cave final environmental economics (evsp502) paper - limited bottle bills stuck at ten states
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AbstractThe author of this paper summarizes the unequivocal and singular recycling rate success realized by beverage container deposit programs (i.e. bottle bills), and statistics that show such programs save resources and money by shifting responsibility for externalized costs previously born by municipalities and the general public, to their internal sources – beverage producers, bottlers and consumers. From there he discusses the primary, not so obvious weapon that has been gift wrapped and handed to large corporations to impede the expansion of bottle bills geographically (beyond the ten states they are currently in) and compositionally (to most or all types of “mobile” containers). He reviews proposals and initiatives offered as alternatives and/or compliments to bottle bills, and he finishes by describing the only approach that actually will work at maximizing recycling and waste-stream removal of all types of recyclable packaging, including beverage containers.TRANSCRIPT
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 1
Limited Bottle Bills Stuck at Ten States: Benefit-Cost Review of Beverage
Container Deposit Programs As They Exist and Upon Their Expansion to More
Container Types in More States
Mark Cave
Student ID 1055740
EVSP 502 Summer
Professor Johnson
September 25, 2012
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 2
Abstract
The author of this paper summarizes the unequivocal and singular recycling rate success realized
by beverage container deposit programs (i.e. bottle bills), and statistics that show such programs
save resources and money by shifting responsibility for externalized costs previously born by
municipalities and the general public, to their internal sources – beverage producers, bottlers and
consumers. From there he discusses the primary, not so obvious weapon that has been gift
wrapped and handed to large corporations to impede the expansion of bottle bills
geographically (beyond the ten states they are currently in) and compositionally (to most or all
types of “mobile” containers). He reviews proposals and initiatives offered as alternatives and/or
compliments to bottle bills, and he finishes by describing the only approach that actually will
work at maximizing recycling and waste-stream removal of all types of recyclable packaging,
including beverage containers.
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 3
The overall average recycling rate, by weight, of beverage containers in the forty
American states without bottle bills is 24%; for the ten states with bottle bills, the recycling rate
ranges from 66% to 96% (Galland, 2011, p. 12). This one comparative fact, when flushed out
with numbers of containers involved, and the direct and indirect cost/impacts from low
percentage recycling, should by itself galvanize the public and political support necessary to get
bottle bills passed in the majority of states.
This is a digression, however, to be analyzed towards the end of this paper. Before that,
there will be – in chronological order – an explanation of the problems that make bottle bills so
necessary; the basic components of a bottle bill; some of the shared and unique characteristics of
the bottle bills in place in ten states; the comparative advantages of bottle bills versus other
recycling and waste reduction programs for beverage containers; and the “close the loop
synergies” realizable upon combining bottle bills with other programs. The final item, focused
upon during concluding discussions, will be a suggested three-pronged approach to making
bottle bill legislation much more the norm rather than the exception. One caveat before reading
on: while this analysis is inclusive of and generally applicable to all the main types of container
recycling – aluminum, tin, glass and plastic – it is definitely slanted towards plastic, as that is the
most under-recycled type of container, and arguably the one most detrimental to environmental
and public health.
In the United States, the recycling rate for all beverage containers is about 29% (Galland, p.
12). What kind of numbers result from the 71% of beverage containers that aren’t recycled, are
tossed away or thrown out? The bulk of those containers that don’t end up buried in a landfill or
incinerated for energy become litter. Besides being an eyesore in local communities, sometimes
severe enough to depress business and local property values, litter catches rides on wind and
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 4
water, and in drainage and sewer systems, to end up as contributory pollutants of waterways and
ecosystems. Quantifying the adverse environmental and public health costs in dollar terms is
nigh impossible, but there are estimated cleanup costs that, while surely less, are nevertheless
still very expensive. Keep America Beautiful (KAB) estimated that in 2009 some $10.8 billion
was spent on preventing and cleaning up litter, with states and municipalities responsible for $1.3
billion (11.5%) of that. Interestingly, businesses shouldered about 80% of that $10.8 billion, or
$9.1 billion (Abbell, March 2012, p. 1; Keep American Beautiful, September 2009, pgs 4-5 to 4-
9). A 1999 analysis of litter by Solid Waste Coordinators of Kentucky found that 58% of it was
beverage containers. [University of Maryland Environmental Finance Center (UMD EFC),
December 2011, p. 10] . Applying that percentage to KAB’s estimated costs for cleanup of all
litter results in a rough approximation for cleanup of littered beverage containers: $5.28 billion.
The Ocean Conservancy’s 2009 analysis of data from a single day of the International Coastal
Cleanup put beverage containers in the top 10 for types of marine debris collected, at 17% (
883,737 plastic bottles = 9%; 459,531 glass bottles and 457,631 aluminum beverage cans = 4%
each). (Ocean Conservancy, 2010, p. 13). While that percentage and the associated numbers are
not also roughly translatable to monetary costs, they still convey the fact that the total dollar
amount for non-voluntary coastal cleanup of discarded beverage containers in the United States
would be exceptionally high. Hitting home even more on the measurable and immeasurable
costs associated with beverage container littering is the factoid that sixty to eighty percent of all
marine debris starts out on land. There’s no data specific to beverage containers, but there’s little
doubt that virtually all of those in the ocean got there from land.
As already pointed out, it’s impossible to translate into dollars and cents the second- and
third-effect impacts from not closing the loop and keeping beverage containers out of the waste
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stream; however the impacts and their immeasurable costs are indisputably gargantuan. Perhaps
the most shocking, most astronomically expensive impact comes out of the Great Pacific
Garbage Patch (GPGP), a hundreds of square miles in area spiraling whirlpool, or gyre, of trash
in the Pacific Ocean between California and Hawaii. Because it’s a vortex, the debris that
collects there gets more and more concentrated over time. Over the decades that plastics have
been accumulating, much of them have been broken down by wind, sun and waves into tiny
pieces that now are so great in number that their total weight is more than the total weight of the
plankton they’re floating amongst! The significance of that is made apparent by this quote:
“We were 1,000 miles from shore, with no sign of human life for days, yet
our human ‘footprint’ is now apparent there in one of the most remote places
on the planet,” says Doug Woodring, co-founder and director of Project Kaisei.
“It was shocking to see the amount of small pieces of plastic continuously
found in all of our 100 nets, in over 1,200 miles of sampling. This should be a
message to everyone that our consumption patterns, and ways in which we
dispose of products, have failed us. The water in our oceans is like blood for
our planet. If we continue to fill it with toxic materials such as plastic, it will be
to the detriment of all life on Earth.” (Ocean Conservancy, p. 27)
There clearly is a critical need to dramatically reduce the amount of beverage containers that end
up as waste, as litter that pollutes and despoils ecosystems the world over.
The most effective way to maximize recycling of any material, including beverage
containers, is via multiple approaches so that a major block of the targeted item does not go
smoothly and unchecked from producer to consumer to waste. That acknowledged, state and
national container deposit legislation, even after being implemented in different forms and to
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different degrees (i.e. deposit fees assessed, items covered, collection methodologies,
disbursement of unredeemed deposit revenues, etc), is so far the one and only approach that has
quickly and dramatically driven up recycling rates and then kept them high. The general
mechanics of a bottle bill are fairly simple and uniform across the ten U.S. states that have
implemented them (OR, VT, MI, ME, IA, CT, MA, NY, CA, HI) (Container Recycling Institute
– CRI – slideshow, 2009, slide 6); however, the revenue flows and transaction costs are more
complex, and are handled in different ways. To discourage unconcerned discarding of beverage
containers, consumers are incentivized to return them to a store (and/or, in some states, to
redeem them at a redemption center), via a refundable deposit that’s placed on each container.
In most states the deposit is 5 cents on a variety of carbonated and noncarbonated beverages
except dairy products.
Here, The CRI provides an excellent depiction of the deposit collection and redemption paths for
bottle bill programs:
(CRI Slideshow, slide 4)
When the distributor ships bottle bill beverages to the retailer, the per container deposit is added
to the price charged to the retailer. The retailer passes that markup on – i.e., the consumer pays
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the retail price plus the per container deposit fee. The customer may reclaim/redeem the deposit
by bringing the container to an in-state retailer or – if the state has had them set up – a
redemption center.
Some beverage containers are not redeemed, meaning that there are deposit monies
(unredeemed deposit revenues = UDR) still held by the distributor. Four of the ten bottle bill
states mandate that distributors turn over all of the UDR (CA, CT, HI and MA) or most of it
(NY/rest kept by distributors; MI/rest kept by retailers). (CRI – fate of unclaimed deposits, 2011)
There have been disagreements, sometimes leading to litigation, over who should get the UDR –
the state, the distributor or the retailer. The distributors and retailers argued that they should get
them to help offset their costs of maintaining the container return system. That argument,
especially when made by distributors, has been countered by first pointing to two revenue
sources – (1) the revenues gained from the sale of the returned plastic, aluminum and glass for
recycling into new containers or other goods; and (2) the deposits collected from retailers that
can be invested for short term gains – and then highlighting that unclaimed deposits would be a
third revenue source, as tax-free, windfall profits. States and their supporters claim that
unredeemed deposits should be treated like other abandoned property – turned over to the state
and used for public benefit (CRI – fate of unclaimed deposits, 2011). So far, the courts have
sided with the states of Massachusetts, Michigan and Maine.
The above discussion gives a broad brushed description of how states differ in their
disbursement of unclaimed deposits. It is also a very general statement, without delving into
diversions and nuances, that states use the UDR to mostly cover expenses of administering and
sustaining their container deposit program and for funding other environmental programs. Of far
greater importance: a discussion of (1) the different types of beverages and/or containers that
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states require be included in their deposit redemption programs; and (2) the deleterious effect of
inflation upon the rate of container returns.
Before noting the specific differences in types of beverages and containers covered by
bottle bills, it is necessary to explain why the imposition of a deposit-and-return system is
imposed on only beverage containers instead of on all recyclable containers. Beverage
containers make up 80% of all U.S. sold containers and are much more likely to be emptied very
quickly away from home and therefore away from curbside recycling. Financially incentivizing
return-for-recycling of those rapidly emptied items (hereinafter called “mobile containers”) is the
most viable way to divert them from going into trash bins or becoming 40-60% of the litter
stream. A much greater share of non-beverage containers – like peanut butter jars and shampoo
bottles, to name just a couple of many - are emptied slowly at home and therefore captured by
curbside recycling. (CRI Bottle Bill Resource Guide – FAQ, 2011). Another caveat to mention
before getting into specifics on beverages and container types covered and not covered by bottle
bills in individual states: the push has been on to broaden the bills, make them more inclusive of
all types of beverages and containers less than a gallon in size.
The primary difference among states in their current bottle bills is the inclusion or
exclusion of noncarbonated beverages and/or water. Four states – Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and Vermont – exclude all noncarbonated, nonalcoholic beverages. Connecticut, New
York and Oregon include water and exclude other noncarbonated beverages. (CRI table, 2010).
So, 80% (40/50) of states do not have a system in place for incentivizing the diversion from the
waste stream of any and all mobile beverage containers; and 88% (44/50) of the states do not
divert any noncarbonated, nonalcoholic mobile beverage containers, including water bottles!
(CRI table, 2010). Some 30 billion single-serve bottles of water were sold in the U.S. in 2008
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(Gleick, 2010, p.6), and the U.S. recycling rate for single serve water bottles was just over 32%
in 2010. (Resource Recycling, 2012). Even if consumption has dropped and recycling has risen
since those years, there are indisputably still billions of bottles that are going to landfills each
year, and other billions of bottles becoming litter that ends up in waterways and the oceans each
year. That’s not even accounting for other types of noncarbonated beverages, like athletic
drinks, and the ever growing variations and quantities of energy, fruit, vegetable and
combination drinks in less than a gallon containers. They surely also number in the billions for
United States consumption, waste and littering each and every year.
Exacerbating the failure to remove from the waste stream so many containers, is the
diminishing increases in numbers/percentages of returned/redeemed qualified containers in nine
of the ten bottle bill states. The reason for such tapering off is inflation. The only state with a
return deposit of 10 cents for all qualified containers is Michigan, which unfortunately is also
one of the four bottle bill states that do not require deposits for noncarbonated beverages.
The ensuing figures for redemption rates are generally the same for overall recycling rates,
and the connection to inflation will remain implied until after the statistics are provided. Quite
naturally, the percent redemption rate for Michigan has dipped the least and still remains in the
high 90s. The next highest redemption rate is in Oregon, at 83%, which represents a drop of 5%
from that state’s highest rate of 88% in 1994 (CRI redemption rates, 2011). That relatively high
rate is rather anomalous, with plausible attribution being to the higher eco-consciousness of
Oregon’s population relative to other states, and to Oregon being the first state to pass a bottle
bill, in 1971 (CRI table, 2010). Massachusetts better represents the norm – its unclaimed
deposits climbed from $20 million in 1997 to $31 million in 2001, and its redemption rate
dropped from 78.3% to 69.8%. (CRI - fate of unclaimed deposits; CRI - redemption rates 2011)
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Of the nine states that charge a deposit of 5 cents per container, seven have had that charge
in place since passage of their bottle bills in the late 1970s or early 1980s (the other two states
are Hawaii, which implemented its bottle bill in January 2005, and California, which
implemented its bottle bill in September 1987) . A nickel in 1971 is now worth just 1 cent. (CRI
– fate of unclaimed deposits). For many people, redeeming containers for a nickel each isn’t
worth the effort. In other words, the opportunity costs associated with the time and work required
to collect the redemption fees are too high; opportunities – perceived or real – to do other things
of more value or greater remuneration are squandered by going through the redemption process.
So far, it’s been shown that the bottle bill most effective at removing beverage containers
from the waste stream is one that is inclusive of all mobile containers – as is most nearly the case
in Maine – and one that imposes a deposit price high enough to incentivize a 90+ percent
redemption rate – as is still the case in Michigan, although time will inevitably bring inflation to
bear and drive the rate down there too, especially when/if the country emerges from The Great
Recession. Michigan increased its deposit to 10 cents in 1989. (CRI table, 2010). Going by that
year, the rate of inflation would adjust the deposit rate of 5 cents that’s charged in the other states
to 9 cents. (USDOL BLS CPI inflation calculator, 2012). Round up to 10 cents to match the
Michigan rate and set a current standard, just as Oregon set the 5 cent standard in 1971. From
that 10 cent starting point, what would work best moving forward is a deposit charge that
increases at regular intervals in step with inflation – that would surely push the redemption rate
to nearly 100% for covered mobile containers. With the currently toxic political climate and
economic malaise, such an adjustment will be difficult in many states; however, while grow the
calls for behavior that is more responsible and sustainable, bottle bills inclusive of containers for
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all types of mobile beverages and with inflation adjusting deposits can be designed now for
relatively quick introduction and passage at the opportune moment in the future.
By paying to lobbyists and public relations firms huge sums of money each year, front
groups for and companies within industries associated with the filling, distribution, and sale of
beverage containers have been waging a war of disinformation and green washing in order to
stop, delay and/or dilute expansion or wider scale implementation of container deposit programs.
(CRI – bottle bill opponents, 2011). These corporations and front groups engage in such efforts
simply to continue for as long as possible their externalization of severe economic,
environmental and public health costs. Particularly frustrating is the power of money over
popularity. One small example of disinformation peddling is in the defeat this year in
Massachusetts of legislation to expand bottle bill coverage to include noncarbonated beverages.
In a June 2012 press release by the industry front group, Real Recycling for Massachusetts, ten
reasons were offered for not expanding the bill. (Wareck, 2012). A discussion of just three of the
assertions will go far in debunking all of them.
1. “The bottle bill is an unnecessary, new tax for consumers.” (Wareck, 2012). The
one-way movement of more than 50% of beverage containers into the waste stream - as
litter, as waterway pollution, and as landfill contributors– is, net, significantly more
costly in dollars and in effects on ecosystem and public health. Deposits create lower
costs for mobile beverage pollution prevention and litter diversion and properly shift
the costs from taxpayers in general to the cost generators – beverage and container
producers and – for those deposits not redeemed – consumers.
2. “The bottle bill is much more expensive than more comprehensive, effective
recycling programs.” (Wareck, 2012). First off, this statement implies that different
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types of recovery and recycling programs are mutually exclusive. The most effective
way to recover, reuse and recycle containers of all kinds, mobile and not-so-mobile, is
to utilize programs that operate simultaneously and synergistically. Secondly, deposit
programs started from scratch carry higher initial costs; however, in the case of
Massachusetts the deposit program infrastructure and methodology has been firmly
established; actually, without an expanded bottle bill, insufficient economies of scale
and revenue streams are pushing the network of privately owned redemption centers to
collapse – half of them have shut down, the other half are being buried under twenty
years of increasing costs and shrinking revenues (MA Sierra Club and MASSPIRG,
July 2012, p. 24) . Thirdly, there’s this direct quote from the CRI Myths and Facts site:
“The BEAR [(Businesses and Environmentalists Allied for Recycling)] report found
that a combination of recycling methods in 10 deposits states recycles 490 containers
per capita per year, at a cost of 1.53¢/unit, vs. 191 containers per capita per year at
1.25¢/unit in 40 non-deposit states (which rely on curbsides and drop-offs to do the
whole job). In other words, at an additional cost of only 1.5¢ per six-pack, beverage
container recovery rates in deposit states are more than 2.5 times higher than in states
without bottle bills.” (CRI – bottle bill myths & facts. 2011). Surely, a full cradle-to-
grave or cradle-to-cradle benefit-to-cost analysis would result in a ratio much greater
for a mix of programs that includes container deposits (especially if expanded and
deposit increased) than the ratio for an approach without container deposits. Fourth and
finally, the costs of bottle deposit programs that exist are properly born by consumers
and producers, not by governments and taxpayers. (CRI – bottle bill myths & facts.
2011).
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3. “The bottle bill is unpopular.” (Wareck, 2012). This reason is simply a bald
faced lie! Refusal by lawmakers to vote in favor of a bottle bill is not at all equivalent
to a bottle bill being unpopular. Failure to pass a bottle bill has overwhelmingly been a
result of political pressure put on lawmakers by lobbyists for the deep-pocketed
companies seeking to continue externalizing their costs. In fact, container deposit
programs enjoy great support in the general population – 76% favor them, 24% oppose.
(CRI, Deposit legislation… 2009)
There just is no program more effective than the container deposit program at keeping
mobile beverage containers out of the waste stream. That does not mean that other programs
should be ruled out. In fact, to most effectively maximize diversion of beverage containers from
the waste stream, there must be a mix of approaches. Nationwide – be it in each state, split up by
regions, or via a national program - there needs to be an inflation adjusted bottle bill that covers
all mobile beverages of all sizes, a single-stream recycling program, and a pay as you throw trash
collection program. A container deposit program must be limited to mobile beverages, for which
it is uniquely qualified. To expand such a program to other containers would likely make it
completely unmanageable and excessively expensive. Curbside recycling is much better suited
to handling the non-mobile containers. To incentivize people to maximally separate recyclables
from non-recyclables, the curbside recycling program should be made single stream (as opposed
to dual stream - requiring separation of aluminum, metals and plastics from paper and cardboard)
and it should be accompanied by a pay-as you-throw trash collection program, whereby residents
pay garbage disposal fees proportional to the amount they throw out. Oftentimes municipalities
effect such a program by requiring residents to pay a specific amount to buy uniquely marked
trash bags – the number of bags placed out for weekly collection determines that resident’s trash
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removal fee. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, pay-as-you-throw programs
reduce waste, and therefore increase curbside recycling – by 25 to 35 percent (O’Donnell, 2012)
There’s an interesting approach to increasing recycling rates for all recyclable packaging,
including mobile containers, that is gaining traction: Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR).
Under EPR, legislation would require that companies collect and recycle a certain percentage of
the packaging they produce; however, the mechanism(s) for meeting that percentage would be
left to the companies to design and implement. (Franklin, 1997) This in an exciting proposition,
especially considering that EPR programs for packaging have been in place for some 20 years in
Europe and (not as long) in Canada. (Fishbein, 1998). Those programs have led to many
innovations that have reduced the amount of materials in original packaging, and have increased
the rate of recycling for the packaging that still exists.
In the United States, battle lines are being drawn between large corporations and their trade
groups for and against EPR programs, especially mandated ones. For instance, on one hand
Nestle Waters NA and Coca-Cola are speaking up in favor of legislated, mandatory EPR for
packaging; while on the other hand Proctor & Gamble, General Mills and the Grocery
Manufacturers Association are pushing back and calling for some sort of voluntary EPR
programs. EPR proponents counter-argue that voluntary programs don’t work, that the bigger
companies pay the costs for EPR programs while laggards enjoy a free ride. (Westervelt, 2012).
A mandatory EPR program for all packaging, involving all package producers and users would
spread costs and make them cheaper on an individual basis.
Such a market-driven approach to making producers internalize hitherto externalized costs
would seemingly be more attractive to those opposed to government mandates and regulations;
however the political climate in this country is such that imposition of more regulation, even if
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it’s less intrusive and market based, is going away from what the ruling extremists scream is
needed – reduced and removed regulations and program mandates.
A major driver helping to make EPR programs increasingly attractive is the cost savings
the packagers would realize from the greatly increased volume of recycled materials. It is far
less expensive to remanufacture packaging from ingredients with recycled content than from
virgin materials. It is also becoming costlier from a public and investor relations perspective to
continue stonewalling about being socially responsible. (Washburn, 2012).
Nestle Waters NA and Coca-Cola have lobbied long and hard against container deposit
programs, which are a form of EPR, yet they are now pushing for state-level legislated EPR
programs. (Washburn, 2012). Why this dichotomy? Some reasons have already been
mentioned. One is that EPR programs, especially after being implemented in several states,
would spread the wealth so that many more companies producing or handling both mobile and
non-mobile packaging would spread and thin the financial burden involved in closing the loop.
Also, unlike container deposit programs, the packaging producers would be able to simply shift
some or all of the costs for EPR, in the form of higher prices for many of the packaged goods.
To counter that concern, producers and proponents argue, reasonably, that EPR would drive
down or eliminate fees that consumers pay for municipal and curb-side recycling.
A plausible case to be made is that, by pushing EPR and fighting bottle bills, companies in
the mobile container business are indefinitely delaying implementation of any program that
increases the national recycling rate, especially of plastics. By doing that, they will continue to
reap unreasonable profits while making taxpayers and the planet pay for their externalized costs.
Regardless of that viewpoint’s accuracy, there is growing sentiment that delaying action has to
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 16
end, and end right away – the recycling rate for mobile containers must increase dramatically and
quickly.
How do we reverse things, get companies and their executives to be more socially
responsible so that the recycling rate for mobile containers, and all packaging, is raised as
quickly as possible and to levels like 75% or higher? The first step is not obvious until stated –
there must be a repeal of the Citizens United decision that has given corporations carte blanche
to pour unlimited funds into influencing elections and politicians. Simultaneously, there needs to
be passage of a constitutional amendment that prevents future reinstatement of free
speech/political influence for corporations and industry front groups. From there, state and
federal environmental and economic agencies need to form partnerships and embark on a multi-
channel ongoing campaign to educate their citizenry about the many and severe economic,
ecological, environmental and public health costs associated with the current cradle-to-grave
throwaway attitude that drives production and consumption of all goods, especially plastics, of
which mobile beverage containers compose a significant share.
Such an education campaign properly includes solutions. For reduction and recycling of
plastic packaging and beverage containers, the only solution that fulfills the cradle-to-cradle
theme that defines sustainability is one that incorporates all the approaches described in this
paper. As recap, those approaches are implementation of right-priced beverage container deposit
laws for comprehensive capture of all or nearly all types and sizes of mobile beverage
containers; single-stream curbside recycling programs that maximize convenience for people;
pay-as-you-throw trash disposal programs that incentivize the curbside recycling; and extended
producer responsibility programs that correctly shift costs from taxpayers to producers and
consumers, and that motivate design of reduced material packaging and increases of recycled
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 17
content in the packaging. Bottle bills should be emplaced before extended responsibility
programs, since they are far simpler and already being used in 10 states, and target an otherwise
uncaptured market segment that disproportionately contributes to littering and ocean garbage
patches.
The education campaign will lay the groundwork; efforts, hopefully successful, to pass a
constitutional amendment denying that corporations are people and that spending is free speech
will weaken the outsized political influence of those corporations. After that, passage of
legislation in states and regions, and perhaps on a national level, will become considerably more
attainable.
High population percentages are in favor of recycling, waste reduction, bottle bills and
pursuit of sustainability. Referendums represent the best way to successfully leverage that
popularity and move from attainability to reality. Yes, there are states that will have populations
that defeat some or all of the referendums. However, there are also states that will pass the
referendums. Those states will grow in number and their waste streams will shrink. As accrue
both the benefits of the programs and the costs of staying with the status quo, the
nonparticipating states will eventually come on board, to the collective relief and salvation of all
life in this country.
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Limited Bottle Bills Stuck At Ten States 18
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