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*****Case Answers*****

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***Inevitability Debate***

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1NC Weaponization Not Inevitable

1. U.S. Leadership Solves Any Inevitability Claim

Johnson 2k3(Dir. Disarmemtn and Arms Control Program, Liu Inst. for Global Issues, U. of British Columbia) ‘03[Rebecca, “Missile Defense and the Weaponisation of Space,” ISIS Policy Paper on Missile Defense, January, www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no11.html ]

Those who argue that weaponising space is inevitable tend to evoke the “flag follows trade” analogy of sea and air power, relating military development to the safeguarding of commercial expansion. They also argue that whoever weaponises first will enjoy a significant advantage.10 These analogies are seductive, but flawed. Indeed, some analysts have come to the conclusion that the weaponisation of space is only inevitable if the US itself drives a race to do so . Moreover, history abounds with examples showing that the security advantage enjoyed by the leader in innovative military technology is soon narrowed. Nuclear weapons, for example, demonstrate how any benefit from being the first to deploy a new type of weapon is quickly eroded, leading to greater national and international insecurity in the longer run. Alternative analogies , based on a military interpretation of the concept of sanctuary , show how co-operative international action can be successful in preventing military competition and deployments from threatening a potentially strategic area of international and scientific importance, as in the case of Antarctica.

2. Weaponization Not Inevitable: Different From Other Media & Other Weapons Prove Restraint Can Hold

Tannenwald 2k4Nina Tannenwald, Joukowsky Family Research Assistant Professor and Director, International Relations Program, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space,” YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 29, Summer 2004, p. 402-403.Arguments from technological determinism or human nature are popular (and are certainly in the interests of the U.S. Air Force). However, although land, sea, and air have indeed become battlefields, there is no inherent reason that space must become one, too. As Karl Mueller argues, because militarization proceeded differently on land, sea, and air, facile analogies between these domains and military space do not predict whether there will be weapons in space. 219 Large areas of the planet, he notes, have been set off-limits to nuclear weapons (e.g., the seabed, the Antarctic, nuclear weapons-free zones), as has the Moon, and some weapons have been prohibited (e.g., biological and chemical weapons, and landmines). 220 Finally, space itself has so far remained unweaponized. As the current debate over the desirability of space weapons shows, the forty-five year tradition of superpower restraint with regard to weapons in space has become a politically significant norm. As Mueller notes, in the very near term , say a decade or more, space weaponization is not inevitable "for the simple reason that only the U nited S tates possesses the resources and capabilities that would be required to deploy space weapons in a serious way ." 221 Whether space is weaponized in [*403] the longer term will certainly depend in large measure on the decisions of U.S. leaders in the coming decade. 222

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3. US weaponization not inevitable – too expensive

Wilkerson 2k8 (Don, Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, pg online @ http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300) It is difficult to support Oberg’s prognostication that weapons in space are inevitable for the U.S. in the 21st Century. The extensive cost of current space programs like Global Positioning System (GPS), Space-Based Infrared System ( SIBIRS ), the Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System (RAIDRS) and Space Based Radar (SBR) along with numerous service military programs competing within a limited defense budget, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government will make more funding available for space weapons when the currently perceived threat can be mitigated using existing cost effective capabilities. The August 2006 U.S. National Space Policy states that its primary objective is to ensure that the U.S. maintains and enables free access to and the use of space for peaceful purposes. The policy mandates that the U.S. will pursue programs and capabilities to ensure space assets are protected since they are vital to our national security and economic interests . However, the policy does not direct the development or deployment of space weapons. The official U.S. policy in space continues to support the existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967 focusing on free access to space for peaceful purposes while deterring the misuse of space by other nation states. Nevertheless, the U.S. will not disclose any technical developments or options that may be essential in defending space assets “in order to forestall a hypothetical future arms race in space. Such an approach would not be in the national security interest of the U.S.” One may infer that the U.S. government will not hamper or discourage technological programs and developments that may eventually produce techniques, weapon systems and operating procedures that place weapons in orbit to defend space assets.

Emprical Examples Prove Weaponization not inevitable

Krepon 2k4(Micheal, co-founder of Stimson and director of the South East Asia and Space Security programs, “Weapons in the Heaven’s: A Radical and Reckless Option”, Arms Control Today http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Avoiding_the_Weaopnization_of_Space.pdf )During the Cold War, no weapons were deployed in space, and the last test of an ASAT weapon occurred almost two decades ago, in 1985 . This record of restraint reflects international norms and widespread public sentiment to keep space free of weapons. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty calls on the exploration and use of outer space to be conducted “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries” and mandates that space may not be subject to “national appropriation” by any means. Why, then, would space warriors now seek to chart a different and far more dangerous course? If the weaponization of space were inevitable, it would have occurred decades ago when Washington and Moscow competed intensively in other domains. Indeed, the record of restraint since the Cold War ended suggests that the Outer Space Treaty’s injunctions against placing weapons of mass destruction in space could be broadened if they are championed by the United States, China, and Russia. The prediction that warfare follows commerce and that the burgeoning of space-aided commerce will produce hostilities is also suspect. 7 To the contrary, most of the world’s strife takes place in poor regions. Space-aided commerce occurs primarily between nations with advanced commercial sectors, which generally have peaceful relations. Moreover, commercial space activities are often collaborative undertakings where risks and costs are shared. No nation that has invested heavily in space-aided commerce stands to gain if these orbital planes are endangered by space weapons debris or space mines. Any country that flight-tests, deploys, or uses space weapons threatens the activities of all other space-faring nations. A third argument for weaponizing space rests on the unparalleled position that the United States now enjoys in terrestrial warfare. Consequently, the Rumsfeld Commission and space warriors argue that weaker nations will carry out surprise attacks in space to neutralize US nuclear war-fighting advantages. The best way to secure US interests, the proponents say, is to transition from superiority to dominance. Worries about a surprise attack in space cannot be written off, but there are far easier, less traceable, and more

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painful ways for America’s enemies to engage in asymmetric warfare than by attacking US satellites. Weapons in space and weapons on Earth specifically designed to neutralize or destroy objects in space are being pursued for another reason as well: to help US armed forces win quickly and with a minimum of casualties. This rationale only makes sense if America’s adversaries will refrain from fighting back in space. If they return fire, however, US troops are likely to be punished rather than helped because of their greater reliance on satellites. Similarly, the clear preference of US space warriors is to use nondestructive techniques that disorient, dazzle, or disable an adversary’s satellites without producing debris that could destroy the space shuttle, the international space station, and satellites. America’s weaker foes, however, h ave far less incentive to be so fastidious about debris in their approach to space warfare . 8 States possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles could explode a nuclear weapon in space to wreak havoc on satellites

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2NC Weaponization Not Inevitable

Space Weaponization Not Inevitable – It’s A Political, Rather Than Military, Process

Deblois ‘98(Bruce M., Lt. Colonel, USAF, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable Naitonal Strategy,” Airpower Journal, 41-57//)Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense (DOD) on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: “Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead .”2 One cannot so readily make such an assumption . The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable3 but must be weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short-term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values). At that level, many reasons suggest why the weaponization of space may not be the obvious “ best” strategy .

Arguments Favoring Inevitability Are Overgeneralizations

Mueller (Analyst, RAND Corporation) 2002(Kair P., “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” Prepared for Presentation at the International Studies Association National Convention, New Orleans, 27 March, www.isanet.org/noarchive/mueller.html, //)There are four prevalent arguments in favor of the proposition that space weaponization is inevitable. This section will address three of them: that human nature mandates weaponization, that historical analogies with the sea and air prophesy it, and that the growing economic importance of satellites predestines it. Each of these arguments is based on a smattering of evidence and logic, extrapolated into facile overgeneralizations that are well-suited for television talk-show punditry but which provide a poor basis for national policymaking . In short, they appear to be straw men—except that each of them is widely believed by intelligent and well-educated people. The following section will examine a much better argument for inevitability, based on the potential military utility of space weapons.

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***Terrorism Advantage***

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Winning WOT

Al Qaeda is back pedaling - The death of bin Laden has crushed morale and Recent Intelligence shows that the organization is internally weak

CBS 6/9/11 ("Expert: Al Qaeda "weaker than we thought"" http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/06/09/earlyshow/main20070262.shtml)Expert: Al Qaeda "weaker than we thought According to two U.S. officials who spoke to the press on the condition of anonymity, the CIA-led team of data analysts, cyber experts and translators is "95 percent done" decrypting and translating the material collected from a journal, computers, hard drives and thumb drives. Those officials say they expect the job to be finished by the middle of the month. As for what the U.S. has learned, Zarate said counter-terrorism efforts have been stepped up, and there are "internal divisions we can play on" going forward. According to U.S. officials cited in an Associated Press report, the information at the political compound showed a type of office politics, with various members of the hierarchy weighing in and sometimes back-stabbing each other in attempts to vie for the bin Laden's attention and work the system. And now, with their leader gone, Zarate told co-anchor Erica Hill, "American officials want to break the back of al Qaeda leadership at a moment where they're very weak." In fact, Zarate said, a recent video of al Qaeda's longtime No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahri, may be an indication of that weakness. In the message, al-Zawahri does not profess to be the new leader of the movement. Zarate called the absence of a takeover "quite significant." "The fact that Ayman al-Zawahri has not been named the new leader of al Qaeda suggests that there are internal divisions within al Qaeda leadership and movement," Zarate explained. "Zawahri is not necessarily well-liked, not charismatic. Bin Laden was the founder, the glue of this movement. And the fact that you haven't seen a new leader emerge really does suggest that there are internal fissures and friction within the al Qaeda leadership." However, it's not only the lack of what Zawahri says, but what he does say that indicates a fragility of the al Qaeda effort in the world. The terrorist organization's No. 2 eulogizes bin Laden and promises a reprisal for his death. However, while Zawahri says America should still be terrified, Zarate said he's also using the video message to try and "buck up" remaining followers. "He is ... trying to build up the morale of the al Qaeda faithful," Zarate said. "The loss of bin Laden was a huge blow to the movement."

Killing bin Laden provides important momentum

Chait 2k11(Jonathan Chait, The New Republic, 5/2/2011, “What Osama Bin Laden's Death Means ,” http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/87732/what-osama-bin-ladens-death-means)1. For the world, the death of bin Laden provides important momentum for the United States and a brake on the prestige of al Qaeda. People around the world knew that bin Laden had defied the might of the American military and intelligence services, and this fact made the United States look impotent. That has been corrected, better late than never. Opposing the United States will seem like a slightly worse idea than it did before tonight.

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Will end Al Qaeda and lead to negotiations after further progress

Kristoff 2k11(Nicholas Kristof, NYT Columnist, 5/2/2011, “After Osama Bin Laden…,” http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/after-osama-bin-laden/)One question is whether the Osama killing will lead to intelligence that will help track down Zawahri and other Al Qaeda leaders or operatives, whether in Pakistan or elsewhere in the world. It might also help work out terror financing networks. Imagine the effort to go through Osama’s laptop. Will there be a reprisal attack by Al Qaeda? Maybe. But after all Al Qaeda has already been trying to hit us. It’s not as if it has shown any restraint. The larger challenge is whether we can press this gain and further dismantle Al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. If so, it may be easier to end the Afghan war by working out a deal in Afghanistan between the Karzai government and the Taliban. For while they are noxious in a thousand ways, the Taliban themselves are inward looking and not linked to foreign terrorism except through their hosting of Al Qaeda; if foreign fighters like bin Laden are out of the picture, an agreement becomes more feasible. The United States and Afghan governments alike pretty much believe that the only way out of the problems in Afghanistan is some kind of a political deal, in which the Taliban stops fighting and joins the government, and in turn is allowed a measure of influence in Pashtun areas. That will be more feasible if bin Laden is gone — and if other foreign fighters also fade from the scene.

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AT: Killing Bin Laden not Enough

That symbolic victory is really important!

Robert de Neufville, Big Think, 5/2/2011, “Why Osama's Death Matters,” http://bigthink.com/ideas/38168When the news hit that the U.S. had killed Osama bin Laden in northern Pakistan, analysts everywhere pointed out that he was no longer involved in Al Qaeda’s operations. Indeed, as I’ve written before, Al Qaeda itself no longer represents the same operational threat it once did. CIA Director Leon Panetta said last summer that the number of real Al Qaeda operatives had probably fallen to “50 to 100, maybe less.” Nevertheless, Osama bin Laden’s death represents a huge victory in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism has been called “propaganda by deed”—a phrase popularized by 19th century anarchists—because it works only to the extent that it publicizes a cause and affects people’s behavior. The 9/11 attacks—as unbelievably tragic and horrible as they were—did little strategic damage the U.S. productive capacity or ability to project power around the world. But they turned the then largely unknown Al Qaeda into a household name, made the U.S. seem vulnerable, and helped to drive a wedge between the U.S. and people in the Middle East. That’s why a symbolic victory matters. The fact that Osama bin Laden was still alive was a continuing symbol of the inability of the U.S. to capture or defeat him. Without bin Laden, Al Qaeda appears more like what it has become: a small, ineffectual group that has stood on the sidelines as real change sweeps the Middle East. That’s not to say that terrorism is no longer a problem. Exactly how bin Laden’s death will affect the various offshoots and affiliates of Al Qaeda is unclear. And it only takes a few terrorists to cause real harm. Nevertheless, with bin Laden gone, Al Qaeda is at long last likely to become increasingly marginal and irrelevant.

And, there’s no champions for space weapons

Dolman and Cooper 2k11(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef) While the policy certainly can be interpreted to support an agenda to fully militarize space, decisive leadership to do so is lacking, presumably because of the political impedance illustrated by the above historical examples. Even military experts seem inclined to shrink from advocacy of fully exploiting space for military purposes— accepting that "space sensors are good, but space weapons are bad"—not a serious military perspective. Today, the Air Force contributes 90 percent of DOD's space personnel, 85 percent of DOD's space budget, 86 percent of DOD's space assets, and 90 percent of DOD's space infrastructure15—yet it has no comprehensive doctrine to guide the Nation's exploitation of space and assure U.S. supremacy—as the 2000 Defense Science Board stated should be the objective of the Nation's military space programs.16

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***Heg Advantage***

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1NC Heg Frontline

Hegemony is self-reinforcing.

Wohlforth ’07 (William, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolar Stability”, Harvard International Review, Spring, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1611/3/)US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize . It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

And, Their evidence is just fear-mongering – We aren’t declining.

Boot, Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, 5-31-10 (Max, “J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Los Angeles Times)Much nonsense has been written in recent years about the prospects of American decline and the inevitable rise of China. But it was not a declining power that I saw in recent weeks as I jetted from the Middle East to the Far East through two of America's pivotal geographic commands -- Central Command and Pacific Command. The very fact that the entire world is divided into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent -- not yet even a Chinese counterpart. It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the

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affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of U.S. bases will stretch from Germany to Japan -- more than 700 in all, depending on how you count. They constitute a virtual American empire of Wal-Mart-style PXs, fast-food restaurants, golf courses and gyms. There is an especially large American presence in the Middle East, one of the world's most crisis-prone regions. For all the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, almost all the states bordering what they call the Arabian Gulf support substantial American bases. These governments are worried about the looming Iranian threat and know that only the United States can offer them protection. They are happy to deal with China, but it would never occur to a single sultan or sheik that the People's Liberation Army will protect them from Iranian intimidation. In the Far East, a similar dynamic prevails. All of China's neighbors happily trade with it, but all are wary of the Middle Kingdom's pretensions to regional hegemony. Even Vietnam, a country that handed America its worst military defeat ever, is eager to establish close ties with Washington as a counter to Beijing. What of America's two most important allies in Northeast Asia -- South Korea and Japan? Not long ago, relations with Seoul were frosty because it was pursuing a "sunshine policy" of outreach to North Korea that the George W. Bush administration (rightly) viewed as one of the world's most dangerous rogue states. More recently, relations with Japan became strained after the election of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009 on a platform of cozying up to China, rethinking the 50-year-old alliance between the U.S. and Japan, and moving U.S. bases out of Okinawa. Now Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has had to undertake an embarrassing U-turn by agreeing to an earlier plan that would move a U.S. Marine Corps air base from one part of Okinawa to another but keep it on the island. In justifying his reversal, Hatoyama said that "we cannot afford to reduce the U.S. military deterrence" because of "political uncertainties remaining in East Asia." There is no shortage of such uncertainties with the Chinese navy becoming increasingly assertive in moving into Japanese waters and with North Korea, which has missiles that can easily hit Japan, sinking a South Korean naval ship. The latter incident naturally has focused attention in Seoul and served to accelerate the reaffirmation of close American-Korean ties that had already begun with the election of the more conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. The anti-Americanism that had been prevalent in South Korea only a few years ago has all but disappeared, and it is not only (or even mainly) because of President Obama's vaunted charm. It is largely because South Korea has tried detente and found that it did nothing to moderate the aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime. China is South Korea's largest trade partner by far, but Beijing shows scant interest in reining in Kim Jong Il. Chinese leaders fear that North Korea will collapse, leading to a horde of refugees moving north and, eventually, the creation an American-allied regime on the Yalu River. Rather than risk this strategic calamity, China continues to prop up the crazy North Korean communists -- to the growing consternation of South Koreans, who can never forget that Seoul, a city of 15 million people, is within range of what the top U.S. commander in South Korea describes as the world's largest concentration of artillery. South Korea knows that only the U.S. offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 U.S. troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure. And yet South Korea is not so unusual in this regard. The Persian Gulf emirates also entrust their continued existence to America's benign power. The Kurds, whom we visited in Irbil, are eager to host a U.S. base, because they know that all of the gains they have made since 1991 have been made possible by our protection. Even Arab Iraqi politicians, who traffic in nationalist slogans while running for office, are quietly talking about renegotiating the accord that would bring the U.S. troop presence in Iraq to zero by the end of 2011. They know what Kosovars, Kuwaitis and countless others have learned over many decades: American power is the world's best guarantor of freedom and prosperity. This isn't to deny the prevalence of anti-Americanism even in the Age of Obama. Nor is it to wish away the real threats to American power -- from external challenges (Iran, China, Islamist terrorists) to, more worrying, internal weaknesses (rising debt levels, decreasing military spending as a percentage of the federal budget, a shrinking Navy). But if my cross-global jaunt taught me anything, it is that those countries that dismiss the prospects for continuing American leadership do so at their peril. The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from local bullies. They may resent us, but they fear their neighbors, and that's the ultimate buttress of our status as the world's superpower.

Social welfare makes isolationism inevitable.

Mandelbaum ‘05 (Michael, Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, The Case For Goliath: How America acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century, page 184-186)The huge bill for entitlements as the twenty-first century proceeds will compel either a very steep rise in the taxes younger Americans pay or a sharp reduction in the benefits older Americans receive , or, what is most likely, both. Neither will be popular. The mark of this unpopularity is the fact that although the fiscal problems the aging of the baby boomers will pose have long been well known, candidates for political office, who have the ultimate responsibility for coping with these problems, have virtually ignored them.72 The required tax increases and cuts in benefits are likely to be substantial enough to affect the context in which public policy is made. The entitlements explosion, especially in conjunction with rising energy costs but

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even without these, will create a new political climate in the United States, and in this new climate the international services that the country came to provide during and after the Cold War are not necessarily destined to flourish. Democracies favor butter over guns.73 The ultimate responsibility for the society's resources rests with the people themselves, and most people see to their own immediate well-being before concerning themselves with events beyond their borders.74 The founding document of the American republic, the Declaration of Independence of 1776, announced that all persons have certain fundamental rights, which the independent country the signers proposed to build would guarantee, namely "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"-presumably individual happiness. The document did not mention international stability or global prosperity as goals to which the new country would devote itself. As the provision of welfare becomes more expensive and therefore more controversial, other public programs, especially those involving other countries and not clearly connected to the physical safety of Americans, may well lose political support . Under these circumstances it will become increasingly difficult for the foreign policy elite to persuade the wider public to support the kinds of policies that, collectively, make up the American role as the world's government. Foreign policy will be relegated to the back burner, regarded as less worthy of concern and attention than the government's financial obligations to its own citizens.

Leadership is resilient.

Mead 2k7(Walter Russell Mead, senior fellow - Council on Foreign Relations, 10/22/2007, Failing Upward, The New Republic, p. lexis)The Bush administration has certainly put America's resilience to the test . Rarely has the national and international consensus about the shortcomings of U.S. foreign policy been so wide or so bitter . Rarely has a U.S. administration promised so much and achieved so little --as if Babe Ruth had pointed to the centerfield bleachers and then struck out. With poll after poll showing the United States plumbing the depths of unpopularity in key parts of the world; with U.S. pressure for elections on the West Bank and Gaza resulting in a victory for Hamas and a Palestinian civil war; with WMD undiscovered in Iraq, Iran on a roll, and Osama bin Laden on the loose, few would use the words "Mission Accomplished" to describe the Bush administration's foreign policy. Yet we will survive this presidency and likely prosper afterward . True , Bush's successor will inherit an ugly war in the Middle East, and American credibility and popularity have been damaged. But America's alliances remain strong, and the tides of history continue to flow our way. God does indeed have a special providence for the United States of America--even when it is led by George W. Bush.

Heg doesn’t solve war.

Conry ’97 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato, Policy Analysis No. 267, 2-5, “U.S. ‘Global Leadership’: A Euphemism for World Policeman,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html)Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-certain disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture: Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a full-throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55] Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher has warned, What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage. [57] In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed , however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The U nited States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not lend themselves well to external solutions . As Maynes has pointed

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out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter , whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58] Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century. "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so. Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable future. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states, which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]

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***China Advantage***

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1NC China Defense

And Rising powers like China have an incentive to act peacefully. If they want to prevent backlash to their rise they will exercise restraint, their peaceful rise will reinforce international cooperation and peace

Ikenberry, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University in 2011(G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. "The Future of the Liberal World Order" http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

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And American Hegemony is sustainable, there is no country that can challenge the US

Lynch and Singh in 2008(Thomas J. Lynch & Robert S. Singh, Lecturer and Professor Foreign Policy, University of London, 2008, After Bush: the case for continuity in American foreign policy, p. 266-8)In the context of American primacy, it is worth recalling William Wohlforth’s observations on measuring power. Four points argue that the days of American primacy and a unipolar world are not yet over. First, power as a relational concept and power as resources are quite different concepts. That is, the ability to achieve certain stated international ends or global public goods need not, of itself, reveal the relative power of a state. The stalemate reached in Korea in the early 1950s, for instance, did not negate America’s superpower position in the First Cold War. Similarly, America’s failed counterinsurgency in Vietnam did not bring into being a multipolar world. Whether or when America “fails” in Iraq, that intervention is equally unlikely to usher in a new multipolarity. America remains the world’s leading power “after Iraq.” It spends roughly as much on defense as the rest of the world put together. The Pentagon’s budget bid for fiscal year 2008, of $578 billion, represented approximately 4 percent of GDP, a low proportion by historical standards. Of course, the ability to use those resources and the need to do so are contingent matters. American power has not been able to establish a secure constitutional democracy in Iraq any more than it could decisively quell the communist subversion of South Vietnam. But the fact of American primacy endures even in the face of a campaign that did not secure its original objectives. The cardinal indicators of a challenge to that unipolar world – a balancing of other powers against the superpower or a meaningful increase in rival powers’ defense spending – have simply not occurred. Second, shifting the goalposts—evaluating US power by its ability to resolve global problems from drug proliferation to climate change—does not offer a solid perspective. The US did not cease to be superpower after the Bay of Pigs fiasco or on being ejected from the UN Commission on Human Rights. The failure to intervene in Darfur will come to be regarded as a global abdication of responsibility to international actors, just as Rwanda was previously. But it was not authored by Washington and it affects American power not a jot. Third, relying on a single indicator is typically unreliable in evaluating national power. To be sure, analysis of budget and trade deficits highlights possible weaknesses in the American economy. But the economy is, on other indicators—growth, inflation, unemployment—in robust health. Moreover, even in terms of the financial position of the US, growing interdependence means that those states (notably China and Japan) that hold most in terms of dollar reserves are themselves exposed should they abandon them. There exist few states with a relationship with the US (and all developed states have one) that would not be materially disadvantaged if America suffered a serious economic downturn. Fourth, analysts often overlook latent power – the degree to which resources can or could be mobilized by a government. Despite America waging a global campaign since 9/11, it has been the military rather than the nation as a whole that has been at war. The public has not been asked or required to make serious material sacrifices either to secure the homeland or to assist the struggle against jihadism abroad. Taxes remain low, America has an exclusively volunteer army, and fatalities in Iraq – while tragic—do not remotely brook comparison with those of Vietnam, Korea, or the Second World War. In sum, America possesses ample reserves with which to defend its global role and primacy, if needed.

No China Threat: Wants A Ban, An Threat Created By U.S. Aggression

Hitchens 2k3Theresa Hitchens, Vice President, Center for Defense Information, “Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization,” DISARMAMENT FORUM n. 1, 2003, pp. 15-32.As noted above, there have been sporadic reports regarding China’s interest in disruption of American space-based capabilities. At least in the open literature, there seems to be some argument among Chinese military officials and experts about the best course to chart regarding space. China has many fewer space assets than the United States, despite ambitious plans for the future of its space programme. China is the third nation to develop a manned civil space programme, albeit many decades after the United States and the Russian Federation. Many observers, however, believe China will emerge as a major space power. ‘China is set to become a major space power pursuing regional and intercontinental objectives. It could be the world number two in space by 2020’, according to the year 2001–2005 Strategic Plan of France’s space agency, the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES).39 That

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said, China’s official position regarding space weapons is that ASATs and space-based weapons should be banned under a multinational treaty. Indeed, China has been pushing for a treaty on the non-weaponization of outer space since the late 1980s, driven in part by the United States Strategic Defense Initiative and its follow-ons. Chinese military officials also expressed concerns following the Persian Gulf War about the American military’s ability to use satellites to amplify American military superiority on the ground in a way not seen before. According to Li Bin, director of CDI-Tsinghua Program on Cooperative Security in Beijing, Chinese arms control officials say they believe space weapons would be detrimental to world security, not just Chinese security.40 In recent years, China has been a key proponent of negotiating such a ban within the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), in talks known as PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space). At the 7 June 2001 meeting of the CD in Geneva, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said such negotiations are urgently needed because of American missile defence and space-control plans, and presented a working paper describing potential elements of such a treaty.41 That working paper, ‘Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space’, includes concepts such as: ‘the prohibition of testing, deployment, and use of weapons and weapon systems and their parts and components in outer space; and the prohibition of testing, deployment and use of weapons, weapon systems and their parts and components from outer space against targets on land, sea and air’, according to Cheng Jingye, deputy director of the Arms Control Department at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.42 In 2002, China followed up with a joint paper with the Russian Federation, presented to the CD at the 28 June meeting.43 According to Cheng, China strongly believes negotiations on such a treaty are urgently needed within the body. ‘China is of the view that introducing weapons into space will not contribute to the goals of ensuring space security or reducing space vulnerabilities. Rather it will lead to an arms race in space, which will then be turned into another battleground, thus endangering our dependence on space’.44 At the same time, however, some influential thinkers in China have argued that the revolution in military affairs requires China to now consider its options in space. Some maintain that space warfare with a superpower should be a Chinese concern, and that China needs anti-ASAT technology, smaller satellites to reduce vulnerability and first strike capabilities in space.45 According to the Pentagon, China already has jamming technology and may be developing ASAT capabilities, including a ground-based high-energy laser and other lasers to blind optical satellites.46 However, as indicated, much of China’s interest in space seems to stem directly from concerns about American military activities in space. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China’s worries about protecting its space-based assets are due to concern about American development of missile defences and future American global dominance as a result of American space power.47 Indeed, at the 7 February 2002 meeting of the CD, Hu specifically mentioned American actions as a key reason that negotiations on the weaponization of space should commence quickly. ‘Now that the ABM [Anti- Ballistic Missile] Treaty has been scrapped and efforts are being stepped up to develop missile defence and outer space weapon systems, there is an increasing risk of outer space being weaponized’, he said.48

China Lacks Quality Control Necessary To Deploy Effective Space Weapons

Charles V. Peña, Senior Defense Policy Analyst and Edward L. Hudgins, former Director of Regulatory Studies, the Cato Institue, “Should the United States “Weaponize” Space? Military and Commercial Implications,” POLICY ANALYSIS n. 427, March 18, 2002 , http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1286.China, the country often feared as threatening U.S. space-based assets, has quality problems similar to those of the old Soviet Union. For example, it has never been able to produce in quantity a quality fighter plane, which would be far more important to its military needs than exotic space weapons. Thus, the fact that a country possesses a technology that could be developed to threaten U.S. space assets is a reason for attention and concern, but it is not a reason for new, costly programs to counter phantom threats.

Despite Their Ev, China Lacks Meaningful Asat Capabilities Because Of:

Tracking Limits

Launch Limitations

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Phillip Saunders, Director, East Asian Nonproliferation Program (EANP), Jing Dong Yuan, Senior Research Associate, EANP, Stephanie Lieggi, Research Assistant, EANP, “China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” RESEARCH STORY OF THE WEEK, July 22, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm

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Despite numerous indications that China is interested in developing ASAT weapons and significant overall improvements in China's space program over the last two decades, China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. These limitations include: * Limited tracking capabilities. China continues to rely heavily on shared and leased space tracking facilities, which might not be available in the event of a conflict. Despite a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships, the Chinese tracking system does not have a global reach. * Limited launch capabilities. Although its launch capabilities have been improving, China still lacks the launch on-demand capability required for space warfare and for an effective ASAT system. * Vulnerable infrastructure. China's immobile launch facilities, tracking facilities, space infrastructure, and possible ground-based laser sites would all be vulnerable to attack. Assessment Chinese strategists recognize the potential importance of ASAT weapons as a tool of asymmetrical warfare and Chinese scientists are pursuing research with potential ASAT applications. China's existing civilian and military space programs also provide a base of capabilities that could potentially be applied to the development of ASAT weapons. Although open source information clearly indicates Chinese interest and scientific research in ASAT weapons and technologies, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. This conclusion is based largely on an assessment of China's current space capabilities and inferences based on open-source information about Chinese ASAT-relevant scientific research. Direct information on Chinese ASAT weapons programs and possible operational capabilities is limited and of questionable reliability. The evidence is insufficient to reach a definitive judgment on whether China has an active ASAT weapons program or a limited operational ASAT capability. However, if China did have a robust operational capability, there would probably be more indications (in terms of tests and physical infrastructure) than have been observed to date. Although China's current space program is gradually developing technologies that could be used to support ASAT development, its overall near to mid-term space capabilities remain limited. Although the Chinese have a strong strategic motivation to pursue asymmetric programs such as ASAT weapons, serious questions remain about their technical capabilities and political will to undertake such a costly program. China has been extremely vocal in international fora with regards to the demilitarization of outer space and is a strong proponent of a multilateral treaty banning space weapons, indicating internal pressures may exist that could slow progress towards ASAT development and deployment. This seems to signal that Beijing, although interested for strategic reasons in counter-space and ASAT capabilities, is not keen to enter an expensive and potentially open-ended space race. Given China's limited space capabilities and stated interest in preventing an arms race in outer space, Beijing's ultimate commitment to developing ASAT weapons remains ambiguous.

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***Weaponization Bad***

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1NC Weaponization BadA. Weaponization Destroys The Economy Trailblazes An Arms Race, And Guts Commercial And Exploratory Space

Deblois 2k3(Bruce M. Deblois, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” ASTROPOLITICS v. 1 n. 1, Spring 2003, p. 46-48, pp. 29-53.)Counter-Proposition 3: Exorbitant Costs $1 trillion for an effective space weapons system – and that is on the low side, assuming the world is not compelled into a space race. Additionally, opportunity costs go well beyond mere dollars. In the zero-sum game of government expenditures, costs must be measured in foregone investments in other necessary military and defense acquisitions; domestic investments in education, pensions and health; and international investments in humanitarian relief efforts. Although the precise cost of any space weapon system is impossible to predict, we can consider some rough approximations. The space-based laser, for example, has undergone considerable cost study. A rudimentary 24-satellite constellation is estimated to cost between $80 and $100 billion. A more robust system, requiring 120 or more satellites, could cost as much as $500 billion or several trillion dollars. Furthermore, space systems – such as the Space Shuttle and International Space Station – have often grossly overrun their budgets, due to underestimation during the budgeting process and unforeseen technical hurdles encountered during development and construction. For the sake of argument, $1 trillion for a significant space weapons capability is a reasonable estimate. All of this presages adverse impacts on other national security programs. As an accountant for any national treasury might put it, the books simply do not balance. The United States far out-spends any other state in the area of national security, and its annual defense budget of $350 billion is mostly committed upon arrival. Given salaries, pensions, benefits, facilities, operations and maintenance, only $125 billion is left for procurement and R&D. Within that, major acquisitions of the .-22, joint strike fighter, bombers, carrier battle groups, UAVs, etc., all vie for this limited funding. Every other national defense establishment operates under similar or more severe funding constraints. In the context of military spending alone, space-based weapons are simply unaffordable. Beyond this, one country’s pursuit of space weapons could well catalyze the next major arms race. One state’s decision to weaponize space could prompt other countries to acquire space weapons or ASAT capabilities and might result in uncontrolled proliferation or an outright arms race in space. Although most experts agree that some degree of space weapons proliferation would probably result from weaponization, they are divided over the likelihood of a space arms race. Many suggest that high cost, the technological sophistication required, and viable asymmetric alternatives would drive all but a few states away from following another in a race to weaponize space. There are potentially four powers that could pursue parallel paths in a race to develop and deploy space weapons: the United States, Russia, the European Union and China. Other countries could also respond without an aim for parity and include those with access to space (or which may soon have access); among these are Australia, Brazil, China, .rance, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Taiwan and Ukraine. Countries with the ability to fabricate satellite technology include France, [47] Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom. 38 Technology transfer has been rapid, especially for micro-satellites, and many other countries may soon be capable of building their own satellites. .or instance, the United Kingdom’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd has undertaken joint technology transfer programs with Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Portugal, Chile, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and China. 39 All said, a multitude of countries, at some level, could enter a costly race to space weaponization, or align with major powers that do so. Moreover, the first country to do so might actually provide the gateway to space exploitation. At huge expense, it will have broken the technological frontier only to realize that once the heavens are opened to weapons, everyone else goes much more cheaply. 40 In addition to posing insurmountable military opportunity costs and the potential of another costly arms race, space weapons directly threaten the fiscal health of the space sector itself. Use of destructive weapons in space would obviously promote an orbital debris problem that is on the threshold of becoming a major inhibitor to space commerce. Currently, the US Space Surveillance Network uses ground-based radar and optical/infrared sensors to track roughly 7,500 objects across orbital space. That constitutes objects greater than 10 cm in diameter in low Earth orbit to objects greater than 1 m diameter in geostationary orbit. Only approximately five per cent of those objects are operating satellites; the rest are effectively debris, 40 per cent of which are fragments of disintegrated satellites and upper stages of rockets. 41 Unfortunately, there are between 30,000 and 100,000 untracked objects between 1 cm and 10 cm diameter (large enough to cause serious damage to spacefaring vehicles), and an unknown but enormous number of particles smaller than 1 cm (many of which could damage sensitive systems on impact). While the space environment is extremely large and the probability of an impact is still small, that probability is growing. For some space missions active protection through shielding is already a requirement (e.g. the International Space Station). Getting this shielding to orbit is an added expense to an already low-profit-margin industry. Any weapon use in space, but particularly proliferating weapons use in space, could readily make space a no-go area of dangerous debris, in the process pre-empting commercial and civil development . Beyond the use of weapons in space, the satellite insurance business is extremely volatile. In the last four years, satellite insurance rates have risen by 129 per cent, driven by increasing complexity and anomalies of satellite systems. 42 The mere presence of weapons poses a risk, and insurance companies structure their rates on risk estimates. The resolution approach for the insurers will be to strengthen their exclusion clauses

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for acts of war – and pass the risks to the financiers, who will have to decide to go to space without such insurance coverage, or not go at all. 43 The combination of weapons posturing and/or use may well cause increasing debris, expensive hardening and increasing risk (perceived by insurers and/or assumed by financiers), all producing an inaccessible international commercial space environment. But there are adverse impacts on domestic programs as well. National domestic expenditures and international [48] relief expenditures pose a zero-sum game for national economies. To highlight the significance of domestic and international concerns, last year alone over six million people died of cancer worldwide, and the 2020 projection is 20 million deaths – yet our collective investment in research to combat this foe is less than one per cent of defense spending. The opportunity costs of space weapons in terms of other national security expenditures, impact to the international space market, other domestic expenditures, and international relief efforts are but a few of many international ramifications. This begs the question: what real wars are to be lost while we collectively expend billions on space weapons – weapons that in all probability will merely pacify paranoid insecurities?

B. That Causes the Most Destructive Conflict Ever Seen

Mitchell 2k1(Dr. Gordon, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

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DA Space Weapons Uniqueness - no space weapons now

Even the United States has Exercised Constraint in Deploying Space Weapons

Krepon, Director of Space Security Program at Stimson and received masters in International Studies, in 08[Michael, March, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf, Opening Pandora’s Box, Survival vol. 50, FJR]

I believe there is reason to be optimistic rather than fatalistic. The more spacefaring nations become invested in satellites for economic growth, global commerce, and military capabilities, the more they will pause before opening Pandora’s Box. The constraints that worked against using satellites as target practice in the past are even stronger today. They will be stronger tomorrow, because dependency on satellites in growing in all spacefaring nations. I rest my case by citing as evidence the behaviour of the George W. Bush administration, which has not been shy about utilising American military superiority and about taking significant risks in pursuit of presumed security interests. Even the Bush administration – and even after the Chinese ASAT test – has refrained from undertaking the offensive ASAT programmes endorsed by Tellis. Notwithstanding existing US Air Force guidance and the Rumsfeld Commission’s recommendations, the Pentagon has so far confined its testing in space to the demonstration of multipurpose technologies that fall far short of dedicated ASATs. The United States, like China and Russia, is pursuing a hedging strategy in the event that the norm against harming satellites in crises or warfare is broken.

Inherent Norm Against Space Warfare because of the Risks it Poses to Valuable Space AssetsKrepon, Director of Space Security Program at Stimson and received masters in International Studies, in 08[Michael, March, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf, Opening Pandora’s Box, Survival vol. 50, FJR]

Space is exceedingly vast, so it is possible that no satellites and space flights will suffer catastrophic losses as a result of the Chinese ASAT test, but Beijing’s leadership is smart enough – and its space equities are broad enough and expanding – to have a learned a cautionary lesson from this test. US military guidance calling for space superiority does not foreclose hit-to-kill ASATs, but the Pentagon prefers to use temporary and reversible effects in space warfare. But once this Pandora’s Box is opened, and the first satellite in military history is attacked in combat, not everyone may choose to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules. Asymmetric warfare applies in space, no less than on the ground. Asymmetric warfare applies in space Because every spacefaring nation can lose badly in the event that vulnerable and essential satellites are damaged or destroyed , a rudimentary form of deterrence against satellite warfare existed during the Cold War. It continues to exist today.

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China is concerned about possible US space weaponization, but has no plans to weaponize space in the status quo without provocation Hui, research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2005 (Zhang Hui, 2005, research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China”, Arms Control Today. Vol 35, No 10 (December 2005) HH)

China is particularly concerned that space weaponization could limit its civilian and commercial space activities and negatively affect its economic development. Today, China has various operational civilian satellites in space, a family of launchers, a modern space-launch complex, and a growing list of customers in the international satellite-launch market. Since launching its first satellite in 1970, China has made steady progress both in launch vehicle design and in other areas of space technology development for civilian and commercial purposes. China has developed manned spacecraft and a high-reliability launching vehicle. Between November 1999 and December 2002, China launched four unmanned experimental Shenzhou (Magic Ship) spacecraft. In October 2003, China successfully launched the Shenzhou-5 manned spaceship and, in October 2005, the Shenzhou-6 manned spaceship. China is now planning to explore the moon with unmanned spacecraft. The U.S. pursuit of space control would threaten China’s civilian and commercial space activities and perhaps even deny China access to space.

No weapons in space now.Van Ness from the Department of International Relations and the School of International, Political and Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

There are no space-based weapons in place yet, so there is still a possibility to keep them out.

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DA Space Weapons – linksChina And Russia Are Against Space MilitarizationThe Daily Telegraph, 08(2-13, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “Russia and China urge ban on space weapons”, LexisNexis, Rishi Shah)

China and Russia yesterday demanded a ban on the use of weapons in space, signaling a shared effort to challenge America's military superiority. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, unveiled proposals for a "treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space'' at a UN conference on disarmament being held in Geneva. He said the treaty "prohibits the deployment of weapons of any kind in space, and the use or threat of force against space objects''. Mr Lavrov suggested that US military domination of space could lead to a nuclear-style arms race. "Weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction,'' he said. "This, in turn, is fraught with a new spiral in the arms race both in space and on Earth.'' China and Russia made similar proposals on space-based weapons in 2002, shortly after President Bush withdrew the US from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But their efforts have assumed greater weight with worsening relations between Russia and the West and following a missile test by China in December 2006, when it destroyed an old weather satellite. However, the US has made clear it has no intention of surrendering its advantage in space technology, which is set to be a key component of its missile defense shield. A White House spokesman rejected the call for a treaty. Russia and China believe that America cannot take their co-operation for granted in attempts to reduce the threat from North Korea and Iran while forcing them to choose between giving up the space race or vastly increasing their military spending. Some analysts have also warned that ground-based weapons, which would not come under the treaty, could wreak havoc with the satellite-dependent US armed forces.

Space Militarization Will Anger ChinaVoice Of America News ’05 (7-13, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “July 13, 2005, “Concern Rising Over Space-Based Weapons”, Theresa Hitchens is the vice president of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington research organization. She is also the director of research at the British American Security Information Council, a think tank based in Washington and London. LexisNexis, Rishi Shah)

As the U.S. government reviews its policy toward the military uses of space, the most serious concern raised by some activists is the potential to put a weapon in space that could attack targets on earth. VOA Defense Correspondent Al Pessin reports on the debate over what some see as the ultimate weapon and others see as a destabilizing and dangerous concept. It is not a complicated idea. Satellites orbit the earth approximately every 90 minutes. Put a weapon on a satellite that can hit targets on earth, and it can strike almost anywhere within that short timeframe. Put several such satellites in orbit, and the owner would have the ability to hit any target, anywhere on earth, within just a few minutes. So why has no country done so? The answer can be summed up in one word: Cost. And that refers to both the huge expense of developing and deploying any space weapon, and the political cost. "There is not going to be any other nation on earth that is going to accept the U.S. developing something they see as the 'Death Star,'" said Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington research organization. "I do not think the United States would find it very comforting if China were to develop a 'Death Star' - a 24/7, on-orbit weapon that could strike at targets on the ground anywhere in 90 minutes," she added. "What if we develop such a weapon, and we orbit it, and China decides to follow suit ? Are we going to shoot it down before they get it in space to prevent them from being on equal footing with us? And if we did that, what kind of follow-on would come from that?" It sounds like a scary scenario.

Russia And China Hate US Space WeaponsVan Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

Both China and Russia are adamantly opposed to these weapons, and Chinese analysts make a strong case that a US space-based, boost phase

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missile defence system would indeed threaten the PRC’s basic nuclear deterrent.12

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DA Space Weapons – links – missile defense - China

China fears US space missile defense will undermine it’s nuclear deterrent.NTI 2003 ( NTI.org, NTI is an organization in which board members include US Secretary of Defense, members of the legislative branches of government from the United States, France, Russia, and the UK, China’s Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons, http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm, HH)

China is publicly opposed to the weaponization of space for a number of reasons. Most notable, Beijing opposes the use of space-based equipment in missile defense systems, such as the space-based sensors and intercept warheads in outer space potentially to be deployed in planned US missile defense systems. Although not mentioned in official statements, China is concerned that the US deployment of missile defenses, especially national missile defense (NMD), will negate its strategic nuclear deterrent, potentially forcing China into an expensive arms race that it cannot currently afford. Beijing's focus on arms control in outer space is an attempt to block future deployment of missile defense by the US. In addition, as the US rapidly improves its ability to deploy weapons systems in space, China is concerned that this preeminence will enable the US to use this technology to achieve global dominance. Considering the difficulty China's defense industry has had in developing and absorbing new technologies and the cost of developing space-based sensors and weapons, Beijing worries it will be unable to match the US for an indefinite period of time. Without an formal multilateral agreement banning the deployment of space-based weapons, the US will have an increasing strategic advantage for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Beijing is aware of US preparation for future space warfare against China, as seen by various reports of US war games with China as “enemy.” For example, in early 2001, a war game in Colorado pitted the US against an opponent threatening a small neighbor (i.e. China threatening Taiwan), where both the two main countries facing off were relying heavily on space assets. As a result of these reports, China increasingly views itself as the target of US increased militarization (and possible weaponization) of space.

Not only is this a reason the plan doesn’t solve in the long term, but blown up satellites create debris that risks destroying other important satellites Shixiu, senior member of military and international relation studies at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007(Bao, senior member of military and international relation studies at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, he was the former director of the institute, http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/Issue5full.pdf, HH)

The deliberate destruction of a satellite in a highly used orbit – creating mass quantities of space debris that will remain a global danger for decades – has deservedly been met with U.S. and international opprobrium. U.S. Air Force satellite tracking data is already showing that debris from the impact has spread from the FY-1C’s original orbit of about 850 kilometers in altitude to as high as 3,500 kilometers and as low as about 200 kilometers 1 – an area of space that includes hundreds of satellites owned by numerous nations and commercial companies, particularly Earth-observation and weather satellites important in day-to-day civil life as well as the International Space Station. As of Jan. 29, some 517 pieces of debris have been publicly identified by the U.S. Air Force’s Space Surveillance Network (SSN), according to Dr. T.S. Kelso, technical program manager at Analytical Graphics, Inc.’s (AGI) Center for Space Standards and Innovation in Colorado Springs. David Wright, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Mass., has estimated (based on NASA models) that the impact will create at least 800 pieces of debris larger than 10 centimeters in diameter (the size of a baseball) and some 0,000 other pieces of smaller debris, between 1 centimeter and 10 centimeters). Most of the larger debris will eventually be tracked by the SSN, but the smaller debris will be difficult, if not impossible to track without at the same time damaging or destroying a satellite. So, it likely will be weeks if not months before the debris threat becomes clear. Even if China broke no laws, the destructive ASAT test violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, in which signatory nations (including China) pledge not to interfere with the space operations of others and to consult when national action might lead to such interference. China neither notified others nor has it conceded fully to calls for consultations; behavior that is simply unacceptable, particularly in peacetime. While China has now admitted to conducting the test after an inexplicable two weeks of official silence, official dismissals of any “threat” emanating from the test are not credible, and all space-stakeholders have not only the right but also the responsibility to press China for more details and transparency regarding their future

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intentions. Indeed, the cavalier attitude toward endangering other’s satellites raises serious questions about Beijing's credibility as a responsible space-faring nation – undercutting the good reputation that the Chinese leadership has been steadily building among the international space community. For example, concerns are already emerging about the potential negative impact of the test, and its implications for the future of the commercial space market. 6 How that affects, or should effect, other nation's willingness to continue civil and commercial space cooperation with China will be discussed below, but suffice to say it is more than likely there will be repercussions at some level.

China perceives US space missile defense as a threat to their nuclear deterrent.Van Ness from the Department of International Relations and the School of International, Political and Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became even more determined to take advantage of its superiority in space to establish and maintain its strategic dominance. The current debate about weapons in space was prompted by the administration of George W. Bush, when he decided in 2002 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union. This treaty had restricted missile defences in order to help stabilise their bilateral strategic relationship in terms of a concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Instead, Bush committed the US to deploying a so-called layered missile defence system to include boost phase, midcourse, and terminal phase defences, and made plans for space-based orbiting ‘defensive’ weapons. The Bush administration attempted to assure Russia and China that this missile defence system was not intended to affect their nuclear deterrent capabilities, saying it was designed only to defend against missile attack from so-called rogue states. In Washington, US analysts described the American missile defence strategy as intended to replace MAD with a strategy of the assured survival for the US and its allies by means of missile defence; however critics pointed out that this was a design for achieving absolute security for the US, and if successful, it would mean the absolute insecurity of all other countries. The US could intervene or attack any country at will without fear of retaliation. Chinese analysts, understandably, inferred that such a US missile defence system was potentially a serious threat to China.

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts – ChinaUS space based missile defense causes China to not only reciprocate, but attempt to block the US space deployment, turns caseHui, research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2006(Zhang Hui, 2006, research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective”, Page 2, HH )

In particular, China is concerned that the U.S. missile defense network will undercut China’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China’s fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. China is even more concerned about space-based BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to China’s nuclear deterrent than a non-space-based BMD system. In addition, Beijing is worried that the deployment of missile defense systems would further promote a preemptive U.S. military strategy. As viewed by Chinese leaders, China’s own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target for U.S. missile defenses. China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to intervene in its affairs, including undermining the country’s efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a developing economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access. Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means. Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans. In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat.

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts – Miscalculation

Space weapons risk Miscalculation Blazejewski, Masters degree in public affairs, Advanced JD Degree, ’08 (Kenneth, Spring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly cdg)

Introduction The issues surrounding the weaponization of outer space present difficult security and diplomatic challenges to the United States in its relationship with foreign states. Several features of space weaponization account for these dif- ficulties. First, many space technologies have dual-use capacity, making it dif- ficult for states to distinguish between defensive and offensive preparations or conventional and space weapons.1 Second, some defense analysts argue that space weapons are inherently better suited to offensive than defensive war- fare since they are able to launch powerful attacks quickly but are vulnerable to attack.2 Third, due to insufficient situational awareness in space and poor “forensic” ability, the causes of satellite failures can be unclear, creating the po- tential for both anonymous attacks and groundless accusations of antisatellite (ASAT) attacks.3

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts – EconomyWeaponization of Space Destroys Economies, poses clear threatMaogoto, JD University of Melbourne, ’07 (Jackson Nyamuya,, holds a Bachelor of Laws with First Class Honours from Moi University, three postgraduate degrees from the University of Cambridge (Masters in Law), University of Technology Sydney (Masters in Law) and University of Melbourne (Doctorate in Law) Winter, http://search.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/docview/191684681/1308A6D608C2FC80882/2?accountid=12598, “Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?”, ProQuest, ctc)

The increasing weaponization of outer space poses not only difficult legal questions but also represents a clear and present danger to international peace and security. There is already a great fear of an arms race being undertaken in space, with the latest developments in both Beijing and Washington adding further fuel to that fire. In this context, one can certainly envisage that the deliberate destruction of, say, a communications or weather satellite by a missile such as was launched by China or like those that could be launched as part of the U.S. missile shield system, even if not resulting in any immediate civilian casualties, could have a devastating impact on a community, country, or even region of the world. Millions of lives and livelihoods could potentially be affected, economies destroyed, and essential services incapacitated.

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DA Space Weapons – Impact – ProlifSpace Weaponization will spur ASATS and nuclear proliferationBlazejewski, Masters degree in public affairs, Advanced JD Degree, ’08 (Kenneth, Spring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly cdg)

To maximize US long-term security, however, I would argue that the United States should not deploy space weapons as part of a multilayered BMD shield or otherwise. Space weapons would not contribute to US security in the way that many proponents suggest. Ultimately, space weapons deployment is likely to expose US satellites to greater threat by encouraging foreign states to develop more advanced ASAT technology and expedite nuclear prolif- eration. Even when considered in isolation, the decision to forgo space weaponization is a wise one; when considered within the larger context of arms control negotiations, it clearly presents an opportunity to advance US long-term security. The United States should concede to negotiate on space weaponization with China in return for Chinese cooperation in other more critical areas of counterproliferation, such as the Fis- sile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Proliferation Security Finally, the United States should continue to push for increased transparency in China’s military and space programs.

Space weapons will have negative consequences with China and Russia- nuclear proliferation and international securityPodvig and Zhang, Senior Research Associates at Harvard’s School of Government, ‘08(Pavel/Hui, March, Zhang has a PHD in nuclear physics and Podvig has worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18178/russian_and_chinese_responses_to_us_military_plans_in_space.html “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, VJ)

In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the space weapons programs laid out in its military planning documents. This makes probable the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications for international security be? The American Academy called upon Pavel Podvig (Stanford University) and Hui Zhang (Harvard Univers ity) to elucidate answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military plans for space. Each scholar suggests that introducing weapons into space will have negative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security. As Podvig points out, Russia's main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deployment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely. Podvig suggests that Russia does not have many options for the development of its own weapon systems in space but is likely to react to U.S. development of space weapons through other countermeasures, such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles. Podvig describes such measures as "the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons." Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. military plans for space will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting civilian and commercial initiatives, but he focuses

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his discussion on a much greater concern among Chinese officials — that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China's options for response, as detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China's commitments on arms control. Thus, a U.S. decision to introduce weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international nonproliferation regime. Zhang concludes, "U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country's security interests."

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts - Russia scenarioRussia can match the military of the US Podvig, Ph.D. in political science, ‘08[Pavel, March, http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf, “Russian and Chinese Responses to US Military Plans in Space”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, FJR]

Russia is one of the few countries to carry out a full range of activities in space. The Russian government supports a number of space programs, from manned flights to civilian and military communication, navigation, and satellite-imagery systems. Russia has at its disposal launchers and launch facilities that can deliver a range of payloads to almost any orbit. These capabilities make Russia an important actor in all developments related to military uses of space, especially those related to the weaponization of space. Russia also has an important role in the future development of space because it remains a nuclear state with sizable offensive strategic nuclear forces. Although the relationship between Russia and the United States—as well as the other nuclear states—no longer has the adversarial nature that characterized it during the cold war, an expansion of U.S. military capabilities in space might affect Russia’s security calculations and force its government to take measures that would protect Russia’s strategic status vis-à-vis the United States. Russia is capable of carrying out its own military space program. Despite the setbacks of the last decade, during which all Russian military programs suffered due to lack of adequate funding, recent steps of the Russian leadership indicate their intention to expand the military space program. Although it is not clear whether Russia could maintain its military presence in space so as to successfully compete with the United States, an expansion of the military space program would be an important benchmark and would certainly affect U.S. military policies.

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts – Space Debris

Attacks on satellites creates space debris that takes out satellites that work for other purposes like communication, surveillance, and military

Van Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)Protection of satellites is a more difficult problem. One fact that should help in their defence is that all countries are increasingly dependent upon the communication, surveillance, and geo-positioning functions of earth satellites, so we all have a huge stake in their defence. Secondly, attacks on satellities are likely to produce debris (like the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007 did), and that debris endangers the proper operation of everyone’s satellites. A major attack on several satellites could have a disastrous impact on global military and commercial communications.

Space Debris As Dangerous As AsatsVan Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)Some preliminary thoughts about a design: A global commons in space A Sino-American agreement might begin with a joint declaration to protect and to sustain what is currently a global commons in space, one to be enjoyed by all people. The Union of Concerned Scientists reports that, as of April 2010, there were some 928 operating satellites in space, 437 of which were US owned, 58 owned by China, and 95 owned by Russia.However, the present arrangement in space is vulnerable to disruption or even destruction if there were ever to be a serious conflict in space. Debris from destroyed satellites might create a ‘collisional cascading effect’ that could endanger the entire system. 14 Estimates of current space debris run as high as 600,000 objects of larger than one centimetre in diameter. As an example of the continuing dangers of space debris, Russian officials in July 2010 were reported to be warning about the threat to astronauts in the International Space Station from debris produced by the 2007 Chinese ASAT some three and a half years earlier. 15

Use of ASATS would cause massive space debris

Myers, Founded The Defense And Aerospace Consulting Firm SM&A And Graduated From Stanford University, ’08 (Steven Lee, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09myers.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On. AD”)Space, in this view, should remain a place for exploration and research, not humanity’s destructive side. The grim potential of the latter was hinted at by the vast field of debris that China’s test left, posing a threat to any passing satellite or space ship. (The Pentagon said its own shot, at a lower altitude, would not have the same effect — the debris would fall to earth and burn up.) The risk posed by space junk was the main reason the United States and Soviet Union abandoned antisatellite tests in the 1980’s.

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Space Weapon Use would result in the production of space debris- multiple warrantsMyers, Founded The Defense And Aerospace Consulting Firm SM&A And Graduated From Stanford University, ’08 (Steven Lee, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09myers.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On. AD”)IT doesn’t take much imagination to realize how badly war in space could unfold. An enemy — say, China in a confrontation over Taiwan, or Iran staring down America over the Iranian nuclear program — could knock out the American satellite system in a barrage of antisatellite weapons, instantly paralyzing American troops, planes and ships around the world. Space itself could be polluted for decades to come, rendered unusable. The global economic system would probably collapse, along with air travel and communications. Your cellphone wouldn’t work. Nor would your A.T.M. and that dashboard navigational gizmo you got for Christmas. And preventing an accidental nuclear exchange could become much more difficult. “The fallout, if you will, could be tremendous,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. The consequences of war in space are in fact so cataclysmic that arms control advocates like Mr. Kimball would like simply to prohibit the use of weapons beyond the earth’s atmosphere. But it may already be too late for that. In the weeks since an American rocket slammed into an out-of-control satellite over the Pacific Ocean, officials and experts have made it clear that the United States, for better or worse, is already committed to having the capacity to wage war in space. And that, it seems likely, will prompt others to keep pace. What makes people want to ban war in space is exactly what keeps the Pentagon’s war planners busy preparing for it: The United States has become so dependent on space that it has become the country’s Achilles’ heel.

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DA Space Weapons – Impacts – WarMultiple potential conflicts if the US deploys space weapons.Weston, Masters from Naval Postgraduate School, 2009(Major Scott A., USAFA; MS, Troy University; MA, Naval Postgraduate School, Major Weston is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College., http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/weston.html, HH)

If a conflict occurs in the next five to 10 years, the long acquisition process for space systems and limited space-launch schedules will confine the main space systems involved to those now fielded. Therefore, a survey of current counterspace assets is necessary in

order to understand how space-warfare scenarios would likely occur. The following considers only those countries most likely to confront the United States militarily in space in the near future—specifically, nuclear states with domestic space-launch and satellite capabilities, nuclear powers possessing ballistic missiles, and nonnuclear states with ballistic missiles capable of direct ascent

into occupied space orbits. Each group has the potential to age in space combat along a spectrum ranging from creation of a crude debris field to targeted space attacks. Limiting the study to the most plausible threats, the discussion focuses on the capabilities of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, citing examples that cover most of the space-warfare spectrum and applying lessons to other countries of interest.

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DA Space Weapons – Soft Power

Weaponization Collapses Soft Power

Brown 2k9 (Trevor, BA, Indiana University, Soft Power and Space Weaponization, Air & Space Power Journal, 1 March 2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html ) The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing. Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on 5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

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Space Weapons immoralSpace Weaponization Is Immoral, Illegal, And A Huge MistakeHyten, Is The Director Of The Commander's Action Group, Air Force Space Command And Uy, Who Is A Member Of The Institute For Defense Analysis's Research Staff ’04 (6-1, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare”, Air and Space Power Journal, John E Hyten has a BA from Harvard University and a MBA from Auburn University. Robert V. Uy has a BSE, University of Michigan; BA, University of Canterbury; MS and PhD, California Institute of Technology. LexisNexis. Rishi Shah)

Editorial Abstract: The possibility of warfare in space not only reshapes the traditional view of conflict, but also challenges national leaders and military commanders. Outlining the moral and ethical dimension of determining the right course of action in space, the authors consider the consequences of moral and ethical choices in the context of the appropriate and measured development of certain space weapons. The big, red line we all have is the weaponization of outer space, which would be immoral, illegal, and a bad mistake. --Bill Graham Canadian foreign affairs minister, 2001 In combat today, United States military commanders face many difficult moral and ethical decisions. The nation has entrusted them with her most precious resource--her sons and daughters--to fulfill their obligation to protect and defend her vital interests. Commanders' decisions have life-and-death consequences for Americans, allies, enemy forces, and, unfortunately, sometimes noncombatants. Without a doubt, these decisions are among the most difficult any human being could ever face. The potential for warfare in space adds a new dimension to our traditional view of war and further challenges national leaders and military commanders. The debate over weapons in space continues to be vigorous and controversial; both sides are entrenched in their own positions, asserting that only their judgements are buttressed by "moral" and correct arguments. The purpose of this article is to highlight the moral and ethical challenges that surround space warfare in a way that helps clarify the issues for all who must examine these choices and make appropriate decisions in future combat situations. Ethics and morality issues are often not clear-cut, and future decision makers must be open to the possibility that the greater good--a means to measure the consequences of moral and ethical choices--may be served through an appropriate and measured development of certain space weapons. The Dichotomy: Who is Right? It would be a disaster for us to put weapons in space of any kind under any circumstances. It only invites other countries to do the same thing. --Senator Tom Daschle, 2001 We know from history that every medium--air, land and sea--has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. --Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 2001

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***Solvency Turns***

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Chinese Pre-emption

Space based weapons are not worth it- costly, easily negated, and difficult to replaceButt, PhD in nuclear physics. ‘08(Yousaf, physicist at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. July 22, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/can-space-weapons-protect-us-satellites, “Can space weapons protect U.S. satellites?” VJ)

TENSIONS IN the United Nations over space-based weapons ran to new heights recently when the United States delivered a hard-line statement on its right to develop such weapons. Responding to repeated and increased international pressure in recent weeks, John Mohanco, US deputy director of the Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, said "our government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our [space] assets." Russia, which is pushing for a new treaty on such weapons, wanted countries to "refrain from any practical activities aimed to place weapon systems in outer space while the international agreement on non-weaponization of outer space is being elaborated." Apparently the US reaction was only to harden its stance. This adds to the alarming change of course last year when the United States became the first country to oppose the annual non binding resolution on Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space. Essentially the world considers it important to develop a treaty to prevent an arms race in space by prohibiting weapons there. The need for a treaty is compounded by the US withdrawal in 2002 from the ABM Treaty, which had key restrictions on space weapons. This discussion is far from theoretical: The US Air Force is pushing lasers with which to attack satellites, and the Missile Defense Agency is pushing for another budget hike for space-based weapons. Already the United States is spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year on such weapons. Space issues are perhaps the most important Achilles' heel facing the US military. Their importance can be seen from Iraq: Planning and operations are helped by satellite imagery. Planes, ships, tanks, and even missiles are guided by the Global Positioning System. Generals command missions from outside the country thanks to communications satellites. Beyond this, early warning satellites would serve as the first notice of missile attacks. The problem is that satellites are also vulnerable to elimination by enemies. A Space Commission report chaired by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld considers the threat so real it warned of a "Space Pearl Harbor." Naturally, Americans want to protect these assets, so why not pursue space weapons? The most compelling reason is that they would actually make the situation worse. This is due to the technical ease of ground-based anti-satellite systems. Adversaries wouldn't need to go to the trouble of building space-based weapons systems. Simple and inexpensive, ground-based systems could shoot these satellites out of the sky. More than 25 nations already have the missile capability to reach the altitude at which the satellites orbit. More significantly, powerful lasers able to kill a satellite in low orbit through heating are available commercially in more than 50 nations. If the United States deploys ground-based anti-satellite technology, or ASATs (which it can do technically now), then others will follow suit. America has the most assets in orbit to lose in such a game. If the United States deploys space-based weapons — like interceptors for missile defense (which it is on course to deploy within about 6 years) — an adversary could simply take them out from the ground. If any security advantage afforded by such a weapon is easily negated, then one is left with the prospect of other nations moving toward developing ground-based ASAT capabilities. This would severely jeopardize America's precious satellites, all of them. Also, the capabilities provided by each proposed space-based weapon can be achieved with ground-based alternatives that are generally 100 to 1,000 times cheaper. In addition, the United States is planning to release a new National Space Policy within weeks, tweaks to the language of which could give the green light for US deployment of space-based weapons. Instead, the United States should send a sign to other nations by taking space-based weapons off the books once and for all. America can still protect its satellite systems — in less-threatening ways. Instead of having a space architecture that consists of a few big satellites that are complex, expensive, and difficult to replace, the United States should move to a model consisting of many inexpensive micro-satellites that offer the same capability. Other nations are already moving in that direction. Doing nothing about the vulnerability of satellites would be a bad security decision, but weaponizing space is no solution. Doing that would be like watching brave Achilles unsheathing his knife and turning it on himself.

Weapons Are Expensive, Hard To Use, And Easy To Target By Asats, China Threatens To Shoot Down And US Weapons With Their AsatsVan Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10

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(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

Space-based weapons, if they are ever developed, would be hugely expensive, difficult to deploy, and vulnerable to attack by China’s and Russia’s existing ASAT capabilities. What China seems to be saying to the US, by its actions more than words, is: if you go to the expense of developing and deploying space-based weapons, we will be able to defend against them with our current ASAT, missile defence, and cyber war capabilities. If it should come to a military conflict between us, we could destroy those weapons in space or confound their command and control by means of cyber attacks. As a result, the US would be engaged in a one-sided arms race in space, trying to gain dominance by means of space-based weapons, while ignoring the fact that they are vulnerable to asymmetrical attack.

US would lose any space race, China would use ASATsVan Ness from the Department of International Relations and the School of International, Political and Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

China already has an asymmetrical capacity in its demonstrated ASAT capability to destroy almost anything that the US may choose to orbit in space. 16 Given this relationship, without an agreement, the US might commit itself to an immensely expensive, one-sided arms race in space that, even now, it could not necessarily win. 14

China Developing ASATS And Cyber War Capabilities.Van Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

In January 2007, China launched a missile into space to destroy one of its own defunct weather satellites, demonstrating an ASAT capability that previously only the US and Russia were thought to have. Analysts complained loudly about the debris produced by the attack because space debris constitutes a serious threat to all orbiting satellites, but the main shock was a strategic one. China had demonstrated that it, too, could play the game of weapons in space. Then, in January 2010, China carried out a ground-based missile interception test, apparently a successful missiledefence test. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that ‘The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft’. 5 At the same time, there is growing evidence of China’s cyber warfare capability, exhibited most prominently this year in the dispute with Google. 6 Google complained about being targeted by cyber attacks from within China, and finally decided to move its search services to Hong Kong. It is interesting to note that the US government’s National Security Agency assisted Google in attempting to identify the source of the cyber attacks. Cyber warfare potentially constitutes a ‘space weapon’, as most analysts define the term, because cyber attacks have the capacity to shut down, or even distort, ground-based command and control for orbiting satellites. The US government has published detailed studies of China’s cyber warfare capability and its space warfare thinking,

China Could Effectively Respond To US Space Weapons.Van Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

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There is no doubt that the US is still far ahead in space technology, but the combination of China’s ASAT and missile defense tests and its cyber capability suggest that China could launch an asymmetrical response to any US effort to build and to deploy space-based weapons. Meanwhile in April 2010, the United States tested the Air Force’s X-37B Space Plane, launching it with an Atlas V rocket. This is the reusable robotic X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), which is described as a small space shuttle-like craft which is designed to remain in orbit for up to 270 days. Analysts debate about whether this OTV should be seen as a space weapon. Also in the works is a test of a US ‘global-strike missile’ and other possible weapons, while

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*****Off-Case*****

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***Politics***

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1NC Link

Plan is Massively Unpopular with Everyone in Congress

Moltz 2k2(James Clay, research professor and associate director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control,” Arms Control Association, pg online @ http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1031 //sdi-ef)Where Does Congress Stand? The same Congress that boosted funding for missile defenses by 57 percent to $8.3 billion last year also cut significant chunks out of Bush proposals for space-based elements of national missile defense. Indeed, the final House-Senate conference committee eliminated $120 million from the president’s proposed $170 million appropriation for the Space-Based Laser. It also eliminated funds entirely for the Space Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low), a satellite-based early-warning system. These actions suggest that space weapons are vulnerable to congressional challenges. Also, the full impact of the change in the Senate’s leadership has not yet been felt. Key Democrats have come out in strong opposition to space weapons, including Senators Tom Daschle (SD), Joseph Biden (DE), and Carl Levin (MI). Except for the unprecedented budget unity brought on by the September 11 events, cuts would likely have been made in the missile defense budget for fiscal year 2002,9 forcing even harder choices regarding space defenses. Such debates are beginning for fiscal year 2003. Conservative Democrat Robert Byrd (WV) warned on the Senate floor against “a headlong and fiscally spendthrift rush” to deploy space weapons, concluding, “That heavy foot on the accelerator is merely the stamp and roar of rhetoric.” In addition, a strong contingent within Congress still supports NASA and the International Space Station, which, despite problems, continues to resonate as a worthwhile endeavor with the American public. Introducing weapons into space is abhorrent to many Americans, raised to view space as the realm of the Apollo astronauts, the moon landing, and the shuttle missions. Even conservatives such as Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) have emphasized the continued importance of manned space research to the nation’s economy and the development of spin-offs for furthering our technological base. Despite Weldon’s support for missile defense, he and other NASA supporters may modify their stances when they recognize that aggressive deployment of space weapons could jeopardize other U.S. space priorities. Tests of ASAT weapons, for example, could create debris that might threaten astronauts on the International Space Station. They might also cause costly litigation in which commercial providers seek restitution from the U.S. military for damage caused to their satellites. Foreign claims could create international incidents harmful to U.S. foreign and defense policies, as well as commercial interests. Ten to 20 years down the line, multiple states responding to U.S. weapons in orbit could create an unlimited test range in low-Earth orbit, to the great harm of U.S. space interests, including for military assets. It is not surprising, therefore, that risks associated with weaponizing low-Earth orbit do not sit well with many members of Congress, who want to see U.S. military, scientific, and commercial leadership in space protected. According to defense analyst Theresa Hitchens, U.S. satellite providers are already nervous about possible future U.S. government decisions to try to shut off foreign access to U.S. communications satellites in times of crisis and to shoot down U.S. and foreign satellites providing such access.10 They fear that this may lead foreign customers to develop their own satellite industries to ensure the availability of spares, thus stimulating competition and cutting into existing U.S. market share. A liberal House Democrat introduced H.R. 2977 in fall 2001 and a revised bill (H.R. 3616) in January entitled the “Space Preservation Act of 2002.” This legislation would prohibit U.S. funds from being spent on space-based weapons, terminate all research associated with such systems, and instruct the president to participate in international negotiations toward completion of a treaty banning such weapons worldwide. Although the bill is unlikely to pass in the Republican-controlled House, it does set down a marker of opposition to current administration policies. More indicative of chances for creating a bipartisan consensus on limiting space weapons was a speech in late September 2001 by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a highly respected Republican foreign policy beacon. In an address to the National Press Club, Lugar rejected the idea of moving forward with a multitiered national missile defense and instead called upon the Bush administration to reorient missile defense programs to focus on the existing, short-range missile threat and to redouble efforts to fight terrorism and provide for homeland security. He argued that longer-range missile defenses and space systems should be put off indefinitely, suggesting a significant difference of opinion with the Bush administration. Other concerned Republicans are echoing such thoughts in this spring’s congressional budget debates, particularly as politically risky deficit spending looms. Thus, although arms controllers may despair about current plans, there are good reasons to think that cooler

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heads can still prevail in the space weapons debate. Although missile defense of some sort may be inevitable, those who doubt the utility of space weapons represent a majority in Congress. This middle constituency is the one with whom the arms control community must open a dialogue. The problem today in trying to identify a defensible middle ground for space arms control is the lack of a formula to draw in these moderates, who do not want to be painted as “anti-missile defense.” Thus, a search to create new alternatives to the existing options and arguments must be undertaken.

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DA Politics – links

Bipartisan Support To Block Space Weapons

Boyd – Has Reported On Asia For Over 2 Years, 08 (Alan, June 6, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2008/june-2008/china-takes-on-the-us-in-space/?locale=en, Asia Times: “China takes on the US - in space”, XJADX)Congressmen, sitting on both sides of the political spectrum, have been less enthusiastic. Reluctant to commit money to fantastic weapons that might never work, they have joined forces in the House Armed Services Committee to slash hundreds of millions of dollars from missile defense and ASAT research in the past two years. Among the scuttled programs was an additional interceptor site in Europe, research into lasers that would target satellites and funding for a space-based missile defense interceptor. Allocations for the high-altitude airships were sharply reduced.

Democrats opposed to the weaponization of spaceMyers, Founded The Defense And Aerospace Consulting Firm SM&A And Graduated From Stanford University, ’08 (Steven Lee, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09myers.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On. AD” )

Democrats in Congress, in particular, have opposed explicit authorization of space weapons programs. But John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, an organization that studies military and space issues, has noted a spike in recent years in secret “black budget” spending by the Missile Defense Agency. The idea, he said, is, “If you desire peace, prepare for war.” Mike Moore, author of a new book, “Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance,” argued that such logic is misguided.

The Plan is politically contentious

Lambeth 2k3 (Benjamin, PhD Political Science, “Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/1415)For the time being, the idea of placing offensive weapons in space for use against terrestrial targets remains contrary to declared national policy, and there is no indication that the nation is anywhere near the threshold of deciding to weaponize space. Any truly serious steps toward acquiring a space force application capability will involve a momentous political decision that the nation's leadership has not yet shown itself ready to make. As the Air Force's former deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, then Lieutenant General Robert Foglesong, noted, "if the policy decision is made to take our guns into space, that will be decided by our civilian leadership." Until that threshold is reached, any talk of space weaponization will remain not only politically moot but needlessly provocative, and military space activity will remain limited to enhancing terrestrial operations and controlling the ultimate high ground.

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Normal means is black budget.Normal means is black budget.Myers, Founded The Defense And Aerospace Consulting Firm SM&A And Graduated From Stanford University, ’08 (Steven Lee, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09myers.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On. AD”)

Democrats in Congress, in particular, have opposed explicit authorization of space weapons programs. But John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, an organization that studies military and space issues, has noted a spike in recent years in secret “black budget” spending by the Missile Defense Agency. The idea, he said, is, “If you desire peace, prepare for war.”

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***Defense Trade-off***

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And, Plans Massive Cost comes from the Defense Budget – it Trades off with other Military Projects

Dolman and Cooper 2k11(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)Space weapons are expensive; alternatives are cheaper and just as effective.This is the first argument against space weaponization, although it is an easy one to set aside. Of course space weapons are expensive—very expensive, though not necessarily more expensive than terrestrially based systems that may accomplish the same objectives, not to mention objectives that cannot be met otherwise—but so are all revolutionary technologies, particularly those that pioneer a new medium. Furthermore, the state that achieves cutting-edge military technology first has historically been the recipient of tremendous battlefield advantage, and so pursuit of cut-ting-edge technology continues— despite the enormous cost. Moreover, the cultural and economic infrastructure that allows for and promotes innovation in the highest technologies tends to remain at the forefront of international influence. All empires decline and eventually are subsumed, but it has not been their search for the newest technologies or desire to stay at the forefront of innovation that causes their declines. Rather, it has been the policies of those states, generally an overexpansion of imperial control or an economic decision to freeze technologies, that result in their stagnation and demise. Space and space technology represent both the resources and the innovation that can keep a liberal and responsible American hegemony in place for decades, if not centuries, to come; furthermore, unless America maintains this technological edge, it will likely lose its preeminence. A follow-on argument is rhetorical and usually takes the form, "Wouldn't the money spent on space weapons be better spent elsewhere?" It would be lovely if the tens of billions of dollars necessary to effectively weaponize space could be spent on education, or the environment, or dozens of other worthy causes, but this is a moot argument. Money necessary for space weapons will not come from the Departments of the Interior or State or from any other department except Defense. Any windfall for not pursuing space weaponization is speculative only and is therefore not transitive. This means that the funds for space weaponization will come at the expense of other military projects, from within the budget of the Department of Defense. This observation is the basis for criticism among military traditionalists, who see the advent of space weapons as the beginning of the end for conventional warfare.

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***Spending D.A.***

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DA Spending linksSpace Militarization Is Costly.Voice Of America News ’05 (7-13, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “July 13, 2005, “Concern Rising Over Space-Based Weapons”, Theresa Hitchens is the vice president of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington research organization. She is also the director of research at the British American Security Information Council, a think tank based in Washington and London. LexisNexis, Rishi Shah)

As the U.S. government reviews its policy toward the military uses of space, the most serious concern raised by some activists is the potential to put a weapon in space that could attack targets on earth. VOA Defense Correspondent Al Pessin reports on the debate over what some see as the ultimate weapon and others see as a destabilizing and dangerous concept. It is not a complicated idea. Satellites orbit the earth approximately every 90 minutes. Put a weapon on a satellite that can hit targets on earth, and it can strike almost anywhere within that short timeframe. Put several such satellites in orbit, and the owner would have the ability to hit any target, anywhere on earth, within just a few minutes. So why has no country done so? The answer can be summed up in one word: Cost. And that refers to both the huge expense of developing and deploying any space weapon, and the political cost. "There is not going to be any other nation on earth that is going to accept the U.S. developing something they see as the 'Death Star,'" said Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington research organization. "I do not think the United States would find it very comforting if China were to develop a 'Death Star' - a 24/7, on-orbit weapon that could strike at targets on the ground anywhere in 90 minutes," she added. "What if we develop such a weapon, and we orbit it, and China decides to follow suit? Are we going to shoot it down before they get it in space to prevent them from being on equal footing with us? And if we did that, what kind of follow-on would come from that?" It sounds like a scary scenario.

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***China DA***

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DA China Relations – link

US Space Weaponization leads to arms race with China, and undermines relations with China.Blazejewski, Masters degree in public affairs, Advanced JD Degree, ’08 (Kenneth, Spring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly cdg)

Finally, as in many areas of foreign policy, states often send mixed signals regarding their true intentions in space. In considering the costs and benefits of space weaponization, the United States must consider the effects it will have on its security relationship with foreign states. The United States should pay particular attention to the effect on relations with China, a potential future superpower with nuclear, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and ASAT capability, along with growing space programs. This article explores the range of possible interpretations of US policy and Chinese policy on space weaponization. I argue that although the United States cannot have full certainty about China’s space weapons program, it should proceed against the background of certain basic facts about China’s position. First, I argue that if the United States proceeds with space weaponization, China will respond with some form of its own military buildup. The extent of such a response is not certain, but a new arms race revolving around space warfare is not unthinkable. Second, China has already developed the means to attack some US satellites, and there is no guarantee that China does not seek to develop the means to launch a more robust space weapons or ASAT program. Members of Congress and the Department of Defense have responded to China’s increased space capacity and its January 2007 ASAT test by calling for renewed focus on US space policy and defense.

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***Code of Conduct CP***

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Text: The President of the United States should issue and executive order that offers a Code of Conduct to all space-faring nations that prohibits harmful interference against man-made space objects and reduces practices that contribute to the weaponization of space.

Code of conduct solves conflict and creates cooperation

Krepon 2k8 (Michael Krepon is the co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs, writer/editor of 13 books and over 350 articles, MA from Johns Hopkins in International Studies, BA from Franklin and Marshall College, “Space As A Strategic Asset Twilight War: The Folly Of U.S. Space Dominance, And The Politics Of Space Security: Strategic Restraint And The Pursuit Of National Interests,” The Non-Proliferation Review, November 1, 2008, Vol. 15 No. 3, 549-554)Johnson-Freese makes the case for a comprehensive U.S. space strategy that fosters cooperation with major space powers; this in turn requires moving away from a U.S. military doctrine of space control and reinforcing the peaceful uses of outer space. She acknowledges the possibility that the United States might need space weapons one day but concludes that the case for such weapons is not now compelling. This argument assumes, as Johnson-Freese believes, that China is willing to accept her vision of a cooperative future in space . The one scenario that stands most prominently in the way of this vision is a potential confrontation between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan. Johnson-Freese argues persuasively that national security is not the only driver for China’s space policy; other drivers are economic development and national pride. The United States and Soviet Union managed to carve out a zone of cooperation in space, but this was possible only during upswings in bilateral relations. U.S. space cooperation with China may well be possible under similar circumstances. Johnson-Freese advocates legally binding agreements to manage the security dilemma in space. In the interim, Johnson-Freese does not envision an arms race in space between the United States and China, since Beijing will pursue asymmetric responses to U.S. military plans. Consequently, if the Bush administration’s policies continue unabated, the United States will be ‘‘racing against itself.’’ But Beijing will be ‘‘hedging its bets’’ against the development of space weapons by the Pentagon. Johnson-Freese did not predict ASAT testing as part of this hedging strategy; neither did she rule this out. She resorts to occasional overstatement, as when referring to space weapons as ‘‘bright, shiny objects that the Bush administration seems fixated upon.’’ But overall, her book makes an informed and well-defended case that the Bush administration’s space policies could benefit from course corrections. Mike Moore’s book, Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance, is also written with lay readers in mind. Moore, a former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, writes with clarity and passion against the policy preferences of U.S. ‘‘space warriors.’’ Moore is interested primarily in the military uses of space, a narrower focus than Space as a Strategic Asset, but one that leaves room for many digressions about the history of airpower and U.S. exceptionalism, which he believes is one of the root causes of unwise U.S. military space policy. Some readers may take issue with the extent of these digressions; this reviewer learned from them. Moore doesn’t mince words. His central thesis is that the Bush administration’s space policy is not only ‘‘headed in the wrong direction,’’ but that the pursuit of space dominance is ‘‘a lulu of a mistake,’’ and that the initiation of military strikes in space by the United States ‘‘will guarantee conflict and, possibly, a new cold war.’’ He argues for ‘‘a new and unrelentingly tough space treaty’’ to ensure that no nation could dominate space. Moore contends that such a treaty, ‘‘if it is hardheaded enough’’ and if it is negotiated by ‘‘the most skeptical realists,’’ can be fully verifiable. It must also, in his view, contain ‘‘tough and certain’’ sanctions against violators. To enforce the treaty, he argues that signatories must be ‘‘unfailingly willing’’ to destroy the spaceports of states that violate treaty provisions.

Code of conduct solves space weaponization --- other countries want multilateral agreements

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Krepon 2k7 (Michael, Co-founder and contributor to the Stimson Center “Will the Bush Administration Endorse a Space Code of Conduct?”, 3/5, Space News, http:www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=402)Support is growing for a specific kind of multilateral space agreement that borrows heavily from the Bush administration’s own preferences. The mechanism in question is a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations that could either take the form of political compacts or executive agreements among like-minded states that wish to continue to enjoy the national security and economic benefits that satellites provide. Like the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative, a Code of Conduct for space could be designed by a core group of states to clarify responsible and irresponsible behavior. The core group might then invite any other spacefaring nation that wishes to abide by these high standards to join the group. The European Union has now joined Canada in endorsing a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations. The commercial satellite industry also has expressed a strong interest in “rules of the road” for space. The Bush administration has further distanced itself from America’s friends and allies by continuing to insist that new multilateral agreements related to space are “unnecessary and counterproductive.” No other nation in the world has adopted such a negative stance. Saying “hell no” to new multilateral agreements for space seems particularly questionable after China’s irresponsible test of an anti-satellite (A-Sat) weapon that endangers spaceflight in low Earth orbit for decades to come. George Washington’s farewell address warned against indulging in “habitual hatred” resulting in a slavish animosity that leads the United States to “stray from its duty and interest.” Rejecting a Code of Conduct for space because it smacks of arms control would seem to violate Washington’s sound admonition. The Bush administration has not yet taken a position towards a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations. Because rules of the road for space make so much sense, and because the Bush administration has championed other codes of conduct to prevent proliferation, it might still join in the emerging consensus on this issue. The administration’s reasoning against new multilateral agreements for space boils down to five arguments, none of which applies to the Code of Conduct. First, administration officials argue that there is no likelihood of an arms race in space, therefore, there is no need for new multilateral arrangements. It is true that an arms race is unlikely, since arms racing has now been replaced by asymmetric warfare. But an arms race is not needed to do lasting damage to space, as the Chinese A-Sat test demonstrated. We can now see clearly that it takes very few kinetic energy kill tests and A-Sat weapons to result in significant damage to low Earth orbit. New diplomatic initiatives are needed precisely because an arms race isn’t needed to prevent the peaceful uses of outer space. The second argument advanced by the Bush administration is that arms control is a vestige of the Cold War and not terribly relevant to contemporary security concerns. Again, there is partial truth in this argument, because classic arms control arrangements dealt with a superpower competition that ended with the demise of the Soviet Union. What used to be known as arms control has now morphed into cooperative threat reduction agreements, including rules of the road clarifying responsible behavior. Semantic arguments aside, the administration has itself championed multilateral agreements in the form of codes of conduct to prevent proliferation, such as The Hague Code of Conduct, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative. We do not have to argue over whether these codes of conduct constitute arms control to conclude that these creative arrangements were sensible initiatives. A Code of Conduct for space also would be quite useful in making the Chinese kinetic-kill A-Sat test the very last of its kind. If codes of conduct relating to missiles and exports make sense for preventing proliferation – and do not, in the Bush administration’s vocabulary, constitute arms control – then surely a code of conduct also makes sense for activities in space. After all, troubling activities in space also could prompt vertical and horizontal proliferation on the ground. The third argument that the Bush administration advances against new diplomatic initiatives for space activity is that there can be no agreed to definition of what constitutes “space weapons.” Moreover, verification is extremely problematic. Consequently, no multilateral agreement can be negotiated barring such weapons. The administration is correct in pointing to the difficulties in defining and verifying space weapons. A code of conduct, however, focuses on activities, not on definitions of what constitutes a space weapon. For example, one key element of a Code of Conduct would surely be that responsible spacefaring nations do not engage in activities that deliberately produce persistent space debris, such as the Chinese A-Sat test. This key element makes it unnecessary to define space weapons, since actions, not definitions, lie at the core of a rules of the road approach. Verification of noncompliance with this key element is quite straightforward, since it is very hard

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to hide the deliberate generation of persistent space debris. The fourth argument advanced by the Bush administration to oppose new diplomatic initiatives for space is that the United States must preserve its right to self-defense – including the right to defend space assets. This argument is certainly valid, but it doesn’t justify rejecting a Code of Conduct. With such a code, the United States still would possess more capabilities than ever before to deter and, if necessary, punish states that take actions against U.S. satellites. The right of self-defense, however, is more likely to be invoked, and will be more difficult to execute, if there are no agreed rules of the road for outer space. Lastly, the Bush administration contends that new diplomatic initiatives are unwise because U.S. freedom of action in space must not be constrained. By this standard, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, President Ronald Reagan’s Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and President George H. W. Bush’s Strategic Arms Reduction treaties were all dreadful errors in judgment, since every one of these agreements limit the U.S. military’s freedom of action in some key respects. Using the Bush administration’s reasoning, the Geneva Conventions for U.S. armed forces also are unwise, as are codes of conduct long in place for the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and gravity-bound Air Force. If freedom of action were the topmost U.S. national security objective, we would ditch all of these treaties and codes of conduct. Of course, no responsible political leader or public official would consider doing this. So why should we use this standard to oppose new diplomatic initiatives in space?

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Solvency: U.S. Leadership

U.S. Action Key To Developing Rules Of The Road, U.S. Leadership In This Area Key

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfIn this environment of mounting political and economic pressures, a principal objective of the United States should be to maintain a leadership role in all aspects of human activity in space. One way or another, rules of the road for national activities in space will evolve to account for the phenomenal growth in its importance for both the military and commerce. For much of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union wrote these rules-first by actual practice, and then by leading the process of codifying them into treaties and international agreements. Other nations have, as has been shown, achieved modest success in influencing international practice and law on space, particularly in the allocation of geosynchronous orbital slots and radio frequencies. But the failure of the Moon treaty and other efforts to circumscribe the activities of the major space powers shows the importance of a major and continuous U.S. presence in space to writing the rules in such a way as to promote (or at least not hinder) American interests there. Thus, the most important order of business for the United States in the years immediately ahead is to maintain and build upon its status as the leading spacefaring nation. This not a new aspiration. As John Logsdon has pointed out, "the quest for leadership has been a central feature of U.S. space policy from the very beginning."105However, the objective is changing. During the Cold War, leadership in space was perceived by senior American leaders to be an important element in a multifaceted competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the rest of the world. Demonstrated accomplishment in space was thought to confer prestige that translated into international influence writ large. Today, leadership in space assumes a different, more focused dimension as the best means of influencing the evolution of the international regime in space in response to clearly emerging political, economic, and military challenges.

U.S. Leadership In Development Of Rules Of The Road Critical To Maintaining Its Space Superiority**

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfHeated disputes have erupted over the placement of satellites into specific operating locations in space. The proliferation of communication, remote sensing, and perhaps even navigation satellites suggests that such disputes may be even more likely in the future. For most of the space age, the two superpowers dominated the process of establishing the "rules of the road" for space by virtue of their unique capabilities and presence there. As more nations and international consortia launch and operate satellites in space, American preeminence will be subject to increasing challenge. The study thus concludes that the most important task facing American space policy in the immediate future is to sustain the nation's historical leadership in space in order to ensure the establishment of standards and rules for space that support American objectives. To this end, particular attention must be paid to developing low-cost access to space, promoting a dynamic domestic space industry, and achieving greater focus and unity of purpose in the formulation of U.S. space policy.

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Solvency: U.S. LeadershipU.S. Leadership Key To Managing Growth Of Space Industry

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfUnlike the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the Moon treaty garnered little support. The agreement was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1979, but it took five years to obtain the ratifications needed for it to enter into force. To date, only eight countries have actually ratified the treaty. None of the major space powers have done so; the United States has not even signed it. A major objection to the Moon treaty is that it actually discourages any development of resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and thus removes a compelling reason for humans to eventually return there or to journey even farther into space. Since the costs and risks of mounting expeditions to these forbidding locations would be so enormous, no public or private entity would be willing to assume them if it was subsequently forced to share any returns with nations that had absolutely nothing to do with the venture. Moreover, the treaty had almost no natural constituency. Mining on the Moon is generally considered to be a distant prospect and not an issue that generates much enthusiasm even among interest groups that routinely deal with resource development issues.93(However, recent discoveries that suggest substantial quantities of frozen water may exist on the Moon have rekindled interest in returning there.)94With the collapse of the Moon treaty, the U.N. system has largely been marginalized as a force in developing international space law. COPUOS and its two subcommittees continue to address such issues as the definition and delimitation of space, geosynchronous orbit, remote sensing, space debris, and nuclear power sources in space. Yet, despite lengthy discussion and the drafting of weighty reports, no major agreements on space have emerged from within the United Nations for nearly two decades. Thus, in the final analysis, the attempts within multilateral fora and bilateral discussions to place some limits on the unrestricted use of space have had little impact on the ability of the American military or companies to operate in space. In part, this is a result of continued American leadership in the field and the corresponding ability to set the agenda and write the rules.95Whether the United States will continue to be as influential is by no means certain. More nations are becoming involved in space. To date, nine countries and one international organization (the European Space Agency) have actually launched satellites into orbit. Several other nations are developing indigenous launch systems and many more own and operate satellites launched by other nations or commercial launch services. The development of alternative, lower cost launch technologies may lead to the proliferation of space launch capabilities just as the commercial aircraft industry has enabled virtually every country to operate a modern airline fleet. As the number of launches and payloads in orbit rises sharply over the next decade, the technical challenges of operating in space will require a good deal more coordination among nations. The perceived crowding in the geosynchronous belt led to acceptance of the ITU's regulation of slots and frequencies--a mutually agreed to restriction, but a restriction nonetheless. At present, there are few international mechanisms for managing routine "traffic" to and from space, coordinating the placement of satellites into low Earth orbit (which will become increasingly crowded as the large telecommunication satellite constellations become operational), or dealing with common "environmental" issues--such as the proliferation of space debris from spent boosters and defunct satellites. The need to manage these new issues will no doubt give impetus to new international regulatory mechanisms for space. The best course of action for the United States would be to remain at the forefront of this process to ensure the outcomes do not unduly impinge upon its activities in space. Its success in doing so will in turn depend upon its continued leadership in space-both military and commercial-and the ability to articulate and pursue a coherent space policy in its dealing with other nations.

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Solvency: Rules Of The Road Good

Erosion Of U.S. Leadership In Establishing Space Norms Is A Greater Threat To Security Than Enemy Space Weapons**

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfAccordingly, some American officials have become increasingly concerned with ensuring U.S. access to space and protecting the substantial investment there. Thus far, the public discourse on the subject has focused on the national security implications of the increasing dependence on space, and a corresponding concern with protecting friendly space systems and denying an adversary access to similar capabilities. These are important issues that are ripe for discussion, particularly as the United States continues to define its military requirements in the new, post-Cold War strategic environment. Accordingly, this study addresses the military dimensions in some detail. To set the stage, it first recounts the public history of American and Soviet antisatellite systems at the height of the Cold War and the political debate that surrounded them in the 1980s. It then describes and evaluates more recent military thinking on alternative approaches to protecting U.S. national security and economic interests in space in the next century. The military dimension is, however, only one part of the story. The more fundamental issues surrounding American interests in space are far broader in scope. For the greater part of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated all human activities in space. As the only players in the game, they literally wrote the "rules of the road" for space, both by their practices and in their proposals for international agreements. Key among these rules was unfettered access to space and noninterference with national activities in space. Both countriesin fact pursued their respective civil and military space programs with remarkable freedom and few, if any, restrictions imposed by others. More recently, the emergence of additional "spacefaring" nations and the growing importance of space to the global economy have resulted in political and economic challenges to the preeminent position of the major space powers. In the long run, these challenges could pose a more worrisome "threat" to American interests in space than any nascent military capability to deliberately disrupt American or allied space capabilities. The second half of this study thus examines political and economic developments affecting American access to and use of space. It concludes with a discussion of steps the United States can and should take to maintain its status as the preeminent space power-in all its dimensions-so that it can continue to lead the process of setting standards and writing the rules for space in ways that support U.S. interests there.

Commercial/Political Challenges To U.S. Space Dominance Are A Far Greater Challenge

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999,

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfWhile the preceding analysis has focused primarily on the military aspects of protecting the new lines of communications in space, the more immediate and potentially more worrisome threats to American use of space are in fact political and economic in nature. For most of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union--by virtue of the level of their activity and their presence-dominated space and, in the process, wrote the rules of the road for national activities there. Key among these rules was free and unimpeded access to space. However, as the potential economic benefits of space have become more apparent and the number of players in the game has expanded, the preeminent position of the major space powers has been challenged. The net result has been calls for limits on the use of space by the space powers and, in some cases, the mutual acceptance of restrictions on totally unfettered access to space. So far, these have been relatively modest.

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Avoidance Of Commercial Barriers Key To U.S. Space Leadership

Klotz ‘99Frank G. Klotz, Council on Foreign Relations, SPACE, COMMERCE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, January 1999,

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdfIn summary, the most immediate task for the United States in the years ahead is to sustain and extend its leadership in the increasingly intertwined fields of military and commercial space. This requires a robust and continuous presence in space, which in turn depends upon ready and affordable access to orbit. As was the case with the great seafaring and air power nations of history, this presence will be provided in the first instance by large fleets of commercial launchers and satellites providing a variety of products and services to the nation and the global economy. At the same time, the commercial space industry will supply much of the know-how and many of the capabilities the military needs to conduct operations on or near the earth's surface-and in space. With this end in mind, every effort should be made to reduce the regulatory and bureaucratic impediments to a flourishing space industry. An essential step in doing so, however, is to reduce the institutional barriers that stand in the way of a coherent national space policy that nurtures not only the nation's space capabilities, but confronts America's competitors and rivals with a strong and united voice.

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Solvency: Rules Of The Road Solve

Rules Of The Road Are A Good First Step

Hitchens 2k5Theresa Hitchens, Vice President, Center for Defense Information, The Weaponization of Space: Implications for U.S. National Security, Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7998/weaponization_of_space.htmlBut there are proposals out there for rules of the road along the Incidents at Sea Agreements, and that—Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center has written extensively on this. He’s written a booklet where he actually took—and I worked on this with his organization—and what he did was take the various provisions in the Incidents at Sea Agreement and the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement and parsed them to where they could fit with space operations. For example, no—you know, you stay a certain amount—distance away from a ship at sea when you’re doing maneuvers, so you don’t buzz your aircraft over the top of somebody’s ship when, you know—so there are certain things that can be applied to space, like the distance issue, like notifying people if your satellite—your launch is going to—your satellite trajectory is going to come very, very close to their own orbiting asset.That’s not—it’s actually not difficult, and it would—that kind of agreement, I think, as the first step, would be a great thing, because it would reduce tensions, it would provide more transparency, and it would allow people to feel a bit better and build that trust that we were talking about. So that’s another way of doing that.

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Solvency: 2NC

Russia and China wanted to ban space based weapons, but the treaty didn’t happen because Bush wanted to keep the missle defense program

Van Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)On 27 June 2002, Russia submitted a Russia–China working paper for a new space treaty to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Their proposed treaty would complement existing agreements with respect to space: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibits weapons of mass destruction from space; the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which bans nuclear tests in space; and four others: the Astronauts Rescue Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration Convention of 1976, and the Moon Agreement of 1984. The proposed obligations in the Russia–China draft treaty are: ‘Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner’; and ‘not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects’. In short, the proposed treaty would ban any kind of space-based weapons, not just weapons of mass destruction which are already banned by the 1967 treaty; and it would obligate all countries not to threaten or use the ASAT weapons that the US, Russia, and China all currently possess. Not surprisingly, the Bush administration was not eager to engage with Russia and China about this proposal which called for a ban on precisely what President Bush wanted to do: deploy space-based missile defence weapons to orbit the earth in order to dominate outer space.

Use Of Asats Destroys Everyone’s Satellites, So No One Will Use Them; Cuban War Proves – This Makes A Treaty Possible.

Van Ness From The Department Of International Relations And The School Of International, Political And Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

US, China, and Russia all have the capability to attack and destroy each others’ satellites, but if they did attack, they would very likely destroy their own use of satellites in space—so, in that sense, an attack would be suicidal. One answer with regard to the protection of satellites might be to use the analogy of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both the US and the USSR realised that they had weapons that could not be used, and they agreed with each other to begin to limit their use. They maintained the capacity to use them, but realised that any use would be counter-productive. If the US and China began to think about their ASAT capabilities in these terms, agreement could be reached to limit the testing, deployment, and use of ASAT weapons.

We Shouldn’t Militarize To Respond To China- Leads To Space Arms Race – We Should Purse A Treaty That Bans Weapons In Space

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Macdonald, Master’s Degrees In Aerospace Engineering And International Affairs, And Ferguson, A Fellow For Science And Technology At The Council On Foreign Relations, ‘07(Bruce and Charles, 1-22, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?start=52&sort=RELEVANCE&format=GNBFI&risb=21_T12346495349, Christian Science Monitor, “Responding to China's antisatellite test”, LexisNexis, Rishi Shah)

China's provocative test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon last week shines a spotlight on the long- overlooked national security issue of space weapons. Given the substantial US dependence on civilian and military satellites, the successful test's implications are troubling for US security - and relations with China. Before taking any hasty action, it would be prudent for the U nited S tates to think hard about how to react to this worrisome Chinese move. For years, Beijing has called for banning space weapons, but the test flies in the face of this rhetoric. Washington and other governments are right to decry the test. However, it may reflect the logic the US used in the early 1980s when it deployed medium-range missiles in Europe to encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate limits on these weapons. Ironically, had the US conducted this test, it would have been entirely consistent with its newly revised policy that places greater emphasis on offensive space capabilities. For several years, the Bush administration has signaled its interest in attaining antisatellite capabilities and has openly rejected any interest in legal agreements that could restrict countries from acquiring these capabilities. While China, Russia, and the US have demonstrated these capabilities, any country with a ballistic missile program could develop an antisatellite weapon. "There is no arms race in space and we see no signs of one emerging," said Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph last month. That remark is now probably moot, but America should pause before reacting with a demonstration of its own. Negotiating restrictions on space weapons may be a better path forward. China's test wasn't exactly a surprise. In Beijing last November, Chinese security experts told one of us that China was worried about US space policy and Washington's apparent unwillingness to consider mutual restrictions on offensive space weapons. They warned that China would respond with countermeasures if the US continued to refuse negotiations on these weapons. At the very least, the US should consider a global ban on precisely the kind of weapon that China has demonstrated. Apart from this technology's military significance, weapons like these produce huge amounts of orbital debris that can damage all satellites and remain in orbit for many years - a dangerous legacy for all spacefaring nations. The US could maintain many offensive options for space, if desirable, and still seek to ban weapons that create debris, just as the US and former Soviet Union agreed to ban atmospheric nuclear tests for environmental reasons in 1963 while still maintaining their ability to test nuclear weapons. The US response to China should take a mix of military and diplomatic steps: * Make it clear to China that its ASAT test has damaged US-China relations and that more tests will have important economic and other consequences. * Accelerate programs to protect its satellites against ASAT weapons of all kinds, including lasers. * Perform a thorough assessment of possible threats to its space assets, and the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them. * Reexamine its unwillingness to discuss limits on space weaponry. Washington loses nothing by talking, and it hardly serves its interests for a technologically advancing China to attain an antisatellite arsenal. * Recognize that a space-arms competition could have unwanted consequences. America stands at a critical space-weapons threshold. Whatever steps it takes, it should carefully weigh its options, mindful that once the US and China cross this space Rubicon, they may never be able to cross back.

Treaty key to future space development.Van Ness from the Department of International Relations and the School of International, Political and Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)

From a positive perspective, we would propose to affirm a global commons for all to enjoy, keeping in mind that if we failed to reach agreement, a conflict in space could destroy the major benefits, both commercial and military, that we now enjoy, plus the potential benefits of future development. This would be an immense loss of all the ways that we communicate with each other today, the way that we navigate, and of course the way that governments spy on each other. Proponents of weaponising space have not yet taken into account the full dimensions of this serious risk. Ban space-based weapons It is important at the outset to distinguish space-based weapons from landbased weapons capable of attacking space.

US key to banning space weapons, Blazejewski, Masters degree in public affairs, Advanced JD Degree, ’08

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(Kenneth, Spring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly cdg)

However, unilateral defensive actions must not come at the cost of multilateral diplomatic progress. I argue that the United States should take a proactive role in developing international rules for the military use of outer space. The United States can use its significant international influence to shape rules that preserve its national interests, such as deploying a limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) system but placing a ban on the testing of ASAT weapons.

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1NC Politics Net Benefit

And, the counterplan avoids politics – it is an executive order that avoids scrutiny

Kueter 2k11 (Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939 //ef)The United States Constitution reserves for the U.S. Senate the right to provide advice and consent on all treaties entered into by the United States. Proponents of the Code are quick to point out that it is not a treaty , and therefore, would not require the advice and consent of the Senate. Once signed, a treaty is “implemented” domestically through legislation passed by the Congress adjusting U.S. law, budgets, and programs to comply with the treaty’s requirements. For an international agreement, like the Code, how it is implemented is less clear. The most probable and efficient tool is the executive order. The President simply will sign an order detailing general or specific steps departments and agencies must take to comply with the Code. Such an order is not formerly reviewed, certainly is not subject to Senate approval , and may even be classified so as to escape public scrutiny and notice altogether. Presidential executive agreement authority is important and arguments favoring wide latitude for allowing executive discretion can be made persuasively. But the tool can be misused and its use to advance poorly constructed policy ideas is particularly problematic.

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1NC Net Benefit

Unilateral weaponization will cause arms races and nuclear war --- cooperation solves

Blank et al. 2k8 (Stephen Blank – Prof. at the US Army War College, Ethan Burger – adjunct prof at the Georgetown Law Center, Eugene Kolesnikov – Netherland Consultant, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: A New Arms Race?” http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Experts'+Panel&articleid=a1221842130#1)What is Russia’s leadership up to? Is Moscow indicating its readiness to engage the West in a new arms race or in a new round of cooperation? Are there any preconditions for a new arms race? Or is Moscow signaling that it is prepared to work with the West constructively, provided that Russia’s interests are respected? How will the West read these seemingly conflicting signals from Russia? Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands: The arms race during the Cold War was about maintaining full parity between two irreconcilable ideologies and socio-economic systems. The arrangement of the world governance system and related military potentials during that era was quite simple: it consisted of two competing camps and a collection of non-aligned countries that were either too big to swallow or too unimportant to worry about. The military forces of the non-aligned block were not threatening the status quo between the big players. After the peaceful disbanding of the Soviet empire, a very short period of disarmament ensued. The United States and Western Europe started to reduce their armies and arsenals on the premise that a new benign world order was in the offing, while Russia largely neglected its military, being completely preoccupied with the economic, social and political devastation. Only parity in the nuclear “mutually assured destruction” was maintained. This brief interlude, having excited the pacifists and believers in the post-modern world order based on supranational interests, ended as abruptly as it started. The United States single-mindedly embarked on a new mission of imposing a U.S.-centric democratic world hegemony, underpinned, not surprisingly, by military force. The ABM treaty was scrapped, the “star wars” concept was dusted off, space military predominance was declared a vital U.S. interest, NATO rushed to the countries around Russia, Iraq was invaded, the EU countries were continuously pressured into increasing their NATO military budgets, and Japan was encouraged to graduate from its anti-war policies and increase its offensive military capability. This “unipolar” moment, however, did not last long. Four major factors started to determine the course of militarization around the world, while U.S. policymakers were still congratulating each other on the great opportunities that the unipolar moment offered for the planet. These four major factors were the rise of China, the revival of Russia, fast economic growth in Asia and South America and a sense of insecurity setting in everywhere as a result of the collapse of the bi-polar world, as well as the United States’ inability to be the world policeman and security guarantor—made abundantly clear by the U.S. failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The world as a whole has taken to arms. This time, however, the race is fueled by different goals. America wants to maintain its military predominance. China and Russia are re-arming as fast as they can without hurting economic growth, to be able to defend their sovereign status. Enriched Asian countries are snapping up arms to secure their positions vis-?-vis each other and the rising China. South American regimes are doing a similar thing. And now the EU is seriously thinking about creating its own military capability. The world has become more insecure and arguably much more dangerous than it was during the second half of the 20th century. In this context, Russia is undeniably in the arms race, but the race is not about achieving full parity with the United States. It is about catching up with the advances in military technology and re-building military forces for the purposes of securing Russia's independence, particularly vis-?-vis the United States and China. The unfortunate aspect of modern militarization is that it is likely to transform into a truly Cold-War-type mode as far as anti-ballistic defense systems and space militarization are concerned. Despite the sense of superiority that overwhelmed the U.S. establishment, it must realize that a country with only three percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of the world’s GDP cannot maintain a 50 percent share of the world’s military spending forever. This realization is the true reason behind the American plans for global anti-ballistic missile defense and space militarization. The United States believes that over the next two to three decades, it can beat the others (Russia and China) in these spheres and gain a decisive strategic military advantage. Both Russia and China will do everything possible to thwart this vital threat. A frightening Cold-War-type arms race to counter the U.S. missile defense systems and militarization of space is about to take off in earnest, unless the United States gives in to the Russian and Chinese demands to leave the nuclear and space parity alone. This arms race is perhaps as dangerous as the Cold War one. This time, however, the trigger is in the hands of only one party –the U.S. establishment. Unfortunately, the signs are that the United States is already pulling the trigger. With the price for a barrel of oil dropping to about $100, foreign direct and

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portfolio investment in the country plummeting, and the Russian infrastructure deteriorating, the Russian government can ill-afford a new arms race. Similarly, given the size of the U.S. budgetary and trade deficits, adding more defense spending to an already huge defense budget would create major funding problems for key domestic programs, and would be difficult to justify politically.

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***Joint Working Group CP***

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CP Joint working group to ban ASAT TestingCP solves

Van Ness from the Department of International Relations and the School of International, Political and Stratigic Studies, 10(Peter, August, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/wps/anu/0019647/f_0019647_16771.pdf, “The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space”, Australian National University, CIAO, cmh)Verification would be very difficult. The emphasis should be on banning the testing of ASATs. As mentioned before, the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty might be a good model. The US, Russia, and the PRC all have demonstrated ASAT capabilities (just as the US and the USSR both had demonstrated nuclear capabilities in 1963), but now they would agree to ban the further testing of those capabilities because they could perceive it to be in both their separate national interests to do so, as well as in the global interest. Obviously, there would be many specifics that would have to be worked out. A working group We should begin at the unofficial level, bringing together specialists on the many dimensions of this problem, especially people who are committed to finding a way to avoid an arms race in space. It should be a joint, US and Chinese , group of experts with any others included who may have good ideas. It should not be an official negotiation—at least not yet. It should be a Track II meeting of people who have the skills and experience to work together to design an agreement that just might work. The Russians need not be included at the outset, because they have neither the political will nor the resources to engage in an arms race in space, but as an important spacefaring nation they would obviously want to participate in any future treaty. If China and the US, the two countries most in contention about weapons in space, can reach agreement for a ban, it would be easier to include Russia and other countries in a subsequent treaty or code of conduct. Finally, Australia and all countries have a stake in helping China and the US find agreement to avoid an arms race in space. Australia is particularly fortunate to have good relations with both countries and many opportunities to debate, discuss, and possibly help design agreements of mutual benefit.

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***Asset Protection CP***

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CP Solves

The United States should improve it’s protection of space assets

Blazejewski, Masters degree in public affairs, Advanced JD Degree, ’08 (Kenneth, Spring, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly cdg)Last fall, Cong. Terry Everett, the Ranking Republican member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, in an article pre- viously published in this journal entitled “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy,” referred to China’s ASAT test as a “clear wake- up call for the Administration, Congress, and the American people.”4 I agree with the congressman that China’s actions require a clear response from the United States. This response must include some of the unilateral defensive actions that the congressman calls for, including the develop- ment of a comprehensive space protection strategy and improvement of space situational awareness.

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***Treaty CP***

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CP Treaties and counter measuresText: The USFG should pursue treaties, reduce dependence on space systems, develop counter measures, and maintain the ability to deploy space weapons beginning with less provocative weapons.

CP solves

Hyten, Is The Director Of The Commander's Action Group, Air Force Space Command And Uy, Who Is A Member Of The Institute For Defense Analysis's Research Staff ’04 (6-1, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare”, Air and Space Power Journal, John E Hyten has a BA from Harvard University and a MBA from Auburn University. Robert V. Uy has a BSE, University of Michigan; BA, University of Canterbury; MS and PhD, California Institute of Technology. LexisNexis. Rishi Shah)Numerous think tanks, educational institutions, and individuals have put a great amount of thought and effort into defining the debate between space sanctuary and weaponization. In the winter 1998 issue of Airpower Journal, Lt Col Bruce DeBlois published an article that has become a lightning rod for debate on both sides of the issue. His article, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy," argued that it was in the best interest of the United States to pursue a sanctuary strategy and that a strategy of weaponization was flawed in a number of ways. He outlined four strategy-implementation elements that he felt would best position the United States for dealing with the future challenges in space. Specifically, DeBlois argued that the United States should (1) pursue intense diplomatic efforts to develop treaties and agreements to preserve the sanctuary of space, (2) develop strategic alternatives to our current force structure to reduce our dependence on a relatively small number of critical space systems that inherently provide a vulnerability, (3) develop passive hide-and-seek protective measures to protect our critical space assets, and (4) maintain the technical ability to develop and deploy space weapons should the need arise, preferably beginning with "the lesser provocative earth-to-space weapons." [Note 5]

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***K Work***

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K Links

Weapons in space construct the identity of the US as the global sovereign and strips the sovereignty from other states.

Duvall, Ph.D., Professor in Political Science at the University of Minnesota, and Havercroft, Ph.D., Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, ‘08(Raymond, Jonathan, http://search.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/docview/204895195/1308A553C3049A3BB22/10?accountid=12598, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future,” Review of International Studies No. 34, 755–775, MWH)

In the third section, we develop the primary argument of the article: space weapons under the control of a single state logically constitute a new structure of imperial power through the counteracting forces of centralisation of sovereign power and deterritorialisation of sovereignty. Specifically, we explore the constitutive effects of each of the three types of space weapons discussed in section two. As many critics have argued, space-based missile defence undermines the logic of deterrence by simultaneously reinscribing the territorial borders of the United States and stripping from all other states the ability to deter attacks from the United States through missile-based retaliation. Space control, in denying potential adversaries access, privatises the commons of orbital space for (US) commercial and strategic interests, thereby expanding the frontier of American empire into low-earth orbit. Finally, force application from space enables the US as sole possessor of such weapons to project lethal force to any target, at any location on Earth, on very short notice. In addition to exploring the constitutive effects of each of these specific space weapons programmes separately, we consider, most importantly, their conjoint effects in constituting a new, historically unprecedented, type of global political rule, which is simultaneously centralised but deterritorialised – sovereign empire of the future. In the final section of the article we conclude with a consideration of two types of implications of our constitutive analysis. First are implications for currently influential theories of empire and imperialism, which in our view should be revised to accommodate the constitutional logic of empire of the future. Second are implications for the possible – and the desirable – modes of resistance to this emerging imperial form. We wish to be clear that we are not technological determinists; nor do we believe that the constitutive logics of such weapons are so overpowering as to prevent any possibility of resistance.6 Just as other military technologies, such as airpower and precision-guided munitions, have proven vulnerable to low-technology strategies aimed at neutralising their efficacy, space-based weapons systems may also be vulnerable to similar counter-measures. With that in mind, but also cognisant of the inordinate capacity of the possessor of space weapons to counter opposition, our article concludes by examining how resistance and insurgency might be practiced in anticipation of and under a future global regime of space-based empire. 6 For a technological determinist argument about space weapons see David Baker, The Shape of Wars to Come (Cambridge, MA: Patrick Stephens, 1981). He argues that an inevitable consequence of the development of technologies for space exploration is weapons in space. For a critique of such technological determinism, see Sanford Lakoff and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). They argue that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a classic example of misplaced faith in technological salvation. Behind President Reagan’s SDI is ‘the fallacy of the last move’. In a technological arms race it is dubious to believe that there is a final move to end it. Taking sovereignty out of this world 757

SDI 11File Title

Framework

We have to consider the ethical and moral implications of space weapons before adopting new policies.

Hyten, Is The Director Of The Commander's Action Group, Air Force Space Command And Uy, Who Is A Member Of The Institute For Defense Analysis's Research Staff ’04 (6-1, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, “Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare”, Air and Space Power Journal, John E Hyten has a BA from Harvard University and a MBA from Auburn University. Robert V. Uy has a BSE, University of Michigan; BA, University of Canterbury; MS and PhD, California Institute of Technology. LexisNexis. Rishi Shah)

One example of asymmetric advantage can be found in a quick examination of the US special operations forces (SOF)--the troops that "own the night." Through high levels of training in the application of night vision and other technologies, these forces have developed a capability that gives them enormous tactical advantage in the field. However, this advantage is increasingly being challenged by the sale of low-cost night vision devices that are available on the commercial market. Is this bad? Is it necessary for America to take every opportunity to apply technology to gain and maintain a battlefield advantage over potential adversaries? Or are there circumstances where it would be in the best interests of the United States not to pursue such an advantage? Some might argue that vast advantages in capabilities make it easier to engage in an "electronic stay-at-home war," neither suffering combat losses nor sharing sacrifice. A more level playing field, one that puts American forces at greater risk, might make the United States think twice before engaging in hostilities and having to pay that terrible price. It has been argued that shared sacrifice and the loss of untold lives on both sides of a conflict make for an easier peace at the cessation of hostilities. However, as evidenced by the conflicts of the twentieth century, shared sacrifice and loss have not made people more averse to war and have not made the world a "kinder, gentler" place. A lasting peace has been, and remains, elusive. The United States has not always pursued an asymmetric advantage. Although America recently celebrated the centennial of the Wright brothers' first flight, it should be remembered that just 15 years after that American first, the air forces of every other major nation that participated in the First World War were numerically and technically superior. [Note 11] In 1904 an American, Benjamin Holt, implemented the first use of Caterpillar tracks; his application was for farm machinery, but it was the British who applied his innovation to armored vehicles. [Note 12] Both the airplane and the tank eventually helped break the stalemate and mass slaughter of trench warfare--few have questioned the morality and ethics of incorporating these new technologies. The method chosen to gain space superiority in recent conflicts has been a lethal attack on the enemy's ground stations and/or ground systems. What will be our preferred method to establish our control of space in the next conflict? The answer to this question must include more than the perspective of just what is most effective. Leaders and planners must also consider the moral and ethical issues of asymmetric advantage and their effects on the idea of space sanctuary. What kind of military response would allied commanders prefer? The traditional answer is to respond with lethal force against ground targets in a way that eliminates an enemy's access to space and preserves the sanctuary of space. However, this is fraught with many problems, as evidenced in the previous examples. First, attacking the ground system will not guarantee the desired effect on the battlefield. Today, before a conflict begins, enemies can implement redundancy into their infrastructure, making it difficult to destroy the network's ability to function; the Iraqis built in infrastructure redundancy and preserved access to their satellite communication network during OIF. Although coalition forces identified and destroyed, with little collateral damage, what they believed to be the Iraqi satellite system's critical antenna, the Iraqis stayed on the air; Saddam Hussein continued to communicate propaganda to the world and directions to his army, putting our forces at risk. Another risk was illustrated by the OAF example previously discussed in this article: no matter how good the intelligence and how careful the military planning, the employment of lethal force runs the risk of inflicting collateral damage and causing noncombatant civilian casualties. The political fallout from those casualties--lost domestic support, lost international support, split coalitions, legal complaints, and so forth--may be more damaging than the possible gains that would accrue from a successful attack.