ceqls lecture: hardy bouillon: why social justice is not just
DESCRIPTION
Konzervatívny inštitút M. R. Štefánika v spolupráci s New Direction – The Foundation for European Reform a ďalšími partnermi organizovali dňa 19. novembra 2012 v Bratislave ďalšiu z cyklu prednášok CEQLS. Tentoraz bol našim hosťom Hardy Bouillon, profesor filozofie na Universität Trier a profesor filozofie a ekonómie na SMC University, Viedeň. Viac informácií nájdete na www.konzervativizmus.sk. Conservative Institute organized another of the CEQLS Lectures: Hardy Bouillon, Professor for Philosophy at the University of Trier and Professor of Philosophy and Economics at SMC University, Vienna, was our guest on November 19, 2012 in Bratislava. More information is available at www.institute.sk.TRANSCRIPT
Prof. Dr. Hardy Bouillon
University of Trier,
SMC University, Vienna, and
New Direction Foundation, Brussels
Why social justice is not just
Many thanks …
… for inviting me to Bratislava!
Preview
Compatibility problem Social Justice as:
unjustified redistribution mixing of spheres complementary justice limiting formal justice
Finders-Keepers-Principle correcting original appropriation?
To start with
Conceiving social justice as complement to justice without prefix Based on the assumption that a more
comprehensive notion of justice is necessary for achieving a more just world.
Justice without adjective
What does „justice without prefix (or adjective)“ mean? each to his own (suum cuique) leaning towards Aristoteles
Aristotelian justice
Justice in a universal sense vs particular justice Justice in a universal sense means
virtuous life – conformity to law. particluar justice divided into commutative
and distributive justice.
Commutative and distributive justice in Aristotle
Commutative (or rectificatory) justice to preserve or restitute the legitimate status
Distributive justice to order collective gains and honour
… according to merit alone Commutative justice and distributive justice
are complementary.
Merit based justice as social justice?
Distributive vs social justice Worthiness based on merits vs based on
neediness, etc. Distributive justice as complement to
commutative justice Can social justice also be a complement to
commutative justice?
Justice and unjustified redistribution
Redistribution to change the market results Anthony Flew: Social justice contradicts
commutative justice because it implies: Taking away from A, what he does not
unjustly possess, in order to give it to B, who was not unjustly deprived of it.
Market results: social just oder unjust?
Assumption: If market results are unjust they ask for correction.
Friedrich A. von Hayek: mixing of spheres Only individuals act, justly or unjustly … if and only if they intend and sufficiently
cause the result. The market, in turn, is not an actor, and its
results originate unintentionally from endless market interactions by individuals.
Hence, the results of the market are neither socially just nor socially unjust.
Social justice from a different perspective?
Calling for social justice without claiming the market was socially unjust SJ as complementary justice
Assumption: Under certain conditions, market actors would prefer a different distribution of market results.
SJ as limiting formal justice Assumption: Under certain conditions
commutative justice leads to injustice.
Social justice as complementary justice
John Rawls: Under the veil of ignorance and following
the maximin rule, people would prefer redistribution that matches the difference principle.
Explaining veil of ignorance, maximin rule, and difference principle
With a little help of Pareto and Popper
Alfredo Pareto: If one or more superior alternatives to A exist, then it is not rational to insist on A. Of course, this does not say which of the
superior alternatives should be chosen. Karl Popper: For logical reasons, it is
impossible to exclude the possibility that a superior alternative to A could exist.
Interim conclusion
One or more alternatives, superior to market results, could possibly exist. If at least one in fact exists, it is not rational
to insist on market results. If more than one superior alternative
exists, then redistribution should be in favour of the worst-off, following the maximin rule and the difference principle.
Maximin rule and difference principle
Rawls in short: ‘Thus, in comparing different arrangements of the
social system, we can say that one is better than another if in one arrangement all expectations are at least as high, and some higher, than in the other. The principle gives grounds for reform, for if there is an arrangement which is optimal in comparison with the existing state of things, then, other things equal, it is a better situation all around and should be adopted.’* *(John Rawls, ‘Distributive Justice’, Philosophy, Politics and Society.
Third Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and Walter G. Runciman, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, p. 64.)
Criticising Rawls
„Veil of ignorance“ is unrealistic. Saying that people could rationally prefer
the Rawlsian conception is not enough. Fictitious contracts are not contracts at all
… and no subclass of contracts either. Without real contractual approval by all
individuals, Rawlsian redistribution implies an unjustified prioritization of competing utility preferences.
Social justice as limiting formal justice
Thesis: Market actors use private goods as well as
common goods. Using the latter calls for tolls. Joel Feinberg, James Griffin et al.
Market actors consume „pool goods“, owned by the common.
He who uses the pool more often than others should pay more than others (proportionally to his use rate).
Socially just redistribution finally serves commutative justice.
Criticising the pool goods theory
Anthony de Jasay: Pool goods are not common goods, but
positive externalities. Hence, they are free goods.
On top of that: Pool goods are not only consumed. They also
become produced. The latter implies that redistribution from
indolent to deligent market actors would more than compensate the reverse redistribution.
SJ to correct original appropriation?
Thesis: Though the chain of accumulation might be just, how about first possession?
Let us look at: the argumentum pro libertate asymmetric claims
First possession and the finders keepers principle
Gerard Radnitzky: argumentum in favour of freedom:
For logical reasons, it is impossible to proof that no justified objection to original appropriation taken in freedom exists.
Ought implies can. Anthony de Jasay:
First possession does not imply any asymmetric claim.
Demanding suspension of originally appropriated goods implies an asymmetric claim, namely a one-sidely worsening of the original owner.
Conclusions
The cardinal conceptions of social justice are incompatible with formal justice. This holds for the „complementary“ as well
as for the „limiting formal justice“ version of social justice.
Market results based on original appropriation and (commutatively) just accumulation of wealth are compatible with prefix-free or formal justice.
Thanks a lot!