case study: nottingham express transit1: the role of green...
TRANSCRIPT
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Case Study: Nottingham Express Transit1: The Role of Green Innovation in the Drive for
Sustainable Mobility Through Improved Public Transport
John Disney, Will Rossiter and David J Smith
Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham
NG1 4FQ, UK.
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
Abstract: Traffic congestion at peak times has long been a problem facing cities in the UK.
Latterly concern about combating congestion has been hightened by concerns over carbon
emissions and poor air quality. In tackling these problems green innovations incorporating new
technologies appear to have much to offer, although progress in implementing these sorts of
innovation appears to have been slow. This case study on the efforts of one city to tackle these
problems by pioneering a number of green innovations including the introduction of a light rail
system employing trams known as Nottingham Express Transit (NET) as well as electric and
gas-powered buses. The nature of these innovation s is explored together with a detailed
examination of how they came to be implemented and the impact they have had.
Keywords: green innovation; public transport; sustainability; project management; modal shift;
Introduction: Traffic in Towns2
Nottingham, with a population of 300,000 is located in a conurbation with 670,000 inhabitants
within a 15km range. It is the seventh largest city in England and a member of the Core Cities
group, an advocacy initiative formed in 1995 and comprising the largest regional cities in the
UK. Located 180 km north of London, Nottingham is the largest city in the East Midlands
region. Once very much an industrial city, its economic structure is increasingly based on
1 This case study draws on a local economic evaluation (Rossiter et al 2016) undertaken by a team including Will
Rossiter, Craig Bickerton, Rick Canavan, Chris Lawton and Peter Murphy and commissioned by Tramlink
Nottingham. 2 ‘Traffic in Towns’ was the title of the Buchanan Report of 1963, a highly influential report on the impact of
increased car ownership on Britain’s towns and cities (Buchanan, 2015).
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business and financial services. Among the service organisations that are major employers in the
city are Experian which provides business information, Capital One the financial services
company and HM Revenue and Customs, the UK’s tax authority, whose regional offices are
located in Nottingham.
Like most cities Nottingham has a problem with the car. The city has long experienced peak
period traffic congestion (Dale et al., 2014). Recent estimates put the cost to the local economy
at as much as £160million per year (NCC, 2013). Consequently tackling traffic congestion has
been an important issue for the city council for many years. This has grown in recent years as a
result of increasing awareness of the problem of climate change and the recognition of health
problems brought on by poor air quality caused by vehicle fumes.
Urban Motorway schemes
Back in the 1960s the city, like many large cities in England attempted to construct its way out
the problem of traffic congestion by building more roads. Following the example of cities like
Birmingham and Leeds that opted for major urban motorway building programmes involving the
destruction of swathes of existing buildings, Nottingham looked to urban motorways to provide
the capacity to cope with a rapidly increasing volume of traffic. With the construction of a
section of inner ring road, known as ‘Maid Marian Way’, traffic was increasingly squeezed out
of the city centre itself. This provided scope for the extensive pedestrianisation of narrow streets
around the market place, thereby returning the central shopping and business area to people on
foot.
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But Maid Marian Way was only the first small step in a much larger and much more ambitious
scheme to create an urban motorway system around the city core. The key element in this
scheme was a section of urban motorway called the ‘Sheriff’s Way’ (see figure 1). The plan was
that this urban motorway would go round the eastern flank of the city centre and funnel traffic
from the wealthy northern suburbs into a major new shopping complex, the Victoria Centre. This
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would have involved wholesale destruction of parts of the city with a flyover going through the
Arboretum and the historic Lace Market district intersected by a slip road. However the
‘Sheriff’s Way’ scheme was never built. Local elections in 1972 brought a change of political
control in the city and with it new ideas about how to tackle the problem of traffic congestion
(Aldous, 1974).
The Zone and Collar system
Instead of trying to accommodate the car through road building, the city council proposed a very
different strategy of demand management through restraining car journeys. The chosen
instrument for achieving this was a novel ‘zone and collar system’, designed to restrict access to
the city centre by cars at peak times. Involving the designation of special bus lanes and double
sets of traffic lights located as part of a collar around the city centre, the system gave buses
priority while delaying cars. This concept introduced possibly the first example of route branded
buses in the UK (now a feature of bus operations in Nottingham and other cities throughout the
UK), with a fleet of dedicated vehicles known locally as " Lilac Leopards" due to their colour
and Leyland Leopard chassis.
Introduced on an experimental basis for the peak morning period in August 1975 (Vincent and
Layfield, 1977), unfortunately the results proved inconclusive with no significant reduction in
traffic flows being achieved. Further analysis revealed that a factor that lay behind this was the
very high proportion of drivers who had access to free parking in the city (Vincent and Layfield,
1977). However over time the zone and collar experiment led to the provision of extensive park
and ride facilities in the city and the successful introduction of more bus lanes.
Nottingham Express Transit: Phase One
In the late 1980s the city council, now concerned about the health of the local economy (Richer
and Hasiak, 2014) following several major factory closures (Rossiter and Smith, 2017), as well
as the cost of peak hour congestion, began to explore new ideas for public transport. It reached
agreement with Nottinghamshire County Council to collaborate on a feasibility study to explore
the best modes of transport to address the future needs of the city (Richer and Hasiak, 2014).
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One innovation considered as part of this study was the development of a light rail system3 using
trams as a way of relieving traffic congestion and at the same time stimulating urban renewal in
some of the more deprived areas to the north west of the city. From an environmental point of
view, modern trams had the advantage that they were powered by electricity rather than diesel
and were three times more energy efficient than buses. Many European cities (and Blackpool in
the UK) retained their original tram networks and modernised them rather than tearing up the
tracks and replacing them with diesel buses. Trams were also perceived by many to be more
acceptable form of transport than buses, especially for young professional people4.
At this time the UK’s first new light rail system had just opened in London’s Docklands. While
this was not a proper tram system in that the lines did not use roads, nonetheless it did employ
very similar technology. Meanwhile other countries were establishing tram systems in cities in a
bid to curb traffic congestion. France led the way in Europe, with new tram systems in Grenoble
and Nantes (Wolmar, 2016), and trams even began to appear in the car-dominated US in cities
like Portland and San Diego. Significantly these pioneering tram projects not only demonstrated
that trams helped to reduce traffic congestion in cities, they also showed that large well-run tram
networks for passengers contributed to economic development by attracting businesses in to the
city (Forrest, 2014). Britain was slow off the mark but by the early 1990s tram schemes were
being planned, with the first, Manchester’s Metrolink Phase 1 trams becoming operational in
1992 (Senior, 2007). It was followed by Sheffield’s Supertram in 1994 (Mulder, 2014) and
Croydon’s Tramlink in 2000 (Wolmar, 2016).
The Manchester Metrolink ran from Bury some miles north of Manchester to Altrincham on the
south side via the city centre. The route comprised a mixture of on-street lines shared with other
traffic and converted former railway lines. The scheme quickly proved successful. By 2001 the
trams were carrying double the number of passengers carried by the railway lines in 1987
(Mulder, 2014). An extension to Salford was opened in 1999 and by 2006/7 the system was
carrying 20 million passengers a year (Senior, 2009).
3 The term light rail was coined by the US Urban Mass Transportation Administration in 1972 to collectively
describe a wide range of new urban public transport systems operating on on-street lines and conventional railway
lines utilizing trams and similar vehicles (Green, 2016) 4 The apparent reluctance of professionals to use buses may possibly be a reflection of Margret Thatcher’s reputed
claim that, ‘a man who beyond the age of 26, finds himself on a bus may count himself a failure.’ (Economist, 2006)
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Sheffield’s ‘Supertram’ however proved rather less successful. Use of the tram built up more
slowly than anticipated and the hoped for impact on the local economy in terms of regeneration,
proved disappointing (Lawless and Gore, 1999). One factor undermining the Sheffield
Supertram was intensive competition from de-regulated bus services which undercut the tram on
price and often provided faster door to door journey times by deviating into residential areas en
route to the city centre. These bus operators were not interested in providing feeder services to
tram stops as their revenue share from a through ticket would have been insufficient and they
only tended to operate during the daytime Monday to Saturday. Another significant factor was
that Sheffield had only recently upgraded several of the main arterial roads around the city.
Whilst Manchester and Sheffield may have pioneered the introduction of modern tram systems
in Britain, Nottingham was well placed to learn from these innovators. Two aspects that those
devising a tram system for Nottingham paid attention to were the need to provide substantial
park-and-ride parking facilities (see Table 1), to enable people to transfer from cars to trams, and
the need to coordinate other forms of transport (i.e. buses) so that they could link up with the
trams. Parliamentary approval for the scheme was obtained in 1994. In 1998 the Minister of
Transport announced that government funding would be available to support the development of
a tram system in Nottingham. The final green light for the project was given in April 2000.
Construction of the 14km line with 24 stations began in the same year and the line opened as
Nottingham Express Transit (NET) in March 2004 (Richer and Hasiak, 2014). NET Phase One
stands out from other light rail systems in the UK in the extent of the park-and-ride facilities
provided in order to encourage modal shift from cars to trams. Five large park-and-ride car parks
offering a total of 3,000 parking spaces (Skelsey, 2007) are available. At the same time
Nottingham City Transport (a partner in the NET consortium) and local bus operator Trent
Barton introduced bus route revisions to act as feeders for tram operations (Skelsey, 2007).
The new tram system quickly exceeded expectations in terms of numbers using the tram, with
8.5 million and 9.8 million passengers carried in the first two years of operation (Potts and
Ankrah, 2014). In addition the use of public transport in the urban area of Nottingham grew by
8% in the five years to 2008 with road traffic only increasing by 1% compared to 4% nationally.
The success of Phase One of Nottingham’s tram in large measure reflected the way in which the
new system had been carefully integrated with other transport modes available in the city.
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The original tram operating consortium included TransDev which had a minority shareholding in
Nottingham City Transport (NCT), which was otherwise still municipally owned although
operated as an arms length company under the requirements of the 1985 Transport Act. This
meant that they had no desire to compete directly with the trams. Furthermore by the time that
NET opened in 2004 the bus market had settled down in Nottingham with two high quality bus
companies dominating the scene. For several years NCT Day and Season Tickets were also valid
on the trams at no extra cost to passengers.
Following the success of Phase One of the Nottingham tram project, a second phase involving
the construction of two further lines extending the system to the south of the city was planned.
This time however Nottingham City Council opted for a novel way of raising a very substantial
proportion of the capital required to finance the tram extension.
The Workplace Parking Levy
The city council had for some time been exploring alternative ways of funding public transport
improvements in the city. One innovative scheme considered was the introduction of a form of
pollution tax or congestion charge known as a ‘workplace parking levy’ (WPL). This comprised
an annual charge (i.e. tax) on each parking place occupied by an employee, student or regular
business visitor attending their place of work. This type of scheme had first been put forward in
1998 in a UK government White Paper ‘New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone’, which
proposed that local authorities be allowed to introduce road user charging (RUC) such as
London’s ‘congestion charge’. As an alternative to road user charging the White Paper put
forward the possibility of charges levied on workplace parking spaces. In both cases the revenue
raised was specifically to be ring fenced for transport improvements (DTER, 1998) contained
within a local authority’s Local Transport Plan. This proposal was duly passed into law as part of
the Transport Act 2000.
The purpose of a workplace parking levy was primarily as a demand management tool focusing
on commuter parking and designed to encourage commuters to switch to alternative modes of
transport. Similar schemes were being planned in other countries, most notably in Australia,
where the State of Victoria was well advanced with plans for a workplace parking levy (WPL) to
be introduced Melbourne’s central business district (Hamer et al., 2009). Introduced in January
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2006 a charge of $AU400 was applied to all public and private parking spaces with the specific
aim of reducing traffic congestion and encouraging the use of public transport.
Following consultation with officials implementing workplace parking in Melbourne, the city
council proposed introducing a similar arrangement in Nottingham. In this instance the transport
improvement to be funded would be a major extension to the tram system. When, following local
elections in 2009, Nottinghamshire County Council indicated that it was no longer able to
support plans for further development of the tram system, it became clear that the introduction of
a workplace parking levy was the only feasible means to implement a revenue raising scheme in
time to fund the Phase Two tram extension (Dale et al., 2014).
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Insert Table 2
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The plan was that the workplace parking levy should contribute as much as £170 million towards
the cost of Phase Two of the tram system. More significant was the fact that having raised money
locally the city council was then in a position to leverage significant additional funding from
other sources such as the UK government (see table 2). When the idea of a WPL was first
proposed there was fierce local opposition, especially from the business community (Pidd,
2010). There were claims that it would have an adverse effect on the local economy, forcing
firms to leave the city because of the additional costs they would have to bear.
When the workplace parking levy came into force in 2012 firms employing more than 11
employees had to pay £334 per year for every parking space provided. Notwithstanding strong
reservations voiced by local business leaders the scheme functioned remarkably smoothly. There
were no legal challenges and 100% compliance. In the first five years of operation the
workplace parking levy raised £44 million in revenue all of which was hypothecated for
improvements in public transport. Along with Phase Two of the tram, this included a number of
other improvements to public transport in the city (see table 2), including the introduction of a
fleet of Link Buses serving key employment sites, hospitals and park-and-ride sites and the
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refurbishment of Nottingham’s train station. Far from an exit of firms from the city as some had
predicted, there has been a movement of firms into the city creating nearly 2000 jobs.
It is unfortunate however that the environmental gains from these public transport improvements
will to some extent be offset by the UK Government’s recent decision to cancel electrification of
the Midland Main Line (Topham, 2017), resulting in diesel powered trains continuing to operate
from Nottingham train station for the foreseeable future. It is also notable that one of the major
bus operators in Nottingham (although it operated the first small fleet of electric buses) appears
wedded to the diesel engine, possibly because many of its routes are long with vehicles often
clocking up in excess of 500km per day.
Nottingham Express Transit Phase Two
The NET Phase Two project extended Nottingham’s existing tram network by 17.5km and 28
new tram stops, more than doubling the size of the network. The original estimate for the value
of the 22.5 year Public Finance Initiative contract to design, build, operate and maintain the
extended NET system was £570 million5, making it one of the largest construction projects
undertaken within Nottingham in recent years.
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Phase Two involved extending the tram system south from the train station through the
construction of two new arms, one going to Toton located near to junction 25 of the M1 and
another going south of the River Trent to Clifton (see figure 2). In extending the network south
of the city, Phase Two connected major employment sites such as the NG2 business park, the
University of Nottingham and the Queens Medical Centre to the tram.
5 This figure was reduced by 15% by the then Coalition Government at the final approval stage.
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The purpose of Phase One had been not only to reduce traffic congestion, but to stimulate
regeneration in areas to the north of the city centre experiencing high unemployment and ones on
the edge of the conurbation affected by pit closures. Phase Two in contrast shared the objective
of reducing traffic congestion, but added more objectives relating to network integration and
economic growth – factors reflected in the choice of routes.
As an engineering challenge, the two phases of tram development were quite different. Phase 1
was able to take advantage a number of current/former railway routes through the conurbation –
reducing the proportion of the total route that had to be shared with other forms of road transport.
In contrast, Phase Two saw a greater proportion of the route sharing tarmac with other road
users. It also required the construction of five major engineering structures to effect crossings of
the Midland Mainline railway, the River Trent and major road transport arteries within the City.
The topography of the line coupled with the need to effect multi-modal interchange at
Nottingham train station resulted in a significantly more complex engineering project.
Overall, Phase Two was more integrated with larger sections of the existing urban fabric than
Phase One. This led to significantly greater impacts on local communities during construction
and increased associated mitigation requirements. The need to integrate with highways and other
public infrastructure (including utilities) presented particular challenges. One indicator of the
greater complexity faced in terms of integrating the new lines into the existing urban landscape
was that Phase Two required approximately 80 properties to be demolished and 500 plots of land
to be compulsorily purchased, while no properties were demolished in order to facilitate the
construction of Phase One. This was largely a function of the use that the route was able to make
of existing rail corridors.
Work to pave the way for the construction of Phase Two commenced in 2000 before Phase One
even opened, with the commissioning of a feasibility study into potential options for the further
extension of the network. This study considered six routes in three transport corridors: Clifton,
Beeston and West Bridgford. Its conclusions, published in 2002, were that additional routes to
Clifton via Wilford and Chilwell via QMC and Beeston were viable in these terms, but that the
West Bridgford option was not. The opening of Phase One in 2004 coincided with the start of
work to prepare a Business Case for new lines for submission to Government. It is noteworthy
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that by this time the national policy enthusiasm for light rail had cooled somewhat – largely in
face of growing concern at the cost of such schemes. Proposed schemes in Liverpool and Leeds
had failed to secure Government support on these grounds. A 2004 report by the National Audit
Office (NAO)6 responded to this concern by reviewing a number of constructed tramlines,
including Phase One of the Nottingham tram, and made recommendations intended to inform the
manner in which future light rail projects were brought forward.
An outline Business Case for Phase Two was developed by the then joint promoters of the
scheme – Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council. Programme Entry
Approval (which was the first of three approval stages) was duly received from Government in
2006. It seems likely that the experience of delivering Phase One, which by this point had been
running for two years, contributed to this successful outcome for the promoters. The NET
System Order, providing statutory powers for the scheme, was made in 2009. The preferred
bidder was selected in March 2011 and the contract awarded to a new consortium, Tramlink
Nottingham, in December 2011 following the receipt of Full Approval from the Department of
Transport.
Awarding the contract to a new consortium however presented a potential problem in terms of
ticketing systems since the new consortium no longer included Nottingham City Transport
(NCT) and TransDev but did include Wellglade, the parent company of Nottingham's second
large bus operator TrentBarton. This could have been a portent of disintegrated ticketing and
tram/bus competition but for the swift action of Nottingham City Council to convert its paper
based Kangaroo multiple operator ticket into the Robin Hood Smartcard. This is effectively a
Nottingham version of the London Oystercard.and it proved very successful in encouraging
greater use of public transport of all forms in the city, when Phase Two of the tram system
became fully operational in August 2015.
Impact of the Tram development on travel in the City
6 National Audit Office (2004)
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In more than doubling the size of the existing tram system, with Phase Two the tram took on a
more network-like form (Rossiter, 2016) capable of feeding traffic from one line into other lines,
very much as the opening of the Victoria underground line in the late 1960s acted as a conduit
feeding traffic into other underground lines in London (Barker and Button, 1975), resulting in
more passengers using the system overall.
In terms of its impact on traffic congestion in Nottingham it is as yet too early to see a clear
picture emerging. However table 2 shows that in 2015-16 following the opening of Phase Two
of NET, passenger journeys on the extended tram network, increased by 50 per cent while
vehicle miles travelled more than doubled. In the first full year of operation (April 2016-March
2017) the enlarged tram network carried almost 16.5 million passengers (Pritchard, 2017), 4
million more than in 2015/16 (see table 2). While this is still some way behind Manchester’s
Metrolink which carried over 30 million passengers in 2015/16 (see table 2), the latter now has a
significantly larger network that has been running for longer.
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Insert Table 2
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In terms of a modal shift from private to public transport taking place as a result of the growth of
passenger numbers on the tram system, more modest growth in car use is evident in Nottingham
compared to other cities in England over the last ten years (see table 3). Clearly only a small
amount of this can be attributed to the opening of Phase Two, which does appear to have made a
modest contribution to date. Over the twenty years to 2016, traffic levels in Nottingham
increased by 4.1%, compared to a 6.4% increase in the previous ten years (see table 3). The
figure for 1996-2016 was a substantially lower increase than occured in other cities in the East
Midlands region. In Derby and Leicester for instance traffic growth over this period was 10.4%
and 11.6% respectively. Other core cities in England saw similar increases in levels of traffic,
with traffic growth in Sheffield and Leeds amounting to 12.6% and 20.8% (see table 3) over this
period.
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In terms of car miles covered within the city, the figures were if anything even more striking.
Over the 15 years from 2000, annual car miles in Nottingham fell by nearly 40 million to 440
million. In Bristol in contrast numbers rose by 27 million (Nottingham Post, 2016). At the same
time public transport use in the city increased above 40 %, a very high percentage for the UK
(Nottingham Post, 2016).
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Insert Table 3
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The Nottingham Tram in spatial and strategic context
A consistent policy insight to emerge from research that has been undertaken on light rail
concerns the importance of integrated transport and land-use planning (see for example Knowles
and Ferbrache 2014). Some suggest that this can only occur when schemes are developed under
the auspices of a single authority that is responsible for both transport and land-use planning
(Dickens 1992).
In this context, it is striking to note that the NET Phase Two project has been developed under
the auspices of a single project promoter – Nottingham City Council (since the withdrawal of
Nottinghamshire County Council in the early stages of the project). This may have served to
facilitate better integration of transport and land-use planning than is possible in areas where
multiple authorities are involved. It is notable that in the case of Sheffield, a failure to fully
integrate transport and land use planning is thought to have adversely affected the ability of this
scheme to maximise economic development and regeneration benefits (Lawless and Gore,
1999; Dabinett, Gore, Haywood and Lawless 1999).
A striking characteristic of the NET is the degree to which it now integrates with other transport
infrastructure. Transport integration was a key strategic objective for the extended network.
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Indeed, both the Business Case documents prepared for NET Phase One and Two make this
objective very explicit. Similarly, the Nottingham Local Transport Plan 2011-26 is equally
explicit in positioning the NET at the heart of its vision for the creation of an integrated local
transport network. While the implementation of this vision for an integrated network remains
work in progress, the development of the NET evidences progress towards this goal.
The redeveloped Nottingham train station now forms the hub from which the NET lines radiate
to the north, west and south. The station serves the function of a multimodal interchange
facilitating integration between light and heavy rail networks. The siting of the new Clifton park
and ride facility integrates well with the newly dualled A453 trunk road connecting Nottingham
to the M1 motorway. The Toton Lane park and ride site fulfils a similar function for approaches
to the city from the west. Alongside the pre-existing Line One facilities at Hucknall and Phoenix
Park, NET Phase Two has effectively transformed the NET from a couple of lines arrowing out
of the City to the north (see figure 2), into a functioning and integrated network.
Rossiter et al (2016) highlight the extent to which NET Phase Two has become more of a
‘network’ with the advent of the new lines to Toton Lane and Clifton. Furthermore, the first of
these two lines has created the potential for an important link to the planned East Midlands hub
for the high speed rail line HS2 at Toton. As such, NET Phase Two seems likely to have paved
the way for future transport integration as and when the planned high speed rail network
emerges. The choice of routes – serving major strategic employment sites in the City – further
reinforces the impression that the NET has been integrated into local spatial planning such that it
can support the development of key sites within the city.
The strategic integration theme is also evident in other spheres of local decision making.such as
the location of recent major public sector capital projects implemented by the City Council itself
and other local anchor institutions. The City Council’s Loxley House offices are adjacent to
Nottingham train station at the heart of the NET system. Similarly, three out of the four joint
service centres built by the local NHS in collaboration with the City Council: Clifton
Cornerstone (Clifton), Mary Potter Centre (Hyson Green) and Riverside Centre (Bulwell), are all
located close to the network. Recent developments by Nottingham Trent University, both
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teaching and residential, have consolidated the existing City and Clifton campuses, and a new
fire station on London Road is close to both the train station and the tram/train interchange.
Conclusion: Achieving Modal Shift
Nottingham was one of the first cities in the UK to seek to bring about a modal shift from cars to
public transport in an attempt to combat the problem of traffic congestion and latterly carbon
emissions and poor air quality. The means to do this have over the years included a range of
environmental or green innovations. These innovations have been both technological and
behavioural in nature.
By far the biggest technological innovation in terms of investment has been the new tram system,
which has been developed to the point where 30% of the population of Greater Nottingham now
live within 800 metres of a tram stop, the only urban area in the UK where this is the case
(Green, 2016). Nottingham has also pioneered alternative fuelled buses, with fleets of electric
and hybrid buses (including the first Chinese built BYD electric buses in the UK) and more than
fifty gas powered buses. The most significant innovation in behavioural terms has been the
introduction of a novel form of congestion charge in the form of the WPL, designed to both
manage the demand for road space and fund improvements in public transport.
A number of factors help to explain the success of Nottingham’s pioneering green innovations.
Foremost among these factors would appear to be the way in which the tram project has been
developed under the auspices of a single project promoter – Nottingham City Council (latterly at
least with the withdrawal of Nottinghamshire County Council from NET Phase Two). This
facilitated careful preparation and management as well as providing clarity in relations with
partner organisations. As a result NET became the only tram in the UK to be described as, ‘an
instant success’ (Green, 2016: 238). Whilst other tram schemes only gradually started to carry
the passenger volumes anticipated, Nottingham’s tram exceeded the most optimistic predictions
from the start, providing 90 million passenger journeys in its first decade of operations (Green,
2016). Although the construction of Phase Two did lead to delays it also saw the successful
introduction of the WPL, a novel innovation in terms of funding transport improvements and
curbing car use, that as yet no other local authority has been bold enough to adopt.
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Having a single promoter was linked to another key factor in Nottingham’s success, namely the
integration of other public transport developments in the city into the tram system. From its
inception transport integration was a key strategic objective of the tram system. The continued
municipal stakeholding in Nottingham City Transport and the inclusion of the other major bus
operator in the current Tram Consortium has strengthened the aims of integrated transport rather
than the destructive deregulated bus competition which has plagued many other cities.
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Insert Table 4
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Notable examples of transport developments that have been integrated with the tram include the
provision of very extensive park-and–ride facilities along the tram routes which currently have
the capacity to take in excess of 5,000 cars (see table 4), the provision of bus services that act as
feeders into the tram system, the provision of effective information systems giving users accurate
information about tram availability, and the development of a smartcard that provides for inter-
modal and inter-operator travel on other forms of public transport (Skelsey, 2015). Similarly the
redeveloped Nottingham train station now forms a hub from which the NET lines radiate to the
north, west and south.
With the coming of the Leeds branch of HS2, the tram’s Toton line has the potential for an
important link to the planned East Midlands Hub station on the site of the former railway
marshalling yard at Toton. As such, NET Phase Two has paved the way for future transport
integration as and when the planned high speed rail network emerges.
Ackowledgement
This case study is based in part on a report entitled ‘NET Phase Two Local Economic
Evaluation, Report 2 Impact Evaluation and Findings’, sponsored by and undertaken for
Tramlink Nottingham Ltd (Rossiter et al., 2016). The authors also gratefully acknowledge the
assistance of Andy Gibbons, Head of Public Transport, Nottingham City Council. Views
expressed in the case study are the responsibility of the authors.
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19
Teaching Note
1. Case summary
The case study provides several examples of green innovations in the form of new
technologies applied to public transport. While trams are clearly the main focus of the
case study these innovations extend to electric and gas-powered buses and facilities for
walking and cycling. In environmental terms these green technologies not only help in
tackling problems associated with traffic congestion such as carbon emissions, they also
offer much scope for achieving significant improvements in air quality. Modern tram
systems are quiet, highly efficient, and contribute to reducing carbon emissions. Similarly
electric and gas powered buses are more environmentally friendly than their diesel
powered equivalents
The case study shows that where urban transport systems are concerned there are a range
of green technologies available.
The case study indicates that while there are a range of green technologies/innovations
available to contribute to reducing carbon emissions, they won’t necessarily fulfil their
potential. Achieving the outcomes that are possible is dependent on a number of factors.
These include:-
• The use of an integrated approach that links other facilities (e.g. car parks,
information systems, ticketing etc) to major transport investments
• Appreciation of the potential value of road user charging ( e.g. workplace parking
levy) and its role in managing demand and funding the supply of appropriate
investments
• The need for effective inter-agency collaboration
• Appreciation of the lengthy timescales associated with major development
projects like trams
It is worth noting that while the main focus of the case study is on public transport, it also
covers important issues such as the preservation of historical and cultural aspects of
20
cities, the economic development of cities, place leadership and economic opportunities
for different social groups.
2. Case study themes and issues
The case study focuses specifically upon innovation, in particular innovations that ofer
environmental benefits. A number of themes can be explored through the case study
including:-
• The different drivers behind green innovations such as regulatory push v.
technology push factors
• The various technologies contributing to green innovations
• The problems associated with trying to bring about a modal shift away from
private cars and to public transport
• The value of transport networks
• Funding public transport improvements
• The role of transport policy
3. Discussion questions
(i.) Why was Nottingham’s ‘zone and collar’ experiment in traffic demand
management in the 1970s not successful? Despite the apparent lack of success,
what useful lessons if any did it provide?
(ii.) What do you consider to be the main factors that led to a successful outcome for
Nottingham’s innovative tram system? Why does the Sheffield Supertram appear
to have been less successful?
(iii.) Compare and contrast the relative merits of road user charging (like London’s
congestion charge) and workplace parking levies (such as that introduced in
Nottingham) as (a.) demand management mechanisms designed to curb car use
and (b.) sources of funding for public transport improvements.
(iv.) Given that Nottingham is the only city in Britain to have introduced a workplace
parking levy, what do you consider were the key factors that enabled Nottingham
to win public acceptance for this controversial form of congestion charge?
21
(v.) What part do you think Nottingham’s smartcard and information systems played
in the success of its tram system and why?
(vi.) When it comes to the successful adoption of green innovations – what do you
consider to be the most important lessons that Nottingham’s innovative tram
system offers?
4. Suggested teaching approach and strategy
This case study is mainly intended for students studying innovation, but could be used for
other subjects as well including public management and project management. It can be
used in a variety of different ways including:
• As an introduction to ‘green’ aspects of innovation
• As an illustration of some of the real life issues and problems associated with
trying to curb traffic congestion in cities
• As an example of the issues surrounding the practical application of green
technologies
• As an illustration of some of the behavioural issues associated with achieving a
modal shift from private to public transport
5. Model answers
(i.) Why do think Nottingham’s ‘zone and collar’ experiment in the 1970s was not
successful? Despite this what useful lessons if any did it provide?
Nottingham’s zone and collar system was a form of demand management
operating at peak commuting times. It was designed to curb commuting by car,
while at the same time providing an alternative in the form of improved bus
services and dedicated park and ride facilities.
At the time there was a lot of parking both on-street and off-street available within
the city centre of Nottingham. Comparatively little pedestrianisation had taken
place so cars had access to streets throughout the city centre. As a result there was
insufficient incentive for commuters to get out of their cars and use the park and
ride buses.
22
Despite this, the zone and collar experiment did provide some very valuable
lessons. Not least it showed the potential value of dedicated bus lanes and the
provision of park and ride facilities (both something of an innovation at the time).
These facilities were significantly extended and expanded in the years that
followed. Other cities in England soon followed Nottingham’s lead. As a result
the park and ride concept is now much more familiar and more widely used by
commuters. This proved to be a key factor in the success of Nottingham’s tram
system which from the outset provided extensive park and ride facilities at key
locations on the tram network.
The zone and collar experiment also highlighted the ‘problem’ of too much
parking being available within the city. In the years that followed Nottingham’s
city centre was extensively pedestrianized, substantially reducing the amount of
on-street parking available. It also provided a strong rationale for the introduction
of the workplace parking levy (WPL) in 2012.
(ii.) What do you consider to be the main factors that led to a successful outcome for
Nottingham’s innovative tram system? Why does the Sheffield Supertram appear
to have been less successful?
A number of factors resulted in a successful outcome to the innovation. These
included: provision of large free park and ride car parks; bus services linked to the
tram to act as feeders; a smartcard that was interchangeable with buses; and an
information system showing tram availability.
Another factor was that Phase One made extensive use of existing railway track
which considerably eased construction. Also the route of the tram in Phase One
linked a number of disadvantaged communities on the edge of the city (e.g.
Hyson Green and Bulwell), giving residents access to increased job opportunities
(i.e. the tram route both improved public transport and contributed to economic
development/urban regeneration).
23
The construction of the Sheffield Supertram in contrast coincided with several
major road improvement projects in the city – this reduced the incentive for car
drivers to undertake a modal shift. Also there were separate agencies responsible
for the development of the Supertram system and economic development in the
city resulting in a lack of coordination.
(iii.) Compare and contrast the relative merits of road user charging (like London’s
congestion charge) and workplace parking levies (such as that introduced in
Nottingham) as (a.) demand management mechanisms designed to curb car use
and (b.) sources of funding for public transport improvements.
Road Use Charging (RUC)
Has the advantage that a widely publicised precedent has been set in London in
the form of the congestion charge. Likely to be complex to administer with a need
to increase charges over time, differential rates for different users etc. Collection
costs are also likely to be expensive (i.e. cameras, recording equipment etc)
Workplace Parking Levy (WPL)
A highly contentious alternative! This has been explored by other cities in
England but they have all balked at implementing a WPL. Nottingham is very
much the innovator. Having implemented a WPL scheme it has the following
advantages: Very simple and easily understood; produces a predictable income;
few avoidance/non-compliance problems; cheap to administer.
A key feature of both schemes is hypothecation. While both can deter car use the
fact that income goes specifically to public transport improvements provides a
strong rationale for the imposition of what is effectively a congestion tax.
(iv.) Given that Nottingham is the only city in Britain to have introduced a workplace
parking levy, what do you consider were the key factors that enable Nottingham
to win public acceptance for this controversial form of congestion charge?
24
A highly controversial scheme! There was very strong opposition from local
business interests prior to its introduction. Success factors include: money raised
allocated to highly visible public transport improvements i.e. tram, buses, train
station etc. Hence there is clear evidence of where the money is going in terms of
public transport improvements. Nottingham has one of the newest bus fleets and
operates efficient and well used bus services. Residents have also benefited from
the introduction of a very effective and versatile smartcard that can be used
interchangeably on different forms of public transport. Nottingham has also been
a leader in introducing green innovations such as its electric and gas-powered bus
fleets.
Quite literally the evidence of where the money from WPL has gone is on the
streets – in the form of modern and up to date forms of public transport.
(v.) What part do you think Nottingham’s smartcard and information systems played
in the success of its tram system and why?
These may seem like minor features of the tram system, but they have actually
been very important. Both impact directly on consumers and how they interact
with and experience the tram system. From a consumers point of view they aid
and assist ‘usability’. Quite literally they help to make the tram system easy to
use.
It is worth stressing that green innovations like the tram which are obvious
symbols of technological solutions to the problems of traffic congestion/pollution,
while they appear to have much to offer are in practice reliant on effective and
easily usable ticketing and information solutions, if they are to bring about a
modal shift away from cars.
(vi.) When it comes to the successful introduction of green innovations – what
important lessons does Nottingham’s innovative tram system offer?
25
A number of points emerge including: (a.) the value of having a single promoter
(i.e..Nottingham City Council) who has been there throughout; (b.) careful
planning and thought given to the routes – i.e. serving a number of purposes in
addition to trying to reduce traffic congestion at peak times (for example -
regeneration, access to the city, linking and accessing important sites/facilities in
the city; (c.) planning the system as a network so that different routes feed-in
passengers to the tram; (d) having access to a novel form of finance in the form of
the WPL; (e) linking the development to other improvements in public transport
e.g. new environmentally friendly buses.
26
Figure 1
Nottingham’s Proposed Urban Motorway of the 1960s
Source: Little (1966)
27
28
Figure 2
Nottingham Express Transit network
Source: Nottingham City Council (2013)
29
Table 1
Distribution of WPL revenue
Public Transport
development
WPL
contribution
£m
External
funds
£m
Tram extension (Phase 2) 199.0 371.0
Train station refurbishment 12.0 48.0
Electric buses 5.8 9.2
Bus station 1.7 1.3
Smartcard system 1.1 1.0
Information system 1.2 1.0
Total 220.8 431.5
Source: Nottingham City Council
Table 2
Light Rail/Tram statistics: England 2015/16
Tram system Passenger
journeys
(m.)
%
change
Vehicle
miles
%
change
Passenger
revenue
%
change
England 252.0 5.8 21.0 14.2 336.9 9.3
London systems 143.9 2.1 5.7 2.4 184.7 9.6
Docklands Light Railway 116.9 6.1 3.8 3.7 161.9 12.3
Croydon Tramlink 27.0 -12.1 2.0 0.0 22.8 -6.7
England outside London 108.1 11.0 15.3 19.4 152.2 9.0
Nottingham Express Transit 12.2 50.2 1.6 102.1 13.6 54.9
Midland Metro 4.8 10.4 1.0 6.1 8.6 11.9
Sheffield Supertram 11.6 0.6 1.4 3.0 11.4 -10.2
Tyne & Wear Metro 40.3 5.7 3.5 -0.5 50.2 4.5
Manchester Metrolink 34.3 10.1 7.2 27.1 62.4 9.7
Blackpool Tramway 4.9 20.3 0.6 10.3 6.1 8.6
Source: Department of Transport
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Table 3
Changes in Traffic Levels 1996-2016
1996-2006 1996-2016
England +13.6% +18.6%
Nottingham City +6.4% +4.1%
Nottinghamshire County +19.9% +27.5%
Derby +5.1% +10.4%
Leicester +8.7% +11.6%
Sheffield +11.9% +12.6%
Manchester +5.9% +5.3%
Croydon -4.4% -11.4%
Birmingham +3.0% +3.6%
Leeds +13.0% +20.8
Source: Nottingham City Council
Table 4
Park-and-Ride car park capacity for the Nottingham tram system
Park-and-Ride
site
Capacity
(parking
spaces)
Tram line Phase Time to city
centre
(mins.)
Clifton 1000 Clifton 2 20
Forest 972 Hucknall 1 7
Hucknall 439 Hucknall 1 26
Moor Bridge 119 Hucknall 1 13
Phoenix Park 657 Hucknall 1 20
Toton Lane 1400 Toton 2 28
Wilkinson Street 600 Hucknall 1 13
Total 5187
Source: Nottingham Express Transit