Caltex v. Palomar [GR L-19650, 29 September 1966]

PERTINENT LAWS

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.

Conditions sine qua non for declaratory reliefConditions sine qua non: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. In the case at bar, all the conditions are present. Caltex’s insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by Palomar of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interest are substantial. To Caltex, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of

views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To Palomar, the suppression of Caltex’s proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With Caltex’s bent to hold the contest and the Palomar’s threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration.

3. Definition of Statutory ConstructionConstruction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black). In the case at bar, whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.

4, Judicial duty to look into substance of lawThe Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent.

5. Case not an advisory opinion nor premature; Rules of Court liberally construedEven if there has been no breach of the Postal Law yet, there is propriety or necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead. Denial of declaratory relief would force it to choose between undesirable alternatives: that of being a self-appointed censor, or that to be at risk of a fraud order. Considering the alternatives in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (Section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court), i.e. to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law; there is no imposition upon the Court’s jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.

6. Judicial decision interpreting or applying a law forms part of legal systemJudicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system”(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decision assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. The jurisdiction of the Court, nor its ruling’s force and binding effect, cannot be underrated not to have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. Precedent are abundant to support the conclusion that the Court has reached (Liberty Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 NJ 399, 117 A 2d 487; In pari material, also: Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d, 207, 234 NYS 2d, 435; Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, supra.; Thrillo, Inc. v. Scott, 15 NJ Super. 124, 82 A. 2d, 903)

7. Lottery and gift enterprise defined; Caltex contest not a lottery nor gift enterpriseThe term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate v. Topacio, 44 Phil 278, 1922; citing various jurisprudence). With respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived

directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.While an all-embracing concept of the term “gift enterprise” is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.In the case at bar, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

8. Consideration does not consist of benefit derived by sponsor of the contestThe required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor (People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d. 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp). 788)

9. Conflicting viewpoints on gift enterprise warrants resolution on case-to-case basisThe apparent conflict of opinions (for one: holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited; or the other: like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration) is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, the terms “lottery” and “gift enterprise” are used interchangeably; in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. Every case, thus, must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

10. Noscitur a sociisConsonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.

National Federation of Labor v. Eima [GR L-61236, 31 January 1984]En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with hope that Article 217 does not undergo repeated amendments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

FACTS: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. Such employees, on 17 April 1982 charged the firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, including the 90 ballots (79, yes, 3 no). The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. 6 days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. The motion to dismiss was denied. Hence the petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the respondent Judge. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on Civil Case 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the TRO issued on 5 August 1982.

PERTINENT LAWS

Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code."

1. Jurisdiction of case belong to labor arbiters and not CFI; History of amendments to Art. 217(1) The original wording of Article 217 of the Labor Code vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction (applied in Garcia v. Martinez and in Bengzon v. Inciong). (2) On 1 May 1978, however, PD 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages. The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. (3) On 1 May 1980, PD 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, enabling them to decide all money claims of workers, including those based on

nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; all other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by the Code. (4) On 21 August 1981 BP 130, amending Article 217. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) was worded as “(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment,” replacing the former phraseology: “(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.” BP 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.

Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. The plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez; Ebon v. De Guzman; and Aguda v. Vallejos). Further, unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, trend shows that the choice should fall on an administrative agency (Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc.).

2. Statutory Construction, when appliedThe first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 1913). Any deviation from the express terms of the law cannot therefore be tolerated.

3. Jurisdiction of exercise of compulsory arbitration and claims for damages under Article 217 belong to the Ministry of LaborNo valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.

Haystack: Paat v. CA [GR 111107, 10 January 1997]Paat v. CA [GR 111107, 10 January 1997]Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concur.

FACTS: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from san Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO’s Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. De Guzman failed to submit the

required explanation. On 22 June 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277. De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration dated 28 June 1989, which was denied in a subsequent order of 12 July 1989.

The case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss by the petititoners in an order dated 28 December 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied.

A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the CA which sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, the petition, with prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners on 9 September 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated 27 September 1993, the prayer for the issuance of TRO of petitioners was granted by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

PERTINENT LAWS:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

1. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesBefore a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Thus, in the case at bar, the respondents cannot, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

2. Principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies not absoluteThe doctrine is relative and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department

secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

3. Doctrine of primary jurisdictionThe doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In the case at bar, the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative.

4. Due process is opportunity or right to be heard, not necessarily requiring a hearingDue process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. Further, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. (Navarro v. Damasco)

5. Rules liberal in administrative proceedingsIn administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

6. Statutes construed to give effect to purposes projected in statute; “To dispose of the same” includes conveyanceIn the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

7. When statute is clear, court cannot rationalize the lawWhen the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. In the case at bar, the language of EO277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal

Code ” and inserted the words ” shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,” meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

8. Suit of replevin as reliefA suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. In the case at bar, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under PD 705, as actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

9. “To detain” defined“To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in custody,” and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.

People v. MapaGR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

FACTS:

Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the

manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR L-34568, 28 March 1988)

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. (In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.) The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.(Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160) Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.( Child and Welfare Code, Art. 28.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Paras v. Comelec [GR 123169, 4 November 1996]Paras v. Comelec [GR 123169, 4 November 1996]; ResolutionEn Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concur

FACTS:Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, Comelec resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on 14 October 1995, and set the recall election on 13 November 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition. On 6 December 1995, the Comelec set anew the recall election, this time on 16 December 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (SP Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they

should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On 12 January 1996, the Court issued a TRO and required the OSG, in behalf of Comelec, to comment on the petition. In view of the OSG’s manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the Comelec, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Paras thereafter filed a reply.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular elections are 7 months away. The TRO issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

PERTINENT LAW:

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

1. Every part of statute must be interpreted with reference to the context of the whole enactmentIt is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. In the case at bar, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, i.e. during the second year of his term of office. SK elections cannot be considered a regular election as this would render inutile the recall provision of the LGC.

2. Assumption that Legislature intended to enact an effective lawIn the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

3. Statute interpreted in harmony with the ConstitutionIt is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. In the case at bar, the interpretation of Section 74 of the LGC, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.

4. Intent of law paramount; too literal interpretation discouragedThe spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’.

5. Intent of the law in prohibiting recall elections for one year immediately preceding a regular electionRecall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Digest: Floresca v. Philex Mining (GR L-30642, 30 April 1985)

FACTS:

Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.

Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the

employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.

The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.

HELD: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Digest: Republic v. CA and Molina (GR 108763, 13 February 1997)

FACTSRoridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly

explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Digest: Aisporna v. CA (GR L-39419, 12 April 1982)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas , digests

Aisporna v. CAGR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

Haystack: Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982]

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas , haystacks

Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982]First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy. For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR) finding the Aisporna guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. In its 28 October 1974 resolution the Court resolved, without giving due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment filed on 20 December 1974, the OSG, representing the CA, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. On 3 April 1975, Aisporna submitted his Brief while the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in lieu of a Brief on 3 May 1975 reiterating his stand that Aisporna has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

1. Scope of the law; Definition of Insurance AgentThe first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section; and, third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. In the case at bar, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph. This was a reversible error as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, to wit “Any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.”

2. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole; Doctrine of Noscitur a SociisLegislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently.The doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

3. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved to warrant convictionA law making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. To warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

Digest: China Bank v. Ortega (GR L-34964, 31 January 1973)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas , digests

China Bank v. Ortega (J)GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was

turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs against the petitioners.

Digest: Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista (GR L-37867, 22 February 1982)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under digests

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. BautistaGR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.

Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the

general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.