case 2013-001_decision 12112013

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CJTHEOFFICIALJUDICIALARM

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SANGGUNIN NG MGA MAG-AARAL NG MGA PARALNG LOYLA NGATENO DEMANILA

TUDENT UDICIAL OURTS

ATENEO STUDENT JUDICIAL COURT

Ateneo de Manila University - Loyola SchoolsBarangay Loyola Heights, Quezon City

UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS OF Case No. 2013-001

THE LOYOLA SCHOOLS

Petitioner

represented by

CHIEF PROSECUTOR CLYDE Promulgated:

MARAMBA,PROSECUTORS December 11, 2013BEATRIZ BEATO, ROBERT

MARI IBAY, JULIA DARYL

LENARZ, MAGDALENA MARIEPINEDA, JIEGO MICHAEL

TANCHANCO, CRISTINE

MARIE VILLARUEL, SPECIAL

PROSECUTORJAYVYGAMBOA, ANDDEPUTY

CLERK OF COURT PATRICK

JOSEPH NG

versus

SOSS SECRETARY-TREASURER

MARVIN LAGONERA

Respondent

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

TO: Mr. Clyde Maramba, Chief Prosecutor, and Mr. Andre Miko Alazas,Lead Counsel for Mr.Lagonera (Respondent)

IN RE: Consolidated Decision on the Impeachment Complaint filed by Petitioners and the Motionto Dismiss filed by the Respondents legal counsel

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ATENEO STUDENT JUDICIAL COURT DECISION 12112013

Pertinent to the cause of this decision are the following:

On 2 December 2013, the Ateneo Student Judicial Court (hereinafter referred to as the Court forbrevity), received a consolidated impeachment complaint from Mr. Clyde Maramba, Chief Prosecutor, etal. (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioners, containing six (6) impeachment charges against Mr.Marvin Lagonera, SOSS Secretary-Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent).

Article XIII Section 10a of the 2005 Constitution of the Undergraduate Students of the Ateneo de

Manila Loyola Schools(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) states:

Section 10. Procedures on Accountability

(a) The Student Judicial Court shall order investigations of cases of impeachment and recall at its owndiscretion or on the basis of written complaints from any member of the student body within sevenregular school days. The JC shall then decide whether to initiate impeachment or recall proceedings ornot. Should the Student Judicial Court fail to meet this deadline, complaints shall be automaticallydismissed.(emphasis ours)

implying that the Court is given until 11 December 2013 (counting Faculty Day, 6 December 2013 as aschool holiday and Saturday, 7 December 2013 as a regular school day) to render a decision onacceptance or rejection of the consolidated impeachment complaint based on its judicial merits.

On 7 December 2013, the Court released a decision granting the Respondent a two-day or 48-hourextension for the deadline of filing responses and/or motions, extending the deadline to 9 December2013, 3:20 pm.

On 9 December 2013, 2:46 pm, the Court received a Motion to Dismiss filed by Mr. Andre Miko Alazas,lead counsel for the Respondent.

This decision is a consolidated decision on the merits of the Impeachment Complaint filed by thePetitioners and the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Respondents lead counsel. The decision is structured asfollows:

1. Applicable Laws2. Impeachment Charges (with facts as presented by both parties, and analysis and ruling)

a. Usurping the School Board Chairpersonshipb. Appointment of Block and Course Representatives without due processc. Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives without due processd. Illegal creation of the Committee System, a structure that undermines the roles and

responsibilities of the Executive Officers and the Executive Committee

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e. Corruption, related to offering a public-office petition to a person, with the condition the

person changes political affiliation to the Secretary-Treasurers partyf. Failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent and falsification of official

School Board documents in the course of the investigation3. Summary of the Decision/Ruling

APPLICABLE LAWS

The Court rules that in determining cases related to the internal governance of the Sanggunian ng mga

Paaralang Loyola ng Ateneo de Manila, the 2005 Constitution of the Undergraduate Students of theAteneo de Manila Loyola Schools (the Constitution) and its by-laws are given primary application.Only in instances where the either the Constitution or its by-laws are cited may Philippine law andjurisprudence apply, giving them merely suppletory application.

IMPEACHMENT CHARGES

USURPING THE SCHOOL BOARD CHAIRPERSONSHIP

The Facts

The Petitioners complaint stated that the Respondent, who was elected Secretary-Treasurer, cannot

assume the position of School Board Chairperson in the case that the Chairpersonship is vacant due tofailure of elections and that any action committed by the Respondent amounting to assuming the powersand responsibilities of the Chairperson constitutes a positive act of usurpation. To support this, they citeArticle VIII Section 2 of the Constitution which states:

B. Chairperson

(a) To be the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of the School Board;

(b) To be the official spokesperson of the School Board;

(c) To coordinate with the Central Board on behalf of the School Board;

(d) To maintain the autonomy of the School Board;

(e) To chair the meetings of the School Board; and

(f) To perform such other functions as the School Board Executive Committee may so direct.

C. Secretary-Treasurer

(a) To assume the responsibilities of the Chairperson if the Chairperson is absent, or incapacitated;

(b) To automatically assume the Chairpersonship in the event that such office is permanently vacated;

(c) To be the Chief Administrative Officer of the School Board, keeping records of the School Board's proceedings, and

correspondence and be responsible for furnishing copies to the Sanggunian Secretary-General where appropriate;

(d) To be the School Board's budget officer and disburser of funds; and

(e) To perform such other functions the Board or President may so direct.

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and the Declaratory Relief regarding Article XV Section 4 of the 2005 Undergraduate Constitution,released by the Court on 22 February 2013, which states:

the Court interprets the word vacated as, quoting the Merriam Webster Dictionary, to give up the incumbency oroccupancy of. This definition presupposes that the office, then, must have already been previously occupied beforethe office is once again open due, for example, to the resignation or impeachment of the former chairperson. Thus,the Court would like to emphasize that the position must have been vacated and not simply vacant.

in the case where no Chairperson is elected, the Secretary-Treasurer cannot assume the Chairpersonship. This alsomeans that for the two schools, School of Social Sciences and School of Science and Engineering, wherein noChairpersons were elected, the positions will remain vacant until the next General Elections.

The Petitioners also make the case that there was no officially recognized proceeding allowing Mr. Lagonera toassume the Chairpersonship.

In the investigation they conducted, the Petitioners gathered evidence showing that Mr. Lagonera, inthis Facebook post used the title of Chairperson and claimed that the Secretary-Treasurer can assume thetitle of Chairperson during Special Elections. Also, the Petitioners advance that the Respondentoperate[d] under theassumption of his role as Acting Chairperson. He justified his actions of appointingCentral Board Representatives, Executive Officers, and the Committee Chairs of his new implementedcommittee system structure on the grounds of this acting Chairperson position. They also attest that heoffered positions to people using the title of Chairperson. Moreover, the evidence they gathered suggeststhat he assumed the title of Acting Chairperson in official documents.

From this, they aver that by assuming the powers and responsibilities of the Chairperson, and by assumingthe title of Chairperson and Acting Chairperson on separate accounts, the Respondent is guilty of usurpingthe Chairpersonship, which under Article II Section 19 of the Constitution, which states:

Section 19. Members of the student body have the right to initiate the recall and impeachment of appointed and elected Sanggunian

officials on any of the following grounds:

(a) Any willful violation of the Constitution or its By-Laws;

(b) Gross neglect of duty;

(c) Abuse of power, usurpation of authority,or insubordination;

(d) Misuse of funds, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or fraud committed in the course of official

duties;

(e) Mismanagement, inefficiency, incompetence;

(f) Graft and corruption; or

(g) Gross moral misconduct in the course of official duties. (emphasis ours)

which is an impeachable offense.

In his Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent argues that his actions did not constitute positive acts ofusurpation because he was legitimately acting as de facto Chairperson. In his motion, he cites thePhilippine Supreme Court in Codilla, et. al. v. Martinez, et. al (G.R. No. L145693):

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Nevertheless, the trial court did not consider the designation of Martinezas acting mayor entirely void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at themost a de facto officer whose acts may be given validity in the eye of the law.Thus, the trial court said: Although his designation was irregular, still he wasacting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is onewho neither has title nor color of right of an office. The acts of Jose L. Martinezare therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope ofthe authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of ade facto office are here present.

adding further that the Philippine Supreme Court distinguished a de factoofficer from a de jure officer,as well as from a usurper:

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearanceof being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumesto hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color ofright or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to excercise its functions without either thelegal title or color of right to such office. (McQuillin , Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized bylaw and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority. State vs. Babb, 124W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d) 683. (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, suprafootnote No. 11, p. 383.)

From this they qualify that the Respondent, in assuming the powers and responsibilities of theChairperson, and using the title Acting Chairperson to show no intent or pretense to the position he isproscribed from assuming, he is in fact not to be classified as a usurper under Philippine law. Moreover,they argue that as a matter of procedure, the proper relief should have been a quo warranto proceeding,challenging the Respondents right to hold office.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court accepts the Respondents argument that by virtue of his office as Secretary-Treasurer andthe fact that the Chairpersonship is vacant, the Respondent has been acting indeed as de factoChairperson. It is the opinion of the Court that application of the law cannot go contrary to fact. Assecond-in-command of the School Board, and as one holding succession rights to the position under

normal circumstances (i.e. not during failure of elections), the Secretary-Treasurer is then logicallypresumed to be acting rightfully as de facto Chairperson.

Given that the Respondent Secretary-Treasurer is recognized by this Court as de facto Chairperson, theCourt likewise agrees that in assuming the title Acting Chairperson and qualifying his statement thathe was in an acting capacity shows no intent on the defendants part to commit anymisrepresentation.The Court believes that in this instance, the Respondent was acting in good faith.

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The evidence gathered by the Petitioners also cites instances where the Respondent, as de factoChairperson, used the title Chairperson without the word acting. Citing once again the Supreme Courtcase mentioned by the Respondent, the Court reiterates:

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearanceof being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumesto hold. (emphasis ours)

Thus, even if the Respondent is indeed de facto Chairperson, he is proscribed from using the soletitle Chairperson.

However, the evidence cited by the Petitioners does not show the Respondent using the titleChairperson acting in an official capacity. The Court rules that for the Respondent to have used thetitle in an official capacity, he must have at least used it in official documents. The Petitionerspurported evidence shows otherwise. Thus, even if the Respondent used the title Chairperson in severalinstances such as posting on Facebook or informally communicating with other people, this cannot becounted as him acting in an official capacity. Thus, the Respondent is presumed to have been acting ongood faith under the safe knowledge that he is indeed de facto Chairperson.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the complaint of usurping the School Board Chairpersonship forlack of due merit, on the grounds that the Court recognizes the Respondent as de facto Chairperson,that the Respondents use of the title Acting Chairperson demonstrates no intent to usurp the

position, and that the Respondents use of the title Chairperson was not done in an officialcapacity. Counts against Petitioners.

APPOINTMENT OF BLOCK AND COURSE REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

The Facts

The Petitioners complaint stated that the following persons were appointed illegally by the Respondent:

1. Nicole Anne T. Gil, First Year Block C1 Acting Block Representative2.

Juan Pedro M. Avila, First Year Block F1 Acting Block Representative3. Michaela Francesca T. Defensor, First Year Block I1 Acting Block Representative

4. Bernice Marie S. Violago, First Year Block II Acting Block Representative5. Claudia Beatriz A. Altavas, Third Year AB COM Acting Course Representative6. Celine Marie D. Villonco, Third Year AB COM Acting Course Representative7. Raphael Guio A. Martinez, Third Year AB COM Acting Course Representative8. Kevin Bruce D. Que, Third Year AB EC-H Acting Course Representative9. Kim Alexis R. Vidal, Third Year AB MEC Acting Course Representative10.Dominic Amon R. Ladeza, Third Year AB POS-MPM Acting Course Representative11.Jessica Ma. B. Rey, Third Year AB/MA POS Acting Course Representative

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12.Andrea Cecilia E. Chavez, Third Year BS PSY Acting Course Representative13.Erika Bianca G. Paras, Third Year AB DIP IR Acting Course Representative14.Justin Rey, Fourth Year AB CHNS- Acting Course Representative15.Pauline Marie S. Villar, Fourth Year AB EU Acting Course Representative16.Angelo Pulido, Fourth Year AB HI Acting Course Representative17.Louise Gabriel A. Alvarez, Fourth Year AB MEC Acting Course Representative18.Aira Marie M. Andal, Fourth Year AB MEC Acting Course Representative19.Mitch Tuazon, Fourth Year AB POS Acting Course Representative20.Raphael Limiac, Fourth Year AB POS-MPM Acting Course Representative21.Nicole Wee, Fourth Year AB/MA POS Acting Course Representative22.Aimi Chiba, Fourth Year AB PSY Acting Course Representative23.Katharine Nerva, Fourth Year BS PSY Acting Course Representative

(those in boldface referring to those whose written statements directly confirm their having beenappointed by the Respondent).

They supply this list with written testimony from the appointees themselves implying that the Respondentindeed appointed these representatives and without the participation of the School Boards ExecutiveCommittee.

They base their accusation of illegality primarily on Article XV, Section 4a of the Constitution, whichstates:

Section 4. Vacancies.

(a) Vacancies that occur in the Central Board and School Boards before the election of Freshman Officers, with the

exception of the positions of Sanggunian President and School Board Chairpersons, shall be filled via special

elections to be held simultaneously with the Freshman Year Officers Elections.

and Article VIII Section 2 of the Constitution, which states:

C. Secretary-Treasurer

(a) To assume the responsibilities of the Chairperson if the Chairperson is absent, or incapacitated;

(b) To automatically assume the Chairpersonship in the event that such office is permanently vacated;

(c) To be the Chief Administrative Officer of the School Board, keeping records of the School Board's proceedings, and

correspondence and be responsible for furnishing copies to the Sanggunian Secretary-General where appropriate;(d) To be the School Board's budget officer and disburser of funds; and

(e) To perform such other functions the Board or President may so direct.

The Petitioners main contention is that although it is not explicitly stated how vacancies are to betreated after the election of Freshmen, it is non sequitur that Mr. Lagonera can appoint to his own rulingunless there was a directive from the President or an (sic) unanimous decision resulting from votation todo so by the Executive Committees Chairperson, Secretary-Treasurer, and Elected Executive Officers.

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There is also the reliance on the Constitution which shows the absence of either the Chairpersons orSecretary-Treasurers power to appoint people to positions.

In reply, the Respondent cites the Supreme Court in Pamantasang Lungsod ng Maynila vs. IntermediateAppellate Court (G.R. No. L65439), which states:

The term [ad interim] is defined by Black to mean in the meantime or for the time being. Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the dutiesof the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent(Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use in the context of Philippine Law. In referring to Dr. Estebans appointments, theterm is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, itis used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, doneby the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents,which is originally vested by the University with the power of appointment isunable to act

The Respondent then argues: it does not necessarily follow that the executive of an institution wouldnot be given the authority to appoint ad interim officers. The Pamantasan case clearly shows that as longas a body vested with the original power to appoint is unable to act, in this impeachment case, theChairperson, who shall serve as the School Boards Chief Executive power, Mr. Lagoneras appointments,based on the statutory grant given to him to assume the responsibilities of the Chairperson if theChairperson is absent or incapacitated, or in other words as long as the Chairperson is unable to act, then

Mr. Lagonera can make ad interimappointments.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court accepts that the Respondent can appoint ad interim officers, or officers-in-charge (OICs).By virtue of his position as de facto Chairperson, and in the absence of any provision in the Constitutionor its by-laws that specify the body capable of appointing ad interim Block and Course Representatives,or provide for the appointment of ad interim Block and Course Representatives, the Respondent cannotbe faulted for making such appointments.

The Court rules that in the absence of any by-law that provides for the process of appointing people tovacant Block and Course Representative positions, the Chairperson (or in this case, the Respondent who is

de facto Chairperson) is the body vested with the original power to appoint people to these positions.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the impeachment complaint of appointment of Block and CourseRepresentatives without due process for lack of due merit, on the grounds that there is nocognizable provision in the Constitution or its by-laws that provide for the due process of makingsuch appointments to begin with. Counts against Petitioners.

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APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND CENTRAL BOARD REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

The Facts

The Petitioners complaint stated that the following persons were appointed illegally by the Respondent:

1. Raphael Niccolo L. Martinez, Acting Third Year Central Board Representative2. Christopher S. Cunanan, Acting Third Year Executive Officer3. Kevin Luke V. Mizon, Acting Fourth Year Central Board Representative4. Jomar B. Villanueva, Acting Fourth Year Executive Officer

(those in boldface referring to those whose written statements directly confirm their having beenappointed by the Respondent).

They supply this list with written testimony from the appointees themselves implying that the Respondentindeed appointed these representatives without following the normal and legitimate mechanisms forappointing them as stipulated in the Constitution and its by-laws.

They base their accusation of illegally appointing School Board Executive Officers primarily on Article XVSection 4c of the Constitution, which states:

Section 4. Vacancies.

(c) Vacancies for the positions of School Board Secretary-Treasurer occurring after the election of Freshman

Representatives shall be filled by the Chairperson appointing an Executive Officer to the post, subject to

confirmation by three-fourths of the entire School Board. Vacancies of the same nature for Executive Officers

shall be filled by the concerned constituency's block or course representatives electing amongst themselves a

replacement. Officers so appointed will not enjoy succession rights.

and their accusation of illegally appointing Central Board Representatives on Title II Sections 10 and11of the 2013 Sanggunian ng mga Mag-aaral ng mga Paaralang Loyola ng Ateneo de Manila Code ofInternal Procedures (hereinafter referred to as Sanggu CB CIP for brevity), which state:

Title II. Membership of the Central Board

Section 10. Eligibility for OIC Central Board Representative Positions. Elected block and courserepresentatives shall be given priority for appointment as officer-in-charge batch

Central Board Representatives. In the event that no such elected representatives exist

or if all such representatives are unwilling to accept the appointment, the position shall

be made open to other members of the concerned constituency.

Section 11. Appointment Procedures for OIC Central Board Representatives. Any OIC Central

Board Representative for a given batch shall be chosen by that batchs block and course

representatives and by the School Board at large. The School Board shall then forward

to the Central Board a letter of endorsement for the concerned representative. The

Central Board shall deliberate and decide by majority vote whether to accept the

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endorsement of the School Board. If approved, the representative shall be appointed

the officer-in-charge Central Board Representative for his or her batch and school,

effective until the next Sanggunian Elections.

In his Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent argued correctly (as the Court agreed with supra) that he canmake ad interim appointments for cases wherein there exists no extant provision in the Constitution or itsby-laws that provide procedures for appointing ad interim Block and Course Representatives because hisposition is vested with original power to do so, citing Pamantasang Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court (G.R. No. L65439).

The Respondent, in his Motion to Dismiss, failed to respond to the part of the complaint forwarded by thePetitioners for cases wherein there exist extant provisions in the Constitution or its by-laws that provideprocedures for appointing ad interim Central Board Representatives and School Board Executive Officers.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court believes that the Respondent, in conflating the two separate cases of appointing Block andCourse Representatives, and Central Board Representatives and School Board Executive Officers, and inarguing against the case of illegal appointments in toto using the Supreme Court case which indeedproves that the original power to appoint Block and Course Representatives lies with the de facto Chairbut not that the original power to appoint Central Board Representatives and School BoardRepresentatives lies with the same (because there exist extant provisions in the Constitution and the

Sanggu CB CIP to prove otherwise), his Motion to Dismiss irresponsibly implies that his main argument isapplicable for both cases, when in fact, it is not. The fact of the matter is that the Motion to Dismissdid not address the fact that there exist extant provisions in the Constitution and the Sanggu CB CIPthat provide mechanisms to appoint ad interim Central Board Representatives and School BoardExecutive Officers.

Thus, the de facto Chairperson cannot simply appoint Central Board Representatives and School BoardExecutive Officers without following the procedures stipulated. If proven in trial, this could potentiallyconstitute a willful violation of the Constitution and its by-laws, which is an impeachable offense.

WHEREFORE, the Court accepts the impeachment complaint of appointment of Executive Officersand Central Board Representatives without due process on the grounds that the Petitioners can

offer evidence to suggest that the Respondent had violated specific provisions in the Constitution andthe Sanggu CB CIP that provide the appropriate process for the appointment of said officers. Countsagainst Respondent.

ILLEGAL CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM, A STRUCTURE THAT UNDERMINES THE ROLES ANDRESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Facts

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The Petitioners in their complaint give a narration, based on cited testimony from witnesses, of thecreation and operation of the SOSS School Boards Committee system. Among the allegations were:

how the Respondent had begun recruiting SOSS students as Committee Chairpersons for his systembefore his induction as SOSS Secretary-Treasurer

how the Respondent has claimed that to be a Committee Chairperson is to be greater than beingan Executive Officer

how there was minimal consultation between the Execom and Committee of Consultation beforethe release of a purported survey

how the execution of certain projects did not go through the due process of voting, implying thatCommittees had acted independently of the Execom

how Resolution No. 1, which formalized the creation of the Committee System, is unconstitutionalbecause it was voted upon by Executive Committee members and Central Board Representatives(who should not have participated because it is outside their jurisdiction),

how Executive Officers were never consulted on the committee system before it was implementedand;

how, in general the process of creating the Committee System had bypassed the ExecutiveOfficers mandated legislative and executive functions

The Petitioners prayed for the Court to declare Resolution No. 1 unconstitutional because the processthat led to the creation of the Committee System witnessed how the Respondent had exercised an

unconstitutional autocratic control over the structure of the SOSS SB by bypassing the formal procedurefor the creation of such, which they assert must have included votation, and to impeach the Respondentfor wilfully violating the Constitution.

In his Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent rebutted the Petitioners arguments. The Court quotes theRespondent:

On the onset, the prosecutions charges are attended by procedural and substantiveinfirmities. First, the question of constitutionality of the aforementioned Resolutiondoes not belong in an impeachment complaint. It is an issue that must be resolved in aseparate suit. The Prosecution committed a fatal procedural error when it prayed that thisCourt both declare Resolution No. 1 unconstitutional and to impeach Mr. Lagonera in the

same petition.

Second, even assuming arguendo, that Resolution No. 1 is deemedunconstitutional, Mr. Lagonera should not be faulted for acting in good faith inexecuting a resolution attended to by the presumption of regularity, and is thusnot liable for impeachment.

Furthermore, the Prosecution hinges their argument that Mr. Lagonera should beimpeached for instituting what they argue are unconstitutional committees. This kind ofassertion does not have any basis on logic or established doctrines of the law. It does not

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necessarily follow that an act that is declared unconstitutional would render its legislatorsliable for impeachment. Mr. Lagoneras subsequent actions based on Resolution No. 1cannot be imputed as impeachable offenses as these are covered by the doctrine ofoperative facts. It imposes an undue burden on Mr. Lagonera as the Prosecution quitefallaciously imputes that he should be impeached for his implementation of the CommitteeSystem, which was done in good faith and is governed by the operative fact doctrine.

Third, not content with asserting that Resolution No. 1 is unconstitutional, theprosecution argues that the very process Mr. Lagonera undertook in introducing thecommittee system was irregular. They aver that Mr. Lagonera began actively recruitingcommittee heads and members even before the committee system was approved by the

School of Social Sciences Sanggunian School Board during its planning and evaluationseminar. They assert further that the very approval of the committee system through a voteby the School Board convened in the planning seminar was in effect a "mere formality."This argument disregards in toto the principle of the separation of powers itis not in the prosecution's purview to charge that a vote undertaken to approve a resolution is unwise.

Finally, Mr. Lagonera is charged with usurping the powers of the members of theexecutive committee through the implementation of a committee system. They argue thatthrough the appointment of various committee heads and volunteers, Mr. Lagoneramaterially prevented the elected officers of the School of Social Sciences Sanggunian fromexecuting their mandate by sowing confusion in the delegation of duties. This charge haslittle basis in law and in fact. Title V, Sections 33 to 35 of The Sanggunian Code of InternalProcedures, the primary document that interprets and implements the 2005 Constitution of

the Undergraduate students of the Ateneo de Manila University Loyola Schools providesfor the creation of committee systems.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court believes that the main issue of the case, as successfully argued by the Respondent, isprocedural in nature. The Court agrees that the question of the constitutionality of a specific law thatis passed, in this case Resolution No. 1, does not belong in an impeachment case . The Petitionersimpose an unnecessary burden on this Court by praying for it to decide on the constitutionality ofResolution No. 1, which indeed is protected by presumption of regularity, and the actions of theRespondent prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 1, which are indeed protected by the doctrine ofoperative fact.

The question on the constitutionality of Resolution No. 1 will not be answered in this decision because thePetitioners have failed to seek the appropriate relief.

Anent the allegations that the process of creating the Committee System was unconstitutional because ofthe Respondent not putting the matter to a vote, the Court rules in favor of the Respondent by concurringthat this argument disregards in toto the principle of the separation of powers it is not in theprosecution's purview to charge that a vote undertaken to approve a resolution is unwise. Because thePetitioner had not cited any specific provision in the Constitution or its by-laws that directly require avotation to take place in all its proceedings, it becomes a matter of policy at the discretion of the School

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Board. It is not in the power of the prosecution, nor is it under the jurisdiction and authority of theCourt, to dictate matters of policy to its co-equal branches in the Sanggunian on how to specificallyenact general provisions stipulated in the Constitution and its by-laws. There is no such enacting lawthat the Court can apply.

Moreover, the Court agrees that even if Resolution No. 1 were declared unconstitutional, it must assumethat the Respondent had acted in good faith because it had not been declared unconstitutional by thisCourt, in a separate relief, prior to this impeachment complaint. The Court cannot fault the Respondentfor enacting and executing a law that he did not know to be unconstitutional because no prior relieffrom this Court had been released declaring it so.

The Court thus believes that the Petitioners err in the matter of combining a request to declareResolution No. 1 unconstitutional, and an impeachment complaint targeting the Respondent on the basisof mere assumption that Resolution No. 1 was unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the impeachment complaint of Illegal creation of the CommitteeSystem, a structure that undermines the roles and responsibilities of the Executive Officers and theExecutive Committees for lack of due merit, on the grounds that the Petitioner failed to seek theproper relief, that it is not in the purview of either the Petitioners or the Court to dictate matters ofpolicy to its co-equal branches of the Sanggunian when no law has been cited specifying pertinentprocedures, and that even if Resolution No. 1 were unconstitutional, the Respondent is presumed tohave acted on good faith. Counts against Petitioners.

CORRUPTION, RELATED TO OFFERING PUBLIC-OFFICE POSITION TO A PERSON, WITH THE CONDITION THEPERSON CHANGES POLITICAL AFFILIATION TO THE SECRETARY-TREASURERS PARTY

The Facts

The Petitioners in their complaint state that the Respondent is currently the Chancellor and previouslythe Solicitor-General of the Christian Union for Socialist and Democratic Advancement (hereinafterreferred to as CRUSADA). They cite evidence indicating that many of the acts of the Respondent,including but not limited to the appointment of people to vacant positions and the creation of theCommittee System, were originally plans of the Respondents party. Moreover, the Petitioners also cite

the testimony of Ms. Fiona Lazaro who was purportedly offered a position in the SOSS School Board by theRespondent on the condition that she switches political affiliation to CRUSADA (but that she wasappointed without having had to fulfill this).

The Petitioners argue that these actions constitute graft and corruption because the Respondent providedunwarranted preference through manifest partiality towards members of CRUSADA in being heads of hisnew Committee System). They aver that this manifest partiality impedes other political parties fromfielding their own candidates for the Committee Chairpersonship and thereby injures their right to holdsuch office.

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In reply, the Respondent in his Motion to dismiss states:

Specifically, the complaint states that defendant Lagonera approached Ms. FionaLazaro with the intention to appoint her as Committee Head under the condition she mustjoin CRUSADA. It was noted and manifested, however, that Mr. Lagonera withdrew suchcondition precedent. From this core allegation, the Prosecution went on to conclude thatthe mere offer initially made by defendant Lagonera already caused material injury byimpeding other political parties in fielding their own candidate for CommitteeChairpersonship.Moreover, the complaint also stated that the act encroached on the rightof the SOSS constituency to elect representatives tasked to protect their own interests.

Ultimately, such acts allegedly constituted manifest partiality in favor of Lagoneras politicalparty. It is worth noting, however, that Ms. Lazaros appointment pushed through evenwithout assenting to the supposed condition that she must be a member of CRUSADA.

The provision cited by the Prosecution clearly requires causation of injury in orderthat a cause of action against an officer may arise. The statement of facts clearly state thatLagonera made a retraction of the offer. Because of this subsequent act, any allegation ofinjury on the part of other political parties is mere conjecture and speculation. TheProsecution did not sufficiently show any vested right violated by the acts of Mr. Lagonera.If at all, this is a case which at the most constitutes damnum absque injuria, or damagewithout injury.

To reiterate, the purported injured party other Political Parties do not have a vested legal right conferred by any

substantive law insofar as the appointment to Committee Chairmanship is concerned.

...the question of appointments is one that involves a question of wisdom and not a question of law. Mr. Lagonerasact of initially offering a Committee Chairmanship on the condition that Ms. Lazaro be a member of his politicalparty which he later retracted was a purely political act. The allegation that Mr. Lagoneras act of requesting [her]to be a member of CRUSADA to hold the position is undeniably without legal basisas a source of culpability reeksof a futile attempt to impute upon Mr. Lagonera a wanton disregard for purportedly existing legal parameters. Torepeat the argument in the previousparagraphs, there was no source of legal duties and rights to begin with. As such, Mr. Lagonera merely acted on hisdiscretion as an officer.

Mr. Lagonera, in pursuance of his exercise of discretion both as SOSS Secretary-Treasurerand a bona fide member of his political party, only thought it best to consider appointing people whom he deem

best qualified for the task. The Student Judicial Court must restrain itself from passing upon this issue as it is clearlya nonjusticiable political question. Without jurisdiction nor a cause of action, there is no issue to litigate. In light ofthese, a dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption is the only proper recourse for the Honorable Court.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court agrees with the Respondent that his actions are purely political.In this specific case, thequestion of appointments on the grounds that manifest partiality was shown on the part of theRespondent is not to be treated by the Court as a justiciable question but as a political question becauseno one has a vested legal right to the appointive positions to begin with.

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The Court concurs with the Respondents application of the Philippine Supreme Courts ruling on Luego vsCivil Service Commission (143 SCRA 327) stating that:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by theofficer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being thatthe appointee should possess the qualification required by the law. If he does, then theappointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified whoshould have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations ofwisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

and Cortez vs. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 92673) which states:

We agree that many factors are taken into account in evaluating the qualifications ofprospective appointees and the formal examinations, work experience and educationalattainment are only some of them. Such abstract criteria as loyalty, cordiality,initiative, resourcefulness, discipline, and other personality traits are alsoproperly considered. When making this evaluation, the appointing authority shouldbe given the widest possible leeway and cannot be controlled by the Commission.The Commission cannot, even for the best of motives, substitute its own discretion forthat of the appointing authority in derogation of the latter's prerogative.

To reiterate, the Court sees no breach of procedure in the appointment of certain members of theRespondents party to newly-created Committee System because, in the first place, no set ofqualifications has yet been drawn up and ratified in order to provide the legal prerequisites to certify thecompetence of these people, and second, no vested legal right is given to anyone for these appointivepositions. The Court believes that the Respondent in appointing members of his own party to the newly-created positions was doing so legally and in good faith because he enjoys such discretionary powers.Thus, it is in the opinion of the Court that the Petitioners gravely err in accusing the Respondent ofgraft and corruption for assuming without sound basis that anyone at all enjoys a vested legal right tothese positions and thus arguing that injury had been caused to other political parties in theirapparent exclusion.

Moreover, the Court sees nothing wrong in the Respondent offering a position to Ms. Lazaro on thecondition that she changes political affiliation. This is a purely political act and is thus outside thejurisdiction of the Court, which chooses to exercise judicial restraint on responding on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the complaint corruption, related to offering a public-officeposition to a person, with the condition the person changes political affiliation to the Secretary-Treasurers party for lack of due merit. Counts against Petitioners.

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FAILING TO KEEP THE RECORDS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD TRANSPARENT AND FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIALSCHOOL BOARD DOCUMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION

The Facts

In their impeachment complaint, the Petitioners accuse the Respondent of being unable to disseminatecertain documents which they found to be in possession of the Respondent in the course of theirinvestigation. They also attest that the Respondent, based on Mr. AJ Elicanos written statement, hasnot kept correspondence with him on the SOSS SB proceedings.

The Petitioners also accuse the Respondent of falsifying documents requested in the course of theinvestigation. They attest that there appear to be certain discrepancies between the official minutessubmitted by the Respondent as Secretary-Treasurer, and the collected written statements gathered bythe Petitioners. They also attest that there appear to be discrepancies between the minutes submitted bythe Respondent and the minutes submitted by Ms. Lazaro who was tasked to be the Respondents officialscribe.

The Petitioners lastly note that further modifications by Mr. Lagonera are evident in the soft copiessubmitted through the Dropbox account. In the time stamp for the PowerPoint presentation from27,08,2013, it may be seen that the file was created, modified and last opened on November 18, 2013 at10:29 AM. The presentations content now matches the official minutes as attested by Mr. Lagonera butnot the minutes submitted by official scribe, Ms. Lazaro.

Thus the Petitioners accuse the Respondent of failing to accurately document and to publicize all SOSSSB proceedings and submitting official documentation on meetings, that content of which is said to behighly contestable.

They base their accusation on Article II Section 19d and e of the Constitution, which state:

Section 19. Members of the student body have the right to initiate the recall and impeachment of appointed and elected Sanggunian

officials on any of the following grounds:

(a) Any willful violation of the Constitution or its By-Laws;

(b) Gross neglect of duty;

(c) Abuse of power, usurpation of authority, or insubordination;

(d) Misuse of funds, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or fraud committed in the course of

official duties;

(e) Mismanagement, inefficiency, incompetence;

(f) Graft and corruption; or

(g) Gross moral misconduct in the course of official duties. (emphasis ours)

The Respondent, in his Motion to dismiss, argues:

to constitute falsification of private documents, it must be

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clearly established that the accused acted with intent to cause damage or hascaused damaged to third persons. Otherwise, the elements of the offense alleged are

insufficient to bring about a cause of action.

The Prosecution argues that by virtue of the purported falsification done by Mr.Lagonera, he in effect encroached upon the student right to have a transparentSanggunian, citing the analogous duty of the Central Board to publicize the agenda andsubmit budgets upon request of any constituent. Such is in conjunction with theinterpretation of the Prosecution that the documents should be easily accessible to theconstituency. We need not go far to debunk the self-defeating logic of the Prosecution asstated in the Articles of Impeachment. They already qualified easily accessibleas being

available upon request of any constituent. Nowhere in the charges was it alleged that aspecific constituent was prejudiced or injured or denied of their right to information when itwas requested from Mr. Lagonera. No parties were named nor a specific instance wascited. In this vein, the third element that would be necessary to constitute falsificationtheintent or causation of damage to a party is absent. There is no telling that had aconstituent requested for the said documents, Mr. Lagonera would have denied it.

In stating his case that the Respondent acted in accordance with law, his Motion to Dismiss cites the 2011Sanggunian School Board Code of Internal Procedures (hereinafter referred to as the Sanggu SB CIP forbrevity), specifically Title III Section 24, which states:

Section 24. Minutes of the Meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer together with his/her deputies is tasked to preparethe minutes of all the meetings of the School Board and ExeCom. He/she is required to transmit a soft copy of the

minutes to the e-group of the ExeCom 2 days after the meeting in PDF file. The Secretary-Treasurer is tasked tosubmit a soft copy of the approved minutes to the Secretary-General for compilation. A hard copy of the minutesshall be kept at the Sanggunian Room. He/she is also tasked to send soft copies of the approved minutes to allmembers of the Board within 2 school days after its approval. Other Protocols regarding minutes, attendancereports and status reports from the Code of Internal Procedures of the Sanggunian Secretary General will also befollowed.

Moreover, he states:

From this provision it can be gleaned that the primary authority to take charge of theminutes is lodged with the SecretaryTreasurer. The minutes submitted by Mr. Lagonera,by virtue of his office is clothed with the presumption of regularity. It is then peculiar for theProsecution to give credence to the minutes submitted by Ms. Lazaro rather than Mr. Lagoneras. At best, the

authority granted to Ms. Lazaro as assigned scribe is a delegation of authority. It is a principle in political law thatdelegated authority cannot exceed the delegating power. In case of conflict between the files submitted by Mr.Lagonera and Ms. Lazaro, the SecretaryTreasurerscopy should bear more weight. As Mr. Lagonera enjoys the presumption of regularity of official, the onus probandilies in the Prosecution, which in this case they failed to discharge factually as will be argued further.

Third, allegations are inferred from circumstantial evidence. Among the pieces of evidence where the Prosecutionanchors its charge on is the inconsistency in the timestamps submitted by Mr. Lagonera and the assigned scribe Ms.Lazaro. In the Articles of Impeachment, the Prosecution infer malice on the part of Mr. Lagonera from therecoveredminutes of the budget proposal when they were granted access to the SoSS Sanggunian Officials Facebook group.

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The evidentiary weight of timestamps should be scrutinized. The defendant invites the Honorable Court to takejudicial notice of the fact thattimestamps are not determinative of the fact that a file was manipulated on the date reflected in said timestamp. Itmay be possible that the act of opening the document at a later time would effectively alter the timestamp.

Analysis and Ruling

The Court agrees with the Respondent that it is tenuous at best to assume that he had any intentionof withholding information from his constituents.The Petitioners, citing the provisions in theConstitution which emphasize the need for accountability and the keeping of records on the part of theRespondent, wrongly assume that this automatically obliges the Respondent to consistently disseminateofficial documents without prompting from a constituent who requests it. As it is, there is no extantprovision in the Constitution or its by-laws requiring him to do such.

Moreover, the Court agrees that the accusation is partially substantiated only by circumstantialevidence.Specifically, the Court is cognizant of the fact that indeed, timestamps are not determinativeof the fact that a file was manipulated on the date reflected in said timestamp. It may be possible thatthe act of opening the document at a later time would effectively alter the timestamp.As such, theCourt rules that evidence based on time stamps gathered from soft copies of the documents obtained isinadmissible in trial.

However, the Court cannot agree with the Respondent that he was merely acting in accordance withlaw.The Respondent, in delegating the work of transcribing minutes to Ms. Lazaro, is indeed followingthe provision in the Sanggu SB CIP. But the Court denies that the documents submitted by the Respondentis clothed with presumption of regularity simply because it is a principle of political law to give duecredence to the delegating power over the delegated authority. The Court deems the Respondent aparty in interest because the documents were obtained in the course of an investigation prompted bycomplaints coming from the SOSS School Board. As such, the documents he submitted cannot be said tobe clothed with presumption of regularity. It can be inferred from this (in a way that is indicative but notconclusive) that there could have been motive to cause injury to a third party (which the Motion toDismiss mentions), that is to say, their constituents (represented by the Petitioners who enjoy the right toknow the content of these official documents upon prompting, as the Respondent similarly asserts.

Moreover, the Petitioners also state that the Respondent has failed to keep correspondence with theSecretary-General. In Title III Section 24 of the Sanggu SB CIP, which the Respondent himself cites, it isindicated there that:

Section 24. Minutes of the Meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer together with his/her deputies is tasked to preparethe minutes of all the meetings of the School Board and ExeCom. He/she is required to transmit a soft copy of theminutes to the e-group of the ExeCom 2 days after the meeting in PDF file. The Secretary-Treasurer is tasked tosubmit a soft copy of the approved minutes to the Secretary-General for compilation. A hard copy of the minutesshall be kept at the Sanggunian Room. He/she is also tasked to send soft copies of the approved minutes to allmembers of the Board within 2 school days after its approval. Other Protocols regarding minutes, attendance

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reports and status reports from the Code of Internal Procedures of the Sanggunian Secretary General will also befollowed. (emphasis ours).

The Respondent provides no reply to this allegation.

If proven in trial, these could potentially constitute mismanagement and fraud committed in the courseof official duties, which are impeachable offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court accepts the impeachment complaint of failing to keep the records of theSchool Board transparent and falsification of official School Board documents in the course of the

investigation, solely on the grounds that there are discrepancies between the documents submittedby the Respondent who is a party in interest, and the documents submitted by the official scribe Ms.Lazaro, the discrepancies being substantiated by written testimonies from SOSS SB officers, and thatthe Petitioners can offer evidence showing that the Respondent had failed to keep appropriatecorrespondence with the Secretary-General, which is mandated by the Sanggu SB CIP.

SUMMARY OF THE DECISION/RULING

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby dismisses the following the impeachmentcomplaints lodged against the Respondent for lack of due merit:

Usurping the School Board Chairpersonship Appointment of Block and Course Representatives without due process Illegal creation of the Committee System, a structure that undermines the roles and

responsibilities of the Executive Officers and the Executive Committee and;

Corruption, related to offering a public-office position to a person, with the condition theperson changes political affiliation to the Secretary-Treasurers party

WHEREFORE, similarly in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby accepts the following impeachmentcomplaints lodged against the Respondent:

Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives without due process Failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent and falsification of official School

Board documents in the course of the investigation

Mr. Clyde Maramba, Chief Prosecutor, et al. are hereby invited to be Petitioners to the impeachmentcomplaint.

Mr. Marvin Lagonera, SOSS Secretary-Treasurer, is hereby invited to be Respondent to the impeachmentcomplaint.

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The Court, by unanimous vote of the Magistrates and in the interest of due process and time for bothparties to adequately prepare, has decided to suspend the part of the Rules of Court (Section 5.2.1) thatstates:

5.2.1 Acceptance of PetitionIf the Student Judicial Court decides to accept the petition, the hearing on the petition, ifthe court decides to conduct a hearing, shall be held no later than seven days after the saiddecision.

in order to extend the maximum time period before a hearing is held.

Notice of Hearing shall be served to both parties shortly. Moreover, the Court orders both parties toappear at a pre-trial conference where they may officially turn over evidentiary material to the Court,swap evidentiary material, negotiate and discuss arguments, and be oriented on matters of procedure.The pre-trial conference shall be facilitated and observed by the Magistrates, and only the parties withtheir counsels (who must be undergraduate students of the Loyola Schools as defined in the Constitution),may attend. Pertinent information (e.g. time, date, venue) regarding the pre-trial conference and thehearing itself, which is open only to all officially-enrolled undergraduate students of the Loyola Schools,shall be provided in the Notice of Hearing.

SO ORDERED.

Roy Lambert Guerra, Chief Magistrate

Leo Francis Abot, Magistrate for Internal Affairs Administration

Danielle Joanna Gaite, Magistrate for Audit

Lorenzo Pepito, Magistrate for Human Resources

Ryan Gregory Nicolas, Magistrate for External Affairs

Aldwin Segismundo, Magistrate for Project and Operations Management

case 2013-001_decision 12112013

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