cansofcom professional development centre …
TRANSCRIPT
C A N S O F C O M P R O F E S S I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C E N T R E
Colonel Bernd Horn
INNOVATION AND DARING
THE CAPTURE OF EBAN EMAEL, 10 MAy 1940
M I S S I O N
The mission of the Canadian Forces Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Professional Development Centre (PDC) is to enable profes-sional development within the Command in order to continually develop and enhance the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel.
V I S I O N
The vision of the CANSOFCOM PDC is to be a key enabler to CANSOFCOM headquarters, units and Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) as an intel-lectual centre of excellence for special operations forces (SOF) professional development (PD).
R O L E
The CANSOFCOM PDC is designed to provide additional capacity to:
1. develop the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel;
2. access subject matter advice on diverse subjects from the widest possible network of scholars, researchers, subject matter experts (SMEs), institutions and organizations;
3. provide additional research capacity;
4. develop educational opportunities and SOF specific courses and professional development materials;
5. record the classified history of CANSOFCOM;
6. develop CANSOF publications that provide both PD and educational materials to CANSOF personnel and external audiences;
7. maintain a website that provides up-to-date information on PD opportunities and research materials; and
8. assist with the research of SOF best practices and concepts to ensure that CANSOFCOM remains relevant and progressive so that it maintains its position as the domestic force of last resort and the international force of choice for the Government of Canada.
THE CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
1. More Than Meets the Eye: The Invisible Hand of SOF in Afghanistan Colonel Bernd Horn, 2011.
2. Squandering the Capability: Soviet SOF in Afghanistan Major Tony Balasevicius, 2011.
3. Military Strategy: A Primer Dr. Bill Bentley, 2011.
4. Slaying the Dragon: The Killing of Bin Laden Colonel Bernd Horn and Major Tony Balasevicius, 2012.
5. Between Faith and Reality: A Pragmatic Sociological Examination of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’s Future Prospects
Colonel Mike Rouleau, 2012.
6. Working with Others: Simple Guidelines to Maximize Effectiveness Dr. Emily Spencer and Colonel Bernd Horn, 2012.
7. Operation Dawn in the Gulf of Aden and the Scourge of Piracy Colonel Bernd Horn, 2012.
8. “We Murder to Dissect”: A Primer on Systems Thinking and War Dr. Bill Bentley, 2012.
9. Breaching Barriers: A Comprehensive Approach to Special Operations Decision-Making in Non-Traditional Security Environments Major Steven Hunter, 2013.
10. Chaos in Kandahar: The Battle for Building 4 Colonel Bernd Horn, 2013.
11. “Little Giant Killer”: The Bill Underwood Story Dr. Emily Spencer with Robbie Cressman, 2013.
12. From Assassins to Al-Qaeda: Understanding and Responding to Religious Terrorism Kevin E. Klein, 2013.
13. Amongst the Eagles: The Battle of Mount La Difensa Kevin E. Klein, 2013.
CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
MONOGRAPHS
INNOVATION AND DARING
Colonel Bernd Horn
INNOVATION AND DARING
THE CAPTURE OF EBAN EMAEL,
10 May 1940
Copyright © 2014 Her Majesty the Queen, in right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence.
CanadianSpecialOperationsForcesCommand 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa,OntarioK1A0K2
ProducedforCANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentreby17WingWinnipegPublishingOffice.WPO31041
COVeR pHOTO: Survivors of Storm Detachment Granite after the assault, 11 May 1940 Bundesarchive,Bild146-1971-011-27/Büttner
MONOgRAPH 14: INNOVATION AND DARINg: THE CAPTURE OF EBAN EMAEL, 10 MAy 1940
CANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentreMonographSeriesEditor:Dr.EmilySpencer
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Horn,Bernd,1959-Innovationanddaring:thecaptureofEbanEmael,10May1940/ColonelBerndHorn.
(CANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentremonographseries;14)Produced for the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre by 17 Wing Winnipeg PublishingOffice.AvailablealsoontheInternet.Includesbibliographicalreferences.ISBN978-1-100-23898-2Cat.no.:D4-10/14-2014E
1.WorldWar,1939-1945--Campaigns--Belgium.2.FortEben-Emael(Eben-Emael,Belgium). 3. Special forces (Military science)--Germany--History--20th century. 4. Raids (Militaryscience)--History--20thcentury. I.Canada.CanadianArmedForces.Wing,17 II.Canada. Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. Professional Development Centre III.Title.IV.Title:CaptureofEbanEmael,10May1940.V.Series:CANSOFCOMProfessionalDevelopmentCentremonographs14
D763.B42E242014940.54’219324C2014-980031-2
PrintedinCanada.
Theviewsexpressedinthispublicationareentirelythoseof theauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviews,policyor
positionoftheGovernmentofCanada,theDepartmentofNationalDefence,theCanadianForces,theCanadianSpecialOperations
ForcesCommandoranyoftheirsubordinateunitsororganizations.
1
FOReWORD
It is my pleasure to introduce the latest monograph created by
theCanadianSpecialOperationsForcesCommand (CANSOFCOM)
Professional Development Centre (PDC). This series remains an
important forum in expanding the growing body of literature on
Special Operations Forces (SOF) in general and Canadian Special
OperationsForces(CANSOF)inparticular.Inthismanner,thosein
theCommand,aswellasthoseexternaltoit,cancontinuetolearn
moreaboutSOF,particularlywithregardtoitsstrategicutilityandin
thecaseofCANSOF,itscontributiontotheCanadianArmedForces
andtheGovernmentofCanada.
Thismonograph,Daring and Innovation: The Capture of Eben Emael,
May 1940 is especiallyworthyof studyas theevent is a seminal
exampleof,asthetitledescribes,daringandinnovation.Theattack
wasacoup de main actionthatcapturedwhattheworldperceived
to be an impregnable fortress within hours. In fact, the actual
objectiveofthemission,toknockoutgunsthatcouldinterferewith
the actions of conventional units attempting to cross the Albert
CanalinBelgium,wasachievedwithin15minutes.
Assuch,thiscasestudyprovidesthedetailsofhowasmallgroup
of specially selected and specially trained individuals was able
to accomplish the unthinkable. Their bold strike and seizure of
Eben Emael is indicative of a number of core SOF attributes
and principles of success. In particular, innovation and agility of
thought allowed them to capitalizeonnewmethodologies, tech-
nologiesandapproachestowar.Furthermore,maintainingsecrecy,
ensuringasolidplanthatmaintainedsimplicityandhadcontingency
options,ensuringdetailedrehearsals,utilizingspeedandsurprise,
2
aswellaspsychologicaldislocationoftheenemyintheexecution,
allplayedanimportantpartinthesuccessoftheattack.
Daring and Innovationprovidesanexcellentcasestudythatwillal-lowpractitionersandstudentsofSOFtounderstandthesuccessfulemployment and effectiveness of SOF actions. As always, I hope youfindthispublicationinformative.Additionally,itisintendedtosparkdiscussionand reflection.Pleasedonothesitate tocontactthePDCshouldyouhavecommentsortopicsthatyouwould like toseeaddressedaspartoftheCANSOFCOMmonographseries.
Dr.EmilySpencerSeriesEditorandDirectorofEducationandResearchCANSOFCOM PDC
3
INNOVATION AND DARING: THe CApTURe OF eBAN eMAeL,
10 MAy 1940
Nervous tension filled the confined interior of the aircraft. Thesame scene was played out in eleven separate gliders spreadacrossthenondescriptairfieldinthepredawndarknessneartheGerman/Dutchborder.HeavilyarmedGermanFallschirmjägers satmotionlessinthetightlyconfinedspaceoftheirnarrowDFS-230gliders.Theyrantheirhandsovertheirequipmentinthedark,reassuring themselves that theyhadall thenecessary toolsandmunitionstodotheirtask.
Thecalmpre-morningstillnesswassuddenlyshatteredastheen-ginesoftheJunker(Ju)-52transportplanessprungtolife.Theroarandshudderofthemotorsshookthelargeaircraft,whichinturnsentvibrationsthroughthethicktowropeattachedtothegliderscausingthemtobegintorock.Then,suddenly,theglidersjerkedforwardasthetowropeswerepulledtaunt.
The Ju-52snowbegan to rumbledown the airstrip, straining topickupspeedwhilepullingtheirtetheredcharges.Asthetrans-portplanesstruggledtoacceleratetheglidersfellinlinewiththeirrespective towing aircraft. The chain-rattling noise of the gliderwheelsacceleratingtokeepupwithitsslavedtransportplanefilledthefuselage,whichwobbledandshookviolentlybackandforthasitmadeitswaydowntheairstrip.Then,afterasuddenlungeintotheair,thewheelswentsilent.Butthesilencewasshort-livedastheinteriorofthegliderbegantofillwiththeslappingandpulsat-ingof the canvasmaterial covering the fuselage. Thenoise anddiscomfort, however,would not last long. The distance to their
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objectivewas relatively short and the transport planes climbedsteeply to reach their required altitude before releasing the gliders.
Blind to all around them and feeling particularly vulnerablecrammed into the DF-230 glider, the German Fallschirmjägers mentally reviewed their tasks. They had rehearsed the assaultendlesslyandfeltwell-prepared.However,theyallknew,that inwar,asthegreatGermantheoristKarlvonClausewitzhadstated,eventhesimplestoftaskscanbecomedifficult.
Then without warning the lurching subsided. It was now eerilycalmandquietwithonlytherushingwindandgentleslappingofthecanvasbeingaudible.Nonetheless,theturbulentpitchingandswayingremainedthreateningtomakeeventhehardestsick.
In the cramped cockpit the glider pilots looked down and theycould see on the distant ground a line of fire pointing thewaytotheobjective.OncetheJu-52transportplanesattained2,000metres and their final release point, whichwas intended to beinGermanterritorysoastomaintainsurpriseandtoensuretheaircraftenginesdidnotprematurelywarntheBelgiandefenders,thetowropeswerecastoff.Theglidersnowhadtomakethelast32kilometrestotheobjectiveontheirown.Theybeganagentlesteadydescent,butitsoontransitionedintoaseriesofhard,tightcirclesastheskilled,experiencedgliderpilotsbeganarapidandprecipitousdescentdirectlyontotheobjective.
The assault force inside the gliders tensed themselves for thelanding.Withoutwarning,thestillnessoftheflightwasdisruptedbythesoundsofroundsrippingthroughcanvasandthesplinter-ing of wooden frames. The violent eruption of noise was onlymomentaryas theglidersmadecontactwith thegroundwithadistinctthudandskiddedacrossthegrassatanalarmingspeed.Thepilotsquicklyapplied thehandbrakesandthegliderscame
5
tojarringhaltsthroughouttheconfinesoftheBelgianFortressofEbenEmael.
Withouthesitation,theFallschirmjägersexitedtheglidersthroughthe reardoorsand the frontcanopy.Althoughexpecting to sur-prise their enemy, the attacking force was still shocked by theapparentdisarrayoftheiropponentsandthesubstantivelackofinitialresistance.Quicklycapitalizingontheirmomentaryadvan-tagetheassaultingdetachmentswastednotimeinexecutingtheirtasks. Eachdetachment grabbed their explosives anddashed totheirobjectives.Timewasoftheessence.Afterall,ontheirshoul-dersseeminglyrestedthesuccessoftheinvasionofFrance!Theheavily outnumbered assaulting forcewas gambling that speed,innovationandviolenceofactionwouldcarrytheday.
BACKGROUND
By1939,despiteHitler’sprovocativemoves,theAllieswerehesi-tant,ifnotreluctant,togotowar.Germany’sinvasionofPoland,due toallianceguarantees,however, forced the issue.Nonethe-less,therewaslittleBritainandFrancecould,ormoreaccuratelywould,do.TheGermanArmycutaswathofdestructionthroughPoland,forcingthecountrytocrumbleinalittleoveramonth.Theuseofcombinedarms,aptlytitled“Blitzkrieg”thatleveragedthemarriageof tanks,armouredvehiclesandclosesupportaircraft,createdanoffensivecapabilityempoweredbyspeed,mobilityanddestructivepower.
In the aftermathof thePolish victory,Hitler haltedhiswarma-chine.Amazingly,theAllieshadgivenupagoldenopportunitytostrikeat,anddefeat,Germany.HitlerhadcorrectlygambledthattheAllieswouldnotact.Assuch,hehadlefthisWesternfrontierpractically undefended, utilizing second rate frontier troops toguardtheborder.Hehadtaken62divisions,representinghisbest
6
forces,supportedby1,300aircraft,fortheattackonPoland.OncetheconquestofPolandwascompleted,heceasedfurtheroffen-siveaction.TherewasnowastalemateontheWesternFrontasGermanyfaceddownBritainandFrancealongtheFrenchborder.
The“PhoneyWar”draggedonthroughthewintermonths.TheninAprilof1940,GermanforcesseizedNorway.FewdoubtedthatFranceandtheLowCountrieswouldbenext.Assuch,itwasonlyamatteroftimebeforetheconflictwouldhemorrhage,forcingyetanotherwaronthescaleoftheGreatWar.
The Allies had apparently learned nothing in the interveningwar years, or for thatmatter, from the invasions of Poland andNorway.TheystillclungtotheirFirstWorldWarexperienceanddoctrine and prepared for a replay of the GreatWar. They hadspentmuchof the interwar yearsbuilding formidabledefences.TheFrenchbuilttheMaginotLineinthe1930s,whichwasaseriesof fortifications that stretched along the eastern French borderfromSwitzerlandtoBelgium.TheBelgiansinturnbuiltdefencesalongtheAlbertCanal.BetweentheFrenchandBelgiandefensivebelt stood the Ardennes forest, an obstacle the Allies believedwouldbe impenetrablebyGerman forces.TheAlliesbankedonthe idea that themixofconcrete fortificationsanddense forestwouldleavetheGermansnochoicebuttoonceagainswingtotheNorth,astheyhadintheFirstWorldWar,wheretheAllieswouldbewaitingwiththeirconcentrationofforces.
Indeed, Major-General F.W. Von Mellenthin later revealed, “InNovember 1939, the German plan of attack in the West wasverysimilartothefamousSchlieffenPlanofWorldWarI,i.e.theschwerpunkt[mainpointofeffort]wastobetherightwing,butswinging a littlewider than in 1914 and includingHolland.”1 All tenofGermany’spanzerdivisions,groupedunderArmyGroupB, were assigned to this mission. Meanwhile, Army Group A was
7
responsible for penetrating the Ardennes and advancing up the line of theMeuse River with infantry, while Army Group CfoughtadefensivebattlefacingtheFrenchMaginotline.2
However,anunfortunate,orperhaps intheendanalysisapara-doxically very fortunate blunder, by a German courier, changedthefateoftheAllies.3GeneralHeinzGuderianexplained:
ALuftwaffeofficercourierwho,contrarytostandingor-ders,wasflyingbynightwithimportantpaperscontain-ingreferencestotheproposedSchlieffenPlanoperation,crossedtheBelgianfrontierandwascompelledtomakeaforcedlandingonBelgiansoil.Itwasnotknownwhetherhehadsucceededindestroyinghispapers.Inanycase,itwasassumedthattheBelgians,andprobablytheFrenchand British, knew all about our proposed operation... ThisresultedinMansteinPlannowbecomingtheobjectofseriousstudy.4
TheMansteinPlan,devisedbyGeneralErichvonManstein,andfavoured by many of the new breed of German generals who believed in the power of mobility and speed, still rested onthe concept of three Army groups sweeping through the Low CountriesandFrance.Thedifference,however,layintheempha-sisandlocationofthe“schwerpunkt.”TheMansteinPlanputtheemphasisonArmyGroupA.Mansteinrevealed:
OKH [German Army Headquarters] in accordance withHitler’sdirectiveof9thOctober–tosendastrongrightwingoftheGermanarmiesthroughHollandintoNorth-ernBelgiumtodefeattheAnglo-FrenchforcesitexpectedtoencountertheretogetherwiththeBelgiansandDutch.Inotherwords,thedecisionwasprimarilytobesoughtbyastrongthrustontherightwing…TherealchancelaywithArmyGroupA,andconsistedinlaunchingasurprise
8
attackthroughtheArdennes–wheretheenemywouldcertainlynotbeexpectinganyarmorbecauseoftheter-rain–towardthelowerSommeinordertocutofftheen-emyforcesthrownintoBelgiumforwardofthatriver.Thiswas theonlypossiblemeansofdestroying theenemy’sentirenorthernwinginBelgiumpreparatorytowinningafinalvictoryinFrance.5
Andso,inaveryriskygambit,MansteinproposedthatthebulkofthepanzerforcesbesentthroughtheconfiningArdennesforestsinaboldthrustthatwouldcatchtheAlliesbysurpriseandcutofftheirforcesintheNorth,inBelgiumandHolland.ArmyGroupB,wouldswingthroughBelgiumandHolland,muchliketheSchlief-fenPlanoftheFirstWorldWaranddrawtheAlliedforcesawayfrom themain blow in the Ardennes. These forces would thenbe cutoffonceArmyGroupA sliced through theArdennesandreachedthecoast.ArmyGroupCwouldcontinuetofightadefen-siveholdingactionfacingthevauntedimpregnableMaginotline.6
Major-GeneralvonMellenthinemphasizedtheimportanceofthefocusontheArdennes.Heexplained:
ButthedecisivefactorwasforthatforthebreakthroughbetweenSedanandNamurwehadmassedsevenofourtenpanzerdivisions,ofwhichfivewereconcentratedintheSedansector.TheAlliedmilitaryleaders,particularlytheFrench,stillthought intermsofthelineartacticsofWorldWar I and split their armor among their infantrydivisions... Thewhole campaignhingedon the employ-mentofarmor,andwasessentiallyaclashofprinciplesbetweentworivalschools.7
9
Ger
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inva
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ay 1
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10
The German gamble was risky. In May 1940, the Germans had2,439tanks,mainlylighttanks,againstacombinedAlliedstrengthof 4,204 tanks,many ofwhichwere superior in armour and ar-mament to theGermanmodels. TheGermanswere alsoheavily outnumbered in other areas as well. They fielded 135 infantrydivisionsagainsttheAlliedcombinedstrengthof151infantrydivi-sions.Inartillerythebalancesheetwasevenmorelopsidedwith7,378artillerypiecesfortheGermansagainst14,000Alliedpieces.8
Moreover,theBelgianshadbeenbusysincetheendoftheFirstWorldWarpreparingtheirborderdefences.GeneraltheViscountGort,theBritishCommander-in-ChiefoftheBritishExpeditionaryForce(BEF),reportedbacktohisheadquartersinLondonontheeveoftheinvasion:
The development of the successive defensive positionsandswitchlinesbehindtheBelgianfrontierwascontinuedsteadilytill10thMay.Bythisdateover400concrete‘pill-boxes’ofvaryingsizehadbeencompletedwithover100moreunderconstruction,whileworkontheimprovementoffielddefences,wireandotherobstaclesproceededcon-tinuouslyontheoriginal frontand inthesectornorthofArmentièresrecentlytakenoverfromtheFrench.9
Inshort,theBelgianplanforthedefenceoftheircountrywastoholdadelayingpositionontheAlbertCanal longenoughtoen-abletheBritishandFrenchexpeditionaryforcestodeployforwardandassistwiththecontrolledwithdrawalofallAlliedforcestotheDyle Line (or National Redoubt),whichwas the primary /mainAllieddefensivepositioncoveringAntwerpandBrussels.Thede-laying position,whichwas responsible for buying time to allowAlliedforcestoreactandcompletetheirnecessarydeployments,consistedofaforwardlineofoutposts,withtheexceptionofthe16kilometresectoroppositeMaastrichtwhere theAlbertCanalranincloseproximitytotheDutchborder.
11
Here, near the Maastricht sector, the defences were based onthe Albert Canal. This formidable entrenchment was cut deepandwasapproximately107metreswide.Theobstaclehadonlythree bridges that spanned the canal at Veldvezelt, VroenhofenandCanne.TheBelgiansectorwasdefendedbythe7thInfantryDivisionwiththreebrigadesdeployedforwardinbrigadesectorssupportedbythegunsofFortressEbenEmael.10
Albert Canal, May 1940
Albert Canal, May 1940. The fort is on the left.
Bundesarchive,Bild146-1971-011-29/KliemBundesarchive,Bild146-1972-066-03
12
TheBelgians,ifnottheAlliesintotality,perceivedthefortresstobeimpregnable.Thediamondshapedfortheldagarrisonof1,322personnelanditformedthe“foundation”oftheBelgianforwarddefensiveline.FortEbenEmaelwasbuiltin1934,inconcertwiththe constructionof theAlbert Canal. Thinking theyhad learnedthe lessonsof theFirstWorldWar, theBelgiansconstructedtheFortbytunnellingintoarockyhill,hopingtothusavoidarepeatoftheembarrassingdefeatoftheirfortsaroundLiegein1914.Assuch, the living quarters,workshops andmagazineswere all lo-cateddeepintheheartofthehill.Shaftshousingammunitionliftsandaspiral staircaseranupthroughtherocktotheheavycon-cretegunemplacementsonthesurface.Thegunemplacementsthemselveshadreinforcedconcretewallsandceilingsthatwereapproximately1.2metresthick.Thefortressarmamentconsistedoftwelve75mmgunsincasements,aswellasfour75mmandtwo120mmguns in revolving armouredcupolas thatweremadeof15cmthicksteel.Manyofthecasematesandcupolasalsohousedmachinegunsthatprovidedanti-infantryfireonthesurface.Theartillerypiecescoveredthebridgesandtheoutlyingtowns.
Therewere alsofive60mmantiaircraftbatteries situatedat thesouth-eastcornerofthefort.Theapproachestothefortresswereequallyimpressive.ThesideofthefortclosesttoapredictedGer-manassaultwasasteep61metrecliffthatdroppedintothecanal.The other three sides were protected by deep entrenchments,barbedwire,andanti-tankditches,allofwhichwerecoveredbyprotectivefirefromdominatingconcretebunkers.11TherewasanAchillesheel,however.Theforthadnoinfantryfightingpositionsonthesurfaceand,althoughtheexternalapproachestothefortwere covered by anti-tank obstacles and belts of barbed wireandminefields, with the exception of five rows of barbed wireconstructed instrategic locations, thetopof the fortwas leftasagrassyfield.
13
Nonetheless, crossing the 107metrewide canal itself would beproblematictoanyattacker.Ateachofthethreebridges,immedi-atedefencesconsistedofaninfantrycompanypositiononthenearbankof thebridgeanda small poston the farbank. Embeddedwithin thedefensivepositionwere four large concretepillboxes.Onthenearsideofthebridge,paralleltotheroad,wasabunkerwith an anti-tank gun. The remaining three bunkers, containingmediummachine-guns,werespreadalongtheembankmentontheedgeofthecanal,oneimmediatelybelowthebridgeandoneoneachflank,approximately500metresdistant.ThebridgeatCannewasanexception.Alongthissectortherewasnoembankmentto
14
thecanalsotheanti-tankgunwaspositionedintoahillsideabout100metresbehindthebridgeonthenearside.
Fearingawarintheoffing,in1938,Belgiumbegantoprepareitsbridgesforpotentialdemolitions.Unfortunately,inAugust1939alargebridgeacrosstheRiverMass,inLiege,blewupbyaccidentduringathunderstorm,whentheelectricalactivitycausedbythestorminducedcurrentsintheelectricalfiringsystem.Asaresult,theBelgiansdecided to replaceelectrical firingwith safety fuseanddetonatingcord.Thischangeof ignitionmadefiringthede-molitionsinanemergencymoretimeconsuminganddifficult.
TheactualauthoritytodemolishthethreebridgesovertheAlbertCanalwasheldatahighlevel.ThetwonorthernbridgesweretheresponsibilityoftheCommanderofthegarrisonatLanaken.ForthebridgeatCanne,authorityforfiringwasinvestedintheCom-manderof Fort Eben Emael. Ironically, neither of the twoCom-manders charged with ordering the destruction of the bridgeswereundercommandofthe7thDivision,withinwhosesectorthebridges lay. Both Commanders were connected by land line tothefiringdetachments,whichwerelocatedinthemainanti-tankbunker at each of the respective bridges. The firing parties, ledbysergeants,weresmall.Nonetheless,totheBelgians,theentirefiringsystemputinplaceseemedsatisfactorysincetheybelievedtheywouldhavesufficientwarningsincetheGermanshadtocross24-32 kilometres ofDutch territory prior to reaching theAlbertCanal.Assuch,asurpriseattackseemedimpossible.
THe pLAN
Although themain German thrust, consisting of the bulk of itspanzer force grouped in Army Group A, was to go through theArdennes, the feint to the north, through Belgium and HollandbyArmyGroupB,was instrumental in fooling theAllies so thattheywouldcommittheirforcestothatfront.Assuch,centralto
15
successfullydrawingtheAlliestotheNorthwasarapidadvancepenetratingdeepintoBelgium.Therefore,neutralizingFortEbenEmael and capturing the bridges across the Albert Canal intactwerevitaltotheGermanplanofmanoeuvre.
As such, Hitler gave General Kurt Student, the commander of 7 FliegerDivision,Germany’sFallschirmjägerdivision,twofunda-mentalmissionsfortheinvasionofFrance.Thefirstmissionwasto seize amajor airhead on the Allied defensive Dyle Line. ThesecondmissionwastocaptureFortEbenEmael.Hitlerdirected:
You will land nearMaastricht on Fort Eben Emael withspeciallytrainedengineersandontheAlbertCanalbridg-eswithairinfantry.ThecaptureofFortEbenEmaelbyuswillpreventaflankingactionagainstourcrossingsoftheMaas[River].EbenEmaelisoneofthestrongestpositionsthattheBelgianshave.Theirmilitaryexpertsconsider itimpregnable–againstconventionalgroundattack.Timedsimultaneouslywith landings on Eben Emael your para-trooperswill take thebridgesover theAlbertCanalandprevent their destruction. The accomplishment of thesetwomissionswillenable[GeneralWalthervon]Reichenau[Commander 6th Army], after seizing his own crossingsovertheMass,tolinkupwiththeparatroopersandthencontinuethedriveintoBelgiumwithhispanzers.12
For Student, the Fuhrer’s intent was clearly for the 7th Flieger Division to enable the German 6th Army to pass the Dutch and Belgianborderdefences “withoutdelay.”But amajor issuewashow todealwith Fort EbenEmael and thebridges crossing the Albert Canal and Mass River. A careful study of the problemrevealed that the fort and bridges were well defended againstgroundattackbutnotagainstadirectassaultfromtheair.Infact,theForthadaflatsurfaceandapartfromartilleryithadonlytwotothreemediummachinegunscapableoffiringonthesurfaceof
16
theFort,or inananti-aircraftrole.Therefore, itwassusceptible toattackfromgliders.
The idea tousegliderswasa functionof chance. In casual con-versation with Hanna Reisch, a glider pilot, Hitler had learnedthatgliderswerepracticallynoiseless inflight.Heseizedon thepointanddirected thata studyon theuseofgliders for the in-vasion of France, specifically the break-in through Belgium, bemade. Germany had a number of large freight gliders that hadbeendevelopedin1938ascargo-carriers.Themostrecenttrialsdemonstratedthatthesegliderscouldcarryninearmedmenandifreleasedatapproximately2,400metrestheycouldeasilyglidethe32kilometrestotheirobjective.Importantly,in1940,Belgiananti-aircraftdefencesusedsound-locationnotradar.Therefore,ifthe gliderswere released in thedarkoverGermany, they couldpotentiallyreachBelgiumunseenandunheard.13“SotheGermancommanddecided,”First-LieutenantRudolfWitzig,oneofthede-tachmentcommanderstoparticipateintheassaultonFortEbenEmael, revealed “to use freight gliders, which could approachsilentlyandinvisiblyinthehalf-lightandwhichwouldmoreover,possessahigh ‘surprisepotential,’as theyhadneverbeenused onsuchascaleasaweaponofwar.”14
German DFS 230 Freight Glider.
Bundesarchive,Bild1011-568-1530-13/Dr.Stocker
17
German Fallschirmjager practicing glider assaults.
German innovation went a step further. To deal with the for-midable reinforced concrete bunkers, the Germans specificallydevelopeda state-of-the-artdemolitioncharge, theHohlladung, whichwas considereda secretweapon. Itwas ahollow-charge,alsoknownasashapedcharge,whichwasdesignedinitslargestformasa50kilogramdemolitioncapableofpunchingaholeofabout 31 centimetres diameter through approximately twome-tresofconcrete.15
Asaresultofaseriesofstudies,Studentacceptedthatairborneforcescouldcarryoutthemissions.Forthecriticaltaskofcaptur-ingthebridgesacrosstheAlbertCanalandtheimpregnableFortEban Emael, Student began to assemble a task force consistingofparachute infantry,parachuteengineers, tugaircraftandglid-ers.16 Hegavecommandof the task force,namedStormGroupKochafteritscommander,toCaptainWalterKoch.TheactualtaskforcewasformedatHildesheim,nearHanover,inNovember1939. It was made up of 1 Company, 1 Parachute Regiment and the ParachuteSapperDetachmentofthe7th FliegerDivision.CaptainKochbrokehisassaultforceintofourdetachments:
Bundesarchive,Bild1011-569-1579-14A
18
1. Storm Detachment Granite under command of First- LieutenantWitzig,hadastrengthof85men.Itsmissionwas to neutralize Fort Eben Emael and hold it until re-lievedbyArmySapperBattalion51.
2. Storm Detachment Concrete under command of Lieutenant Schacht had a strength of 96 personnel, which included the task force command element. Itsmissionwas to prevent the bridge at Vroenhoven frombeingblownandforming/defendingabridgeheaduntilrelievedbyleadingelementsofthe6thArmy.
3. Storm Detachment Steel under the command of First-LieutenantAltmannhadastrengthof92men.ItsmissionwastopreventthebridgeatVeldwezeltfrombeingblownand forming / defending a bridgehead until relieved byleadingelementsofthe6thArmy.
4. StormDetachmentIronunderLieutenantSchächterhadastrengthof90men.Itsmissionwastopreventthebridgeat Canne from being blown and forming / defending abridgehead until relieved by leading elements of the 6thArmy.
Theoverallassaulthadtwomajorphases.ThefirstphaseconsistedofcapturingFortEbenEmaelandseizureofthebridgesacrosstheAlbertCanaltopreventtheBelgiansfromblowingthem,aswellas neutralizing the bunkers and securing bridgeheads of 300m radiusateachobjective.TheGermansestimatedthattheshockofsurprisewouldbefleeting,approximately lasting10-15minutes.Afterthatpoint,theyrealizedresistancewouldbuild.Therefore,theyplannedtoachievethefirstphasebyH+45minutes.Thesec-ondphasewaspurelydefensive,tosimplyhangontoalloftheirobjectives.
19
Storm Group Koch objectives.
ToaddtotheshockanddislocationoftheBelgians,tenminutesprior to the realdrop,dummyparachutistswere tobedroppedintherearoftheBelgian7thDivisiontocauseconfusionandde-laydeploymentofreserves.Finally,inordertoachievecompletesurprisenoGermanairorgroundforcesweretocrosstheDutch
20
frontierpriortothelandings.Rather,330lightbombersandJu-87Stukadive-bomberswereassignedtoconductsupportingattacksagainst Belgian headquarters, reserves, and gun positions fromH+15minutestoH+80minutes.Germanplannersassessedthatifallwentwell,themainGermaninvasionforcewouldlink-upwiththeKochStormDetachmentwithinfourhours.
As such, the assault on Fort Eban Emael fell to First-LieutenantWitzig.Basedonaerialphotoshedecidedtoattackthenortherntipofthefortwithfivedetachmentsandthecentralsectionwithfour. Witzig quickly prioritized his actions. First, he deemed itessential todestroy thearmamenton topof the fort thatcouldimpedethe landingofglidersandfreedomofmovementonthesurfaceofthefort.Second,herealizeditwasofgreatimportancetosilencethegunsthatweretrainedonthethreebridges.Fromaerialphotographshewasabletoascertainthatthesteelcupolaswereessential forobservingartilleryfire.Therefore,hedecideddestroyingthecupolas,andthusrenderingtheartilleryfireinef-fective,wasofinitialimportance.Finally,Witzigassessedthathewouldneedtoblockand/ordestroyentrancesandexitstotheFort to seal up the garrison and deny the enemy the ability tocounter-attackorreinforcethegarrison.
Success depended on speed and violence of action to induceshock in the enemy.Withonly 85menassigned to his task, hischancesofsurvivalagainstaspiritedcounter-attackwereslim.Atbest,Witzigcalculatedthathewouldhavenomorethananhourbeforetheenemybegantocounter-attack.YetWitzighadonema-joradvantage.TheLuftwaffewasabletoattainblueprintsoftheFort fromaGermansubcontractorwhohadassisted in thecon-structionofthefortification.17Assuch,Witzigknewexactlywhereallthelargegunswerelocated.Assuch,hebrokehisplatoonintoelevendetachments.Heexplained:
21
Wewereallocated11glidersforthejob,andastheplanofcampaigndeveloped,itbecamenecessarytodividethedetachmentinto11sectionsofsevenoreightmen.Eachsectionwastocapturetwoemplacementsorcasematesand,inaddition,tobeequallyreadytotakeoverforanysection out of action. Moreover, unlike other pilots, agliderpilot,whoisincommanduptothetimeoflanding,cannotstandasideduringtheactualbattle.Soourpilotstooktheirturnassappersinthedetachmentandthesec-tiontowhichtheywereallocated,sothattheywouldbereliableinaction.18
22
Witzigwentontodescribe:
Inadditiontoflamethrowersandthecollapsibleassaultladderswhichwehadbuiltourselves,thespecialequip-mentfortheoperationconsistedchieflyof21/2tonsofexplosives, predominantly cavity charges, which wereused for the first time at Eben-Emael for cracking thearmoured domes. The 50-kg cavity charges, carried intwoparts,wereintheshapeofhemispheres.Theycouldpenetratearmoureddomes25cmthick,andevenwherethis armourwas28cm thick, itwas likely thatweaponsand troops belowwould be put out of action by flyingsplinters. Where the armour was thicker still, severalexplosions in the same hole would be necessary. Eventhe smaller 12.5kg cavity charge penetrated armour of 12to15cm,anditwasalsosuitableforprecisionblastingofloop-holesandheavyartillery.Allchargesweredeto-natedbyten-secondfuses.19
To assist with the defence of the Fort once it was neutralized,WitzigwasalsoassignedaliaisonofficerfromtheLuftwaffewhowouldberesponsibleforactingasaforwardaircontrollerrespon-sible forcalling incloseair supportandresupplydrops. Inaddi-tion,theplandetailedtheassistance/reliefofStormDetachmentGranite by the 51st Engineer Battalion, 151st Infantry Regimentgroup, 4thPanzerDivision,attheearliestopportunity.Theywereresponsible for crossing at Canne and providing direct supportinthesilencingofFortEbenEmaeland/orthereliefofWitzig’sdetachment.
Thoseawareof theactualmissionquickly realized that securitywastheverybasisofsuccess.First-LieutenantWitzigexplained:
Oursurvivaldependedontakingtheenemybysurprise.We were all made aware of this and drastic measures
B. H
orn
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B. Horn
Corridor with protecti
ve equipment against gas att
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B. H
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B. Horn
Twin 120m
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B. H
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ola.
B. Horn
Twin 120m
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B. H
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Casemate 4.
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Retractable, rotating cupola w
ith 75mm
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B. Horn
The damage caused by a demolition charge thrown down the elevator shaft.
B. Horn
The resultant elevator shaft explosion blew
open the steel doors, at the bottom
, in the interior of the fort.
B. H
orn
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Calmer days.
23
sometimes had to be taken; or training and details ofequipment, tactics, and objective had to be kept com-pletelysecret,andevenamongourselvesthenameofthefortresswasnotgenerallyknownuntilafter itscapture.No leavewas granted, norwerewe allowed out, or tomixwithmenfromotherunits.Thesapperdetachmentwas constantly moved around under different codenames,andallparachuteinsigniaanduniformswereleftbehind.20
Allmembers of StormGroup Kochwere required to sign state-ments that acknowledged that they risked a sentence of deathshould they “by intent or carelessness make known to others”anythingaboutthebaseatwhichtheywereservingorthetrain-ingtheywereundertaking.21Rankandinsigniawereremovedandlettersandphonecallswererestricted,thosethatwereabsolutelynecessaryhadtobeclearedbyMajorKochhimself.
TrainingwascarriedoutinitiallyatHildesheim,butthetaskforcewasmovedoftenforsecuritypurposes. Rehearsalswereessen-tial.Allof thesub-componentCommandersviewedthemkeytosuccess.ParticularlyforWitzig,practicingthegliderinsertionandactionsontheobjectivewerecritical.Ontwoseparateoccasions,despitetheriskitentailed,theymountedfulldressrehearsalsuti-lizingthegliders.TheCommandersdeemedthesedressrehears-alsessentialtoconfirmloads,aircrafthandling,aswellasensuringthateveryoneknewwhatthelandingwouldbelike.Moreover,itwas also important for everyone to overcome the fear of flyinginaglider.TheCommanders felt that theexposure to fulldressrehearsalswouldprovideconfidencetoall those involved inthemission.22“Afterthefullestusehadbeenmadeofthetrainingfa-cilitiesinHildesheim,”Witzigrevealed,“thedetachmentpractisedattackingstronglydefendedfortificationsintheSudetenland,andalsocarriedouttrialdemolitionsatPolishinstallations.”23
24
Despite the lengthy detailed training and rehearsals, a large elementofriskremained.Witzigexplained:
Thefailureofthewholemissioncouldbebroughtaboutbyheavylossesduringtake-off,flightlandingandparticu-larly during the critical periodwhen the airborne forcewaswithinrangeofenemyinfantryweapons.Thiscriticalperiodcould,however,bereducedbymeansofnose-divebrakes, parachute-brakes, and landing spurs.Moreover,withitsminimumglidingangleof1:12atatowingheightof2,000metres, thefreightglidercouldbereleased20kilometres from its objective and an experienced pilotcouldmakeaspotlandingwithinaradiusof20metres.This meant that we could approach noiselessly and,moreover,inthedark.24
Thetheorywassoontobetested.On1May1940,StormDetach-mentGranitemoved toOstheimairfield inCologne. Theglidershadbeendismantledandmovedtotheairfieldinlargefurniturevans to maintain secrecy. At the airfield, Luftwaffe techniciansassembled the freight gliders in large hangers. Strawmats hadbeenhungovertheperimeterfenceand45largegeneratorsdis-chargedsmokecreatingascreenthatcloakedtheentireareafromoutsideattention.25Thenfinally,themomenthadarrived.Witzigdescribed:
After half a year of strict isolation, the alert in theafternoon of May 9 came as a relief. The Koch StormDetachment met according to plan at the airfields ofKoln-Ostheim and Koln-Butzweilerhof, some of thembeingbroughtinbythetowingunit.Atnightthetowingcraftwerebroughttotherunway,loaded,andtheplacesoccupied.26
25
Meanwhile, in Belgium, the 1,200 troops thatwereon strengthatFortEbenEmaelwererecalledfromleaveat2235hours,thatsamenight, inanticipationofaGermanattack.27At0030hours,theCommanderofEbenEmael,MajorJeanF.L.Jottrand,receivedwordofGermanmovementson theDutchborder.Higherhead-quartersinLiegeorderedanalert,thethirdoneinthelastmonth.Jottrandarrived in theFort tenminutes later, as gun crewsandothersinthegarrisonbegantotricklein.Onedelayinthealertno-tificationwastheabsenceoftheguncrewforCupola31,however.Theywereresponsibleforfiringtwentyblankrounds,30secondsapart,towakeupandnotifygarrisonmemberslivinginthecom-munitynearby,aswellasthosedefendingthebridges,thatanalertwasunderwayandtoimmediatelymantheirdefensivepositions.Yet the alert signalwas only sent at approximately 0330 hours,whenCasemate23firedthenecessaryroundsintheirstead.Theproblemwasthat theguncrewswerebusymovingoutbeddingandsuppliesfromthebarrackslocatedjustoutsidetheForttotheinteriorofthefortificationascalledforbythealertplan,aspriortoimminentattack,thebarracksweretobedemolishedsotheywouldnot interferewith thefieldsoffireof theguns.AlthoughMajorJottrandwasconcernedwiththedelayinfiringthewarningsignal,hewasnotoverlyanxioussinceheassessedtheGermanshadtofirstcrosstheDutchfrontier,whichwouldgivehimabitofwarning,aswellastime.
Back inGermany, at 0300 hours, the first of the towing aircraftbegantotrundledowntheairstripwiththeirslavedglidersrum-blingbehind.Theassaultwasunderway.Theentireaerialarmadawas in theair by0335. “In completedarkness,”Witzig recalled,“theaircrafttookofffromthetwotinyairfieldsandstartedtheirjourney through the night. Heightwas gained by circling to thesouth, then we turned westwards following a route which hadearlierbeenmarkedwithbeacons.”28
26
At 0340 hours the Luftwaffe began to bomb targets in depth,confirming the Belgian suspicions that an attackwas imminent.Shortlybefore0400hours,aBelgianoutpostreportedtoJottrandthat30-50aircraftflyingathighaltitudeweresightedcomingfromthedirectionofMaastricht.Minuteslater,at0404hours,JottrandorderedthebridgesacrosstheAlbertCanaltobeblown.29Buthewastoolate.Theassaulthadbegun.
The gliders of Storm Group Koch began to land shortly after 0410 hours, much earlier than planned due to a strong tail wind. They had achieved complete surprise. Tragically for theBelgians, thethreebridgeswerenotyetblownandtheGermanFallschirmjägers who had landed behind them quickly sweptthrough the relatively undefended rear of the Belgian defencesandcapturedthebridges.30Manyofthedefendershadnotevenrealizedthethreat.Theyhadbelievedtheaircrafttobedisabledlightreconnaissanceaircraft.SomethoughtthemtobeEnglishastheycouldnotseetheGermanSwastika insignia.OnlyatCanneweretheBelgiansabletoblowthebridgeintime.31
The demolished bridge at Canne.
Bundesarchive,Bild146-1971-011-31/Kliem
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The demolished bridge at Canne.
StormDetachmentGraniteachievedsimilarsurpriseandsuccess.“Speedwasessential,”Witzigbelieved,“sinceanythingnotaccom-plishedinthefirst60minuteswouldbemadepractically impos-siblelaterbytheincreasingstrengthofenemydefence.”32
Moreover,theassaultforcewasalreadyunderstrength.Onlyninegliderswith70menactually landedon the topof theFort,andtheywerewithout theircommander. Theflightwasanticipatedto last50minutes,duringwhichtimetheaircraftwererequiredtoclimbtoapproximately2,600minonly72km.Beaconsandbon-firespositionedbyLuftwaffepersonnelmarked the route to theunhitchingpointjustnorth-westofAachen,Germanyonthebor-der.Suddenly,misfortunestruck.ThepilotoftheJu-82transportplanetowingWitzig’sglidernoticedanaircraftdriftingperilouslyclose.Heinstinctivelydovetoavoidacollision.Thedownwarddiveputtremendousstressonthetowlineandeventhoughthegliderpilot reacted instantlyandattemptedto followthetowplane inthedive,thepressureontheropewastoogreatanditbrokeset-ting theglider free. Luckily, thegliderpilotwasable to stabilize
Bundesarchive,Bild146-1971-011-55/HannsKarlRum
pf
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theflightandlandinafarmer’sfieldclosetoCologne.Witzigthencommandeeredavehicleanddroveoffintothenightsearchingforanother towplanewhilehisdetachmentprepared thefieldandgliderforasecond,albeitimprovised,take-off.
Witzig’saircraftwasnottheonlyglidertohaveamishap.ShortlyafterWitzig’scalamity,theJu-82towingSergeantMaxMaierandhisSecondSquad,waggleditswingsindicatingthatthegliderwastounhitch.Thegliderpilotrealizingtheerror,specificallybecausetheywerestilltoolowandtoodistantfromtheobjective,refusedtounhitch.Asaresult,thetransportaircraftwentintoasteepleftbankforcingtheglidertoreleaseitself.Maier’sglidernowhadtheimpossibletaskoftryingtoreachEbenEmael,40kmdistant,withonlyapproximately1,500mofaltitude.
Luck was seemingly against the aerial armada. At 0415 hours,when the aerial formation reached the unhitching point, indi-catedbyalargesearchlightatVetschauerMountain,nearAachen, theAerialCommanderdidnotgivethesignaltounhitch.Astrongtailwindhadcaused themtoarrive tenminutesearly,butmoreimportantly they were still 460m too low from the required altitudeof2,600m.Asaresult,theAerialCommanderdecidedtocontinue towing foranother tenminutesuntil they reached thenecessaryaltitude.However,thischangeofplansmeantthatthelargeaerialformationanditslouddroneofenginescouldpossiblyalerttheDutchandBelgiandefendersthatanaironslaughtwasimminent. Nonetheless, they pressed on and once the armadahadreachedaltitude,thegliderswerereleasedandeachwasnowresponsibletomakeitsownwaytotheobjective.
Andso,shortlyafter0400hours,atEbenEmael,asMajorJottrandwastryingtoprocessalltheinformationwithwhichhewasbeinginundated, another report arrived announcing that there wereunidentifiedaircraftoverheadandalsonoted that their engines
29
hadstopped–theywereseeminglymotionlessinthesky.Bythetime the defenders gathered their wits and began to fire theiranti-aircraftguns,itwasalmosttoolate.Theanti-aircraftmachinegunswere sighted andmounted for high-angle fire at high alti-tudetargets.Bythetimetheordertofirewasgiven,manyoftheswooping,criss-crossingaircraftweretoolowtoengageandthensuddenlytheywereonthegroundamongstthedefenders.
By 0425 hours the ground assault had begun. Sergeant Hans NiedermeierandhisOneSquadwerenotoneoftheluckygliderstoavoidanti-aircraftfire.Theydovethroughavirtuallyshredderas60mmanti-aircraftfiretorethroughtheirglider.Asthewreck-agecametorestontheground,NiedermeierracedtoCasemate18andwithassistanceofsquadmembersplaceda50kgshapedchargeinthecentreoftheconcretebunkerandignitedthefuse.Thesubsequentexplosionblewtheinteriortopieces,killingthoseinside. Other members of the squad placed a smaller 12.5kgchargeunderneathoneoftheremaining75mmgunsandblewitoffitsmount.NeidermeierthenledmembersofthesquadintothecasematethroughthebreachkillingandcapturingmoreBelgians.However,manyescapedintothebowelsoftheFort,wheretheyquickly prepared the emergency barriers. Layers of steel beamsandtwosteeldoorswithsandbagsin-betweenwereputinplacetopreventtheGermansfromaccessingthetunnelsystembelowground.Regardless,OneSquadnowcontrolledCasemate18.
Two Squad, under command of SergeantMaxMaier,whowereforced to release early, ended up landing in Duren, Germany,where they commandeered a truck and drove to Canne. In hisdesiretolink-upwiththeremainderoftheforceatEbenEmael,Maier was killed attempting to cross the destroyed bridge. Hissecond-in-command(2IC)eventuallyledthesquadacrossandintothetownofEbenEmael,buttheywereneverabletogainentranceintotheFort.Theydid,however,capture121BelgiansinCanne.
30
SergeantPeterArendtandhisThreeSquadwereresponsiblefordestroying Casemate 12. They seemed to have had a guardianangel.Theirgliderdescendedunmolestedandlandedunscathedapproximately 30m from their objective. They approached theircasemateandbegantryingtoaffixtheirdemolitionswithoutanyresistance from the Belgian crew,who did not even realize the Germanswerethere.Arendthaddifficultyplacingthe50kgcharge,soheelectedtousethe12.5kgdemolitionatthebaseofthegunmount instead. The resulting explosionwas horrific, tearing thegunoffitsmountsendingitcareeningthroughthechamberanddownastairway,killingandwoundingBelgiansoldiers inside,aswellasignitingafireandsecondaryexplosionsfuelledbypropel-lent stacked inside.Thechamberquicklyfilledwith thick smokeandtoxicfumes.
The effects of the Hohlladung (shaped charge) on a Eben Emael gun emplacement.
Three Squad fired their small arms through the opening andentered into thechamber.ThreewoundedBelgianswerepulledoutside,awayfromthetoxicfumes.Arendtthenworkedhiswayinto the interior of the Fort. Hearing voices he dropped a 3kg
Bundesarchive,Bild183-L22757/Bork
31
chargedownanelevator shaftkillingmoreBelgians.Heworkedhiswaydownastaircase,atonepointnotingthatthreeofthestaircoveringshadbeenremoved.Inthedarkanunknowingpursuingintruder could easily fall through themetal staircasewhere the“steps”hadbeenremovedandmeethisdeathorserious injury.Atthebottom,Arendtcameuponasteeldoorthatbarredfurtherprogress.Asaresult,hereturnedtothesurface.
Retractable cupola with 75mm guns.
Four Squadmetwith a similarwelcome toOne Squad.As soonas SergeantHelmutWenzel’s glider hit the ground itwas takenunder machine gun fire from his objective, Casemate 19. TheBelgianswerefiringfromthesteeldomeontopofthecasemate. Wenzel’s men took the casemate under immediate assault andforcedtheBelgianstoclosethesteelobservationdoorstothecupola. Wenzel dropped a 3kg charge down the observation periscopethatprotrudedfromthecupola.Despitethefactthatitreverber-ated throughout the cupola, it seemed to have no effect. TheBelgianscontinuedtofighton.Wenzelnextplaceda50kgcharge
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ontopofthesteeldomebutitfailedtofullypenetrate.However,theimpactoftheexplosionrenderedthecupolainoperable,hav-ingdislodgedthedomefromitstracksoitcouldnotrevolve.TheBelgiandefenderssubsequentlywithdrewintotheinterioroftheFort.Wenzelthenmoveddownthehilltothebaseofthemam-mothconcretecasemate.Heplaceda50kgchargeatthegunem-brasuresblastingopena largehole throughtheconcrete,killingandwoundingthoseinsideanddestroyingtheguns.TheBelgianssoonabandonedthecompletelydestroyedCasemate19.
ThegliderpilotforFiveSquadsettheirDF-230gliderrightdownon topofaBelgianmachinegunposition.Afterneutralizing theposition,SergeantErwinHaugandhismenimmediatelyassaultedCupola23.Thedemolitiondislodgedthegunmountsbutdidnotprevent the gun from firing altogether. Nonetheless, Haug andhissquadwenttoassaultCasemate30,althoughitwasnotpartof their assignment.Once again, their demolition failed to fullyneutralizethegunswithin.Throughouttheiractions,boththem-selvesandSix Squadwere takingeffectivefire from the storageshedlocatednearCupola24.Asaresult,theyconductedanattackbutwererepulsedwithcasualties.Atthesametime,Belgianartil-lery,calledinbyMajorJottrandonhisownposition,begantoraindownontheattackers.HaugandtheremainingmembersofFiveSquadsoughtshelterinaditch,wheretheywereforcedtoremainuntilnightfall.
AtthenorthernendoftheFort,SixSquadunderSergeantSiegfriedHarlo,ranthroughagauntletoffirewhichrakedtheirglideronap-proachandthenlandedinaseaofbarbwirethatbroughttheglid-ertoanabruptstop.Thewirewassothickthatitblockedtheexitsoftheglider.Asaresulttheyhadtroubleextricatingthemselvesfromthemangledgliderandwireobstacle.Whentheyfinallyar-rivedattheirobjective,Cupola14,theydiscoveredanothersquad
33
hadalreadydestroyedit.Moreover,itwasactuallyadummyposi-tionwithafakecupola.Nonetheless,wherethecupolahadbeentherewasanunoccupiedmachinegunemplacementdugintotheground.Harloseta50kgchargeintotheemplacementandpulledtheigniter.Thesubsequentexplosionblastedaholeintotheinnerbowelsof theFort causing concreteandearth to cave-in to thetunnelsbelow.Harlothenestablishedamachine-gunpositiontoanchorthenorthendofthepositionandfromwhichheengagedBelgianforcesthroughouttheattemptedcounter-attacks.
Also at the extremenorth endof the Fort, Seven Squad, underSergeant Heineman, was responsible for destroying Cupola 16.Theyquicklyassaultedthepositionandaffixedtheirdemolitions.Theyrealizedittoowasadummyposition.
For Eight squad theapproachwasnerve-racking. In aneffort toavoid sheetsofanti-aircraftfire, thegliderpilotexpertlydippedtheaircraftbelowtheeastcliffwalladjacenttothecanalandthenatthelastmomentpulledupandlandedtheDF-230approximate-ly30mfromtheimposingCasemate31.SergeantOttoUngerandhissquaddisembarkedandcameunderimmediatewitheringfirefromthestorageshedandtheirobjective.Ungersplithissquad.Some,assistedbyFiveSquad,attackedthestorageshed,whileheandtwoothermenassaultedCasemate31.
The Belgian gun crew in Casemate 31 had beenwarned off 30minutes prior toUnger’s landing. Amazingly, however, the gunswere not ready for action. Firstly, the door to the ammunitionlockerwaslockedandnoonecouldfindthekeys.Secondly,oncethishurdlewaspassed,theelevatorthatcarriedtheroundstothegunroommalfunctioned.Assuch,onlyalimitednumberoftheheavy75mm rounds couldbe carriedup to the guns. Ironically,just as the crew loaded thefirst round into thebreach,Unger’s50kgchargedetonated,killingtwoandwoundingmanyothers.
34
Next, Sergeant Unger placed another 50kg charge on the steeldomeontopofthecasemate.Fromhisperspectiveoutsidethefort, itappeared tohavehadnoeffect. Inactuality, the impactoftheexplosioncompletelydestroyedtheinsideofthechamber,destroyingthegunsandrenderingthemtotallyunusable.Ungeralsoseta12.5kgchargeatanexitdoor,whichblewthedooroffitshingesandcausedtheconcretewallstocollapseonthemselves,completelyblockingtheexitandthussealingtheBelgiansinside.
EightSquadwasthenorderedtomovetoWenzel’spositionintheNorth,however,heavymachinegunandartilleryfirekilledUngerandseveralothers.Intheend,onlythreemembersofthesquadsurvivedtojoinSergeantWenzel.
The external effect of a 50kg shaped charge.
NineSquadwasanotherwhoreceivedawarmwelcome,sustain-ingheavydamage fromanti-aircraftfireon approach.Nonethe-less,theywereableto land60mfromtheirobjective,Casemate13. They too landed in a morass of barb wire, which impededtheirexitfromtheirglider.Fightingthroughtheobstacle,SergeantEwald Neuhaus led his section against his objective. The heavy
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Belgianmachine gun firemade the approach difficult, however,aflamethrowerquicklyforcedtheBelgianstopullawayfromtheembrasure. Witzig later described, “The only installations pro-tectedbybarbedwirewereinthenorth,wherethesappershadtofreethemselveswithwirecuttersandturntheirflame-throweronamachine-gunfiringfromanembrasure,beforetheycouldplacetheircharges.”33
Neuhaus’smenplaceda12.5chargeover themachinegunem-brasurebuttheBelgianscleverlyusedaramrodtoknockitdownontothegroundwhereitexplodedwithouteffect.TheGermansthendroppedanumberofgrenadesthroughthegunembrasureopening, silencing any resistance. Next Neuhaus placed a 50kgchargeonthesteeldoorsleadingintothecasemate.Theresultantexplosionwashorrific,blowing in thedoorandsupportingwall.NeuhausenteredtheinnerchamberandfoundtheBelgiansdis-orientatedandinshockontheground.Heproceededtosetupadefensiveposition.
The interior of a 75mm gun station.
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SergeantHeubelandhisTenSquadwereoriginallydesignatedastheDetachmentreserve.Theirglidertookheavyfireonapproachbut fortuitously no-onewas injured. The squad took cover andawaitedorders.TherunnercontactedSergeantWenzel,whohadtakencommandonceherealizedFirst-LieutenantWitzighadnotarrived.HenowpassedonordersforWilliHeubeltotakeoutCase-mate26,whichhadbeenTwoSquad’soriginalobjective.Heubelandanother squadmemberquickly assaulted theobjectiveandplaced a 12.5kg chargeon theobservationdome. The resultantexplosionput thepositionoutof commission for the remainderofthefight.
120mm gun cupola with 50kg shaped charge crater.
Cupola 24 nearby, however, with its twin 120mm guns, stillremained menacingly dangerous. Luckily for the Germans, theBelgiansexperienceddifficulties.Onceagain,keyequipmentwasmissingor non-functioning.Many suspected treachery.34 None-theless,beforethegunscouldbeeffectivelybrought intoactiongliderpilotHeinerLange,althoughseriouslywounded,retrieved
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a 50kg charge from his wrecked glider and single-handedlyplacedthechargeonthetopof thecupolaandpulledthefuse. The resultant explosion failed to destroy the guns, however.Thankfully,SergeantWenzelarrivedshortlyafteranddroppedtwochargesdown thegunbarrelsfinallyputting thepositionoutofcommission.
ThemainobjectiveofStormDetachmentGranite’s initialassaultwas todestroytheguns thatcouldfireonthebridges.Theyac-complishedthisactioninthefirst15minutesoftheattack.Nowall that remainedwas to ensure theBelgians did notmount aneffectivecounter-attack.SergeantWenzelandhisbatteredassaultdetachmentnowhadtoholdthepositionuntil4thPanzerDivisionarrived.ThesurvivingmembersofStormDetachmentGranitepro-ceededtoplacesignalpanelsontopofthecaptured/destroyedcupolas and casemates to indicate theywere inGermanhands.TheStukas,aspartofplannedairsupportfortheoperation,thenfocused their attentiononpockets of Belgian resistance.Withinthehour,Wenzelalsoreceivedanairdropofammunition.
At 0630 hours, two hours after the assault had begun, StormDetachmentGranitereceivedasurprise.Suddenly,atenthgliderswooped down and landed near Casemate 19. First-LieutenantWitzighadfinallyarrived.Despiteadelay,hehadbeensuccessfulinfindinganothertowplaneandgettingairborneonceagain.
AlthoughtheplancalledfortheassaultforcetoholdtheFortforonlyfourhoursuntil link-up,thetheorywasnot inconcertwiththerealityofthesituation.Bynoontherewasnosignofareliefforce.Witzigexplained:
The Belgians had blown up the Canne bridge in time.Hereourparatrooperswereengaged inawholedayofhardfighting,whichpreventedthe51stSapperBattalion, detailed to relieve us, from crossing the canal. Their
38
attempts to cross in rubber dinghies were made ex-tremely difficult by the shooting from Emplacement 15 [actuallyCasemate17],bythesideofthecanal–wecouldourselves hear the gunfire far belowus. Eventually,wemanagedtobringthisemplacementunderpartialcontrolby using hanging charges to block the look-out slits in theobservationdomewithsmokeanddirt.35
Moreover,theBelgianslockedupinsideEbenEmaelwerecallingartillery from a neighbouring fort to fire on Storm DetachmentGranite inanattempttosweeptheGermansoffthesurface.Allitaccomplished,however,was todrive theassault force to takeshelterinthecasematestheyhadjustcaptured.ThroughoutthedaytheGermansheldoutengagingsmallgroupsofBelgiansthatemergedonthesurfaceorinthesurroundingareaforacounter-attack.36 Sergeant Arendt and his squad actually assaulted intothe bowels of the Fort itself. In the process they destroyed ac-cesspointsthatallowedpassagetotheexterior.Additionally,theStukas disrupted a number of attempts at counter-attacking byBelgianforcesstationedoutsidetheFort.
The stalemate persisted for most of the day. By early evening Witzigconsolidatedhisforcesinthenorthendinanticipationofaconcertedcounter-attack.Witzigexplained,“TheBelgianartillerystartedtoshellourpositionsandtheirinfantryattackedusrepeat-edlyoverthenorth-westernslope,whichwascoveredwithdenseundergrowth.”Heelaborated,“Thesituationforcedustodefendourselvesinthenorth-westernarea,sothatweonlymanagedtoremaininoccupationofthispart.”37
Atthesametime,WitzigalsorealizedthatCasemate17,whichhadnotbeendestroyedsinceitcouldnotfireonthebridges,couldinfactinterferewithtroopscrossingthecanal.Assuch,heordereditsdestruction.However,theywereunsuccessful.Theyattempted
39
toblowthepositionthreetimes,evenloweringchargesonarope,buttonoavail.Thegunscontinuedtofirethroughout.
Canal defensive casemate that German attackers were unable to disable.
The Belgian defenders inside the Fort were clearly rattled. TheFortitselfwasintatters.Thepowerwascutoffinmanysectors,therewasminimal lighting,noair ventilation,heatorair condi-tioning and smoke lingered inmost of the interior. In addition,theBelgianswereunsureastohowmanyGermanswereonthesurface. Nonetheless, at 2000 hours, Major Jottrand’s “ForlornHope”decidedtopersonallyleadacounter-attack.Heassembled60menandplannedtosurprisetheGermansbyexitingthroughanemergencyexit.However,theGermanshadalreadyfoundtheexit point and once again, fate intervened against the Belgians.JustasJottrandwasapproachingtheexit,theGermansdetonatedachargethatblewamassiveholeintheFortwall.Fearinghehadlostsurprise,Jottrandwithdrewintothe interioronceagainanddecided to fortify his position. He now decided that preventing
PhotobyAuthor
40
theGermansfromtakingcontrolofthesubterraneancomponentofEbenEmaelwasallthatheandhisforceswerecapableof.
To make matters worse for the Belgians, throughout the nightWitzig and his men continued to assault Belgian positions thatwerestillfiring.BymorningtheFortwasvirtuallyrenderedoutofaction.First-LieutenantWitzigrecalled:
[At]about0700hoursonMay11theadvancesectionofthe51stSapperBattalionat lastarrivedatthefortifica-tion,havingcrossed theditch in frontof Installation14inarubberdinghy.TheysilencedEmplacement14.Thisopenedthewayforthewholebattaliontocross.Towardsnoon,moregroupscameupoverthewesternedge,andthelastBelgianinstallationsceasedfiring.38
At 0830 hours, 11 May 1940, Storm Detachment Granite was formally relieved by elements of the 151st Infantry Regiment. Witzig and his survivors departed Eben Emael at approximately0930hours.At1227hours,MajorJottrandofficiallysurrenderedthe fortress. The Eben Emael garrison had lost 25 killed and 63 wounded. The Germans destroyed 10 of 17 cupolas and casemates. They had lost 23 dead and 59 wounded.39 Storm Detachment Granite suffered 6 killed and, apart from injuries sustainedbythehardlandings,15wounded.40
AFTeRMATH
The coup de main on Eben Emael was a stunning victory thatproved key in the rapid penetration of Belgium, which was in-strumentalindrawingtheAlliedforcesintothetrapinNorthern Belgium andHolland. Itwas achieved by innovation and daringby a relatively small force. After the war, General Student toldrenownstrategistBasilLiddellHart:
41
Aftermeetingtheparamountneedsof thecoup inHol-land, only 500 airborne troops were left to help theinvasionofBelgium.TheywereusedtocapturethetwobridgesovertheAlbertCanalandtheFortofEbenEmael,Belgium’smostmodernfort,whichflankedthiswaterline-frontier. That tiny detachment, however, made all thedifferencetotheissue.Tocompensateforthescantinessoftheactualresources,andcreateasmuchconfusionaspossible,dummyparachutistswerescatteredwidelyoverthecountry.41
Overall, the German invasion caught the Allies unprepared. Manstein’s plan worked perfectly. General Gort’s observationscapturedtheconfusionandimpendingdoom.Hereported:
AtMaastricht, itwas reported that they [Belgians] hadbeenforestalledbyenemyactionfromtherearandhadbeen unable to demolish important bridges over theAlbert Canal and the Meuse across which the enemyhad begun to move. Air bombing was requested andwas extremely effective, but could not altogether denythe passage of the water obstacles to the enemy...Theenemyprogressacross theAlbertCanalhadup tonowbeenrelativelysmall,duetoasuccessfulcounter-attackbytheFrenchCavalryCorpsatSt.Trond,butlargercon-centrationswerenowreportednorthoftheAlbertCanal.DisquietingnewswasreceivedfromtheArdennes,whereaGermanthrustwasreportedasdevelopingonthefrontof theFrench9thArmy,withat least twoarmoureddi-visions…The speedwithwhich the enemy exploited hispenetrationoftheFrenchfront,hiswillingnesstoacceptrisks to further his aim, and his exploitation of everysuccess to theuttermost limits emphasised, evenmorefully than in the campaigns of the past, the advantage
42
whichaccrues to thecommanderwhoknowshowbesttousetimetomaketimehisservantandnothismaster…Again,thepaceofoperationshasbeensoacceleratedbythe partnership between offensive aircraft andmodernmechanised forces that the reserves available for thedefenceareoflittleuseunlesstheyarefullymobileoral-readyinoccupationofsomereserveposition…Soendedacampaignof22dayswhichhasprovedthattheoffensivehasoncemoregainedascendencyinmodernwarwhenundertakenwithanarmyequippedwithgreatlysuperiormaterialpowerintheshapeofairforcesandarmouredfightingvehicles.42
Intheend,thedestructionoftheWesttook46days,but itwasdecided inonly10.43 As such,on thenightof2 June1940, thelast of the British soldierswere evacuated from the beaches ofDunkirk, France. However, the desperate withdrawal resultedin the loss of virtually all their heavy equipment,weapons, andvehicles.44 Keyto thisoutcomewasthecaptureofEbenEmael.FieldMarshalAlbertKesselringassertedtheoperation“hadbeenamilitarymasterpiece.”Headded,“Thesuccessoftheoperationwith respect to its strategic effect is incontestable. The Dutch theatreofoperationswaspracticallyeliminated.”45
CONCLUDING ReMARKS
Withregardstotheirremarkablesuccess,First-LieutenantRudolfWitzigassessed:
TherealreasonsforthecapitulationofEben-Emaelseemtobeas follows:althoughanattackwasclearlynotex-pected, our useof tactical and technical surprisemadethedestructionofthevitalsurfaceinstallations,artilleryandobservationpostspossible,andthisinturnmadetheenemyuncertainaboutthegeneralsituation.Damageto
43
the ascent shafts and ventilating systemonly increasedtheirconfusion;allhelpfromoutside,includingthefieldartillery, failed. They felt captives in their own fortressand their fighting spirit was stifled. Although defeatedonly in their surface positions, theywere not preparedtomake a counterattack in the open field, even beforethefortresswassurrounded;whiletheymayhavebeentrainedonlytofightunderarmedcover,thisneverthelessrevealsshortcomings.Certainly,anattackbynightwouldhavehurtusconsiderably.46
Witzig’s explanation fails to pay fullmeasure to the daring andinnovation of the plan and achievement, however. With only 438personnel for the entire endeavour of capturing the bridgecrossingsandtheFort,andwithonly85Fallschirmjägersallocatedto the capture of Fort Eben Emael itself, and remarkably only 70actuallytakingpartintheinitialassault,theoperationaleffectwasimmense.
Thesuccess,however,wasnotduetoathrowofthedice.Itwastheresultofmeticulousthought,planningandtraining.First,animaginativesolutionwas required toovercomeacomplexprob-lem. The ability to recognize, accept and implement new tech-nologies,methodologiesand tactics is amajoraccomplishment.Toooftenanembedded conservativeorganizational culture, ad-herencetothestatus quo,anintolerancetowardschangeandanoverrelianceonexperienceblindsorganizationstoopportunity.Infact,successhereisasmuchafunctionofGermaninnovationanddaringasitisAlliedinabilitytodevelopphilosophically,theoreti-callyandpractically fromtheirdefensivewarmindset.Thesignswereallthere.BoththeSovietsandtheGermanshadundertakenseriousdevelopmentsintheirairborneandmechanizedapproachtowarfare,substantiallyintheory,butalsoinpractice,throughoutthe1930s.
44
The success of the operation also depended on the innovationto developnew tactics basedon anuntried assault vehicle, the DF-230glider,anewmethodofattack(i.e.gliderandparachutists),combinedwithnewtechnology(i.e.theHohlladung).Thisinnova-tion required foresight and risk acceptance. It alsodemandedarealisticappraisaloflimitationsandeffect,namelythatalthoughsurprise,speedandviolenceofactionwouldcreatephysicaldis-locationintheenemy,itwouldberelativelyshort-lived.Assuch,actionsontheobjectivewouldneedtobeswiftandprecise.
The essential requirement for surprise to allow the freedom ofmanoeuvretoaccomplishthetaskinthemomentsfollowingland-ingdrovethreeotherkeyfactorsforsuccess,specificallysecurity,training and rehearsals. Storm Group Koch took great pains toensuresecurityofboth themission,aswellas the technology/methodologybeingemployed.Thetaskforcewasvirtuallyisolat-edforapproximatelysixmonthspriortoD-Day.Frequentmoves,cover names, and restriction on correspondence and individualfreedom of movement were all imposed to guarantee secrecy,aswas the threat of death in theevent someone compromisedthemission.Theunderstandingbyallwasthatsuccessbyasmallforce, severelyoutnumbered,workingdeepbehindenemy linescouldonlybeattainediftheenemywerecompletelyunawareofwhatwasabouttosetuponthemsotheycouldnottakestepstomitigatetheattack.
Equallyimportantwastraining.Witharelianceonsurprise,speedandviolence,camethenecessitythateachindividualwasabletofunctionwithouthesitation.All,regardlessofrank,wererequiredtobeproficientintheuseofweapons,explosivesandallotherde-tachmentequipment.Allwererequiredtounderstandtheintentoftheplan,theirmission,aswellasthetasksofotherssothatintheeventofcatastropheanyandallcouldcarryontoachievethelarger intent.Thisability iswhy theabsenceof theCommander
45
of StormDetachmentGranite at the start of the assault, or thefailureofTwoSquadtoappear,hadlittleimpactontheoutcome.Otherswerereadyandabletofillthegaps.
Buttraininginandofitselfwasnotenough.Becomingproficientwith weapons and equipment in isolation does not necessar-ilyensuresuccess. Thetrainingmustalsoberealisticandset inthe context of themission to be conducted. As such, continualrehearsalsutilizingallcomponentpartssetinasneartorealisticsettings as possible is essential. Repetition and rehearsals buildcompetenceandconfidence.Italsoallowsforanabilitytoidentifyflawsintheplan,aswellastoworkthroughpossiblecontingencyplans.Theexpertiseandconfidencebuiltintheprocess,inturnfeedstheabilitytomaximizespeedontheobjectiveaseveryonehasseenanddonethetaskoverandoverbythetimetheyarriveontheobjective.
Andso,theassaultonFortEbenEmaelwasaclassicexampleofwhatcanbeachievedthroughdaringandinnovation.Specifically,itspeakstotheabilityofasmallforce,expertlytrained,executingawellthought-outandrehearsedplan,beingabletoachieveop-erationaleffect,andpotentiallystrategiceffect,throughsurprise,speedandviolenceofaction.
46
Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD is a retired experienced Regular Force infantry officer who has held key command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including Deputy Commander of CANSOFCOM, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and Officer Command-ing 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment. He is currently the Director of the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre. Dr. Horn is also an adjunct professor of history at the Royal Mili-tary College of Canada. He has authored, co-authored, edited or co-edited 38 books and over a hundred chapters / articles on military history, leadership and military affairs.
47
ACKNOWLeDGeMeNT
TheCANSOFCOMPDCwishestoextenditsdeepestappreciationtoCathySheppard forher invaluable assistance in researchandsourcingoforiginalphotographsandMikeBodnarforhisexpertmapreproductions.
49
NOTeS
1 Maj.Gen.F.W.VonMellenthin,Panzer Battles(NewYork:Ballan-tineBooks,1956),14.
2 Mellenthin, 14. Army Group A was commanded by Colonel GeneralvonRunstedt;ArmyGroupBbyColonelGeneralvonBock;andArmyGroupCbyColonelGeneralvonLeeb.
3 Specifically,on10 January1940engine failure forcedaGermanME108aircraftcarryingaLuftwaffeofficerwhohadinhispossessionadetailedplanofthependinginvasionofBelgiumandtheNetherlandsto land in a deserted field just insideMass-Mechelen, Belgium. The Alliesrightfullyconcludedthatthedocumentsweregenuine.ThisfindreinforcedtheirbeliefthattheanticipatedGermanoffensivewouldcutthroughnorthernBelgium.
4 HeinzGuderian,Panzer Leader (London:ArrowBooks,1990ed),91.Guderiannotedthatawargameconductedon7February1940inKoblenzdemonstratedtheplantobepotentiallyhighlysuccessful.
5 Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio,1982),94&104.Mansteinrevealed,“Ifoundithumiliating,tosaytheleast,thatourgenerationcoulddonothingbetterthanrepeatanold recipe ...Whatcouldpossiblybeachievedby turningupawarplan that our opponents had already rehearsedwith us once beforeandagainstwhoserepetitiontheywereboundtohavetakenfullpre-cautions?” Ibid.,98.Thewell-knownstrategistB.H.LiddellHart,afterhis interviewswith senior capturedGermangenerals, recounted, “So[FieldMarshal von]Manstein conceived thebold ideaof shifting themainstroketotheArdennes.Hearguedthattheenemywouldneverexpectamassoftankstobeusedinsuchdifficultcountry.YetitshouldbepracticablefortheGermantankforces,sinceoppositionwaslikelyto be slight during the crucial stage of the advance. Once they hademergedfromtheArdennes,andcrossedtheMeuse,therollingplainsofNorthern Francewould provide ideal country for tankmanoeuvre
50
andforarapidsweeptothesea.”B.H.LiddellHart,The German Gener-als Talk. Startling Revelations from Hitler’s High Command(NewYork:Quill,1979),113-114.
6 TheGermanHighCommandassignedArmyGroupA45divisions,7ofwhichwerepanzerdivisionstocutthroughtheArdennesForest.ArmyGroup B received 30 divisions, 3 ofwhichwere armoured andArmyGroupChad19divisions.
7 Mellenthin,16,28.VonMellenthinargued,“TheBattleofFrancewaswonbytheGermanWehrmachtbecauseitreintroducedinwarfarethedecisivefactorofmobility.Itachievedmobilitybythecombinationof firepower, concentration, and surprise, together with expert han-dlingofthe latestmodernarms–Luftwaffe,parachutistsandarmor.”Ibid.,30.
8 Karl-HeinzFrieserwithJohnT.Greenwood,The Blitzkrieg Legend. The 1940 Campaign in the West(Annapolis,Maryland:NavalInstitutePress,2005),38,56.
9 GeneraltheViscountGort,“FirstDespatch”(Coveringtheperiod3rdSeptember,1939to31stJanuary,1940),25April1940,Supplement to The London Gazette,March1941,40.PRO,CAB66/17,Memoranda,W.P.(41)128-W.P.(41)177,VolXVII.
10 BelgiumhadasmallnumberoftankswhichweredeployedontheDyleLine.
11 Lieutenant-ColonelI.H.LyalGrant,“TheGermanAirborneAttackonBelgium,”InMay1940,RUSI,Vol103,February1958,No.609,96.
12 Captain Boyd T. Bashore, “Sword of Silk,” Infantry School Quar-terly,October1956,59.6thArmyconsistedof20divisions.
13 Grant,97.
14 Oberst Rudolf Witzig, “Coup from the air: the capture of FortEben-Emael,”History of the Second World War,Part4,107.
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15 Grant, 97. The theory behind the hollow chargewas articulatedalreadyin1888byCharlesMunroe,aninternationallyrenownedexplo-sivesexpert.Inessence,thehollowcharge(shapedcharge)permitsa“normal”explosion tocreatea jetofhighpressure immediatelyupondetonation, which in turn generates tremendous penetrating powerevenwhenusingarelativelysmallcharge.Withtheshapedchargesusedon Eben Emael, once ignited, the explosion from a chargemelted itssteellinerandsentamoltenstreamofmetal,aswellasmetalsplintersandhotgases,throughanarrowholeinthecupolaorcasematekillingeveryoneinside.Thelarge50kgchargewasdividedintotwopiecesandhad tobe assembledprior to employment. TheGermans alsoused aone-piece12.5kgchargethatcouldpenetrateupto15cm.
16 Intotal,fourtugsquadrons(44xJu52s),fourglidersquadrons(44gliders)andonetransportsquadron(i.e.todropparachutists,dummiesandsupplies)wereallocatedtotheeffort.Grant,99.
17 WilliamH.McRaven,Spec Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice(NewYork:Presidio,1995),43.
18 Witzig,109.
19 Ibid.,109.Approximately5tonsofexplosiveswerecarried.
20 Ibid.
21 JamesE.Mrazek,The Fall of Eben Emael (Novato,CA:PresideioPress,1991),49.Thisbookremains theseminalsourceontheactualevent.
22 McRaven,42.Itwasalsodeterminedthatthelandingsurfaceonthe topofFortEbanEmaelwas toosmall for landing theglidersduetotheirspeedanddistancetheywouldtravelonthegrounduntiltheycametoastop. Asaresult,ahandbrakewasdesignedtoassist thelargeglidersinstoppingsooner.
23 Witzig,109.
24 Ibid.,107.
52
25 All the gliders were wedged into the hangars. The technicianswere not allowed to leave the confines of the airfield until after theassaultwascomplete.
26 Witzig, 109. Koch held his final Orders Group at 2100 hours, 9 May1940.
27 Witzig later recounted, “According to a Belgian source, at thebeginningoftheattacktherehadbeenabout750menpresentoutofaregularforceof1,200.”Witzig,110.
28 Ibid.,109.
29 Captain Boyd T. Bashore, “Sword of Silk,” Infantry School Quar-terly,October1956,61.
30 At the Vroenhoven bridge, the defenders reported to head-quartersthataplanehadlandednearbyandtheyqueriedwhetherornot theyshouldshoot.Thereply fromanunidentifiedvoiceover thetelephonenetworkwas“yes.”Mrazek,82-83.
31 It was a close run thing. The sergeant at the bridge refused tocarryouttheorderbecausehewantedtowaitforhisplatoonofficertoarrivetoavoidthepersonalresponsibilityofblowingthebridge.OnlywhenMajorJottrandtelephonedthebunkerandforcefullyorderedthesergeant to carry out the order did the demolition take place,mereminutesbeforetheGermanassaultforcearrived.
32 Witzig,109.
33 Ibid.
34 SeeMrazek,105-106.
35 Witzig,101.
36 The Belgians did attempt several counter-attacks, however, asartillerymen,theylackedtheweaponry,trainingandtacticstocompe-tentlychallengetheGermanassaultforce.
53
37 Witzig,110.
38 Ibid.
39 McRaven,55.
40 Witzig,111.
41 Hart,119.
42 Gort,“FirstDespatch.”
43 TheGermanvictorywas somewhatdeceptive. Its successowedasmuchtoGermany’s innovativedoctrineandtacticsas itdidtotheAllie’sunpreparedness.Quitesimply,themodernGermanmechanizedspearheadwaslargelyafacade.Nearly80percentoftheGermanArmyforboththeFrenchandRussiancampaignsremainedafootandhorse-drawnarmy.SeeWilliamsonMurrayandAllanR.Millett,eds.,Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996); John A. English,On Infantry (Westport: Praeger, 1984),47-85; LenDeighton,Blood, Tears, and Folly (London:Pimlico,1995),160-204;andLenDeighton,Blitzkrieg(Edison,NJ:CastleBooks,2000).
44 53,000 French troops were evacuated 3-4 June 1940, after thewithdrawal of theBritish forceswas completeon2 June. TheBritishAdmiraltyestimatedthatapproximately338,226menwereevacuatedbetween26Mayand3June.TheBritishleftbehind2,000guns,60,000trucks,76,000tonsofammunitionand600,000tonsof fuelandsup-plies.CesareSalmaggiandAlfredoPallavisini,2194 Days of War(NewYork:GalleryBooks,1988),4June1940;andI.C.R.Dear,ed.,The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),312-313.Anotheraccountgivesthelossesas475tanks,38,000vehi-cles,12,000motorcycles,8,000telephones,1,855wirelesssets,7,000tonnesofammunition,90,000rifles,1,000heavyguns,2,000tractors,8,000Brengunsand400antitankguns.On6JunetheWarCabinetwasinformed that therewere fewer than 600,000 rifles and only 12,000Bren guns in the whole of the UK. John Parker, Commandos. The Inside Story of Britain’s Most Elite Fighting Force (London: Headline
54
Book Publishing, 2000), 15. Yet another source gives the losses as:storesandequipmentfor500,000men,about100tanks,2,000othervehicles,600guns,andlargestocksofammunition.A.J.Barker,Dunkirk: The Great Escape(London:J.M.Dent&SonsLtd.,1977),224.Notably,amajorproblemwithdeterminingnumbersistheactualcategorizationofequipment.
45 Bashore, 62. Kesselring was referring to the entirety of the airborneoperationstocaptureRotterdam,theHague,aswellasEbenEmaelandthebridgesacrosstheAlbertCanal.
46 Witzig,111.
M I S S I O N
The mission of the Canadian Forces Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Professional Development Centre (PDC) is to enable profes-sional development within the Command in order to continually develop and enhance the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel.
V I S I O N
The vision of the CANSOFCOM PDC is to be a key enabler to CANSOFCOM headquarters, units and Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) as an intel-lectual centre of excellence for special operations forces (SOF) professional development (PD).
R O L E
The CANSOFCOM PDC is designed to provide additional capacity to:
1. develop the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel;
2. access subject matter advice on diverse subjects from the widest possible network of scholars, researchers, subject matter experts (SMEs), institutions and organizations;
3. provide additional research capacity;
4. develop educational opportunities and SOF specific courses and professional development materials;
5. record the classified history of CANSOFCOM;
6. develop CANSOF publications that provide both PD and educational materials to CANSOF personnel and external audiences;
7. maintain a website that provides up-to-date information on PD opportunities and research materials; and
8. assist with the research of SOF best practices and concepts to ensure that CANSOFCOM remains relevant and progressive so that it maintains its position as the domestic force of last resort and the international force of choice for the Government of Canada.
THE CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
1. More Than Meets the Eye: The Invisible Hand of SOF in Afghanistan Colonel Bernd Horn, 2011.
2. Squandering the Capability: Soviet SOF in Afghanistan Major Tony Balasevicius, 2011.
3. Military Strategy: A Primer Dr. Bill Bentley, 2011.
4. Slaying the Dragon: The Killing of Bin Laden Colonel Bernd Horn and Major Tony Balasevicius, 2012.
5. Between Faith and Reality: A Pragmatic Sociological Examination of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’s Future Prospects
Colonel Mike Rouleau, 2012.
6. Working with Others: Simple Guidelines to Maximize Effectiveness Dr. Emily Spencer and Colonel Bernd Horn, 2012.
7. Operation Dawn in the Gulf of Aden and the Scourge of Piracy Colonel Bernd Horn, 2012.
8. “We Murder to Dissect”: A Primer on Systems Thinking and War Dr. Bill Bentley, 2012.
9. Breaching Barriers: A Comprehensive Approach to Special Operations Decision-Making in Non-Traditional Security Environments Major Steven Hunter, 2013.
10. Chaos in Kandahar: The Battle for Building 4 Colonel Bernd Horn, 2013.
11. “Little Giant Killer”: The Bill Underwood Story Dr. Emily Spencer with Robbie Cressman, 2013.
12. From Assassins to Al-Qaeda: Understanding and Responding to Religious Terrorism Kevin E. Klein, 2013.
13. Amongst the Eagles: The Battle of Mount La Difensa Kevin E. Klein, 2013.
CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
MONOGRAPHS
C A N S O F C O M P R O F E S S I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T C E N T R E
Colonel Bernd Horn
INNOVATION AND DARING
THE CAPTURE OF EBAN EMAEL, 10 MAy 1940