c r e a s i n g i t s inves tments inthat sectqr. In 1954, f o r example, i t was p la nn ed t o i n -crease cqpi ta l inves tment i h a g r i c u l t u r e f rom t h e budget t o21 bi l l. $on r ub le s from t h e 1 2 b i l l i o n r u b l e s a l l o c a t e d i n1953.

ber'1953 encouraged t h e peasan t t o i n c r e a s e t h e ou tpu t ofv e g e t a b l e a nd l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c t s on h i s p r i v a t e p l o t andt hu s l i f t e d p a r t i a l l y t h e th rea t t o t h e p l o t g l impsed i nStal in 's Economic Problems of.S o c i al i s m i n t h e USSR. Si-multaneously, however, stepKwere t aken = E e n g ' t h e n or-g a n i z a t i o n a 1 ,c o n t r o l o v e r a g r i c u l t u r e f ro m t h e c e n t e r by re-i n f o r c i n g t h e Machine' Tr ac t or St a t io ns , t h e government's

main lever in t h e c o l l e c t i v e f a r m economy, and by inc reas ingp a r t y a u t ho r i t y i n t h e coun t rys ide . These i nc luded a pro-gram t o t r a n s f e r 7,000 mechanica l engineers t o t h e MTS's,t o i n s t a l l i n each of t h e 9 ,000 s t a t i o n s a group of p a r t yi n s t r u c t o r s , a nd t o s en d i n t o t h e MTS's and c o l l e c t iv e farmsupwards of 100,000 ag ronomist s and o t h e r t e c h n i c i a n s .

The measures taken by t h e regime i n August and Septem-

A s l a i d out by Khrushchev a t t h e September 1953 plenumof t h e cen t ra l com m i t t ee , t h e immediate a i m of t h e a g r i c u l t u r -a l program was t o r a i s e t h e ou tpu t of l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c t s ,p o t a t o e s , v e g e t ab l e s a nd f r u i t , p r i m a r i l y by r e l i a n c e on in-ce n t iv e m easures as a means of r a i s i n g y i e l d s. A t t h i ss t ag e , a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l ic y w a s not o nl y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , itw a s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f , t h e New Course a s a whole. I t seems

t o hav e assumed, however, t h a t th,ere w a s no urgency t o t h eproblem of i n s u r i n g a n a d e q u a te g r a i n s u p p ly . T h i s w a s in -dicated by Malenkov a t t h e August 1953 Supreme So vie t s es si onwhen he asserted: "Our coun t ry has p l e n t y of grain." Khru-shchev spoke i n somewhat t h e same sense , though w i t h a nadded caveat , when he t o l d t h e cen t ra l com m i t t ee in September:"We are i n g e n er a l s a t i s f y i n g t h e c ou n t ry ' s need f o r g r a inc r o p s , In t h e s e n se t h a t our coun t ry is w e l l s u p p l i e d w i t hbread. W e have t h e necessa ry s t a t e r e s e r v e s a n d are expor t -in g wheat on a l i m i t e d scale." Ag r ic u l t u ra l p rocurement s in1953 proved , however, t o be a t t h e lowest l e v el i n t h e F i f t hFive-Year Plan per iod ,* and wi th in a f e w months t h e estimateof g ra in needs had been sh ar pl y rev ise d. Khrushchev informed

*Thi s f a c t was n o t r e v e a le d u n t i l 1956 ( I z v e s t i y a , 4 O c t 56)

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S



t h e February-March 1954 c e n t r a l committee plenum t h a t " t h el e v e l of g r a i n p r o d uc t i on so f a r has no t m e t a l l t h e re-

quirements of t h e national economy," and therewith launchedt h e "new lands" prpgram which c a l l e d i n i t i a l l y f o r t h e ex-pans ion {by 32,000,000 ac res of t h e area sown to g r a i n . Thegoa l w a ~xtended i n August 1954 t o 37,000,000 acres ,

In h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h t h e B r i t i s h s c i e n t i s t J o h nBerpal (publ i shed in l a t e December 1954, on t h e eve ofMalenkov's resignat ion) , Khrushchev tended t o minimize thod i f f e r enc es between himsel f and Malenkov over agr icul tura lp o l i c i e s . H e s a i d :

"There w a s a l o t of t a l k abroad about a seeming con-t r a d i c t i o n betw een t h e s t a t e m e n t s by J , V. S t a l i n a tt h e 1 8 t h par ty dongress and by Go M. Malenkov a t t h e

1 9 t h par ty congress abou t t h e g r a i n problem i n ourcountry having been solved and t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h el a t e s t plenary meet ings of t h e c e n t r a l committee oft h e CPSU which p o i n t t o t h e n e e d f o r i n c r e a s i n g g r a i n

lands . Ac tua l ly t h e r e i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n here. J.V. S t a l i n and G. M. Malenkov were q u i t e r i g h t whent h e y s a i d w e had enough g r a i n t o a s s u r e bread f o rt h e popula t ion . Our c o u n t r y w a s s a t i s f y i n g i t sbread requi rements . W e have enough of it now, too,and w e have t h e necessary reser ves . But man doesn o t l i v e by bread a lone . I t i s p r e c i s e l y o t h er re-quirements of man t h a t i n d i r ec t l y demand an inc re asei n g r a i n p roduct ion. ''

production and expanding t h e g r a i n areas i n v i r g in

More r e c e n t l y , however, Khrushchev h a s ' a l luded on s e v e r a l oc-cas io ns t o m isg iv ings among ce r t a in of 41s presid ium co l l eaguesover t h e "new lands" scheme, a n d , s i n c e t h e June plenum of 1957,he has e x p l i c i t l y c i t e d Malenkov f o r oppos i t ion on these grounds.I t i s dou btf ul , however, i f t h e d i f f e r enc es between them wereacrose t h e board.

I t h a s been suggested (most r e c e n t l y by P a r t y S e c r e t a r yBelyayev, fo l lowing t h e removal of Malenkov from t h e presidium)t h a t MaIenkov and Khrushchev d i f f e r e d , as a matter o f p r i n c i p l e ,on t h e i s s u e of i n c re a s ed y i e l d s a s agains t expanded acreage a sa means of s o l v i n g t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l problem. T h i s , again , ap-pears t o be a n o v e r s i m p l if i c a t i on for propaganda purposes.Malenkov 's res ignat ion l e t t e r took care t o r ep r e se n t t h e ag-r i c u l t u r a l tax reform, a key measure for r a i s i n g y i e l d s i nt h e o l d e r c u l t i v a t e d areas , a s p a r t y ra ther t han pe r sona l po l i cy ,and t h i s m easure con t inued in force a f t e r h i s removal. Moreover,

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Khrushchev has recognized on more than one occas ion, pub-l i c a nd p r i v a t e , t h a t e x t en s i ve c u l t i v a t i o n i s no t a long-

term panacea f o r S o v ie t a g r i c u l t u r e . In March 1955 Khru-shchev t o l d a n a g r i c u l t u r a l c on fe re nc e:

I !$!

1n ;o rde r t o i n c r e a s e g r a i n p r o du c t io n u p t o t h en e c es s a ry a mo unts un de r t h e e x i s t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o nof c r o p s ' i t i s n e c e ss a r y t o r a i s e t h e y i e l d s s h a rp l yand f o r t h i s it i s necessary t o i n cr ea se f e r t i l i z e rp r o d u c t i d n* b y s e v e r a l t i m e s , which requires enormous

But w e c a n a c h ie v e t h i s a i m even wi th in a s h o r t e rper iod of t i m e and w i t h small expend i tu res of funds ,i f w e pay p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o c or n.

c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t s i n t h e chemical i n d u s t r y .

I

I n t h e same connect ion , a fo re ign d ip lom at r e p o r t e d t h e fol-l owing d i sc uss io n on agrAcu l tu re w i t h Khrushchev i n January1957:

,

/xhrushchev7 s a i d he w a s pleased by t h e good harvestTn t h e v i r z i n l a n d s , which meant tha t S o v i e t g r a i nrequirements f o r t h e year w e r e s a t i s f i e d . However,Khrushchev expressed t h e view that e x t e n s i v e c u l t i v a -t i o n w a s no answer f o r t h e long-term needs of t h e So-

v i e t economy and t h a t a r e a l e f f o r t would have t o be

made r e i n t e n s i v e c u l t i v at i o n . T h i s would requi ref e r t i l i z e r s a nd t h e USSR had i n s u f f i c i e n t f e r t i l i z e r sa nd n o t e nough f a c t o r i e s t o ma nu fa ct ur e f e r t i l i z e r s .Khrushchev said h e hoped something could be done about

t h i s , b u t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s q o u l d n ' t do everyth ing a tonce. *

But, however, t h e "new lan dst q program was conceived--whether as a "get-r ich-quickqt scheme which c o u ld s t r e n g t h e nt h e p o l i t i c a l hand of i t s backers, or a s a f e a s i b l e s t e p t o-ward s o l u t i o n of t h e ag r i cu l t u r a l p roblem -- there is a goodp o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t w a s t h e s u b j e c t of s e r i o u s debate i n t h epresidium. I t might have been an t i c ipa ted tha t i t would

*The r e gi m e' s c o n ti n u ed i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d y i e l d s was re-f lec ted in plans t o doub le p roduc t ion o f chemical f e r t i l i z e r su nd er t h e 6 t h FYP.

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S%T



superimpose on t h e New C ou rs e s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i o n a l de -mands f o r f i n a n c i a l means, machinery and manpower,** an d

that i t might (as , i n f a c t , i t d i d ) s e t up a com pe t i t i onf o r r e s o u r c e s which would epdanger t h e New Course 's con-sumption!:goals. I t i s pos s ib le t o suppose , knowing what,w e do a%o ut Khrushchev's temperament, t h a t he came t o re -gard t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l program as more or l ess h i s ownp r i va te campaign and t o make more and more i n s i s t e n t de-

mands ' f o r t h e means t o f u l f i l l i t . A p o s s i b l e c l u e t oh i s t h i n k i n g was his s t a te m e n t t o t h e Hearst p a r t y that" t h e development of l iv es to ck farming i s imposs ib le wi th-o u t t h e development of heavy indus t ry , which s u p p l i e st r a c t o r s , a g r i c u l t u r a l machin es, etc. to a g r i c u l t u r e . "And, in a somewhat d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t, a Westerner repor tedh i m a s s a y i ng i n J an ua ry 1956 " t h a t t h e emphasis on tech-n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s ana p r o d u c t i v i t y of labor w a s i n p a r t

due t o a des i re t o hal t t h e flow of labor f r o m t h e coun t ry -s ide t o i n d u s t r y , " ; a n d " tha t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e of c o n t i n u i n gt h e p r e s e n t r a t e of i n c r e a s e of pl an t ca pa ci ty would haven e c e s s i t a t e d a n i n c r e a s e in t h e i n d u s t r i a l l a b or force w i t ha r e s u l t a n t d r a in from a g r i c u l t u r e , "

I t is n o t u n l i k e l y , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a s Khrushchev'ss t r e n g t h i n ' t h e p re si di um i n c r e a s e d he came i n t o p e rs o na lc o n f l i c t w i t h Malenkov over how a v a i l a b l e re so ur ce s w e r et o be d i s t r i b u t e d and t h a t t h e i s s u e came t o be drawn f o rt h e p u rp o se s of p o l i t i c a l debate in t e r m s of t h e r e l a t i v ep r i o r i t i e s of inve stme nt and consumption. Th is h e l p s t o ex-p l a i n , perhaps, why, i n re si gn in g, Malenkov w a s f o r ce d t oassume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a g r i c u l tu r e .

Heavy vs. L i g h t I n d u s t r y "

There is some reason t o suppose that t h e New Course , . a sf i r s t o u tl in ed by Malenkov, w a s r e a l l y d es ig ne d t o do no morethan i t claimed-that is , through a concent ra ted , shor t - te rm

4

**On t h e b a s i s of 1955 a l ' l oca t ions i t has been estimated that" t h e e f f e c t of t h e new l a n d s program on t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l b udg-e t .has been t o i n c r e a s e c a p i t a l investment by about one t h i r dand t o i n c r e a s e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l e x p e nd i t ur e s of t h e blachineT r a c t o r S t a t i o n s by a b o u t o ne With r espec t t o manpower,a S o v i e t s o u r c e s ta te s that, "Already i n t h e f i r s t hal f of 1954t h e number of workers i n a g r i c u l t u r e (Machine Tractor S t a t i o n sand s t a t e farms) i n c r e a s e d by 2,300,000 over t h e f i r s t h al f of1953.

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' .

e f f o r t , t o c o r r e c t t h e "disproport ion" between t h e outputof producer and consumer goods, no t t o de pr iv e heavy in-

d u s t r y of i t s longer t e r m p r i o r i t y . If t h i s i s t h e case,Malenkov Can be t aken a t face v a lu e i n h i s August 1953speech wken h e i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e foresaw no c o n f l i c t i np r i o r i t $ e s :

U n t i l now i t has been impossible t o expand t h e

heavy indus t r i es . A t t h e presen t t i m e w e can ,a n d t h e r e f o r e a re obl iged t o speed up l i g h t i n -d u s t r y w i t h t h e a i m of a more s a p i d improvementi n t h e material and cu l t u r a l we l l -be i ng of t h epopulation....lVe w i l l expand w i t h a l l means t h eheavy industries....We must a lw a y s remember thatheavy indus t ry is t h e foundat ion of foundat ions

of our s o c i a l i s t economy, because wi tho ut i t s. expansion the re cannot be assured t h e f u r t h e r

development of l i g h t i n d u s t r y , t h e growth oft h e p o t e n t i a l of a g r i c u l t u r e an d t h e s t rengthen-ing of t h e d e f e n s e a b i l i t y of our country.

~ l i g h t a nd fo od i n d u s t r i e s a t t h e same r a t e a s

In t h i s h e w a s echoed by h i s presidium col leagues .* I t wasassumed, o r hoped, ap pa re nt ly, t h a t t h e Soviet economy wascapable, over a pe r i od of two o r t h ree y e a r s , of increas ings h a r p l y t h e output of consumer goods w h i l e heavy industrycon t inued t o expand sub s t a n t i a l l y , t hough a t a somewhatslower r a t e than in t h e immediate fo r ego i ng period.**

I

*BY Khr shchev , i n Apr i l 1954, as fo l lows: "Our m o s t impor-t a n t t a sk i n t h e immediate f u t u r e , i s , without weakening oura t t e n t i o n t o t h e development of heavy industry, t h e foundat ionof fou nda t ion s of t h e So vi et economy, t o or ga niz e a s h a r pupsurge of a g r i c u l t u r e , t o i n c r e a s e s h ar p ly t h e production ofconsumer goods, t o supply t h e popula t ion in t h e next t w o o rth ree y e a r s w i t h s u f f i c i e n t i n d u s t r i a l ) pr od uc ts and food-S t u f f s , t o , . ra i se d e c i s i v e l y t h e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d . oft h e workers. ''**Academician St ru mi li n put i t this way: "To r a i s e t h e l e v e lof consumption of t h e workers by 30-40 percent even over 2-3y e a r s c o u l d be cons idered a l l t h e g r ea t e r a n accomplishment i nthat i t would not demand a s i g n i f i c a n t r e t a r d a t i o n e ven i n t h egeneral growth of t h e means of production...."

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Some of t h e inc re as ed ou tp ut of consumer goods w a se v i d e n t l y i n te n d ed t o be a t t h e expense of heavy ind us tr y,

In 1954, f o r example, heavy in du st ry was t o r e c e i v e 53percen t of t o t a l s t a t e investments a s compared w i t h 55 per-ce nt anc$;56 p ercen t , re sp ec t iv e l y , i n the 1953 and 1955p lan , wpile t h e share of t h e l i g h t , food, and loc a l i ndus -t r i e s ro se f rom 5 pe rcen t i n 1953 t o 8.5 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 54 ,plaa , f a l l i n g b ack t o ab ou t 7 p e r ce n t i n t h e 1955 plan .In a d d i t i o n , a p o r t i o n of t h e inves tments i n heavy in-d u s t r y were t b ' b e u s ed f o r t h e p ro d u ct i on of consumer goods.In t h e main, however, t h e i n c r e a se d i nv e st m en t i n l i g h t i n -d u s t r y w a s t o be achieved through a s h a r p i n c r e a s e in t o t a linves tmen t r a ' t he r than th rough cu t s i n heavy ind us t ry ' sshare.

Some of t h e mealis for t h i s i nc reased investment was

probably t o come from t h e g e n e r a l growth of t h e economy,and from di sc on tin ua t i on of some of t h e investment-hungry" g re a t S t a l i n i s t pr o je c ts . " An ad di t i on al sou rce may havebeen sought i n some red uct ion i n t h e share of a major claim-a n t t o production, defense . T h i s i s suggested by t h e f a c tt h a t e x p l i c i t defen se expend i tu res i n 1954 were planned a ta l e v e l 10 percent below t h e 1953 p l a n, a l th o u gh t o t a l i n -vestment from t h e budget w a s t o i n cr e as e by approximately20 percent . I t i s , of course , r i sky t o draw conc lus ions i nterms of t h e o v e r - a l l S o v i e t d e f e n s e p i c t u r e fro m t h i s kindof data , since d i r e c t a l l o c a t i o n s t o t h e Minis t ry of D e -f ense th rough t h e budget account for only p a r t of t h e t o t a lde fense ou t l ay , Never theles s , t h e s h i f t of expendi tures be-

tween 1954 and 1955, viewed together w i t h t h e progress of!

ar rangements for West German rearmament and t h e e l e v a t i o n ofMarshal Zhukov t o t h e Dost of d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r , s u g g e s t s

'

that defense cons ide ra t ions p l ayed a major p a r t in t h e re-examination of economic policy which preceded Malenkov'so u s t e r .

Increa sed inves tment under t h e N e w Course and t h e in -crease i n income of workers and peasants which resul ted fromt h e government's f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , added to t h e need to h a l tt h e f lo w of manpower from t h e coun t rys ide , en la rged t h e s i g -n i f i c a n c e of l ab or p rodu c t iv i ty . Un les s t h e i n c r e as e i nl abo r p r o d u c t i v i t y k e p t pace w i t h t h e i n c r e as e i n t h e wagefund the s t a t e sav in gs needed f o r increased investment couldnot be accumulated. In f a c t , however, lab or pro duc t iv i ty

f a i l e d t o i n c r e as e a t t h e expected r a t e , I t grew by only7 percen t i n 1954 and a t t h e end of t h e gear w a s w e l l behind

. - 4 .I 8 ; : t u . ' , - .

~ -14-

=@w



t h e schedu le s e t i n t h e F i f t h Five-Year Plan.* In a ne f f o r t t o f u l f i l l i t s product ion goa ls t h e government w a s

forced t o resort t o t h e expedient of i n c r e a s i n g t h e l a b o rfo rc e beyond i t s i n t e n t i o n s .

sumer gbods goals were n o t f u l l y m e t , l a r g e l y b e ca us e a

s u f f i c i e n t i n c re a s e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l o ut pu t d i d n o t material-ize,, and, conseque ntly, purchasin g power ra n ahead of avai l -ab l e supply . *The e f fe c t of t h e government's po l i c i e s wast hu s t o inc rea se demand be fo re i t w a s ab l e t o p ro vi de t h econsumer goods to m e e t i t and, t h e re f o re , t o v i t i a t e t h ei n c o n t i v e e le me nt i n i t s program. I n a March 1955 convers a-,t i o n w i t h a fo re ig n ,diplomat i n , Moscow,, Khrushchevr e p o r t o d l y c r i t i c i z e d Malenkov d i r e c t l y on t h i s s c o r e , sl-l e g i n g t h a t h e had "Created demands i n t h e Sovie t people

wi thout having created t h e c a p ac i t y f o r s a t i s f y i n g them."Much t h e same p o i n t w a s made by Xaganovich, who remarked t oa Western diplomat t h a t " i t w a s a m i s t a k e t o r a i s e t h es t a n d a r d of l i v i n g too qu ick ly a s t h i s produced demorqliza-t i o n a nd lack of d is c i p l in e among t h e popula t ion .1* B u t ,though i t had f a i l e d t o meet i t s g o a l s , t h e program had ap-p a r e n t l y h a d t h e f u r t h e r u n d e si r ab l e e f f e c t of p u t t i n g ad r a i n on s t a t e r e s e r v e s , a c o n d i t i o n which Bulganin, i nh i s f i r s t speech as premier , s a i d coul d not be a l lowed.

Coiifusion i n t h e Ranks

I *

Thg'problem was compl ica ted by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e con-

-Towards th e end of 1954, apparent ly , t here w a s a f a i r

amount of perplexity a s t o t h e r eg im e ' s a i m s a n d i n t e n t .

' ing of i d e o l o g i s t s Lnnd econom ists which h e a t te n d e d i n hlos-cow i n December 1954. "When t h e s u b j e c t o f r e l a t i v e stresson l ig h t and heavy ind us t ry came u p f o r d i s c u s s i o n , " h e says,"there was a s i t u a t i o n amou nting t o l b o ur g e oi s l i b e r a l i z a -t i o n , ' w i t h every man express ing h i s own in t e rp re t a t i on oft h e p a r t y p o s i t i o n .

-ang t o Sovie t s t a t i s t i c s , labor p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r c a s e don ly 33 p e r c e n t f o r t h e 1951-54 p e r i o d , whereas r e a l wages in-creased 37 percen t . From t h e p o i n t of view of t h e Sovie t l ead-e r s h i p , such a r e l a t i o n betw een t h e s e r a t e s of growth i s high-l y unfavorab le , because i t t e n d s ti-) c o n s t r i c t t h e s u r p l u s a v a i l -

a b l e f o r i n ve s tm e nt and hence t h e r a t e of growth of t h e Sovie tecoxaomy

c i t e d above (p . 6 ) , has described a meet-

I t was comDlete disorder and t h e f i r s t

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S W



s t e p t o a r ight -wing devia t ion . " H e s t ressed that abso lu te -l y c l ea r d i r e c t i v e s m ust be i ssued by t h e p a r t y on a c e n t r a l

i s s u e l i k e that of economic policy in a Communist s ta te ."

I t , w a s s a i d ag ai n andc'again, once t h e f u l l - s c a l e cam-p a i g n o f ' " r e c t i f i c a t i o n " was begun i n ea r l y 1955, t h a t t h eregime'had always based i t s p o l i c y on th e primacy of heavyi n d u s t r y . I n a s t r i c t l y l i t e r a l sense, t h i s w a s t r u e .Ma1,enkov's statement on t h i s p oi nt i n h i s keynote speech ofAugust 1953 (see p+ . 1 3 ' above),., h n a i a e d - as- : t h e o f f i c i a lp o s i t i o n t hr ou gh o ut t h e N ew Course. Never the les s , t h e -r e l a t i v e l y h i g h c on su mp ti on t a rge ts , by v i r t u e of t h e i r

no ve l t ya nd t h e ve ry heavy em phas is they r ece ived i n propa-ganda, m us t have seemed t o many t o be t h e c o r e of t h e N ewCourse.

Once t h e regime concluded t h a t i t had overreached i t -s e l f i n t h e N ew Course, t h e f a l s e hopes which had beenraised had t o be put down and i t chose t o do so, t y p i c a l l y ,by c a l l i n g o u t t h e hobgob lin of ide o lo g ic a l dev ia t io n .S u i t a b l e t a r g e t s were found in t h e p e rs o ns of a number ofeconomists who had come through t h e open ing i n t h e ideo-l o g i c a l f r o n t t o propose t h a t (in Khrushchev's words t ot h e Jan uar y 1955 plenum) "at a p a r t i c u l a r s t a g e of s o c i a l i s tco ns t ru c t i on t h e deve lopm ent of l i g h t in du s t ry can and musto v e r t a k e a l l other branches of industr y."

I t remains an open ques t ion t o what e x t e n t t h e e r r a n teconomists had become involv ed i u th e tug-and-pull amongh igh- rank ing f igures . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t some of them a t

l ea s t had merely t r i e d t o f i n d t h e o r e t i c a l groundw ork f o rwhat they supposed w a s approved pol icy , and t h a t t h e i rgreatest s8n was f a i l u r e t o f o r e s e e a n impending c h an ge i nl i n e . I nd ee d, u n t i l l a t e 1954, t h e consumer goods l i n eseemed t o be s t i l l i n t a c t , t h o u g h t here had been some signsof wavering in e a r l i e r months. One of t h e e a r l i e s t of theses i g n s was a n a r t i c l e by t h e economist K. V. Ostrovi tyanovi n t h e Idarch 1954 i s s u e of Kommunist which s a i d t h a t to l e tconsumer goods produ ctio n r un ahead of c a p i t a l good p roduc-t i o n w a s u n d e s i r a b l e in t h e S o v ie t economy. However, a newe d i t i o n of t h e o f f i c i a l pa r t y textbook P o l i t i c a l Economy,publ i sh ed i n August, once ag ain reaffirmed t h a t , in c e r t a i npe rio ds, consumer goods produ ction coul d outru n producergoods output , w h i l e t h r e e months l a t e r , i n t h e November an-n i v e r s a r y speech, Saburov a lso sugges t ed t h a t the New Course

:. , I ' * I . ' :' I , ' ., I, I?



. - . . ,.

would remain i n e f f ec t .* I t was c u r i o u s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a tt h e s l o ga n s i s su e d f o r t h e ann ive r sa ry d i d no t , as had t h e

s logans i s sued t h e year before and a t May Day 1954, g i v ei t a s a goal of t h e r eg im e, ," to s a t i s fy abundan t ly i n t h enex t tw o ; : t o three years) ' t h e popu la t io n ' s r equ irem ent s i nf o o d s t u f f s .

In December, signs of t h e coming s h i f t m ul t ip l i ed .In a Keynote speech t o a S o v i e t c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n f er e n cewhich m e t on 7 December ( t h e speech was not pub l i shed un-til 28 December), Khrushchev appeared t o stress more thanu s u a l t h e importance .of heavy i n d u s t r i a l development. On21 December, t h e a n n i v e r s ar y of S t a l i n ' s b i r t h , P ra vd a a ndI z v e s t i a p u b l i s h e d commemorative a r t i c l e s , t h e former'sauthored by V. Kruzhkov, then t h e chief of t h e ce nt ra l com-m i t t e e ' s department of propaganda and ag i t a t io n , and t h e

l a t t e r ' s by F. Konstant inov, a l so a prom inen t pub l i c i s t .Kruehkov came dowp'hard on t h e p o i n t t h a t heavy indus t rywas t h e be-all-and-end-all of economic p o l i c y , om i t t inge n t i r e l y t h e convent ional promises t o t h e consumer.Konstant inov, by cont ras t , made only a p o l i t e bow f n t h edi re c t io n of heavy ind us t ry and cont inued t o speak b l i t h e l yabout ' I f orc ing t h e production of consumer goods. ** T h i sw a s unques t ionably a meaninful divergence, but i t i s l e ssc e r t a i n t h a t t h e t w o newspapers were conscfous ly a t oddsw i t h one another . If t h e s e two c e n t r a l o r ga n s had, indeed,momentarily broken ranks and were lending themselves t ot h e expos i t ion of c o n f l i c t i n g v i e w s on a major p o l i c y is-s u e , i t seems t h a t I e v e s t is . would have been f or ce d t o admi ti t s e r r o r o n c e t h e heavy vs..' l i g h t l i n e had been dogmatical ly

defined.** I t might have been expected, . too, t h a t theI z v e s t i a author would have pa i d a p r i c e f o r b ei ng on t h ewrong s i d e , but , t o a l l appearances, Konstant inov has pros-pered s i n c e t h e end of 1954. In March 1955 h e was i d e n t i f i e das r e c t o r of t h e Academy of Social Sciences , in A p r i l or May

-is year ," Saburov sa id , Ira s t a r t has a l r ead y been made onpract ica l accompl ishment of t h i s Fon sum er goods7 program,"thus implying t h a t more w a s t o c oz e.**The monthly journal Problems of Economics, which had pub-l i s h e d a n a r t i c l e , b y one of tgeFondemned economksts itg-Septem-ber 1954, apologized ' f b r i t s e r r o r . i n d ts March 11955 issue, ' . 41

a f t e r f a $ l i n g , t o a pp ea r d ur in g t h e f i r s t two,months of t h e ,

year . e 0 , ! ' I + I1 I *" . i. 1

-17-



he was added t o t h e e d i t o r i a l b oa r d of K o m u ni s t , a nd byth e f o l low ing autumn he w a s i n Kruzhkov's former j o b a s head

of Agitprop.

i n g t h e , ' l in e which had been i n f o r c e x u s t as a new one wasemerging on th e pages of Pravda.s i g n i f i e d tha t t h e presid=cisionswh[ich meant t h e endof $he N ew Course had f i n a l l y been taken. Delay i n t h e re-f inement of t h e propaganda or ch es tr a ti on may acco unt fo rIev es t ia ' $ . having been, f o r a t i m e , awkwardly out of t u n e .

By t h e fo l lowing month th e l i n e was c r y s t a l .clear and af u l l - s c a l e a t t a c k w a s begun against t h e advocates of con-sumpt ion pre feren ce . The h i g h p o i n t s were Shep i lov ' s de-nunc ia t ion in Pravda ' fo r 24 January of " r i g h t o p p o r t u n i s t s , "

a nd K h r u s h c h e v ' s l l r ou gh er l an gu ag e b e f o r e t h e J a nu a ryplenum of t h e ce n t ra l com mi tt ee , where he a cc us ed c e r t a i nt h e o r e t i c i a n s of " r e u r g i t a t i o n of t h e r i g h t d e v i a t i o n ,r e g u r g i t a t i o n of v ie ws h o s t i l e to Leninism, views which Rykov,Bukharin and t h e i r i l k once preached."

I t $ty have happened t h a t Izves t ia ; . was ro u t in e l y purvey-

The Pravda a r t i c l e probably

Th e r e w a s a c e r t a i n d an ge r, in a n i d e o l o g i c a l s e n s e,i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s pu t forward by t h e condemned theoreti-c i a n s . I n a r g ui n g t h a t t h e Soviet economy had progressed to

a p o i n t where i t was no t on ly poss ib l e bu t necessa ry t o de-

ve lop l i g h t and heavy ind us t ry a t equal r a t es , i t may haveseemed t h a t these economists were a t te m p ti n g t o c o n ve r t atemporary l i n e of pol icy i n t o a dogma and, thus , t o l i m i t

t h e regime i n i t s r i g h t t o prom ulga te economic laws i n i t s

own p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t . I t i s p o s s i b l e , t o o , t h a t t h e hand-f u l of pr of es si on al economists who were c i t ed by name weremerely t h e exposed sa l i en t of a more or l e s s widespreadbody of thought .

The charges of t h e o r e t i c a l h er e sy were probably, inp a r t , t h e r e f l e x a c t i o n of a regime long accustomed t o ra-t i o n a l i z i n g i t s p o l i c i e s in t h e pseudo- theo log ica l languageof Marxism-Leainism, and, i n ad d it io n , a s i g n . that i t wantedno one t o m i s s i t s propaganda point.

t h e heavy- l ight ind us t ry heresy .l y t o h av e a vo id ed t h i s c h a r g e i n h i s conver sa t ions w i t h

f o r e i g n e r s , th ou gh h e f r e e l y ascribed other s i n s t o Malenkov.C e r t a i n l y , i t would have been Inco ngru ous i n Communist t e r m si f Malenkov had remained on t h e presidium a f t e r having beenp u b l i c l y s t igmat ized a s a " r i g h t d e v i a t i o n i s t 'I

P u b l i c l y a t l eas t , Malenkov was never t i e d d i r e c t l y t oHhrushchev seems del ibera te-

However,

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p a r t y m e m b e r s who were fami l ia r w i t h t h e c o n t e n t s of thec e n t r a l committee document on Malenkov 's res ignat ion were

t o l d t h a t "by h i s emphasis on l i g h t i n d u s t r y , h e advocatedslowing down t h e tempo of heavy in du s t ry con s t r uc t ion , "and "terged t h i s a r i g h t i s t deviat ion." Thus, t h e t h r e a tof f u r t p e r d i s g r a c e was l e f t hanging over Malenkov's head.

The Po l i t i c a l P roblem

p o l i c y c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h i n t h e Sovie t pres id ium.of t h e N ew Course had proven overambit ious. The inves tmentsqueeze which had developed brought t h e q u e s t i o n of p r i o r i t i e st o t h e f r o n t a nd i n d i c a t e d t h a t , as between heavy industry,defense , a gr ic ul tu re and consumer goods something had to

g iv e way. The approdch of a new Five-Pear P l a n pe r i od , t h e

impact of i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n ts an d s i g n i f i c a n t t e c h n ol o g ic a ldevelopments on Sovie t de fense needs , t o which might be

added t h e unknown q u a n t i t y of t h e USSR's economic commit-ment t o Communist China and other bloc m e m b e r s , a r e some of

t h e f a c t o r s which converged to demand a r ead jus tm en t ofpo l i cy then and these.

i

A t t h e ea8 of 1954 there w a s no l ack of subs tance f o rThe g o a l s

Whether t h e p o l ic y i s s u e s were i n them selves l a r g eenough and deep enough t o bring Malenkov down or whether ac o n f l i c t of p o l i t i c a l a mb it io ns w a s t h e rea l s t a r t i n g p o in t ,seems t o be s t i l l , three y e a r s l a t e r , a chicken-and-eggques t ion . I t remains a matter of s p e c u l a t i o n a s t o how deep-l y Malenkov w a s per son al l y committed t o t h e N ew Course and a st o whether h e car r i ed t h e i s s u e of i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n to apo in t f rom which i t was impossible t o r .e t re a t.leaders themselves had, of c o u r s e , t r i e d t o p i c t u r e "col-l ec t i v e l eade r sh ip" a s a well-oiled machine and t o minimizet h e l i k e l i h o o d of malfunct ions-csomet imes protes t ing a l i t t l et o o much.* However t h i s might be, i t w a s d i f f i c u l t no t t osee in t h e c i r cum s tances of Malenkov's resignat ion, w i t h i t sdegradi ng admission of incompetence, in h i s appointment t oa n i n f e r i o r p o st , a nd i n some of Khrushchev's comments t o

The S o v i e t

*A prime example of t h is i s Malenkov's resignat ion l e t t e r :"One may expect, he sa i d , " t h a t v a r i o u s b o u r ge o i s h y s t e r i c a lv i r a g o s w i l l busy themselves wi th s lar iderous inv en t io ns i nconnection w i t h my p r e s e n t s t a t e m e n t an d t h e f a c t i t s e l f ofmy release from t h e post of chairman of t h e USSR Council ofM in i s t e r s , bu t we--the Complunists and t h e Soviet people-w i l l i g n o r e t h i s l y ing and s l ander . "

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S



f o r e ig n d iplo m at s on t h e s u b j e c t , an e lement of p e r s o n a lanimosi ty and revenge. While t h e c i rcumstances of t h e

p o l i c y s h i f t may have c a l l e d f o r a high-ranking scapegoat ,t h e r e w a s , , none the less , a c o n t r a s t be tw een t h e t r e a tm en tof Yalenkov and the graceful e x i t from t h e M in i s t r y ofTrade ($4 January 1955) and subsequent promotion t o af i r s t deputy chairm anship of t h e Counci l of M i n i s t e r s (28February 1955) of Mikoyan, who had been hardly less con-cerned' i n t h e consumer goods program.

* ,

There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t M a le n k o v ' s p o l i t i c a ls t o c k had dec l in ed c ons id erab ly between March 1953 andJanua ry 1955 and t h a t Khrushchev's had r i s e n s h a r p l y .t h e t i m e of S t a l i n ' s d e a th , the re were s i g n s t h a t Malenkovw a s poised t o become t h e new So vie t aut oc ra t . H i s s t a r r i n gr o l e a t t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y c o n g r es s a f e w months ear l i e r had

seemed t o st.amp him a s S t a l i n ' s most l i k e l y heiq-. Two daysa f t e r S t a l i n ' s dea t h he w a s named premier of t h e new govern-ment. H e had become, a t t h e same t i m e , t h e s e n i o r m e m b e rof t h e p a r t y sec re ta r ia t . Whether f rom ha b i t o r under or-ders , t h e pres s began what appeared t o be a build-up of t h enew chief ta in , and on 10 Werrch Pravda publ ished i t s famouscropped photograph, which reduc-roup s c e n e t o t h et r i o of Malenkov, S t a l i n , an d Mao.

A t

On 21 March, however, t h e press announced t h a t on 14March a plenum of t h e c e n t r a l c om mi tt ee had acceptedMalenkov' s re s ig na t io n from th e se c r e t a r i a t .t h a t p o i n t became i t s rank ing m e m b e r . Malenkov suggestedt h e reason f o r t h i s change i n a speech t o t h e Supreme So-v i e t on 16 March; a source of s t r e n g t h .to t h e l e a d e r sh ip ,h e s a i d , w a s i t s " c o l l e c t i v i t y , " a poi l i t which n e i t h e r henor anyone else had thought to mention a t S t a l i n ' s f u n e r ala week ear l i e r . Sometime between these t w o dates, evident-l y , t h e members of t h e p r e sid iu m had been ob l iged t o s i tdown together to work o u t a n a rrangement f o r .the d iv i s io n ofpower. If any one event marked t h e beginning of Malenkov'sdescen t f rom t h e apex of power i t was tfais--the loss ors u r r e n d e r of h i s pre-eminent place in t h e p a r t y o r g a n iz a t i o n,w i t h i n which, a lm o s t e x c lu s iv e ly , he had made h i s mark throught h e kind of maneuver and manipulation which l eads t o poweri n t h e a re na of S o v i e t p o l i t i c s .

Khrushchev a t

l 9 l L S * . , , L *

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S F T



During March and t h e fol low ing months t h e governmentwas reorganized and a number of imp ortan t par ty po st s were

reassigned.>* The gu idi ng purp ose was t o ease t h e regimethrough iFs po s tn a ta l perio,d , bu t there were a l s o s i g ns ' ofpo l i t i ca g maneuver ing i n a'.number o f i r r e g u l a r i t i e s whichaccompapied t h e process . In March, A. I . Koelov, minis terof s t a t e farms, w a s appoin ted head of a conso l i da t ed a g r i -c u l t u r a l m i n i s t r y an d I . A. Benediktov, long- t ime minis terof p g r i c u l t u r e , w a s somewhat incongruously appointed am-bassador t o Iadda . Af te r t h e a r r e s t of Beria , however,Benediktov w a s reca l led from N ew D e lh i , and in Septemberwae named t o head a newly organized Minis t ry of Agr i cu l t u r ean d Procuremen ts. Kozlov w a s , a t t h e same t i m e , appoin tedt o t h e lesser pos t of m ini s te r of s t a t e farms. A l s o i nMarch, M. 2. Saburov, though re ta in ed on t h e pa r t y p r es i d iumt o w hich h e had been 'e l eva t ed a t t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y c o n gr e ss ,

w a s r e l i e v e d f r o m Gosplan, which he had headed since 1949,and appo in t ed mi n i s t e r of machine bui ld i ng . The t r an sf erw a s r eve r sed on 20 June, and he once aga in became Gosplanchairman. M. D. Bagi rov , par ty ch ie f i n t h e AserbaidzhanRepubl ic , w a s made a cand i da t e m e m b e r of t h e pa r t y p r es i d iumi n March onl y t o go down i n a Ju ly purge of B e r i a fo l lowers .In A p r i l , t h e re w a s a pa r ty shake-up i n B er i a ' s n a t i v eGeorgian Republic and, i n June, L. G. Melnikov w a s removeda s f i r s t s e c r e t a r y of t h e Ukrai n ian pa r t y , i n a move whichthere i s r ea s on t o b e l i e v e w a s engineered by Beria.

s u l t s t o a s i n g l e ca u se , b u t B er i a ' s hand w a s c lea r i n someof them and i t i s a l m o s t c e r t a i n that he w a s making a none-

t oo - sub t l e p l ay f o r power i n de f4ance of t h e new, unwrit tenr u l e s of " c o l l e c t i v e leadership."

I t i s probably not poss ib l e to t race all of t h e s e re-

A n ea r l i e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Beria w a s among t h echarges r e p o r t e d l y made a g a in s t Malenkov a t t h e January1955 plenum. There i s , indeed, some evidence po in t in g t o ana l l i ance be t ween t h e two a t v a r i o u s t i m e s in S t a l i n ' s l a t eyears, and t h e threat of i t s renewal may w e l l have alarmedt h e o t he r members of t h e pre sid ium . Malenkov, however, hadapp are nt ly h imse l f tu rned on Beria a nd r e p o r t e d l y j o i n e d i nt h e de c i s io n which le d t o Beria 's a r re s t and exec ution. Butw h i l e t h i s f a c t may have helped t o s a v e Malenkov from t o t a l

. . I

*The c i rcumstances in which t h e f i r s t p o s t - S t a l i n regime w a sformed and t h e ser ies of r eo rgan i za t i ons effected i n suc -ceeding months a re d i sc u s se d i n d e t a i l i n CAESAR 2.

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..

p o l i t i c a l e x t i n ct i o n i n 1955, t h e t h r e a t of subsequentdamaging reve la t ions w i t h respect t o h i s involvement i n

p o l i c e t e r r o r w a s ke pt a l i v e . When, f o r example, announce-ment w a s made i n December 1955 of t h e execut ion of formerMVD chief 'hbakumov, there *as a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e l a t t e r ' sc r i m i n a l' c o m p l i c it y i n a "Leningrad case." The pub l i c i m -p l ic a t io n of Malenkov i n t h e same case a f t e r h i s expuls ionfrom t h e p r es id i um i n J u ne 1 957 p l a i n l y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h eear3ier r e f e r e n c e had been a barb f o r Malenkov.

P o l i t i c a l n e u t r al i z a t i o n of t h e p o l i c e a nd a g e n e r a lloosening of t h e mechanism of r e p r e s s i o n c o n ti n u ed a f t e r

Beria 's arres t : i n l a t e June a new man w a s appoin ted t ohead t h e procuracy, and t he r e a f t e r p r o c e d u r a l r e v i s i o n swere i n t r o d u ce d t o l i m i t t h e power of that o r g a n i z a t i o n ; amop-up of Beria adherents began and t h e re w e r e f u r t h e r p u rg es

of h i g h p o l i c e o f f i c i a l s ; f i n a l l y , i n A p r il 1 954 a Committeeof S t a t e S e c u r i ty , presum ably s u b j e c t i n p r i n c i p l e t o c o l -l e g i a l c o n t r o l , w a s formed.

* I

But Beria ' s a r re s t removed t h e immediate t h r e a t t o"c ol le c t iv e l eadersh ip" and opened t h e way t o t h e formula-t i o n of new domestic po li ci e s. Within two months of Ber ia ' sa r r e s t Malenkov w a s b e f o r e t h e Supreme Soviet t o announcet h e N e w Course, The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of " c o l l e c t i v e lead-

e r s h i p " were by no means fi rm ly fi xe d , however, and t h e com-p e t i t i o n f o r power cont inued , though i n a more gradual andless v i o l e n t way. Malenkov had e v i d e n t l y reached h i s h ig hwater mark a t t h e August Supreme Soviet. By September,Khryshchev was e s t a b l i s h e d a s f i r s t s e c r e t a r y of t h e p a r t yand w a s busy lay ing down agr icu l$ura l pp l icy before a p a r t yplenum. Numerous changes i n pa r ty .personnel follo wed, ofwhich t h e most important w a s t h e November 1953 shake-up of

t h e Leningrad pa r ty organ iza t io n , over which Khrushchev him-self presi ded. The r e s u l t was t h e removal f r o m l eader sh ip

of t h e Leningrad organ iza t io n of V. M. Andrianov, possiblya Malenkov adherent, and h i s replacement by F. R. Kozlov,who subsequently emerged a s a Khrushchev par t isan. A t t h eFebruary-b krch 1954 plenum of t h e central commit tee Khru-shchev w a s a g a i n t h e spokesman on a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i cy - -t h ist i m e t h e N e w Lands program. In A p r i l h e p u t a n o t h e r f ea th e ri n h i s cap by addres s i ng t h e Supreme Soviet ,a governmentalbody, on equa l p ro t oco l t e r m s w i t h t h e premier, Malenkov.

The i n t r o d uc t i o n , i n J un e, of a l ph a b et i ca l l i s t i n g s of t h ele ad er s ' names, ending t h e previous prac t i ce of l i s t i n gMalenkov f i r s t , w a s i n k ee pi ng w i t h t h e f * c o l l e c t i v e f l dea,bu t a l s o a fo rm al iz at io n of Malenkov 's l o s s of precedence.Khrushchev had, i n t h e meant ime, begun t o accumulate pu bl ic i t y

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a n d p r e s t i g e f ro m h i s v i g o r o u s s tu mp in g on behalf of t h eN e w Lands program and had begun t o develop h i s own s t y l eof "ward-heeling." H i s appearances a t p a r t y c o n g r e s s e si n Warsaw and Prague i n t h e s p r i n g of 1954 and h i s t r i pt o P ei pi ng a s head 'of a S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n i n Se ptemb erwere f u d th e r i n d i c a t i o n s of h i s r i s i n g i m po rt an ce i n t h eSov ie t ' h i e ra rchy . By t h e end of 1954 he w a s r e c e i v i n ge x te n si v e n o t i c e ' i n t h e S o v i e t press p a r t l y on t h e basisof sheer a c t i v i t y an d p a r t l y , i t seems, on t h e basis of a no f f i c i a l l y i n s p i r e d b uild -u p. The l a t t e r w a s e s p e c i a l l ye v i d e n t i n an attempt t o ma gn ify r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y h i s andBulgan in ' s pe r sona l r o l e s in t h e w a r a t t h e expense oft h e S t a t e Defense Committee, of which both Malenkov andS t a l i n had been m e m b e r s . * In December h e gave t h ep r i n c i p a l addres s t o a c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n f e r e n c e h e l d i nMoscow, thu s, a pp ar ent ly, la yi ng pu bl ic claim t o a u t h o r i t y

i n a n area o u t s i d e a g r i c u l t u r e .

Fear of Malenkov's am bi ti on s may have a s s i s t e d t h er a p i d p o l i t i c a l a s c e n t of a man who seemed a compara t ive lysecondary f ig ur e i n M arch 1953. In view of w h a t h e hasshown s i n c e in t h e way of as se r t iv en es s and p o l i t i c a l s k i l li t must now seem unl ike ly , however , that h i s b a c k i n g i n i t i a l -l y d e r i ve d s im pl y from a n u r g e i n t h e p r e si d iu m t o set upa buffer against Malenkov. With t h e p a r t y a s f o o t i n g a ndh i s own na t i v e boldness a s a c l u b , h e began t o c h a l l e n g eMalenkov's primacy a t a v e r y e a r l y s tage and, when t h e chal-l e n g e had succeeded, w a s ab l e t o make h i s own views onp o l i c y s t i c k .

The c o n f l i c t betw een t h e two men s,eems t o have beenfought o ut t o some e x t e n t in t e r h of r i v a l claims to com-p e t e nc e an d a u t h o r i t y on t h e p a r t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s ofp a r t y and government. I n p a r t , t h i s w a s probably a r e s u l tof a n a t u r a l t en de nc y of each to use t h e weapons a t hand,b u t i t was a p p a r e n t l y c o n v e r te d a l o n g t h e way into a p o l i t i -c a l a nd i d e o l o g i c a l i s s u e . Thus, i t i s reported, Khru-shchev complained t o a f o r ei g n er i n a r c h 1955, t h a t Malen-kov had t r i e d t o run th i ng s th rough t h e government a ppara tusra the r than through t h e p a r t y . T h i s w a s a lso t h e implica-t i o n of Bulganin ' s pledge, i n a c ce p ti n g t h e premiership , t h a t" t h e Council of M i n i s t e r s w i l l a l s o i n t h e f u t u r e f a i t h f u l l yc a r r y o ut t h e policy worked out by t h e Communist party."

. *Beginning w i t h a 5 March 1954 Trud a r t i c l e commemorating-S t a l i n ' s d e a t h .

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Khrushchev undoubtedly profi ted from a po l i cy des ignedt o " reac t iva te" th e par ty --a po l i cy which he n a t u r a l l y d i de v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e

t opromote. August 1953

w a st h e f i r s t

and l a s t t i m e that, major p o l i c y was e n u n c i a t e d i n i t i a l l ybefore t h e Supreme Soviet- thereafter , and w i t h i n c r e a s i n gfrequency, t h e c e n t r a l committee provided the- foru m when-e v e r th'e regime s a w f i t t o d i s c u s s i t s i n t e n t i o n s o u t s id et h e pres idium.

2 .

There were good r easons , both theore t i ca l a n d p r a c t i c a l ,behind t h e pol i cy . The regime not only needed 8 s u b s t i t u t efor t h e p r i m i t i v e ( b u t, in i t s way, ef fe c t iv e ) symbol oft h e "vozhd" represented by S t a l i n , b u t it a l s o needed ac le a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l c ha nn el f o r t h e t r ansm iss ion of t h e au-t h o r i t y v e s te d i n t h e c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e . The v a r i o u s i n s t r u -ments of c o n t r o l a nd < p e r s u a s i o nhad been personal ized by

S t a l i n and t h e d i s t i n a t i o n s b etween them had become, t osome ex te nt , blu rre d. Moreover, a f t e r h i s d e a t h , t h e scopeof p o l i c e a u t h o r i t y had been l i m i t e d . P a r t l y a s a r e s u l tof t h i s , t h e army gained importance a s a r e s e r v e of c o e r c i o nand its p r es t i g e increased. But t h e par ty , though i t s s p i r i tof u n i q u e n e s s a n d i n i t i a t i v e had been dampened under Stalin,had the whole weigh t of t heory and l eg i t im a cy on i t s s i d e .I t had i n Khrushchev, moreover, 8 f i r s t sec re ta ry who wouldprod i t i n t o e x e r c i s i n g i t s r i g h t s a nd would f o r c e f u l l y re -asser t i t s primacy i n S o v i e t l i f e .

A New Tone t o Po l i cy

With t h e e v e n t s of January-February 1955 t h e New Course

T he change was a l so r e f l e c t e d i n a r e a l l o c a -phra ses about f or c i ng t h e development of l i g h t i n d u s t r y p as se di n t o o b li v io n .t i o n of r e s ou r c es i n t h e 1955 budget, announced t o t h e Feb-r u a r y s e s s i o n of the Supreme Soviet.

The fac tors of economic growth, defense preparedness ,popular morale, and labor p r o d u c t i v i t y were still in terdepend-e n t , however, even though t h e Bulganin government had dec i ded ,in ef fec t , to e n t e r t h e c i r c l e s a t a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t. Thep r e s s u r e for r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e economy, and, w i t h t h emovement away from t h e S t a l i n i s t m ethod of v i r t u a l l y un d il ut e dc o e r c i o n , t h e need f o r some accommodation t o t h e popularu r g e for a "bet ter deal"--an improved d i e t , bet ter housing,a more e q u i t a b l e r e t u r n on l a b o r , a n d m o r e le isure--remained

t o be d e a l t with . I n succeeding months t h e Bulganin govel'n-ment int rodu ced a.number of new measures which looked i n t h a td i rec tion.

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S



....

As b e f o r e , t h e regime's dom es t i c goa l s cond i t ionedand were cond i t io ned by i t s f o r e i g n p o l i cy . The c r e a t i o nof a n in t e r n a t i o n a l s e t t i n g which would permit t h e exten-sion of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e w i t h ou t t h e r i s k of nuclear warremained/,,A prime 0bjective;of t h a t po l i cy . Af t e r a b r i e fi n t e r l u d e i n which t h e r e were signs of a r e v e r s i o n t o t h eo l d g l o w e r i n g i n f l e x i b i l i t y , a new pe ri od of d iplom aticmaneuver opened, character ized by a g r ea t e r boldness andm obi l i t y than th e p reced ing one . The a d d i t i o n of t h e wordl l cohpe t i t i ve" . to t h e phrase "peace fu l coex i s t ence" w a s ar e v e a l i n g e x p r e s s io n of a n e w s t r a i n in Sovie t t h inking-a bel ief t h a t s u c c e s s came from a s p i r i t of i n i t i a t i v e andagg ress ive se l f -conf idence -- in which t h e Khrushchev person-a l i t y shows through. Within a h a l f y e a r t h e Khrushchev-Bulganin team had undertaken two major v e n t u r e s - - t h e v i s i t st o Be lg rad e and Geneva--and had begun in e a r ne s t t o seek

a f o o t ho l d i n t h e Middle E a s t , a11 of which, though noti n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e "peaceful coexis tence" of t h e Malenkovgovernment , represented a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n s i o n of t h a tpo l i cy .

Economic Readjustment i n 1955 e

l o c a t i o n s t o t h e economy. Allocations t o t h e heavy indus t ryse c t o r went up t o 101.2 b i l l i o n r u b l e s , a n i n c r e a s e of ap-proximate ly 27 p e r c e n t o v e r p l a n n e d a l l o c a t i o n s in 1954,a l though budge t expend i tu res wi th i n t h e o v e r - a l l c a t e g o r y"Financing t h e National Economy'' were t o r i se by onl y about2.8 percen t above t h e l e v e l p l a nn ed f o r 1954 (approximately

4.2 p e r c e n t a bo ve a c t u a l e x p e n d i t u r e s in 1954). Direct out-l a y s from t h e budget f o r de fense 'were to i n c r e a s e by n e a r l y12 b i l l i o n rub les , an i n c r e a s e of abou t 12 pe rcen t . A t t h esame t i m e , a l l o c a t i o n s t o l i g h t i n d u s t r y were t o be reducedfrom a p lanned 12.6 b i l l i . on ru b l es i n 1954 t o 10.6 b i l l i o nr u b l e s . I n a b s o l u t e terms t h i s w a s n o t a s h a r p r e d u c t i o n ,e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e 1 95 5 p la nn ed a l l o c a t i o n is measured againstt h e amount which was a c t u a l l y u se d u p in 1954. I t has beenpointed out , however, t h a t must pr op er ly compare, no t1955 w i t h 1954, but 1955 w i t h what 1955 sho uld have been i ft h e pos t -S ta l in economic po l i c i e s had been pursued." If t h i sy a r d s t i c k i s used, t h e change i n em phas is shows c l e a r l y .

The 1955 budget reve aled a s h i f t i n t h e p a t t e r n of a l -

Figures on t h e r e l a t i v e ra t e s of growth of t h e producer

and consumer goods sec to rs in 1955 shows an even more pro-nounced change than w a s f o r e t o l d i n t h e budget. The upwardr e v i s i o n of t h e annua l p roduc t ion t a r ge t s , under taken a f t e rt h e over -a l l p roduct ion goa l s of t h e F i f t h Five-Year Plan

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i

had been m e t i n May, appare n t ly p l aced add i t io na l em phas ison heavy indus t ry .

volume of ou tpu t of producer goods in cr ea se d by approximate-l y 15 percen t a s compared w i t h a n i n c r e a s e of approximate-l y 8 peqcent in consumer goods ou tpu t , whereas i n t h e pre-

ceding; two years t h e ra tes of growth i n t h e two sec torshad been near ly equal . (see f o o t n o t e , p. 811

In con junc t ion w i t h t h e cutback in l i g h t i n du s tr y , t h e,&me acted to constract pur cha sin g power--by en la rg in gt h e budget su rp lu s and by canc el ing some of t h e f i s c a l c on-ces s i o s s gran ted dur ing t h e preceding two years . The s t a t el o a n was upped t o th e pre-1953 le ve l and t h e pr ice reduc-t i o n s g r a n t e d a n n u al l y s i n c e 1 94 7 were w i t h h e l d .

On t h e heels o f ' t h e s h i f t i n economic emphasis a re-

vi si on of propaganda formulas took place . The press con-t i n u e d t o t hu nd er i n t e r m i t t e n t l y a g a i n s t t h e economic "here-t ic s" f o r se ve ra l months, but , in t h e meantime, t h e e n t i c i n gphrases of t h e N e w Course had been un ive r sa l ly replaced bya guarded promise of lla fur ther development of t h e l i g h t andfood indus t ry . t1

reduced t b e consumer * s expec ta t ions t o a more r easonab lel e v e l . I t does-not fol low from t h i s , however, t h a t t h e re-gime had come t o r e j ec t e n t i r e l y t h e New Course assumptiont h a t increased consumption w a s important t o h ig h e r laborproductivi ty and improved morale.t h e new p oli cy and t h e one which had preceded it w a s , a t

l ea s t i n t h e abs t rac t , more one pf t im ing than of i n t e n t(a l though t h e p o l i c y debate d i d not have t o be any t h e l e s sheated for t h a t ) ; and there i s r e a so n t o s up po se t h a t t h eregime regarded consumption a s something which could bepostponed but not permanently ignored. In a conver sa t ionw i t h a West erne r i n Moscow, Khrushchev us ed t h e word "pre-mqturel' t o describe t h e Malenkov government's emphasis on

consumer goods but went on t o pr e d i ct t h a t "a second ort h i r d f i ve - y e a r p l a n fr om now" would see l i g h t i n d u s t r ygrow a t a more rapid r a te than heavy.

An i n t e r e s t i n g s i d el i g h t on t h i s can be found in aPravda a r t i c l e of 27 March. Apparently t h e new l i n e w a s in-terpreted i n some overz ealou s q ua rt er s t o mean t h a t consump-

t i o n w a s v i r t u a l l y anathema. The Pravda a r t i c l e , w r i t t e n b yOstrovityanov, one of t h e regime's-conomic spokesmen,s e t t h e r ec o rd s t r a i g h t f o r these people , too , and, in t h eprocess , gave one of the f u l l e s t e x p o s i t i o n s of t h e t h i n k i n g

According t o Sovie t s t a t i s t i c s t h e

r

In both word and deed, t h e r e f o r e , t h e government had

The d i f fe re nc e be tween

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. .. .

which under l ay t h e po l i cy change t o a p pe a r i n t h e S o v i e tpress. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g a l s o b e ca us e of i t s i m p l i c i t

d e f e n s e of t h e New C o u r s e ' s i n t e n t :

Soy$'et public opinion, has f i r m l y condemned t h eant i -Marxis t r eason ing of c e r t a in econom is t swlio deny t h e l a w of preponderant development ofheavy in du s t ry under socialism. However, therehave been foun d ec ono mist s who too k t h i s c r i t i -

c cism dogm at i ca l ly , ped an t i c a l ly , and went t o t h eopposi te ext reme.on t h e par ty and government dec is ions on expand-i n g p r o d u c ti o n of consumer goods, on a sh a rp ad-

vance i n ag r i c u l tu re , on fu r th e r development of

t h e l i g h t and food i n d u s t r i e s i n p r op or ti on t ot h e growth in r a w ma.ter ia1 res our ces produced by

a g r i c u l t u r e .

They began t o mainta in s i le n ce

These economists are i g n o r a n t of t h e f a c t t ha tt h e requi rements of t h e object ive economic l a wof preponderant growth of produc t ion of t h e meansof productio n can be m e t on ly on c o n d i t i o n t h a tthere i s pro por t io na l development of a l l branchesof p roduct i on .I n t h e course of t h e development of t h e s o c i a l i s teconomy i nd iv id ua l branches may l a g , a s a con-sequence of which p a r t i a l d i s p r o p o r t i o n s a r i s ei n t h e economy. To e l i m i n a t e these d i sp ropor -t i o n s t h e l agg ing b ranches , i n so fa r a s t h e neces-

s a r y material p r e r e q u i s i t e s a re cqeated, mustdevelop a t fo rced pace f o r a c e r t a i n p er i o d oftime. B u t thi by no means cont radic ts t h e f a c t

ment of t h e s o c i a l i s t economy i s t h e l a w of pre-

ponderant growth of t h e means of production.

1

t h e f i r m b a s i s of t h e gen era l l i n e of develop-

Cont inua t ion of t h e A g r i c u l t u r a l E f f o r t

in a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n b udg et a l l o c a t i o n s t o t h a t s e c t o ri n 1955.ab l e p r o p o r t i o n of the t o t a l (see f o o t n o t e , p. 12). Agri-c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , i n . ge n er a l, now had f o u r p ri ma ry f e a t u r e s ,

o u t l i n e d by Khrushchev a s follows:m u s t be i n c r e a s e d , h a r v e s t i n g l o s s e s decreased, v i r g i n a n di d l e l a n d s reclaimed and t h e area sown t o corn cons ide rab lyexpanded. *'

The search f o r a firmer a g r i c u l t u r a l base w a s r e f l e c t e d

The N e w Lands program aga in accounted f o r a size-

" y i e l d s i n a l l a r e a s

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.

T h i s l a s t , a program t o i n c r e a s e t h e area sown t o c or nfrom 10,000,000 acres t o 40,000,000 acres dur in g 1955 and t o

70,000,000 acres by 1960, was a n o th e r d e v i c e f o r i n c r e a si n gt h e supply o f l i ves t ock foqder . In t roduced by Khrushcheva t t h e Gnuary plenum of t h e ce n t ra l comm it tee, t h e corn

prograq', l i k e t h e N e w Lands program, matched t h e prospectof a qu ick r e tu rn aga ins t t he econom ic r i s k involved overt h e longer run. And l i k e t h e earl ier v e n t u r e i t seems to

havp had behi,nd i t b o th t h e a u t h o r i t y a nd personal i n t e r e s tof Khrushchev: Spea king t o t h e c e n t r a l committee of h i sr e p u b l i c on 15 February 1955, Ukrainian party leader Kiri-chenko descr ibed i t a s though i t were Khrushchev's personalp r o j e ct , s t a t i n g t h a t "The sp read i n eve ry po ss i b l e way ofco rn growing, a s i s known t o many of you, has long beent h e dream of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. He helped u s t ounders tand t h e great ' importaace of corn growing for t h e na-

t i ona1 economy

.t

c u l t i v a t i o n w a s r e i n f o r c e d , d u r i n g t h e s p r i n g of 1955, by anumber of r e g i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l c o n fe r en c es .on hand t o make lo ng speeches which stressed t h e regime'si n s i s t e n c e on immediate implementation of t h e new agricul-t u r a l d i r e c t i v e s. Resor t w a s a l s o had t o t h e i n c e n t i v e sdevice : a decree of 21 May 1955 made i t poss i b l e f o r t h ep ea sa nt t o r e c e i v e u p t o 1 5 percent of t h e harves t ed co rnc r o p i n g r a in o r s i l age .

An ex te ns iv e propaganda campaign i n su pp or t of corn

Khrushchev was

Revi s ion of Agr i cu l tu ra l P lann ing

t o g r i ps w i t h t h e problem of ove rce n t r a l i z a t io n and ove rbu re au cr at iz at io n of t h e economy. Under t h e Malenkov govern-ment t h i s had produced l e g i s l a t io n designed to reduce t h es i z e of t h e adm in i s t r a t i ve appara tus and t h e volume of paperwork; t o e f f eo t some d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n t h e e conomic s t r u c -t u r e t h r o u g h t h e cr ea t i on of Union-Republican mi ni s t r i es i na number of i n d u s t r i e s which had t here to fo re been managedfrom t h e c e n t e r ; a nd t o g i v e e x e c u t i v es below t h e t o p some-w h a t greater a u t h o r i t y i n p l a n f o rm u la t io n .admitted t h a t t h e topheaviness of t h e economic s t ruc turewas a n ob s ta c le t o f l e x i b i l i t y a nd i n i t i a t i v e a nd t h a t thesee f f e c t s were e s p e c i a l l y p e r n i c i o u s i n a g r i c u l t u r e .

Ever since S t a l i n ' s d e a t h the regime had t r i e d t o come

he press f r e e l y

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A t t h e February-March 1954 plenum of t h e c e n t r a l com-mittee, Khrushchev had declared:

Loca? personqel a re q u i t e correc t i n r a i s i n g t h equqs t ion t h a t our p lahning is too c e n t r a l i z e d .Th$s preven t s t h e u t i l i z a t i o n of e x i s t i n g op-p o r t u n i t i e s , hampers t h e c r e a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e oft h e c o l l e c t i v e farmers and weakens t h e i r per sona l

, s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s i n g yields....We s h ou lde s t a b l i s h a planning procedure which would re-t a i n p la nn ed s t a t e guidance over t h e developmentof a g r i c u l t u r e a t t h e same t i m e that i t releasedl o c a l i n i t i a t i v e .

Malenkov had a l s o addressed h imse l f t o t h e s u b j e c t in aspeech to t h e A p r i l 1954 s e s s i o n of t h e Supreme Soviet, where

h e declared tha t t h e c e n t r a l p la n n in g a g en c i e s attempted toencompass to o much d e t a i l "wi thout the r e q u i s i t e knowledgeof d i v e r s e local c o n d i t i o n s and po te nt ia l" and "such p lanningcreates d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e work of l o c a l areas a nd b i n d s t h ei n i t i a t i v e of l o ca l agencies."

With these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in mind t h e c e n t r a l committeeand t h e Council of M i n i s te r s i s s u e d a j o i n t decree on 9 March,"On Revising t h e Pract ice of Planning Agri cul tu re." The e f -f e c t of t h e decree, i n b r i e f , w a s t o a b o l i s h t h e prac t ice ofs e t t i n g both t h e ou tpu t t a rge t s a nd p r o d uc t i on p a t t e r n f o reach a g r i c u l t u r a l u n i t f r o m t h e center . Thencefor th , a l -though t h e d e l i v e r y q u o t a s were still t o be c e n t r a l l y de-

termined, t h e c o l J e c t i v e a nd s t a t e farms were t o work o u t

fo r them se lves t h e p a t t e rn . o f u t + l i z a t i o n of acreage andherds . I t w a s speci f ied , however , that t h i s was t o be donei n c o n su l ta t io n w i t h t h e YTS and w a s t o be s u b j e c t t o reviewby t h e lo c a l governmental organs.

Although i t gave some encouragement t o l o ca l i n i t i a t i v e ,p r o v i s i o n was a l so made f o r e n s ur i ng c o n t r o l from t h e c e n t e rw i t h t h e announcement on 5 A p r i l that a new urban levy w a s t obe rai sed and s h i f t e d t o t h e count rys ide . By J u l y 1955, ac-cord ing t o Pravda, 30,000 "experienced members of party, gov-ernment, bu- and e ng in ee ri ng -t ec hn ic al s t a f f s , an d manualand o f f i c e worke rs fvwere to be ass igned t o t h e cha i rm ansh ipsof backward c o l l e c t i v e farms. - This meant th a t ne a r ly onet h i r d of a l l c o l l e c t i v e farms w e r e t o be given new chairmen;

on t h e premise, as Khrushchev put it i n t y p i c a l f a s hi o n , t h a t" i f there i s a real organ ize r a t t h e head of e ve ry c o l l e c t i v ef a r m w e w i l l be a b l e I t o b r i n g any f a r m up t o t h e l e v e l of anadvanced farm w i t h i n a sh0r.C t i m e . " Although some p r o v i s i o n

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was made f o r t h e t r a i n i n g of t h e new chairmen and t h e i ro r d e rl y i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e f ar ms ,* f a m i l i a r i t y

with andhave be e qa more Ampor tan t c r i t e r ion of s e l e c t i o n th ana g r i c u l F u r a 1 e x p e r t i s e .Grigor,ev, who was conver ted f r o m d i s t r i c t p r o s ec u t o r t ochairman of a c o l l e c t i v e f a rm i n t h e Moscow Oblas t . Hewas he ld up as a model of t h e new type of chairman by Krhu-shTchev a t a l o ca l a g r i c u l t u r a l co nf er en ce , m os tl y itseems, on t h e s t r e n g t h of a s p ee c h wh ich f a i t h f u l l y p a r-r o t e d t h e l a t t e r ' s own i deas on a g r i c u l t u r e .

L i m i t e d as t h i s r e v i s i o n of o a g r i c u l t u r a lp r a c t i c e w a s ,the re can be s e e n in i t t h e germs of t h e much broader schemeof economic dec en tr a l iz a t io n under taken l a t e r , i n 1957. Theregime had been confronted for some t i m e w i t h t h e problem

of more r a t i o n a l o r g a ni z a t io n and there were s i g n s i n 1955t h a t i t was even the n mull ing over f ur th er changes . Pravdarepo r ted i n May, f o r example, that a t a n i n d u s t r i a l con-f e r e nc e i n Moscow "Comrade Khrushchev devoted much a t t e n st i o n . . . t o q u e s t i o n s of planning.necessa ry t h a t w e p la n p r o d u ct i o n n o t o n ly on a nationwides c a l e b u t a l s o ac c o r d in g t o p a r t i c u l a r economic r e g io n s ,making wider u s e o f a l l t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . "

Along s i m i l a r l i n e s , R u lg a n in t o l d t h e J u l y 1955 plenumof t h e c e n t r a l committee:

The pr i nc ip a l shortcoming i n t h e a c t i v i t y of o u rm i n i s t r i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o l e a d e r s h ip of i n d u s t r y

c o n s i s t s in t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y d o , l i t t l e work ont h e d i r e c t o r ga n iz a ti o n of p r od u ct i on , b u t d i r e c tt h e p l a n t s , f a c t o r i e s an d mines t h a t come undert h e i r sp he re s of competence f r o m t h e i r o f f i ce s ,making use of a l a rge and mul t i l eve l appara tus . . . .

r e s p o ns iv e ne s s t o t h e regime's purposes seems t o

A. 'cas e i n p o i n t i n a c e r t a i n

\

!

H e p o in t e d out that i t was

If t h e q u a l i t y of t h e i n d u s t r y ' s l e a d e r s h i p is t obe improved, t h e a d m in i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a tu s m ust be

brought c lo se r t o p r od u c ti o n .. .

*The selectees were t o t a k e c o u r s e s l o c a l l y a nd t o work f o r

a t r i a l p e r i o d on t h e c o l l e c t i v e farms. If t h i s had not pre-pared them adequa te ly they migh t be a s s i g n e d f o r a t i m e a sa s s i s t a n t c h a i r m e n a n d , if s t i l l unaccep tab le , even tua l ly re-j ec t ed a l o g e ther .

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... x c e s s i v e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n h a s a r i s en i n t h e lead-e r s h i p of i n d u s t r y . A grea t number of e n t e r p r i s e s

a re d i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e u n io n m i n i s t r i e s ,a l t h o u g h t h e , r e p u b l i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d s u cc e ss -f u l l y c a r r y o ut t h e g$idance of them, Such cen-t r a l i z a t i o n is n o t b e n e f i c i a l . On t h e one hand,i t ' h inder s t h e org ani za t ion of op er a t i ve and con-crete management of e n t e r p r is e s , and, on t h e o t h e rhand, it diminishes t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of r e p u b li ceconomic; #partya nd s o v i e t o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r t h ework of i ndus t ry . . ,

M in is t r i e s must dec i s iv e ly decrease t h e t y p e s ofitems produced by ind iv idua l - en te r p r i se s , f rees p e c i a l i z e d e n t e r p r i s e s from turn ing out produc-t i o n f o r which they a re no t in t ended , c r e a t e new

spe c ia l i ze d en t e r p r i se s and expand coopera t ion in -s i d e and among minis t r ies , bear ing in mind t h e in-te res ts of in di vi du al economic areas.

The Search for N e w Economic Stimulants

In May t h e government convened an in d u s t r i a l conferen cein Moscow a t which Premier Bulganin presented a genera l re-view of t h e per spec t ives o f t h e in d u s t r ia l economy. H e pro-posed se ve ra l i nnova t ions which supplemented t h e ea r l i e r meas-u r e s f o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n an d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e o r g a n iz a t i o nand were p r i m a r i l y des igned t o m e e t t h e 'problem of u n s a t i s -f a c t o r y l a b o r p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d a diminishing labor pool , Thea p p r o p r i a t e en ab l in g l e g i s l a t i o n was enacted by t h e presidium

of t h e Supreme Soviet l a t e r i n the month.

Increased labor produc t iv i ty , Bu lgan in t o l d t h e conference,was v i t a l t o fu r t he r economic g rowth. A key to t h i s i n c r e a s ewas t echno log ica l p rogress and h e cal led for t h e modernizationof Sov ie t i ndus t ry , w i t h stress on mechanization, automation,and t echno log ica l i nnovat ion i n t h e product ion process .There was, he i n d i c a t e d , a widespread tendency among industr ialmanagers t o seek s a f e ty i n f a mi l i a r ways and, consequently, ar e s i s t a n c e to change. Among s c i e n t i s t s and tec hno log is t s t h e r ewas i n s u f f i c i e n t a p p r e c i a t i o n of Western advances--a hol dov er,a l though h e d i d n o t say so, from t h e xenophobia of S t a l i n ' sl a s t years .Committee on N e w Technology be s e t up under t h e USSR Council

of M inis t e rs - -thus r ec rea t ing an o rgan i za t ion which had existedfrom 1948 u n t i l 1951 when i t w a s absorbed into Gosplan. Thecommittee (Gostekhnika) was f o r m a l ly es t ab l i shed , under t h echairmanship of t h e l a t e V. A. Malyshev by a decree of 28 my

To remedy these d e f e c t s h e proposed t h a t a S t a t e

. . I

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I

1955. I t s assignment w a s t o draw up current and long-rangep l a n s f o r a d v an ci ng S o v i e t t e ch no lo gy , t o d e v i s e i n c e n t i v e s

t o and means f o r p ropaga t ing t echn ica l i nn ova t ions (bo thhome-grown and for ,e ig n) , an d t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e e f f o r t s oft h e m i n i s t r i e s: i n t h i s sph$re..

f e rence , was 'to undergo a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n des igned to over-come two major weaknesses:t h a 3 i t f r e q u e nt l y f a i l e d t o prov ide p roduc t ion un i t s w i t hannual t a r ge t s u n t i l t h e p l an p er io d w a s under way, and,

converse ly , it w a s so preoccupied w i t h c u r r e n t b u s i n e ss t h a tit tended t o lo s e long- term per spec t ive . Accordingly , Gos-p lan was t o be d i v i d e d i n t o a S t a t e Commission f o r C urrentPlanning (Gosekonomkommissiya) and a Sta t e Commission on

Long-Range Plan ning < r e t a i n i n g t h e t i t l e Gosplan).

proposal became law on 25 May. Gosekonomkommissiya, underA!. Z . Saburov, who had been chairman of t h e combined or-g a n i z a t i o n , , w a s g i ve n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for drawing up t h eannual p lans an d oversee ing t h e i r breakdown in t o qu ar te r l yand monthlly s e ct io ns , and, a l so , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a s s u r i n gt h e even p roduc t ion and d i s t r ibu t ion of materials and equip-ment thro ug hou t t h e economy. The new Gosplan, under N. K.Baibakov, who had been minis ter of t h e o i l i nd u st ry , assumedr e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' for t h e f ive -yeas p l ans ; f o r fo rm ula t ion long-er t e r m p l a n s f o r t h e development of key sectors such a s f u e land power; and, more gene ra l l y, f o r gauging fu t u r e economicprospec t s w i t h a view t o de termining "a t w h a t time t h e var iousbranches of /Zovie tJ indus t ry w i l l o v e r t a k e the most advancedc a p i t a l i s t c %m tr iS s in per capi ta production."

Thb p lann ing appara tus , Bulganin ind i ca t ed t o t h e con-

t h e mechanism w a s so cumbrous

The

This p rocess of organieationa1 markpu l ation continuedw i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of an ot he r new committee--the S t a t e Commit-te e f o r Labor and Wages of t h e USSR Council 0f Minis ters underL. M. Kaganovich, who had he ld a v a r i e t y of economic p o s t s i nh i s l o n g p a r t y career and w a s , l i k e Sabusov, a member of t h epa r t y presid ium. Crea t ion of t h e committee w a s a n a d d i t i o n a lresponse to t h e problems of u n s a t i s f a c t o r y l abor p r o d u c t i v i t ya n d u n d e s i r a b l e m o b i l i t y i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e . I t s task wast o u nd er ta ke t h e f i r s t c om pr eh en si ve r e v i s i o n , s i n c e 1 93 1,of t h e wage system. A s Bulganin pointed out a t t h e J u l yplenum, t h e system had become over t h e years something of ac r a z y q u i l t of f r e q u e n t l y r e v i s e d a nd o f t e r d i s p a ra t e norms,compl ica ted schedules of bonuses and piece ra tes , and d i d n o t

t a ke account of techn olog ica l change.



Renewed Diplomatic Activity

Aga ins t a backdrop of inc rea sed mi l i ta ry spending and apropaganda a t tack ,on t h e Paris Agreements which had produceda good d5ya1of t ru cu l en t l anguage, there was a s u s p i c i o nou t s ide ; . t h e USSR t h a t t h e a c c e s s i o n of t h e Bulganin govern-ment foreboded a-harder l i n e i n S o vi et f o r e i g n p ol ic y.was t h e obvious ascendancy of Khrushchev par t icular ly re-a s s y r h g , s i n c e h e h ad , t i l l then, g iven t h e appearance ofa b e l l i c o s e " d o c t r a i n a i r e " who lacked Malenkov 's subt le tyand f l e x i b i l i t y . T h i s impress ion w a s s t r eng thened , on t h eday t h e new government was announced, by Molotov's h a r s hf o r e i g n p o l i c y r e p o r t t o t h e Supreme Soviet.on t o p of the oSber charges of Western a ggre ss iv enes s andbad f a i t h , c o n t a i n e d h a r d l y o ne c o n c i l i a t o r y phrase, andw a s capped by a boast of S o v i e t n u c l e a r s u p e r i o r i t y .

Nor

It heaped one

- A t t h e same t i m e , however, t h e r e were s i g n s at var i ancew i t h t h i s p i c t u r e of renewed in t ra ns ig ence . J u s t before t h eSupreme Soviet m e t , t h e H e a r s t pa rt y, the n i n Moscow, wasunexpectedly informed tha t it could interview Khrushchev,Bulganin, Molotov and Zhukov. Some of t h e i n t e r v i e w s t oo kplace b e f o r e t h e 8 February Supreme Soviet session and somea f t e r , bu t i t soon became a p p a r e n t t h a t t hey were ar rangedw i t h a m e y e t o b al an ci ng t h e impress ion which t h e government-al change and Molotov*s speech might crea te i n t h e West. A t

tha t j u n c t u r e , t h e Hearst par ty p rov ided a convenient mediumof communication w i t h t h e non-Communist world. The commentswhich the in terv iews produced were co ns i s t e n t ly m oderate andseemed t o have a s i ng le purpose -to a s su re t h e West that t h e

USSR w a s s t i l l i n t e r e s t e d i n " pe ac ef ul F o ex i st e nc e .member of t h e Hearst group has o f fe re d t h i s exp lana t ion :

I t h i n k t h e S o v i e t leaders wanted t o o f f s e t t h r o u g hc o n c i l i a t o r y s t a t em e n ts t o u s t h e e f f e c t of t h ev i o l e n t a t t a c k s which they decided Fore ign Minis terMolotov and Premier Bulganin must make against t h eUnited S ta t e s i n t he Supreme Sov ie t .

I b e l i e v e t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h o se a t t a c k s a g a i n s tu s w a s prompted by a desire to o f f e r t h e Russianpeop le a scapegoat f o r t h e d e c i s i o n t o c u r t a i lt h e produc t ion of consumer goods i n ord er t o con-c e n t r a t e o n ce a g a in on heavy industry.

One

In mid-January t h e Sov ie t ambassadors t o France , GreatB r i t a i n , t h e U ni te d S t a t e s , a n d E a s t Germany and t h e Sovie th i g h commissioner f o r Au st r i a had been reca l led to Moscow. Very

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S*T



p r ob a bl y S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t concernedWestern Europe, w a s undergo ing r e-examina t ion i n t he l i g h t

of cur re nt domest ic and in te rn at io na l developments. Thed ive rgence b i? tween, the a t t i t u d es d i sp lay ed i n t h e Heasst i n -terviews,$nd before the Supreme Soviet may have meant t h a t :

c r o s s - c u r r e n t s were a t work w i t h i n t h e regime and t h a t itwas f a d i n g a ch oi ce between "hard" and "sof t*f l i n e s of pollicy.

However, t h e adamancy and "sa bre -ra t t l i ng" dis pla yed be-

A f u r t h e r t h r ea t w a s con ta ined in r e i t e r a t e d h i n t s t h a tGerman rearmament would preclude further negotiat ion betweent h e USSR and t h e West on European problems. In t h e midst ofthese t i rades , however, there were s i g n s that t h e USSR was

a l r e a d y p r e p ar i ng f o r t h e next d ip lomat ic phase.a r y it pu t forward r e v i s e d p r o p o s a ls on al l-German elect ionsand ca l l ed f o r t h e es tabl i shment of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s be-tween i t s e l f and t h e G er maQ Federal Republic. On 25 Januaryt h e Presidium of t h e Supreme Soviet formally ended the s t a t eof w a r w i t h both pa r t s of Germany. A h i n t of another Sovie ti n i t i a t i v e was con ta ined i n M olo tov' s s t a t em ent on Austriab e f o r e the Supreme Soviet on 8 February, which f o r e t o l d then e g o t i a t i o n s which l e d t o t h e signing of a n Austrian Treatyon 15 May. Even Molotov, presumably , was reckoning with t h el i k e l i h o o d tha t German rearmament would be formally approvedand w a s contemplat ing means t o hobble i t s implementation.

On 26 March, Premier Bulganin s t a t ed t h a t the USSR took

"a po s i t i ve view" toward t h e sugge st i on of gr ea t power nego-t i a t i o n s c o n ta i ne d i n P r e s i d e n t E is en ho we r* s s t at e m en t th ree

days e a r l i e r , and thus took t h e f i r s t s t ep , OB the Soviet side,toward t h e J u l y Summit conference.

15 Janu-

In Mzry t h e USSR made a

They were t o soae e x t e n t , probably, t h e tag-end of the cam-p a i g n a g a i n s t t h e Paris Accords, which, toward t h e end of1954, had become f u l l of b l u s t e r and t h r e a t . Much was madei n propaganda of t h e new w a r danger posed by German rearma-

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f u r t h e r e f f o r t t o re -e s tab l i sh a n e g o t i a b l e p o s i t i o n by offer-ing disarmament pkoposals which accepted many of t h e p o i n t s

in t h e Anglo-French po si ti on . The opening of a new phase i nS o v i e t p o l i c y was f u r t h e r marked i n t h a t month by the announce-ment of V'Sowiet-Yugoslav qbeting "at t h e h ig h e s t l e v e l " andthe f i r s t S o v i e t o f f e r of a r m s a i d to Egypt.

seem t o have been present a t t h e time of h i s o u s t e r or t o

breas t -bea t ing in February is, perhaps, best seen no t so muchas a p o l i c y i n t e r l u d e as an attempt t o p ro vi de a s e t t i n g forwhat w a s t o f ol lo w. I t w a s p a r t l y for t h e b e n e f i t of t h eS o v ie t p u b l i c , which w a s ob l iged to sc a l e down its expecta-t i o n s of a r a p id improvement of t h e l i v i n g s t an d ar d , andp a r t l y a means of p r a e c t i n g an image of strength and s e l f -

c o nf i de n ce t o t h e o u t s i d e world a t a moment when t h e S o v ie tl e a d e r s h ip w a s showing signs of i n s t a b i l i t y . I t was probablyno coincidence t h a t a t t h e same t i m e a small tempest wass t i r r e d up, f i r s t by Molotov and then by a number of others ,**around t h e q u e s t i o n of whether " c i v i l i z a t i o n t ' or o n l y t h ec a p i t a l i s t w o r ld w o u ld be des t royed i n a n u c l e a r war? JBhethert h i s w a s a l s o a v e i l e d a t t a c k on Malenkov, who had referred t ot h e p o s s i b l e " d e s t r u c t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n " in a March 1954speech, i s s t i l l a matter f o r c o n j e c t ur e .

Molotov's "tough t a l k " w a s , the re f ore , p robab ly no t ex-c l u s i v e l y t h e express ion of h i s own hidebound point-of-view.Never the less , these had a l r ead y been s i gns , subsequen tly con-f i r m e d , that Molotov w a s n o t e n t h u s i a s t i c ab ou t t h e foreignpol icy approach adopted a f t e r S t a l i n ' s death and had begun to" s w i m a g a i n s t t h e stream."

. )

Importan t e lements i n t h e post-Malenbov policy

hav& emerged soon thereaf ter .* If t h i s is true, then t h e

His dmission from t h e d e l e g a t i o n t o

*There i s some reason t o suppose t h a t t h e groundwork for theBelgrade conference w a s l a i d before Malenkov's removal. Fora d i s c u s s io n of t h i s p o i n t see below pp . 44-45.**The " d e s t r u c t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n t t idea w a s denounced by,among others, Maurice Thorez in a 3 March l e t t e r to Humnite,by Konstantinov i n t h e 5 March PTavdb, and by Voroshilov be-f o r e t h e Russian Republi c Supreme So vi et on 26 March.

-3 -

+T



Peipixng in Septembes-October 1954 suggested a d e c a t s i n g i n -f l u e n c e OQ Soviet diplomacy. L a t e r i n the year, on two

se pa ra te occas ions , Wes te rn d ip lomats de tec t ed w h a t appearedt o bo resentment in, h e u s u a l l y i n s c r u t a b l e " s t o n e bottom"and conj99tured t h a t h i s foqeigra p o l i c y views had come underc r i t i c i s m i n t h e Presidium. Later on, i n h i s February 1955i n t e r v i e w w i t h t h e Hearst p a r ty , he l e f t t h e impress ion tha t ,though his words were much t h e same, h i s a t t i t u d e w a s d i s -t i n c t l y m ore f r i g i d than Khsushchev's, Bu lga nin gs, andZhukbv's. In succeeding months, in di ca t i on s of his dimimish-i n g ro le in So vi et diplomacy accumulated, as Khslnshehev andBulganin more and more took publ i c command. H e took a backsea t at t h e b lo c s e c u r i t y c o n f er e n c e which m e t i n Warsaw i nMay; and i n Vienna for t h e A u s t r i a n T r e a ty n e g o t i a t i o n s d ur -i n g $he same month, he himself h in t e d at r e t i r e m e n t fromt h e Foreign Mi nis t ry . ' Because of his 0pposition to r e c o n c i l i a -

t i o n w i t h T i t o , he w a s l e f t ou t of t h e Sovie t miss ion t o Bel -grade and a t t h e Summit conference in J u l y h e once aga i nplayed a secondary ro l e .

Molotov 's whole approach to fo re ign po l icy- -h i s a t tach-ment t o t h e " o s s i f i e d forms of diplomacy" which Mikoyan con-demned a t t h e 20th party congress--and his view on i n t r a - b lo cr e l a t i o n s h i p s were a p p a r e n t l y a t i s s u e .

I

However, h i s dogged res i s tance t o rapprochement w i t hYugoslavia seem t o have weakened his p o s i t i o n as much asany one th in g. The cur iou s exchange which took place be-

tween T i t o and t h e Russians i n March w a s e v i d e n t l y an ex-p r e s s io n of t h i s p o l ic y c o n f l i c t . I n h i s speech to theSupreme Sov ie t i n February, Molotov had sa id :

i

A s w e know, p r o g r e s s has l a t e l y been made i n ther e l a t i o n s between ' t he Sov ie t Union and Yugoslavia.

W do not c o n s id e r that every th ing has a l r e a d ybeen done i n t h i s respect , b u t w e b e l i e v e that thisno less depends on Yugoslavia h e r s e l f , Ewidently,i n these pas t yea rs Yugoslavia has t o some e x t e n tdepar t ed from t h e posi t ion. which she held in thee a r ly y e a r s f o l l o w in g t h e second world warp. That,of c o u r s e , is e x c lu s iv e ly her I n t e r n a l affair.

On 10 March, Pravda and Ieves t ia pub l i shed a repost of aspeech d e l i v e r e d b m o the Yugoslav National Assembly on

7 March. T i to , a c c o r d in g t o t h e Soviet newspapers9 had

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--



complained tha t "some countries of Eastern E3mope" were say ingt h a t "although Yugoslavia is s t i l l what she had been accused

of, n e v e r t h e l e s s , s h e has now recognized h e r e r r o r s s o m e w h a tand i s t r y i n g t o reform." "This is nonsense," h e cont inued,*'and natr qral ly i t can cause ;us to doubt t h e s i n c e r i t y of thes ta temeneb made by respons ib le l eaders of t h e s e c o u n t r i e si n t h e c bu rs e of d i r ec t c o n t a c t , r e g a r d i n g t h e unJust accusa-t i o n s a g a in s t Y u go sl av ia in 11948. Unquestionably Mr, Molo-to v ' s €ormulat ion regardin g Yugoslavia in his speech to t h eSupr'eme So vi et ld oe s no t cor resp ond t o f a c t and i n some re-s p e c t s c o i n c id e s w i t h these a s s e r t i o n s . W e c o n s i d e r this a nattempt t o concea l t h e f a c t s from his own people, again a tour expense.. I t i s t i m e to descr ibe t h i n g s as they a r e andas they deve loped , ins tea d of s topping halfway toward normal-i z a t i o n and r a i s i n g new doubts among t h e people."

,

Two days l a t e r Pravda p u b l i s h e d a r e p ly . I t den ied t h a tt h e USSR took t h e po- wbjch had offended T i t o . I t arguedt h a t Molotov's remarks on post-1948 Yugoslavia were consistentw i t h st at em en ts by Yugoslav leaders themselves t o t h e e f f ec tt h a t 1948 had been a t u r n i n g p o i n t f o r them, and c o u ld n o t ,therefore, be t aken a s a g r a t u i t o us i n s u l t . The USSR, m a v d saf f i rmed , desired further improvement of r e l a t i o n s with-s l a v i a , b u t , . i t s a i d , repeating Molotov, t h i s depended "inno less measure upon Yugoslavia herself . ' '

Yugos lav o f f ic ia l s a t about t h e same t i m e , p l a i n l y i n d i c a t e dt h a t dis cus s io ns between Belgrade and Moscow had g o n e f u r t h e rthan was p u b l i c l y admitted. Eviden t ly , t h e s u b j e c t of a So-viet-Yugoslav conference had a l ready been broached.speech, in e f f e c t , r e s t a t e d h i s terms for such a conference9which inc luded withdrawal of t h e 1948 charges. Molotov'ss c a r c e l y f l a t t e r i n g remarks app are nt l y provoked him i n t o de-manding a f u r t h e r t ok en of S o v i et s i n c e r i t y , p e rh ap s i n c lud -i n g Mo,lotov's "head." The S o v ie t press r ep l i ed with somethingl ess t h a n w f u l l apology but had a t l eas t t aken note of' Tito'spro tes t . P u b l i c a t i o n of T i t o ' s p e r s on a l a t t a c k on t h e S o v ie tf o r e i g n m i n i s t e r w a s , moreover, unprece dented and, if nothingelse, showed l i t t l e r e g a r d f o r h i s p r e s t i g e and s e n s i b i l i t i e s .I t i s no t surprising t h a t one Yugoslav off ic ia l concludedt h a t Mohotov had f a l l e n i n t o disgrace.

T i t o ' s speech, t aken toge ther w i t h other s ta temen ts by

Tito's

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j"Co l lec t ive Leadersh ip" A f t e r Malenkov

Promotions and Demotions

I n Mdarch 1953 t h e three men who had given t h e eulogiesover S t a l i n ' s cof%Xn--Malenkov, Beria and Molotov--seemedt o be a $owerful t r iu mv i ra te capab le of dodna t i n g t h e So-

v i e t l eade r sh ip . Two y e a r s l a t e r B e r i a w a s dead, Malenkovhad been demoted and disgraced, and Molotov ' s au thor i ty had

been considerably reduced. In t h e r e l a t i v e l y brief periodit h ad ' f u n c t i o n e d , " c o l l e c t i v e leadership" had p l a i n l y un-dergone a s u b s t a n t i a l r ea dd us tm en t. Khsushchev's r a p idand conspicuous ascent t o a commanding place i n t h e leader-s h i p prompted specula t ion that t h e p a t t e r n of t h e Z O ' s ,when another "dark horse" ha d moved ou t f r o n t by s p l i t t i n gh i s rivals, w a s be ing repeated. Was t f e o l l e c t i v e e a de r sh i p, ('which ha d to e n t a i l some s h a r i n g of power, about to become

a propaganda slo ga n witho ut r e a l p o l i t i c a l s ub st an ce ?In t h e mouths after Febsuary.1955 these were a number

of changes in governmental appointm ents which involved personsa t or n e a r t h e top of t h e p o l i t i c a l l adder . There was alsoa small-scale shake-up of par ty pe rsonne l a t t h e p r o v i n c i a ll e v e l and below. I n some cases, it appeared tha t KBsushchevwas u s i n g t h e power of appointment t o augment his a l r e a d yf o r m id a b l e s t r e n g th , p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e p a r t y a p p a r at u sw a s concerned. The c i rcumstances i n which other changestook place, however, suggested t h a t t h e h ig h - le v e l a p p o int -ments, a t l e a s t , w e r e s t i l l s u b j e c t t o n e g o t i a t i o n i n thepresidium.

A t t h e same t i m e , t h e idea of " c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p "ga ined a con s ide rab l e vogue in SoQie t p$opsaganda, perhaps asa means of compensating for t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of' Msnlenkov'sdemotion. l tC ol lec t iv e leaders hip" took on a c e r t a i n d o c t r i n a lleg i t im acy f rom having been designated a "Lenin i s tw h i l e i t s o p p o s i t e , t h e idea of t h e in fa l l ib le one-man leader,w a s t rea ted w i t h in cre as i ng opprobr ium. The p u b l i c symbolsof i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l power were a l t e r ed hardly a t a l l - -

c e r t a i n l y f a r less t ha n i n t h e two y e a r s which precededMalenkov's re si gn at io n. Throughout t h e s p r i n g of 1955 Khsu-shchev cont inued to be vocal and remained very much in t h ep u b l i c e y e in appearances be fore a se r ies of a g r i c u l t u r a lconfe rences and a meeting of i n d u s t r i a l o f f i c i a l s . The press,however, acted w i t h w h a t appears t o have been d e l i b e r a t e re-s t r a i n t , and it was noted in Moscow t h a t Hlasushclaev seemed, i f

any th ing , t o be r e c e i v i n g less i n d i v i d u a l p u b l i c i t y than be-

f o r e fiaalenkov 's res ig na t io n.Khrushchev had become t h e s i n g l e most powerful leader, andt h e stamp of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y a nd p o l i t i c a l style OH both

There was l i t t l e doubt tha t



domestic a n d f o r e ig n p o l i c y was e v e n p l a in e r t h a n b e f o r e ;b u t, f o r t h e moment a t l e a s t , h e was a t pains t o c0ncea.8

a n y i n c l i n a t i o n to make a g r a b f o r t o t a l power or tooverth row th e "cheqks and ba lances" im pl ic i t i n "col lec t ive1eadershf.p. ''

era l p u b l i c w a s given no exp lana t ion of what had happenedb e y 9 n d . t h a t c o n t a in e d i n h i s r e s i g n a t i o n l e t t e r and, asf a r as observevs on t h e s p o t c o u ld j u d g e , seemed t o re-gard t h e even t w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e . A c e n t r a l committeel e t t e r , c o n t a in in g a "bill of p a r t i c u l a r s " a g a i n s t theformer premies was, however, c i r c u l a t e d among pa st y members,a fac t which must c e r t a i n l y have weakened whatever p o l i t i c a lsup por t remained t o h i m .

Soviet meet ing, rumors began t o be heard i n Moscow t h a t

Yalenkov was i n poor h e a l t h , which, when added t o t h e clamorover t h e " d e s t ru c t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n " i s s u e , raised thep o s s i b i l i t y t h a t fu r t he r pun ishment w a s i n s t o r e for him.Nothing came of t h i s then, however, and he c o n t i n ue d t o a p-p e a r a l o n g s id e h i s pres id ium co l leagues a t p u b l i c f u n c t i o n smuch as before , excep t that h e had moved down t h e l i n e ofprecedence. The disgrace of h i s publ ic admiss ion of execra-t ive incompetence w a s underscored by h i s appointment t o t h esecond-rank post of m i n i s t e r of e lec t r ic power stations, and,somewhat l a t e r (28 February) , by t h e e l e v a t i o n of Miksgan,Pervukhin, and Saburov to p o s i t i o n s a s F i r s t Deputy C h a i r -men of t h e Council of Minis te r s . T h i s l e f t Malenkov t h eo n ly p a r t y p r e s id ium m e m b e r on t h e government council withoutthat s t a t u s and car r i ed t h e i m pl i ca t io n o f ' p o l i t i c a l i s o l a -

t i o n .

Be t h i s as it may, t h e promotion of Mikoyan, Pervukhin,and Saburov was a l s o p a r t of a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Councilof M i n i s t e r s d e si gn e d t o s t r e n g t h e n h i gh - le v e l o p e r a t i o n a lc o n t r o l of k e y s e c t o r s of t h e economy. It paved t h e way fort h e appointment of f o u r new de puty chairmen, of whom t h reewere i n d u s t r i a l o r c o n s t r u c t i o n s p e c i a l i s t s and one an a g r i -c u l t u r a l s p e c i a l i s t . A. P. Zavenyagin (died 31 December 1956)had had a long career i n c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d h eavy i n d u s t r y a ndhad been a top a d m in i s t r a to r o f t h e S o v ie t atomic energyprogram, w h i l e , a n o th e r new deputy chairman, M. V. Khrunichev,had worked in t h e a i r c r a f t and other d e f e n s e ifndthstsdes ffora number of years. V. A. Kucherenko, who was head of th e

Moscow C on st ru ct io n Adm ini str ati on a t t h e t i m e of his promo-t i o n , w a s subsequen t ly (30 bfarch) named chairmn of t h e StateConamittee on Cons t ruc t ion A f f a i r s of t h e USSR Counci l ofM in i s t e r s . Of t h e f o ur new a p p o in t e e s he seemed most l i k e l y

. .

Mriienkov was l e f t i n a n e q ui vo c al p o s i t i o n . The gen-

Within a f e w days of t h e Supremei

I

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to have enJoyed the personal paitsomage of

under whom he had s e r ve d i n t h e Ukraine. Since mid-1959,when he began to beat t he d rum s fo r p re fabr i ca t ed f e r ro -con cre te bui ld ing s ec t i on s , Khrushchev had taken a d i r e c ti n t e r e s t , $ n c o n s t r u c t i o n a f f a i r s , and had had k in d wordsf o r Kucherenko's work a t the Moscow builders conference inD e c e m b e r 1954. The fouzth new man, P. 9, Lobanovp had beenm i n i s t e r of a g r i c u l t u r e I n t h e Russ ian Republic and an ae-tiare promoter of t h e New Lands progran,months he s h r e d t h e pla t form w i t h Khrushchev a t a seriesof r e g i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l conferences , sugges t ing t h a t he .had been given broad r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e implementationof a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y w i t h i n t h e Council of Minis ters ,*

Following t h i s r eo rgan iza t ion ,t h e Council of M inis t e r s

was composed of a chairman, Bulganin; f ive f i r s t deputychairmen, a l l members of t h e p a r t y pres id ium; eight deputyc$airmsfa,ilncluding Malenkov, w i t h g e n er a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ford i v e r s e sectors of t h e economy; and, beneath these uppbsc o o r d i n a t i n g l e v e l s , 48 min i s t e r s and three o f f i c i a l s w i t hm i n i s t e r i a l r a n k .

Khrushchevt

,

In succeeding

On 2 March a shake-up of a g r i c u l t u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o ntook p lace which r e su l t e d i n t h e f i r i n g of A . 1. Kozlov asm i n i s t e r of s t a t e farms and h i s replacenent by I . A. Benedik-tov, who had been serving as m i n i s t e r of a g r i c u l t u r e . Ttae

careers of both of t h e s e men, i t will be remembered, Fwd

taken somewhat p e c u l i a r t u r n s i n t h e m onths immediately a f t e r

S t a l i n ' s death. (See above p. 21). They had he ld th e postsof which they were now r e l i e v e d s i n c e September 1953,** thatis, f r o m t h e p o i n t a t which the agr iculTura1 side of t h e NewCourse w a s laid before a p a r t y plenum by IUarushchear. Sincethat t i m e t h e p r e s s had f r equ en t ly found f a u l t w i t h t h e i rministr ies (among others) and both had been crit icized--Kozlov is especia l ly b lun t terms-by Khrushchev a t t h e February-March 1954 p a r t y plenum. There is some evidence of a p o l i t i c a l

$In April 1956 Lobanov w a s r e l i e v e d of h i s Council of M inis t e r spos t and appointed President of t h e all-Union Academy 0f Agri-

cu l t u r a l Sc iences , succeed ing t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l agronomist-g e n e t i c i s t T. D. Lysenko,**At t h a t t i m e Benediktov w a s appointed Minis ter of Agr icu l tu reand Procurement. A separate Procurement l i n i s t r g under L. R.Kornie ts was es t ab l i shed in November 1953.

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a f f i l i a t i o n b etween Kozlov and bialenkov dating from t h e timewhen they were both concerned w i t h a g r i c u l tu r a l a f f a i r s i n

t h e c e n t r a l committee appara tus , bu t t h e only evidence t ha tBenediktov had f a l l e n v i ct im t o p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s i n thep r8sidiuynp:is c rcums an i a1;

For' reasons which a re s t i l l obscurel Benediktov's p os ta t t h e Ministry of A gr i cu l t u re , which would have been,, pre-sumably, among t h e f i r s t t o be f i l l e d if Khsushchev hard hadcar& blanche,. remained vacant f r o m 2 March U n t i l 18 Octcsber.

of behlnd-the-scenes tug-and-pull in a n o t h e r shift of spcond-echelon of f i c i a l s begun i n March. Early that month, FMBOFS

began t o c i r c u l a t e in Moscow tha t G . F. Aleksandrov hadbeen removed a s m i n i s t e r o f c u l t u r e , a l l e g e d l y b ec au se 09personal misconduct , i racluding use of h i s o f f i c i a l positionfor "immoral purposes." Aleksandrov, who had made h i s name

career.some exten tco ixnc idedwi th those i n Malenkov's career, mad i th a s often been supposed t h a t h e f ig u r e d somehow i n a i3Aalen-kov-Zhdanov rivalry. I n 1947 Be had run a f o u l of t h e Bdeo-log ica l puri f icat ion campaign when his H i s t o ry of WesternPhilosophy was, on S t a l i n ' s o r d e r s, at tacked by?A-Adanov fbrR s bourgeoi s ph i losophica l t hought .'* H e was removed aschief of the c e n t r a l commit tee ' s Department of Propagandaand A g i t a t i on a t t h a t t i m e b u t h e w a s appoin ted t o a numberof h i g h e r academic p o s i t i o n s t hereaf t e r . He w a s appoin tedm i n i s t e r of culture i n March 1954, replacing P. K. Ponoma-renko. A t t h e February 1955 Supreme Soviet he was p e r s o n a l l y

c r i t i c i z e d for th e poor work of d i s m i n i s t r y i n the New Landsarea; and soon after h i s removal , Pravda char ged that thetextbook D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism, a i c h he had e d i t e d , wast a i n t e d wlth th consumer goods hersy.

I *. .

.

There were c u r i o w s p o l i t i c a l o v e r t o n e s and a suggestion

. as a philosopher-propagandist, had had a somewhat unevenH i s ups and downs in t h e postwar period had to

Aleksandrov's removal w a s no t announced o f f i c i a l l y until21 March, n e a r l y t w o weeks a f t e r t h e rumors began to spread.H i s replacement was N. S. Hikha i lov , who had himself beens u b j ec t t o shifting f o r t u n e s .of t h e Komsomol from 1938, when he r ep l aced one of the v i c t i m sof t h e Great Purge , un t i l 1952. A t t h e 19th party congressin October 1952 he was one of a number of second-rank partyo f f i c i a l s appoin ted to t h e en l a rged par ty presidiun--a movewhich, Khrushchev's secret speech i m p l i e d , was pre l i m i na ry to

a new S t a l i n p ur ge of s e n i o r leaders. fie w a s dropped front h e presidiunm when i t w a s reduced t o i t s former s ize a f t e rS t a l i n ' s death and was appoin ted Khrushchw 's su@c@9s0rs

H e had been f i r s t secretary

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f i r s t s e c re t a ry of t h e Moscow Oblast p a r t y o r g a n iz a t io n .Though somewhat Below t h e t o p l e v e l of i t s e l f , t h i s was

s t i l l a ranking pos t and probably ref lected Mikhaillov'st r u e h i e r a r c h i c a l s ta n di n g more a c c u r a t e l y than h i s brief

a n d l a r g @ y a r t i f i c i a l presidium membership.l a t e r , i6 March 1954, h e w a s named Soviet ambassador t oPoland .'

The case of L. G. Yelnikov i s s t i l l myst i fying. Hehad'succeeded Xhraashchev a s f i r s t s e c r e t a r y of the Ukrainianpas ty i n 1949.pres id ium in October 1952, b ut i n t h e March 1953 reorganiza-t i o n h e w a s r e t a i n e d a s a c a n d i d a t e m e m b e r , not dropped en-t i r e l y . H e l o s t t h i s p o s t together w i t h h i s Ukrainian partyp o s t I n J u ne 1953, a m i d s t charges of excesses i n t h e R u s -s i f c a t i o n and c o l l e o t i v i z a t i o n of t h e a n n e x e d t e r r i t o r i e sof wes tern Ukraine. Subsequently, t h e r e v e r s e 0% those sins

were a t t r i b u t e d t o B e r i a t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a th e had had a hand i n Melnikov's dismissal. Yelnikov wasg i ven a new assignment as Sov i e t ambassador t o Rumania i nJuly 1953, within a f e w weeks of Beria ' s downfal l .1955, h e was reca l l ed from Bucharest to head a newly fornedMi n i s t ry of Const ruct ion of t h e Coal Indus t ry , H i s earliercareer in t h e Ukra ine po in t s t o an a f f i l i a t i o n in t h e p o l i t i -c a l s e n s e between him and Khrushchev and the l a t t e r ' s patron-age may w e l l have had something t o do w i t h h i s return to Mos-cow. A t t h e same t i m e , t h e f a c t that Mellnikov had not then,nor has he since, rega ined h i s former h i gh raralk becloudst h e ques t i on , and sugges t s t h a t t h a t patronage, i f exercised,had had only l im i t e d e f f e c t .

A yea r

Lik e Yikhai lov, he had been elected t o the

In April

Following Mikhailov's r eca l l on 22'?darch, t h e post ofS o v i e t ambassador t o Poland remained open u n t i l t h e appoint-ment of P. R. Ponomarenko was announced on 8 May. A v e t e r a nof both p a rt y and government work, Ponomarenko w a s a candi -da te m e m b e r of t h e par ty pres id ium a t t h e t i m e 0%hhs appoi5 t -ment

I n 1938, a f t e r s e v e r a l months of s e r v i c e a s U l e d s o v ' sdeput y i n t h e ce n t r a l comm it tee' s Sec t i on of Leading P a r t yOrgans, he had become f i r s t s ec re ta ry of t h e B e l o r u ss i a n p a r t yand cont inued in that p o s t u n t i l 1947. H e became a m e m b e rof t h e p a r t y secre tar ia t in 1948, a p p a r e n t l y f i l l i a a g thevacancy created by Zhdanov's death. In this post he hadsome r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s and, i n n 1950,

h e w a s appoin ted Mini s t e r of Agr icu l tu ra l Procurements .was made a m e m b e r of t h e pa r t y p re s i d i um a t t h e 1952 p a r t ycongres s bu t , l i k e Melnikov, w a s reduced t o c a n d i d a t e stamding

H e

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'.' ,

, .

*. - _ -

'-a

a t t h e t i m e of Stalin's death. A t t h e same t i m e he los t

h i s p l a c e on t h e p a r t y secre ta r ia t and w a s appointed d n -i s t e r of culture..secretary,of t h e Q z a k h p a r t y as p a r t of a shake-up whichfo l l ow ed , , c ri t ic i sm o f ag r i c$ l t u ra l adm i n i s t r a t i on in thatrepub1i.c. Khrushchev w a s on the scene for t h e change andit w a s apparen t ly expec ted that Ponomrenko, on t h es t r e n g t h 09 his execut ive exper i ence in a g r i c u l t u r e , wouldp r o yi d e e f f e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n of t h e newly inaugurated NewLands program-in Kazakhstan. There was never any f n dhn -t i o n t h a t PonoaarPrenko had f a l l e n down on t h i s job. TheW a r s a w assignment was a responsible one and conformed t ot h e pract ice of appoint ing experienced party o f f i c i a l s tot h e s a t e l l i t e c a p i t a l s , b u t it appeared , never the less , t0be below par fo r a cand i da t e member of the greaid%tam. I tsignified h i s exc lus ion f rom th e inner ci rc le , a fac twhich was confirmed a t t h e t i m e of t h e 2 0 th pasty congress,

when h e was not re-electest t o t h e pres id ium.

In February 1954 h e w a s appointed firat

Probably the clearest case of t h e f a l l from grace ofa 19Malegkovman'' is that of N. N. Sha t a l i n . S i nce t h e l a t eO3O's S h a t a l i n had worked i n t h e p a r t y apparatus and atv a r i o u s times had been blalenkov's deputy i n t h e c e n t r a l com-mittee se c t i on which d ea l t w i t h pasty personnel appointments .Defector r e p o r t s h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y placed him as a Mallenkovadherent . H e became a member of t h e p a s t y secretariat inMarch 1963 in a move which showed t races of 8 political corn-promise.only a cand i da t e m e m b e r of t h e cen t r a l committee.March t h i s i r r e g u l a r i t y w a s corrected a f t e r t h e fac t by h i se l e c t i o n t o f u l l membership a t t h e sam e ,cen t r a l committee

meeting which received Malenkov's resignat ion from t h e secre-t a r i a t . Conceivably, t h e t w o even t s were related, w i t hS h a t a l i n being i n t ended t o se r ve on t h e secretar ia t as al a s t l i n k between Malenkov and the pasty apparatus. Whileon t h e sec re ta r ia t , Sha t a l i n seems t o have had a hand An t w oof i t s most v i t a l funct ions--personnel appointments and partysupe rv i s i on of t h e police--and, in view of his t ies to MaPen-kov, might e a s i l y have become an obstacle between Khsushchevand f i rm control of t h e party apparatus . On 14 March 3956, itwas announced t h a t he hhld been appoin ted party first s e c r e t a r yin t h e Primosye Krai--a very f a r Krai from MOSCOW. In l a t eJanuary 1958 he l o s t t h i s post and at th e 20 t h pa r t y copagressin t h e fol lowing month he w a s dropped from the c e n t r a l com-m i t tee.

A t t h e t i m e of h i s appointment on 6 XarcB he w a sOn 114

i

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TT



The Khaushchev-Bulganin Yisit t o Belgrade

According to a re l iab le r e p o r t on t h e proceedings oft h e J u l y 1955 p a r t y plenum, B u l gan i a t o l d t he assembledpar ty o f f i k i a l s tl&t t h e Bdgrade t r i p had been precededby a tw&year exchange of correspondence between Belgradeand M o s ~ o w p n i t i a t e d by t h e l a t t e r . The f a c t of such anexchange, commencing soon a f t e r S t a l i n s death, r e c e i v e ssome. confi rmat ion from Yugoslav Vice P r e s i d e n t Kardeljwho to ld a Logdon Observer cor respondent i n February 1955

t h a t "there had been during t h e *norn&%liaat ion ' eriodf u l l e r discussions between Yugoslavia and Russia t hanhad ever been described publ icly ." What t h e s u b j e c t of

t h e s e d i s c u s si o n s was i s unknown, but it can be supposedthat t h e y began on a cau t i ous , exp l o ra t o ry basis. Overt ly,t h e rapprochement developed through t h e various stages of

"normalizat ion, " which m eant, i n gene ra l, r a i s i n g t h e v a r i o u sf o r m s of seiga whPch S t a l i n had a p p l i e d a g a i n s t Yugoslaviain h i s f u t i l e campaign t o over th row T i t o ,

On 29 A p r i l 1963, Molotov r ece i ved t h e Yugoslav chargei n Moscow and t h e appointment of a new Soviet charge soonfollowed. In J u n e t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s agreed to restore t h eexchange of ambassadors. Thereafter, t h e border c o n f l i c t sbetween Yugoslavia and her s a t e l l i t e neighbors came to anend, t h e economic blockade against Yugoslavia was l i f t e d

and trade n e g o t i a t i o n s were opened, and the b i t t e r propa-

ganda ba t t l e was mutual ly terminated in Moscow and 3elgrade.

So f a r , however, Soviet ac t s and ges t u re s appeared t o bes t i l l within the framework of t h e pos t -S t a l i n policy ofdeten te .

I

In t h e f a l l of 1954 t h e USSR first showed an Pnclina-t i o n to carry t h e process f u r t h e r a nd t o exp l o re t h e pos-s i b i l i t y of an i deo log ica l rapprochement,speech on t h e anniversary of t h e Bolshevik revolu t ion ,Saburov appealed for a renewal of " the anc ien t bonds off r i endsh i p" between Yugoslavia and t h e USSR.mbmth, a t a r e c e p t i o n in the Yugoslav Embassy i n Moscow,Khrushchev, Malenkov, an d Molotov offered a t o a s t t o"Comrade Tito and t h e Yugoslav Communist partyt1 in a clearg e s t u r e of ideological r econc i l i a t i on . Seve ra l sou rceshave repor t ed t ha t i n November o r December of 1 9 M , tfne'RraEa-sians made a formall proposal %OT a conference of party r e p m -s e n t a t i v e s which i nc luded an i n v i t a t i o n to T i t o to v i s i t Mos-

COW. Tito, according t o one of these r e p o r t s , dad not r ep lyu n t i l J an ua ry 1955 and then made t h e counterproposal that a%

Sovie t delegation. should come t o Belgrade. These exclmnges

In the 6 November

Later in t h e

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_-

ppasentlg also i nc luded some d i scuss i on of the termson which a.meeting should be convened, %OF in February,

Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s claimed that t h e USSR had conceded in' p r i v a t e that i t had mistreated Yugoslavia in 1948, that

there coyJ'd be di f fe ren t pa$As t o soc ia l i sm, and thatYkagoslaqlb'a w a s a bona fide socialist s t a t e . These werevirtual'$y i d e n t i c @ w i t h t h e term on which t h e Bellgradeconference was t o be conducted.

The Sov i e4 ,po l i t A ca l upset of January-February 11855a p p a r e n t l y r e s u l t e d i n a temporary saaspension of negotia-tions.might s i g n a l a halt i n t h e process of p o s t - S t a l i n changeabout which they had been cons i s t en t ly hopefu l .7 Ur ch s D e e @ h . t a k i n g i s s u e with Molotov, was ev i den t l y

; .

The Yugoslavs at first feared that ~ l e n k o v * c s u st er

Tito's

__ -

a5 at tempi t o i i n d ouz i f t h e winds had sh i f t ed , and

Pravda's Bandling ofl t h e matter sugges t s that i t was readi n Moscow in just t h a t way.w a s the sudden t r i p t o MOSCOW, soon a-ftes Titows peechpof Soviet Ambassador Valkov. Upon h i s r e t u r n t o Belgrade,towards t h e end of Marchp Valkov was immediately gran tedan i n t e rv iew w i t h T i t o . The Yugoslav foreign secre t a ryadmitted t o fo re i gn d i p lom a ts i n Belgrade that t h e i n t e r -view had d e a l t w i t h t h e Molotov-Tito exchange. A t thisp o in t , appa ren t l yp t h e conc re t e nego t i a t i ons which precbdedt h e 14 Mag announcement of a high-level Soviet-Yugoslavmeeting had begun.

Another ind ica t ion of t h i s

IUa~ushchev~sscendancy, fo l lowing on Malenkovss de-

fea t and t h e d e c l i n e of Molotov 's authori ty , undoubtedlyhad much t o do w i t h t he t iming and f o r m , of t h e raspproclxe-ment w i t h Yugoslavia.grade meant t h a t t h e Soviet leaders had agreed to s w a l l o wt h e i r pr i d e and to pay t h e pr ice exacted by Yugoslav Vanity.But t h e USSR was playing f o r p o t e n t i a l l y l a r g e stakes.remove from t h e record t h i s s i n g u l a r exampbe of d e f e c t i o nfrom t h e Communist ranks and t o r e v e r s e t h e trend whichbad brought T i t o onto t h e fringe of t h e Western a l l i ancewere only minimum Sov i e t ob j ec t i ve s , which, i f every th ingwent w e l l , could be enlarged upon. The dominant eleaeznti n t h e Soviet l e ade r sh i p en t e r t a i ned t h e hope that Pppago-

slavia could be drawn back i n t o t h e "socia l is t camp" andf e l t that t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y should be exploited t o t h e P u blest. A dramatic gesture of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , public adatis-SIORh a t t h e USSR had erred in t h e past, rmognit ion of

Yugoslavia*s r i g h t t o c e r t a i n n a t i o na l p e c u l i a r i t i e s , andformal r e i n s t a t em en t of Tito into t h e r anks of "true be?1ievers"--these things would remove Belgrade's ssunsp~cione

OR t h e fade of it, the t r i p to Bel-

To

-

. .

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and i t would t hen f e e l an i r r e s i s t i b l e urge f o r completereal ignment. Thi 's, in turn, promised t o r educe the r i s ki n t h e e f f o r t , which was t o be name f u l l y u nf ol de d at t h e20 th pa r t y cong resq , t o organ i ze t h e Sov i e t bloc on looserterms of ,$n i t y and d i s c i p l i p e than t h e e appl ied by S t a l i n ,s i n c e t h e s a t e l l i t e s t a t e s would no l onge r have t h e in-s i d i ous ' exam pl e 0% T i t o ' s i ndependen t Conmuaaism beforethem.

I n his r e p o r t on t h e Belgrade conference to t h e Julyplanum, Bulganin i s s a i d to have described t h e Sov i e t mi$-s i o n as a mission of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . Its purpose, he as-ser t ed , was f i r s t of a l l t o p r e ve n t t h e f u r t h e r e x t en s io nof US i n f l uen ce i n Y ugos lavi a and to assess t h e l i k e l i h o o dof her r e t u r n t o t h e "camp of social i sm." The Sov i e t as-

sessment of Yugoslav socialism made at t h e Belgrade con-f e r e n c e d i d not o ve rl oo k e n t i r e l y t h e points off isagree-ment between t h e t w o s ides , b u t t here was, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,as t h e summing-up a t t h e July plenum showed, a tendencyt o stress t h e degree of sameness and to regard i t as ahopefu l basis f o r f u r t h e r c o n s o l id a t i o n. R e po r te d ly ,Mikoyan, having conceded t ha t Yugoslavia had much i n corn-mon w i t h non-Communist social ism, went on to p o i n t out thatin the sa t e l l i t e s many eminent Communists had come from so-c i a l i s t ranks, and t o c o nc lu d e o p t i m i s t i c a l l y that Yugo-s l a v i a would c e r t a i n l y r e t u r n t o t h e Sovie t b loc .

s l a v i a would r e t u r n t o t h e f o l d on pre-1948 terms.is much to sugges t t ha t t h e Belgrade v e n t u r e was only p a r tof a broad e f f o r t t o reorder i n t s a b l o c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . AP-

ready, s i n c e S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , tbefe had b e e n s i g n s of t h i si n the replacement of S t a l i n i s t g a u l e i t e r s , =my of themp o l i c e o f f i c i a l s , by p a r t y pr o f e s s io n a l s i n tine USSR'ss a t e l l i t e and Chinese embassies--a process i n t ended t ostress t h e bonds of p o l i t i c a l sympathy ove r t hose of corn-pulsion. The Sov iet regime, a t t h e s a m e time, was seasch-i n g f o r an arrangement e l a s t i c enough to permit t h e p l a yof n a t i o n a l i s t i c p r e s s u re s w i t h i n t h e o u t e r band of SOV%ethegemony. It w a s aware t h a t nat ion a l i sm remained a r e a lforce w i t h i n t h e bloc, that ' S t a l i n ' s p o l i cy had suppressedbu t no t eradicated i t , and tha t , l i k e r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g at

home, it should be worn away not battered. Considera t ionof C h i n a ' s p r e s e n t an d f u t u r e place i n t h e soc ia l i s t corn-monwealth undoubtedly had a p a r t i n s t im u la t in g t h i s re -

th inking. China, l i k e Yugoslavia , obviously d i d not f i ti n t o the scheme of a monol i th i c b loc made up of the USSBand a group of compl iant s a t e l l i t e s , and i t may have been

It was prob ably no t envisaged, however, that Hugo-There

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more than coinciden e t h a t t h e groundwork for t h e Belgrade

conference began t o be l a i d soon a f t e r t h e r e t u r n of Khraa-shchev and Bulganin f r o m Pe ip ing in l a t e 2954.

a c l ea r connection between t h e Belgrade conference and theover -a l l ,problem oP bloc r e l a t i o n s was drawn a t t h e Julyplenum. *."According t o a l l accounts , t h e v a r i ~ u s ovie tleaders 'who addressed t h e plenum dwel t on t h e damage whichhad been done i n t h e p a s t t o relations with Ch in a , Yugo-s l a v i a , a n d t h e ba te l l i t e s by Sovie t a r rogance and of fensest o -6a t i ona l i s b s e n s ib i l i t i es . Nat ional ism, Khrushkhev re-por t ed ly sa id , should be d e a l t w i t h t a c t f u l l y a n d i t wascur ren t po l i cy o f t h e Sovie t pa r ty to t ake t h e problemmore f u l l y i n t o a cc ou nt .

Moreover,

Where t h e s a t e l l i t e s w e r e concerned, however, qualifi-c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of Soviet dominance and changes int h e forms of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n w a s something less than d e n i a lof t h e p r i n c i p le . Sov iet acknowledgement i n t h e 2 Junecommunique concluding t h e Belgrade conference t M t soc ia l i smmight take d i f f e r e n t fo rms in d i f f e r e n t c o u nt r ie s , w a s , i n

t h e case of Yugoslavia and C h i n a , merely recogni t ion of ane x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . But t h e USSR's p o l i t i c a l and econodcho ld on t h e s a t e l l i t e s meant--or so the USSR ev iden t lyreckoned--that they had been given a verba l concess ion whicht h e y were in no p o s i t i o n t o e x p l o i t .Moscow from Belgrade, Khrushchev stopped off i n Sofia andBucbarest for conferences w i t h s a t e l l i t e p a r t y leaders atwhich, according t o one repor t , h e made t h i s po in t clear--that what was sauce for T i t o ' s goose w a s no t necessarilys a u ce f o r t h e s a t e l l i t e gander.

when they accepted t h e Sovi et conference proposal . Theysensed t h e danger of being crushed i n t h e Sovie t embrace,but in view of t h e i r own preachments on "peaceful coexistence"i t was impossible f o r them t o r ef us e t o negot ia te . Fur ther -more, t h e Yugoslav economy stood to b e n e f i t from any se t t l e -ment which recognized Yugoslav claims a r i s i n g from t h e Sovie t -s a t e l l i t e economic blockade. But t h e key f a c t o r f o r Yugo-s l a v i a w a s i t s own i n t e r n a t i o n a l a m bi ti on s and i t s bel ief

that i t could , having c losed t h e r i f t w i t h t h e USSR, havean im por t an t i n f luence on t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e of events inthe Sovie t b loc . With regard t o t h i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e Yugo-s l a v s i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e pro ces s of change tha t beganw i t h S t a l i n ' a dea th would i ne vi ta bl y cont inue and shouldbe given every encouragement.

On h i s way back to

d

The Yugoslavs had s o m e w h a t d ' i f fereht thoughts i r e mind

-47-

.1.



Soviet Communism and Western democracy could be achieved.Thus i t w a s t h a t on 15 May, t h e day a f t e r announcement of

t h e Belgrade conference, T i o declared that Yugoslavia wasa moral leader w i t h ffa place i n t h e world t h a t even t h eb ig powers may envy,f"and described Belgrade's p o l i c y asa n a t tempt " to create a t h i r d fo rce of world mora l s t reng thf o r a l l t h o s e who love peace and freedom." The root of t h eYugoslav conception i s foun d i n T i t o ' s p h ra s e " a c t i v e peace-f u l c o ex i st e nc e ," which denoted movement between t h e twoa n t a g o n i s t s d e s ig n e d t o b r i n g them closer t o g e t h e r , andBelgrade's commentary in connect ion w i t h t h e May - Juneconfe rence w a s a t p a in s t o re jec t f o r Yugoslav ia the s t a t i o n a r y

The tugg ing and pu l l ing t h a q went pn between t h e Yugo-

Slavs and t h e USSR over t h e q u e s t i o n -02 whether a party-to-p a r t y r e l a t i o n s h i p was to be r e - e s t a b l i s h e d was one expres-s i o n of t h e divergence of purpose and outlook between then.

This had been a Soviet objective i n the: preconference nego-t i a t i o n s b u t t h e Yu gos lavs ha d held o u t a g a i n s t it.Russians were pe rs is te nt , however, and t h e i r d e l e g a t i o n t oBelgrade was headed by Khrushchev, t h e p a r t y c h i e f , t ho ug ht h e p r e te n s e w a s maintained t h a t h e ha d come as a member oft h e Supreme Soviet Presidium, a governmental body. On hisa r r i v a l a t t h e B e lg r a d e a i r p o r t on 26 May, Khrusbchevs t a r t l e d t h e Yugoslavs by declaring:

The

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As r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Communist party of theSoviet Union'--the party created by t h e great Lenin--w e c o n si d er d e s i r a b l e t h e es tabl i shment 02 mutualt r u s t be tween ,ous pa r t i e s also. The most s tab ler e l a d i o n s a re es t abl ieh ed between t h e peoples oft h o s e c o u n t r i e s i n which t h e l e a d i n g f o r c e s arepair t ies which base a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s on t h eteaching of bWrxism-Leninism.

e T h i s wa s- a l typ ica l Khrushchev g a m b i t , an attempt t o s o l v ea complicated problem by charging s t r a i g h t into it.not respond t o t h e a i r p o r t speech and it was r epor t ed t h t t h eYugoslavs laad emphatical ly rejected t h e over ture .por ted a l s o t h a t t h e y gawe no d e f i n i t e r ep l y t o a memorandumon pa rt y r el a t i o n s , s igned by Khsushchev and Provda ed i t orShepilov, which proposed that arrangements b e w i ' o r p a r t yc o n s u l t a t i o n s a nd t h e exchange of p a r t y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .Belgrade press, furthermore, maintained throughout t h e con-ference t ha t i t was being conducted on a government-to-gov-ernment, as d i s t i n c t f rom a party-to-pasty, basis, and t h econference ' s f i n a l d e c l a r a t i o n w a s s igned on behalf of theUSSR by Bulganin, t h e government head. Nevertheless , t h e

dec la ra t ion con ta ined a prov i s ion f o r "cooperation among t h es o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e t w o coun t r i e s th rough t h e estab-l ishment of contacts , t h e exchange of s o c i a l i s t e xp er ie nc e,and a f ree exchange of opinions, '* which, as t h e Yugoslavssoon admit ted, implied some form of i n t e r p a r t y r e l a t i o n s .

Both s i d e s r e a l i z e d

that renewal of p a rt y r e l a t i o n s w a s synonymous w i t h t h e re-opening of i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r c ou r s e .t h i s i n t e r c o u r s e , too, because i g p as they hoped, they w e r egoing t o e x e r t any i n f l u e n c e on t h e r*socia l i s&amp," i twould be necessary t o use a common language, i . e . , thelanguage of Marxism-Leninism. At t h e same t i m e , they badt o move c a u t i o u s l y so a s not t o alarm t h e West and so as t os a t i s f y themselves t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p was no t to be re-s t o r e d on t h e old one-sided basis of "soazialist i n t e r n a -t ional isml*-- the subordinat ion of n a ti o na l i n t e r e s t s to t h epurposes of t h e S o v i e t sta te .

i l l u s i o n s t ha n t h e Russians about t h e depth of t h e i r d i f -

ferences .r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , a p p e a r t o have f ixed t h e i r gaze too i n t e n t l yon t h e p o i n t s of mutual agreement and t o have exaggeratedYugoslav nostalgia for t h e Itgood o ld days" of p r o l e t a r i a ns o l i d a r i t y . In t h i s connection, however, there i s room

T i t o d i d

I& was re-

The

Why a l l t h i s st ra ng e maneuvering?

The Yugoslavs wanted

The Yugoslavs hesi ta ted a l s o because they had fewer

The l a t t e r , in t h e i r haste t o g e t ahead w i t h t h e

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* ",

f o r s p e c u l a t io n t h a t t h e USSR was disingenwouslg appeal-

i n g o v e r t h e heads o f Yugoslav leaders f o r t h e sympathy

and suppor t of t h e less wary rank-and-fi le.

i n some;ways l i k e a - r e l i g i o u s sch i sm.from Moscow seemed, in t h e beginning, t o have l i t t l e todo w i t h t h e formal p o i n t s of ideology and he was pro-fesgdclly s t i l l in agreement w i t h i t s fundamental phi lo-s o p h i c a l p r em i s es a nd f i n a l pu rp o se s . N e v e r the l e s s , hehad come t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n that once-shared bel ief s had.be en d i s t o r t e d by S t a l i n , a n d i n s i s t e d on t h e p o s s i b i l i t yof va r iou s in te rp re ta t i on s . The charg es of " sev i sionsim**thrown a t th e Yugoslavs l a t e r when t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n hadgone s l i g h t l y " s ou r ft w e r e , from t h e p o i n t of view of a So-

v i e t Communist, no less j u s t i f i e d i n 1955. Driven by t h e

s i m p l e need f o r surv iva l , Yugos lav ia had at tempted to

f i n d v i a b i l i t y in r e v i s i o n s of i t s i n t e r n a l s ys te m a nd ini n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e non-Communist world. T h i s l e f t thema t v a r i a n c e w i t h Moscow on two impQr tant po in t s : t h e i rbelief that t h e i r i n n o v a t i o n s s h o u ld be s t u d i e d , n o tmerely t o l e r a t e d , by t h e Communist bloc , and a belief thatt h e " s Q c i a l i z a t i o n f fof t h e world should be s e e n as a pro-cess of e v o lu t i o n a r y t r a n s f o r m a t io n r a t h e r t ha n i n t h e

S o v ie t terms of "who s h a l l beat whom?" Thus, w h i l e Moscowcontemplated t h e r e t u rn t o t h e f o l d of a s t r a y s i n n er , t h eYugoslavs probably hoped e v e n t u a l l y t o c o n v e r t t h e wholebody of b e l i e v e r s t o t h e i r own p e r s u a s io n ,

Sin$& 1948 t h @ Yugoslav-Soviet r i f t had developedT i t o ' s d iv er ge n ce

The July Plenum

Khrushchev and Bulganin reported oQ the r e s u l t s oft h e i r B e l g r a d e t r i p to a plenum of t h e p a r ty c e n t r a l com-m i t t e e h e ld from 4 t o 12 Jul y. The plenum also heard acomprehensive r epor t on S o v ie t f a d u s t r y f r o m Bulganin, ap-proved t h e admiss ion of se ve ra l new m e m b e r s to t h e p a r t y ' st o p b o d ie s , v o t e d t o c on ve ne t h e 2 0 th p a r ty c o n g r e ss i nFebruary 1956, an d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c e n s u r e of Molotov.

The plenum gave only pass ing not ice t o a g r i c u l t u r a lp o l i c y , which had been t h e s u b j ec t of most 02 i t s d i s c u s -s i o n s s in c e S t a l i n ' s death, and tu rned its a t t e n t i o n AB-

s tead t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l f r o n t . B u lg an fn 's speech w a s BL

more e l a b o r a t e a nd d e f i n i t i v e s t a t em e n t of t h e p o i n t sraised a t t h e i n d u s t r i a l c o n fe r en c e i n May. I t focused

a t t e n t i o n on the problem of c o n t in u e d i n d u s t r i a l e x p n s P o nas it p e r t a i n e d t o t h e Si xt h Five-Year Plan, which was t obe p resen ted t o t h e coming party congress. Bulganirm spoke



. . .

i n c o nv e nt io n al t e r m s about t h e succ esses achieved bySov ie t i ndus t ry .s l o w i t s growth by g iv i ng p r i o r i t y t o consumpt ion andaf f i rm ed t h a t " th e, g e n e r a l l i n e of t h e Communist pasty,d i r e c e$,,doward preponderaat development of heavy in-dustry, ;was and remains unshakable."t o l d t h e plenum, w a s "standing on t h e t h r e s h h o l d of a

new s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n l c a l a nd i n d u s t r i a l r ev o lu t io n ."In th&s fac t , he sugges ted , l a y the secret of f u r t h e recohomic growtb on t h e bas i s of a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s .H e proposed an approach alo ng three l ines- - technologica limprovement, a more r a t i o na l o rgan iza t ion of p roduc tion ,and increased labor product iv i ty- -and t h e bulk 03 h i sspeech w a s devoted to a d i scuss ion , in c o n s i d e r a b l e de-

t a i l , of s ho rt co mi ng s a nd p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t hose areas.

T h e plenum w a sca l l ed

on t o r a t i f y s e v e r a l a p po in t-ments t o t h e pa r ty ' s p resid ium and secre tar ia t . A. I ,Kirichenko, p a r t y boss in Khrushchev's o l d Ukrainianb a i l i w i c k , and Y. A, Suslov, a m e m b e r of t h e sec re ta r i a twho had been concerned in S o v i e t - s a t e l l i t e a f f a i r s , w e r emade f u l l members of t h e presidium. The secre ta r ia t ,t h e h i g h e s t body f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l over t h e pastyappara tus and pres ided over by Khrushchev, .was enlargedb y t h r e e m e m b e r s . One of them, D. T. Shepi lov , thene d i to r of Pravda, had already begun t o play an a c t i v e p ar t

i n S ov ie t m n f f a i r s and had on ly r ecen t ly been amember of t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n t o Belgrade. A. B. Ari s tovand N. I . Belyayev were advanced from posts as p r o v i n c i a lp a r t y c h i e f s . Some a t l ea s t of these appointments w e r epresumably i n Ktarushchev's i n t e r e s t and, t h e i r n e t effectw a s apparen t ly t o s t rengthen la i s 'hand pr io r to t h e 20thp a r t y c o n gr e s se

H e ag a in condemned t h o s e who would

The USSR, Sulganin

I

The ava i l a b l e account s of t h e proceedings of t h e J u l yplenum di f fer only in d e t a i l a s t o t h e ci rcumstances andsubs tance of t h e Molotov censure, which took place on 9J u l y . I t was decided t o take t h e unusual step of humblingMolotov before h i s i n f e r i o r s on t h e ce n t ra l com mi tt ee , be-cause he had refused t o su r render h i s opposi taon to ~ e c o n -c i l i a t i o n w i t h Yugoslavia, even a f t e r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n had

won a m a jo r i ty i n t h e par ty pres id ium and a f te r t h e Bel-grade confe rence w a s a n accomplished fa c t . The accountsof t h e plenum give an u n us u al ly c l e a r p i c t u r e df Molotov'ss tubbornness and t h e v e r y " S t a l i n i s t "

castof his th inking.

Khrushchev led t h e a t tack and was j o i n e d by BulganinMolotov w a s l e f t t o make a s o l i t a r y d ef en se ,nd Mikoyan.

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al though i t i s r e p o r t e d that Voroshilov showed some re -l u c t a n c e t o j o i n i n th e denuncia t ion. Molotov had keptup a rear-guard ac t i on throughout t h e presidium's de-l i b e r a t i o n s on Yugoslavia, h i s c r i t i c s charged. F i r s t ,he had by,& a g a i n s t a ny at t&mpt a t a l l t o improve re la-t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia. He was over ru led but e v e n a f t e rt h e Belgrade t r i p w a s decided on h e argued t h a t Yugo-s l a v i a s h o u l d be d e a l t with exactly as any o th e r "bour-ge0i.s state. '* H e i n s i s t e d t ha t t h e 1948 break had beenj u s t i f i e d , t h a t , th e Yugoslavs had been and remainedl l d e v i a t i o n i s t ** and he contended w i t h some fos es i gn t ,t h a t any coddl ing of Belgrade would se t a dangerousprecedent. H e h e ld t o t h i s p o s i t i o n a t a c e n t r a l c o m -mittee plenum which m e t j u s t before t h e Soviet delega-t i o n d e p a r t e d f o r Belgrade and again in t h e presidiwma f t e r i t s r e t u r n . I

-52-

Molotov 'rep l ied t o these charges a t t h e July plenumin a n u n re p en t an t r e b u t t a l .same t e r m s as before, argued t h a t c u r r e n t p o l i c y towardYugoslavia was "un-Leninist , *) and reminded those p r e s e n tt h a t , among the t o p leaders , he w a s the only remaining"comrade-in-arms" of Lenin. Molotov * s a t t e m p t t o th rowt h e book of dogma a t h i s c r i t i c s and the appea l to h i sp a r ty s e n io r i t y a p p a r e n t ly t ou ch ed a s e n s i t i v e n er ve andmay ex p l a in why somewhat l a t e r ( i n a n October i s s u e of-om-munist) he himself w a s f o r c e d t o admit t o i d e o l o g i c a lw.t t h e plenum i t s e l f , h i s a t t i t u d e p ro vo ked as h a r p c o u n t er a t ta c k in which the l i s t of h i s o f f e n s e s waslengthened t o i n c l u d e i n f l e x i b i l i t y in t h e d i r e c t i o n oft h e Foreign Minis t ry , a n i n s u l t i n g a t t i $ u d e toward t h e

sa t e l l i t e s , an d, f i n a l l y , d e f e c t s ' of cb&jrzicter i n himselfand h i s w i f e . Molotov w a s warned t h a t u n l e s s he correctedhimself he might be "pensioned."

H e s t a t ed h i s p o s i t i o n In t h e

Although t h e s e v e r a l a c c ou n ts are n o t c o n s i s t e n t o nt h i s p o in t , t h e censure proceedings apparent ly ended w i t ha te r se r e p l y from Molotov i n which he fo rmal ly stated hisacceptance of t h e a c c u s a t i o n s a g a in s t h i m and agreed t osubmit t o t h e judgement of t h e c e n t r a l committee.



Conclusion

In qany ways P t was f + % t i n g h a t t h e Ju ly plenumshou ld h&ve been th e occasion f o r summoning t h e 20 th pa rt ycongress , which w a s to m e e t i n F eb ru ar y 1956 e i g h t monthsbefore t h e d e a d l i n e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p a r t y s t a t u t e s . Thet h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t io n s and t h e m a i m elements of t h e p o l i -c i e s which i t wpuld be t h e c o n g r e s s t d u t y to conf i rm hadal r ead y begun t o emerge.sup pl i ed th e groundwork for t h e new economic plan which w a st o be p r e se n t ed t o t h e congress . The con gre ss pronounce-ment on "di f ferent roads t o socialism" was a n t i c i pa t e d i nt h e communique which ended t h e Belgrade Conference.impending denunciaticrn of S t a l i n was, however, hardly s i g -n a l l e d by t h e stress g iven "co l l ec t ive l eadesshpp" and the

o c ca s io n al a l l u s i o n s t o a harmful "cul t of t h e indiv idual . "

Bu lgan in ' s s t a t em ent OB i n d u s t r y

The

I n t h e pro longed s t rugg le for precedence wi th in theto p lea de rsh ip, Khrushchev had c l e a r l y g a i n ed c o n s i d e r a b l emomentum. Following t h e e x t i n c t i o n of Beria B e had suc-ceeded i n bui ld i ng an ef fe c t iv e combinat ion a ga in s t MaBelakovwhich presumably included such peop le as Molotov, Kaganovichand Zhukov. Now Molotov had been made t h e v i c t i m of thesame t a c t i c .

A p a r t y c o n g r e s s e v i d e n t l y appealed t o Khrushchev a tt h i s j u n c t u r e as a means of p r e s s i n g home h i s advantage--h e would o bt ai n from I t s o l e m n r a t i f i c a t i o n of his po l i c i e sby t h e p a s t y ' s h i g h e s t formal a u t h o r i t y a s w e l l as t h e ellec-

t i o n of a new ce n t ra l com mi tt ee . ' A subsequent paper in tM sse r i e s w i l l examine the period between t h e July plenum andt h e p a r t y c o n gr e ss i n an e f f o r t t o d i scover any t r e n d i a s ap-pointments or p o l i c i e s which might have f lowed from a furtherrearrangement of power r e l a t ionsh ips .



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caesar 18 - aftermath of malenkov's resignation

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