centralized ras (cras) -west of colorado river sce west of colorado river cras...

CONFIDENTIAL EDISON INTERNATIONAL®

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Team Members:

Ben Coalson, Transmission Strategy and Special Assessments

Bill Zhang, Protection Engineering

Gary Kohler, Power System Controls

Reinhard Koehler, Telecom

Presentation to

WECC RASRS

July 24, 2018

Centralized RAS (CRAS)

-West of Colorado River Southern California Edison


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OBJECTIVE

• Informational Presentation

– Approval of the Design Concept of WoCR CRAS

• Final Approval targeted for

November


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• Ben Coalson

– CRAS System Overview

– Project Overview

– Planning Studies

• Bill Zhang

– RGOOSE & IED Design

• Gary Kohler

– Controller Design

– Analytic and UI Design

– NERC CIP Compliance

• Reinhard Koehler

– Telecom Design

Topics


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CRAS System OverviewBen Coalson


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RAS Key Component

RAS CRAS

Controller EMS (GCC/AGCC) – Arming

Relay (Sub) – Contingency

CCS* (GCC/AGCC) –

Arming + Contingency

Relay Each RAS has a set of dedicated relays – resulting in multiple relays for one line/bank element.

Each line/bank element has dedicated relays – one time installation and commissioning

Communication Point-to-point proprietary protocol OSI Layer 3 international standardized protocol (IEEE 61850-90-5)

*CCS stands for Central Controller System

Fundamental Difference of RAS and CRAS


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Solution Summary

Central Controller System in Control Centers

SISCO UAP

- High speed RAS controller

GE XA/21

- GUI (Monitoring, Editing, Alarm)

- Interface with EMS

Telecommunication Networks

RGOOSE path: Diversely redundant circuits Administration path

Substation

Monitoring and Mitigation relays

Substation Gateways: remote access and file collection

DM


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History

• Apr 2008: SCE gave a tour to RASRS for the pilot project

• Nov 2008: RASRS accepts the proposed design of the CRAS, as presented by SCE, including the Unified Analytic Platform (UAP) and IEC 61850 applications. RASRS believes that this technology will be successful. RASRS does expect to review and approve the final system design, as well as, the implementation for individual schemes.

• Mar 2012: Annual IED RAS testing approach for CRAS presented to RASRS.

• Oct 2013: SCE gives a comprehensive informational presentation of CRAS design to RASRS.


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History (continued)

• Nov 2014: RASRS approves the Colorado River Corridor RAS (stand-alone version), as a WAPS.

• Apr 2015: RASRS approves the CRAS pilot project, including implementation of El Nido and El Segundo RAS analytics, as a WAPS.

• Apr 2016: CRAS pilot project, including implementation of El Nido and El Segundo RAS analytics, in service first time.

• Jun 2016: SCE begins development of RGOOSE protocol for implementation in CRAS. Colorado River Corridor RAS identified as first pre-existing RAS to be converted to CRAS


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Project Overview

Ben Coalson


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West of Colorado River CRASRK

• Automated generation tripping scheme that is needed to facilitate (mostly) renewable generation interconnections in the area of the CAISO-controlled SCE grid spanning the southern portion of the Mojave Desert west of the Colorado River

• Technical evolution of legacy RAS architecture that functionally mirrors the existing Colorado River Corridor RAS

• Protects against 500 kV transmission line and 500/230 kV transformer bank overloads due to high concentration of generation interconnections at Colorado River and Red Bluff substations

• Initial scope covers 500 kV line contingency overloads only; transformer bank protection functionality will be added as future generation projects come on-line


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West of Colorado River CRAS Map


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WoCR CRAS Project ScopeRK

• Deployment of the RGOOSE (IEEE 61850-90-5) Communication Protocol in the Central Controller System at the Grid Control Center and the Alternate Grid Control Center

• Deployment of West of Colorado River RAS analytic in the Central Controller (functionally mirrors existing Colorado River Corridor RAS)

• Deployment of West of Colorado River RAS analytic in the field, including installation of monitoring and mitigation relays, substation gateways, and communication networks at Colorado River, Red Bluff, and Devers substations

• Implementation of EMS operator interfaces

• Compliance with the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) standards and regulations


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Project Timeline

A

B

I

Key

• A – SCE Planning

• B – SCE Engineering & Material

Procurement

• C – SCE Substation Construction

• D – SCE Telecom Eng’g & Pre-

Construction

• E – SCE Final Telecom Construction

D

G

F

We are

here

2016Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2017Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2018Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2019Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

In Production and Final

Testing Period

OD/ In-ServiceDec 14 2018

C

E

• F – Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) 1, 2 & 3 Testing

• G – Phase 1 Testing (SCE Facilities)

• H – Phase 2 Testing w/ Interconnection Customer

• I – Proposed Phase 3 Testing (In-Service & In

Production/ Final Testing)

H

West of Colorado River CRAS

WECC Information

Presentation July 24 - 25

WECC Approval Presentation

November 13 - 15


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System Planning Studies

Ben Coalson


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West of Colorado River CRAS System One Line Diagram


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West of Colorado River CRASPurpose/Operating Principles

• Objective: Detect and mitigate thermal overloads on various 500 kV transmission lines and 500/230 kV ("AA") transformer banks in the West of Colorado River and Red Bluff Substations area.

• Monitoring:

– Status of six 500 kV transmission lines• Colorado River – Red Bluff No. 1 and No. 2• Devers – Red Bluff No. 1 and No. 2• Devers – Valley No. 1 and No. 2*

– Status of four 500/230 kV transformer banks• Colorado River No. 1AA and No. 2AA• Red Bluff No. 1AA and No. 2AA

• Arming and Tripping:

– Arm RAS based on total pre-contingency MW flow– Trip local area generation under N-1 and N-2 contingencies when

arming threshold is exceeded

* Italicized text indicates scope not included at initial deployment


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West of Colorado River CRASPlanning Study Assumptions

• Power Flow Study– Minimum historical load data for off-peak load season

– Maximum historical load data for peak season

– Existing generation dispatch to stress study area

– West of Devers interim project modeled

• Transient Stability Studies– 6-cycle 3-phase fault for N-1 and N-2

– 15-cycle SLG fault stuck breaker condition for N-1 and N-2

– 6-cycle 3-phase fault with tripping of generation modeled at 120-cycles after fault is cleared

– 6-cycle 3-phase fault with delayed generation tripping


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West of Colorado River CRASPlanning Study Assumptions

• Generation Projects Participating in the RAS

– Genesis Project: 250 MW solar thermal project @ Colorado River 230kV Bus (in-service)

– McCoy Project: 250 MW Solar PV project @ Colorado River 230kV Bus (in-service)

– Blythe Solar Project: 485 MW Solar PV project @ Colorado River 230kV Bus (OD: 12/1/2015)

– CAISO Queue #576 Project: 224 MW Photovoltaic project @ Colorado River 230kV Bus



– CAISO Queue #421 Project: 50 MW Photovoltaic project @ Red Bluff 230kV Bus

– Desert Harvest Project: 150 MW Photovoltaic project @ Red Bluff 230kV Bus

– Palen Solar Project: 500 MW thermal solar project @ Red Bluff 230kV Bus


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West of Colorado River CRASPlanning Study Results

• Overloaded Facilities

Contingency Overloaded Facilities

Colorado River - Red Bluff No. 1 500 kV Line Colorado River - Red Bluff No. 2 500 kV Line

Colorado River - Red Bluff No. 2 500 kV Line Colorado River - Red Bluff No. 1 500 kV Line

Devers - Red Bluff No. 1 500 kV Line Devers - Red Bluff No. 2 500 kV Line

Devers - Red Bluff No. 2 500 kV Line Devers - Red Bluff No. 1 500 kV Line

Devers - Red Bluff No. 1 and No. 2 500 kV Lines Colorado River - Palo Verde 500 kV Line

Colorado River 1AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank Colorado River 2AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank

Colorado River 2AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank Colorado River 1AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank

Red Bluff 1AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank Red Bluff 2AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank

Red Bluff 2AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank Red Bluff 1AA 500/230 kV Transformer Bank

• No transient stability problems were triggered by the addition of generation projects with the WoCR CRAS in operation


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R-GOOSE and IED Design

Bill Zhang


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WoCR CRAS Block Diagram


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CRAS Line Monitor Relays

• Standardized Logic– Uses GE N60 relays

– One relay monitors up to two lines/banks

– Line/bank open condition determined from 52b switches with undercurrent supervision

– External protection trip inputs to speed up line/bank open detection

– External circuit breaker maintenance switch input for each monitored circuit breaker

– Separate CB Disagreement alarms for each monitored circuit breaker

– Separate CB Error alarms for each monitored line/bank


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• Communicates with Central Processors via R-GOOSE

• Communicates with companion relay in opposite CRAS subsystem via Direct I/O for CB Disagreement comparison between subsystems

• Physical output contacts for GOOSE Fail, Direct I/O Fail, and Relay Fail.

– All other alarms sent via R-GOOSE

• Physical contact input for opposite relay failure

• Front-panel pushbutton to place relay in Test Mode


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• Annual Test Function

– Relay is first placed into Test Mode by controller

– Relay is then placed into Annual Test Mode by controller

• Relay blocks CB Disagreement alarms

• Relay bypasses undercurrent supervision logic

• Relay sends “Blocked” indication to controller

– Controller then sends “Operate” command(s)

• Relay closes contacts that energize 52b inputs, causing a Line-Out condition to occur

• Line-Out condition does not trigger any RAS operation since relay is in Test Mode

• Relay echoes back received “Operate” commands to validate correct number of received commands


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CRAS Dual Mitigation Relays and Target Relays

• Standardized Logic

– Uses GE N60 relays

– Two-out-of-three voting for tripping (2 out of 3 UAPs) for each subsystem

– One mitigation relay can trip up to two mitigation targets

– Targets can have multiple relays. Multiple relays that trip the same target operate together simultaneously

– One target relay can trip up to four circuit breakers and initiate four breaker failure relays


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– Dual Mitigation Relays and Target Relays connected together via dedicated Direct I/O fibers

– R-GOOSE interface in SCE relays

– Trip output contacts in Target relays

– Trip circuit monitoring in Target relays

– Generator output metering in Target relays, sent to SCE relays via Direct Analog communications


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• Dual Mitigation Relays communicate with Central Processors via R-GOOSE

• Physical output contacts for GOOSE Fail, Relay Fail, Test Mode, and Trip Indication to DFR

– All other alarms sent via R-GOOSE

• Physical contact inputs for opposite relay failure, opposite relay in Test Mode, and opposite relay blocked.

• Front-panel pushbutton to place relay in Test Mode



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CRAS Dual Mitigation Relays

• Annual Test Function

– Relay is first placed into Test Mode by controllers

– Relay is then placed into Annual Test Mode by controllers

• Relay disconnects trip coils from trip output contacts and substitutes dummy load resistors in their place

• Relay disables Trip Circuit Monitor alarms

• Relay sends “Blocked” indication to controllers

– Controllers then send “Operate” commands

• Trip commands pass through 2-out-of-3 voting logic

• Successful output from voter closes trip output contacts

• Current flowing through dummy loads is detected by trip output contacts

• Relay sends “Load Shed” indication to controllers

• Relay echoes back received “Operate” commands to validate correct number of received commands


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Relay Status Monitoring

• Line Monitor Relays:– Relay failure (via RTU/Annunciator and opposite relay R-GOOSE)

– Direct I/O failure (via RTU/Annunciator)

– GOOSE channel failure (via RTU/Annunciator and R-GOOSE)

– Major or minor relay errors (via R-GOOSE)

– CB Error (via R-GOOSE)

– CB Disagreement (via GOOSE)

– VT fuse failure (via R-GOOSE)

• Mitigation Relays:– Relay failure (via RTU/Annunciator and opposite relay R-GOOSE)

– GOOSE channel failure (via RTU/Annunciator and R-GOOSE)

– Major or minor relay errors (via R-GOOSE)

– Trip Circuit Monitor alarm (via R-GOOSE)

– VT fuse failure (via R-GOOSE)


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CRAS Relay Commissioning Tests

• Verify wiring prints match elementary diagrams

• Verify physical wiring matches wiring diagrams

• Test all circuits for continuity

• Verify all relay settings are correct

• Verify relay logic matches logic diagrams

• Test relay logic

• Verify communications channels are working

• Verify annunciator and RTU alarm points


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Controller Design

Gary Kohler


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RAS contains logic to:

▪ arming calculations

▪ handle bad quality

▪ data quality determination

▪ mitigation determination

EMS

EMS contains logic to:

▪ Enable/disable of RAS

▪ handle tag outs/skips

IED Analytic contains logic to:

▪ determine device availability

▪ perform annual test

▪ handle tag outs/skips

▪ mitigation command

Event Fabric

IED AnalyticInput

Conditioner

RGOOSE

Interface

RAS

Input Conditioner contains logic to:

▪ Select “best” values to process

▪ alerts on bad quality

▪ alerts on data disagreements

▪ alerts on untimely delivery


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Input

Conditioner

Normal

Flow RAS

Primary

IC methods used:

• MagnitudeMax for

flows

• MagnitudeMin for

loads

Ensures maximum

mitigation calculated

A

A

B

B


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Input

Conditioner

Normal

Flow RAS

PrimaryBad

Quality

A

B

B

A


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Input

Conditioner

Normal

Flow RAS

PrimaryBad

Quality

Alert Indication

loss of visibility

A

B

B

A

Bad

Quality


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Input

ConditionerRAS

IC Affinity method

gives preference

to inputs from the same

system

B

A

B

A


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EMS RAS

Comm Error

Test Mode

Field Test Enter Test Mode

Block

Operate

IED Availability

Mitigation Req.

RGOOSE

InterfacePing

Annual Test

Tag Out

Blocked

RGOOSE

Interface

IED

Ping Response

Path Latency

Need Attn


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EMS

RGOOSE

Interface

RAS

IED

IED Availability

RGOOSE

InterfacePing (1)

Ping Response

(2)

Path Latency

(3)

IED Analytic pings one IED

in each substation every

minute.


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EMS RAS

Test Mode (3)

Field Test (1)

Enter Test Mode

(2)

IED Availability(4)

RGOOSE

InterfaceRGOOSE

Interface

IED

Test Mode (4)


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EMS RAS

Test Mode(3)Enter Test Mode(2)

Block (4)

IED Availability(2)

RGOOSE

Interface

Tag Out(1)

Blocked (5)

RGOOSE

Interface

IED

Tagged Out (6)


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RAS

Oper Resp(3)

Operate(2)

Mitigation Req(1)

RGOOSE

InterfaceRGOOSE

Interface

IED


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Analytic and UI Design

Gary Kohler


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• Objectives:– To provide an automatic scheme for West of Colorado River Remedial

Action Scheme (WoCR RAS Analytic) to protect Southern California Edison (SCE) electrical grid.

– The automatic arming scheme intended to relieve lines limit violation in study area while satisfying reliability criteria.

• Reliability:– The Analytic program resides on SCE’s CRAS which is a redundant

system.

CRAS WEST OF COLORADO RIVER ANALYTIC PROJECT


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• Designs:– The WoCR CRAS Analytic portion is dependent upon the actual total line

flows and the status of the lines:• Colorado River – Red Bluff No. 1 or• Colorado River – Red Bluff No. 2 or• Devers – Red Bluff No. 1 or• Devers – Red Bluff No. 2

The mitigation signal will be sent to the N60 relays and subsequently trip the selected generation at Genesis 1, Genesis 2, Black Creek 1 & 2 and Dracker 1 & 2 when N-2, the loss of Colorado River – Red Bluff 1 & 2 or the loss of Devers – Red Bluff 1 & 2 occur.



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• Designs (Cont.)

− WoCR CRAS UAP Analytic program is executed continuously and receives the real-time line flows and statuses from the N60 Relays to determine the arming/mitigation requirements.

− WoCR CRAS Analytic program can be turned on or off by the dispatcher at the Grid Control Center (GCC).

• Testing:– WoCR CRAS Analytic program will be thoroughly tested with the

production database, UAP and GE N60 logic processors in an end-to-end test environment before placing into production.



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Col River-Red Bluff No.2

Input

Conditioner

Arming

Level

Calculation


Corridor

Power Flow

Calculation

Corridor Power Flow

Input

Conditioner

Mitigation

Selection

Process

Generator

Inputs

Devers-Red Bluff No.1

Arming Level

Black Creek 1 & 2

Genesis 1

Dracker 1 & 2

Input

Conditioner

Mitigation

Actions

Process

Contingency

Lineouts

Selected Points

IED

Analytic

Lineouts






Genesis 2

Black Creek 1 & 2

Genesis 1

Dracker 1 & 2

Genesis 2

Black Creek 1 & 2

Genesis 1

Dracker 1 & 2

Genesis 2


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CRAS UAP Comparison WoCR


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EMS Display N-1 WoCR


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EMS Display N-2 WoCR


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NERC CIP Compliance

Gary Kohler


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CRAS NERC CIP V3/V4 Compliance

- Satisfy NERC CIP Requirements (CIP 002 through CIP 009)

- Gather evidence for review & approval: ✓ CRAS Central Assets (Devices and Applications at the Control Centers)✓ CRAS Edge Assets (Relays and Gateways at the Substations)✓ Telecom equipment✓ Corporate Security

- Leverage existing SCE EMS CIP Compliance Processes & Procedures.- Develop and roll-out Additional Processes & Procedures for maintenance

Substation assets - Receive approval from SCE Corporate Compliance groups

- Ensure Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) is in place (CIP 005)

- Ensure Physical Security Perimeter (PSP) is in place (CIP 006)

- Approve Delegation Agreements (requirement of CIP 003 R2.3)

- Approve TFEs internally and submit to WECC

- Approve ESP & PSP access for CRAS Central and Edge Assets


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Telecom Design

Reinhard Koehler


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Topics

• Network Topology

– Inside the Substation

– Outside Plant

• Equipment Redundancy

• System monitoring & problem resolution


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-56-

C-RAS Network Topology – Inside Plant


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-57-

C-RAS Network Topology – Outside Plant


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-58-

Equipment Redundancy

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

MAUFACTURER MODEL REDUNDANCY

CONTROL CENTER ROUTER

CISCO C4500X Power Supply

CISCO

SUBSTATION GOOSE ROUTER

CISCO IE5000 Power Supply

SUBSTATION NETWORK ROUTER

CISCO ISR4431 Power Supply

AGGREGATION ROUTER CISCO ASR-1002X Power Supply

SONET (LW) ALCATEL-LUCENTDMX OC-192

1:1

Microwave (MW) Alcatel MDR-8000 1:1

Note: Above redundancy table relates to equipment used in one RAS circuit (A or B); redundant circuits provide additional redundancy of all equipment


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System monitoring & problem resolution

• SONET employs element management systems

• All sites have point alarms for equipment & environmental alarms

• Telecom Control Center (TCC) Monitors 24x7x365, using NetCool

• TCC responsible for coordination & dispatch of repair personnel

• Communication Technicians based throughout service territory; spare parts stored at several key locations

• Priority 1 problems have 2 hour response time, and 4 hour repair time.


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Questions?


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SCE is requesting approval of the Design Concept of

West of Colorado River CRAS

• Informational Presentation Today for Design

Concept Approval

• Final CRAS Approval targeted for November


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Thank You!


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