A

FEW months' experience in long

range daylight bombing under the

peculiar conditions of European air

warfare is now behind the US Army

Eighth Air Force. The RAF gained

some knowledge of the work and its

difficulties during the first year of the

war with forces which rarely exceeded

one-tenth of those normally sent down

on important missions by the bomber

command of the Eighth Air Force.

Since then, daylight raiding at long

range has been practiced only on

isolated occasions by the RAF. A

formation of Lancasters did good

work against the Messerschmitt works

at Augsburg on April 17, 1942, and a

bigger force ― some 90 Lancasters in

all ― made a resounding attack on the

Schneider works at Le Creusot,

France, on October 17, 1942. The

many raids made deep into Germany

by Fortresses and Liberators since

midsummer have been undertaken in

the face of the heaviest defenses the

Luftwaffe has been able to muster.

They will rank as classic examples

of that school of thought in air warfare

which holds that powerful defensive

fire is the best protection for a bomber

formation raiding in daylight over long

stretches of heavily defended enemy

territory. The RAF was firmly

committed to that policy for years

before the war. The US Army Air

Forces are still devoted to it. When

Gen Henry H Arnold was in England

during September he declared

forcefully his intention of using

cannon, rockets or whatever might be

necessary to get his bombers through

to targets in Germany.

Nothing could have been more

skillfully organized or more

courageously performed than those

great raids into eastern and southern

Germany. In every instance they were

successful. The quality of the bombing

was magnificent, as numerous

reconnaissance pictures taken after the

event have shown. The defensive work

done by the raiding formations must

have been equally good as judged by

the reports of enemy fighters shot

down. The majority of these fell to the

machine guns of the bombers and only

a small proportion were claimed by the

escorting fighters ― usually Repub1ic

Thunderbolts with long range tanks.

Here are two points to be noted in

any attempt to sum up the experience

gained by the large American

formations which are now operating in

Europe. The crossfire and the banked

or tiered fire of American formations

is highly effective. On the other hand,

the performance of a long range

fighter, never yet effective against that

of the interceptor fighter, has not, in

this instance, sufficed to protect the

bombers it escorted from close and

deadly combat. The cost of daylight

raiding at long range, therefore, still

remains high wherever the enemy can

direct large intercepting forces of high

performance aircraft against the

formations on the inward and outward

journeys.

General Arnold remarked that any

fighter attacking a Fortress formation

head-on (a favorite method of the

Germans for several months), would

have 48 guns bearing down on him. If

it tried to come in above, it would have

the fire of 50 guns to meet. That fire

undoubtedly proved formidable and

the Germans had to find some way of

attacking without entering that field of

fire. Recent reports have mentioned

the use of rocket shells and the

dropping of bombs on the bomber

formations from above. The latter

device probably need not be taken

seriously. As to the success of the

rocket shells nothing, of course, has

been said.

A strict security rule forbids handing

to the enemy any information which

would tell him whether one weapon is

proving more effective than another.

What can be said is that the Luftwaffe

has given a great deal of attention to

lengthening the range of its fire against

the American formations. There was a

time when the fighters tried to pick off

the flank machines with long range

shell fire then closed in to finish them

off as soon as they began to lag. At the

time of writing, rocket-driven shells

are being tried.

Whatever the truth may be about

tactics, there have occasionally been

heavy losses in the bomber formations.

On certain of the more hazardous

operations, such as those against the

Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti and the

big ball-bearing works at Schweinfurt,

heavy losses were to be expected and

were justly accepted in return for the

serious blows delivered at the enemy.

At times, the losses suffered on shorter

runs have seemed to be high, rising

perhaps to the neighborhood of 10 per

cent. If that should prove to be an

average rate of loss it would suggest

that, distance for distance, daylight

raiding with the best arrangements of

defensive armaments and grouping,

and with the aid of long range escorts,

is nearly twice as costly as night-

raiding.

If a balance-sheet had to be drawn

up for purposes of comparison many

things would have to be taken into

account. American daylight bombing

is precision bombing directed against

particular targets of special value to

the enemy. British night bombing is

area bombing directed against a whole

center of industrial activity. How much

productive capacity is destroyed for

each bomber lost on the respective

kinds of operation could only be

estimated if much more detailed

reports of the damage were available

than have yet been put at the disposal

of the press. Nor is any such

comparison the object of this survey.

The determining factor, when once the

strategic significance of a certain

bombing program has been

established, is the accepted

replacement rate.

Everything in the last resort depends

on production and training, provided

the spirit and efficiency of bomber

crews is not lowered by a sense of

being asked to undertake undue risks.

So long as the combat chances are

even the crews are content to take

them ― and the figures show that the

odds are still in favor of the bombers.

Production and training are moving

upwards and the replacement factor

seems likely to be able to meet the

circumstances in the European theater

and leave plenty of room for

expansion. In the long run the damage

done in Germany by the bombers

should weaken the fighter plane

opposition they have to meet in the air.

Nevertheless, losses are regrettable

whenever they have to be accepted and

at the present stage they are high

enough to warrant some consideration

of the less popular school of thought,

which, throughout the period of. the

self-defense creed, has held that the

finest protection for the bomber is

speed. This policy involves some

sacrifice in load and range. It also

involves putting some demands on the

bomber crew which informed opinion

has always declared could not safely

be imposed. It means asking a crew to

forego the chance of a scrap and to run

away instead. That, the experts have

said, is no way to treat a soldier and no

way to expect a soldier to allow

himself to be treated.

Nevertheless we in Great Britain

seem likely to give the idea a trial with

the Mosquito. As a bomber, it carries

no guns and its crew consists of only

two. Some idea of the range it can be

given with a fair bomb load is shown

by its frequent night raids on Berlin, a

round trip of 1,000 to 1,200 miles.

This is an airplane which is faster than

most fighters. It has escaped from

fighter attack by means of its speed

time after time and it does promise to

afford a test on a small scale, perhaps,

of the theory that speed is a bomber's

best protection against both flak and

fighter opposition.

The scale will have to be small

because of the demands that arise for

Mosquitoes for other purposes than

bombing. A fighter version has had

notable success over the Bay of Biscay

against German long range fighters

sent out to oppose the aircraft of the

RAF Coastal Command which attack

submarines near their home posts. The

Mosquito does excellent work on

photographic reconnaissance and there

are certain other duties it may

undertake. Large fleets of Mosquito

bombers, therefore, may not be built

up quickly but no signs have appeared

in the Mosquito squadrons of the RAF

that the crews resent their inability to

fight back. They seem well enough

pleased with the relative certainty of

getting back.

In a small country like Britain the

difficulty is more likely to be

operational. To deliver the same

weight of bombs as are now taken to

distant targets by the "heavies," twice

as many Mosquitoes would be needed.

Multiplying the force without

increasing the load would be judged

uneconomic in these days when high

concentrations of bombs are the aim

and yet, given speed of the order of the

Mosquito, two raids in quick

succession would probably yield

similar results. In the course of 1944

we undoubtedly shall have a chance to

see the theory in practice.

The alternative to using speed is to

develop the defenses of the bomber

formations. The Germans have already

accused the Eighth Air Force of using

"flying cruisers" carrying 30 guns

each. This idea was advocated by the

writer Golovine before the war. He

proposed the design of "destroyer"

aircraft for escort and defensive work.

Their use would be a logical

development of day raiding against

strong defenses, especially if, as is

likely, the arming of bombers with

long range guns should present

awkward problems.

For the main assault against

Germany both the United States and

Britain are committed to the heavy

type of bomber. It is too late now to

rearrange production training and

strategy on a new basis and the point

to be resolved is that of self-defense.

Rearmament plans develop slowly and

the solution will probably be found

partly in better escort aircraft and

partly in the increasing exhaustion of

Germany's power to oppose the air

raids by day and by night.

This column was originally published

in the January, 1944, issue of Flying

magazine, vol 34, no 1, pp 72, 160.

Photo credited to International News

Photos.