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LIFEBOUY – LEVIATHAN OR LEGEND Mr. Partho Sen, the brand manager of Lifebuoy toilet soap was a worried man. Lifebouy is the biggest toilet soap in the Indian market (also probably the world). It is owned by Hindustan Levers Ltd. (HLL), the Indian subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch consumer products major, Unilever. At 110000 tons annually, Lifebouy is still the biggest toilet soap in the country. But in the last 6 years Lifebouy lost market share. Some of the tonnage, of course, went to Lifebouy’s brand extensions. But there were concerns about the brand’s long term prospects. The chief source of worry was the growing power of archrival Nirma Chemical Works. Its brands Nirma Beauty and Nirma Bath were making a dent into a market that was traditionally Lifebuoy’s. Other competitors were also getting active. A concerned Mr.Sen was looking at a consultant’s report that detailed Lifebuoy’s story.

STATUS REPORT ON LIFEBOUY

This report outlines how Lifebuoy might steadily lose dominance in the toilet soap market, if it does not act rapidly. The toilet soap market is Rs. 45 billion (Note: 1$ is approximately equal to 48 Indian Rs.) by value and 540,000 tons by volume annually. There are 3 easily identifiable segments in this market. The first is called the carbolic or economy segment containing soaps like Lifebouy that constitutes 42% of the toilet soap market’s volume. The second segment is called popular segment and features several soaps ranging from Nirma Beauty to Lux contributing to 44%. This segment is medium priced. There is evidence that the popular segment is growing at the expense of the economy segment. The segment above this is called premium segment and has soaps like Liril, International Lux, Pears and Dove. The minimum market share needed to be a successful brand in the premium, popular and carbolic segments is 5,000 tons, 10,000 tons and 15,000 tons respectively. HLL is still clearly the leader in all the segments and many of its soaps satisfy this basic criterion of success. But its leadership is being seriously threatened by competitors like Nirma. HINDUSTAN LEVERS LTD. HLL is the Indian subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch Unilever Group. It is an organization respected for its marketing skills in India. It has constantly produced brands relevant to the customer and marketed them with finesse. HLL has business interests in several consumer product categories like soaps, detergents, personal care products, coffee, tea and oil in India. Besides it caters to business-to-business markets like animal feed and specialty chemicals. Its annual sales turnover is Rs 106 billion (Financial Express, Apr 27, 2001, pg 4). Soaps account for 18% of HLL’s turnover. It has a portfolio of over 75 brands in India, many of which are market leaders. Red Label tea, Kwality-Walls Ice Cream, Surf and Wheel detergent powder, Clinic Plus and Sunsilk shampoo are some of HLL’s more famous brands. Among soaps it owns celebrated brands like Dove, Liril, Breeze, Pears, Rexona, Lux, Lifebuoy, Jai and Hamam. Its soap brands are balanced geographically thereby protecting its overall position in the country. For instance, Lifebouy is strong in the North, while Rexona and Hamam are strong in the South. It advertises its brands so extensively that it buys media space, wholesale from TV broadcasters. Presently HLL is the largest marketer of soaps in India and has a share of 58% of that market. An important reason for its success is its intimate association with the Indian market for more than a century. In these long years HLL’s brands have managed to reach every nook and corner of India. HLL has achieved 88% rural penetration (Business Line, Dec 27, 2000, p6) which is probably the highest for any consumer product company in India. In the year 1999-2000 it was rated among the 25 fastest growing companies in India in a study conducted by magazine Business World (Business World. Apr 9, 2001; pg 39) and the company with the second largest turnover in India in 1998-99 according to Business Today (BT 500) study (Business Today. Sep 21, 1999; pg 33).

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NIRMA CHEMICAL WORKS Nirma is one of the few Indian companies that successfully challenged the might of Hindustan Levers. Its businesses are spread over categories as varied as consumer products like detergents, toilet soap, shampoo, iodized salt on the one hand and industrial products like sulphuric acid, linear alkyl benzene, single super phosphate on the other. Its turnover in 2000-2001 is Rs. 20.52 billion (Business Line, June 3, 2001, p8). Of this 35% is contributed by toilet soaps (Business World, Apr 9, 2001, p54). Nirma entered the national market in the mid-seventies with a detergent powder of the same name. It was priced at one-third the market leader, Hindustan Levers’ brand Surf. Nirma also exercises tight control over its costs. For instance, its advertising expenses were kept in leash, through low cost media options like advertising in railway and bus stations. At the same time its creative advertisements evoked enthusiastic response from customers. It grew rapidly to become a Rs 5 billion detergent brand at the expense of all the other brands in the market. Hindustan Levers took almost a decade to come back with a competing brand called Wheel that did put brakes on Nirma’s runaway growth. After this setback Hindustan Levers started treating Nirma with respect and caution. Nirma since, has perfected the art of introducing value-for-money brands and winning customers. It is now throwing the same challenge in a variety of product categories (most of them consumer products) like soap, shampoo, toothpaste, match-boxes, salt etc. Its early attempts at entering some of these markets (salt, matches, and toothpaste) failed but Nirma is not known to give up easily. GODREJ SOAPS LTD. Godrej is the third important player in the toilet soaps market. The brand name Godrej appears in India appears on a wide range of products like soap, hair dye, shaving cream, edible oil, refrigerators, etc. Godrej Soaps has a turnover of Rs. 8 billion. Though the turnover is respectable Godrej’s influence in the soap market has been steadily waning. It launched several soaps like Fresca, Vigil, Limelite, Evita and Crowning Glory in the 80s and 90s but none of them were successful. Even soaps like Ganga that showed initial promise failed. One reason for Godrej’s slide was its alliance (December 1992) and subsequent break up (June 1996) with Procter and Gamble. The two companies were markedly different in their approach to the soap market. These differences lead to confusion in the positioning of many of its brands. As a consequence, most of Godrej’s brands lost their equity as well as volumes. Its market share slipped from 11% to 5% in the 90s. After the break up with P & G, Godrej has been trying to stage a comeback. It introduced a value-for-money beauty soap called No.1. With high fatty matter (which means better foam and lather) No.1 is priced at 6.00 for 75 gm cake (Business Line, Mar 19, 1998). A brand of some significance in the Godrej portfolio is Cinthol. Cinthol, despite losing volumes, is still seen as a strong brand. PROCTER AND GAMBLE Procter and Gamble, Unilever’s archrival worldwide, is a strong, product-driven company. Though bigger than Unilever world over, P & G is not a competitor in the Indian toilet soap market. Its toilet soap Camay failed due to positioning and pricing related problems. In the early 90s it launched the well-known detergent brand Ariel in India. Ariel has high recall but its high price is deterring its growth. Its sanitary napkins (Whisper), despite their high price are successful. Its shampoos Pantene and Head and Shoulders were moderate successes. P & G India, in line with its global strategic initiatives, is now rationalizing its brand portfolio. OTHER COMPANIES The other prominent players are Wipro Consumer Products Ltd. (Santoor), KSDL (Mysore Sandal), Colgate-Palmolive (Palmolive), Reckitt and Coleman (Dettol), Henkel-Spic (Margo, Fa and Neem) (Names in the brackets indicate the important soaps made by the respective companies). Wipro, is an Indian company, successful in a variety of products in information technology, fluid power, toilet soaps etc. Mysore Sandal despite being a well-known soap lost out because of its parent organization KSDL’s (Karnataka Soaps and Detergents Limited) tardiness. But it is a unique soap with sandalwood

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fragrance and has a small but loyal customer franchise. Colgate-Palmolive has been struggling with its soap Palmolive for several years now with limited success. Palmolive is a skin care soap. Reckitt and Coleman’s Dettol started as an anti-septic liquid brand. Later it extended to become a reasonably successful soap in the premium segment. Dettol promises “100% germ-free bath”. Lever’s Savlon competes head-on with Dettol. Besides these companies, there is the German firm Henkel that has taken over the soap brands Margo and Neem from Calcutta Chemical Works. Its own brand Fa was relaunched recently as a premium freshness soap. (Exhibit 1 shows the price list of important toilet soaps. Exhibit 2 contains the market shares of selected soaps.) LIFEBOUY Lifebouy, introduced in 1895, was one of the earliest soaps to enter the Indian market. At that time not many Indians were using toilet soap to clean their body. They were using flour and other homemade preparations. Lifebouy, therfore, entered the market as a hand washing soap. It had a very traditional packaging with the pictures of Hindu Gods on it. It almost invented the carbolic soap segment. In the 1950’s Hindustan Levers launched a series of rural promotions for Lifebouy in Indian villages. It used village-to-village vans to distribute the product by day and screen open-air films by night. These and other rural marketing initiatives paid off. Steadily Lifebouy became a recruitment brand. That is, Lifebouy became the first brand for any new customer entering the toilet soap market. Its signature brick red, in soap and packaging, is identified today by most Indians. Owing to its affordability Lifebouy is a favorite with the low-income groups. In fact it was the cheapest toilet soap in the market for a very long time. (Exhibit 3 shows the brand scores of 4 brands in different income segments. Greater the score, greater the equity of the brand in the income segment in question.) Its pricing has been retained almost the same despite growth in raw material prices and prices of competitor soaps. There are about 7 million retail outlets in India with many of them difficult to reach. This is because Indian villages are widely dispersed (570000 villages spread over an area of 3.2 million sq.km.) and not well connected. Lifebouy achieved the near impossible task of reaching most of these outlets. Its low price and availability make it a favorite in the rural market. Lifebouy’s positioning (“health”) has, by and large, been consistent. Its advertising jingle has been the same since 1964, i.e., “Tandurusti-Ki-Raksha” (meaning Protector-of-Health). Its advertising has traditionally been associated with outdoor sports but more recently with adventure. Some current advertisements show a soldier rescuing a family from a terrorist. After the sport or adventure the protagonist is shown taking a refreshing bath with Lifebouy. In the outdoor sport advertisement, the same soap is shown as being used by the whole team. This points to the value-for-money, long-lasting aspect of the soap. In short, there has always been an athletic and macho element to Lifebouy’s positioning. This consistency paid rich dividends over the years. In the mid-nineties its tonnage touched an all time high of 140000 tons. 70% of Lifebouy’s sales come from the North Indian states Maharastra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. It was voted as India’s top brand in Advertising and Marketing magazine’s 1998 poll. Lifebouy has traditionally been a 150gm soap. A 75gm variant was launched in 1987 because smaller packages of low unit cost are popular in the rural market. NIRMA Lifebuoy’s fortunes changed after Nirma entered the toilet soap market. Not many expected Nirma to achieve this feat though. In the early 90s, Nirma launched a toilet soap called Nirma Bath and entered the carbolic segment. It copied the physique of Lifebouy to the last detail but priced it lower than Lifebouy itself. Nirma repeated its time-tested formula of low price, high dealer margins and high decibel advertising. It offered 52% margin to the channels while competition offers 10 to 15%. Its early advertising showed construction workers, athletes and other hard working people using Nirma Bath. Most critics wrote it off as a “me-too” brand doomed to die. It struggled for 6 years, but stayed

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put with 15,000 tons in the carbolic segment. It also launched upmarket versions of the same soap, Nirma Beauty and Nirma Premium. These soaps were endorsed by popular Indian film actresses. Their packaging and formulation imitated Lux. Lux, a well-known HLL brand, is positioned the world over as “cinestar’s beauty secret”. (Lux also has a premium variant called Lux International). Nirma Beauty offered everything that Lux offered, besides giving more lather at lower price. It went on to become a big success. Nirma Beauty’s success was more surprising than its parent, the detergent powder. It eventually became the most successful soap to be launched in the 90s and the third biggest toilet soap in terms of volumes. (Most of the successful soaps like Lux, Lifebuoy, Pears etc. are very old. Pears’ origin dates back to pre-French Revolution period. Only three soaps launched in the period between 70s and 2000 were successful namely Liril (HLL brand) in the 70s, Santoor (WIPRO brand) in the 80s and Nirma itself in the 90s. Almost all the other soaps launched between 1970 and 2000 failed. Thus, when Nirma took to marketing soaps, it challenged history. Most industry watchers predicted failure for Nirma because a detergent powder brand was trying to extend into the beauty soap category.) OTHER SOAPS While the number of soaps in the carbolic segment is limited, there is keen competition in the popular segment priced above Lifebouy. Ganga, a soap brand owned by Godrej was positioned on “tradition” and “religion”. (Ganga is the name of an Indian river, regarded holy by all Hindus). The soap claimed to contain Ganga water (which is known to be endowed with medicinal properties) and witnessed a lot of initial euphoria. After the tie-up of P & G and Godrej, its positioning was changed to “family soap”. This switch did not find favor with the consumers and the soap lost volumes. Later, though Ganga tried to go back to its original position of “tradition”, it was not successful. Godrej launched Doodh Ganga (“Milk Ganga”) as a high priced extension to Ganga (A & M, May 15, 1999, p 36). Doodh Ganga was endorsed by the earthy film star Govinda. Despite all these efforts the brand’s performance continues to be lack lustre. Besides, there have been allegations against the soap for exploiting religious sentiments for commercial gain (Business Standard, Jan 4, 2000, p10). In the recent past, Godrej launched several soaps like No.1 (“No.1 in beauty”), Nikhar (“skin care properties of home-made flour”) and Fairglow (“promises fairness”). (Description in the brackets indicates positioning of the soap).It is too early to judge their success or failure. Santoor, Hamam and Rexona are priced slightly higher than Ganga. Santoor, owned by Wipro Consumer Care Products, delivers age-defying complexion through sandalwood and turmeric. Its traditional domain is South India. In the late 90s, Santoor launched a sub-brand called Santoor Milk and Roses which strengthened its position in North India (Financial Express, June 5, 1998, p5). Hamam is an old soap, owned by Levers, traditionally popular in South India. It was promoted through doctors and for a long time and positioned as the “family soap”. It moved from “family” through “100% natural” to “herbal soap” and is still searching for a good position. Currently Hamam is identified with “herbal”. Rexona started as a poor cousin of Hamam but overtook the latter in the 90s. It has been consistently positioned as “skin care” soap. It is projected as a “woman’s secret recipe for soft, silk-like skin”. Rexona also has high priced variants like Rexona Olive and Rexona Sandalwood (A & M, Oct 31 1997, p10). Margo, a soap that is strong in the South and East of India is positioned as “herbal protection of neem for the young”. It straddles the position between Rexona and Hamam. Vrinda, a soap with similar attributes, also stands on herbal positioning. Cinthol, a Godrej brand, started as a premium deodorant soap but stretched downwards with its variant Cinthol Fresh. This extension is trying to give the soap a freshness connotation. Cinthol also has premium variants in the freshness segment called New Cinthol and Cinthol International. There are also soaps of medicinal value like Wipro’s Shikakai and Godrej’s Shikakai. Both are basically hair wash soaps and compete more with shampoos. In the premium segment HLL has soaps like Pears (“skin protection”), Liril (“freshness”) and Moti (“premium sandalwood soap”) (Description in the brackets indicates positioning of the soap).

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THE AFTERMATH Because the low-end volumes were being lost to Nirma, HLL launched new soaps in a price range slightly higher than Lifebouy’s. It re-launched its old soaps Breeze and Jai. Breeze’s positioning remained that of a “beauty soap” with an added promise of fairness. It was given a new look and communicated through a new advertisement. Jai’s overall position was retained as “romantic fragrance”, but its packaging was changed from foil to paper. These two soaps came handy to HLL in its fight with Nirma. Besides HLL launched and fortified its premium brands as well. Nirma retaliated by introducing Nirma Lime and Nirma Rose, the former to compete with Jai Lime and latter to compete with Breeze (Business Today, October 21, 1999, p23). Overall Nirma was the gainer in the market. It attained a market share of 14% in the toilet soap market by 1997 at the expense of all the other soaps including HLL’s. It further grew from 14% to 19% between 1998 and 2000 (Business Standard, Feb 28, 2001, p24). In 1999-2000 its toilet soap sales went up by 42% (Business Line, June 24, 2001, p14). The most significant loser of this period was Godrej. Its soaps, including flagship Cinthol, steadily lost market share. Besides launching new soaps to combat Nirma, HLL extended Lifebouy into higher price ranges. This marked the launch of Lifebouy Plus in 1991. Lifebouy Plus is a deodorant soap meant for the upgraders of Lifebouy. It retained the parent’s brick red color but had a fancier shape and perfume. The rationale of the launch was that the segment using Lifebouy improved its incomes and changed its lifestyle. This customer did not want to leave Lifebouy and therefore wanted an upmarket version of the same soap. Lifebouy Plus was HLL’s answer. Its advertisements explained how a bath with Lifebouy Plus, fought body odor throughout the day. Lifebouy was also extended to a liquid soap, but its high price limited its penetration. Besides, the concept of using a liquid soap did not find takers in India. The launch of Lifebouy Gold stretched the brand Lifebouy further. This brand targeted the teenage girl in the house. It promised “flawless skin”. The more recent advertisements tried to link Lifebouy Gold to the health aspect of its parent. Bacteria were claimed to be responsible for pimples and Lifebouy Gold knew how to handle them. Since pimples are a big source of embarrassment for young girls, and “pimple free” was offered as a “reason-why” for buying Lifebouy Gold. A brand between Lifebouy and Lifebouy Plus was also launched with the name Lifebouy Active. This was offered from the Lifebouy stable with a view to counter Nirma’s value-for-money brand extensions. Lifebouy Active focused intensely on the “protection from germs” platform. It has more medicinal connotation than Lifebouy. Further, a 150-gram Lifebuoy Extra Strong soap at Rs8.50, the 100-gram Lifebuoy Extra Red at Rs6.50 and the 100-gram Lifebuoy Extra Strong at Rs6.50 were also introduced (Financial Express. Apr 5, 2001). The parent brand Lifebouy was also activated. Since Lifebouy’s forte is the rural market, HLL looked at opportunities to sell more of Lifebouy there. For instance, it was observed that rural folk do not wash hands with soap after feeding cattle or washing clothes. HLL chose the Kumbh Mela (a religious congregation wherein 70 million people bath in the holy river Ganga on a particular day once in 12 years) to educate customers that washing hands after chores is important. Levers showed, with the help of ultraviolet wands, that dirt on the hands remained even after washing unless a healthy soap like Lifebouy was used. Millions of people were thus educated at the Kumbh Mela about the virtues of cleaning hands with Lifebouy. This program is seen by HLL as a success. HLL launched a promotional program called “Lifebouy Lifeline Express” which consisted of running a rural van with medicinal supplies (Financial Express, Dec 17, 1999, p7). This was to underscore Lifebouy’s health positioning. Lifebouy also took the help of firms like “Rural Relations” which

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specialize in rural communication. Rural relations networks with 15,000 key feeder villages, 100,000 retailers, thousands of post masters, teachers and thousands of students. (Supply of goods to most Indian villages is routed through a few feeder towns and villages. Post masters, teachers, landlords, headmen and priests are opinion leaders in rural India. They are specifically helpful in spreading a favorable message about any rural product. Students are also useful because they are the most active and reliable communicators of messages.) A new program called “Operation Streamline” was initiated. The aim of this program was to extend the HLL distribution into the hinterland beyond the existing 7,500 distributors. To reach an additional 30,000 villages HLL appointed super-stockists in bigger towns. These would service the sub-stockists who in turn reach out to the retailers. HLL also involved women’s self help groups in the state of Andhra Pradesh to distribute HLL products. Nirma meanwhile, brought in a new brand, by name Nima in the late nineties. Nima was made available in lime, sandalwood and rose variants. This was the first time a brand name different from the company name was used by Nirma. Nirma traditionally depended on wholesalers to push its product. Therefore, despite its lower price, (which is an important criterion for success in rural markets) its rural penetration was not up to the mark. Its rural penetration was just 56%. Nima was meant to offset this disadvantage. It is being expressly targeted at the retailer through incentive schemes. Besides, it is being heavily advertised on TV and other media. Nima’s positioning was similar to Nirma Beauty’s. The other initiatives of Nirma like its backward integration projects, debt restructuring, cost cutting helped it post good financials year after year. Further it benefited from lower manpower and capital costs (Business Today, Jan 21, 1999). In the recent past it was also helped by recessionary conditions in the market. Recession usually pushes customers to value-for-money brands like Nirma. (See Exhibit 4 for Nirma’s financials and Exhibit 5 for HLL’s financials) Lifebouy’s initiatives, by contrast, seem to have met with limited success. Firstly the variants did not improve the overall market share of Lifebouy though they cannibalized the parent. Secondly, HLL, the organization was under pressure across-the-board, in all the product categories. It lost market share in most product categories like soaps, tea, detergents etc. in the year 1999 (Business World. Feb 5, 2001; pg 20). Its sales per advertisement rupee fell from Rs. 31 in 1995-96 to Rs.14 in 1999-2000. To contain costs it started supply chain management initiatives. (The Telegraph, Jun 8, 2000; pg 18). It is also trying to network its dealers and salesmen through e-commerce solutions (Financial Express. Jan 8, 2000; pg 4). These initiatives though, seemed to have limited impact on HLL’s profitability. Thirdly toilet soap market itself is growing sluggishly. Soap has already penetrated 98% urban and 70% rural homes. Fourthly, Unilever, the parent company has issued instructions to its subsidiary to rationalize its brand portfolios. Hindustan Lever is therefore planning to reduce the number of brands from 75 to 30. These 30 brands contribute 75% of HLL’s turnover (Economic Times. May 22, 2001; pg 1). Fifthly dealers are not happy with Lifebouy because its per unit margin is low. HLL argues that the volumes of Lifebouy more than make up for the low per unit margin. Dealers are worried that if the sales of Lifebouy go down, its overall profitability will also comes down for them. ############### Partho Sen tossed the report aside and exhaled deeply. Despite all the troubles with the brand, he thought, Lifebouy cannot be put on back burner. It contributes to 8% of HLL’s profits. But how to arrest the fall in its turnover was not clear. Since Lifebouy was no longer the cheapest brand, it was no longer the recruitment brand. The first time consumers were now going to Nirma rather than Lifebouy. At the same time consumers were upgrading from Lifebouy because the popular segment was growing at the expense of the economy segment. Thus Lifebouy ended up as a loser from both ends.

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Quo Vadis Lifebouy? That was the million dollar question.

EXHIBIT 1

Current market prices for toilet soaps (alphabetical order)

Toilet soap Price (Rupees) Weight (grams)

Breeze 8.50 100 Cinthol fresh 10.00 100

Dettol 13.50 75 Dettol extra 15.00 75

Doodh Ganga 8.50 75 Dove 19.00 50

Fair glow 11.00 75 Ganga 7.00 75

Hamam 10.00 100 Jai 7.00 75 Lifebuoy 8.00 150

4.00 75 Lifebuoy Active Red 6.50 100 Lifebouy Plus 15.50 150 Lifebouy Gold 10.00 75 16.50 125 Liril 23.00 125

Lux 11.00 100 Lux International 12.00 75

Lux skincare 14.00 75 23.00 125

Margo 10.00 75 Mysore sandal 16.00 75 New Cinthol 13.50 75

Nikhar 10.00 75 16.50 125

Nima 7.50 75 Nirma bath 6.00 150

Nirma beauty 7.50 100

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Nirma lime fresh 8.00 75 Nirma Premium 9.00 75

Nirma Winner 8.00 150 No.1 6.00 75

10.00 125 Palmolive natural 9.00 75

Pears 19.50 75 31.00 125

Rexona 10.50 100 Rexona Olive 11.00 75

Santoor 10.50 100 Savlon 13.00 75

Vrinda 13.00 100 Wipro Shikakai 14.00 100

EXHIBIT 2

Current tonnages for selected soaps (alphabetical order)

Toilet soap Annual sales tonnages Breeze 15,000

Cinthol Fresh 7,000 Dettol 10,000

Dove 100 Ganga 2,000 Hamam 13,000

Jai 10,000 Lifebuoy 110,000

Lifebuoy gold 11,000 Lifebouy Plus 7,000 Liril 8,000

Lux 75,000 Lux international 4,000

Margo 10,000 Nirma bath 15,000 Nirma beauty 45,000

Palmolive Natural 2,000 Pears 4,000 Rexona 15,000

Santoor 20,000 Savlon 1,500

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EXHIBIT 3

Brand Score in the Income groups

Brands Up to Rs. 2,000 Rs. 2,001 - 4,000 Over Rs. 4,000 Lux 29.82 30.02 27.31 Lifebuoy 41.47 36.07 29.30 Liril 17.50 15.84 12.99 Cinthol 20.68 16.10 21.71

(Source : ORG-MARG Brand Power Survey 1998)

EXHIBIT 4

Nirma’s financial highlights (all figures in billion Rs.)

1999-00 1998-99 1997-98 1996-97 1995-96

Net Sales 14.551 12.561 10.288 7.446 3.931 Other Income 0.349 0.231 0.170 0.139 Total Income 15.031 12.814 Operating 3.843 2.509 Profit Gross Profit 3.289 2.224 1.859 1.379 PBT 2.661 1.906 PAT 2.353 1.708 1.446 1.063 0.502 Reserves 8.243 6.037 4.405 and Surplus

EXHIBIT 5 HLL’s financial highlights (all figures in billion Rs.) Particulars 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 Net Sales 106.04 101.42 94.82 78.20 66.00

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Operating profit

9.84 7.33

Interest 0.224 0.293 0.339 0.57 Depreciation 0.129 0.101 0.580 0.55 Tax 2.93 2.70 Profit after tax 13.10 10.69 8.37 5.80 4.14 Equity 2.19 1.99 Reserves 18.83 14.93 10.61 7.92 EPS (Rs.) 48 36.69 28.14 20.72 Book value (Rs.)

63.30 77.49

Dividend (Rs) 17.00 22.00

(This case is written by Prof. YLR Moorthi, IIM-B)