capacity building for security sector - wordpress.com · eu-civcap working paper no. 02–17...

EU-CIVCAPWorkingPaperNo.02–17(September2017)

1

CapacityBuildingforSecuritySectorReforminKosovo1SonjaStojanovićGajić1. ExecutiveSummary

Thispaperevaluatesthe internationalcommunity’sapproachestocapacitybuildingofthe security sector in Kosovo from NATO’s intervention in 1999 to the present day.Analysingaperiodofalmosttwodecades,therefore,thispaperprovidesinsightsonhowthe approach to capacity building has evolved through four phases of security sectorreform,reflectingcorrespondingchangesinthepoliticalcontextoverthesameperiod.Inthefirstphase(stablisationanddemobilisation,1999–2004),thesecurityagencieswereinitiallyestablishedtodemobiliseformercombatantsandtopartiallyaddressthesecurityvacuumthatinternationalactorscouldnotfillalone.Inthesecondphase(securitysectordevelopmentandinstitution-building,2004–08),thefocusofcapacity-buildingactivitieswasonbuildinginstitutionstotakechargeofthemanagementofsecurityagencies,thusfacilitating the gradual transfer of governance responsibilities to local provincialgovernment. In the third phase (state-building, 2008–12), international actors whosupportedsupervisedindependencehandedoverfullresponsibilityfortheexecutionofsecurity and justice to the unilaterally proclaimed independent state of Kosovo, andthereforemuchofthecapacity-buildingagendawastransformedintothementoringandadvising of local authorities. The fourth and most recent phase of capacity-buildingactivitiesbytheinternationalcommunity(EU-mediatedintegrationofminoritiesandtheEUaccessionprocess,2012–present),hasbeenmarkedbytheEU’s leadingrole inthemediationprocessoftheBelgrade–Pristinadialogue.Thisdialogueaimstoachievethenormalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and to initiate Kosovo’sassociation process towards EUmembership. This has led to a shift of focus towardscapacitybuildingdesignedtointegrateparallelsecurityandjusticestructuresrunbytheKosovoSerbianminority,whichisconcentratedinthenorthofKosovo,andhasbeen(self)excludedfromtheKosovosystemuntilrecently.

1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovationprogrammeunder grant agreement no.: 653227. The content reflects only the author’s views, and theEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.


2

2. Findings1. Integratedexecutivemissionsprovideadvantagesfortheeffectivedivision

oflabourandthecoordinationofcapacitybuildingforsecuritysectorreform(SSR), but limit the potential of local ownership. The efforts of theinternationalcommunitywerebettercoordinatedintheinitialtwophasesofSSRduetothepillarstructureoftheexecutiveUNmission,whichintegratedmajor intergovernmental actors (the OSCE, the EU and NATO-led KosovoForce,KFOR)andmoreclearlydelineatedthedivisionoflabourbetweenthem.However,capacitybuildingatthatpointdidnotnecessarilyleadtocoherentmodelsbeingtransferredtolocalauthorities,giventhatmuchoftheworkwasimplemented by member states’ contingents or senior representatives ininternational governmental organisations, who in turn imposed theirrespectivenationalmodels.

2. The limited involvementof local actors in security governanceduring the

stabilisationanddemobilisationphaseprevents thedevelopmentof localownership,althoughequallyitreducesthepotentialforlocalactors’armedwings to spoil the fragile security governance architecture run byinternationals.Oncetheshort-termperspectiveofcapacitybuildingdeployedduringthestabilisationphaseisreplacedwiththelonger-termperspectiveofcapacitybuildingforpeacebuilding,thedesiredmodelofstatehoodinwhichthesecuritysectorisgoingtobepositionedbecomesmoreimportant.

3. Security sector development/reform is an intrinsically political process

linkedtotheunderstanding/desirabilityofstatehoodbyallsidesinaconflict(in this case, this includes Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, as well asKosovo and Serbia themselves), in addition to the attitudes of keyinternationalactorsactiveinthecontext.Thelackofajointpoliticalvisionbytheinternationalcommunitydiminishesthecoherenceandeffectivenessoftheirapproachtolocalpoliticalactorsandsecuritysectorreform.ThecaseofKosovodemonstratesthattheinternationalcommunity’seffectivenessincapacity building of the security sector has been less coherent due to thepolarisationbetween thosewho recogniseKosovo’sunilaterallyproclaimedindependence (the US, UK and all but five EU member states) and non-recognisersorstatus-neutralactors(Russia,theUN,OSCEandsomememberstatesoftheEUandNATO).Thedifferencesbetweenthevariousapproachesto Kosovo’s statehood were evidenced by the correspondingly variegated


3

choices of institutional recipients and thematic foci of capacity-buildinginitiativesbyinternationalactors.Thedifferencesinapproachescorrespondcloselytothecampsinwhichrecognisers,non-recognisersandstatus-neutralcapacitybuildersaresituated.Thisleadstounequaldevelopmentamongthevariousindividualinstitutionswithinthesecuritysector.Italsoresultsintheunsuccessfuldevelopmentofcapacitybuildinginareaschallengingpoliticallysensitiveissues,suchasprosecutingwarcriminalsandorganisedcriminals,orconfronting different perceptions of the legitimacy of international actorsbetweenlocalAlbanianandSerbiancommunities.

4. TheinternationalcommunityinKosovohasdisproportionallyinvestedmore

inbuildingthecapacitiesofsecurityinstitutionsthanithasinbuildingjusticeandoversightinstitutions.Thishasincludedbuildingfromscratch–andlaterstrengthening – the capacities of law enforcement and other public safetyinstitutions to deliver security. In terms of capacity-building assistanceprovidedtoindividualsecurityinstitutions,theKosovoPolice,astheoldestofthese institutionshas received themostattentionoverall,while the justicesectorbecametheforemostreceiverofassistanceandcapacitybuildingafterKosovo’sproclamationofindependence.Supportingthecapacitybuildingoflaw enforcement agencies and the judiciary seems to bemore acceptableamongboth recognisersandnon-recognisers,as it is justifiedaspromotinghuman security, which is status-neutral. Only those in the internationalcommunitywhorecogniseKosovoarewillingtosupporteffortstobuildthecapacityofinstitutionalactorslinkedtonationalsecurity.Thisistruebothforinstitutionswithaformalmandatetodealwiththeriskstonationalsecurity(suchastheKosovoIntelligenceAgency),andforthelightdefenceforce(theKosovoSecurityForce(KSF),whichisperceivedasthesymbolicguarantorofstatehoodbackedbypotentialarmedforce).

5. TheideathatbuildingcapacityinKosovoinstitutionsisapoliticallyneutral

activitywasnotsharedbySerbsfromthenorthofKosovo,whoboycottedallKosovosecurityinstitutionsandmanyoftheirinternationalsponsors.Thiswasthecaseuntil2013whentheEU-mediatedBrusselsAgreementbetweenBelgradeandPristinawasbrokered,providingfortheintegrationofSerbianparallelstructures intotheKosovosystem.Priortothisagreement,mostofthecapacitybuilding inKosovowasfocusedwithintheAlbanian-dominatedareasincentral,southern,westernandeasternKosovo.


4

6. Theeffectivenessofcapacitybuildingislinkedtoseveralactiveinternationalactors, their support for certain institutions, and the consistency andcoordinationofapproachestheyhavedeveloped.ThemosteffectivecaseofcapacitybuildingwasarguablythedevelopmentofKosovoCustoms.Thiswasduetotheconsistencyofinternationalassistance:itwasonlysupervisedbyoneinternationalactor–theUK–foralmosttwodecades.Thethematicareasofsecuritysectorreformthathavebeenmostcrowdedbydonorshavebeenfirst,theruleoflaw,andsecond,certainareasofpolicing–communitysafety,intelligence-led policing and more recently, countering violent extremism(CVE).Yet,thereisaperceptionthatmanyoftheseover-crowdedareasofcapacitybuildingareapproachedwithaviewtoidentifyingandmanagingpotentialthreatstoEUmemberstatesandtheUS,butnotnecessarilythosetoKosovo’slocalpopulation.Thisisevidentinthepossibleover-prioritisationofcapacitybuildingforCVEandsophisticatedmethodsoftacklingorganisedcrime(suchasintelligence-ledpolicing)overinvestmentsininfrastructureforday-to-day/neighbourhood policing. A major concern among both KosovoAlbanians and Kosovo Serbs is that the international community hasoverlooked local demands for theaccountabilityofpolitical leaders for thesakeoftheirparticipationin,andenforcementof,interethnicdeals.Lastbutnot least, the lackofadequatebacking for localownershipof reforms (andtherefore their sustainability) is evident from insufficient support for localproblemidentification,projectdevelopmentandevaluation.


5

3. Recommendations

1. Long-termcommitmentsofresourcesarerequiredwhentheinternationalcommunitydecidestointerveneinacountryandcommencebuildinganewsecuritysectorfromscratch.Executivemissionsandcapacitybuildingneedtobemoreeffectivelylinkedtoensuresmoothtransitionsbetweeninternationalorganisationsandwithinthesamemission(inthiscase,betweentheUNandEU andwithin the EU Rule of LawMission in Kosovo (EULEX), between itsexecutiveandcapacity-buildingmandates).

2. Integratedexecutivemissionsareaneffectivemechanismthroughwhichtocoordinateinternationalassistanceforcapacitybuilding,butthesemissions’mandatesmust be limited andmust have clear exit strategies from theirinceptioninordernottohinderlocalownership.Executivemissionsrequireclear benchmarks to guide local actors towards progress and to avoidsituationswheremissioncreepoccursstemmingfromthelackofaclearexitstrategy.

3. Consistencyacross theEU’sciviliantools forcapacitybuilding (diplomacy,

development,securityandsoon)isvital,especiallyinsectorswheretheEUisaleadinternationalproviderofcapacitybuilding(suchaspolicingandtheruleoflaw).

4. Internationalorganisationsandactorswithhighprofilesshould‘lend’their

reputationtotheirpartnerssotoeffectivelydevelopthecapacitiesoflocalactorsduringpeacebuilding.

5. Localownership,understoodasnegotiatingwiththepoliticalactorthathas

themostpowertodestabilisethesituationor tomaintainthestatusquo(vetoplayers),maystrengthenthepoliticalpowerstructurepresentattheendofconflict.This,inturn,risksallowingthosepowerfulactorstocapturethestateandthenascentinstitutionswhosecapacityisbeingbuilt.Therefore,itiscrucialthat,fromthebeginningofanintervention,sufficientattentionispaidtocapacitybuildingforthedemocraticoversightofthesecuritysector.Internationalactorsshouldalsofocusonlinkingcapacity-buildingprogrammesthat share the common goals of investigation and prosecution for seriouscrimes,suchaswarcrimes,organisedcrimeandcorruption.


6

4. Introduction

Thispaperevaluatestheinternationalcommunity’sapproachestobuildingthecapacityof thesecuritysector inKosovofromNATO’s intervention in1999tothepresentday.Kosovo has been a major recipient of international assistance, including in capacitybuildingofitssecuritysector.PriortotheconflictinUkraine,Kosovowaspercapitaoneof the lead recipients of direct security provision from international actors and ofdevelopmentassistancefromEuropeanactors.BesidesBosniaandHerzegovina,KosovohasbeenthesubjectofthelongestengagementthroughtheEU’sCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy (CSDP) in crisismanagementandpeacebuilding inEurope,which since2012hasoverlappedwiththeEU’senlargementagenda.2KosovoistheonlycountryinwhichtheEUhasanexecutive justicemissionthathasalsobeentaskedwithcapacitybuildingof local lawenforcementagenciesandthe judiciary,with theaimofassistingthemtoworkindependentlyinsensitiveareas(tacklingorganisedcrime,corruptionandwar crimes). In this context, with many different forms of engagement occurring inconcert,thispaperevaluatesthecoherenceandinteractionsbetweenEUinternationaloperationsandexecutivemissions in the fieldon theonehand,andcapacitybuildingamonglocalactorsontheother.Theanalysispresentedinthispaperisbasedonareviewofpreviousresearch3andmorethan 40 interviews carried out with national and international stakeholders betweenJanuaryandApril2017aspartoftheEU-CIVCAPproject.ThestudymapskeyphasesofcapacitybuildingofthesecuritysectorinKosovo,andthecorrespondingapproachesofthe international community to support and encourage this. This study also analysesachievementsinthisareatodate.Theempiricalmaterialforthisstudyisbroadlydividedintothreekeythemes:(1)thecontextofsecuritysectordevelopment,(2)applyingtheconceptofcapacitybuilding,and(3)theeffectivenessofcapacitybuilding.ThepaperbeginswithananalysisofthecontextinwhichsecuritysectordevelopmentandreformhavetakenplaceinKosovooverthepasttwodecades.Insection5,keyphasesofthedevelopmentofKosovo’ssecuritysectorfrom1999to2017arepresented.Eachofthemainphaseswillbeanalysed,whichwillalsoentailthemappingofkeyinternational2InMarch2012,theEuropeanCommissionlaunchedafeasibilitystudyontheprospectsofaStabilisationandAssociationAgreement,thefirststeptowardstheformalarrangementofassociationwiththeEU.TheAgreementwassignedinOctober2015.3ThemostcomprehensiveanalysisoftheKosovosecuritysectorisbyQehaja(2017),whileresearchbytheKosovarCentreforSecurityStudieshasprovidedmostoftheempiricalmaterialondevelopmentsinthesecuritysectorinKosovosince2008.


7

actors.ThepaperwilldrawoutthelogicofsecuritysectordevelopmentandhighlighttheKosovosecurityandjustice institutionsthathavebeenprioritisedforcapacity-buildingassistance.ThiselementoftheanalysiswillconcludewithasummarisationofthecurrentdivisionoflabouramongkeyinternationalactorsprovidingcapacitybuildinginKosovo.Section 6 will analyse the concept of capacity-building support provided for thedevelopmentandreformofsecurity institutions inKosovo.Thissectionwill includeananalysisofthedifferenttypesofcapacity-buildingactivitiesappliedtothecontextandthe shifts in the overall capacity-building approach (from the stabilisation of a post-conflictstateduringtheinitialstagesofengagement,tothepreparationofthatstateforaccessiontotheEUmorerecently).Section7willanalysethecapacity-buildingrecordsofar,providingadeeperanalysisoftheeffectivenessandcoherenceoftheinternationalcommunity’svarious interventions,aswellasevaluatingtheextent towhichcapacity-buildingactivitiescontributedtolocalownershipandlegitimacyamonglocalactors,andtooverallsustainabilityofthereformsinthisnotoriouslysensitiveareaofgovernance.5. Thecontextofsecuritysectordevelopment/reformTo facilitate an analysis of the effectiveness of capacity building in Kosovo’s securityinstitutions,oneneedstounderstandhow,overtime,thegoalsofthecapacity-buildingagendahaveevolvedasthepoliticalcontexthaschanged.Forthisreason,thispapermapskeyinternationalprovidersofcapacitybuildingandthelogicoftheirengagement.Thismappingalsorevealswheretheireffortstodevelopsecurityinstitutionsandprogrammesareconcentratedineachphase.TheperiodisationdeployedbythispaperisbasedonanearlieranalysisofthecontextdevelopedbyFlorianQehajaandMentorVrajolli(2011).4Thispaperupdatesthisframeworktotakeaccountofsubsequentperiodsaftertheendofsupervisedindependencein2012andfollowingthe2013normalisationofBelgrade–Pristina relations. The periodisation presented below should be understood as ananalytical tool that does not fully mirror reality in the field, as some of the trendsidentifiedinearlierphasesweremaintainedinsuccessivephases.Themainphasesarenamedafterthe internationalcommunity’sapproachtoKosovo’ssecuritygovernance,whichevidentlychangedsignificantlyovertime:(1)stabilisationanddemobilisation,(2)security sector development (institution building), (3) state building (supervisedindependence), and (4) EU-mediated integration of minorities and the EU accessionprocess.

4Note that theperiodisationpresented in thispaperdiffers slightly from theoneearlierdevelopedbyQehaja and Vrajolli (2011), as the present framework focuses on categorising the various logicswithininternationalassistancethatareappliedtothesecuritysectorinKosovo(includingcapacitybuilding).


8

Table1:OverviewofkeyperiodsandparadigmsofSSRinKosovoName Period Targetsecurityand

justiceinstitutionsforcapacitybuilding

Dominant/leadinternationalactors(providersofcapacitybuilding)

Keylocalactors

1.Stabilisationanddemobilisation

1999–2004 KosovoPoliceService;KosovoProtectionCorps;KosovoCustoms.

MissionledbytheUNInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo,whichincludedtheUN,OSCEandNATO.

Albanianpoliticalpartiesandtheirparamilitarywings.

2.Securitysectordevelopment(institutionbuilding)

2004–2008 Ministriesofinteriorandjustice.

3.Statebuilding(supervisedindependence)

2008–2012 Alltraditionalsecurityinstitutionswiththemostfocusonthepolice,judiciaryandcustoms;TransformationoftheKosovoProtectionCorpsintotheKSF.

‘Recognisers’ofunilaterallyproclaimedindependence(includingtheUSandUK);EU;Status-neutralactors:theOSCE,UNDevelopmentProgramme,etc.

CentralKosovoauthoritiesbasedinPristinaandKosovoSerbsfromcentralKosovo.

4.EU-mediatedintegrationofminoritiesandtheEUaccessionprocess

2012–present

IntegrationofparallelSerbiansecurityandjusticestructuresfromthenorthofKosovointotheKosovosystem;Institutionsinchargeoffightingorganisedcrime.

EU(EuropeanExternalActionService,EUOfficeinPristina,EUSpecialRepresentativeandEULEX);US.

CentralKosovoauthorities;SerbianpoliticalelitesinBelgradeandlocalSerbianrepresentativesfromnorthKosovo.


9

Name Period Targetsecurityandjusticeinstitutionsforcapacitybuilding

Dominant/leadinternationalactors(providersofcapacitybuilding)

Keylocalactors

KSFtransformationinlinewithNATOstandards.

Source:QehajaandVrajolli(2011).

The first phase of security sector development (1999–2004) is best described as thestabilisationanddemobilisationphase.ItstartedimmediatelyafterNATO’sinterventioninthethenFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaandthewithdrawalofSerbiansecurityforcesinJune1999,whichleftKosovoinasecurityvacuum.5ThisvacuumwasonlypartiallyfilledbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)Resolution1244/99(UN1999),whichauthorisedtheinternationalcommunitytointerveneandsubsequently‘toestablishasecuritypresence,demilitariseKosovoLiberationArmy(KLA)6andfacilitatethereturnofrefugees’(UN,nodate).TheresolutionalsoestablishedtheUNInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo(UNMiK), with a mandate to perform all aspects of civilian administration, establishdemocraticinstitutionsandcreatethebasisforresolvingthequandaryofKosovo’sstatus(UN, no date). The UNSC Resolution 1244/99 established the four-pillar structure ofgovernance,which tasked the agencies as follows: (1) theUNHigh Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) with leading humanitarian assistance, (2) the UN with civiladministration,(3)theOSCEwithdemocratisationandinstitutionbuildingand(4)theEUwithreconstructionandeconomicdevelopment.AfterthereturnofthemajorityofethnicAlbanianrefugeesin2000,thefirstpillarwastransformedintoaruleoflawpillarundertheUN(UNMiK,2003).ThesameresolutionmandatedNATOtoestablishpeacesupportoperationsthroughitsKosovoForce(KFOR),todeterthepotentialofrenewedhostilities,toestablishasecureenvironmentandensurepublicsafetyandorder,todemilitarisetheKLAandtosupportinternationalhumanitarianefforts(NATO,nodate).KFORwasalsoinchargeoftheimplementationoftheMilitary-TechnicalAgreementbetweenNATOandthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the ceasefire agreement). Besides internationalorganisations, the major actors in Kosovo’s security sector development have been

5ForanoverviewofpoliticaldevelopmentsandconflictinKosovo,seeJudah(2000)andKer-Lindsay(2009).6TheKLAistheparamilitarywingofoneofKosovo’sAlbanianpoliticalparties–theDemocraticPartyofKosovo(Albanianabbreviation:PDK),ledbyHashimThaçi,thecurrentpresidentofKosovo.


10

individualstates–inparticular,theUSandseveralEUmemberstates(France,Germany,ItalyandtheUK),aswellassomenon-EUmembers(Norway,SwitzerlandandTurkey).Inthefirstphase(1999–2004), internationalactorsfilledthesecurityvacuumthroughthedirectprovisionofsecurity–forbothmilitary(throughNATO-ledKFOR)andpublicsecurityandsafety(undertheUNpolice,judiciaryandcustoms).Duringthisperiod,theinitialsecuritysectorinstitutionsweredevelopedfromscratch–theKosovoPoliceServiceandKosovoProtectionCorps–andthereforeitismoreappropriatetorefertosecuritysector development than reform. This development was completed according to thedesignprovidedby internationalactors,almostwithoutanyformaldecision-makingoroversightgiventolocalpoliticalelites.ThePoliceServicewasdevelopedbyUNMiKandtheOSCE (OSCE, no date). The two international organisations jointly carried out theselectionofpotentialcandidatesamongformerKLAcombatants,formerpoliceofficerswhoworkedduringtheYugoslavtimeandnewrecruits.TheOSCEoversawprovisionoftrainingatthePoliceTrainingCentreinVucitrn,whileUNMiKsupervisedfieldtraininginpolicestationscommandedbyUNpolicestafffromvariouscountries.7UNMiKandKFORweretaskedwithcreatingtheorganisationforcivilemergencymanagement–theKosovoProtectionCorps8–whichwouldmainlyemployformerethnicAlbaniancombatants.Themajorlogicbehindthedevelopmentoftheinitialsecurityinstitutionsunderthecommandof the internationalcommunitywasdemobilisation,disarmamentandreintegrationofformerKLAparamilitaries.Thisisthereasonwhy,earlyon,UNMiKadoptedaregulationthatallowedforestablishingprivatesecuritycompaniesthatwouldemployasurplusofthen-unemployed KLA veterans, butwithout permission to carryweapons (Emini andVrajolli,2015:61).Therewasnoparliamentaryoversightofsecurity institutionsinthisphase,as‘ProvisionalInstitutionsofLocalSelf-GovernmenthadnoexecutiveoroversightcompetenciesoverKPC[KosovoProtectionCorps]andKPS[KosovoPoliceService]andthejudiciary’(QehajaandVrajolli,2011:11).Basedontheevidenceavailable,itseemsthat integrated executivemissions such asUNMiK coordinated a four-pillar structure,providingadvantagesforeffectivedivisionoflabourandcoordinationofcapacitybuildingofSSR,butlimitingthepotentialforlocalownership.Besidesthenewinstitutionsbuiltfromscratch,theparallelsecuritystructuresfunctionedaswell. InAlbanian-dominated areas, two intelligence services affiliatedwithpolitical

7Interview1.8 The Kosovo Protection Corps could not perform any defence, law enforcement, riot control or otherinternal security tasks; itsactivitieswere limited to civilianemergency tasks, suchasdisaster response,searchandrescue,deminingandsoon.Formoredetails,seeScahill(2000).


11

partiesoperated–theKosovoIntelligenceService(ShërbimiInformativiKosovës,ShIK),affiliatedwiththeDemocraticPartyofKosovo(PartiaDemokratikeeKosovës,PDK),andtheInstituteforStrategicResearchandPublicOpinion,associatedwiththeDemocraticLeagueofKosovo(LidhjaDemokratikeeKosovës,LDK)(Qehaja,2012;QehajaandVrajolli,2011:21).ShIKwasallegedlyinvolvedintheethniccleansingoftheremainingSerbsintowns with an Albanianmajority, as well as persecuting ethnic Albanians considereddisloyaltothecauseofindependenceorwhomighthavebeencompetitorsofthenewpoliticalandsecurityelite(Borger,2014).InmunicipalitieswhereSerbswerethemajority,especiallyinnorthKosovowherethesesettlementswereterritoriallyconcentrated,thestructuresoftheSerbianMinistryofInteriorandpublicadministrationandintelligenceagencies,aswellasthejudicialsystem,remainfunctioning(ICG,2004:4).Thesecondphase(2004–08)couldbecalledthesecuritysectordevelopmentphase,asit saw a gradual transfer of competencies from the international community to theProvisional Institutions of Self-Government, including for themanagement of securityagencies.ThisphasewasinitiatedaftertheriotsofMarch2004,duringwhichthemassivedisplacementofSerbs,alongwiththedestructionoftheirpropertyandSerbianOrthodoxChurch monasteries and churches, ended with the unilateral proclamation ofindependence in 2008. This occurred in linewith the Internal Security Sector Reviewlaunchedattheendof2005,whichhadbeenofficiallyrequestedbythegovernmentofKosovo and was managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The holisticreview of security architecture and threat assessment performed through publicconsultation9endedinthetransferofcompetenciesbyprovidinglocalauthoritieswithcivilianmanagementoversecurityinstitutions.TheMinistryofInteriorandtheMinistryofJusticewerecreatedin2006,aswellasthefirstparliamentarycommitteesinchargeofoverseeingnascentsecurity institutions(theCommitteeforOversightofEmergencyPreparednessandtheCommitteeonSecurity,whichoversawtheKosovoPoliceServiceand other security institutions). In this phase, most competencies for managing theKosovoPoliceServicewerehandedovertothelocalauthorities,exceptthecommandbytheUNMiKpolicecommissioner.Duringthisperiod,theEUslowlystartedplayingamoreimportantpoliticalroleintheanticipationofKosovo’sstatussettlement,asitwassettooversee this agreement.10 In addition, aCSDPmissionwas conceivedwith amandaterelatedtotheruleoflaw.

9Forlessonslearned,seeBleasaandQehaja(2013)andISSAT(nodate).10Foreanoverviewofmissionplanning,seeCounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2007).


12

Thethirdphase(2008–10),whichcanbereferredtoasthestatebuildingorsupervisedindependencestage,wasinitiatedatthepointoftheproclamationofindependenceon17 February 2008 and lasteduntil the endof supervised independence in 2012– thebeginning of the formalised EU association process. The independence was initiallysupervisedbytheInternationalCivilianOfficeasanEU–USofficeanditsmandatelasteduntil2012.11Thetransferofcompetenciesforsecuritygovernancewascarriedoutinlinewiththeconstitutionbasedontheso-calledAhtisaariPlan(formally,theComprehensiveProposalfortheKosovoStatusSettlement),(Ahtisaari,2007).The2008ConstitutionofKosovo envisages the development of fully functional public safety, security, justice,intelligence,civilemergencysectorandbordercontrolinstitutionsundertheauspicesofthe Kosovo authorities. For the first time, an official intelligence service, the KosovoIntelligenceAgency,andsecurityservice, theKosovoSecurityForce,wereestablished.TheAhtisaariPlanalsoenvisagedthedisbandmentoftheKosovoProtectionCorps,whichwasperceivedasbeingoverburdenedwith theKLA-styleofmanagement (QehajaandVrajolli, 2011: 25–26). This situation led to the creation of a new, lightly-armedparamilitarysecurityactor,theKSF,inlinewithNATOstandards.ItsmissionistoconductcrisisresponseoperationsinKosovoandabroad,undertakecivilianprotectionoperationswithinKosovoandprovideassistancetocivilianauthoritiesincasesofnaturaldisastersand other emergencies (Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces, no date). Kosovo’sconstitution also contains special safeguard mechanisms for the protection of ethnicminorityrights,especiallythoseofSerbs(forexample,quotasfortherepresentationofminoritiesinallpublicadministrationbodies,includingsecurityinstitutions,aswellasavetopowerovertransformationoftheKSFintotheKosovoArmedForces).Inanutshell,during this thirdphaseofsecuritysectordevelopment,all competenciesexcepttheprosecutionofwarcrimeswerehandedovertoKosovoauthorities.Warcrimeinvestigations remained a reserved domain of the newly-established CSDP mission,EULEX,duetothedistrustofinternationalsandtheunwillingnessoflocalpoliticalelitesto prosecute those within its own ranks who were suspected of crimes. Newresponsibilities also included that of the government of Kosovo to develop its ownstrategicdocuments–forexample,thefirstnationalsecuritystrategywasdevelopedin2010,followedbytheKosovosecuritysectorreviewin2012–14.Thereasonthisphaseislabelledthestate-buildingphaseisbecausemanyofthecountriesthathadrecognisedKosovo’sindependenceduringpreviousphasesnowworkedtosupportittobecomea

11ForacomprehensivereportontheworkoftheInternationalCivilianOfficeinKosovo,refertoICO(2012).


13

fully-fledgedstatethatwouldbeacceptedintointernationalorganisations.12Thismeantthat the international communitywas no longer to be in the driving seat, and that itshouldhavemovedtousecapacitybuildingtosupportlocalpoliticalelitestodevelopandmanage Kosovo’s security. However, this was not really what happened in practice.Instead,duringthisphase,theinternationalcommunitystartedpayingmoreattentiontotheissuesoftheruleoflawandfocuseditscapacity-buildingactivitiesonstrengtheningKosovo’snascentjusticesystemanditscooperationwithlawenforcementbodies.Thiswasalso thephase inwhichsecuritysector reformwasusednotonly in linewith theparadigm of stabilisation of the situation within Kosovo and between Kosovo itsneighbours (primarilySerbia),butalsotopotentially integrate it intotheEuro-AtlanticcommunityinlinewithEUandNATOnorms.TheEUbecamethemajoractoramongtheintergovernmentalactors,although theUS remains themostpolitically salient.Duringthisperiod,theEUworkedregularlyinthepartsofKosovorunbyethnicAlbanians,andwhiletheEUwaspresentinthenorthofKosovo,whereethnicSerbsarethemajority,itwasnotabletocompletemuchworkthere.The current, fourth phase (from 2010) ismarked by the EU-mediated integration ofminoritiesand theEUaccessionprocess (BrusselsDialogue),whichhas led toseveralagreements13 related to security governance: the establishment of integrated bordermanagement,aswellas the integrationofSerbiansecurityand justicestructures thathaveoperatedinnorthernKosovointothegovernmentofKosovo’sinstitutionalsetup.14This isalso thephase inwhich theEU’s largestoperation (EULEX)under theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)hasbecomeoperationalinKosovo(EULEX,nodatea),with an executive mandate to prosecute and judge sensitive cases of war crimes,organisedcrimeandseverecorruption,aswellasacapacity-buildingmandateintheareaof justice and law enforcement. This capacity-building phase can be referred to asmediatedintegration.BesidestheBrusselsDialogue-relatedsupport,muchemphasishasbeen given to alignment with EU standards since Kosovo started negotiating theStabilisationandAssociationAgreementatthebeginningof2012.Thatsameyear,EULEXwas significantly downsized in staff and restructured, although itsmandate remainedunchangeduntil2014,whenitstoppedtakingnewcases.

12 See for example the mission statement on the website of the UK Embassy to Pristina, available athttps://www.gov.uk/government/world/kosovo,accessed7February2017.13 For an overview, see Serbia–Kosovo negotiations, available athttp://www.balkaninsight.com/en/page/serbia-kosovo-relations-negotiations.14ConcerningtheintegrationofSerbianpoliceofficersintotheKosovoPolice,seeBjelošandElek(2014);ontheintegrationofcivilianprotectionunits,seeStakićandBjeloš(2015).


14

Basedontheabovementionedmappingofkeyphasesofsecuritysectordevelopmentandreform,itcanbeconcludedthattheinternationalcommunityhasdemonstratedalong-term commitment to the capacity building of Kosovo’s security institutions. OneinterlocutortreatsworkintheWesternBalkansas‘amarathonratherthanasprint.Thechangesaremadeincrementallyandtheimpactisonlyvisibleafteranumberofyears.’15Still, the international community has not always shared the same political vision forKosovo’spoliticalstatusanditssecuritysector,whichinturnhasinfluenceddifferencesinthevariouscapacity-buildingapproachestested,aswillbedemonstratedinthenextsection.5.1CurrentdivisionoflabouramonginternationalactorsForthepurposesofthissection,theinternationalcommunitycanbedividedintothosewhohaverecognisedtheunilaterallydeclaredindependenceofKosovoandthosewhohavenot.SinceUNMiKhandedexecutivefunctionsovertothegovernmentofKosovoin2008,theformer has focused predominantly on capacity buildingwithin andmonitoring of thesituation for reportingback to theUNSC.UNMiK,however,has lost its credibility andlegitimacy among ethnic Albanians as it has been associatedwith the running of thecountryasaprotectorate16anditsstrongemphasisonstatusneutrality.17BesidesUNMiK,therearemanyUNagencies,funds,programmesandaffiliatesactiveinKosovo,suchastheUNHCR, theUnitedNations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and –most importantly forsecuritysectorreform–theUNDevelopmentProgramme.TheUNDPhasbeenactiveinsupportfordemocraticgovernanceandpeacebuilding,includingsupportfortheruleoflaw initiatives, the control of small arms and lightweapons and setting upmunicipalsafetycouncilsinseveralmunicipalities.18Other UN agencies and the OSCE seem to be more acceptable partners from theperspectiveofKosovo’sauthorities,becausetheyneverhadanexecutivefunction,and

15Interview2.16Interview3.17Interview4.18 See the overview of ongoing and past projects under Democratic Governance and Peacebuilding,available athttp://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance.html,accessed4April2017.


15

haveonlyprovidedmoredetachedassistance.19TheOSCEMissioninKosovo(OMiK)was,until theconflict in theUkraine, the largestOSCEmissionofall.20 Ithasbeenamajorprovider of capacity building in terms of police reform, including establishing and/orsupportingpoliceeducation,communitysafety,theruleoflawandhumanrights.Inthelastphase, ithasbeenaskedbytheEUtosupporttheimplementationoftheBrusselsDialoguebydelivering training for civilprotectionunits runby local Serbs innorthernKosovoduringtheirintegrationintoKosovo’ssystem;21asimilarprogrammeisplannedfor the incorporation of the Serbian judiciary in northern Kosovo into Kosovo’sstructure.22NATO and the EU have remained active with executivemandates while concurrentlyexpanding their capacity-building activities. KFOR is still the onlymilitary forcewith amandatetoactinKosovo,andisalsoinchargeofactingasthethirdrespondentincasesofcivilemergencies,includingmajorriotslikethoseinMarch2004.KFORhasgraduallyhandedoverborder control toKosovo’s authorities. Furthermore,NATOoversees theinstitutionbuildingoftheKSFthroughNATO’sAdvisoryLiaisonTeam,whichissituatedwithintheheadquartersoftheMinistryforKosovoSecurityForces,andhasanadvisoryroleinthecapacitybuildingoftheKSFinlinewithNATOstandards.23Currently, the EU is present as the mediator of the dialogue between Belgrade andPristinaonthenormalisationofrelations,butalsoasthebiggestproviderofdevelopmentassistanceinKosovo,outofwhichthemostsignificantcontributionistotheruleoflawsector.Throughitsmission(EULEX)undertheCFSP,theEUisalsoactiveinexecutiveandcapacity-building roles in Kosovo. The dialogue with Belgrade is facilitated by theEuropean External Action Service (EEAS) through the direct involvement of the HighRepresentativeoftheEU.24ThisdialogueissupportedbytheEUSpecialRepresentativeinKosovo,whoalsoheadstheEUOffice.Therefore,theEUOfficeisengagedinKosovoboth politically and financially. Its major task is programming funding through theInstrumentforPre-accessionAssistance(IPA)inKosovo,includingthatfortheruleoflawandpublicadministrationreform.Since2008,EULEX’smissionhasbeentoeffectamajor

19Interview3.20Interview4.21SeeOSCE(2016).22Interview5.23SeeMinistryfortheKosovoSecurityForces(2016).24 For an overview, see the EEAS web page, with an overview of dialogue (no date), available athttps://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations_en, accessed 3 March2017.


16

EU presence in Kosovo with two operational objectives: ‘Monitoring, Mentoring andAdvising’(MMA)and‘Executive’(CounciloftheEU,2008).ThefirstobjectiveisrelatedtosupportingKosovo’sruleoflawandlawenforcementinstitutionsaliketodeveloptheminlinewithEuropeanstandardsofruleoflaw(EULEX,nodatea).Since2014,adivisionofMMA functions amongdifferent agencies has assisted the implementationof the EU-facilitatedBelgrade–Pristinadialogueinthefieldoftheruleof law(EULEX,nodateb).Underthesecondobjective–“execute”–EULEXhasdirectlyprovidedpolice,prosecutionandjudiciaryservicesincasesofseriouscrimes(warcrimes,organisedcrime,corruptionandsoon)25andwillcontinuetodosountilthefulltransitionoftheruleoflawfunctionstoKosovo’sauthorities.Followingthe2014extensionofitsmandate,EULEXwasobligednottotakeanynewcasesandtograduallyhandovercompetenciestoKosovo’sjudicialsystem, except for in northern Kosovo, where EULEX will remain in charge until theintegrationofSerbianjudicialpersonnelintheBasicCourtandProsecutionOffice,whenallcasesinMitrovicawillbecomejointcases(EULEX,nodatec).The US has been arguably the most important political actor and objectively one ofbiggestprovidersofassistancetothesecurityandjusticesectorinKosovo.Itslegitimacyamong Kosovo Albanians is based on the support it provided during the militaryinterventionagainstSerbiaas‘theUS[supplied]ninetypercentofthebombs’,26aswellas indicating open support for the independence of Kosovo, including lobbying forKosovo’smembershipininternationalorganisations.27TheUShasbeeninvolvedinallofthe major political developments related to, and the design of, security and justicereforms in Kosovo and therefore it has been an essential partner to internationalorganisationsinvolvedthere.TheUS’sstrengthisalsointhefactthat,besidesprovidingdevelopment assistance, it has beenwilling to exercise political influence through itsembassyinKosovo‘ifsomethinggoeswrong’,28whichwouldbemuchmoredifficultforintergovernmentalactorsliketheEUtoachieve.TheUSistheleadproviderofcapacitybuildingtotheKSF,29andofsignificantassistancetothepoliceandjusticesystem,butalso togovernancebodies suchas theNationalSecurityCouncil,and ithascollocatedadvisers in all these bodies. In addition, it has been the initiator andmost importantproviderofprogrammesfocusingonCVE.

25 Ibid., Articles 2 and 3(d) and EULEX (no date, c), Executive Division, available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,2,accessed25November2016.26Interview6.27Interview7.28Interview6,interview8andinterview3.29BesidestheUSandNATO,othermajorsupportersoftheKSFhavebeentheUKandNorway.


17

Tosumup,thedifferencesbetweenthevariousapproachestothestatehoodofKosovohave been reflected in the corresponding different choices of institutional recipients.Meanwhile,thethematicfociofcapacity-buildinginitiativesbyinternationalactorshavebeen divided between the camps of recognisers on the one side and status-neutralcapacitybuildersontheother.Duetothestatus-neutralpositionheldbyboththeOSCEandtheEU,theyhavebeenworkingwithallelementsofKosovo’s justiceandsecuritysectorexcept for theKSF,30which is regardedbySerbiaand localSerbsasapotentialforebearofKosovo’sfuturemilitary.TheUS,UKandNorway,alongwithNATO,havebeenmajorsupportersoftransformationoftheKSF.UNMiKisstillengagedincapacitybuilding,butduetoresistancefromKosovoAlbanians,ithasdifficultiesinworkingwiththePristinaauthorities.6. TheconceptofcapacitybuildingMuchcapacitybuildingwasinspiredbytheperceptionofthreatstoEUmemberstatesand the US alike. This capacity building has included investment in fighting humantrafficking and organised crime, and recently in CVE programmes in particular. SinceKosovo’s proclamation of independence, the focus of capacity building in Kosovo hasshifted towardsbuildingcapacity for themanagementof institutionsand towards thepromotionoflocalownershipinrunningtraininginstitutions.Inparallel,thestandardsoftheEUandNATOhavebeenpromotedinmostcapacity-buildinginterventions.ThisalsoincludescapacitybuildinginlinewiththestandardsofotherinternationalorganisationsthatKosovoisnotcurrentlypartof,butisexpectedtojoinonitsroadtojoiningtheEU.An example of this is the EU’s support for the analysis and alignment of Kosovo’sauthoritieswiththeCouncilofEurope’sstandardsrelatedtothefightagainstcorruption(GRECO) or money laundering (MONEYVAL).31 The foreign promoters of Kosovo’sindependence have also facilitated the participation of Kosovo’s security and justiceofficials in regional capacity building, and thereby supported its cooperation withneighbours and recognition internationally.32 However, there are still sensitive areaswhereinternationalshavenotfullysharedgovernancewithKosovo’sauthorities.Theseincludethefightagainstorganisedcrimeandinvestigatingandprosecutingwarcrimes,

30Interview9andinterview4.31Interview9.32Interview10.


18

duetotheperceptionthatlocalinstitutionshavebeencapturedbycorruptpoliticalelitesimplicatedincasesofwarcrimesandorganisedcrime.33Concerningassistanceprovidedtosecurityinstitutions,theoldestofthese,theKosovoPolice,hasreceivedmostofthecapacity-buildingassistance,whilethejusticesectorhasbecome another top receiver of assistance and capacity building following theproclamationofindependence.TheintelligencesectorhasbeenlessprominentlyassistedbytheUS,UKandafewotherbilateraldonors,whilesupportfortheKSF–alightlyarmedforce – has exclusively been provided by strong promoters of independence. Theoversightinstitutions,suchastheparliament,havemostlyreceivedassistancefromtheOSCEandUNDPintheformofsupportforhiringadvisersandexternalconsultants.Thethematicareasofsecuritysectorreformthathavebeenmostcrowdedbydonorshave been policing (with a special emphasis on community safety, intelligence-ledpolicingandmorerecentlyCVE)andtheruleoflaw.CapacitybuildingforthecommunityhasbeensupportedbytheUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),theOSCEandUNDPaswellassomebilateraldonorswhowereactiveindifferentpartsofKosovo.Intelligence-ledpolicingisperceivedtobeanessentialpartofthefightagainstorganisedcrimeandcorruptionandithasbeensupportedfromthestartbytheOSCE,USandUK,andsincetheEUaccessionprocessstartedithasalsobeenoneofthemajorreceiversofEUassistance.CVEprogrammeswereinitiatedbytheUS,whichhasremainedthemostsignificantactorinthisfield.TheOSCEhasfocusedonpromotingtoleranceamongyouth,while theUNDP carries out risk assessment, and theUK has expressed its interest incounteringonlineextremism.Themostovercrowdedareahasbeensupportfortheruleof law sector and it hasbeenmost challenging for Kosovo’s authorities to coordinatedevelopmentassistanceandtouseiteffectively.34Therearefourmaincategoriesofcapacitybuilding:

1. Thefirstcategoryofcapacitybuildingisstrategicgovernanceofandplanningwithin the security and justice sector. The first strategic documents weredraftedduringthestabilisationphaseundertheauspicesofUNMiK,withthelimitedparticipationof localpoliticalelitesandsecurityprofessionals.Sincethe proclamation of independence, the international community hasdeclarativelyallowedKosovo’sauthoritiestotakealeadindraftingstrategicdocuments,withthesupportofinternationaladvisers,mostfrequentlyfrom

33Interview11.34Interview8.


19

the US, as well as representatives of the EU and other internationalgovernmentalorganisations.Whilesomeaimedtoprovidetechnicaladvice,therearealsoexamplesofinvolvementintheselectionofpoliticalpriorities.Furthermore, therehavebeencasesof internationalactorsoverriding localdefinitionsofthreatsandriskstonationalsecurity–forexample,bythestaffoftheInternationalCivilianOfficeinthedraftNationalSecurityStrategy2010(Bleasa andQehaja, 2013). Since the proclamation of independence,muchassistancehasbeenprovidedtodevelopmanagementcapacityinthesecurityandjusticeinstitutionsthroughthedevelopmentofmanagementprocesses,structures and skills, for example in the areas of human and financialresources,intheKosovoPolice,theKSF,theKosovoJudicialCouncilandtheKosovoProsecutorialCouncil.Inthelastfewyears,severalprojectshavebeensupported by the EU, to allow for the harmonisation of organisationalprocessesandgovernanceinlinewithEUstandards.ThisisusuallyachievedbypartneringwithanEUmemberstateorthroughhiringexpertsthatcouldbecollocatedininstitutionsandprovideguidance.

2. Thesecondcategoryofcapacitybuildingisthedirectprovisionoftrainingandequipment.Thedirectprovisionoftrainingwasmostprominentduringthestabilisationphase,whenasignificantnumberofinternationalpolicetrainersweredeliveringbasicpolicetraining,aswellastraininginotherkeysecuritysector institutions.35Since2004,aslowtransferofcompetencieshas takenplacethroughthetrainingoftrainersandtheestablishmentoflocaltraininginstitutions (OSCEMission inKosovo,2005). Themostprominentexamplescome from theKosovoPublic SafetyAcademy (in chargeof trainingpolice,customs officers, firefighters and civil protection units), which was initiallyestablishedwiththesupportoftheOSCEandwaslatertakenonbytheEU.TheUKstillinvestsindevelopingthetrainingcapacityforbasicmilitaryskills,suchasfitnessandorientation,asitperceivestheseskillstobethefoundationupon which other military skills can be built. International experts haveremainedinvolvedinthedirectprovisionoftraininginrelationtonewormoresophisticatedareasofpoliceand judicialwork, forexample intelligence-ledpolicing,orcounteringfinancialorcybercrime.Internationalexpertsarealsoactiveason-the-jobmentorsandcoachesthroughtechnicaladvisoryteamsembeddedininstitutions,contractedeitherthroughacommercialcompany

35Forexample, theOSCEalonedeployed150 internationalpolice trainerswithamissionto train3,000Kosovopoliceofficers.Formoredetail,seeOSCEStrategicPoliceMattersOfficeoftheSecretaryGeneral(2008).


20

or partnering. The International Criminal Investigative Training AssistanceProgramme of the US Department of Justice and EULEX have collocatedadvisers within the Kosovo Police, while EULEX has also posted EU policeofficerstodelivercoachinginthepolicestationsinnorthernKosovo.TheUSadditionally provides advisers to the National Security Council and NATOAdvisoryLiaisonTeam,aswellastotheJudicialCouncil.

3. Thethirdcategoryofcapacitybuilding isstrengthening local infrastructurethroughthebuildingandrefurbishmentofpremises.Afterinitialinvestmentsduring the stabilisationphase throughUNand severalbilateraldonors, thebiggestinfrastructureandequipmentprocurementshavetakenplacethroughEUIPAfunding.TheEUhascommitted€601,650,000inEUpre-accessionfundstoKosovofortheperiod2014–20(EuropeanCommission,nodate).SomeofthemostprominentinfrastructureworkssupportedbytheEUhavebeenthebuildingofanewPalaceofJusticeworth€27.9million,therefurbishmentofthePublicSafetyAcademyand theestablishmentofaForensic Laboratory.The best practice has been in the establishment of a special fund for theimplementationofagreementsbetweenPristinaandBelgrade,thusallowingforquickerandmoreflexibleprocurementprocedures.Since2011theEUhasinvested€58.6millionjustforthispurpose.Insomepoliticallysensitivecases,theEUhassub-contractedotherinternationalactorsfortheimplementationofprojects,as intheexampleoftheirselectionoftheUNOfficeforProjectServicesforconstructionofborderandboundarycheckpointswithSerbiainnorthernKosovo,duetotheUN’sperceivedneutralitytowardsthestatusofKosovo’sstatehood.Nevertheless,thereisageneralperceptionamonglocalAlbanians and local Serbs alike thatmore support for the improvement ofbasicpoliceinfrastructureisneededtoimproveworkingconditionsforpoliceandinteractionswithordinarycitizens.

6.1 Whosecapacity?Thelocalgroupstargetedbycapacity-buildinginterventionshasvariedfromonephasetothenext.Mostcapacity-buildinginterventionsinthesecurityandjusticesectorhavebeen implemented intheethnicAlbanian-dominatedsouthernareasofKosovo. Inthefirstphase,most internationalpoliticalattentionwasgiven to thedemobilisationandintegrationofformerKLAcombatantsthroughtheiremploymentintheKosovoPoliceServiceandtheKosovoProtectionCorps,aswellastodirectnegotiationwiththepoliticalpartiesthathaddevelopedfrompoliticalwingsofinsurgentorganisations(thePDKandtheAlliancefortheFutureofKosovo(AleancapërArdhmërinëeKosovës)),aswellaswith


21

the LDK, todisband their parallel intelligence agencies.Using a selectionof only vetoplayersforconsultations,wecanconcludethattheinternationalcommunityhashelpedstrengthenthepowerpositionsofthosewhohadarmedpowerattheendoftheconflictand neglected accountability for crimes committed during and in the immediateaftermathoftheconflict.FromthesecondphaseofSSRonwards,moreemphasishasbeengiventodevelopingmanagementandleadershipcapacityamonglocalsecurityprofessionals.ThislogicisstillprominentintheapproachoftheUSandtheUK,36whichhaveeachinvestedintrainingprospectivemilitary officers in theirmilitary academies, aswell as developing servingmilitarycommandersthroughseveralmanagementdevelopmentprogrammes,includingsupportfortheirattendanceatcommandandstaffcolleges.37Thestatus-neutralpositionofinternationalorganisationsthathavenon-recogniserswithintheirmembership(exceptNATO)hasmeant that they canworkwith all security institutions, except theKosovoSecurityForce.38Capacity building of civil society and of oversight institutions has receiveddisproportionally less attention than that of security staff. The support for local civilsocietyalsostartedlater,becomingmoreintensifiedduringthethirdphaseofSSR.Civilsocietyhasbeen recognisedasan implementerofprogrammes related tocommunitysafety and to a lesser extent of those related to the integrity of security institutions.Assistancetosectionsofcivilsocietydealingwithsecurityissueshasjumpedsince2015aspartofCVEprogrammes,inresponsetothesignificantnumberofWahhabifightersfromKosovojoiningthewarinSyria.A further category of locals targeted by capacity-building programmes are ethnicminorities. Since theearlydaysof capacitybuilding inKosovo,when the first securityinstitutionswerebuilt,internationalactorshaveemphasisedtheintegrationofminoritiesinsecuritygovernance.Thishasresultedintheimplementationofquotasforrecruitmentin security institutions (Emini, 2014), as well as in support for community safetyprogrammes, especially in theareaswhereminorities (primarily Serbs) are isolated inenclavesthroughoutKosovo.SerbsfromsouthernKosovowhowereintegratedintotheKosovoPoliceServicehavebeenleavingtheirjobsintheservicefollowingmajorcrises,forexamplethe2004riotsandtheunilateraldeclarationofindependencein2008.Thus,

36Interview2andinterview10.37Interview10.38GroupinterviewwiththeeightmanagersoftheOMiK,30March2017,andinterview9.


22

inthelastphaseofcapacitybuilding,therehasbeenmoreemphasisonintegratingtheSerbian security and justice structures in northern Kosovo through bespoke, targetedcapacity-buildingprogrammes,andonhandingover limitedcompetencies for securitygovernancetolocalSerbianpoliticians(forexample,theappointmentofaregionalpolicecommanderfornorthernKosovo).Hence,theemployeesofSerbiansecurityandjusticeinstitutions in the north became recipients of capacity building only after the EU-mediatedBrusselsAgreementbetweenBelgradeandPristinain2013.39However,thereisaperceptionamonglocalSerbianpoliticiansandactivistsinnorthernKosovothatsomeofthecapacity-buildinginterventions,suchastheestablishmentofMunicipalCommunitySafety Councils (MCSCs), would lead to their integration into Kosovo’s securityarchitecture without the possibility for them to retain coordination and control overrelevant local law enforcement and judicial authorities.40 Localmayors in these areasapprovedtheestablishmentoftenLocalPublicSafetyCommittees,buthaveboycottedthe establishment of MCSCs until the Brussels Agreement on the judiciary isimplemented, incorporating theSerbian judiciary intoKosovo’s judicial system. In thisway, theyexpect tobe inapositionnotonly to influencepoliceprioritiesbutalso tocoordinatewithresponsibleprosecutorsandjudgeswhowilldealwiththecasesbroughtforwardbythepolice.7. Localcapacitybuildinginpractice:TherecordsofarThe effectiveness of capacity-building initiatives has beenmodest, as concluded in arecentEuropeanCourtofAuditors’study:

AssistancehasmadeonlyamodestcontributiontobuildingthecapacityoftheKosovopoliceand littleprogresshasbeenmade in the fightagainstorganisedcrime.Inthejudicialsectorassistancehasbeenusefulbutthejudiciarycontinuestosufferfrompoliticalinterference,inefficiencyandalackoftransparencyandenforcement.EUinterventionshavehadonlylimitedresultsintacklingcorruptionwhichcontinuestoprevailinmanyareas.Mostprogresswasmadeintheareaofcustoms.TherehasbeenalmostnoprogressinestablishingtheruleoflawinthenorthofKosovo.Overall,thesustainabilityofresultswhichhavebeenachievedbytheassistanceisthreatenedbyalackofpoliticalwill,weakfinancialcapacityandthelimitedinfluenceofcivilsociety.(ECA,2012:35)

39More formally, this is theFirst InternationalAgreementofPrinciplesGoverning theNormalizationofRelationsbetweentheRepublicofKosovoandtheRepublicofSerbia,signedon19April2013.40Interview12.


23

The effectiveness of capacity building is linked to several active international actorssupporting institutions,andtheconsistencyofapproachesandcoordinationtheyhavedevelopedinsodoing.Themosteffectivecapacitybuildingwasthedevelopmentofthecustomsservice,dueinparttotheconsistencyofinternationalassistance,whichwasledand supervised by only one actor – the UK – for almost two decades. Thatnotwithstanding,mostinterlocutorsinterviewedforthisstudyperceivedthattheKosovoPolice had more capacity due to the longer-term investment by the internationalcommunity.TheKosovoPolice isperceivedtobeacoherent institutionas itwasbuiltfromscratch,ratherthanbeingadaptedfromapre-existinginstitution.WithintheKosovoPolice,acommonstandardofprofessionalcapacityacrossallpersonnelwasachievedbyrequiringallpoliceofficerstogothroughbasicpolicetrainingirrespectiveofwhethertheyhadpreviouspoliceexperiencefromtheYugoslavperiod.41TheKosovoPolicewasalsothefirstsecurityinstitutiontobehandedovertolocals,aprocessthatbeganin2004andhasprogressedgraduallysincethen.Incontrasttothis,Kosovo’sjudicialsystemwasandisstillanunhappyamalgamationofinternationaljudges(initiallyUNMiKandlaterEULEX),judgesrecruitedfromtheranksoftheformerYugoslavjudiciaryandnewlyenrolledjudges.Thediscussionofthechallengesencounteredwhen using international police and judges to develop the capacities ofrelevantlocalinstitutionsisrelevantforfuturemissions:thisisthemostdifficultareaofinstitutionalcapacitytodevelopforboththehostcountryandthecountriesdeployingcapacity-building assistance. Finally, and importantly, it is considered that nationalpolicingstylesarelessdiversethannationaljudicialpractices.Therefore,whencomparingtheireffectsonthepolice,internationalshavecausedlessconfusionthaninthejudiciary,wherecorelegislationwasdevelopedinlinewithContinentalEuropeanandAnglo-Saxoncaselaw(dependentonwhichinternationalactorhadmorepoweratagivenmoment).42A report by the European Court of Auditors found, in a conclusion supported byinterlocutors interviewedforthisstudy,thatthereasonsforthiscameoutof ‘the lowstartingpointatindependenceforbuildinguptheruleoflawandtheinsufficientpriorityaccorded by the new Kosovo authorities to the rule of law agenda. In addition, theabsenceofacommonEUpositionovertherecognitionofKosovohas jeopardisedtheincentiveofEUaccession’(ECA,2012:35).

41SeemoreinGreene,FriedmanandBennet(2012).42Interview13.


24

7.1 CoherenceAsignificantreasonbehindthelimitedeffectivenessofcapacitybuildinginKosovohasbeen the lack of coherence among EU institutions, actors and tools. The majorcoordinationchallengeshavebeenbetweentheEUOfficeandEULEX,astheyhavebothbeen active in supporting the rule of law – EULEX through its executive and MMAfunctions since 2010, and the EUOffice from as early as 2000 and later through IPAfunding. This was partially caused by the inadequate planning of the EULEXmission,duringwhichthe ‘objectivesandrolesof theCommissionandEULEXcapacitybuildingactivitieswerenotadequatelyassessedandbenchmarked’(ECA,2012:35).AweaknessintheplanningprocessforcapacitybuildinginKosovoisthattheplanningdocumentdidnot contain any elements of an exit strategy – for example, objective benchmarks ofprogressoraplanforhandingoverresponsibilityforcapacitybuildingtotheEUOfficeorotherinternationalorganisationswithrelevantexpertise(ECA,2012:29).ThesecondfactorthathaslimitedtheeffectivenessofcapacitybuildinginKosovorelatestoinadequaciesintheEuropeanCommission’sprogrammingandprocurementsystem,whichdidnotallowforthetimelyprocurementrequiredtorespondeffectivelytotheoperationalneedsofEULEX.Moreover,majorstaffingchallengeswithinEULEXhaveledtoasignificantstaffturnover,andconsequentiallyalackofconsistencywithinEULEXandevenlessconsistencyinitsrelationswithotherEUactors.Despitetheestablishmentofthe EU Special Representative position in Kosovo in order to ensure intra-EUpoliticalcoordination and guidance, the coherence of political messaging towards localstakeholders has been limited, and since its corruption scandal unfolded, EULEX hasrestricteditscommunications.OtherchallengeshavearisenassupporthasbeenprovidedfortheimplementationoftheBrussels-mediatedagreements(forexample,the integrationofSerbianpoliceandcivilprotectionofficersfromnorthernKosovo).Politically,thereisaperceptionthattheEUhasnotadequatelyusedenlargement-relatedconditionalitiesandpoliticaldialogue tostrengtheneffortstobuildcapacityintheruleoflaw.Ontopofthat,thereisaperceptionthatEUmemberstateshavetheirownagendas,asputbyoneEUOfficemember:‘WecannotaskwhatGermanyandAustriaaredoing.Wehavetoassumethattheyaredoingwell.’43 In conclusion, the EU’s political influence and its effectiveness in providingcapacitybuildingfortheimprovementofKosovo’ssecurityandruleoflawstructuresisdisproportionatelylowwhenconsideredagainsttheleveloffinancialresourcesinvested

43Interview10.


25

init.The coherenceof international assistancehasbeenunderminedby the lackof a jointcapacity-building concept amongEUactors, aswell asby the absenceof a consensusbetweenrecognisersandnon-recognisersoftheproclamationofindependenceonthetypesofmandates that shouldbeheldbyKosovo’s institutions.Moreover, competingmodelshavebeenpromotedbydifferentactors,asdescribedinthecaseoftheKosovoPolice,andmostvisiblyinUS–EUcompetitioninsupportforthejusticesector:

EUInstitutionshavemadesignificanteffortstocoordinatewiththeUSAwhichisthelargestbilateraldonorinKosovo.Nonethelessitremainsdifficulttoachievefullco-ordinationgiventhewiderangeofUSactorsinvolvedinKosovointheruleoflawfield.Co-ordinationisparticularlychallenginginthedraftingoflegislation,wheretheUSAisveryactivedespiteKosovo’sinterestinadoptingtheEUacquiscommunautaireandthefactthatKosovo’slegalframeworkisbasedonEuropeanContinentallaw.Forexample,thenewlawoncourtsrequiredaround50draftsstartingfrom2004andwasonlyadoptedbytheAssembly inAugust2010,thegovernment blaming the significant delay on disagreement between EUO andUSAID.(ECA,2012:30)

Capacitybuildinghasbeenmorecoherentwithinmilitaryinstitutions(KSF),asallcapacitybuilding has been completed in linewith coherent NATO standards. It has also beencoherentwithintheinstitutionsthatwerefortunateenoughtobedevelopedbyasingledonorfromthedeploymentofUNMiKtothepresentday,suchastheKosovoCustomsAuthority, which was developed and mentored by the UK throughout this period.44However, the latter makes interagency cooperation even more difficult due toincompatibilities between different institutional designs and concepts for serviceprovision (for example, justice, which is mainly a French system,may clash with thecustoms service, which was developed by the UK, while the police has receivedcontributionsfromtheUSandmultipleEuropeanstates).Theeffectivenessofcapacitybuildingisthereforelinkedtoseveralactiveinternationalactorssupportinginstitutions,andtheconsistencyofapproachesandcoordinationtheseactorshavedeveloped.Localauthoritieshavebeenpassiveobserversofcompetitionbetweendonors,asevidentinthecaseoftheLawontheCourtStructure: it issaidthat49draftsofthis lawwereexchanged between the US and the UN (later the EU) before it was adopted.45 Only

44Interview3,interview7andinterview10.45Interview14.


26

recentlydidtheEUOfficebeginsigningmemorandaofunderstandingwiththeUSbeforeengaging in developing substantive legislation to formally divide the roles andresponsibilitiesbetweentheEUandtheUS,asinthecaseofdraftingtheCivilCode.467.2 SustainabilityWhilemuchemphasishaslatelybeengiventothetransferofresponsibilitiestoKosovo’sauthoritiesandtothecreationofsustainablecapacities,progressinthisregardisverylimited.Themostprogresshasbeenachievedthroughthecreationofadomestictrainingcapability,whichwasachievedthroughthetrainingoftrainersandthedevelopmentofnational training institutions (such as the Public Safety Academy and the JudicialInstitute),aswellasthroughthecertificationofsecurityservicesinlinewithinternationalstandards(forexample,theForensicsInstitute).Oneoftheproblemsisthatthescarcefinancialresourcesandweakplanningcapacityoflocalsecuritybureaucracieshaveledtoawasteofinvestments,asseenforexamplewhenaforensiclaboratorywasestablishedbutlaterfailedbecausethegovernmentofKosovodidnotfollowthisupwithanadequatebudgetformaintenancecosts.47Most strategic obstacles to the sustainability of international investment have beenrelatedtothepoliticisationofsecuritygovernanceandtheruleoflaw,andthelackofwilltosupportthesustainableintegrationofnon-Albaniancommunities.Thepoliticisationofsecuritygovernanceresultsinahighturnoverofprofessionalstaffinthepoliceandthejudiciary.Itwouldthereforebeadvisablethat,infutureEUoperations,moreandearliercareshouldbegivento‘statecapture’,toavoidthesituationwhereassistancepurposedtoenhancestability,whengiventolocalinstitutionsinfactleadstothecaptureofthoseinstitutionsforprivatereasons.48The lackofpoliticalwill for thesustainable integrationofnon-Albanians intoKosovo’sinstitutionsisevidentinthefocusgivenonlytoachievingquotasforrepresentation,whilestrategiesformaintainingthoseallocationsarenotgivenseriousattention.49Therehasbeen little tonoeffort todealwith thestructuralobstacles to the integrationofnon-Albaniansintosecurityinstitutions.Forexample,theseinstitutionslackmultilingualstaff

46Interview3andinterview9.47Interview9.48Interview11.49Interview1.


27

(onlyoldergenerationsspeakbothAlbanianandSerbian).The recruitmentcampaignsandacceptancelevelsforcandidateswhomightjointheKosovoPublicSafetyAcademyhave declined after responsibility for its recruitment was handed over to nationalauthorities. Since Kosovo declared independence, there has been no systematicmonitoringoftheturnoverofminoritiesemployedinKosovo’ssecurityinstitutions.TheseissuesshouldhavebeendealtwithbytheEU’senlargementconditionality,underwhichwithlimitedresources,butstrongpoliticalcapital,morecouldhavebeendonetoensurethesustainabilityofreformsimplementedinearlierstagesofcapacitybuilding.7.3 LocalownershipThe first finding related to local ownership is that capacity-building initiatives in thesecurity sector in Kosovo have focused on enabling Pristina-based institutions toimplement security policies, and to a lesser extent to support them todevelop andmanage security. The extent and intensity of external actors’ involvement in securitygovernancehaschangedover timeand in relation to thepoliticalpositionsofvariousinternationalactorstowardstheissueofKosovo’sstatehood.The second finding in this area is that limited involvementof local actors in securitygovernance during the stabilisation and demobilisation phase prevents thedevelopment of local ownership, but it makes sense as a method of reducing thepotential for localactors in theconflict touse theirarmedwings to spoil the fragilesecuritygovernancerunbyinternationals.Oncetheshort-termperspectiveofcapacitybuilding deployed during the stabilisation phase is replaced with a longer-termperspectiveofcapacitybuildingforpeacebuilding,thedesiredmodelofstatehoodwithinwhichthesecuritysectorisgoingtobepositionedbecomesmoreimportant.In the first phase of SSR, there was no attempt to develop meaningful partnershipsbetweentheinternationalcommunityandlocalactorsinthecapacitybuildingofsecurityand justice institutions. All security sector-related initiatives were instigated by theinternational community under UNMiK coordinationwith no attempt to involve localactors in decision-making. Themistrust among local political actors is understandablebearinginmindthattheyallhadsecuritywingsthatwereinvolvedinproliferatingconflictand which used to eliminate political opponents and carry out reprisals against theSerbiancommunity.ThedistrustofinternationalsamonglocalactorswasevidentfromthepointthatlocalemployeesofUNMiKdidnothaveaccesstotheirintranetduetothefearthattheywouldleakinformationtotheircompatriots,whointurnmightusethat


28

informationtotargetpoliticalopponents(interviewwithRashitiinQehaja,2017:81).ThelocalpoliticalactorsbecameinvolvedindecisionsonsecurityandjusticegovernancebyprotestingUNMiKdecisions–forexample,againsttheselectionofsomeSerbsamongothersforappointmentaslocaljudges(vonKarlowitz,2011:12-13).Thisresultedintheestablishmentof a joint commission for the selectionof judges that endedupmostlyselectingunpreparedAlbanian judges. This is illustrativeof a trendofpractising localownershipasifitweresynonymouswiththeinvolvementoflocalpoliticalvetoplayers.That approach has the unintended consequence of reinforcing the political powerstructurespresentattheendofconflict.Localownership,understoodasnegotiatingwiththepoliticalactor thathas themostpower todestabilise thesituationor tokeep thestatus quo, has resulted in the perception among the local population that theinternationalcommunityiswillingtotoleratetheimpunitywithwhichmembersofthepoliticalelitesuspectedofwarcrimesandcorruptionaretreatedforaslongastheyare‘delivering’ondecisionsmadebytheinternationalcommunity.50DuetotheestablishmentofaninternationalmissionwithresponsibilityforsecurityandjusticegovernanceandthesignificantmeasureofautonomygiventoindividualnationsforgoverningsecurityandpolicinginsomepartsofKosovothroughtheKFORregionsorthe regional heads of theUNMiK police, there have beenmany internationalmodelstransferredwithoutattentionbeingpaidtothelocalcontext.AsQehaja(2017:70–71)writesinhisbookInternationalorLocalOwnership,thiswasjustifiedwiththetransferofWesternbestpractices.Oncethegradualtransferofsecuritymanagementcompetenciesbeganinthesecondphase,theinternationalsinchargeofnewinstitutions(forexample,theUNMiKpolicecommissioner)usedtheirauthoritytoexerciseavetoongovernancemodelsandtoimposemodelsfromtheirownsystemswithoutpayingattentiontolocalcircumstances.An example of this is the selection of amodel for riot policing by the UNMiK PoliceCommissioner Kai Vittrup.51 After being trained in various riot-policing models bydifferentnationstakingpartinthetrainingoftheUNMiKpolice(theUKandItalyamongothers),officersoftheKosovoPoliceServicevisitedseveralcountriesandproposedeightpotential models to the UNMiK police commissioner. The police commissioner theninsistedonselectingtheDanishmodeldespitetheadvicefromlocalpolicethatthismodelwasincompatiblewithKosovo’scontextduetothelackofadequatestreetinfrastructure.The Danish model was in line with the best European human rights standards, as it

50Interview6.51Interview14.


29

minimiseddirectconfrontationwithprotestersmore thananyothermodeldid,but itmanagedcrowdsthroughthemanoeuvringofpolicevehicles.Thismodelcouldnotbeimplemented in Kosovo, wheremost of the streets are too narrow for manoeuvringvehicles andwheremost protests happen unannounced.Moreover, the internationalpolicecommissionerinsistedontheprocurementofthesameNorwegianequipmentforriotpoliceprotectionasusedinDenmark,althoughthisrequiredadditionalinvestmentinKosovo’spolicevehicles,whichatthattimedidnothaveadequatestoragespacetomeetDanishstandards.TheKosovarcivilservantsresponsibleforthedevelopmentofthispolicydidnotopenlyopposetheimpositionofthismodel,butfoundalocalityinKosovo–thetownofLebane–thatcouldsatisfythecriteriaforsimulatingtheDanishmodelofriotpolicing.Afterthisinitialtest,themodelwasneverapplied.TheKosovarswaitedforthedepartureofthethen-incumbent(Danish)UNMiKpolicecommissioner,afterwhichtheyreplacedtheDanishriot-policingmodelwiththeItalianmodel,whichtheyfoundtobemoreapplicabletoKosovo’scontext.Thisbringsustotheissueofthedependencyoflocalsoninternationals,whichremainsrelevanttoday.Thisispartiallyduetotheweakpolicyanddonorcoordinationcapacitywithin Kosovo’s institutions (ECA, 2012: 29). Officially, the Ministry of EuropeanIntegrationoversees thecoordinationofdevelopmentassistanceofbothbilateralandmultilateraldonors.Moreover,eachministryhasadonorcoordinationunit,butinsomesectorsthatareover-populatedwithnationalactorsanddonors(suchastheruleoflaw),thisisineffective.Thatisduetothelackofaleadministrythatwould‘ownapolicy’tofightagainstcorruption52andbecauseseveraldonors‘wanttogettheirhandsoncertainlegislation’.53 This tendency seems to be more pronounced in the policy sector, forexampleinsecurityorCVE,whereonedonorhasmoreleveragethananotherwhereveraninternationalpartnerisinvolved,theUSbeingakeypartner.Itisalsoevidentfromthefactthatalmostallworkinggroupsforthedevelopmentoflegislationandstrategieshaveinternationaladviserswhofrequentlynotonlyadviseandmentoraworkinggroup,butalsodictatemodelstoit.54Manylocalinterlocutorshavepushedbackagainstthisideaoflocalweaknesstodevelopalternativeproposalsortohavethe‘authoritytosayno’(BaininQehaja,2017:147).Butthathasledtointernationalsoverridinglocalconcernsatthepolicylevel.BothKosovo

52Interview8.53Ibid.54Formoreon thisprocess, seeQehaja’sdescriptionof thedevelopmentofKosovo’sNationalSecurityStrategy(2017:115–123).


30

AlbanianandKosovoSerb interviewees thought thatWesternersprioritised the issuesthatconcernregionalandinternationalsecurityabovetheissuesconcerningthesafetyofthelocalpopulation.ThishasbeenexemplifiedbytheenormousinvestmentsinCVEandinspecialisedunitsforinvestigationofformsoforganisedcrimepertinenttotheWest(for example, human trafficking and cyber security), at theexpenseof investments ininfrastructure for day-to-day policing (such as police stations). Interestingly, thisperceptionissharedbybothKosovoAlbaniansandKosovoSerbs.Theapproachof internationalsoutlinedabove is sometimes justifiedby theargumentthattheinternationalcommunitydoesnotwanttoallowthelocalprioritiesarticulatedbythemajoritytoexcludetheminoritypopulationorendangerthefragilepeaceprocess.Asaresult,evensupportersofKosovo’sindependencedonotwanttoletgocompletelyof informal supervision over the independent governing of Kosovo, as evident by therecentoppositionoftheUSambassadorinKosovoovertheestablishmentoftheKosovoArmedForces,which theUShashelped tobuild,due toopposition fromSerbs.Somesolutionsarepromotedwiththeirprioritybeingconflictresolution,whilenotnecessarilybeing the most effective governance models, but they are promoted nonetheless tosustainthebuy-infromimportantexternalstakeholdersintheprocess.Theprioritisationofconflictresolutioninreformsisevidentinthedecisiontomaintaintheregionalpolicestructure,thusallowingSerbstofeelthattheyhavesomemeasureofcontroloverpolicingintheregioninwhichtheyareamajority–afeelingreinforcedbythemandatethatthecommanderoftheKosovoNorthpoliceregionwouldbeaSerb.PoliceregionsanddistrictswereoriginallydevelopedpriortotheestablishmentoftheMinistryofInterior,toallowforthedevelopmentofmorespecialisedpoliceservicestohandlecomplexcriminal investigations,andsoon.ButtheneedforpoliceregionsanddistrictsceasedoncethemanagementofpolicingwasincorporatedintotheMinistryofInterior.557.4 LegitimacyPerceptions of the legitimacy of various international actors differ among KosovoAlbaniansandKosovoSerbs.Theseperceptionshavealsochangedovertimeinrelationto the key events in the independence process. In short, Kosovo Albanians generallyfavourinternationalactorsthatsupporttheindependenceofKosovo,whileKosovoSerbs

55Interview14.


31

preferstatus-neutralorganisations,aswellasthosethatSerbiasponsorsorisamemberof(orboth).UNMiKisrecalledashavinghadthehighestqualityinternationalstaffduringitsexecutivemandate,whencomparedwithsubsequentperiodsofinternationalsupportforSSR.Itisalsorememberedforthelackofanyattemptonitsparttodeveloplocalownershipofreforms.ThisisthereasonwhyUNMiKhaslostcredibilityandlegitimacyamongethnicAlbanians,apositionworsenedbyUNMiK’sstrongemphasisonstatus-neutralityandtheperceptionthat ithadrunthecountryasaprotectorate.56Becauseofthisperception,therehasbeenaboycottofUNMiKactivitiesbyPristina-basedauthorities,whileUNMiKhasreceivedsomeacceptancebyKosovoSerbs.Asaresult,UNMiK’sstaffdevelopedacopingmechanismthroughtheexchangeofcapabilitieswiththeOSCE(seeDijkstraetal.,2016). On account of the problems experienced when attempting to access Pristinaauthorities,UNMiKhas recentlyanonymised its capacity-building initiativesbyusinga‘logo-switchingstrategy’:fundingajointcapacity-buildingactivityinpartnershipwiththeOSCE,butonlyallowingtheOSCE logotobeassociatedwiththeprojectwhileUNMiKremains anonymous. Other UN agencies, such as the UNDP and the UN HighCommissionerforRefugees,arewelcomeinKosovo,solongastheyareperceivedtobedisassociated fromUNMiK and focused on technical capacity building and assistance.Similarly, theOSCE isperceivedtobeacceptabledespite itsstatus-neutrality,as ithasneverhadanexecutiveroleinKosovo,butratherhasprovideddiscreteassistanceandadviceinelections,policing,theruleoflawandcommunitymatters.TheOSCEandtheUNarecomparativelymorewelcomedbytheKosovoSerbcommunitybecauseSerbiaisamemberoftheseorganisations,andthereforeitisperceivedthattheOSCEandtheUNcanactontheirbehalftoprotectthemfromtheprospectofmajorityAlbanianinterestsoverridingtheirminorityinterests.SomeoftheKosovoAlbanianelitewouldliketoseeallinternational actors leave Kosovo, but the EU and selected countries invited by thePristinaauthoritiesremainanindicationoftheirfullindependenceandthepresenceofaclearEUaccessionpath(Qehaja,2017:145).The US is most trusted among Kosovo Albanians, because of its military support forKosovo through NATO and its open support for Kosovo’s independence, includinglobbyingonKosovo’sbehalfforitsmembershipininternationalorganisations.However,forthesamereasons,theUShasfacedresistanceamongSerbsinthenorthofKosovo.EUmembership is highly supported among Kosovo Albanians, but its CSDPmission –EULEX–hasbeendivisivetothepointwhereperceptionsoftheEUhavechanged.Initially

56Interview3.


32

EULEXwaswarmlywelcomedbyKosovoAlbanians,asitwasperceivedasaprogressionfromtheUN-runprotectorateandastepclosertoindependentstatehood.Yetevenatthat stage, Kosovo Albanians were selective when deciding with whom they wouldcooperate among the EULEX staff members, based entirely on whether a given staffmember came from a recognising or non-recognising state. There were also highexpectationsamongordinarycitizensofKosovo–AlbanianandSerbalike–whenitcametotheprospectiveprosecutionofcorruptpoliticiansandofwarcrimes.OwingtothelackofconsensusamongEUmemberstatesonKosovo’slegalstatusandEULEX’smandate, EULEXwas slow to deploy in the field. Among the reasons for thetardiness of EULEX’s deployment and operationalisation were, most importantly,inadequatestaffingwithinEULEXandplanningpolicieswithintheEUthatwereill-suitedtooperations(GriljandZupančič,2016).EULEXlost its legitimacyamongKosovoSerbsbecauseoftheirperceptionthatitdidnotprosecutecrimesagainstAlbaniansadequately(dropping theGorazdevaccase),and that theprosecutionof theKosovoSerbpoliticalleaderOliverIvanovicwaspoliticallymotivated.AsaconsequenceofEULEX’sfailuretodeliveronitspromises–incombinationwithacorruptionscandalwithinitsranks(Jacque,2015)–itisnowoneofleasttrustedinternationalactorsinKosovo.Thishasbolsteredthe sentiment that executive justice missions are impossible for internationals toimplement. Thoseemployed in EULEXbelieve that justicemissions aremore complexthansecuritymissionsduetothemorepoliticalnatureofthework,butbelievethatthischallengecouldhavebeenovercomeinEULEX’scaseiftherehadbeenadequatemissionresourceplanningandstaffinginplaceinadvance.Finally,amongtheseviews,thereisalsotheperceptionamongcivilsocietyrepresentatives,andparticularlyjournalists,thattheinternationalcommunityislosinglegitimacybecauseofitswillingnesstoworkwithcorruptpoliticiansforthesakeofstability.8. ConclusionBuildingthecapacityofthesecuritysectorinKosovoisanactivitythathasnowlastedalmosttwodecades.Therehasbeenanunderstandingamongmostinternationalactorsthatbuildingthecapacityofthesecuritysectorfromscratchafterconflictrequireslong-terminvestmentandacommensuratecommitmentofhumanresources.AlthoughdonorattentiononKosovohasdecreasedoverthepastseveralyears,thecountryremainsoneofbiggestrecipientsofdevelopmentassistanceinEurope.


33

WhiletheinitialphaseofSSRsawamyriadofinternationalactorsaddressingthesecurityvacuum,theestablishmentofjointstructuresunderUNMiKhasseenamorecoordinatedapproach.Thishasdemonstratedthatintegratedexecutivemissionsprovideadvantagesfortheeffectivedivisionoflabourandcoordinationofcapacitybuildinginthesecuritysector,butlimitthepotentialforlocalownership.Thelimitedinvolvementoflocalactorsin security governance during the stabilisation and demobilisation phase stunts thedevelopmentoflocalownership,butitalsoreducesthepotentialfordifferentsidesina conflict to use their armed wings to spoil the fragile security governance run byinternationals.Oncetheshort-termperspectiveofcapacitybuildingdeployedduringthestabilisationphaseisreplacedwithalonger-termoutlookcentredonpeacebuilding,thedesiredstatehoodmodelinwhichthesecuritysectorisgoingtobepositionedbecomesmoreimportant.Itseemsthatthemostsignificantsuccessofthecapacitybuildingmission–atleastwithinthe security sector – has been the establishment of the Kosovo Police, coupledwithcapacity development for routine policing and emergency management tasks. Bycontrast,therehavebeenchallengeswhenitcomestodevelopingafunctioningjudiciaryandtheruleoflaw.Thisdemonstratesthatfurtherworkisrequiredonthedevelopmentofdeploymentcapacityandontheadvancementofconceptsamonginternationalsonhowtobuildcapacityfortheruleoflawabroad.Therehasbeenadisproportionatelyhighlevelof investment incapacitybuilding for theexecutionofsecurityand justice tasks,comparedwiththelimitedinvestmentthathasbeenputintooversightinstitutionsandprogrammes.Becauseoftheemphasisthathasbeenplacedonincreasingcapacitiesintheareasthatconcerntheinternationalcommunitymorethantheyaffectthelocalpopulation,suchasCVE and human trafficking, difficulties remain in effectively allocating day-to-dayresources for theworkof security institutions.Given theconcernsabout stability, theaccountability of political leaders has not been actively sought. In view of the publicperception that some international actors have been involved in war crimes and incapturingstateinstitutionsthroughcorruption,thelegitimacyofinternationalassistancehasbeenchallenged,especiallyintheruleoflawsector.In theWesternBalkans, the complexeventsof thepost-conflictenvironmentand thedevelopmentofthesecuritysectorhaveoccurredconcurrentlywitheffortstowardsEUaccession.OwingtocomplexitiesstemmingfromthedisparateapproachofvariousEUmemberstatesandothermajorinternationalprovidersofcapacitybuildinginsupportofKosovo’s statehood, the effectiveness and coherence of capacity building has been


34

diminished.ThecaseofKosovocasedemonstratesthatthe internationalcommunity’seffectivenessinbuildingthecapacityofthesecuritysectorhasbeenlesscoherentthanitcouldhavebeenduetothepolarisationbetweenrecognisersofKosovo’sindependence(mostprominently,theUS,UKandallbutfiveEUmemberstates)andnon-recognisersorstatus-neutralactors(includingRussia,theUN,OSCEandsomememberstatesoftheEUandNATO).Thisindicatesthatsecuritysectordevelopmentandreformisanintrinsicallypolitical process linked to the understanding and/or desirability of statehood by thevarioussidesinaconflict(includinginthiscaseKosovoAlbaniansandKosovoSerbs,aswellasKosovoandSerbiathemselves),inadditiontotheattitudesofkeyinternationalactorsactiveinthecontext.


35

ListofAbbreviations

CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyCSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicyCVE CounteringviolentextremismEEAS EuropeanExternalActionServiceEU EuropeanUnionEULEX EuropeanUnionRuleofLawMissioninKosovoIPA InstrumentforPre-accessionAssistanceKFOR NATO-ledKosovoForceKLA KosovoLiberationArmyKSF KosovoSecurityForceLDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Albanian: Lidhja Demokratike e

Kosovës)MMA Monitoring,mentoringandadvisingNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationOMiK OSCEMissioninKosovoOSCE OrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEuropePDK Democratic Party of Kosovo (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e

Kosovës)SSR SecuritysectorreformUK UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandUN UnitedNationsUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNMiK UnitedNationsInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovoUNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilUSA UnitedStatesofAmericaUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment


36

Bibliography

Ahtisaari,M.(2007),“ComprehensiveProposalfortheKosovoStatusSettlement”,UNSpecialEnvoy,availableathttp://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf,accessed25October2016.

Bjeloš.M.andB.Elek(2014),PoliceIntegrationinNorthKosovo:ProgressandRemainingChallengesinImplementationoftheBrusselsAgreement,BelgradeCentreforSecurityPolicy&KosovarCentreforSecurityStudies,BelgradeandPristina.

Bleasa,D.andF.Qehaja(2013),“Theconundrumoflocalownershipindevelopingasecuritysector:ThecaseofKosovo”,NewBalkanPolitics,No.14,pp.1–21.

Borger,J.(2014),“AllegedconnectionsbetweentopKosovopoliticiansandassassininvestigated”,Guardian,availableathttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/07/kosovo-hitman-inquiry-eulex-hashim-thaci,accessed20March2017.

ClelandWelch,A.,S.Kondi,D.StinsonandM.VonTangenPage(eds.)(2006),InternalSecuritySectorReviewKosovo,UNDP,Pristina.

Cooper,R.(2015),“FiveminuteswithSirRobertCooper:TheBrusselsAgreementbetweenSerbiaandKosovowasbasedonconversation,notEUpressure”,LSE,London,availableathttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/02/06/five-minutes-with-sir-robert-cooper-the-brussels-agreement-between-serbia-and-kosovo-was-based-on-conversation-not-eu-pressure/,accessed4March2017.

CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2007),“Background:PreparingforthefutureinternationalandEUpresenceinKosovo”,Brussels,availableathttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070206-bis-ICO-EUSR_and_ESDP.pdf,accessed25November2016.

CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(2008),CouncilJointAction2008/124/CFSPof4February2008ontheEuropeanUnionRuleofLawMissioninKosovo,EULEXKosovo,Brussels,availableathttp://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/WEJointActionEULEX_EN.pdf,accessed4April2017.

Dijkstra,H.,P.PetrovandE.Mahr(2016),“ReactingtoConflict:CivilianCapabilitiesintheEU,UNandOSCE”,EU-CIVCAPDeliverable4.1,availableathttps://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/eu-civcap_deliverable_4-1.pdf,accessed8August2017.

Dowling,A.(2007),“EUConditionalityandSecuritySectorReformintheWesternBalkans”,inD.SpenceandP.Fluri(eds),TheEuropeanUnionandSecuritySectorReform,London:JohnHarperPublishing,pp.174–99.


37

Emini,D.(2014),“InclusionofExclusion?MinoritiesintheSecuritySectorinPost-independentKosovo”,PolicyPaper,KosovarCentreforSecurityStudies,Pristina.

Emini,D.andM.Vrajolli(2015),“Kosovo”,inF.KlopferandN.Amstel(eds),ForceforGood–MappingofPrivateSecurityLandscapeinSoutheastEurope,DCAF,Geneva,pp.61–80.

EULEX(nodate,a),“ShorthistoryofEULEX”,availableathttp://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197,accessed25November2016.

EULEX(nodate,b),“StrengtheningDivision–Monitoring,MentoringandAdvising”,availableathttp://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,3,accessed25November2016.

EULEX(nodate,c),“SupporttotheEU-FacilitatedDialoguebetweenPristinaandBelgrade”,availableathttp://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/Anglisht_Dialog_1.pdf,accessed25November2016.

EULEX(nodate,d),“ExecutiveDivision”,availableathttp://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,2,accessed25November2016.

EuropeanCommission(nodate),“KosovoonthePathtowardstheEU”,availableathttps://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_kosovo.pdf,accessed22November2016.

EuropeanCourtofAuditors(ECA)(2012),“EuropeanUnionAssistancetoKosovoRelatedtotheRuleofLaw”,SpecialReportNo.18,ECA,Luxembourg.

EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)(2016),“EU-facilitatedBelgrade–PristinaDialogue:ImplementationoftheJusticeAgreement”,availableathttps://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/16888/eu-facilitated-belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-justice-agreement_en,accessed5February2017.

EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)(nodate),“EUFacilitatedDialogue:RelationsbetweenBelgradeandPristina”,availableathttps://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations_en,accessedon3March2017.

Greene,M.,J.FriedmanandR.Bennet(2012),“BuildingthePoliceServiceinaSecurityVacuum:InternationalEffortsinKosovo,1999-2011”,InnovationsforSuccessfulSocieties,PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJ,availableathttp://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/building-police-service-security-vacuum-international-efforts-kosovo-1999-2011,accessed23November2016.


38

Grilj,B.andR.Zupančič(2016),“AssessingthePlanningandImplementationoftheEURuleofLawMissions:CaseStudyofEULEXKosovo”,EuropeanPerspectives–JournalonEuropeanPerspectivesoftheWesternBalkans,Vol.8,No.2(15),pp.62-85.

InternationalCivilianOffice(ICO)(2012),StateBuildingandExit:TheInternationalCivilianOfficeandKosovo’sSupervisedIndependence2008-2012,ICO,Pristina,availableathttps://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_downloads/state_building_and_exit_-_reducedfile.pdf,accessed15November2016.

InternationalCrisisGroup(2004),CollapseinKosovo,ICGEuropeReportNo.155,ICG,Pristina,BelgradeandBrussels,April.

InternationalSecuritySectorAdvisoryTeam(ISSAT)(nodate),“InternalSecuritySectorReview(ISSR)inKosovo”,availableathttp://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Internal-Security-Sector-Review-ISSR-in-Kosovo,accessed20October2016.

Jacque,J.P.(2015),ReviewoftheEULEXKosovomission’simplementationofthemandatewithaparticularfocusonthehandlingofrecentallegations,availableathttp://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/150331_jacque-report_en.pdf,accessed11December2016.

Judah,T.(1997),TheSerbs:History,Myth&theDestructionofYugoslavia,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.

Judah,T.(2000),Kosovo:WarandRevenge,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.

Ker-Lindsay,J.(2009),Kosovo:ThePathtoContestedStatehoodintheBalkans,London,NewYork:I.B.Tauris.

Marty,D.(2010),“InhumanTreatmentofPeopleandIllicitTraffickingofHumanOrgansinKosovo,CommitteeonLegalAffairsandHumanRights”,AS/Jur(2010)46,12December2010,CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg,availableathttp://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20101218_ajdoc462010provamended.pdf,accessed24November2016.

MinistryfortheKosovoSecurityForces(2016),“NATOmandatesadvisingandliaisontemforMinistryofKSFandKSF”[sic],availableathttp://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,1750#.WOPoNVJMSUk,accessed4April2017.

MinistryfortheKosovoSecurityForces(nodate),“KosovoSecurityForce:MissionStatement”,availableathttp://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,7#.WSKA_yN97LY,accessed20October2016.

NATO(nodate),“KFORobjectives”,availableathttps://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history/kfor-objectives,accessed22November2016.


39

OSCE(nodate),“OSCEMissioninKosovoPoliceTrainingandDevelopment”,Factsheet,availableathttp://www.osce.org/kosovo/37595?download=true,accessed22November2016.

OSCE(2016),“OSCEMissioninKosovotrainsformerCivilProtectionmembers”,availableathttp://www.osce.org/kosovo/221186,accessed16February2017.

OSCEMissioninKosovo(2005),“Policeeducationanddevelopment”,Factsheet,OSCE,Vienna,availableathttp://www.osce.org/kosovo/37595?download=true,accessed22November2016.

OSCEStrategicPoliceMattersOfficeoftheSecretaryGeneral(2008),ImplementationofPolice-RelatedProgrammesLessonsLearnedinSouth-EasternEurope,SPMUPublicationSeriesVol.7,OSCE,Vienna,availableathttp://www.osce.org/secretariat/35659?download=true,accessed22November2016.

Qehaja,F.(2012),“IntelligenceGovernanceinKosovo”,OccasionalPaper,DCAF,Geneva.

Qehaja,F.(2017),InternationalorLocalOwnership?SecuritySectorDevelopmentinPost-IndependentKosovo,Washington,D.C.:WestphaliaPress.

Qehaja,F.andM.Vrajolli(2011),ContextAnalysisofSecuritySectorReforminKosovo(1999-2009),KosovarCentreforSecurityStudies,Pristina.

Scahill,J.(2000),“Washington’sMeninKosovo–AYearaftertheNATOOccupation,TerrorReigns”,InternationalSocialistReview,No.14,availableathttp://isreview.org/issues/14/scahill_kosovo.shtml,accessed24March2017.

Stakić,I.andM.Bjeloš(2015),TheFutureofCivilProtectioninNorthKosovo,BelgradeCentreforSecurityPolicy&KosovarCentreforSecurityStudies,BelgradeandPristina.

UKEmbassyinPristina(nodate),“MissionStatement”,availableathttps://www.gov.uk/government/world/kosovo,accessed7February2017.

UN(nodate),“UNMIKBackground”,availableathttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/background.shtml,accessed22November2016.

UNDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)(nodate),“DemocraticGovernanceandPeacebuilding”availableathttp://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance.html,accessed4April2017.

UNInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo(UNMiK)(2003),“PillarI–PoliceandJustice”,PresentationPaper,July,availableathttp://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.unmikonline.org/ContentPages/5728595.pdf,accessed24November2016.


40

UNInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo(UNMiK)(nodate),“UNMIKMandate”,availableathttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/mandate.shtml,accessed22November2017.

UNSecurityCouncil(1999),UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1244(1999),adoptedbytheSecurityCouncilatits4,011thmeeting,on10June1999,availableathttps://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement,accessed22November2016.

UNSecurityCouncil(2007),“ComprehensiveProposalfortheKosovoStatusSettlement”,S/2007/168/Add.1,26March2007,Letterdated26March2007,UNSC,NewYork,NY.

VonKarlowitz,L.(2011),“LocalOwnershipinPractice–JusticeSystemReforminKosovoandLibya”,OccasionalPaperNo.23,DCAF,Geneva.


41

ListofInterviewees

Interview1:Internationalcommunityrepresentative,Pristina,Kosovo,3February2017.

Interview2:Internationaldiplomat,Pristina,Kosovo,31January2017.

Interview3:NaimRashiti,Pristina,Kosovo,2February2017.

Interview4:OSCEemployee,Pristina,Kosovo,30March2017.

Interview5:OSCEemployee,Pristina,Kosovo,21April2017.

Interview6:BIRNKosovoDirector,Pristina,Kosovo,27March2017.

Interview7:KosovoMinistryofForeignAffairsrepresentative,Pristina,Kosovo,30January2017.

Interview8:KosovoMinistryforEUIntegrationemployee,Pristina,Kosovo,27March2017.

Interview9:EUofficial,Pristina,Kosovo,2February2017.

Interview10:International/EUcommunityrepresentative,Pristina,Kosovo,1February2017.

Interview11:EUofficial,Brussels,Belgium,27February2017.

Interview12:RepresentativeofSerbianNGO,Mitrovica,Kosovo,3February2017.

Interview13:Internationalactorworkingontheruleoflaw,Pristina,Kosovo,21April2017.

Interview14:FormerKosovopoliceemployee,Pristina,Kosovo,30January2017.

capacity building for security sector - wordpress.com · eu-civcap working paper no. 02–17...

Documents