cases and principles in political law

8/11/2019 Cases and Principles in Political Law

1/11

PEOPLE VS. GAMER (totality of circumstances test in a police line-up)

In People v. Verzosa,[36]

the Court enumerated factors to be considered, following

thetotality of circumstances test, in order to resolve the admissibility of an out-of-court identification of suspects,viz:

"...(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the

crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the

accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the

length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the

suggestiveness of the identification procedure."

EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT

DEFINITION:

This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made

available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any

type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).

ARGUMENT AGAINST EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT:Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress

has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes

mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project and to spend the

money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the

Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.

ARGUMENT FOR EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT:Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the

authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either

expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from thePresidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause.

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the

President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public

interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a

project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the

President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential

Impoundmenti Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law

Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment andCongressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686 [1973]).

Note: In the General Appropriations Act, impoundment of funds is not allowed

except if there will be anunmanageable national government budget deficit.

ATONG PAGLAUM CASE (NEW PARAMETERS IN PARTY-LIST)

G.R. No. 203766 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department

Party-List System

This case partially abandoned the rulings inAng Bagong Bayani vs

COMELECandBANAT vs COMELEC.


2/11

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on

Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for

not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging

grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD:No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases

ofAng Bagong Bayani andBANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the

cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new

guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated

cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I.Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the followingparameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)national

parties or organizations, (2)regional parties or organizations, and (3)sectoral

parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any

marginalized and underrepresented sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district

elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in

legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its

sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral

wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party

through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and

underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is

enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of

their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined

political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and

underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of

sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies

must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or


3/11

organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or thatrepresent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must

belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their

respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations

must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualifiedif some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least onenominee who remains qualified.

II. In theBANATcase, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been

the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really

no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can

now participate in the party-list systemprovided that they do so through their

bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list

elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending theirconstituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack

well-defined political constituencies.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision

of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to

include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system

which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In theBANATcase, Justice Puno emphasized

that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the

intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system

should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT

RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack

well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It

is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined

political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them

cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or

sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes

in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the

system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat

in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be

understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous

cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors

that by their nature areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted

that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for

sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically


4/11

marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do nothave well-defined political constituencies as they areideologically marginalized.

OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the

effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left

undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the

operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void,

undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided.[3]

In a labor case

involving the computation of holiday pay, the court held that it is "now almost the

end of 1991 . . and [t]o require various companies to reach back to 1975 now and

nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh.

Under the general rule, a void law or an administrative act cannot be the source of

legal rights or duties. However, the doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the

general rule. Under the doctrine, a judicial declaration of invalidity may notnecessarily eliminate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such

declaration.

Prior to the declaration of nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act must

have been in force and had to be complied with as they were presumed to be valid.

Only the courts can declare a law invalid, and without such declaration, taxpayers

would have had no other choice but to follow the existing rules or in this case the

practice of filing the judicial claim within the two-year period.

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY

CARPIO VS EXEC SEC

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZEDDEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND

FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar

and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as

he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.

He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission

(NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP

thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPCand the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local

police heads also undermine the power of the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and

NPC by virtue of RA 6975.

HELD:No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and

offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of

government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the

lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of


5/11

the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the Presidentcannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in

person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all

executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive

Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and

agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive isrequired by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of thesituation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and

administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the

executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,

performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless

disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the

Chief Executive.

Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him

over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the

bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive

department.Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed

under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would

bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local

executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies

created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part

subsidized by the national government.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter

egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the

latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him.14 Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved

party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and

may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of

the said secretary.15

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari

to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in

excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law.

SENATE VS ERMITA

495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch

Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as

well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public

hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the

NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department

heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.


6/11

Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the saidhearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff

Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said

requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and

scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executivedepartments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by theexecutive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are

covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with

rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment

of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national

security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered

by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the

President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first

securing the presidents approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate

committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the

scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying

President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before

legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan

were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial

proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it

infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of

legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the

validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from

Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is

expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although

there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of

Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it

may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so

far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power

of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to

the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in

the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation isintended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess

the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to

others who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is

closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or

a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of

Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and


7/11

balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to QuestionHour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,

under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can

be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries

in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be

discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of

legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementaryto each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power ofCongress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for

legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the

objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight

function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of

executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their

basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot

frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demandsfor information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for

department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.

They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one

executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom

executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the

power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the

executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government

which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure

presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the

question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the

Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is

discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of

department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such

instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,

unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President

herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are

implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as

imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department

heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such

instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that

Congress may onlyrequesttheir appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry inwhich Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section

21, the appearance ismandatory for the same reasons stated inArnault.

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest

invalid.On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151,

revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She

advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,


8/11

existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case ofSenate v.

Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiriesin aid of legislation.

ARAULLO VS AQUINO III

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund

Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program

Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the

sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy

needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up

with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.

DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority

projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under

the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by acertain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the

Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the

Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The

DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact

reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the

Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General

Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made

by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming

that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive

for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.

Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed

upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not onlyrealign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects

were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples

Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),

P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B forRelocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of theBagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the

Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides

that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law.


9/11

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the

Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive

Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use

savings, respectively).

Issues:I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of theTreasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art.

VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by

the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I.No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was

merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is

a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the

Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP

no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation

made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated

for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II.No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds

refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retainor deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually

prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government

budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in

the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III.No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that

the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are

allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer

or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, nocross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was

violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being

transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of

funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some

projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the

GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.

Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent


10/11

under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transferto such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the

Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,

among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain projectonce it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does notrefer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the

statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no

basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of

the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain

projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the

Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV.No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for

the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a

certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collectionshave exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured

before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an

act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is

applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded

numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the

DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be

undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received

especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of

Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents

of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or

administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

ENROLLED BILL

78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were

suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not

allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House

Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered indetermining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution

(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an

enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into theJournals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it

could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of

Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed

amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either

branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the


11/11

said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannottake cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of

the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether

or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journalsfrom each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the

disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply

rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a

law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No.

190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the

passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an

authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of

the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the

enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy

out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. Nodiscrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court

did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would

give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly

certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the

due enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both

houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed

by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.

2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the

proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be

provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those

bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by

copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That

in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,

when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and

secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such

Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled

bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shallprevail over those of the journals.

cases and principles in political law

Documents