center of excellence evolving modern peace operations col (ret) peter leentjes center of excellence...

Center of Excellence

EVOLVING MODERN EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONSPEACE OPERATIONS

Col (Ret) Peter LeentjesCenter of Excellence inDisaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance


PEACE OPERATIONS

Examine a ModelExamine a Model Establish the EnvironmentEstablish the Environment Discuss Evolution in the 90sDiscuss Evolution in the 90s Principles and PoliciesPrinciples and Policies Challenges and OptionsChallenges and Options

The Complex Emergency Model


Definition

“A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a dramatic disruption in the

political, economic and social situation, resulting from internal or external conflict or natural disaster, seriously disrupting the population’s capacity to survive and the national authorities’

capacity to respond, and which requires a consolidated multi-sectoral international response”

IASC of the United Nations


ModernComplex Emergencies

DisasterResponse

HumanitarianAssistance

PeaceOperations


DisasterResponse


PeaceOperations

Range of Military Activity

Support

Combat

Security ComplianceOperations

Support Security



DisasterResponse


PeaceOperations

Range of Civilian Activity

Support

CM

Humanitar

ianMitig

ation




DisasterManagement


PeaceOperations

Civil - Military Coordination


PEACEKEEPINGPEACEKEEPING

Pragmatic Solution - No Legal BasisPragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis

For 40 + years peacekeeping was:For 40 + years peacekeeping was:

– Based on resolution of interstate conflictBased on resolution of interstate conflict

– Conducted post an agreementConducted post an agreement

– Separated Forces or Monitored AgreementsSeparated Forces or Monitored Agreements

Classic or Traditional PeacekeepingClassic or Traditional Peacekeeping


FEATURES OF CLASSIC FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPINGPEACEKEEPING

• Interstate ConflictInterstate Conflict

• Governments Functioning and in Control Governments Functioning and in Control

• Government Infrastructure intactGovernment Infrastructure intact

• Military and Police Structures operatingMilitary and Police Structures operating

• Judicial Systems in placeJudicial Systems in place

• International Rules operableInternational Rules operable

• Minimum Contact with PopulationMinimum Contact with Population

• Minimum Involvement with Civilian Minimum Involvement with Civilian AgenciesAgencies


Traditional peacekeepingTraditional peacekeeping Implementation of Complex Agreements and Implementation of Complex Agreements and

SettlementsSettlements Preventive DeploymentPreventive Deployment Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping ForceObservation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force Co-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping ForcesCo-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping Forces Provision of Humanitarian AidProvision of Humanitarian Aid Peace EnforcementPeace Enforcement

EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGESCHALLENGES


FEATURES OF MODERN FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPINGPEACEKEEPING

• Intra-state ConflictIntra-state Conflict

• Governments ineffective or not in controlGovernments ineffective or not in control

• Factional Political Groupings & LeadershipFactional Political Groupings & Leadership

• State Infrastructure broken downState Infrastructure broken down

• Judicial & Police Breakdown Judicial & Police Breakdown

• Military factions & WarlordsMilitary factions & Warlords

• Weapons proliferationWeapons proliferation

• There are no RulesThere are no Rules

• Intermingled with PopulationsIntermingled with Populations

• Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOsFull Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs

NEW YORK TIMES““Rethinking and retrenchment are in Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ... There should be a shift back order ... There should be a shift back towards more limited objectives towards more limited objectives likelike

policing cease-fires”. “UN peacekeeping policing cease-fires”. “UN peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It makes does what it can do very well. It makes

no sense to continue eroding it’s no sense to continue eroding it’s credibility by asking it to do what it credibility by asking it to do what it

cannot”.cannot”.

New York Times - 1996New York Times - 1996


“ “Traditional peacekeeping operations Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold of the kind deployed during the Cold

War are unlikely to be repeated. War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only Peacekeeping today requires not only

re-thinking the means but also the re-thinking the means but also the methods of implementing mandates methods of implementing mandates

set out by the Security Council.set out by the Security Council.

Secretary-General Kofi AnnanSecretary-General Kofi Annan

19981998


CHAPTER VI VERSUS

CHAPTER VII


CHAPTER VI Peaceful settlement of disputesPeaceful settlement of disputes The Council provides assistance at the request of the The Council provides assistance at the request of the

partiesparties Council has authority to investigateCouncil has authority to investigate Investigation is not normally military until accord is Investigation is not normally military until accord is

arranged – then military assess role a peace operation arranged – then military assess role a peace operation could playcould play

A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful resolution A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful resolution of the disputeof the dispute

PKO assists in consolidating the peace and building PKO assists in consolidating the peace and building confidenceconfidence

Forces are lightly armed for self defenseForces are lightly armed for self defense


As a result there are conditions to a Chapter As a result there are conditions to a Chapter VI operation:VI operation:– Consent of the parties is requiredConsent of the parties is required– A cease-fire needs to be effectiveA cease-fire needs to be effective– A comprehensive agreement should be signedA comprehensive agreement should be signed– Parties assist the deployment of the forceParties assist the deployment of the force– Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to

establish the status of the forces – there is no other establish the status of the forces – there is no other legal basis under Chapter VI)legal basis under Chapter VI)

– Self-defense ROE are developedSelf-defense ROE are developed

CHAPTER VI


CHAPTER VII“The Decision to Use Enforcement Power” Conflict is ongoingConflict is ongoing High risk that conflict may start againHigh risk that conflict may start again Parties are not in agreementParties are not in agreement Rogue elements are not included (increased risk to UN forces Rogue elements are not included (increased risk to UN forces

– force protection)– force protection) Risk of external interventionRisk of external intervention Presence of other national forces in the areaPresence of other national forces in the area Risky internal situation – violence / human rights abuses / Risky internal situation – violence / human rights abuses /

banditry / weaponsbanditry / weapons Self defense insufficient to protect deployed forcesSelf defense insufficient to protect deployed forces A legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (SOFA A legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (SOFA

cannot be agreed)cannot be agreed)


CHAPTER VII“The Use of Force”

Chapter VII Chapter VII – does not tell you to use force activelydoes not tell you to use force actively– is not combat operation is not combat operation

Provides the full range of options including up to Provides the full range of options including up to and including enforcement powersand including enforcement powers– Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to

international peace and securityinternational peace and security– Non use of force options –ie sanctionsNon use of force options –ie sanctions– Use of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resortUse of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resort

Establishes the legal context for intervention and Establishes the legal context for intervention and the use of forcethe use of force


CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST

Chapter VI Chapter VII

•Parties request assistance•Commit to peaceful resolution•Political will of the parties•Consent to the operation•Effective cease-fire•Comprehensive agreement•Parties assist the deployment •Signature of SOFA

PKO assists in consolidating the peace

•Conflict is ongoing•Risk of renewed conflict high•Parties not in agreement•Risky internal situation•Rogue elements not included•Risk of external intervention•Presence of foreign forces•Self defense judged insufficient•Legal basis for intervention needed•SOFA

PKO enforces the will of the SC


PEACE CONFLICT WAR

PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT

Chapter VIChapter VI Chapter VIIChapter VII

Pacific Pacific Settlement of Settlement of

DisputesDisputes

Chapter VIII: Regional ArrangementsChapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

Action with Respect Action with Respect to to

Threats to the Peace, Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,

and and Acts of AggressionActs of Aggression


Separation of Forces

Truce Supervision

PEACE CONFLICT WAR

Supervision of Elections

Restore Civil Institutions

Preventive Deployment

Civil Police Operations

Economic Assistance

Transition Assistance

Demining

Protection

Disarmament

Human Rights Monitoring

Collective Enforcement

Gross Violation ofHuman Rights

Peace Restoration

Regional Enforcement

Ecological Disaster

Humanitarian Aid

Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

Safe Areas

Co - Deployment



1990 ISSUES

Wider Range of TasksWider Range of Tasks Change in the Composition and Needs of Change in the Composition and Needs of

Missions Missions Only the Traditional Model of Only the Traditional Model of

Peacekeeping AvailablePeacekeeping Available


SECURITY COUNCILATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE

PROBLEMS IN THE 90’s

• A wider application of the peacekeeping model

• Development of hybrid mandates


PEACE CONFLICT WAR


Truce Supervision



Economic Assistance




Demining

Protection

Disarmament


Humanitarian Aid




Peace Restoration

Regional Enforcement

Ecological Disaster

Safe Areas

Co - Deployment



PEACE CONFLICT WAR


Truce Supervision



Economic Assistance




Demining

Protection

Disarmament


Humanitarian Aid




Peace Restoration

RegionalEnforcement

Ecological Disaster

Safe Areas


Co - Deployment


PEACE CONFLICT WAR


Truce Supervision



Economic Assistance




Demining

Protection

Disarmament


Humanitarian Aid




Peace Restoration

RegionalEnforcement

Ecological Disaster

Safe Areas



Chapter VII Tools Comprehensive Mandate Comprehensive Mandate Clear Military TasksClear Military Tasks Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Robust Force Structures (Equipped and

Trained)Trained) Effective Command and Control StructureEffective Command and Control Structure Authority to Use Force AppropriatelyAuthority to Use Force Appropriately

– Robust Rules of EngagementRobust Rules of Engagement

Legal Basis for InterventionLegal Basis for Intervention


WHAT CAN THE UN DO?

Classic PeacekeepingClassic Peacekeeping Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VI Reinforced with

Chapter VII elementsChapter VII elements

Any Operation with Sustained Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations – this requires a Combat Operations – this requires a coalition of the willing / lead nation / coalition of the willing / lead nation / multi national forcemulti national force

WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?


CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENTOPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

UN has no Combat Operations CapabilityUN has no Combat Operations Capability LogisticsLogistics

– no combat logistics systemno combat logistics system– contractor based supportcontractor based support

Authority over National ForcesAuthority over National Forces– authority uncertainauthority uncertain– inadequate command & control stuctureinadequate command & control stucture– nations reaction to forces under threatnations reaction to forces under threat

Different CulturesDifferent Cultures– military culturesmilitary cultures– leadership & managerial backgroundsleadership & managerial backgrounds– training standardstraining standards


The UN may authorize a region / coalition to The UN may authorize a region / coalition to conduct the missionconduct the mission– To a regional organizationTo a regional organization– A coalition of the willing (MNF)A coalition of the willing (MNF)– A framework / lead nation in a coalitionA framework / lead nation in a coalition– To a Nation capable of executing the missionTo a Nation capable of executing the mission

The UN may decide to mange the missionThe UN may decide to mange the mission– Form a UN multi-national forceForm a UN multi-national force– Designate a framework / lead nation conceptDesignate a framework / lead nation concept

OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES


WHY AUTHORIZE

The operation has a high risk of combat The operation has a high risk of combat operations taking placeoperations taking place

UN missions take a long time to deploy and UN missions take a long time to deploy and deployment time is criticaldeployment time is critical

Support for funding cannot be generatedSupport for funding cannot be generated A region or coalition offers forcesA region or coalition offers forces


UN MANDATED OPERATIONS COALITION OF THE WILLING / MNFCOALITION OF THE WILLING / MNF

– UN mandate authorizes the missionUN mandate authorizes the mission– Lead nation generates the forcesLead nation generates the forces– Lead Nation appoints Force commanderLead Nation appoints Force commander– Participating Nations pay all costsParticipating Nations pay all costs– Lead Nation coordinates & provides day to day political directionLead Nation coordinates & provides day to day political direction– Lead Nation coordinates & provides ROELead Nation coordinates & provides ROE

UN FORCE UN FORCE – UN sponsored missionUN sponsored mission– UN generates the forcesUN generates the forces– UN appoints Force CommanderUN appoints Force Commander– Mission paid by assessed contributionsMission paid by assessed contributions– Political direction by UN (through DPKO)Political direction by UN (through DPKO)– UN ROEUN ROE


PEACE CONFLICT WAR


Truce Supervision



Economic Assistance




Demining

Protection

Disarmament


Humanitarian Aid




Peace Restoration

RegionalEnforcement

Ecological Disaster

Safe Areas


TYPICAL COALITION / MNF MANDATE


PEACE CONFLICT WAR


Truce Supervision



Economic Assistance




Demining

Protection

Disarmament


Humanitarian Aid




Peace Restoration

RegionalEnforcement

Ecological Disaster

Safe Areas


TYPICAL UN PKO FORCE MANDATE


CHANGING PRECEPTS

Limitations onLimitations on– ResourcesResources– Political effortPolitical effort– Military sacrificeMilitary sacrifice

Revision of principlesRevision of principles–SovereigntySovereignty–ConsentConsent

Impartial statusImpartial status

Broader range of tasksBroader range of tasks

Time constraintsTime constraints

Humanitarian Basis Humanitarian Basis for Interventionfor Intervention


CONSENTWho Gives Consent?

International BodiesInternational Bodies– UN Security CouncilUN Security Council

– UN General AssemblyUN General Assembly

TCNsTCNs

Third PartiesThird Parties

Parties to the Conflict Parties to the Conflict Military OrganizationsMilitary Organizations Military FactionsMilitary Factions Local CommandersLocal Commanders WarlordsWarlords

ProvidesProvidesLegitimacyLegitimacy

Strategic LevelStrategic LevelEnvironmentEnvironment

Operational & Operational & Tactical Level Tactical Level EnvironmentEnvironment


NO MILITARY SOLUTION

Blunt instrument Blunt instrument of political power of political power

End state can only End state can only be political, economic be political, economic and social in natureand social in nature

Military can Military can

–temporizetemporize

–maintain situationmaintain situation

–reduce levels of violencereduce levels of violence

–induce complianceinduce compliance

ExpensiveExpensive tool tool


SUPPORT OPERATIONS

MILITARYMILITARYOPERATIONSOPERATIONSM

ILIT

AR

MIL

ITA

RYY

CIV

ILIA

CIV

ILIA

NN

CRISISCRISIS STABILISATIONSTABILISATION

ECONOMICECONOMIC& SOCIAL& SOCIAL

LIFELIFESUPPORTSUPPORT

OPERATIONAL PHASES

LIFELIFESAVINGSAVING

POLITICALPOLITICAL

5 to 10 years?


UNITED NATIONS UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE

SRSG

Deputy SRSG

Human Rights Component

Military Force Humanitarian Component

Election Component

Police Component

Administrative component

Observer Force

National Authorities UN SG


COALITION OR LEAD NATION COALITION OR LEAD NATION PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE

Military Force

Coalition NCAs

SRSG

Deputy SRSG

Human Rights Component

Humanitarian Component

Election Component

Police Component

Administrative component

Observer Force

UN SG

Component

Component

Component

Component


ReconstructionHuman Rights

Military Role in Peace Operations

SRSG

Deputy

ElectionsHumanitariansCIVPOLMilitary Force

Primarymilitarymission

securitytraining supportsecurity / protection / transport

security on sites / protection / transport / medicalemergency medical

assistance to the election process

Development

secure environment / engineering /transport / materielassistance to the reconstruction process

Manage the mandate

Coordinate effort of components

Provide unity of effort

assistance to long term development


REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS FOR A FOR A

SUCCESSFUL SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATIONPEACE OPERATION

LegitimacyLegitimacy– Consent -at key levelsConsent -at key levels– Legal BasisLegal Basis

CredibilityCredibility– Credible ForceCredible Force– Achievable Mandate and Military PlanAchievable Mandate and Military Plan

Operating EnvironmentOperating Environment– Signed AgreementSigned Agreement– End State with achievable goalsEnd State with achievable goals– Integration of Effort with other ComponentsIntegration of Effort with other Components


SUMMARY OF CHANGESSUMMARY OF CHANGES

Chapter VII Operations will be the normChapter VII Operations will be the norm Multi-dimensional, Multi-national OperationsMulti-dimensional, Multi-national Operations Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and Social Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and Social

SolutionsSolutions Integration of Tasks under One MandateIntegration of Tasks under One Mandate Full Range of Civilian InterventionFull Range of Civilian Intervention New Coordination MechanismNew Coordination Mechanism Broader Range of Military TasksBroader Range of Military Tasks Complementary Roles for ComponentsComplementary Roles for Components

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