can rising rates of church participation be a consequence of secularization?

Sociolo~ o… Reli~m 2004, 65:2 139-153

Can Rising Rates of Church Participation be a Consequence of Secularization?

Rick Phillips*

Ah influential theory in the sociolog# of reli~on hoids that the s@araaon o… church and state forces religious organizations to compete with one another for adherents. This competitive dimate heightens levels of church participation. This paper examines two cases where rates o… individual religaous activity increased foUowing the &'fferentiation of political and eoclesiastical smwmres as the compeaaon theo~ t~e~cts. However, the facts surrounding these increases ate not whoUy consistent with the theory's propositions. Rather, I show that a hereto… neglectexl variant o… secularizntion theory suggests a mechanism that better links the process of social differerttiation to changes in individual reli~~as participation.

Traditional secularization theories assert that when social structures and political institutions once suffused with religious significance are transformed into secular entities, churches lose their public power, and people become less involved in religion. Until the 1980s, these theories dominated the sociology of religion (Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto 2002:59-67). These days, however, orthodox proponents of secularization are rare - - a[though some persist (e.g. Bruce 2002). Traditional secularization theories have been supplanted by a "new paradigm," which holds that societies with no state church or predominant religion enjoy greater religious participation than those with govemment spon- sored monopoly faiths. According to the new paradigm, when political and ecclesiastical institutions are separated, people become more involved in religion (Warner 1993; Finke and Stark 1992). This essay examines two cases where rates of individual religious participation rose following the differentiation of political and ecclesiastical structures, as new paradigm theorists predict. I show, however, that a neglected variant of secularization theory suggests a mechanism that better links the process of differentiation to rising religious participation, and reconciles some of the apparent discrepancies between the two paradigms.

* Direct correspondence ro Rick Phillips, Department o… Sociology, Universiry ofNorth F/or/da, 4567 Saim Johm Bluff Road South, JacksonviUe, FL 32224-2659. Email: [email protected]

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140 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

PRINCIPLES OF THE COMPETITION THESlS

New paradigm scholars point to the Second Great Awakening, a period of intense religious revival after the Revolutionary War, to support their claim that the separation of church and state heightens religious activity (Warner 1993: 1052; Finke and Stark 1992). Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, two influential new paradigm theorists, claim that the Second Great Awakening was caused by competition between churches after state supported Protestant establishments were dismantled. According to Finke and Stark, disestablishment "deregulated" religion in the nascent republic, and initiated a free and open "religious market" where various religious entrepreneurs vied for adherents. Religious freedom ensured that itinerant preachers and religious innovators could establish new congregations or orchestrate schisms without government interference (Finke 1997, 1990). This allowed citizens to choose from a wide variety of churches, and affiliate with one that met their needs. Pastors were also compelled to please their flocks, since member contributions were their sole livelihood, and dissatis- fied adherents were free to leave the fold (Stark and Finke 2000). In short, Finke and Stark assert that religious freedom in the antebellum republic spawned vigorous competition among churches. This competition increased the efficiency of religious organizations, and increased rates of individual religious participation. Finke and Stark's model is the most prominent new paradigm theory, and it countermands nearly every assertion of traditional secularization theories.

NEO.SECULARIZATION

Secularization is one of the oldest ideas in sociology, and is central to the work of founding theorists like Comte and Weber (Casanova 1994). As such, traditional secularization theories are primarily based on observations of Euro- pean religion (Wamer 1993). Orthodox proponents continue to emphasize the European case (e.g. Bruce 2001, 1997, 1995). In contrast, the new paradigm is based largely on observations of United States religion, and some scholars urge caution when applying the new paradigm's logic to other parts of the world. Wamer (1997:95) states: "Whether the American recipe for religious vitality would work in other cl imates. . , is beyond my ken." Traditional secularŸ theories, however, purport to be general (Bruce 2002). Because of this, advocates have difficulty with sustained religious vitality in the United States. Bruce, for instance, spills considerable ink explaining away the American case (e.g. Bruce 2002:204-228, 1996:129-168).

Some scholars unwilling to abandon secularization have addressed this problem by promoting a more parsimonious model of secularization, dubbed "neo-secularization" (Yamane 1997). They note that justas competition is the engine of religious increase in the Finke and Stark model, religious differentiation m or the process whereby social structures and institutions once suffused with

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RATES OF CHURCH PARTICIPATION 141

religious significance are transformed into secular entities - - is the cause of religious decrease in traditional secularization theories. Advocates of neo- secularization emphasize the importance of differentiation, but depart from traditional secularization theories by limiting their focus to structures and institutions. They abandon the presumption that differentiation necessarily leads to declines in individuals' religious practice and belief. Tschannen (1994:72) explains: "what has changed is not so much the individual's relationship to religion as the position of religion within the social structure." Casanova (1994:6) concurs, arguing that secularization is the "emancipation of secular spheres from religious institutions and norms," and not necessarily the demise or dissipation of personal piety. Finally, Chaves concludes that secularization should not be linked to a decrease in individual religious participation, but rather defined as the "declining scope of religious authority" (Chaves 1994:750). In short, neo-secularization is an attempt to lift the baby of differentiation from the bathwater of predicted declines in personal religiousness. Casanova (1994:7) writes: "the thesis of the differentiation of the religious and secular spheres is the still defensible core of the theory of secularization."

The persistence of religious vitality in the United States does not contradict the tenets of neo-secularization. This is because the theory employs a stream- lined definition of secularization. Sommerville (1998:251) states: "Please note that we are not saying that differentiation/eads to secularization. Ir/s secularization" (Sommerville 1998:251). But this reformulation has limitations. Tradi- tional secularization theories hypothesize that when social structures and institutions once suffused with religious significance are transformed into secular entities, pe@le become less religious. Neo-secularization discards the dependent variable in such hypotheses, and essentially substitutes a definition of secularization fora theory of secularization. Moreover, Finke and Stark also theorize about the consequences of differentiation, although their model only considers the differentiation of religious and political entities (see Stark and Finke 2002:38). However, Finke and Stark are not so timid as to shrink from predictions about how such differentiation affects individual religious behavior. They note that when church and state separated in the U.S., the Second Great Awakening ensued, and rates of church participation rose dramatically (Finke and Stark 1992).

Toward a Comparative Analysis

Is Finke and Stark's competition model the best explanation for how religious differentiation can resuk in heightened religious involvement? Can neo-secularization m which emerged from theories specifically constructed to predict and explain religious decline m be consistent with increases in religious participation? In the pages that follow I address these questions by using two case studies of religious differentiation in the United States. The first case examines

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the transformation of American Mormonism. The second revisits the Second Great Awakening.

THE DECLINING SCOPE OF MORMON AUTHORITY

No time or setting in U.S. history provides a better case study for investi- gating how the "declining scope of religious authority" and the "emancipation of secular spheres from religious norms and institutions" impact individual religious participation than does the history of Mormonism in 19 th century Utah. Utah was settled in 1847 by Mormon pioneers seeking to establish a theocratic kingdom of God in the desert. The affairs of this k i n g d o m - both temporal and spiritual - - were administered by Brigham Young and the Mormon hierarchy. No distinction was made between political, economic, and church authority, and religious and civic life in early Utah was fused (Campbell 1988). Brigham Young was both church prophet and governor of the Utah Territory, and other members of the Mormon hierarchy held top political posts (Allen and Leonard 1992). Church leaders told the rank-and-file how they should vote in territorial elections, and from 1847 to 1874, nota single candidate put forth by Mormon leaders lost (Jack 1970).

In most Utah towns, the local "ward house" served as church, school, and town hall. Worship services were not limited to religious topics, and town business was often introduced from the pulpit and debated during meetings (Arrington and Bitton 1992:115-116, 211; Alexander and Allen 1984:79). Mormon ecclesiastica[ courts could levy fines for violating church standards, and these courts resolved many civil disputes in the territory (Shipps, May and May 1994: 302-303).

Mormon Power Curtailed

Mormon theocracy did not sit well with Washington. In 1857, President James Buchanan removed Brigham Young as territorial governor and sent a federal appointee to replace him. Buchanan also dispatched troops to the region, anda garrison was set up outside Salt Lake City. This established a non-Mormon presence in Utah, which "cracked and weakened the cement that held the temporal and spiritual spheres together" (Alexander 1995:174).

Shortly after these events, Eastern mining interests arrived in the territory to exploit Utah's mineral resources. Mining companies imported much of their labor force, and increased Utah's non-Mormon population (Madsen 1990). Eastern merchants set up shop in Utah as well, importing goods previously unavailable in the territory. Church leaders viewed the miners and merchants as threats to the Mormon way of life. They counseled Mormons not to work in the

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mines, and to boycott "gentile ''l stores (Walker 1998; Peterson 1984:72-73). Nevertheless, mining paid well and stores contained goods that Mormons wanted, so these injunctions ultimately failed (Allen 1967:15-17). The church lost its ability to control labor and commerce in Utah, and the religious and economic spheres began to split.

Conflict with the federal government eventually forced Mormon leaders to dismantle the overt manifestations of theocratic rule. By the early 20 th century, public business had moved to government buildings, and churches no longer doubled as town halls. Civil courts supplanted church courts, and Mormon leaders stopped settling public disputes (see Alexander 1986).

Religious and political life in Utah was substantially differentiated by the 1930s (Alexander 1986:4). Most of the Mormon hierarchy preferred the Republican party, while the rank-and-file were largely Democrats (Quinn 1997). This political division irritated certain church leaders, and in 1936, they attempted to bring the flock into the fold by vigorously campaigning against F.D.R. and the New Deal (Cannon 1999). Nevertheless, while Mormons accepted their leaders' authority in church matters, they felt free to ignore their political advice. Roosevelt garnered 69.3 percent of Utah's vote (Quinn 2002:80-83). The days of directed, unanimous bloc voting were over.

In sum, the demise of Mormon theocracy and the "Americanization" of Utah is an archetypal tale of the "declining scope of religious authority," and a clear illustration of the "emancipation of secular spheres from religious norms and institutions." But what effect did this differentiation have on the religious behavior of individual Mormons?

Differentiation and Mormon Religious Behavior

Extant data show that as church leaders lost control over the political and economic lives of their people, rates of religious participation among the Mormons began to rise. Changes in church attendance illustrate this phenomenon. Nineteenth century Mormons were notoriously indifferent to worship services (Walker 1987). At the turn of the century, church attendance rates were generally below 15 percent (Alexander 1986:108-109). However, by the 1930s attendance had more than doubled to 35 percent (Arrington and Bitton 1992:285). As the vestiges of Mormon theocracy dissolved in the last hall: of the 20 th century, these rates tose still higher. Cowan (1985:69) demonstrates that church attendance increased steadily after World War II, and attendance averaged 48 percent in the 1970s (Arrington and Bitton 1992:285). Thus, the differentiation of temporal and religious authority coincided with increases in the frequency of church attendance among Mormons.

1 Nineteenth centa~ Mormons referred to those outside the faith (including Jews) as gentiles.

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This trend runs counter to the predictions of traditional secularization theories, but it would not surprise Finke and Stark. They theorize that whenever one church enjoys a virtual religious monopoly, rates of participation within the monopoly church are low, because no single organization can meet the diverse religious needs of ah entire society. Unmet needs create a latent constituency for insurgent sects, so to retain their dominance, monopoly churches must use their power to repress incipient schisms and restrain minority faiths. They do this by regulating the activities of potential competitors through a merger of church and state. This stifles religious competition and reduces the likelihood of defection from the monopoly church (Stark and Finke 2002:33-40, 2000:198-202). Finke and Stark's model would predict that the demise of Mormon theocracy initiated a free and open religious market in Utah, and paved the way for religious pluralism and competition. Once this happened, Mormonism was forced to compete on equal footing with minority churches, and rates of religious activity t o s e .

Unfortunately, this hypothetical narrative is not entirely consistent with the facts, and the competition model cannot fully account for rising rates of Mormon church attendance. First, while it is certainly the case that temporal and ecclesiastical power were merged in early Utah, the territory enjoyed de jure religious freedom from the outset. The constitution of the Mormon theocracy, penned in 1847, used words similar to those in the First Amendment to guarantee religious liberty for minority churches (Morgan 1987:126-127). This was not simply rhetoric. Allen and Leonard (1992:349) note that the Mormons made no effort to exclude minority churches, "and sometimes even cooperated by letting them use Mormon chapels until they could build their own meeting places." In addition, there was substantial religious pluralism in Utah m and hence a climate where religious competition was possible - - long before Mormon rates of church attendance rose. Jews, Catholics, Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians and Baptists were all present in Utah before 1870 (Bean, Mineau and Anderton 1990:50). Moreover, in 1870 a schismatic group comprised of powerful ex-Mormons organized a church that proselytized openly and operated without interference (Walker 1998:189-209). Thus, religious freedom existed in Utah almost a century before church attendance rates began to rise, and religious pluralism was present at least 50 years before these increases.

Second, the religious demography of Utah does not suggest that rising Mormon church attendance was caused by intensifying competition from other denominations. As the 20 th century progressed, Mormonism actually increased its per capita membership in Utah. Sixty percent of Utah's population belonged to the Mormon church in 1920, but by the year 2000 the figure had increased to 75 percent (Deseret News 2001-2002 Church Almanac 1982, 2000). These gains contrast with losses sustained by other churches. In 1906, Protestants claimed 13.4 percent of Salt Lake City's adherents, while Roman Catholicism claimed

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16.3 percent (Christiano 1987:174). By 2000, neither group could muster 8 percent (ASARB 2000). These figures rebut Finke and Stark's claim that churches with extensive "market share" lack vitality (Stark and Finke 2000: 219), and that competition necessarily propels religious markets toward equilibrium and the absence of any veritable or virtual monopoly church. Mormonism became more vital as it gained market share m a fact that can't be squared with the competition thesis. 2

In sum, while it is possible that religious competition played a role in elevating rates of Mormon church participation in the 20 th century, the competition thesis alone is not sufficient to explain this trend. Can neo-secularization fill in the blanks?

Differentiation and Mormon Church Participation Rates

AII aspects of social life in 19 th century Utah were infused with religious significance. Typical Mormons did not see laboring on a public works project or singing in the ward choir as different kinds of activities - - both were "religio- community" obligations. For those engaged in building the kingdom of God, tilling fields and damming streams were sacred duties indistinguishable from things like paying tithes of reading scripture (see May 1997:144; Shipps, May and May 1994:302). Because of this, 19 th century Mormons did not regard church attendance asa particularly important form of religious expression. Walker (1987:155) writes: "Instead of gathering at the chapel, the pioneers declared the faith by adopting a life-style that set them apart from the world and put them to work 'building the kingdom.'"

The demise of Mormon theocracy transformed religiosity in Utah. As more and more social and political institutions disengaged from the church, interac- tion in these arenas lost its religious significance, and religious expression was relegated to the ecclesiastical sphere. As the differentiation process accelerated, church attendance became an increasingly necessary way to sustain and preserve Mormon identity and solidarity. Brooke (1994:292) writes: "Attendance at local ward meetings and at the temple began to increase, as traditional - - ir irregular

spiritual outlets were suppressed." The more the church withdrew from temporal affairs, the more important church attendance became, and the higher rates rose. As Sommerville (1998:250) points out, "Ÿ is sometimes possible to show secularization and the intensification of religion occurring simultaneously;

2 Proponents of the competition thesis may argue that since Mormonism enjoyed considerable growth outside Utah in the 20thcentu~, rising rates of church attendance are attributable to the religious activiW of Mormons living in states where Mormonism is a minorit~ faith. However, abundant data demonstrate that Mormons inside Utah have higher levels of church attendance and religious observance than those outside the state (See Mauss 1994:41-43; Phillips 1998; Bennion and Young 1996).

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confining religion to a narrower channel can make the flow of its energy more rapid."

Sommerville's reasoning highlights a critical problem with the debate over whether religious participation is higher in differentiated or undifferentiated milieus. Rates of church attendance among 20 th century Mormons did not rise because church members became more religious. Likewise, 19 th century Mormons were not indifferent to their faith. Rather, the meaning and importance of church attendance changed as Mormonism lost its political and economic power. This demonstrates that a fully articulated neo-secularization theory has the potential to make predictions about individual religious behavior, but that theoretical development in this area has been hung up over questions of "less" or "more" religious involvement, instead of examining how types and degrees of differentiation affect the configuration of religious expression (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Gorski 2000).

In short, neo-secularization theory provides a better explanation for increasing Mormon church attendance than does the competition thesis. But can neo-secularization add to our understanding of re[igious participation during the Second Great Awakening, the case that provides the "best historical fit" for the new paradigm? (Warner 1993:1052)

DIFFERENTIATION AND THE SECOND GREAT AWAKENING

Historians and sociologists have documented the role of religious competition in the democratization of Protestantism during the Second Great Awakening. (Finke and Stark 1992; Hatch 1989). But history shows that the emergence of religious competition is best conceived as an integral part of a larger narrative of religious transformation in the early republic. Examining the events leading up to the Second Great Awakening in New England reveals that differentiation and the declining scope of religious authority had independent effects on religious participation, net of the impact of competition.

Reli~ous Life in the Colonies

Social life in early New England was organized around the parish. Within parish boundaries, there was no distinction between ecclesiastical and civic authority (Abzug 1994:5; Stout and Brekus 1994:35), and "all aspects of life were intertwined" (Wood 1991:11). The parish instilled a "restrictive localism" in residents that prescribed allegiance to the community and suppressed individual autonomy (Shain 1994:52). However, wrenching demographic and economic changes were differentiating the social structures encompassed by the parish well before the Revolutionary War. Class antagonisms divided congregations asa waxing individualista undermined traditional status hierarchies (see Schantz 2000). Waves of immigrants broadened religious pluralism (Butler 2000:186;

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RATESOFCHURCH PARTICIPATION 147

Mintz 1995:7). The emergence of a market economy fostered commerce and social relations outside parish lines that chipped away at patemalistic localism (Sellers 1991).

The parish system was disintegrating on the eve of the 19 th century. Itinerant clergy openly challenged the legitimacy of parish boundaries as congregation perimeters. As parishes lost the ability to define public norms and structure religious communities, itinemnts filled the void by founding congregations bounded by willful assent to ascetic lifestyles and spiritual rebirth, rather than geographic borders (Hall 1994). The Second Great Awakening was underway.

Itinerant clergy are central to Finke and Stark's analysis of the Second Great Awakening. They contend that collapsing religious establishments paved the way for vigorous competition among itinemnts and religious entrepreneurs. This competition fostered a vital religious marketplace, and led to increased religious participation. Finke and Stark point to rising church membership rates to bolster this claim. Between 1776 and 1850, the percentage of the nation's populace with membership in a church rose from 17 percent to 34 percent (Finke and Stark 1992:16).

Few would deny that religious competition was instrumental in elevating church membership rates during the Second Great Awakening. But this trend was also caused by changes in the meaning and significance of church membership. The competition thesis cannot fully account for these changes, but they are consistent with the logic of neo-secularization.

The Lo~c of Differenaafion and Church Membership Rates

New England's parishes situated inhabitants within a religious community. Attendance at worship services was expected of everyone, but only a small percentage of those attending enjoyed actual membership in the parish church (Holifield 1994:25). Hence, a religious identity and Christian fellowship were adequately maintained for most parish residents without official church membership. The collapse of the parish system and the subsequent differentiation of congregation and community changed this. Because the congregations established by itinerant clergy and religious entrepreneurs spanned traditional parish boundaries, symbolic boundaries were needed to determine who was or was no ta member of the religious community. Formal church membership assumed this role. Thus, as congregations shifted from taken-for- granted communities based on propinquity to chosen communities based on shared sentiments, church membership became ah important and sought-after marker of inclusion (see Erickson 1998:35). 3

3 Bruce notes a similar phenomenon in his analysis of medieval Europe, and concludes that "Church membership itself is a modero idea" (Bruce 1996:26).

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Comparing trends in church membership rates to church attendance rates in the antebellum U.S. underscores this point. In colonial New England, the number of people attending church meetings generally far exceeded the number of actual communicant members (Holifield 1994; Stout and Brekhus 1994:23). But as parish structures began to differentiate, formal church membership emerged as an important means of religious expression, and this pattern promptly reversed. Thus, while it is true that between 1776 and 1850 the number of Americans with formal church memberships doubled, it is also true that church attendance rates remained stable during this time (Holifield 1994:25-28; see also Chaves and Gorski 2001:272). Moreover, the democratization of Protestantism led to changes in the criteria for church membership. Requirements for joining most churches were relaxed, making it much easier for ordinary citizens to join (Chaves and Gorski 2001:272; Abzug 1994:48). Thus, ceter/s par/bu.s, a typical citizen in 1850 was more likely to be a church member than her counterpart in 1776 simply because membership was more readily available. This suggests that rising church membership rates during the Second Great Awakening are due as much to changes in the meaning and significance of church membership m wrought by differentiation - - as they ate to increased religious participation caused by competition between denominations.

The Ordering of Events in the Competition Thesis

In addition, applying the logic of neo-secularization can solve problems with the temporal ordering of events in the competition thesis. Finke and Stark clearly assert that the demise of established churches prompted the rise of religious pluralism m the principal source of religious competition (Finke and Stark 1992). This chronology is critical to their theory, but the relationship between pluralism and disestablishment is not so cut-and-drŸ in the historical record. It is justas easy to reverse this sequence of events and argue that rising religious pluralism w fueled in part by immigration and geographic mobility undercut support for religious establishments and ultimately speUed their doom (see Olson 2002:155-156). A number of historians make precisely this argument (see Walters 1997:30; Feller 1995:95-98; Pointer 1988:53-71; cf. Chaves and Gorski 2001:273). Indeed, the historical record indicates something of a "chicken and egg" relationship between pluralism and disestablishment (see Hutchison 2003), In short, the link between these variables is more complicated than Finke and Stark's model implies. Neo-secularization theory skirts much of this complexity by regarding both rising pluralism and disestablishment as manifestations of the declining scope of religious authority.

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IMPLICATIONS for the Sociology of Religion

This essay demonstrates that neo-secularization provides a mechanism that links structural differentiation to variations in individual religious participation, and resolves some of the difficulties that limit the utility of the competition thesis. For instance, Finke and Stark measure religious activity with rates of formal church participation, and hypothesize that these rates rise or rail depending on the extent of religious competition. However, my case studies show that differentiation transforms and re&fines religious activity, and that fluctuating rates of formal church participation are as affected by the scope of religious authority as they are by the intensity of religious competition (Spickard 1998:100; c.f. Gorski 2000:243).

The case studies also imply that different forros of religious differentiation have distinct, independent effects on religious participation. For instance, Finke and Stark outline the consequences of the separation of church and state in their analysis of the Second Great Awakening, but this was also a time of tremendous population growth (both from immigration and natural increase), economic transformation, geographical mobility and urbanization (Sellers 1991; Hatch 1989). These social upheavals differentiated congregation from community, religious affiliation from nationality, and gave rise to denominations with class- based constituencies. Such changes had substantial impacts on religious participation net of the effects of competition. Thus, from a neo-secularization perspective, the separation of church and state is not necessarily the prime catalyst for religious change, but rather one axis of religious differentiation among several. This suggests an avenue for synthesizing the differentiation and competition theses into a more comprehensive and nuanced theory of religious participation (see Gorski 2000:143). Indeed, Finke and Stark's story of religious competition in the antebellum U.S. can easily be recast in neo-secularization terms. Seen this way, the First Amendment is a two-edged sword that prevents government from inhibiting religious expression, but also limits the scope of religious authority to ecclesiastical affairs. Asa consequence, churches are less effective agents of social control. Excommunications no longer incur public stigma. Defectors and apostates can't be fined, flogged or banished. In this setting, churches only exert influence over those who freely offer their allegiance. One response is the overt marketing of religion and competition among churches. As Bruce ( 2002:180-181) observes: "The sort of culture in which people feel free to switch between alternative religions would be one in which religion was not embedded in important social identities." Rather, it would be one in which religious identity is largely distinct from neighborhood, class, ethnic and even kinship ties. That rates of formal church membership or attendance might rise in the wake of such differentiation belies the fact that things like community festivals and public assemblies have essentially lost their religious

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chamcter, and church membership and attendance are now the principal forms of religious expression.

CONCLUSION

Scholars sympathetic to secularization theories have been slow to account for instances where religious participation appears to rise, such as the Second Great Awakening. Some have abandoned the search for explanations of individual religious behavior altogether, and simply focused their attention on social structures and institutions. However, this essay shows that neo-secularization provides a mechanism linking structural differentiation and individual religious activity. Nevertheless, a comprehensive neo-secularization theory that properly accounts for individual religious behavior is a long way off. Work toward such a theory must investigate the ways in which different types of differentiation affect individuals' orientation to religion, and consider the changing meanings of religious expression through time.

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can rising rates of church participation be a consequence of secularization?

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