calalang vs register of deeds

7/28/2019 Calalang vs Register of Deeds

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 76265. March 11, 1994.]

VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDSOF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL LANDTITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ,CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN, and IGLESIA NIKRISTO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 83280. March 11, 1994]

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A.PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA,FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II,FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENO M.OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO,petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and BISHOP ERANO-MANALO, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELO, Jp:

The Decision of the Second Division of this Court promulgated April 22, 1992(208 SCRA 215) dismissing, for lack of merit, these two (2) consolidatedpetitions, is assailed by petitioners in their separate motions forreconsideration. LLjur

The assailed Decision states:

With this Court's ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our consideredview that the petitioners can not raise anew the question of ownershipof Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by theCourt of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the de la Cruzcase. Well-settled in the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program,Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that:


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"When a right or fact has been judicially tried anddetermined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as itremains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties andthose in privity with them in law or estate."

The Court's ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership

of Lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago. This declaration must berespected and followed in the instant case applying the principle ofres

judictaor, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The lessfamiliar concept of less terminological usage ofres judicataas a rule onconclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgmentin the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the mattersactually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.(De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).

Inevitably, the de la Cruzruling should be applied to the presentpetitions since the facts on which such decision was predicated continue

to be the facts of the case before us now (See Rivas v. SEC, 190 SCRA295 [1990]). Even the petitioners substantially adopt the same findingsof facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the historyof Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed. . .

xxx xxx xxx

In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try toconvince us to look or inquire into the validity of the reconstitutionproceedings initiated by Lucia de la Cruz ruling, contending that theimplementation ofde la Cruzruling would deprive them of their

properties without due process of law. We have looked long and hardinto the records of the case but the facts and circumstances plus lawand jurisprudence on the matter do not warrant such action from theCourt. INK's title over Lot 671 which necessarily included Lot 671-A hadalready become incontrovertible and indefeasible. To reopen or toquestion the legality of INK's title would defeat the purpose of ourTorrens system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled landsand putting to a stop forever any question of the legality of theregistration in the certificate or questions which may arise therefrom.

(de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK, as registered owner

it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.cdphil

In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest andthe maintenance of the integrity and stability of the Torrens system ofland registration that all transfer certificates of title derived from thereconstituted title of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz beannulled in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles whichare null and void. The legality or validity of INK's title over Lot 671 hasbeen settled. The Court has spoken and it has done so with finality,


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logically and rightly so as to assure stability in legal relations and avoidconfusion. (See Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]).

(pp. 224-225; 229-230.)

In G.R. No. L-76265, petitioners seek a reconsideration of the aforesaid decisionbecause allegedly, the same is contrary to the following settled principles of lawand doctrines laid down by this Court, to wit:

1.That a judgment rendered in an action in personambinds only the parties tothe action;

2.That a petition for "reconstitution" of a certificate of title filed in 1971, thirtyyears after the sale to respondent Lucia de la Cruz in 1941, without personalnotice to petitioners and other title holders of Lot 671-A, whose titles date from1952, is void and can be collaterally attacked;

3.That the registration of the sale to respondent Lucia de la Cruz in the PrimaryEntry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila in 1943 of a land located inCaloocan, Rizal, cannot be the operative act to convey said property to thevendee, as the record of the title to said property was then in Pasig, Rizal andthen transferred to Quezon City, after the war;

4.That the indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one year from issuance, refers tothe indefeasibility of a decree of registration after one year from entry thereof inan original registration or cadastral proceeding, and by analogy, the principle isextended to a patent issued in an administrative proceeding, but not to areconstitution of a certificate of title allegedly lost, nor to the issuance ofsubsequent transfer certificate of title; and

5.That respondent Iglesia ni Kristo cannot be considered as an innocentpurchaser for value as far as petitioners and other title holders to Lot 671-A areconcerned, because the titles of respondent Iglesia ni Kristo are derived from the"reconstituted" title of respondent Lucia de la Cruz issued in 1971. Respondent

Iglesia ni Kristo is deemed to have actual and constructive knowledge of the

rights of more than 80 buyers of Lot 671-A who were issued transfer certificatesof title dating from 1952.

In G.R. No. L-83280, petitioners assail the decision on the following grounds:

1.The decision in the de la Cruzcase does not bind the petitioners.


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2.The Iglesia ni Kristo, represented by public respondent, is not an innocentpurchaser for value of the parcels of land in dispute.

3.Petitioners, as duly registered owners of land under the Torrens system, arepurchasers in good faith whose titles have become indefeasible.

Aware of the importance of the case, the Court granted the request ofpetitioners to have their motions for reconsideration be considered by theCourt en banc.

At the core of the controversy is the case ofAgustina de la Cruz et al. vs. Luciade la Cruz, Iglesia ni Kristo and Hon. Court of Appeals(130 SCRA 666 [1984])which has settled once and for all the question of ownership of Lot 671 of thePiedad Estate in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City. A portion of this lot, Lot 671-A, is thesubject of these two (2) consolidated petitions at bar.

In said de la Cruz case, the Court found and held:

1.The mother title of Lot 671 is OCT. No. 614registered on March 12,1912 in the name of the Philippine Government. When Lot 671, with anarea of 184,268 square meters, more or less, was segregated theoriginal title was partially cancelled and TCT-40355 T-201 was issuedto Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz by virtue of Entry No. 3241which reads:

. . . Vendido a Eugenia de la Paz y Dorotea de la Paz y Doroteade la Cruz el Lote No. 671 del terreno en este certificado de titulo,mediante escritura ratificada al 27 de Julio de 1931 en Manila, ante

Vicente Garcia, Notario Publico, se cancela parcialmente al presentecertificado de titulo, en cuanto al lote mencianado y se expide otro anombre de las compradoras con el No. 40355, folio 5, Tomo T-201 dellibro de transferencias; archivandose la escritura de que se ha hechoreferencia en el Legajo T-No. 40355.

2.On November 29, 1941 Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz sold

Lot 671 to Lucia de la Cruz and TCT No. 40355 T-201 was cancelled by virtueof Entry No. 258, Page 7, Volume 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deedsof Manila. Said entry reads as follows:

1.Number of Entry2582.Date of filing:Month, day & yearJuly 17, 1943Hour and Minute10:15 A.M.


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3.Nature of ContractSale4.Executed byDoroteo (sic) de la Cruz, et al.5.In favor of Lucia de la Cruz6.Date of Instrument11-29-417.Relative to:Certificate ofTitle No40355BookT-2018.Papers presented by:NameRegino Cleofas

AddressPasong Tamo,Quezon City9.Contract valueP2,500.0010.RemarkCaloocan

3.In 1971, Lucia de la Cruz petitioned for the reconstitution of her titlein the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court granted the petitionand the Register of Deeds of Manila issued to her TCT No. RT-58, therebycancelling TCT 40355 T-201. (at p. 698.) LexLib

4.The petition for reconstitution was duly published and proper noticesposted in accordance with law; and after due hearing, was granted bythe court in the exercise of its authority and jurisdiction. "Hence, Wereject petitioners' assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in notdeclaring that the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz is absolutely null andvoid." (at p. 698.)

5."With respect to the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz whichwas granted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 14, 1945 andTCT 5284 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was issued in substitutionand/or reconstitution of TCT 40355 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, . . . it maybe true that the order granting reconstitution was null and voidby reasonof the failure to cause the necessary publication of the petition, and,therefore, the reconstituted title was ineffective. More than that, it isestablished that Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz had previouslysold the land to Lucia de la Cruz on November 29, 1941 as indicated in

Entry No. 258 so that Dorotea de la Cruz was no longer the owner atthe time she petitioned for reconstitution." (at pp. 298-699.)

6."Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Dorotea de la Cruz together withEugenia de la Paz were the registered owners of Lot 671 under TCT


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In the case ofLegarda vs. Savellano(158 SCRA 194 [1988] the Court stated:

. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system ofjurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law,pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of

facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of thequestion litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest.Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere ruleof law, more than an important principle of public policy; and that it isnot too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organizationof every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that atthe risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final atsome definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts wereconstituted was to put an end to controversies.

If we were to allow repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT Nos.

1348-1355 issued to Benito Legarda, Sr. in 1907, the indefeasibility oftitles issued under the Torrens systems and land registration, which thePhilippines has adopted, will be defeated and set to naught. (at p. 200.)

The Court, speaking through Justice Nocon, in Swan vs. Court of Appeals(212SCRA 114 [1992]) stated:

It is high time that we write finisto a litigation that has beenpending for years not only to the prejudice of the prevailing parties, butalso to the prompt determination of controversies, and in violation of thefundamental concept that public policy and sound practice demand that

judgments of courts shall become final at some definite date fixed bylaw. (at p. 124)

Petitioners contend that the de la Cruzcase is not applicable and that thedoctrine ofres judicatashould not have been applied. We do not agree.

The doctrine res judicataactually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar byformer judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or

question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed uponand determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled bythe judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privitywith them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future actionbetween such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court ofconcurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the

judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order


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that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter inanother action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that theissue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the secondaction, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particularpoint or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privieswill be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was inissue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732[1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals(197SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes(76 SCRA 179 [1977]) inregard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars theprosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action,and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or

issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim orcause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts orquestions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action arecommonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subjectmatter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily impliedin the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been madein reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred toin the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under thisrule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not

have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will beconsidered as having settled that matter as to all future actions betweenthe parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,they are as conclusive as the judgment itself . . .

(at pp. 186-187.)

The issue of the validity of the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671of the Piedad Estate, the issue of whether or not the Iglesia ni Kristo was aninnocent purchaser for value and in good faith, and the issue of the validity ofthe reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz (herein

petitioners' predecessors-in-interest) were actually, directly, and expressly raised,controverted, litigated and resolved in our 1984 decision. Applying the rule onconclusiveness of judgment, these issue may no longer be relitigated in thesepresent petitions. cdphil

Petitioners cannot evade the conclusive effect of the 1984 decision, merelybecause they were not impleaded parties in the said case. It has been said that


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the foundation principle upon which the doctrine ofres judicatarests is thatparties ought no to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that,when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trials has been given, the

judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusiveupon the parties those in privity with them in law or estate. (Nabus vs. Court of

Appeals, supra).

In the case ofVda. de Medina vs. Cruz(161 SCRA 36 [1988]), the Court stated:

The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the decision in CivilCase No. C-120 which has long become final and executory can beenforced against the petitioner who is not a party to the aforementionedcase.

Petitioner alleged in her memorandum that she is not affected bythe decision in C-120 as persons who are not parties to a suit are notbound by the judgment and that she purchased the lot in good faithfrom an entirely different person the Heirs of Don Mariano San Pedroy Esteban and not from either the plaintiffs or defendants of theaforesaid case.

It is a generally accepted principle "that no man shall be affectedby any proceeding to which he is a stranger . . ."

[but] being a privy, the petitioner can be reached by the order ofexecution and Writ of Demolition.

(at pp. 43-44.)

Also, in the case ofVarsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro(43 SCRA 503 [1972]), theCourt ruled:

In the face of these declarations in a final decisions of the highestCourt of the land, it becomes indubitable that the action in the courtbelow was definitely barred: for while present private respondents werenot parties in the 1993 cause, their predecessor-in-interest Quintin Mejiawas such a party and the final judgment against him concludes and barshis successors and privies as well.

(at pp. 510-511.)

Admittedly, petitioners derived their title from Amando Clementeand/or Clemville Subdivision. Amando Clemente derived his title fromDorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz. Being privies and/or


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successors in interest to the parties in the 1984 decision, petitionersare bound by said decision.

Likewise untenable is petitioners' contention that the reconstituted titled of Luciade la Cruz, RT-58, is void.

Proceedings for judicial reconstitution or certificates of title areproceedings in rem. Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication issufficient to clothe the Court with jurisdiction and the mere fact that aperson purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did notreceive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate theproceedings.

InAdez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals(212 SCRA 625 [1992]), the Court,through Justice Bellosillo, held:

Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. de la Cruz(17 Phil. 41)We already ruled that the land registration proceedings areproceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessaryto give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought tobe registered, in order to vest the courts with power and authority over

the res. Thus, while, it may be true that no notice was sent byregistered mail to petitioners when the judicial reconstitution of title was

sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.(See PNR vs. De la Vina & Zamacoma, 109 Phil. 342). In Register ofDeeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170 (G.R. No.88623, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 788), We said that "the purpose ofthe publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in theOfficial Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition hasbeen filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause maydo so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearingthe petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the wholeword as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hearand decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the

Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and themere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in theproperty did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground toinvalidate the proceedings. (at p. 628.) LLjur

Besides, the official records of the Quezon City Municipal Hall, as certified to bythe Office of the City Assessor of Quezon City (pp. 456-556, Rolloof G.R. No.


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83280) show that there are no improvements whatsoever on the propertyin question thus signifying that the property is unoccupied. Therefore,it would have been impossible for Lucia de la Cruz to notify petitioners.

Be this as it may, the issue of the validity of the 1971 reconstitution proceedings

is no longer a valid issue in these petitions at bar, its validity having already beenresolved with finality in the 1984 decision.

The contention that the registration of the November 29, 1941 sale byDorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz to Lucia de la Cruz, with theRegister of Deeds of Manila is irregular deserves scant consideration.

As certified to by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (p. 448,Rollo of G.R. No. 83280) the City of Manila and the nearby towns and cities weretreated as a single political unit, that is Greater Manila, during the Japanese

Occupation. Thus, the Excerpts from Volume 7 of the Registry Book of Manila,year 1943 (p. 447, Rollo of G.R. No. 83280), show, among other things, thefollowing entries:

(c)The sale of a parcel of land located in Quezon City executed by

Magdalena Estates, Inc. in favor of Dionisio Bravo;

(d)The mortgage of a parcel of land in Quezon City by AntonioZuzuarregui in favor of Elena Africa, et al.; and

(e)The sale of a parcel of land in Quezon City to Lucia de la Cruz byDorotea de la Cruz, et al.

clearly indicating that transactions involving parcels of land located in QuezonCity were indeed recorded and registered in the Registry of Manila.

Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyancethat serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under theTorrens system. The act of registration creates constructive notice tothe whole world of the fact of such conveyance. (Quilisadio vs. Court of

Appeals, 182 SCRA 401 [1990]; De la Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 212SCRA 390 [1992]).

We cannot go along with petitioners' position that their titles, becausethey were issued in 1952, must prevail over the title of the Iglesia niKristo.


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The titles issued to petitioners are derived from TCT No. 5284. Thistitle, TCT No. 5284 is the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz whichwas declared null and void in the 1984 decision.

3.With respect to the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz which was

granted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 14, 1945and TCT 5284 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was issued insubstitution and/or reconstitution of TCT 40355 of the Register of Deedsof Rizal by virtue of the following inscription on TCT 40335, to wit:

Se expide otra copia para el dueno del presente certificado detitulo en sustitucion del duplicado que se alega haberse quemado,en virtud de na orden del juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizaldictada el 14 de Deciembre, 1945, en Expediente G.L.R.O. Rec.No. 5975, y en donde se declara nulo y ninguna valor dicho

duplicado quemado.

MAMERTO TINGKUNGKORegister of Deeds Interino

it may be true that the order granting reconstitution was null and void

by reason of the failure to cause the necessary publication of thepetition, and therefore, the reconstituted title was ineffective. More thanthat, it is established that Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz hadpreviously sold the land to Lucia de la Cruz executed on November 29,1941 as indicated in Entry No. 258 so that Dorotea de la Cruz was no

longer the owner at the time she petitioned for reconstitution.Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Dorotea de la Cruz together withEugenia de la Paz were the registered owners of Lot 671 under TCT40355, T-201 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, and they could legallytransfer the same to Lucia de la Cruz who thereafter sold in favor ofrespondent Iglesia ni Kristo.

(at pp. 698-699.)

Needless to state, all subsequent certificates of title includingpetitioners' titles are also void because of the legal truism that thespring cannot rise higher than its source (De Santos vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 295 [1988].) The law must protect and prefer thelawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of anytransmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 354 [1988]).

Finally, both petitions are procedurally erroneous because certiorariis not theproper remedy. cdphil


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G.R. No. L-76265 stemmed from a letter in consultaaddressed by the thenActing Register of Deeds of Quezon City to the Administrator of the NationalLand Titles and Deeds Registration Administration involving the registrability of adeed of sale presented for registration by Mr. Constancio Simangan.

The Administrator issued a resolution dated April 4, 1988 ordering the Register ofDeeds to register the deed of sale subject of the consulta.

The Register of Deeds moved for reconsideration. Herein petitioner VirginiaCalalang moved to intervene.

The Acting Administrator denied both motions. Calalang filed a motion forreconsideration but the same was denied, and forthwith, Calalang filed thepresent petition.

The proper remedy available to Calalang is an appeal to the Court of Appealspursuant to Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Republic Act No.5434, and not certiorari or prohibition.

Sec. 117, PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) Procedure . . . theparty in interest who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or orderof the Commission relative to the consultas may appeal to the Court of

Appeals within the period and in the manner provided in Republic ActNo. 5434.

Sec. 2, RA 5434 (Uniform Procedure for Appeals) Appeals to Court ofAppeals. Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within fifteen(15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgmentor from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by lawfor its effectivity; . . . If no appeal is filed within the periods here fixed,the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment shall become final andmay be executed as provided by existing law.

The other case, G.R. No. 83280, stemmed from an injunction suit filed byAugusto de Leon et al. against the Iglesia ni Kristo and Bishop Manalo.

The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. Instead of appealing theorder of dismissal, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals the following.

1.A "Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam"; and

2.An "Omnibus Motion Incident to Execution of the Decision"

The Court of Appeals denied both motions. Hence, the other herein petition.


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It is elementary that a petition for certiorari can not substitute for a lost appeal.The order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the case was appealable.Petitioners in the second petition failed to appeal the same, consequently theorder has already become final and may no longer be reviewed on certiorari.

Moreover, these petitions amount to a collateral attack on the title of the Iglesiani Kristo. Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be altered,modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.(Section 48, PD No. 1529.) LLpr

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners' Motion for Reconsiderations arehereby DENIED

calalang vs register of deeds

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