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Lecture # 2 Geo Strategic Signifcance o Central Asia Central Asia

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Central Asia
 
The regions of Central Asia and Caspian Sea have strategic value, particularly considering
oil and gas reserves, which also represent a peril to the regional security. The "Great
Game" of 19th century etween the !ritish mpire and #ussia mpire, has changed to the
$ew Great Game on the threshold of the %1st Century.
After centuries of #ussian dominance, Central Asia ecame a region with five independent
states. The #ussian influence declined in the 199&s, only to return gradually, ut its rivals
have shown up.
 The natural resources of Central Asia are significant' lessed with oil, natural gas, cotton,
gold, and hydroelectric potential, the Central Asian economies are also growing and
stepping away from their post(Soviet decline. conomic growth has een strong in the post(
Soviet era, fueled y gas and oil deposits in )a*a+hstan, and Tur+menistan gold in the
)yrgy* #epulic and, cotton in -*e+istan.
The geo(political significance of the Caspian region stems from the fact that it is situated at
the intersection connecting urope, the iddle ast, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
/or the new repulics of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea is not only their only waterway ut
also an important source of food and related products. /or these states, unhindered access
to the sea is a fundamental national o0ective.
 
 
The importance of this region is also contriuted to
the fact that it is located net to what may e termed
as a geo(strategic melting pot, 2est Asia. The cross
currents of Ara(3sraeli rivalry, intra(Ara hostility
and the conflict etween 3ran and 3ra4, have all
comined to +eep this oil rich region in a state of
continuous turmoil and instaility, leading to periodic
wars. 3n the changed geo(political environment, it is
not entirely unli+ely that the CA# may now e
dragged into these conflicts, with some scholars
 
 The USA and China has started a quest for Central Asian and Caspian Sea oil
and gas. The US presence in Iraq, the US and NATO’s presence in
Afghanistan, US military ases, !ussian presence and military ases, China’s rising in"uence, Iran’s and Tur#ey’s pro$imity to the region, and military and
economic alliances, sho% that Central Asia is an arena of great po%er ri&alry.
 The alance of po%er, instaility and struggle for control o&er oil and gas reser&es mean that the ne% 'reat 'ame has started.
 The 'reat 'ame is a (ritish term for %hat %as seen y the (ritish to e
strategic ri&alry and con"ict et%een the (ritish and the !ussian )mpire for
supremacy in Central Asia.
 The classic 'reat 'ame period is generally regarded as running
appro$imately from the *+* to the Anglo-!ussian Con&ention of */0.
 The importance of )urasia as a 1orld-island %as recogni2ed y Sir Halford J. Mackinder in his oo# Democratic Ideals and Reality in 1919, the same book in which the 3eartland concept %as introduced. )&en efore that, 4ac#inder
had identi5ed the area in the north and central part of )urasia, and named it
The eo!ra"hical #i$ot of History 6referred to also as 7i&ot8 in */9. 3e considered this area to e the most important part of the 1orld, in terms of
geo-strategy.
 
Strategic and economic relations in Central Asia are characteri2ed y the ri&al geostrategic of the USA and strategies of !ussia and China, and the reason for their interest is mainly geo-economics, since the region, together %ith the Caspian Sea, contains &ast oil and gas 5elds.
 
Rationale o the Ne Great Ga!e in Central Asia
  *. The energy supplies are located in a part of the %orld %hich is &ery unstale and di<cult to reach from neighoring regions, ecause of physical arriers and lac# of infrastructure in the areas located south and south%est of Central Asia;
  =. There are many ri&al, potentially hostile players in the international geopolitical arena that ha&e a ma>or goal in pre&enting the other players from ecoming deeply in&ol&ed in Central Asian a?airs and gaining a larger portion of control o&er its energy resources;
  . A superpo%er from outside the region 6USA8 and a great po%er on the region’s orders 6China8 ine&italy %ant to shun !ussian territory in order to end fore&er the dependence on transporting and e$porting Central Asian oil and gas through the !ussian, e$-So&iet infrastructure. Their o>ecti&es are in opposition to those of !ussia in retaining the dependence of oil and gas e$ports from Central Asia on its infrastructure;
 
Clash o the "S$ Chinese and Russian Strategies in Central Asia
US strategy for Central Asia, an important part of US gloal strategy, gloal y its reach and capailities, %hich %ants to penetrate the region and estalish its in"uence. It is connected %ith the US strategy for the (roader 4iddle )ast region that includes Afghanistan and Iraq. Its postulates are dominated y US interests, %ith support from some )uropean Allies 6NATO memers8;
After the rea#up of the So&iet Union, US policy to%ards Central Asia %as mainly oriented to%ard promoting regional cooperation, and political and economic staility. In its implementation, the USA inclined to multilateral institutions and programs.
 
!ussian strategy, super regional y its reach and capailities, %hich %ants to #eep 1estern in"uence, especially the in"uence of the USA, out of Central Asia. Its second main goal is to #eep Chinese in"uence in Central Asia as %ea# as possile, and, at the same time, to use it against the rising 1estern, predominantly US in"uence;
Chinese strategy, super regional y its reach and capailities, %hich also %ants to in"uence the region, not so much %ith strategic capailities, ut %ith its economic and political in"uence that is rapidly rising. China as the second great %orld economic po%er needs imported energy and in %orld mar#et dominant po%er such as United States control the international trade marine routes of oil transportation, alongside important energy producing region li#e 4iddle )ast, North Africa, 1est Africa, Batin America and )ast Asia. Thus, Central Asian energy resources are a&ailale for China that %ithout outside player can supply energy y intercontinental pipeline net%or# from Central Asia, e&en Iran. Also Central Asian energy resources are constant and useful for Chinas de&eloping economy.
 Therefore in near future China %ill in&est considerale amount in Central Asian and !ussian energy resources and in fact she is perforce to do that.
 
%i&eline %olitics in Central Asia
'eography plays a pi&otal role in the game oard of the Caspian. The land loc#ed status of these countries has increased their reliance for e$port of their energy resources on pipelines that are uilt in foreign territories. They do not ha&e complete control o&er the utili2ation of their natural resources, as they are forced to ship their oil and gas &ia pipelines that run through other countries in order to reach the gloal mar#et.
 
 
(ut increasing production has rendered the e$isting transportation routes inadequate and consequently, !ussia, US, Iran and China proposed some ne% e$port pipelines. The prospecti&e routes suggested y di?erent countries. Central Asian oil and gas has historically "o%ed through !ussian pipelines.
Of course, maintaining this arrangement %ill also mean that !ussia %ill recei&e si2ale transit fees as %ell as ha&e more oil and gas %ith %hich to secure greater le&erage in international politics. China proposes to uild a pipeline of aout /// #m from the Caspian oil 5elds across a2a#hstan and into China to feed its gro%ing economy. Iran %ould pump the oil and gas south into its e$isting net%or#, %hich %ould oost its e?orts to otain a regional leadership position in the 4iddle )ast.
 
 The %estern route of %hich the US is a strong supporter especially the (a#u-Ceyhan pro>ect. This pro>ect %ill transport oil and gas from the Caspian Sea port of (a#u, &ia Tlisi in 'eorgia to the terminal at Ceyhan in Tur#ey and to the other parts of the %orld.  The amount of oil to e transported is roughly one million arrels of oil per day and the US is promoting this pro>ect for ringing the !ussian monopoly of hydrocaron resources e$port to an end. The reason for Tur#ey’s support to this pro>ect is primarily economic.
 
 The Southern route through Iranian territory is another %ay of e$porting gas. The merits of this route include short distance, economic and commercial &iaility as %ell as less en&ironment damage. 3o%e&er, the question of estranged US relations %ith Iran has stalled a meaningful progress on this proposal. US and non US companies ha&e een anned to do usiness %ith Iran under the Iran and Biya Sanctions Act and under US la%s respecti&ely.
 
 
Unocal opted out of this G = illion pro>ect o%ing to the ground realities in Afghanistan. The end of Talian regime in =//*, raised hopes for re&i&ing this pipeline pro>ect. 3o%e&er, the call for a feasiility study in July =// y the Asian e&elopment (an# has put more prolems in its %ay .
 
C'NCL"S('N
 The comination of ri&al strategic and economic interests mean that the region %ill e di&ided et%een the spheres of in"uence of the great po%ers, %hich %ill struggle to #eep and to e$pand the territorial reach and the degree of their control.
  The perception of a geostrategic struggle for in"uence in the region et%een the outside po%ers as a 2ero sum game means that any %ea#ening of their o%n in"uence means strengthening of a ri&al, or ri&als. Since the Central Asian countries are too %ea# to contain these in"uences from outside the region, they are trying to alance et%een them, at the same time and-%agoning %ith the in"uence they 5nd least threatening to themsel&es, and to the region as a %hole.
 
Boo#ing at the struggle et%een Iran, !ussia, China, and the US o&er their preferred pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas gi&es a good glimpse as to the %orlds future geopolitical order.
espite the formidale di<culties in uilding pipelines, those four po%ers are con&erging upon the region %ith an eagerness that is almost desperate. In pre&ious eras, a countrys military %as the sole ariter of her strength, ut today her economy has ecome nearly as important, if not more so, and all industrial economies L and militaries L run on oil and gas.