capital market behaviour

46
S.GANGADHARAN CAPITAL MARKET BEHAVIOUR Dr. SRINIVASA RAO GANGADHARAN [email protected]

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Page 1: Capital Market Behaviour

S.GANGADHARAN

CAPITAL MARKET BEHAVIOUR

Dr. SRINIVASA RAO GANGADHARAN

[email protected]

Page 2: Capital Market Behaviour

S.GANGADHARAN2

The Questions?

1. What is Capital Market – Importance,

2. What is Capital Market Behaviour (CMB) ? Is CMB and Behavioural Finance are

one and the same or they are different?

3. Capital Market behavior in India – 1977 to 1992?a) Valuation of Stocks, Bonds, Convertible Debentures and Market for Debt

b) Market Efficiency

c) Dividends, Bonus & Rights Issue

4. Securities Scam of 1992 - Harshad Mehta, Ketan Parag Scam – 1999 - 2000

5. Dotcom crisis - 2000 - 2002

6. Global Financial Crisis – 2007 - 12

7. Commodity crisis - 2015

8. Research Capital Market in India?

9. What Ails the Indian Capital Market?

10. Liberalisation and Stock Market?

11. Conclusion

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What is Financial System?• The economic development of a nation reflected by the progress of the

following economic units

Corporate Government House holds

• Performing their activities - a surplus/ deficit/ balanced budgetary

situation

• Functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from

the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit.

• It is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and

laws, practices, money manager, analysts, transactions, claims &

liabilities.

Page 4: Capital Market Behaviour

POST – OFFICE SAVINGS

GUARANTEED RETURN INVESTMENT

FIXED DEPOSIT

INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES

NON - GUARANTEED RETURN INVESTMENT

PROVIDENT FUND

PPF

EQUITY GOLD ULIPCOMMODITY REAL ESTATE

MUTUAL FUND

Stock Market

Diversified Equity Fund

Sectoral Equity Fund

MUTUAL FUND

MUTUAL FUND

Physical Form

Stock Market

Page 5: Capital Market Behaviour

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Money marketInstrument

Capital MarketInstrument

Hybrid Instrument

Stock Exchange

Investment bankers

Under Writers

Registrars, Depositories, Custodians

Mutual Funds

Portfolio Managers

Money

Market

Capital

Market

Hybrid

Market

Financial Assets/

Instruments

Financial

Markets

Financial Intermediaries

Financial System

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Seekers of funds

(Mainly business

firms and government)

Suppliers of funds

(Mainly households)

Flow of Financial Services

Income and Financial claims

Flow of funds (Savings)

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What is a Financial Market?

• A market in which financial assets are created or transferred.

• Types of Financial Markets

– Money Market – Whole sale debt market for low risk, highly liquid

short term instrument. Funds available from a single day up to a year.

– Capital Market – Long term (more than one year) financial investment

– Forex Market – Multi currency requirement

– Credit Market – Banks, FI and NBFC short, Medium and Long term

loans to corporate and Individuals

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Capital market Instruments

Equity Segment Debt Segment

1. Equity Shares

2. Preference Shares – no voting rights

3. Convertible Preference Shares

4. Non - Convertible Preference Shares

5. Non – Participating Preference

Shares

6. Cumulative Preference Shares

7. Non Cumulative Preference Shares

1. Debentures

2. Convertible Debentures

3. Non - Convertible

Debentures

Page 9: Capital Market Behaviour

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What is Stock Market?

Page 10: Capital Market Behaviour

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Capital Market Behavior –

Injection of large amount of

liquid funds in the Market –

Securities Scam

Page 11: Capital Market Behaviour

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The Securities Scam – 1992 - (Harshad Mehta)

• Harshad Mehta – A dispatch Clerk in the New India Insurance

Company. Developed interest in the Stock Market and become

a leading broker in the Bombay Stock Exchange.

• Lived like a movie star – 15000 sq.ft houses, Swimming pool,

golf ground and fleet of foreign cars.

• The scam rocked the nation, rattled the markets and triggered

a series of reforms in the stock market.

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• Longest case – 24 yrs. Cases against economic offences &

scams are ring fenced settled in shortest possible time in

developing countries (Ex – Raj Rajaratnam (Galleon group

hedge funds – 3 yr, Societe Generale unauthiorised trading

case – 2008 involving Jerome Kerviel – 2 yrs, Satyam

scandal – 3 yrs).

• 76 criminal cases & over 600 civil suites lodged against

Mehta Family.

• Most criminal cases dropped but civil cases continued.

• Fin. Experts say that HM “simply exploited loopholes in the

system”

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• Harshad held shares worth Rs.453 cr across 131 companies in benami

accounts (value as on June 1995 – Court submission)

• When the scam came to light the benami account holders sold their shares

and refused to cooperate with the custodian

• Total Liabilities – Rs.16,044 crore – Rs.4662 cr to various banks, Rs.11,174

cr. to IT department (interest accrued and penalties)

• As on Sept 2015, the banks were decreed (by court) to get Rs.1,688 cr, out

of which Rs.1,074 cr has already been paid (only to SBI). Others Standard

Charted and SBI Capital not paid.

• ACC shares (Rs.300 cr) & Apollo Tyres (Rs.233 cr) the custodian recovered

from Mehta Family.

• Mehta family argued that the IT department took into account the

revenues of HM and not his income.

Page 14: Capital Market Behaviour

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What is the Securities Scam?

• Period 1991-92 - Diversion of bank funds worth Rs.3500 cr to a

clutch of stock brokers.

• Harshad & his associates siphoned off funds from interbank

transactions and bought shares across sectors resulting in a

stupendous rise in sensex to surge over 4500 points.

• Stocks like ACC surged from Rs.200 per share to Rs.9000

during this period.

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• The tool used Ready Forward Deals (RFD) between banks.

• An RFD is a secured 15 day-loan from one bank to another.

The lending is done against government securities.

• The lending is done against government securities.

• The borrowing bank actually sells the securities to the lending

bank and buys them back at tenure, at a slightly higher price.

• The normal settlement process in G-Securities is that the

transacting banks make payments to each other and effect

delivery of securities.

How they carried out the Scam?

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• In the scam, the delivery of securities and payments were made

through a set brokers. Here, only the broker would know the

parties on either side.

• The brokers perfected the method and started trading on their

own account. They pretended to be undertaking the

transactions on behalf of a bank to maintain a facade (cover

up) of legality.

• The brokers also used Bank Receipts (BRs) in lieu of securities

that were traded. So in real terms, securities did not change

hands, but only Bank receipts did. A BR is also treated as a

receipts for money received from the buyer of securities.

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• The Brokers colluded with a couple of banks (Bank of Karad

and Metropolitan Co-op Bank) which issued fake BRs – Ones

with out any security backing.

• HM collected fake BRs from these banks and passed on to

other banks which paid him money under the assumption that

they were lending against securities.

• This money was then diverted to stocks. The shares were sold

at profit(thanks to pumped up markets) and the BR retired

when it was time to return money to the bank.

• HM struck such deals across banks and rolled the money at

every pay – out level.

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How he caught got?

• On April 23, 1992, journalist Sucheta Dalal in a column in

“The Times of India”, exposed the dubious ways of Harshad

Metha.

• The broker was dipping illegally into the banking system to

finance his buying.

• Once the scam was exposed, though, a lot of banks were left

holding BRs that did not have any value in the banking

system

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Capitalizing the loopholes in the

system - Ketan Parekh Scam –

1999 - 2001

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Ketan Parekh Scam – 1999 - 2001

• a former Mumbai stock broker from family of brokers -

chartered accountant by training

• Convicted in 2008, for involvement in the Indian stock market

manipulation scam (1999-2001)

• Currently debarred from trading in Indian stock exchanges

till 2017

• Trainee of HM - described as “Pied Piper of Dalal Street” -

For 2 years, market men followed his every action because all

he touched turned to gold.

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• kept a low profile, except a millennium bash he threw

attended by politicians, business magnates and film stars.

• Between 1999 - 2000, as the technology bubble was engulfing

the rest of the world, the stk.mkt. in India also sprang to life.

• Formed a network of brokers - Identified & targeted 10

stocks (K-10 stock, KP Index)

• Zee telefilms (Rs. 127 to Rs. 2330) Himachal futuristic (Rs. 194 to Rs.2553)

Aftek Infosys

DSQ Software

Global Tele systems

Himachal Futuristic Communications

Penta Media Graphics

Satyam Computers

Silver Line Technology

SSI Zee Tele Films Pritish Nandy Communications

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How they did it?

• Simple borrowing mechanism - Badla System – Indigenous

carry-forward system invented on Bombay Stock Exchange.

• The process of buying stocks with borrowed money. Example

- you buy 1,000 shares of Infosys at Rs 3,500, = Rs 35 lakh.

Instead of paying cash, you can ask your broker to find a

borrower to finance your trade.

• Interest rate for borrowing determined by the demand for

that stock under badla trading. Higher the demand for

Infosys under badla higher will be the interest rate.

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• Borrowing can be unpaid for a maximum of 70 days, after

which need to be paid back to the badla financier through

the exchange.

• When stock prices were high, they were pledged with

banks as collateral. No problems as long prices were rising

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How KP manipulated the Stock Market?

• KP did not have the money to buy large stakes (Rs.750 mn. July

1999 - Global - Rs 200 mn.,Aftek - Rs 50 mn., Zee and HFCL - Rs 500 mn)

• KP used bank and promoter funds to rig the markets.

• He bought shares when they were trading at low prices and

saw the prices go up in the bull market while continuously

trading. When the price was high enough, he pledged the

shares with banks as collateral for funds. He also borrowed

from companies like HFCL. 

• KP & his associates started tapping MMCB (Madhavapura

Mercantile Cooperative Bank a small Ahmedabad-based bank,) for funds in

early 2000.

 

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Pay order fraud (A bank issues a pay order after it is clear that the

customer's account has sufficient funds)

– In Dec. 2000, when KP faced liquidity problems in settlements he used

MMCB in two different ways.

– First, the pay order route, wherein KP issued cheques drawn on BoI to

MMCB, against which MMCB issued pay orders. The pay orders were

discounted at BoI, SBI, and PNB.

– MMCB issued funds to KP without proper collateral security and even

crossed its capital market exposure limits (As per a RBI inspection

report - MMCB's loans to stock markets limit - around Rs 10 bn., out of

which over Rs 8 bn. lent to KP and his firms.

– Another Bank that crossed its prescribed limit to issue loans to KP is

Global Trust Bank (GTB)

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• Second, borrowing from a MMCB Mumbai branch (Mandvi)

through 16 accounts KP and his associates had in this branch -

Few brokers also took loans on behalf of KP.

• Vinit Parikh (MMCB Chairman Ramesh Parikh’s son) acted

on behalf of KP to borrow funds.

• Madhur Capital (KP owned) used his BoI accounts to discount

248 pay orders worth about Rs 24 billion between Jan – Mar,

2001. BoI's losses eventually amounted to well above Rs 1.2

billion.

• The MMCB pay order issue hit several public sector banks

(SBI,BOI, PNB) all of them lost huge amounts in the scam.

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• KP's modus operandi worked well as long as the share prices

were rising, but reversed when markets crashed in March

2000 due to fall in NASDAQ, saw K-10 stocks declining.

• KP has to either pledge more shares as collateral or return

some of the borrowed money. Either case, pressure on his

financials.

• By April 2000, mutual funds substantially reduced their

exposure in the K-10 stocks.

• May - June 2000, Sensex declined by 23%, NASDAQ - 36%,

the K-10 - 67%.

What went wrong?

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• K-10 stocks picked up in May 2000 global technology (Rs

1,153), HFCL (Rs 790 to Rs 1,353), Aftek Infosys (> Rs 1000)

• December 2000, the NASDAQ crashed again and technology

stocks took the hardest beating ever in the US.

• Doubts regarding the future of technology stocks, prices

started falling across the globe and mutual funds and brokers

began selling them.

• KP began to have liquidity problems and lost a lot of money

during that period.

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• KP's stocks eventually led to payment problems in the

markets. The Calcutta Stock Exchange's (CSE) payment crisis

was one of the biggest setbacks for KP. The CSE was critical

for KP's operation due to three reasons.

1. the lack of regulations and surveillance on the bourse allowed

a highly illegal and volatile badla business

2. CSE had 3rd highest volumes in the country after NSE & BSE.

3. CSE helped KP to cover his operations from his rivals in

Mumbai. Brokers at CSE used to buy shares at KP's behest.

Though officially the scrips were in the brokers' names,

unofficially KP held them.

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• KP used to cover any losses that occurred due to price

shortfall of the scrips & paid a 2.5% weekly interest to the

brokers. 

• Feb 2001, the scrips held by KP's brokers at CSE reduced to

an estimated Rs 6-7 bn. from their initial worth of Rs 12 bn.

• The situation worsened as KP's badla payments of Rs 5-6

billion were not honored on time for the settlement and about

70 CSE brokers, including the top three brokers of the CSE

(Dinesh Singhania, Sanjay Khemani and Ashok Podar)

defaulted on their payments.

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• Mid-March 2001, the value of stocks held by CSE brokers

went down further to around Rs 2.5-3 billion. The CSE

brokers started pressurizing KP for payments.

• KP again turned to MMCB to get loans. The outflow of funds

from MMCB had increased considerably form January 2001.

• Earlier loans against proper collateral and with adequate

documentation, this time without any security.

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SEBI’s control measures put a check on KPs operations

• An addl. 10% deposit margin was imposed on outstanding

net sales in the stock markets.

• limit for application of the additional volatility margins was

lowered from 80% to 60%.

• To revive the markets, SEBI imposed restriction on short

sales and ordered sale of shares had to be followed by

deliveries.

• It suspended all the broker member directors of BSE's

governing board.

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• SEBI also banned trading by all stock exchange presidents,

vice-presidents and treasurers.

• A historical decision to ban the badla system in the country

was taken, effective from July 2001,

• a rolling settlement system for 200 Group A shares was

introduced on the BSE.

• SEBI allowed banks for collateralized lending only through

BSE and NSE

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How he got caught?

• Stock market crash of 2000 – Nasdaq Crashed.

• IT department found discrepancies in sources of funds of KP

• Routine market surveillance of 5 stocks.

• RBI started inspecting accounts and sub-accounts twice a year

in spite of once in two year. 

• One of the biggest Fall in BSE -700 points

• Bank of India’s complaint of bouncing of 1.3 billion pay

orders issued to the broker by Madhavpura Mercantile

Cooperative Bank

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Aftermath of the scam

• Parekh was arrested on March 30, 2001. In custody for 53

days.

• The trading cycle was now reduced from one week to one day..

Forward trading was formally introduced in the form of

exchange-traded derivatives to ensure a well-regulated futures

market.

• Investigations by SEBI and CBI reveal that sheer magnitude of

money moved by Parekh was a staggering 64 billion• Defrauding Bank of India $20mn.• Bank of India and Global Trust Bank merger failed.

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Benefits of the scam

• The market crashed but ended up pushing much-needed

modernisation

• It's perhaps thanks to the Pentafour Bull that India's stock

markets are today considered safe

• And to his credit, Parekh forced lethargic policy-makers to

institute reforms in the financial system.

• many gaping loopholes in the market were plugged

Page 37: Capital Market Behaviour

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Dotcom crisis (March 11, 2000 to October 9, 2002)

• The two important crises crippled the liquidity of the stock markets of many

countries in the World are Dotcom crisis and Sub-prime crisis

• The dotcom crisis, wiped off $5 tn of investors wealth.

• dwindled internet and technology related IPOs (from 457 in 1999 to 76 in

2001) and

• ruined 78 per cent (from 5047 fell to 1114) of the value of NASDAQ

Composite.

• The total global losses from Sub-prime crisis, also known as the World

Financial Crisis could be as large as US $ 15tn (Mark Adelson former Chief

Credit officer of Standard and Poor whose guidance helped set the stage for

unprecedented downgrade of US Debt.)

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Global Financial Crisis (sub-prime crisis) - 2007-12

• In US - Easy availability of credit + large inflows of foreign

funds (after Russian debt crisis,1998 & Asian financial crisis,

1997) led to housing construction boom & facilitated debt-

financed consumer spending.

• Lax lending standards and rising real estate prices also

contributed to the real estate bubble.

• Loans of various types (mortgage, credit card & auto) were

easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt

load.

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• New financial innovative products (mortgage-backed

securities (MBS) & collateralized debt obligations (CDO)

increased. As a result investors around the world invested

in US housing market.

• As housing prices declined, major global financial

institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in

subprime MBS reported significant losses.

• Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Freddie Mac,

Fannie Mae, HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland, Bradford &

Bingley, Fortis, Hypo and Alliance & Leicester

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Adverse Economic effects of the Housing Crisis

• The RGDP decreased at an annual rate of approximately 6%

in the 4th qtr of 2008 & 1st qtr of 2009,

• Unemployment rate increased to 10.2% by Oct. 2009, the

highest rate since 1983 and roughly twice the pre-crisis rate.

• The average hours per workweek declined to 33 (the lowest

level since the government began collecting the data in 1964.)

• The foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in US and

only reduced to historical levels in early 2014 drained

significant wealth from consumers, losing up to $4.2 tn. in

wealth from home equity.

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• Questions regarding bank solvency, decline in credit

availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact

on global stock markets,

• Securities suffered huge losses (US$14.5 trillion or 33 per cent

of the value of the world’s companies have been wiped out by

the crisis (Bloomberg) during late 2008 and early 2009.

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Commodity Crisis - 2015

• Prices of commodities from crude oil to industrial metals

(aluminum, steel, copper, platinum, and palladium (lustrous

silvery-white metal) have collapsed

• Crude oil crumbled below $37/ barrel first time since Feb. 2009.

• Bloomberg Commodity Index, which tracks a wide swath of

raw materials, plummeted to its weakest level since June 1999.

• De Beers (mining giant) suspending its dividend and selling off

60% of its assets, which could lead to a reduction of 85,000 jobs.

• Dow falling over 200 points - raising concerns about the state

of the global economy.

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• In the U.S., roughly 123,000 jobs have disappeared from the

mining sector, which includes oil and energy workers, since

the end of 2014 (US Govt.) statistics.

• Financial trouble for commodity companies have already

lifted global corporate defaults to the highest level since 2009

(Standard & Poor's Ratings Services).

• U.S. manufacturing activity contracted in Nov. 2015 first

time in 3 years.

• The S&P 500 energy sector has lost 23% of its value 2015.

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What is the reason for the Commodity Crisis?

• Real driver is the supply side, compared to the collapse in

demand during the Great Recession

• Cheap borrowing costs, inability to predict China's slowdown

led producers to expand too much in recent years. Now

flooding the market with too much supply.

• Continues underperformance of the European economy.

Europe is the market for many countries 

• China and other emerging markets (Brazil) have slowed

dramatically in recent quarters, lowering their demand for

steel, iron ore and crude oil.

• That means more plant closure and announcements like the

one announced by Anglo American.

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Some positive developments in the Indian Financial sector

• Positive development that made a large section of the people to

presume that the Indian financial market is well integrated with the

global financial market.

– Establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in

1988,

– the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in 1991

– implementation of the recommendations of the Narasimham

Committee Report on Financial Systems in 1992

– the removal of capital controls,

– the financial innovation and technological advancement in

communications and trading systems presumption

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