cfjp 2-0 intelligence
TRANSCRIPT
Ca na da
KEYSTO
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Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFJP 2-0Intelligence
(Supersedes B-GJ-005-200/FP-000 dated 2003-05-21)
Custodian: Chief Defence IntelligencePromulgated: October 2011
B-GJ-005-200/FP-001C
FJP
2-0
–In
telli
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e
Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFJP 2-0Intelligence
(Supersedes B-GJ-005-200/FP-000 dated 2003-05-21)
Issued on authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff
Custodian: Chief Defence IntelligencePromulgated: October 2011
B-GJ-005-200/FP-001
Printed copies of this publication may be out of date. The current version of this publication
is maintained at the joint doctrine website at
http://cfd.mil.ca/doctrine
Cette publication est également disponible en français. Joint Doctrine Branch Canadian Forces Warfare Centre Department of National Defence Major-General George R. Pearkes Building 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2 Cataloguer number: D2-280/20110E ISBN: 978-1-100-19210-9 (paper)
978-1-100-19211-6 (electronic) 1st Edition, 2011 © Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011
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CFJP 2-0
Preface
01. Aim. CFJP 2-0 Intelligence is a keystone doctrine publication fundamental to understanding the role of Intelligence within the CF. It provides authoritative guidance to joint force commanders and their staff. Considerable thought and input from a variety of sources was incorporated into this publication, which are now reflected in the chapters described below.
02. Content overview. CFJP 2-0 Intelligence is divided into seven chapters:
a. Chapter 1 – Canadian Forces Intelligence. Describes the legal and authority frameworks for Intelligence and highlights the elements and agencies within the Intelligence community.
b. Chapter 2 – Fundamentals of Intelligence. Describes the essence, principles, and roles of the Intelligence function, and the various categories of intelligence within the CF.
c. Chapter 3 – The Intelligence Cycle. The four characteristic stages of the Intelligence cycle – direction, collection, processing, and dissemination are described and expanded upon.
d. Chapter 4 – Preparing the Generated Force. Discusses the contribution the Intelligence function makes to the final stages of force generation, with emphasis on theatre specific training and Intelligence architecture.
e. Chapter 5 – Force Employment. Outlines Intelligence responsibilities during force employment.
f. Chapter 6 – Domestic Operations. Highlights unique and legal considerations vis-à-vis Intelligence operations in Canada.
g. Chapter 7 – Combined Operations. Describes the unique role, responsibilities, and architecture of CF Intelligence within joint and multinational environments.
03. This doctrine publication should be read in conjunction with its peer publications – notably CFJP 3-0 – Operations and CFJP 5-0 – Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process.
04. The Chief of Force Development is the approval authority for this publication. Recommendations for amendments and or inclusions to this doctrine should be forwarded to its custodian, Chief of Defence Intelligence.
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Table of Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents ..........................................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1 – Canadian Forces Intelligence Introduction ..................................................................................................................................1-1
The framework of authority for defence Intelligence ..................................................................1-1
The strategic framework...............................................................................................................1-2
The national Intelligence community...........................................................................................1-2
International defence Intelligence relationships...........................................................................1-4
The Canadian Forces defence Intelligence community ...............................................................1-7
Joint Intelligence ........................................................................................................................1-10
Chapter 2 – Fundamentals of Intelligence Introduction ..................................................................................................................................2-1
Intelligence versus information....................................................................................................2-2
Essence of Intelligence.................................................................................................................2-2
Principles of Intelligence..............................................................................................................2-3
Role of Intelligence ......................................................................................................................2-4
Categories of Intelligence.............................................................................................................2-5
Annex A – Counter-Intelligence ...............................................................................................2A-1
Chapter 3 – The Intelligence Cycle Direction.......................................................................................................................................3-1
Collection .....................................................................................................................................3-5
Processing.....................................................................................................................................3-6
Dissemination.............................................................................................................................3-10
Chapter 4 – Preparing the Generated Force Introduction ..................................................................................................................................4-1
Contribution to operational planning ...........................................................................................4-1
Contribution to the force generators.............................................................................................4-6
Joint Intelligence architecture ......................................................................................................4-6
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Intelligence communications and information systems ...............................................................4-9
Policies and procedures..............................................................................................................4-11
Chapter 5 – Force Employment Introduction ..................................................................................................................................5-1
Contribution to joint operations ...................................................................................................5-1
The commander and staff.............................................................................................................5-1
Intelligence input to planning.......................................................................................................5-2
Intelligence relationships..............................................................................................................5-3
Intelligence operations .................................................................................................................5-3
Collection management................................................................................................................5-4
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.............................................................................5-4
Specialist intelligence collection activities ..................................................................................5-4
Intelligence dissemination............................................................................................................5-5
Intelligence contribution to operations enabling activities ..........................................................5-7
Chapter 6 – Domestic Operations Sovereignty...................................................................................................................................6-1
Assistance to civil authorities.......................................................................................................6-1
Legal framework ..........................................................................................................................6-2
Responsibility for Intelligence support ........................................................................................6-3
JTF Intelligence architecture........................................................................................................6-3
Chapter 7 – Combined Operations Intelligence responsibility ............................................................................................................7-2
Intelligence architecture ...............................................................................................................7-3
List of Figures Figure 1-1 Canadian Intelligence Community .............................................................................1-3
Figure 1-2 Joint Intelligence within the Defence Intelligence Framework................................1-11
List of Tables Table 3-1 Source Reliability Rating Scale ...................................................................................3-8
Table 3-2 Information Credibility Rating Scale...........................................................................3-9
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Glossary ...................................................................................................................GL-1 Abbreviations List ...................................................................................................AL-1
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Chapter 1 Canadian Forces Intelligence
Introduction 0101. The term “intelligence1” is defined as the product resulting from processing information concerning foreign nations, hostile (or potentially hostile) forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term “Intelligence” is also applied to Intelligence activities that result in the product; and to the organizations engaged in Intelligence activities.2
0102. Intelligence activity is an essential component of all Canadian Forces (CF) activities, ranging from the Strategic Level3 to the Tactical Level.4 This activity takes place within the wider framework of defence Intelligence, which supports the CF, Department of National Defence (DND), and the Government of Canada (GoC).
0103. Defence Intelligence plays a critical role at the national Strategic Level5 through its active and ongoing participation in Canada’s national Intelligence community and its engagement with international defence Intelligence partners. Interaction with the national and international Intelligence communities directly supports CF Intelligence activities—particularly joint Intelligence—at the Strategic and Operational6 levels.
The framework of authority for defence Intelligence 0104. Self-defence is a legitimate function of every state and is acknowledged as such under customary international law and the UN Charter, Article 51. Thus, sovereign states are entitled to raise and maintain military forces and capabilities for their self-defence. Intelligence is an essential and integral military operation.
0105. In Canada, the primary statutory authority for all matters pertaining to national defence is the National Defence Act, which charges the Minister of National Defence (MND) with the management and direction of the CF and all matters relating to national defence.7 Under the Minister’s direction, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is charged with the control and administration of the CF.8 Unless the Governor in Council directs otherwise, all orders and instructions to the CF—that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada, or the Minister—must be issued by, or go through, the CDS.9
1 A distinction is made in this publication between Intelligence, the process, with a capital “I”, and intelligence, the product, with a lower case “I”. 2 DTB, Record 738. 3 A distinction is made in this publication between Strategic, the level of operation/strategy/war and things related to it, with a capital “S”, and strategic, in the sense of “of or serving the ends of strategy; essential in fighting a war; done or used against an enemy’s home territory as a long-term military objective,” with a lower case “S”. 4 A distinction is made in this publication between Tactical, the level of operation/strategy/war and things related to it, with a capital “T”, and tactical, in the sense of “of, relating to, or constituting tactics; doe or for use in immediate support of military or naval operations; adroitly palling or planned, ” with a lower case “T”. 5 DTB, Record 27065, definition of “national strategic”: “The level where the nature and the quantity of a country’s resources dedicated to achieving objectives critical to the national security interest is determined by the political leadership of the country.” 6 A distinction is made in this publication between Operational, the level of operation/strategy/war and things related to it, with a capital “O”, and operational, in the sense of “of or used for operations; engaged or involved in operation; able or ready to function,” with a lower case “O”. 7 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c N-5, at s.4. 8 Ibid at s. 18(1). 9 Ibid at s. 18(2).
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0106. The authority to conduct defence Intelligence activities is implicit when the CF is legally mandated, pursuant to legislation, or the exercise of the Crown Prerogative by the GoC, to conduct defence activities. This implicit authority is limited: there must be a clear connection between the nature and scope of the Intelligence activity and the legally mandated DND program or CF mission. All defence Intelligence activities must be carried out in strict accordance with:
a. applicable domestic and international laws, conventions, and treaty obligations;
b. direction provided by the Governor in Council, or the MND, and within the framework of the Minister’s authorities;
c. orders and instructions issued by CDS to the CF, in order to give effect to decisions and to carry out the directions of the GoC, or the MND; and
d. GoC, DND, and CF policies and directives.
The strategic framework 0107. Defence Intelligence supports national Strategic objectives:
a. by contributing to the successful execution of defence missions and providing DND and CF with comprehensive Intelligence support;
b. through active engagement in the national Intelligence community;
c. by contributing intelligence—from a defence perspective—to the most senior levels of the GoC;
d. by helping define threats to Canada and its national interests;
e. by advising on national intelligence priorities; and
f. through continuous liaison and cooperation with allies and other nations in areas of mutual interest and concern. These activities include long-standing Intelligence relationships with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
0108. Large-scale defence Intelligence programs (e.g., engagements with the national Intelligence community10 and international partners) inform all joint and combined Intelligence activity by supporting the CF roles to:
a. defend Canada;
b. defend North America; and
c. contribute to international peace and security.11
The national Intelligence community 0109. The Canadian national Intelligence community comprises the Intelligence capabilities of key Government departments who maintain Intelligence staff, or agencies tailored to their mandates. Some departments (i.e., DND) maintain relatively large Intelligence capabilities, while others maintain smaller, highly specialized capabilities.
0110. The Privy Council Office (PCO) coordinates Intelligence support in line with the national Strategic decision-making process. Within the PCO, an associate secretary is appointed as National
10 The national intelligence community is described in paragraph 0109. 11 Canada First Defence Strategy, June 2008.
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Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister. The NSA provides information, advice and recommendations on Intelligence matters to the prime minister, and coordinates the activities of the national Intelligence community. The NSA is assisted by two secretariats within PCO, and has administrative responsibility for the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre:
a. The Security and Intelligence Secretariat provides support and secretariat functions to Cabinet, and interdepartmental national security committees.
b. The International Assessment Staff provides national Intelligence assessments to the Government.
Figure 1-1. Canadian Intelligence Community
c. The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). The ITAC’s primary objective is to produce integrated, comprehensive, and timely assessments of the terrorist threat to Canadian interests, both domestically and internationally.
0111. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). maintains its own political and economic assessment staff. Overseas missions provide diplomatic reporting into the community, and support Canadian Defence attachés (CDAs). DFAIT is a key partner in CF operations overseas.
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0112. Public Safety Canada (PSC) incorporates a number of domestic Intelligence responsibilities, and plays an important part in domestic CF operations. PSC includes the following subordinate agencies:
a. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) provides the GoC with security intelligence on key threats to national security, including those posed by terrorism and foreign Intelligence activities within Canada.
b. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) maintains the Criminal Intelligence Directorate.
c. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) maintains Intelligence capabilities in support of its border control activities.
0113. Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) is Canada’s national cryptographic agency. CSEC provides the GoC with foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT), in support of defence and foreign policy, and information technology security (ITSEC). CSEC also provides technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies.12 Although CSEC is not an integral component of the defence Intelligence community, the MND is accountable to Cabinet and Parliament for all CSEC activities while providing direction on how it carries out its mandate.13 Director General Military Signals, subordinate to Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI), ensures that the CF receives appropriate assistance and support from CSEC.
0114. Other government departments and agencies represented in the national Intelligence community include: Transport Canada, the Department of Justice, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Health Canada, the Treasury Board, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre.
International defence Intelligence relationships 0115. The CF benefits from an extensive and well-established set of defence Intelligence programs and relationships with international partners that fall into three key groupings: Canada–US; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US; and NATO. Not withstanding these well-established affiliations, Canadian defence Intelligence will establish bilateral arrangements with selected nations to deal with areas of mutual interest. These arrangements are usually temporary and less structured.
0116. Canada–United States. The US is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner. Close links exist between the defence Intelligence communities, including:
a. the Combined Intelligence Directorate Activity Center of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and continental security (in cooperation with US Northern Command [USNORTHCOM]); and
b. the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who serves as the head of the US national Intelligence community, and is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council, for Intelligence matters related to US national security.
0117. Within the US defence Intelligence community, the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) is the principal advisor and staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, counter-Intelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other Intelligence-related matters. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the USD(I) exercises authority, direction, and control over US Department of
12 CSEC Website [www.cse-cst.gc.ca]. 13 The Chief, CSEC reports to the Minister through two Deputy Ministers, the National Security Advisor responsible for CSEC's policies and operations, and the Deputy Minister of National Defence overseeing financial and administrative matters.
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Defense (DoD) agencies and activities that are directly concerned with Intelligence, counter-Intelligence, and security. The USD (I) also acts as the Director of Defense Intelligence within the office of the DNI.
0118. Principal US national and defence Intelligence organizations are:
a. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US national-level foreign intelligence agency.
b. The Department of State. As with DFAIT, the US Department of State maintains political and economic intelligence assessment capabilities.
c. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the responsibility for national security intelligence on terrorist and foreign Intelligence threats to the US.
d. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides defence Intelligence support to the US armed services, unified combatant commands, and US DoD decision makers in support of US military planning, operations, and weapon systems acquisition.
e. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides imagery and geospatial support to the US DoD, and other US government departments and agencies.
f. National Security Agency (NSA) is the US foreign SIGINT collection and exploitation agency.
g. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) develops and operates the US reconnaissance satellite constellation.
h. The US Armed Services. Each of the services14 maintains Intelligence capabilities, and organizations and units tailored to their particular requirements.
i. The unified combatant commands (UCCs). Each UCC maintains dedicated Intelligence staff and capabilities tailored to their missions and Intelligence responsibilities.
0119. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States. Known as the “Five-Eyes” Intelligence community, this partnership is enduring and well-developed. Most combined joint Intelligence activity, conducted outside of North America by the CF, occurs within the Five-Eyes framework.
0120. The UK national Intelligence community is coordinated by the Cabinet Office, which provides the Chairman to the Joint Intelligence Committee. This committee includes the heads of the principal UK Intelligence agencies and staff, and sets both the priorities and the requirements for the community. The principal UK national and defence Intelligence organizations are:
a. The Cabinet Office Assessment Staff, which produces strategic assessments for senior levels of government.
b. The Security Service (MI5) is responsible for domestic security intelligence.
c. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) provides a foreign intelligence collection capability.
d. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the foreign SIGINT collection agency.
e. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is an intergovernmental intelligence analysis centre that provides assessments on terrorism threats to all government departments, including defence.
14 US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, and US Coast Guard.
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f. The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) provides defence Intelligence support to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the armed services.15 It is headed by CDI. Staff, directorates, formations, and units serving under the UK CDI are identified collectively as Defence Intelligence (DI):
(1) The Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (DCDI) is responsible for the intelligence production directorates within DIS, which are collectively referred to as the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff (DIAS).
(2) The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff–Intelligence Capabilities (ACDS (IC)) is responsible for the provision of specialist Intelligence (geospatial intelligence [GEOINT], human intelligence [HUMINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], and SIGINT), and Intelligence and security training within the three services. ACDS (IC) is responsible for two major DIS formations:
(a) The Intelligence Collection Group (ICG) is responsible for defence SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and GEOINT.
(b) The Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) is responsible for all defence Intelligence, security, photographic, and language training.
0121. The Australian Intelligence Community is comprised of:
a. The Office of National Assessments (ONA) provides all-source assessments on international political, strategic, and economic developments to the Prime Minister and senior ministers in the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
b. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is the domestic security intelligence agency.
c. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is the foreign intelligence collection service.
d. The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) is responsible for defence Intelligence assessments. DIO supports Australian defence decision making, and assists with the planning and conduct of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations.16
e. The Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) provides GEOINT to meet both defence and government requirements.
f. The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is responsible for conducting foreign SIGINT collection, and advising the government on communications and information systems security.
0122. The New Zealand Intelligence community is comprised of:
a. The External Assessments Bureau (EAB) is responsible for providing the Prime Minister and senior levels of government with Strategic Intelligence assessments.
b. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) provides the New Zealand government with intelligence and advice on security issues.
15 Beyond the DIS, the Five-Eyes relationship also includes intelligence cooperation with the individual UK services (Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force). 16 The Five-Eyes relationship also includes intelligence cooperation with the individual Australian services of the Australian Defence Force (Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force).
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c. The Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) conducts foreign SIGINT collection and advises the government on communications and information systems security.
d. The Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS) is responsible to the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force, the service chiefs of staff, and operational commanders, for the provision of all-source defence intelligence, on areas of interest to New Zealand (and specifically the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)). DDIS also provides security policy and services necessary for the protection of NZDF personnel, resources, and facilities.
e. The NZDF Geospatial Intelligence Organization (GIO) provides GEOINT and information products to support NZDF operations, and by agreement, the New Zealand Government, and other approved customers, in support of defence policy objectives. While organizationally distinct, the prioritization of GIO activities is directed by the DDIS.
0123. NATO provides a broader multinational Intelligence community, including a number of traditionally close NATO Intelligence partners (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands), and new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Within the NATO framework, combined joint Intelligence activities support both standing operations and multinational missions. NATO relies on the individual intelligence contributions of its member nations, with two key organizations providing NATO-originated Intelligence capabilities:
a. The Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) is located in the UK and provides Strategic- and Operational-level intelligence to NATO. Several NATO nations participate in the IFC, including Canada.
b. The Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) Program. From its main operating base in Italy, AGS employs high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) linked to mobile and transportable ground stations, enabling continuous identification safety range operations in support of NATO.
The Canadian Forces defence Intelligence community 0124. Defence Intelligence encompasses joint, maritime, land force, and aerospace intelligence, from Tactical to Strategic Levels (as well as geopolitical, economic, scientific, technical, and security intelligence) where such Intelligence supports the defence mission.
0125. Canada’s defence Intelligence community is comprised of all the Intelligence capabilities, staff, organizations, and agencies within DND and the CF,17 including:
a. CDI;
b. Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG);
c. environmental commands; and
d. operational commands including NORAD.
0126. CDI organization. CDI is the functional authority18 for Intelligence within DND and the CF and wields the same power and jurisdiction as an officer commanding a command. CDI is responsible for the provision of Intelligence advice and the generation of specialist Intelligence personnel, equipment, and connectivity for CF operations. CDI is the sole authority for the conduct of domestic defence counter-
17 With the exception of CSEC. Refer to Paragraph 0113 of this chapter. 18 “Functional authority sets standards, communicates clear expectations, issues binding functional direction, offers non-binding functional advice and guidance, consults and obtains feedback, monitors to ensure compliance with direction and creates a management framework whereby the DM or CDS can hold senior commanders and advisors across the organization accountable for compliance.” CFJP 01.
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Intelligence operations. This broad mandate requires a disciplined prioritization of Intelligence responsibilities.
0127. The CDI organization is comprised of:
a. The Director General Intelligence Production (DGIP) is responsible for the production of defence intelligence on regional, transnational, scientific, and technical issues. It is actively engaged with allies and the national Intelligence community, providing the latter with defence intelligence input to national intelligence priorities, requirements, and assessments. DGIP is accountable to the CDI for collection, coordination, and intelligence requirements.
b. The Director General Military SIGINT (DGMS) is the CDI representative to CSEC19 for SIGINT support matters. DGMS ensures that the CF receives appropriate assistance and support from CSEC.
c. The Chief of Staff (COS) CDI is responsible for the overall administration of CDI’s human and financial resources. The COS CDI also provides the J2 Plans and the operations training function for the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) matrix.
d. The Director Intelligence Capabilities (D Int Cap) manages defence Intelligence force development,20 defence SIGINT force development and generation, and the defence open source intelligence (OSINT) capability. Force development demands extensive interaction with the broader DND and CF force development community. Interaction includes:
(1) input into capital equipment projects;
(2) managing the defence Intelligence relationship with Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC); and
(3) tracking allied and NATO Intelligence force development initiatives.
e. The Director Geospatial Intelligence (D Geo Int) provides IMINT, imagery, geospatial, meteorological, and oceanography support to DND, CF, and in some cases, other government departments and agencies (OGDA). D Geo Int includes three subordinate units:
(1) Mapping and Charting Establishment (MCE);
(2) Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC); and
(3) Canadian Forces Joint Meteorology Centre (CF JMC).
f. The J2X21 develops and coordinates policy and staff support to HUMINT, counter-intelligence (CI), and counter-aggression (CA) capability. CF HUMINT and CI capabilities enable commanders to better ascertain the capabilities and intentions of hostile and potentially hostile persons, elements and groups. Defence CI capability is further designed to deny hostile entities freedom of action. Together these make J2X capabilities a strategic force multiplier by the identification of threats, which influences force structure contributing to mission success.
g. The Director Intelligence Policy and Programs (DPP Int) develops and manages defence Intelligence policy and international/domestic Intelligence partnerships and programs, including defence Intelligence liaison with the Five-Eyes allies and NATO. DPP Int is also responsible for defence intelligence release and disclosure and acts as the national and
19See paragraphs 0113 and 0128. 20 Defence intelligence capability development, lessons learned, and doctrine. 21 J2X is the standard designation for joint HUMINT and CI intelligence staff.
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defence authority for the management and accreditation of personnel and facilities for certain categories of sensitive compartmented intelligence.
h. The Director Intelligence Information Management (D Int IM) represents CDI and defence Intelligence interests in the development of Intelligence-related information management (IM) standards and interoperability. It articulates operational and long-term IM requirements. D Int IM:
(1) interacts with the Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management) [ADM(IM)] and other national and allied IM authorities on Intelligence-specific IM research, technology innovations, validation and security; and
(2) acts as the information systems security manager for all communications and information systems for which CDI has operational authority.
0128. The Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) is a subordinate formation of the Information Management Group, headed by the ADM(IM). CFIOG’s defence Intelligence mission is to coordinate, develop, and employ assigned capabilities for the collection and production of SIGINT for DND and the CF. CFIOG SIGINT capabilities are under the operational control of CDI, through DGMS. DGMS’ mandate is:
a. to ensure the CF receive appropriate assistance and support from CFIOG and CSEC;
b. to ensure CF SIGINT operations are conducted in a manner consistent with legal authorities;
c. to bridge the cultural gaps between CSEC and CF SIGINT operations to aid in the creation of a Canadian SIGINT identity; and
d. to provide CF administrative support to CSEC goals and requirements.
0129. Environmental commands. The three environmental commands represent the principal source of subject matter expertise required for development, generation, and employment of maritime, land, and air forces. Environmental commanders maintain the appropriate Intelligence staff, units, and capabilities necessary to meet four principal requirements:
a. the provision of Strategic- and Operational-level advice on environmental intelligence matters to commanders;
b. the provision of Operational- and Tactical-level environmental intelligence to subordinate headquarters and formations with;
c. the coordination of Intelligence functions and development within the command; and
d. the generation of intelligence personnel for operations.
0130. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) maintains maritime intelligence staff within the Maritime Staff at NDHQ, the headquarters of Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), and the Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC). Located in Halifax, TRINITY provides operational intelligence to deployed maritime forces. The Naval Reserve maintains a cadre of Intelligence officers capable of augmenting operations and acting as naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS) officers.22
0131. The Canadian Army (CA) maintains army Intelligence (G2) staff within the Land Staff at NDHQ, in the headquarters of each Land forces area (Western, Central, Quebec, and Atlantic) and in its three brigade groups. CA also includes an electronic warfare regiment and five reserve Intelligence companies.
22 NCAGS officers provide the interface between the CF and civilian shipping authorities.
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0132. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) maintains Intelligence personnel within the Air Staff in NDHQ, in headquarters 1 Canadian Air Division (1 Cdn Air Div) in Winnipeg, within some units of 2 Canadian Air Division, and with many wing and squadrons.
0133. The operational commands are responsible for planning and executing CF operations.23
0134. Commander Canada Command (Canada COM) is responsible for all CF operations within the Canada COM area of responsibility (AOR), except those conducted under the NORAD agreement. Canada COM maintains a J2 staff at its headquarters and at the six regional joint task force (RJTF) headquarters (North, Pacific, West, Central, East, and Atlantic).24 Additional Intelligence capabilities may be generated and assigned to Canada COM. Commander 1 Cdn Air Div is the CF Air Component Commander for Canada COM (CF ACC). As such, the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Division at the Combined Air Operations Centre in Winnipeg acts as the aerospace Intelligence staff of Canada COM.
0135. Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) is responsible for all international operations outside the Canada COM AOR with the exception of operations conducted solely by Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) elements under the direct authority of the CDS. CEFCOM maintains a J2 staff at its headquarters. Additional Intelligence capabilities may be generated and assigned to CEFCOM.
0136. Commander CANSOFCOM is responsible for all special operations, including responding to terrorist threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world. CANSOFCOM maintains a J2 staff at its headquarters and Intelligence elements within its subordinate units. Additional Intelligence capabilities may be generated and assigned to CANSOFCOM.
0137. The Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) delivers national-level operational support to CF missions, at home, and abroad. This includes the full range of combat support and combat service support functions (e.g., logistics, military engineering, health services, and military police). CANOSCOM staff is responsible for supporting a military mission from start to finish and plan, coordinate and execute operational support for theatre activation, sustainment, and termination of a mission.
0138. Commander NORAD is responsible to the GoC and the US for the execution of missions assigned to NORAD. In accordance with the NORAD Agreement, these missions include aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. NORAD maintains a binational J2 staff at its headquarters and air Intelligence staff in each of its aerospace defence regions.25
Joint Intelligence 0139. Defence Intelligence encompasses all aspects of Intelligence support to the overall defence program. However, joint Intelligence focuses on Intelligence support to the CF itself: at Strategic and Operational levels. This distinction defines the span of joint Intelligence activity by limiting itself to the military Strategic Level (through the SJS to the CDS) and focuses effort on the Operational Level, generally leaving Tactical Intelligence activities to assigned environmental (maritime, land, and air) intelligence. Figure 2-1 depicts joint Intelligence within the Defence framework.
0140. Joint Intelligence is a key enabler and supports:
23 The First Canadian Division Headquarters (1Cdn Div HQ) in Kingston, though subordinate to LFC for administration, is capable of providing both Canada Com and CEFCOM with a deployable joint headquarters for theatre activation. 24 Five of these RJTF HQs and their staff are integrated with MARCOM and LFC headquarters: RJTF Pacific with MARPAC, RJTF West with LFWA, RJTF Central with LFCA, RJTF East with LFQA and RJTF Atlantic with MARLANT. 25 1 Cdn Air Div HQ provides the intelligence staff for the Canadian NORAD Region.
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a. Force development. A system of integrated and interdependent processes that identifies necessary changes to existing capability and articulates new capability requirements for the CF. As it is driven by changes in policy, actual or projected, changes in the security environment and lessons learned from operations, intelligence plays a crucial role. Force development comprises capability based planning, capability management, and capability production.26
National Strategic
Government of Canada
DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE
CDS/SJS Environmental Commands
Military Strategic
JOINT INTELLIGENCE Force
Employment Commands
ENVIRONMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
Operational
Assigned Maritime, Tactical
Figure 1-2. Joint Intelligence within the Defence Intelligence Framework b. Force generation. The process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for force
employment.27 Force generation integrates four major components: force structure, equipment, readiness, and sustainability.28 Intelligence contributes to mission analysis at all levels, to include the planning of intelligence architecture, and to the commanders’ situational awareness.
c. Force employment. The command, control, and sustainment of generated forces on operations.29 The CDS directs the employment of the CF through the operational commanders. Operational support and force generation contribute forces and capabilities to the force employment structures that are subsequently employed on domestic or international operations.30 Intelligence is involved at all levels of planning and conduct of joint operations. Joint operations are conducted using the force employment process, which includes all activities required to plan, execute, and review joint operations.31
0141. CF joint Intelligence capabilities are defined as either standing or mission-tailored in nature. Standing capabilities are those permanently established to support joint activities and operations and include:
26 DTB, Record 26344. 27 DTB, Record 32171. 28 CFJP 01, Chap 5, p. 5-9, para 0541. 29 DTB, Record 32173. 30 CFJP 01, Chap 5, p. 5-6, para 0523. 31 CFJP 3-0, Chap 2, p. 2-1, para 0201.
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a. J2 support to the SJS (e.g., provided by the CDI organization through the NDHQ staff matrix);
b. J2 staff of the force employment commands;
c. specialist CDI staff and units; and
d. CFIOG.
0142. Mission-tailored capabilities are generated to meet the intelligence requirements of a specific joint operation, and may include supplementary Intelligence capabilities attached to existing joint or environmental Intelligence staff and units, or distinct joint Intelligence staff and units required to meet the demands of a particular operational.
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Chapter 2 Fundamentals of Intelligence
Introduction 0201. Intelligence plays a vital role in Canada’s national security. It influences decisions made at the national Strategic Level (i.e., by the Canadian Prime Minister and Cabinet), to decisions made by commanders at the most immediate, Tactical Level. Staff responsible for assessing threats to national security interests require access to all government departments, Intelligence organizations, agencies, and staff, as well as through cooperation and with our allies, and other international security partners.
0202. DND and CF Intelligence capabilities are integral components of the defence Intelligence community32 and share the common doctrinal fundamentals described in this chapter. Defence Intelligence is the umbrella term that encompasses all Intelligence activity conducted within or by DND and the CF.
0203. Intelligence represents one capability within the Sense33 function of the capability-based planning framework34 and influences and supports all domains within the framework. Intelligence is fundamental to the planning and conduct of operations and force protection, throughout all dimensions of conflict, anenables commanders to gain situational awareness (SA), towards mastering their operational environments. Each command customizes its Intelligence organization and procedures to meet specific requirements. Similarly, maritime, land, and air Intelligence capabilities reflect their particular attributes and the demands of their respective environments.
0204. Joint Intelligence doctrine lays the groundwork that informs decision makers,35 commanders, and staff of uncontrollable factors that challenge the conduct and execution of missions and operations, including:
a. hostile nations, forces, and elements;
b. foreign nations, forces, and elements;
c. the geospatial36 environment;
d. the meteorological and oceanographic environment;
e. the human environment, including population demographics, health conditions, infrastructure, and economics; and
f. the information environment.
0205. Activities, intentions, and capabilities of friendly nations and forces remain outside the purview of intelligence: with the exception of when decision makers and commanders require information not otherwise available through operational reporting channels and liaison.
32 Chapter 1 provides an overview and more detail on the structure of the Canadian defence intelligence community and its relationship to both the national intelligence community and our allies. 33 DTB Record 26167. 34 CFJP 01, Chapter 2. 35 All commanders are by definition decision-makers. When used in the context of this publication, the term “decision-maker” refers to those civilian executives within DND with the authority to make decisions on defence matters e.g., the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Ministers. 36 Pertaining to the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on, above, or below the earth’s surface.
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Intelligence versus information 0206. Information consists of a single item or a group of data, collected by technical or interpersonal means. Information may or may not be accurate, or relevant to intelligence use. Commanders and their staff receive a constant stream of information relating to every aspect of their operational environment. Much of this information is reliable and credible, pertaining to the operational status of friendly forces and elements. However, some of this information is unreliable, fragmented, and gleaned from dubious sources where verification of authenticity and accuracy is severely limited, or impossible.
0207. Intelligence differs from information in that it is the end result of an analytical process such as:
a. a judgment on the reliability and accuracy of information;
b. the correlation of one set of information to other information;
c. assessment of information against what is already known; and
d. information analysis to draw relevant conclusions.
0208. Intelligence is not an historical report, or a summary of information. It must provide decision makers and commanders with a critical advantage through predictive, actionable insights that contribute to effective decision making.
Essence of Intelligence 0209. General precepts outlining the fundamental nature of defence Intelligence activity are common to all DND and CF levels and include:
a. Intelligence is command-led.37 Commanders must drive the Intelligence system and have a firm understanding of its strengths and limitations. They must frame their intelligence requirements succinctly, and interpret the intelligence derived in response to those requirements, within their operational context. Decision makers and commanders have an obligation to ensure that their Intelligence staff and systems are properly employed, and are given realistic direction, appropriate to their capabilities.
b. Intelligence is mission-focused. First and foremost, activities must support the commander’s mission and recognize the primacy of fulfilling that mission at every level of command.
c. Intelligence is reliable. The Intelligence system must develop and maintain the confidence of decision makers, commanders, and staff. This is particularly true of those Intelligence officers with direct access to decision makers and commanders. A key aspect of reliability is a thorough professional knowledge of Intelligence and the broader DND and CF. CF Intelligence personnel must possess and display the same level of dedication and professionalism as their comrades in other service arms and branches to project a credible, confidence-building image. Likewise, DND Intelligence specialists must inspire confidence by demonstrating a thorough knowledge of their particular field of expertise, and act as integral members of the defence Intelligence team.
d. Intelligence is comprehensive. Intelligence must answer the decision maker or commander’s questions as completely, objectively, and accurately as possible. Intelligence staff must also be perfectly candid about what is known, unknown, or assessed.
37 Also referred to as “command driven.”
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e. Intelligence is predictive. Intelligence must provide insight and inform a decision maker’s plans, or a commander’s concept of operations. Without the intellectual exercise of drawing out the “so what?” from information, and the production of a predictive assessment, Intelligence becomes a mere reporting function, and risks losing both professional credibility and relevance.
f. Intelligence is all-source. The most authoritative intelligence is derived from information processed from multiple, independent sources. An all-source approach utilizes fusion38 to optimize strengths and minimize weaknesses inherent in information sources. While the level of detail in single-source reporting might sometimes be sufficient to meet an immediate and narrowly defined requirement, all-source analysis and reporting is essential to gain in-depth understanding.
g. Intelligence is multidisciplinary. Intelligence is not the exclusive domain of Intelligence professionals, but draws on the skills of many military and civilian classifications. Intelligence relies on accurate and timely reporting of disparate sources (e.g., an infantry section in contact, a defence attaché in a foreign capital, a maritime patrol aircraft identifying a vessel of interest, or a frigate conducting a port visit).
h. Intelligence is flexible. Intelligence systems must be adaptable and have the ability to re-focus capabilities to meet unexpected challenges. Intelligence analysts must be objective and open-minded about their assumptions, and be able to modify these in light of new, and possibly contradictory, information.
Principles of Intelligence 0210. Intelligence activity is guided by tested and enduring principles that are applicable to the full spectrum of operations. Principles may vary, superficially, from those of our allies (e.g., in name and/or description), but embody commonly held essential truths, confirmed by historical experience. Eight principles of Intelligence are recognized for Canadian defence Intelligence:
a. Centralized coordination. Intelligence must be centrally coordinated to eliminate duplication of effort, to provide mutual support, and to ensure effective and efficient use of resources.
b. Timeliness. Intelligence is useless if it arrives too late for action to be taken. Similarly, intelligence must be provided early in the planning process to ensure that decision makers and commanders are able to achieve and maintain the initiative.
c. Systematic exploitation. Sources and agencies must be systematically exploited by methodical tasking, based on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. Exploitation must be all-source in nature, providing continuous, effective coverage with more than one single collection capability.
d. Objectivity. Temptation to distort or modify information to conform to pre-conceived ideas and biases must be resisted. Intelligence activity demands constant re-assessment of knowledge and assumptions, in light of new or contradictory information.
e. Accessibility. Intelligence must be disseminated to those who require it. Whenever possible, accessibility must be enhanced by achieving commonality of communications and
38 In intelligence usage, the blending of intelligence and/or information from multiple sources or agencies into a coherent picture. The origin of the initial individual items should then no longer be apparent. (DTB Record 5649.)
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information systems (CIS). Every effort should be made to provide intelligence at the lowest practicable security classification.
f. Responsiveness. Intelligence must be proactive and responsive to the requirements of decision makers and commanders.
g. Source protection. All intelligence sources must be adequately protected.
h. Continuous review. Intelligence must be continuously reviewed and revised to compare new and existing information and knowledge.
Role of Intelligence 0211. The ability to maintain and project military power is heavily dependent on the constant collection, coordination, and provision of intelligence, which allows decision makers to retain the initiative. The role of Intelligence is to provide decision makers, commanders, and staff with intelligence that is timely and relevant, which allows for the development of defence policies and plans, and the conduct of operations.
0212. Intelligence is integral to the development and maintenance of a military decision maker’s SA. SA is “the perception of the elements of an operating environment within a defined time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, the projection of their status into the near future and the prediction of how various actions will affect the fulfillment of one’s goals.”39 The collective manifestation of SA may be depicted as a common operating picture (COP). A COP is “an interactive and shared visual representation of operational information gathered from various source.”40
0213. All levels of the defence Intelligence community are engaged in increasing SA based on common, key responsibilities. The focus, range, and scale of responsibilities and requirements vary in response to different environments, commands, and operations. Key responsibilities apply across the spectrum of force development, generation, and employment. The Intelligence contribution to SA is derived from:
a. Indicators and warning (I&W). Provision of timely warning is the most critical Intelligence responsibility. Timely warning intelligence allows commanders to take effective counteraction; warning intelligence that is late makes it impossible for commanders to effectively plan their responses. At the Strategic Level, warning has a global scope and alerts decision makers and commanders to threats to the defence of Canada and Canada’s national interests. Operational- and Tactical-level warnings generally focus on more direct and immediate threats to a commander’s mission.
b. Current and estimative intelligence. The Intelligence process demands that new information be analyzed and compared with existing knowledge of a situation or issue. Accordingly, intelligence knowledge is assembled and maintained in various databases and is categorized as “basic intelligence.”41 Basic intelligence provides the foundation for two subtypes of intelligence:
(1) Current intelligence. Current intelligence is time-critical, perishable intelligence that concerns the current situation and events that have undergone limited analysis, possibly rendering more fidelity than basic intelligence;42 and
39 DTB, Record 41441. 40 DTB, Record 41401. 41 Basic Intelligence: Intelligence that provides reference material for planning and a basis for processing subsequent information. It consists of background about any relevant subject and is maintained in databases that are continually updated. It may contain intelligence on such things as adversary capabilities, deployments, leadership history and training. The principle uses of basic intelligence are to set the scene at the outset of operations and explain relatively unchanging facts such as battle space terrain and weather. 42 Proposed definition for Current Intelligence.
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(2) Estimative intelligence. Estimative intelligence provides forward looking assessment and predictive judgment about future foreign developments, potential courses of action, and their implications.
0214. To successfully fulfill all the preceding key responsibilities, Intelligence must effectively and professionally manage its own activities, including:
a. the Intelligence process;
b. the full spectrum of Intelligence disciplines;
c. the full spectrum of supporting functions such as Intelligence CIS, future capabilities, doctrine, policies, programs, procedures, and the professional development of Intelligence personnel; and
d. staff and units responsible for the efficient day-to-day management of their human, materiel and financial resources.
Categories of Intelligence 0215. Intelligence categories have been developed in response to the increased complexity of Intelligence activities. These categories describe the levels, environments, and disciplines in which such activities are conducted, as well as the dedicated Intelligence specialties required to fulfill them.
a. Levels: (1) Strategic Level. The level at which a country determines national objectives and uses
national elements of power to accomplish those objectives. National policy is made at the highest level of government. Policy is implemented by strategy. In Canada, subordinate strategies are usually developed within government departments and approved by Cabinet. Once approved, a strategy is implemented and managed by a lead government department. As such, Strategic Intelligence focuses on providing intelligence that aids in the formulation of military policies, plans, and direction that affect the CF’s force commitments and Strategic objectives.
(2) Operational Level. Campaigns and major operations link tactics and strategy by establishing intermediate objectives needed to accomplish Strategic objectives, sequence events, initiate actions and apply resources. Operational intelligence is used in the conduct of a campaign or operation, focusing on detailed reporting regarding the capabilities and intentions of adversaries and potential adversaries, and hazards to allow the commander’s staff to prepare for, or counter, these obstacles.
(3) Tactical Level. Activities at this level focus on the planned engagement of an adversary, target, or event. Tactical intelligence focuses on threat and hazards reporting that permit the commander’s staff to achieve a particular short-term mission, task, or event.
b. Environments. Each environment has unique Intelligence capabilities tailored to its particular requirements. Environmental Intelligence staff and organizations are trained and equipped to support the particular demands of their environments, including:
(1) Maritime Intelligence. Supports the development and maintenance of maritime capabilities, and the planning and conduct of maritime operations.
(2) Land (Army) Intelligence. Supports the development and maintenance of land force capabilities, and the planning and conduct of land operations.
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(3) Aerospace Intelligence. Supports the development and maintenance of aerospace capabilities, and the planning and conduct of air operations.
(4) Special operations forces Intelligence: Supports the development and maintenance of an operating environment that allows for economy-of-force operations, generating military and diplomatic advantages.
(5) Joint Intelligence. Supports the development and maintenance of joint warfare capabilities, and the planning and conduct of operations in any environment; or the planning and conduct of operations in which a temporary grouping of elements (e.g., of at least two environments) participate for the purpose of achieving a common objective.
c. Intelligence disciplines. Intelligence collection and processing capabilities is generally divided into disciplines and multidiscipline functions. Such capabilities demand dedicated specialist Intelligence disciplines (i.e., generally identified by the information source from which the intelligence is derived):
(1) CI. CI is a multidiscipline function that encompasses those activities that are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile Intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.”43 Intelligence participates in both aspects of CI by identifying and assessing the threat; and by assisting in the application of effective countermeasures. In doing so, Intelligence makes a vital contribution to operations security (OPSEC).44 Security Intelligence is an essential component of all CI activity and concerns the identity, capabilities, and intentions of hostile Intelligence services of organizations or individuals who pose (or may pose) a threat to the security of the resources, activities, operations, personnel, and information of DND and the CF. It includes intelligence on the identity, capabilities, and intentions of foreign Intelligence systems, criminals, organized crime, and organizations or individuals who may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, violence, or terrorism against DND and the CF. Counter-Intelligence is covered in more detail in Annex A to this chapter.
(2) GEOINT: Intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of topographical, imagery, geospatial, meteorological, and oceanographic information. Results are used to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth, allowing decision makers and commanders to visualize the environment, and the environmental conditions in which operations are conducted. 45 Two key sub disciplines are:
(i) IMINT. Intelligence derived from imagery acquired by photographic, radar, electro-optical, infrared, thermal and multispectral, and hyperspectral sensors (that can be seaborne, ground, air, and space based); and
43 DTB 333. 44 JP 1-02 definition of “OPSEC”: “A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.”
45 (new definition provided by CDI D Geo Int/modified at 1 Dec 09 meeting.)
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(ii) Infrastructure intelligence. Intelligence that concerns rail, road, pipeline, water, and air transportation networks and telecommunications systems and utilities.
(3) HUMINT. Intelligence derived from information collected from, and provided by, human sources. Included in this discipline is document and media exploitation (DOMEX): the exploitation of captured enemy paper documents such as publications, marked maps, overlays, and other media capable of storing information (e.g., cell phones, laptops, and recording devices).
(4) Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments, and for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender, to facilitate the latter’s measurement and identification. The elements of MASINT are:
(a) Biometric intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioural characteristics of human beings.
(b) Electro-optical intelligence. Intelligence derived from the measurement of spectral and infrared emissions and returns, to determine unique target signatures.
(c) Geo-physical intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of sound or pressure waves as they move through air and water (acoustic intelligence – ACINT), and the earth (seismic intelligence).
(d) Hyper/multi spectral intelligence. Intelligence derived from the analysis of data collected using multiple, narrow band sensors in the ultraviolet, visible, and infrared spectrum.
(e) Material intelligence. Intelligence derived from the analysis of the chemical or biological composition of a substance.
(f) Nuclear intelligence. Intelligence derived from nuclear radiation and physical phenomena associated with nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities.
(5) Medical intelligence (MEDINT). Intelligence derived from the exploitation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information, it provides an analysis of health threats and foreign medical capabilities, helping decision makers to develop plans to mitigate and response options so as to minimize the health threat.
(6) OSINT. Intelligence derived from information collected through publicly available media sources, including radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, journals, magazines, periodicals, learned papers, manuals, books and the Internet, to name a few.
(7) Signals intelligence (SIGINT). Intelligence derived individually, or in combination from, communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. SIGINT components include:
(a) Communications intelligence (COMINT). Intelligence derived from electromagnetic communications and communications systems, by those who are not the intended recipients of the information.46 This is intelligence obtained by intercepting communications and data links.
46 DTB Record 3843.
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(b) Electronic intelligence (ELINT). Intelligence derived from electromagnetic non-communication transmissions, by those who are not the intended recipients of the information.47 This is intelligence derived from the technical assessment of electromagnetic non-communications emissions (i.e., emissions produced bradars and missile guidance systems). Lasers, infrared devices, and any other equipment that produces emissions in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) are also included. Valuable intelligence about the equipment and its operator are derived by comparing information about the parameters of the emission with equipment signatures held in databases.
(8) Foreign instrument signals intelligence (FISINT). Intelligence derived by intercepting signals from telemetry; beacons; electronic interrogators; and tracking, fusing, arming and command guidance systems.
(9) Social and cultural intelligence (SOCINT). Intelligence derived from the exploitation of human factors such as psychological, cultural, ethnicity, education, behaviour, population parameters, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the interpretation and flow of information by individuals or groups at any level of organizational or government structure, and includes:
(a) Biographic intelligence concerns views, traits, habits, skills, importance, relationships, health, and curricula vitae of foreign leaders, and personnel of interest.
(b) Economic intelligence concerns a foreign nation’s economic resources, activities and policies, including the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, labour, finance, and other aspects of the international economic system (e.g., aid, trade, investment, and the economic potential to support and develop defence capabilities).
(c) Political intelligence concerns the dynamics of the internal and external political affairs of foreign countries, regional groupings, multilateral treaty arrangements and organizations and foreign political movements directed against, or impacting on, established governments and authorities. This includes foreign government structures and domestic and foreign policies.
(10) Scientific and technical intelligence concerns foreign scientific and technical research and development, including engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapons systems and their capabilities. Technical intelligence, (TECHINT) is concerned with “foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes.”48 It is derived from the scientific examination and testing foreign materiel centered primarily on determining the capabilities and limitations of adversarial equipment.
47 DTB Record 507. 48 DTB Record 5517.
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Annex A to Chapter 2 Counter-Intelligence
01. Counter-Intelligence is an important component of force protection in a joint task force (JTF) during operations. The conduct of CI requires a high degree of functional integration with Intelligence operations. Where Intelligence operations are conducted to build a picture of the capabilities and intentions of an adversary, CI operations aim to determine and counter an adversary’s ability to collect intelligence on friendly capabilities and intentions.
02. CI is a multidisciplinary activity that acts to counter the complete range of adversary intelligence collection activities, for example, counter-HUMINT, counter-IMINT and counter-SIGINT. It requires coordination across staff boundaries and with both national and allied CI and security Intelligence capabilities. CI operations assist friendly forces in gaining dominance over adversary intelligence collection activity and provide opportunities to exploit an adversary’s Intelligence system.
03. At the same time, CI supports the establishment and maintenance of measures to protect friendly intelligence and information, forces, personnel, equipment, and facilities. Depending on the operational environment, CI will alert the JTF to a variety of security threats, including, but not necessarily restricted to:
a. espionage, sabotage, and subversion conducted by an adversary or the Intelligence services of another nation;
b. organized crime; and
c. terrorism.
04. CI operations result in four main outputs:
a. security intelligence on the identity, capabilities, and intentions of hostile organizations and individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, organized crime, and terrorism;
b. operations security (OPSEC) measures for the JTF;
c. countermeasures against adversary ISR capabilities including targeting, information operations and/or actions to disguise or screen friendly activity or confuse hostile intelligence collection; and
d. monitoring of force protection and OPSEC measures to determine their effectiveness.
05. Responsibility for CI. The control of CI capabilities remains a national responsibility on all operations. This is because CI operations require the collection of security intelligence on not only adversaries, but also on CF personnel and other persons present in Canada. In addition, CI could lead to countermeasures designed to protect specific national ISR capabilities. It is also a national responsibility to determine the extent of cooperation and level of exchange of CI information with other nations. However, to successfully counter the threat to a combined operation, the timely exchange of available CI information through constant coordination and liaison is essential.49
06. The DND/CF authority for defence CI activities is the CDI who is responsible for the operations of the domestic defence CI unit, the CF National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU).50
49 Within NATO, nations are responsible for providing CI information to enable NATO and/or coalition force commanders in a area of responsibility to react against the threat in Non-article 5 Crisis Resolution Operations. 50 The CFNCIU is a subordinate unit of the J2X (HUMINT/CI) directorate within CDI. See Chapter 1, p. 1-8.
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07. CI in domestic operations. In domestic operations, elements of the CFNCIU may be attached to the JTF J2 to act as liaison on security threats with OGDA and law-enforcement agencies (LEAs). However, CI elements always remain under operational command (OPCOM) of CDI. As such, CDI will clearly establish the responsibilities of the CI element and its relationship to the force employer.
08. CI in overseas operations. In operations conducted outside Canada, CI elements will be force generated by CDI and allocated directly to the JTF J2 for employment. Normally, CI will be coupled with HUMINT as an integrated activity (called “HCI”) under the staff direction of a J2X.
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Chapter 3 The Intelligence Cycle
0301. At the core of all Intelligence activity is a systematic and straight forward process designed to produce intelligence in response to the requirements of decision makers and commanders. The process is called “the Intelligence cycle,” and consists of a deliberate cyclical sequence of activities. The Intelligence cycle traces its origins to the First World War, when demands for complex operations necessitated a more formalized methodology to manage vast quantities of collected information, and the resources involved in that collection.
0302. Intelligence activity is managed and produces accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence. The Intelligence cycle provides a structured process for organizing Intelligence staff, agencies, and units. It consists of four formal cyclical stages, including:
a. direction;
b. collection;
c. processing; and
d. dissemination.51
0303. Activities related to all four stages occur concurrently. As new information is collected, existing (previously obtained) information is processed and intelligence is produced and disseminated.
Direction 0304. Stage one, “direction,” consists of the determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, and the issuance of orders and requests52 to collection agencies, and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.”53 Two forms of direction occur in the Intelligence cycle:
a. External direction. Provided by decision makers, commanders, and their staff to the Intelligence staff; and
b. Internal direction. Provided by the intelligence staff to coordinate and manage the Intelligence cycle.
0305. Decision makers and commanders must give clear direction regarding their intelligence needs. This ensures that Intelligence staff has a clear understanding of the task at hand and enables them to customize the intelligence product to meet specific requirements. Direction must be precise and intelligence requirements must be prioritized. To that end, Intelligence staff must participate in all aspects of the operational planning process (OPP)54 to fully understand the operational intent. The preparation of
51 US intelligence doctrine recognizes five stages, adding production. However, Canadian, British, Australian and NATO intelligence doctrines combine processing and production into a single stage. 52 Requests rather than orders are passed to other defence, national and Allied intelligence staff, organizations, agencies and/or units outside the command and control of the commander. 53 DTB 5785. 54 The OPP is a coordinated process to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned operational missions or planning for possible future tasks. The planning process is designed to optimise logical, analytical steps of decision making in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. Joint intelligence participation in the OPP is discussed in Chapter 4.
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an Intelligence estimate and the process of supporting the OPP, through the Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE),55 further informs the direction stage of the Intelligence cycle.
0306. To enable Intelligence staff focus their efforts, direction is always framed by the specific parameters in which the decision maker or commander must operate. Direction on Strategic intelligence requirements is generally guided by the manner in which DND and the CF are employed to support national policy. This normally results in prioritized direction to focus on global threats to the defence of Canada and Canadian national interests.
0307. Area of intelligence responsibility (AIR). At the Operational and Tactical levels, an AIR will be established as a control measure. This is defined as the area allocated to a commander for which that commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at the disposal of that commander.56 The dimensions of the AIR include an operational commander’s entire AOR57 or Tactical commander’s area of operations (AO),58 and may include the area of influence in the range of the intelligence collection capabilities assigned.
0308. Area of intelligence interest (AII). Beyond the bounds of the AIR, a commander requires additional intelligence likely to influence current or planned operations. An AII is also established as a control measure, defined as the area of concern to a commander on which that commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of current and future operations. The AII generally mirrors the commander’s area of interest. Since the AII is often beyond the collection capabilities of the commander’s integral Intelligence assets, the Intelligence staff will request intelligence on it, from higher or adjacent commands, formations, or units. As a general principle, the AII is normally the AIR of the next higher level of command.
0309. Neither the AIR nor the AII should be viewed purely in geographical terms. Economic, political, and human demographics also come into play.
0310. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The intelligence requirements identified in the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)59 often form the basis for PIR, which are “those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.”60 Though PIR are a logical extension of the relevant CCIR, their development should not be considered as given. It will depend entirely on the commander’s approach and underlines the need for Intelligence staff to develop a close professional rapport with the commander, and the planning and operations staff. A commander might personally assign and prioritize PIR, or have them recommended by the Intelligence staff. Most commonly though, the commander, the operations staff, and the Intelligence staff will develop the PIR together.
0311. Information requirements (IR). Each PIR may be further subdivided into a set of more detailed questions known as IR. IR represent those items of information regarding the adversary and the
55 IPOE is a systematic and continuous process by which adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action in a specific operations environment are determined. IPOE is employed at the Operational Level; intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) is employed at the Tactical Level. 56 DTB Record 3524. 57 “The geographical area assigned to an Operational-Level commander within which that commander has the authority to plan and conduct military operations. DTB Record 34612. 58 “A geographical area, within an area of responsibility, assigned to a subordinate commander within which that commander haste authority to plan and conduct Tactical operations.” DTB Record 3528 59 “Crucial elements of information identified and required by the commander that directly affect decision-making and the successful execution of operations.” DTB Record 41494. 60 DTB Record 1105.
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environment that need to be collected and processed in order to satisfy the PIR, and to complete the intelligence picture.
0312. Indicators. IR will be further broken out into indicators that are specific requests for information tasked to collectors. Indicators are positive or negative evidence of enemy activity, or any characteristic of the AO, which points toward adversary vulnerabilities or the adoption/rejection by the adversary of a particular course of action. There are three categories of indicators:
a. Warning indicators provide early warning of imminent adversarial61 and hostile actions.
b. Activity indicators reveal the type of operation that the adversary is on the point of conducting, since each type of operation across the spectrum of operations requires specific and characteristic preparations.
c. Identification indicators identify the type and role of a formation, unit, or installation, determined from the recognition of its organisation, equipment, or tactics.
0313. PIR, IR, and indicators are dynamic in nature. The Intelligence estimate and IPOE influence the development of PIR, IR, and the subsequent selection of indicators. Additional PIR, IR, and indicators may be developed, modified, or cancelled, as the operation progresses.
0314. Collection planning. The last steps of the direction stage involve collection planning and tasking. The Intelligence staff finalizes the preparation of an intelligence collection plan (ICP). The ICP matches IR and indicators with the commander’s intelligence collection capabilities, based on the priority of the required intelligence and the factors discussed in paragraph 0317. At the same time, it identifies those IR and indicators that cannot be collected by the commander’s capabilities. The result is specific collection tasks and requests for information (RFI) sent to higher, or adjacent commands, formations, or units.
0315. Collection tasking. The Intelligence terms “source” and “agency,” have precise meanings that must be well understood in the context of collection tasking. In Intelligence usage, they are defined as follows:
a. Source. A person from whom, or a thing from which, information can be obtained.62
b. Agency. An organization or individual engaged in collecting and/or processing information.63
0316. The nature of the source determines the specialized capabilities required by the agency to gather and deliver the information.64 Information from human sources is collected through HUMINT methods, and by HUMINT agencies. Similarly, information from adversarial communications is collected using SIGINT capabilities. A number of factors influence the suitability of a source or agency:
a. Security. Sources and agencies must be adequately protected. Failure to do so results either in the loss or compromise of the source or agency.
b. Capability. Sources and agencies tasked with information collection and dissemination must be capable of doing so. Agencies must be equipped with the appropriate sensor and processing systems.
61 May include less tangible types in the contemporary operating environment, such as local population, atmospherics, or even weather. 62 DTB Record 5388. 63 DTB Record 3322. 64 Refer to Chapter 2 p.2-6 para 0215(c) for a listing and description of intelligence disciplines.
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c. Risk. An element of physical, political, or military risk is often involved in the use of a particular source or agency. The risk must be assessed carefully against the value of the information sought.
d. Operational environment. Variables such as weather, terrain, and rules of engagement can limit the ability of a source or agency to collect information.
e. Multiplicity and balance. Tasking multiple sources to collect the same information gives a greater assurance that the information will be collected, aids information verification, and helps guard against deception. Caution is required because multiplicity can be an extravagant use of limited assets. Balance is achieved through an even distribution of the collection workload across the whole range of sources and agencies available.
f. Timeliness. An agency selected to collect information must be capable of carrying out the task in the necessary timeframe.
0317. Collection coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM). A methodology developed to manage the ICP, CCIRM is an “end-to-end” function in the Intelligence cycle, coordinating the direction of the collection effort with processing, production, and ultimately, the timely dissemination of intelligence products to satisfy PIR and IR. CCIRM staff task integral collection capabilities and generate RFIs to higher or adjacent commands, formations, or units, based on internal PIR, IR, and tasking from higher commanders. They can also search basic intelligence to determine if existing intelligence and information is already held (i.e., that which satisfies PIR and IR). Reusing existing intelligence and information alleviates demands on the collection process and eliminates unnecessary tasking.
0318. Information collection is by no means restricted to specialist Intelligence capabilities. Beyond the integral collection assets that can be directly tasked by the Intelligence staff, other military capabilities collect information of Intelligence value in the conduct of operations. While the Intelligence staff is responsible for collection, they have no direct control over the majority of the capabilities that conduct reconnaissance65 and surveillance.66 Intelligence staff needs to coordinate their collection with the capabilities controlled by the operations staff.
0319. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). ISR is the activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of all collection capabilities, with exploitation and processing, to disseminate the resulting information to the right person, at the right time, in the right format, in direct support of current and future operations.67 It is a multidisciplinary process that draws intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection capabilities into a coherent whole, providing a framework for the coordination and tasking of these assets. ISR also provides the means through which time-sensitive information and intelligence are relayed to assets that can make immediate use of it in target acquisition: a highly responsive sensor to shooter link. The ISR process also contributes to the COP, through the provision of SA.
65 “A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydro graphic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.” DTB Record 1202. 66 “The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.” DTB Record 1418. 67 Proposed definition, JINTWG Oct 09.
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Collection 0320. Stage two of the Intelligence cycle, “collection,” begins the moment a collection capability is engaged, or a RFI is issued. It is defined as the exploitation of sources by collection agencies, and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.68 Collection is comprised of:
a. information gathering;
b. information delivery; and
c. collection plan management.
0321. Information gathering. The various collection capabilities have their own procedures and methods appropriate to the exploitation of their sources. Information gathering is conducted by:
a. organic intelligence collection capabilities, tasked directly by the Intelligence staff, such as:
(1) HUMINT through agent/contact handling, interrogations of prisoners and detainees, questioning of local civilians, displaced persons, and refugees, and the debriefing of friendly forces and elements;
(2) IMINT by obtaining still and video electro-optical imagery through a variety of handheld and space-based sensors;
(3) SIGINT through the interception of adversarial communications and other electronic emissions;
(4) CI by identifying and assessing the threat; and
(5) other specialist capabilities such as ACINT, document intelligence (DOCINT), MASINT, and OSINT.
b. other military capabilities tasked through the ISR process such as:
(1) naval sensors;
(2) ground surveillance and reconnaissance assets and sensors;
(3) overhead surveillance and reconnaissance assets and sensors;
(4) visual and radar surveillance capabilities;
(5) target acquisition capabilities;
(6) maritime, ground, and airborne patrols; and
(7) all other non-traditional surveillance assets.
c. friendly forces reporting during the conduct of operations; and
d. through RFIs, collection capabilities of:
(1) flanking commands and/or forces;
(2) higher commands;
(3) allies, and other friendly forces and elements; and
(4) national and military Strategic Intelligence assets.
68 DTB Record 3796.
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0322. Information delivery. Some specialist capabilities, such as IMINT and SIGINT, need to carry out a degree of pre-processing before the information resulting from their activities can be delivered in a more understandable form to non-specialist Intelligence staff. This is particularly important in making technical information more intelligible, and it can also serve to extract usable information from large amounts of seemingly unimportant data.69
0323. Information is extremely time-sensitive and perishable, particularly during a high tempo of operations. Information must be delivered rapidly before its Intelligence value deteriorates. For this reason, some ISR information is directly disseminated to tactical users, foregoing processing and production to ensure timeliness. In such cases, it is essential that the responsible Intelligence staff ensure that commanders and their staff have the required intelligence (e.g., current and basic) to contextualize ISR information. Effective communication and information systems are also critical to the timely delivery of information.
0324. Collection management. Initial collection planning and tasking cannot anticipate all the potential information that will be delivered to Intelligence staff. Some tasking may prove unsuccessful. Intelligence derived from information gathered previously may well create the need for new tasking. New developments in operations may necessitate a repositioning of the collection effort. Throughout this stage of the Intelligence cycle, Intelligence staff needs to manage their progress using the CCIRM function, seeking new direction where necessary, and to fine-tune collection activity.
Processing 0325. The third stage of the Intelligence cycle, processing,70 comprises sorting collected information and converting it into a form suitable for the production of intelligence, including:
a. collation;
b. evaluation;
c. analysis;
d. integration; and
e. interpretation.
0326. Collation71 consists of procedures for receiving, recording, and grouping all information collected. It involves:
a. identifying and registering each incoming piece of information and intelligence;
b. categorizing each piece of information or intelligence through the accurate and effective use of metadata tags; and
c. maintaining an efficient system for conducting these procedures.
0327. Establishing and operating a collation system requires:
a. Standardization. Information and intelligence must be identified, registered, and categorized to a common defence intelligence standard. Standardized databases simplify
69 In effect, single-source intelligence products will be created and will need to be incorporated with other intelligence and information to produce all-source intelligence during the production stage of the intelligence cycle. 70 DTB Record 5786. 71 DTB Record 19491.
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processing and facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence with other commands, formations, and defence Intelligence organizations.
b. Cross-referencing. All information and intelligence should be cross-referenced to related materials held in the intelligence database to support the identification of related intelligence and to support the development of trend analysis, etc.
c. Visual presentation. Data visualization technology must be exploited as an aid to the rapid assimilation of large volumes of information and intelligence.
d. Urgency and speed of reaction. The collation system must include the appropriate human and IT resources to process urgent information and intelligence requests rapidly and effectively.
e. Restrictions on the volume of records. The collation system’s capacity to process a particular volume of information is dictated by:
(1) the number of personnel available to operate the system;
(2) the nature and tempo of operations;
(3) the capacity of the supporting CIS;
(4) the size of the workspace; and
(5) the size and scope of the Intelligence task.
f. Pragmatism. It is not possible to process every piece of information and intelligence received. To attempt to do so will almost inevitably lead to the processing system becoming overloaded and, in the worst case, halting. A compromise between what is desirable and what is possible is required. Compromise can only be achieved by adopting a pragmatic approach to collation, constantly reviewing collation activity, re-shaping databases, and filtering relevant input. Information, not immediately relevant, is retained for future review.
g. Prioritization. Collation must consider PIR and IR to ensure that relevant information is prioritized and processed with the appropriate degree of urgency.
h. Data system backup and recovery. The vast majority of data used by Intelligence organizations is held on automated systems. Reliable access to this data is critical to the functioning of the Intelligence organization. All data systems malfunction at one time or another. Malfunction causes are internal or external and can disrupt or destroy the data stores and websites. Reliable access to data depends on appropriate planning to maintain a minimal level of service during times of degradation, and if unavoidable, a plan to recover data and functionality in the event of complete failure. Data recovery plans can include backup of data archives, and creation of redundant infrastructures.
0328. Evaluation72 appraises each item of information in respect of the reliability of the source and the credibility of the information. There are many reasons, including deception and objectivity, as to why information may not be reliable or accurate. Evaluation allocates an alphanumeric rating to each piece of information or intelligence, and indicates the degree of confidence that can be assigned to it. The rating is determined, based on a combination of:
a. the subjective judgment of the evaluator;
72 DTB Record 20203.
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b. experience with previous information provided by the same source; and
c. where information is provided by a sensor, a knowledge of the capabilities of the particular sensor system is present.
0329. Reliability and credibility must be considered separately to ensure that the rating allocated to the reliability of the source does not influence the rating given to the credibility of the information, or vice versa. Every piece of information produced by a normally impeccable source is not necessarily correct. Nor does a piece of information that is demonstrably true necessarily imply that its source is totally reliable.
0330. The values for allocating ratings for reliability of the source and credibility of the information are in Table 3-1 and 3-2.73
Rating Reliability of Source Description
A Completely reliable No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability
B Usually reliable Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of valid information most of the time
C Fairly reliable Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
D Not usually reliable Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
E Unreliable Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information
F Reliability cannot be judged
No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the information
Table 3-1: Source Reliability Rating Scale [Source: FM 2.22.3 US Army HUMINT Collection Doctrine]
73 In the absence of CF descriptions, word pictures taken from FM 2.22.3 US Army HUMINT Collection doctrine and matched with ABCA/NATO terms.
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Rating Credibility of Information Description
1 Confirmed by other sources Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject
2 Probably True Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject
3 Possibly True Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject
4 Doubtful Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject
5 Improbable Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject
6 Truth cannot be judged No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information
Table 3-2: Information Credibility Rating Scale [Source: FM 2.22.3 US Army HUMINT Collection Doctrine]
0331. Evaluation ratings are produced by combining the values. For example, information judged “probably true” from a source known to be “usually reliable” is rated B2. This method of evaluation provides a universally understood standard. Generally, these ratings are applied to HUMINT and COMINT.
0332. Analysis marks the phase in which processed information is reviewed in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. It involves the detailed examination of an item of processed information and the resolution of the information into its component elements or facts. Even the most basic report should contain elements indicating the timing, location, nature and extent of a given activity. Each element must be isolated to facilitate subsequent integration with other like items. Personnel involved principally in intelligence production are commonly referred to as analysts.
0333. Integration enables the creation of a coherent intelligence picture through the synthesis of deductions drawn by analysis. It involves the selection, combination, and comparison of the deductions of analysed information with other related items of information or intelligence, specifically basic intelligence, so that meaningful patterns and relationships are identified and clarified. Integration synthesizes deductions and establishes intelligence patterns.
0334. Integration can be a quick mental process involving the addition of one piece of new information to an existing intelligence picture, or it can be a more complex process of merging considerable amounts of information and intelligence. The most complete and reliable intelligence is developed through the fusion of analysed information from several sources and perspectives. Integration methods that present data visually help the mind in recognizing meaningful patterns and relationships.
0335. Interpretation is the last step in the production stage of the Intelligence cycle, during which the significance of integrated information and intelligence is judged in relation to the commander’s mission, PIR/IR, and basic intelligence, to create finished intelligence. Interpretation is a deliberate and objective mental process, based on common sense, experience, service knowledge and training, an understanding of both friendly and adversarial forces and elements, and a thorough grasp of the existing intelligence picture.
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0336. Intelligence is a prime target for deception operations. Analysts must be suspicious and resist assumptions. In ensuring that information is transmitted swiftly to those who need it, Intelligence staffs at all levels must weigh the risk of providing wrong information against the potential gain of having the correct information in time to be of use. Non-corroborated single source reports may lead to misinformation (through source error) or disinformation (deliberate deception on the part of the adversary). As a rule, single-source information should be corroborated by other sources, through all-source analysis, before being disseminated or acted upon. Finally, do not permit personal, cultural, and service biases to impede an open-minded and objective approach.
0337. Interpretation is accomplished by determining:
a. Identity. Who or what is the information about? Details on the subject of the information—the nation, forces, elements, individuals, and/or equipment involved—offer clues to the reasons for their presence.
b. Activity. What does it describe? Understanding what the subject of the information appears to be doing, and comparing this against previous similar activities provides clues to the subject’s intentions.
c. Significance. What does it mean? The significance of what is occurring in terms of its implications for the commander’s planning and operations.
0338. The aim is to methodically draw out the “so what?” from the information and in doing so, not only assess the significance of what is occurring and why, but also assess what is likely to occur next. In effect, the Intelligence cycle furnishes its crucial input to operations by providing predictive, actionable insights to decision makers and commanders.
0339. In completing the production stage of Intelligence, it is essential that the finished product clearly indicate the difference between what has been reported, and what has been assessed. Where a number of interpretations are equally plausible, all are stated. In an effort to clearly distinguish between facts and assessments, intelligence products normally refrain from stating comments and assessments until after the relevant facts are summarized. Comments and assessments are always identified as such (generally by introducing them with the words “comment” or “assessment” as appropriate).
0340. The finished intelligence is incorporated into the overall intelligence picture and disseminated. New intelligence also raises new intelligence requirements. The need to meet these new requirements dictates the cyclical nature of the Intelligence cycle, and the Intelligence staff (through the CCIRM process) may well be required to review and modify the ICP.
Dissemination 0341. Dissemination is defined as the timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means, to those who need it.74 There are two aspects driving timely dissemination: intelligence that reaches its destination too late to satisfy the purpose for which it was required is worthless; and the fact that most intelligence is time-sensitive and decays, or loses its pertinence over time.
0342. There is no point in disseminating intelligence that does not answer the intelligence requirement, or is too lengthy and complex to be easily understood and digested by the recipient. Similarly, it is useless to disseminate intelligence on information systems to which the intended recipients lack access. Intelligence must be in a format relevant to the needs of the recipient, meet requirements, be in the appropriate language, and be processed and disseminated by a common sender/recipient system.
74 DTB Record 4100.
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0343. Dissemination activity must consider:
a. Clarity. Intelligence must be presented in an unambiguous fashion, indentifying clearly facts versus assessments.
b. Conciseness. Intelligence must be reported in the most concise manner possible, and yet must include everything the recipient needs to know. Visual techniques are preferable for imparting information quickly.
c. Standardization. Intelligence is more readily accepted and understood when it is provided in a standard, logical format (e.g., using approved reporting formats that reflect CIS interoperability between environments, commands, and allies).
d. Urgency. Complete processing and production of intelligence derived from urgent, time-sensitive information is not always possible. In such circumstances, information should be disseminated quickly, but include a caveat stating that it has not been fully assessed and may not be reliable.
e. Distribution. Intelligence staff, organizations, agencies, and units are responsible for ensuring that intelligence is passed to those who require it, and (subject to its sensitivity) shared with other commands, formations, staff, organizations, agencies, and units, including allies.
f. Regularity. Intelligence must be disseminated on a regular basis to ensure that recipients are kept abreast of current developments and reinforce the rapport between Intelligence staff and those they support. Nevertheless, the dissemination of critical intelligence should never be delayed simply to accommodate normal routine.
g. Security. Intelligence must be disseminated and safeguarded in a manner appropriate to its security classification. In order to support “a need-to-share,” overclassification75 must be avoided in order to ensure that intelligence is disseminated to as many recipients with a genuine need-to-know as possible.
0344. Forms of dissemination. Intelligence can be disseminated:
a. verbally, through formal and impromptu briefings, in person, by videoconference, and by telephone and radio communications;
b. in writing, through the provision of intelligence assessments, reports, and summaries either in paper or electronic format; and
c. visually, through the use of full motion video, graphics, maps, charts, tables, and imagery in both paper and electronic format.
0345. Dissemination operates on the “push and pull” principle. The “push” concept is twofold in nature:
a. it allows higher echelons to push intelligence down to satisfy existing lower echelon requirements, or to relay additional relevant intelligence; and
b. it ensures that time-critical intelligence in support of decision making is passed to those who must action it.
75 The tendency to place a higher classification and caveat on an intelligence product than is required by the nature and sensitivity of the contents.
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0346. The “pull” concept involves access to intelligence databases by Intelligence organizations at all levels. Web-based technologies and standards are now commonly used to organize and present related intelligence products together, and in doing so, facilitate virtual “one-stop shopping.” This includes operational support pages that link related intelligence products and operational information together on a single web page.
0347. Intelligence dissemination is further enhanced by CIS equipped with electronic publishing capabilities. Electronic publishing allows organizations to publish their own documents and contribute (through collaborative publishing) to the creation of other documents.
0348. Intelligence is published and broadly disseminated to intelligence users via a variety of media, including hardcopy (paper), email, CD, DVD, memory sticks, and web publishing. Among these, web publishing is the preferred media for dissemination because it provides intelligence users with easy access and the ability to browse for intelligence on specific topics.
0349. It is important to emphasize the cyclical nature of the Intelligence cycle and how various stages are often in progress, concurrently. New direction will necessitate more collection even as intelligence products are being disseminated in response to previous collection activity. At each stage, activity may be more or less complex in nature. New information might necessitate an entire round of new intelligence requirements and a new ICP or may simply result in a wider dissemination of a given product.
0350. The Intelligence cycle should never become so overly deliberate and ponderous that it cannot respond quickly and flexibly to changes in the situation. Nor should the professional complexities of the cycle be allowed to inhibit its practical application at all levels. For example, the battle group commander who acts against a target presented in real-time imagery, by a small UAV hovering above the lead company, has employed the Intelligence cycle in its most basic form. In effect, that commander has used the Intelligence cycle just as assuredly and effectively as the Intelligence staff at higher headquarters.
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Chapter 4 Preparing the Generated Force
Introduction 0401. This chapter discusses the Intelligence contribution to the final stages of force generation76 of CF operations. Intelligence has three responsibilities during these stages:
a. Contribution to operational planning. The designated operational commanders and planning staff require regular intelligence products and advice on all aspects of the adversary and the operational environment of the mission area. This intelligence contributes to mission analysis and provides commanders with an understanding of threats and challenges that will be faced during force employment. Further, it assists commanders in determining the optimum composition of forces required to achieve the mission.
b. Contribution to force generation. As those forces and/or elements identified to constitute the JTF are organized, trained, and prepared for deployment, they require regular intelligence on the adversary and the operational environment in the mission area. Intelligence influences the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the force and the manner in which it will be organized and equipped to meet its operational tasks.
c. Development and sustainment of joint intelligence architecture. Intelligence architecture represents the sum of all the Intelligence personnel, equipment, and procedures required to provide Intelligence support to the JTF during force employment. This architecture is designed to address the unique demands of specific operations.
Contribution to operational planning 0402. Planning is conducted by the Government of Canada and within DND and the CF prior to the initiation of operational planning. The complexity of the planning depends on the scale of the operation.
0403. The SJS employs the CF force employment planning process (CF FEPP) to support decision making at the departmental level. This is the process by which future CF force employment is anticipated, assessed, planned, and once approved by the GoC, issues direction for the commencement of preparation. The aim of the CF FEPP is to ensure the national Strategic direction provided by the GoC is properly translated into a thorough understanding of the GoC’s objectives which are then translated into military Strategic objectives and plans.77
0404. Defence Intelligence involvement in the CF FEPP is continuous. As Strategic planning progresses, intelligence input comes from CDI (which provides the J2 staff to the SJS matrix) and from the environmental and force employment commands.
76 CFJP 3-0 Chapter 2 pp 2-1–2-2: “An operation consists of a number of stages. These can occur both at the Strategic and Operational Level, sequentially or concurrently. The typical stages are:
a. Planning. Developing the campaign and operation plans. b. Preparation. Preparing, assembling, and training the force. c. Build up. Putting in place the logistic support, including coordinating host-nation support (HNS), building up stocks, deploying to the area of operations, or reinforcing in-place forces. d. Execution. Conducting operations. e. Termination. Ceasing operations and transitioning to a post-conflict environment. f. Reconstituting the force, before or after redeployment. g. Analysis. Reviewing and analyzing the campaign and conducting doctrine evaluation.”
77 Refer to CFJP 5-0 Chapter 1, Section IV for a more detailed explanation of the CF FEPP.
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0405. CDI is intimately involved in furnishing intelligence to the CF FEPP by:
a. contributing to the Strategic watch78 through the provision of intelligence indications and warning;79
b. contributing to Strategic analysis in cooperation with both policy and planning staff;
c. participating in the Intelligence and operations look ahead (IOLA);80
d. conducting whole-of-government Strategic Intelligence assessment activity with the national Intelligence community; and
e. coordinating defence Intelligence assessments and sharing with allies.
0406. Depending on the magnitude of the planned operation, CDI will have concentrated analytical and specialist Intelligence capabilities on the intended mission area, while increasing intelligence collection. Capabilities are brought together into a dedicated CDI Intelligence response team (IRT) for major operations.
0407. A CDI IRT varies in size and responsibility as the stages of the operation unfold. During the planning and preparation stages, it is a key source for intelligence analysis and products, contributing to national intelligence assessments, while supporting departmental and CF requirements. Once force employment commences and the JTF J2 staff begins to develop expertise on the mission area, the burden is reduced for the CDI IRT, which refocuses on Strategic requirements.
0408. Close CDI involvement from the outset in Government of Canada and departmental planning means that joint Intelligence rarely becomes engaged in operational planning without some existing level of situational awareness and basic intelligence database.
0409. Integration into the OPP. To conduct planning at the Operational Level, the CF employs the OPP,81 a coordinated process to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned operational tasks and to plan possible future tasks. The OPP takes place within the envelope of the CF FEPP. It can be conducted throughout all stages of an operation. In preparing the force, OPP provides the mechanism for effective campaign planning and is used to aid the operational commander in developing the concept by which operations and engagements achieve the mission and satisfy the Strategic objectives set out by the GoC.
0410. Initiation. The OPP for a CF operation commences when the CDS issues an initiating directive (ID). The CDS ID states planning assumptions, defines desired Strategic objectives, outline the CDS intent, imposes appropriate limitations, appoints supported82 and supporting83 commanders, identifies key planning milestones, and provides an initial estimate of available forces authorized for planning (i.e., force apportionment).
0411. In the majority of situations, the CDS ID identifies the commander of one of the force employment commands to conduct and execute the operation, in accordance with its geographical location (whether in
78 Ibid, pp. 1-9–1-10. 79 Pending ongoing review by DGIP. 80 The IOLA provides the DM and the CDS with highly classified briefings on topics of a Strategic nature/impact in a forum where they can ask questions and discuss the issues. Such briefings alternate between a global scan and thematic or regional approaches. 81 This section should be read in conjunction with CFJP 5-0 Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 82 CFJP 1-0 Chapter 5 p 5-4: “The supported commander has the primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by either the Strategic- or Operational-level command. In the context of joint operations planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to the requirements of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).” 83 Ibid: “The supporting commander provides forces and capabilities to a supported commander and develops a supporting plan.”
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continental North America or overseas) and the type of mission (e.g., special forces, NORAD). Force generators are identified through force apportionment. At this point, the JTF commander is appointed.
0412. Once the operational command has been identified, the command J2 assumes responsibility for the Intelligence component of the OPP. This does not preclude the participation of other DND, CF, and allied Intelligence staff, and national Intelligence agencies:
a. CDI, as both J2 SJS, and the central repository for Strategic and specialist intelligence, will continue to provide support to the force employment command J2 throughout;
b. Intelligence staff of the force generators are consulted for environmental Intelligence expertise and advice;
c. allied Intelligence staff may be brought into the planning process for support and consultation, particularly where combined operations are anticipated; and
d. OGDA in the national Intelligence community may also be consulted.
0413. Where conditions permit, an operational reconnaissance may be conducted to the mission area by the JTF Commander designate. J2 staff representatives must be active participants in any such activity.
0414. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment. IPOE is the systematic and continuous process by which adversarial capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action (i.e., as applicable to a specific operational environment) are determined.84 It is designed to support staff activity and lay the foundations for informed decision making as planning proceeds. In effect, the initial IPOE is completed before OPP commences. IPOE serves OPP by:
a. providing an assessment of the adversary and their operational environment for the intended mission area;
b. providing early assistance in determining PIR, IR and RFI and thus refining collection management; and
c. forming the foundation of the overall Intelligence estimate for the operation.
0415. The adversary. J2 staff requires knowledge of adversarial forces and activities within the operational environment. Adversarial knowledge falls into four broad categories:
a. Character Intelligence is concerned with political leadership, ideology, policies, structures, morale, psychological factors, culture and traditions, adversaries’ personalities, and the background history and status of adversarial forces. Character Intelligence supports an assessment of the adversary’s will and commitment, popular support, tolerance for casualties, and susceptibility to information activities.
b. Capabilities Intelligence looks into the organization and resources of civil authorities, command structure, order of battle, standard of training, doctrine, weapons, and equipment (including technical characteristics), ISR capabilities, and assets and logistics. Capabilities Intelligence supports an assessment of the adversary in relation to friendly forces by analyzing force ratios, the nature of the threat and adversary strengths and weaknesses, including critical vulnerabilities. It also contributes to the targeting process.
c. Dispositions Intelligence is concerned with the adversary’s location, it identifies adversarial posture and informs intentions and threat assessments. Dispositions Intelligence is vital to effective warning and facilitates efficient targeting.
84 Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is the Tactical Level equivalent to IPOE.
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d. Intentions Intelligence focuses on the adversary’s intentions (and potential reactions) towards friendly force activities. Intentions Intelligence contributes to effective campaign planning, operational success, preparation of and protection of forces, and allows commanders to pre-empt adversarial operations. It is also possible for commanders to select decisive points at which to concentrate the capabilities and efforts against adversarial vulnerabilities, to attack the adversary’s centre of gravity.
0416. The operational environment. Describing the operational environment of an intended mission area is a complex activity. In joint operations, it is further complicated by the nature and scope of forces involved, the size of the area in which they will operate, and the adjacent areas that can affect their operations. The operational environment comprises maritime waters, terrain, airspace, and can reach into space. It is not restricted to the physical geographic dimension, but includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Knowledge of the operational environment encompasses three general subject groupings:
a. Geographical environment. Hydrographic and terrain information relating to the natural geographical conditions of the mission area.
b. Meteorological and oceanographic environment. Information relating to prevailing weather, climatic and oceanographic conditions, and the likely effect on Intelligence sensors and platforms, strike assets, movement and manoeuvre, personnel, logistics, and communications.
c. Human environment. Intelligence on the history, culture and traditions, language(s), religion(s), political, legal and administrative structures, infrastructure and economy, level of technology of the population in the operational area.85
0417. Orientation. J2 provides support for mission analysis gaps and assists in prioritizing information requirements. The J2 staff provides input regarding:
a. SA of the operational environment regarding known and assessed adversary dispositions, intentions and capabilities;
b. the significant characteristics of the operational environment in terms of cultural, geospatial, meteorological, and oceanographic information;
c. adversarial COAs developed during IPOE, including a recommendation on the most likely and most dangerous COA; and
d. recommendation of PIRs to the commander.
0418. J2 also determines the desired intelligence architecture based on:
a. the impact of the operational environment on Intelligence capabilities;
b. potential Intelligence tasks; and
c. the availability and suitability of ISR assets and capabilities.
0419. Courses of action development. In the COA development stage, J2 assists with the analysis and selection of friendly COA. Each COA may be war gamed against the adversarial COA identified through the IPOE process. In war gaming, the J2 staff represents two distinct Intelligence perspectives of the operational environment:
85 Also referred to as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII).
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a. Define enemy COA. The J2 staff must realistically represent adversarial actions and reactions regardless of what friendly forces would prefer the adversary to do. The aim is to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA from an adversarial perspective and reveal any weaknesses. This leads to a staff recommendation on the COA, with the best probability of success.
b. Plan Intelligence ops. At the same time, the J2 staff analyzes the COA from a friendly force perspective, determining the implications for the Intelligence capabilities and activities that are necessary to support the operation.
0420. When the decision briefing is completed and the commander chooses a COA, J2 supports the production of a concept of operations (CONOP).86 J2 should also have outlined an Intelligence CONOP that allows for joint intelligence architecture refinement.
0421. Plan development. The final product of the OPP is an approved plan or operation order (OP O). J2 staff will:
a. coordinate and finalize with the SJS J2 staff (CDI):
(1) the overall joint intelligence architecture;
(2) the intelligence collection plan (ICP);
(3) Intelligence capabilities to be generated; and
(4) any release and disclosure policies and procedures for intelligence sharing with allies, coalition partners, host nations, and OGDA, as applicable.
b. produce all necessary plan attachments which, depending on the scope of planned Intelligence operations, include:
(1) the threat assessment (including adversarial intentions, capabilities, and potential COA);
(2) the intelligence architecture for the operation;
(3) areas of intelligence responsibility and interest;
(4) CCIRM instructions and procedures;
(5) instructions and procedures applicable to Intelligence disciplines (e.g., HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, etc.);
(6) targeting intelligence;
(7) geospatial support;
(8) meteorological and oceanographic support; and
(9) CI and security intelligence.
0422. Plan review. The issued OP O requires iterative review as force employment draws closer. J2 must continue to update adversarial intelligence and the operational environment to ensure validity.
86 Refer to CFJP 5-0. The CONOP expresses the commander’s intentions on the use of forces, time and space to achieve the mission, objectives, and end state.
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0423. As force preparation progresses, close attention will need to be paid to: the feasibility of the planned joint intelligence architecture, changes to the intelligence assessment, collection requirements, the Intelligence capabilities available, and of necessitating amendments. Significant developments and changes to the situation require another cycle of IPOE and of OPP.
Contribution to the force generators 0424. Force generators are engaged in warning and preparing forces and elements assigned to the JTF, through force apportionment. It is critical for J2 staff, to ensure that forces are informed of intelligence on developments in the operational environment. This necessitates a constant process of delivering operationally focused and customized intelligence. This is best achieved through close cooperation and coordination between the force employment command J2 staff, CDI, and the environmental (force generator) Intelligence staff.
0425. Operational command J2 staff. Over time, and as planning progresses, J2 develop a focused understanding of intelligence at the Operational Level. J2 are positioned to coordinate what intelligence must be provided to the force generators, what mission-tailored Intelligence training might be required, and how Intelligence support needs to be organized and structured.
0426. CDI. Comprised of analytical and specialist resources, CDI is well positioned to provide intelligence products to the force generators and elements being prepared for deployment. CDI assists by providing intelligence briefings and assessments, geospatial intelligence products, and specialist intelligence advice (e.g., CI, HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, and TECHINT).
0427. Environmental Intelligence staff. The environmental Intelligence staff will assist with the workup of the elements allocated from their command. Close relationships between environmental staff and elements places environmental staff in a good position to advise J2 staff and CDI on deficiencies in the provision of intelligence, and to provide feedback and recommendations on any intelligence architecture issues pertaining to organization and personnel. Force generators often provide the nucleus staff for the JTF J2, the Tactical Intelligence staff, and JTF sections and units.
Joint Intelligence architecture 0428. The joint intelligence architecture is the sum of all the personnel, staff, organizations, policies, procedures, capabilities, and CIS required within a JTF. Since this architecture provides Intelligence support to a CF operation during force employment, it is critical that it be coherent, comprehensive, and sustainable.
0429. Developing the architecture demands close cooperation between CDI, the force employment J2, and the force generators.
0430. Design principles. The JTF intelligence architecture design is based on:
a. Unity. The architecture must represent a unified structure while maintaining JTF J2 as the focal point. As the JTF commander drives the Intelligence effort, there should be no intelligence capability within the architecture that is not accountable to J2; or outside the authority of the J2, to task on behalf of the commander.
b. Cohesiveness. To the full extent possible, the architecture must be developed by expanding on existing CF Intelligence capabilities (i.e., rather than creating new architecture). For instance, a brigade G2 might form the nucleus for a JTF J2 rather than bringing together personnel from disparate locations and backgrounds for the first time.
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c. Suitability. Customized Intelligence capabilities and resources that support unique operations and their operational environments such as CI, SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT must be equipped to conduct operations in the mission area.
d. Sustainability. The architecture should be planned and configured with a realistic appreciation of the limitations to Intelligence personnel, capabilities, and resources available within the CF. The architecture should be sustainable throughout successive rotations.
e. Reach-back. The architecture should always include a considerable capacity to reach back into the national and defence Intelligence community in Canada, for support. Applied judiciously, reach-back can reduce the in-theatre Intelligence resource burden and improve sustainability.
f. Survivability. The architecture must be able to withstand the rigours and stress of operations. Intelligence personnel should be trained and prepared for the demands of the mission area. Intelligence capabilities should be able to withstand the conditions of the operational environment. Intelligence CIS must be reliable and incorporate a practical measure of redundancy.
g. Flexibility. The architecture must be adaptable and respond to Intelligence operations changes (in the focus and tempo of Intelligence operations), with actions that ensure sound architectural integrity.
h. Interoperability. The architecture should cater to the participation of allied and coalition Intelligence elements, and the national Intelligence community. Intelligence CIS must be able to support allied and coalition collaboration while also retaining a Canadian-eyes-only (CEO) capability.
0431. The operational context. Developing a joint intelligence architecture requires the J2 to be mindful of the operational context in which it will be employed. A CF JTF may represent the principal military operation in and of itself (as is the case in domestic operations, or when Canada is the lead nation), or it may represent the Canadian contribution to a wider combined campaign or operation (as is generally the case in overseas expeditionary operations).
0432. The operational context has important ramifications for the intelligence architecture. Where the CF JTF is the principal military operation, the JTF J2 staff acts as the senior Intelligence staff. In combined campaigns, however, there may be a separate and/or combined intelligence architecture.
0433. A combined intelligence architecture is determined in consultation with the other participating nations. Both Strategic (e.g., CDI J2 in the SJS matrix), and force employment command J2 staff participate in its coordination. It is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the architecture for the Canadian JTF itself. The Canadian JTF intelligence architecture should therefore always be developed with a view to:
a. complement rather than compete with the wider combined architecture;
b. avoid the unnecessary duplication of combined Intelligence capabilities;87 and
c. support Canadian intelligence requirements while effectively contributing to those of the combined operation.
87 This is an important intelligence sustainment issue. If the JTF is effectively supported by capabilities held within the combined intelligence architecture, the need for unique national capabilities can be reduced.
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0434. The JTF J2 - The JTF J2 and the J2 staff are configured to the needs of the operation. The J2 should always be a senior Intelligence officer whose rank is determined by:
a. the size of the JTF;
b. the need for professional parity with other staff principals; and
c. the requirement to represent a credible authority in any interaction with allied, coalition, and OGDA Intelligence staff, agencies, and units.
0435. Precise staff structure will be dictated by a consideration of the mission, type of operations, and size of the Intelligence operation it is required to support. Depending on those considerations, the JTF J2 staff could be augmented with a joint Intelligence centre (JIC), a national Intelligence cell (NIC) and/or Intelligence liaison officers (ILOs). An all-source Intelligence centre (ASIC) will often complement the JTF intelligence architecture. As a minimum, if deployed without additional resources, the JTF J2 must be capable of supporting:
a. the commander and staff of the JTF headquarters;
b. Intelligence planning;
c. Intelligence operations including CCIRM, participation in ISR and the tasking and oversight of assigned analyst and specialist Intelligence capabilities;
d. an all-source intelligence analysis and production capability;
e. Intelligence support to the targeting process and information activities;
f. Intelligence liaison and coordination with national, allied, and coalition elements as well as higher and lower formations, components, and units; and
g. CI operations.
0436. Joint Intelligence centre. A JIC is an organisation that can be added to the JTF J2 staff when required, and it is accountable and responsive to the J2. The purpose of a JIC is to meet the needs of a JTF headquarters in a more complex operation as a joint all-source analysis section. The JIC would be responsible for producing the intelligence required to support the whole JTF (Commander, staff, components, task forces units, and other elements) under the control and directions of the J2. The JIC concept brings together the intelligence analysis capabilities of all the environmental components (maritime, land, and air) into a central location for Intelligence support. Intelligence analysts from OGDA could be added into a JIC. In other circumstances, like in a domestic operation where the CF is in a supporting role, a JIC may be led by an OGDA in which military Intelligence staff would be added. JICs can be employed in both domestic and overseas operations.
0437. All-source Intelligence centre. An ASIC is a formed, Intelligence line unit, led by a commanding officer who is accountable to the JTF Comd. An ASIC integrates a range of integral intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to produce all-source fused Tactical-Level intelligence in support of the JTF based on the priorities as set by the Commander. In a theatre of operation, the ASIC is the sole Intelligence organization within the JTF to own collection capabilities, which allow a wide array of activities in order to support on-going operations and to define upcoming operations. An ASIC consists of an all-source analysis cell and collection assets such as HUMINT (source handling and interrogation), CI, SIGINT, GEOINT, and Operational-Level exploitation capability. Other capabilities could be added as required. Due to its specialized collection capabilities, an ASIC is best used in overseas operations but could be tailored to fit domestic support. To achieve the overall Intelligence effort, the ASIC CO
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coordinates with the JTF J2. An ASIC can be joint and can also integrate five-eyes community analysts and collectors.
0438. National Intelligence cell. A NIC is a self-contained Intelligence support facility equipped with the necessary personnel and CIS to link elements in a theatre of operations to the national and five-eyes Intelligence communities. Although some analysis can be done by the staff manning the NIC, its main purpose is to provide access to the national Intelligence network (up to top secret special access Canadian-eyes-only level). As the operation of a NIC will further exacerbate the requirement for Intelligence personnel, equipment, and CIS resources in an operation, it should only ever be established in two situations:
a. National Intelligence support to a senior Canadian officer. A NIC can be established to provide national Intelligence support to a senior Canadian commander or staff principal (normally a flag/general officer) employed within a combined headquarters.
b. National Intelligence support to a combined headquarters. Each participating nation can be requested to establish a NIC in proximity to the main combined headquarters in order to provide a conduit for national Intelligence inputs to the combined Intelligence staff.
0439. In each of the two previous situations, a NIC should only be provided if the JTF J2 staff is either too remote from the combined headquarters or has too limited a capacity to provide Intelligence support beyond the JTF.
0440. Coalition Intelligence fusion centre (CIFC). In operations where Canada will participate alongside forces of the five-eyes nations, it may be agreed to establish a CIFC. A CIFC is designed to fuse and integrate intelligence derived from the five-eyes national Strategic and defence intelligence sources for dissemination to five-eyes and designated coalition forces. The Intelligence staff deployed to a CIFC would see their main effort being analysis or other specific Intelligence tasks (e.g., GEOINT ). In order to achieve those tasks, the Canadian Intelligence staff will have access to the national top-secret-special-access (TSSA) network. In general, a senior ranking Intelligence officer would be in charge of the overall Canadian contribution in the CIFC and be responsive to the CIFC CO. As for administration, the Canadian staff attached to the CIFC would be under a major Canadian organization like the CF JTF.
0441. Intelligence liaison officers and liaison teams. JTF J2 staff may have to accommodate the presence of Intelligence liaison officers or liaison teams from OGDA and allied or coalition partners. LOs or teams may bring their own dedicated CIS connectivity with them. In addition, the deployed intelligence architecture may require the detachment of Canadian Intelligence LOs to other combined organizations. Those LOs would normally be accountable to JTF J2, which would necessitate the appropriate CIS connectivity.
Intelligence communications and information systems 0442. Intelligence operations will depend on a robust CIS built around common standards with the widest possible degree of interoperability. Well planned and implemented Intelligence CIS connectivity will assist with the transmission of tasks and requests, the efficient and rapid transfer of information from sources and agencies and the processing and dissemination of intelligence products. This CIS infrastructure must provide the JTF intelligence architecture with:
a. secure connectivity up to the TSSA level;
b. the ability to handle CEO material;
c. high capacity;
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d. real-time capabilities;
e. interconnected databases;88
f. processing tools to support all aspects of the Intelligence cycle;
g. access to Strategic intelligence feeds;
h. connectivity with collection assets;
i. connectivity with Tactical intelligence elements within the JTF;
j. connectivity with national, allied, and coalition Intelligence elements as required; and
k. connectivity with the operations CIS infrastructure to include collaborative activity with all staff functions within the JTF headquarters.
0443. The existing DND and CF backbone of networks is augmented by additional, customized capabilities, including:
a. permanent networks designed to support DND and CF programs, activities, and operations, including:
(1) SPARTAN, a CDI-managed system and satisfies the requirement for a TSSA CEO network for Strategic- and Operational-level Intelligence collaborative activity processing, production, and dissemination. It can serve as the gateway to other TSSA national Intelligence networks and the five-eyes TSSA STONEGHOST network.
(2) Consolidated secure network infrastructure (CSNI), the SECRET CF-wide operations network. A JTF operates this network for the planning and conduct of its operations. As such, it is an excellent gateway for the passage of intelligence across the commands and down to Tactical Intelligence staff.89
b. Other government departments and agencies. OGDA have their own networks operating both at the TSSA and SECRET levels, and the networks are designed to meet their particular needs. Depending on the type of operation, and the level of involvement of OGDA, the JTF J2 may have access to these networks. Alternatively, they may be supported by a department or agency liaison officer, or team co-located with the JTF J2.
c. Allied collaborative. These are existing networks that permit the sharing of intelligence with established allies. They include:
(1) STONEGHOST, a TSSA five-eyes system that permits allied Intelligence interoperability at both the strategic and Operational Levels.
(2) Battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES), a NATO Intelligence network that operates across the alliance and connects some non-NATO nations at the SECRET level.
d. Coalition. These are dedicated networks created to meet the needs of a specific combined operation when existing allied collaborative networks do not permit access to all coalition members. They generally operate up to the coalition SECRET level and provide secure connectivity for all coalition participants.
88 To the extent that security and release and disclosure considerations permit. 89 To date, the Land Command Support System has not been integrated into CSNI. In a land-centric JTF, connectivity between CSNI and LCSS will be critical to the passage of intelligence to and from the Tactical Level.
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Policies and procedures 0444. The joint intelligence architecture is reviewed to identify any requirements for customized Intelligence policies and procedures. Guidance is sought from CDI (functional authority for defence Intelligence)90 on the following:
a. legal considerations for the conduct of Intelligence activities, particularly in a domestic operation;91
b. the conduct of HUMINT and CI activities;
c. Intelligence cooperation with coalition nations for which there is no existing established Intelligence relationship; and
d. the release and disclosure of intelligence to allies, coalition partners, host nations, OGDA, territorial, provincial, and municipal authorities.
0445. When the force generators declare to CDS that their forces are operationally ready (Op Ready) for deployment, the force preparation is complete. At this point, the joint intelligence architecture will have been confirmed, the JTF J2 staff and Intelligence elements organized, trained, and prepared. Some components might have already deployed to the JTF’s AOR.
0446. Successful Intelligence planning during force preparation will have assured that the JTF is as well prepared as is possible to meet the challenges presented by the operational environment of its AOR. It will be supported by a balance of the necessary Intelligence capabilities to ensure that, whether conducting a domestic operation, or participating in a combined operation overseas, the JTF commander, and the commanders of subordinate elements, can rely on comprehensive joint Intelligence support.
90 Refer to Chapter 1, p 1-7, paragraph 0126 or CANFORGEN 009/05 DCDS 011 201610Z JAN 05 91 Legal support to CDI is provided primarily by the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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Chapter 5 Force Employment
Introduction 0501. This chapter discusses Intelligence responsibilities during force employment. At the Strategic Level, force employment represents the application of allocated military means to achieve specified objectives or effects through activities such as operations, defence diplomacy, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral defence activities.92 At the Operational Level, force employment represents the command, control, and sustainment of allocated forces.93
0502. The Intelligence activity must be seamless in the transformation from the planning and preparation of a force, through to its deployment and subsequent employment. It must also be dynamic and evolve with changing situations. Once the joint intelligence architecture becomes operational, it begins to take on the brunt of the Operational-Level Intelligence responsibility for the AOR. Strategic Intelligence then refocuses on its standing defence responsibilities. Strategic and Operational Intelligence reporting must be sustained until the operation is concluded.
Contribution to joint operations 0503. The focus of the Intelligence activity in joint operations generally centres on the Operational Level, where the employment of subordinate elements is directed and coordinated. These elements represent a variety of unique-to-environment capabilities (e.g., a naval task group, an army battle group, or an air wing) whose tasks are conducted at the Tactical Level, according to the applicable doctrine and procedures, and whose Tactical intelligence needs are provided by their own integral Intelligence capabilities. Joint intelligence that reaches the Strategic Level and crosses laterally to allied and/or coalition formations at the Operational Level, will complement the tactical needs of these elements by developing the Operational intelligence picture.
0504. The purpose of all joint Intelligence activity is to provide the Operational-Level commander with the fullest possible understanding of the adversary and operational environment in order that successful operations can be planned and conducted. J2 staff responsibilities are:
a. the provision of intelligence to the commander, staff, and subordinate formations and units;
b. Intelligence input to planning;
c. the planning and monitoring of intelligence collection and production operations;
d. the contribution to operational enabling activities such as information operations, targeting, and force protection, and;
e. the development and maintenance of Intelligence relationships within the AOR.
The commander and staff 0505. The relationship with the JTF Commander is the key relationship for the J2. During operations, the relationship is symbiotic. The J2 relies on the commander to set the PIR/IR; and the commander relies on
92 CFJP 01, p. 5-7. 93 DTB Record 32173.
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the J2 to provide the knowledge of the operational environment and the adversary, necessary for the planning and conduct of operations. In turn, this requires the J2 staff to maintain a close rapport with both the J3 and J5 staff in order to fully understand both current and planned operations and focus the Intelligence effort.
0506. The J2 also needs to closely coordinate Intelligence activities with all other JTF staff elements throughout an operation. These may also include, but are not limited to:
a. the Intelligence staffs of the maritime, land, and air component commands, if deployed;
b. the targeting staff such as artillery, offensive air, and electronic warfare (EW);
c. the engineer staff;
d. the special operations forces staff;
e. the combat service support (CSS) staff;
f. the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) staff;
g. the military police (MP) staff;
h. the public affairs staff; and
i. the legal advisors.
Intelligence input to planning 0507. Planning continues to be conducted throughout force employment. During pre-deployment, emphasis is placed on anticipating the operational environment and developing a campaign plan for the operation. Now the focus becomes the actual conduct of the campaign. As the operation evolves, planning takes place continuously to adapt it to the changing situation. The considerations made in earlier planning need to be reassessed against the realities of the operational environment. As the commander’s picture of that operational environment is sharpened, and adversarial capabilities and intentions materialize, further planning is conducted to refine courses of action and desired campaign effects.
0508. The OPP continues to provide the framework for all Operational planning, as it did during pre-deployment. IPOE provides the structure for J2 staff input. Intelligence input to planning is required, immediately upon deployment. In effect, it is imperative that the J2 rapidly stand up the intelligence architecture and establish Intelligence operations.
0509. Development of in-theatre expertise. On arrival in theatre, the J2 staff already possess essential foundational knowledge on the operational environment and the adversary. That foundation serves as the point of departure for a rapid and intense process of familiarization with the realities of the AOR. The J2’s success rests, largely, on quickly gaining the credibility of the commander and the staff branches. On deployment, the J2 staff must work aggressively to:
a. transition its abstract understanding of the operational environment to a more concrete, comprehensive one, based on being in theatre;
b. update, refine, and master its assessment of the adversary and begin to provide value-added, current Operational intelligence assessments from its own JTF collection capabilities; and
c. conduct early and intensive Intelligence liaison to familiarize itself with friendly forces, OGDA from Canada, local government authorities, host nation, and others as applicable.
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0510. Collection planning The initial implementation of the ICP in theatre must proceed promptly. While it is difficult in some instances to achieve a balanced degree of collection activity right away (e.g., HUMINT requires the careful cultivation of contacts—not a process conducive to immediate Intelligence results), the need to provide reliable intelligence to planning as the operation unfolds will be critical. In addition, the ICP produced during the preparation stage will likely need to be reviewed and recalibrated on arrival in theatre.
Intelligence relationships 0511. Higher formations. The requirement to establish links to higher Intelligence staff and capabilities can be twofold in nature:
a. Combined. A JTF in a continental or international setting is likely to operate within the framework of a combined JTF (CJTF). As such, the JTF J2 must develop working links with both the CJTF J2 and CJTF Intelligence capabilities.
b. National. At the same time, the JTF J2 must maintain complementing links to the force employment command J2. This reach-back assists in minimizing the footprint in theatre, while contributing to the strength and capability of the intelligence architecture. The force employment command J2 is the gateway for representing the JTF J2 on Intelligence support issues with CDI, and the wider defence, and national Intelligence communities.
0512. Lower formations. There is an equally important requirement to establish strong links with the subordinate Intelligence staff and elements of the JTF. To foster these links, the J2 staff should endeavour to conduct visits to these components whenever possible, subject to the security situation in the operational environment.
0513. Lateral formations. The JTF J2 must establish productive working relationships to coordinate Intelligence activity with lateral formations. As a consequence, Intelligence liaison staff may be present in the CJTF headquarters.
0514. OGDA. Depending on the operation, there may be OGDA present. In domestic operations, one of the OGDA will likely be the lead agency. Representatives of OGDA, the national Intelligence community and law enforcement and security agencies may be active participants as part of a comprehensive approach.
0515. Host-nation representation. In overseas operations, subject to higher direction and the discretion of the commander, the JTF J2 staff may develop relationships with host-nation officials and agencies as required.
0516. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A variety of NGOs may be conducting humanitarian activities in the AOR. At the discretion and direction of the commander, the J2 staff can liaise with NGOs to obtain and share information of mutual interest on the operational environment.
Intelligence operations 0517. To fully support operations, the J2 staff must efficiently manage the Intelligence capabilities directly allocated to it in the JTF intelligence architecture. Intelligence operations represent the implementation of the Intelligence cycle under the direction of the J2 staff and extend beyond collection management to include aspects of operations and logistics planning, oversight, personnel management, and supervision for:
a. all assigned specialist Intelligence collection activities; and
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b. the processing, production, and dissemination of all-source intelligence.
Collection management 0518. The CCIRM process acts as the hub for the management of the Intelligence cycle. On behalf of the J2, the role of CCIRM is to:
a. manage the ICP;
b. ensure that the most appropriate collection capabilities and resources are used to obtain the necessary information;
c. participate in ISR management;
d. monitor the progress of collection activities and steer them where necessary as the operation evolves;
e. provide information obtained through collection for analysis and intelligence production; and
f. disseminate intelligence to the consumer.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 0519. Although J2 staff is ultimately responsible for intelligence collection, they normally have no direct control over the majority of capabilities employed to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance within the JTF. As a result, the ISR management process operates in conjunction with the Intelligence cycle in order to coordinate the collection requirements of the J2 staff with the surveillance and reconnaissance assets normally controlled by the J3.
0520. The ISR management process receives tasking as a result of the direction stage of the Intelligence cycle and provides information and single-source intelligence to the processing stage. At the same time, it provides the links through which time-sensitive intelligence can be relayed directly from a collection system to those elements that can make immediate use of it: the sensor-to-shooter link. Collection assets may include:
a. maritime surveillance assets;
b. ground reconnaissance elements;
c. special operations forces;
d. air reconnaissance, UAV, and aviation assets;
e. surveillance and target acquisition systems; and
f. EW assets.
Specialist intelligence collection activities 0521. During operations, the J2 staff may be responsible for directing the operations of assigned specialist intelligence collection capabilities. Such capabilities are normally allocated as a complete element. This reduces the burden on the J2 staff by allowing specialist collectors themselves to determine how best to respond to, and conduct an intelligence collection task. Specialist collection activities may include DOCINT (captured document exploitation), MASINT and TECHINT as well as:
a. HUMINT operations. The type of HUMINT activities conducted in an operation will depend on the nature of the operation. Trained HUMINT operators, may conduct all or some of the following:
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(1) Source handling. The structured interpersonal contact with individuals having access to information of potential Intelligence interest.
(2) Debriefing. The formal and systematic questioning of elected consenting individuals by specially trained personnel in order to gather information of relevance.
(3) Interrogation. The systematic and extended questioning of captured personnel by trained Intelligence personnel to obtain information of intelligence value while adhering to humane practices consistent with all applicable international law.
(4) Intelligence liaison. Liaison with allied, coalition, and host-nation agencies, and organizations for the purpose of obtaining and/or sharing information of intelligence value.
b. GEOINT operations. Operations may require geospatial Intelligence specialists from a number of fields. These specialists may be combined to form a larger geospatial Intelligence support team (GIST), including:
(1) Imagery analysts, operating within an IMINT support team, may be allocated to assist the J2 staff by analyzing and exploiting imagery acquired from photographic, radar, electro-optical, infra-red, thermal and multi-spectral sensors. This can include real-time, near real-time, and time-delayed imagery from UAVs, aircraft, combat camera, and satellite sources.
(2) Geomatics technician specialists in a geospatial support team for terrain analysis and related activities.
(3) Meteorological-oceanographic specialists for forecasts, warnings and projected impacts of weather and oceanography on all capabilities, platforms, and sensors.
c. SIGINT operations. SIGINT specialists may be provided as:
(1) A SIGINT support team capable of reaching back into national and allied SIGINT capabilities to support operations; and
(2) A SIGINT collection element capable of producing Tactical-Level SIGINT in support of subordinate elements.
d. CI operations. A CI team may be deployed to provide support. Overseas, such a team may be incorporated into an HCI capability under a J2X. CI is covered in more detail, in Annex A of Chapter 2.
Intelligence dissemination 0522. Lastly, all Intelligence operations must result in the timely and ongoing dissemination of intelligence to consumers. At the Operational Level, intelligence falls into three broad product groupings for dissemination purposes:
a. briefings;
b. summaries (INTSUMs), reports (INTREPs); and
c. other operational support products.
0523. Intelligence briefings. Oral briefings are a standard component of the regular cycle of staff activity within the JTF headquarters. Their structure and scheduling is determined by the particular demands of the operation. They are the key method by which the J2 staff routinely updates the
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commander and JTF staff. Oral briefings communicate critical intelligence, and permit face-to-face questions and discussion. Formal oral briefings should always:
a. follow a standard format;
b. be presented as succinctly as possible, remaining firmly focused on the purpose of the briefing;
c. cover only the period that has lapsed since the last briefing unless there is a reassessment of something that had been previously briefed; and
d. report the situation, providing an assessment indicating clearly the relevance.
0524. Informal briefings also frequently occur as the J2 staff interacts with the commander, the staff, subordinate components of the JTF, allies, coalition partners, and other agencies and organizations. These briefings, even when extemporaneous, should still be presented in a deliberate, structured manner to ensure mutual comprehension and efficiency of effort.
0525. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). For the JTF J2 the INTSUM is the foundational intelligence product. INTSUMs are regularly produced summaries of the J2 assessment of both the operational environment and the adversary within the AOR and are key inserts into situational awareness. They will have wide dissemination, both down to subordinate components, and up to higher echelon headquarters. Key features of INTSUMs are:
a. they are issued cyclically according to a specific reporting period and production schedule, normally daily in a significant operation;
b. they contain not only reports and assessments of the situation at the time of dissemination, but also a predictive assessment for the next reporting period;
c. they are composed according to an established format in order that consumers may more easily focus on specific subject areas; and
d. they are produced at a security classification that permits their widest practical dissemination to the JTF while still providing scope for the J2 to include meaningful intelligence.
0526. Intelligence Report (INTREP). INTREPs are produced without regard to a specific schedule whenever intelligence or information received is considered sufficiently critical to require the immediate attention of the recipient. Supplementary INTREPs (SUPINTREPs) may also be produced periodically to provide more detailed analysis of a specific issue that has been collected on and assessed over a period of time.
0527. Other operational support products. The J2 staff is called on to provide a variety of other intelligence products in support of particular aspects of an operation. This may include:
a. geospatial products such as imagery and terrain analysis;
b. handbooks and recognition guides (though limitations on analyst staff might mean such publications are developed at the force employment command J2 or CDI level);
c. meteorological, oceanographic, and cultural products;
d. targeting support packages;
e. demographic studies, personality profiles, and social networking products;
f. order-of-battle assessments;
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g. battle damage assessment (BDA); and
h. site survey reports.
0528. Intelligence may have to be produced and disseminated in a variety of formats in accordance with the nature of the operation, the collection sources and the sensitivity of the intelligence. For example, INTSUMs and INTREPs may be issued in separate Special Access, non-Special Access versions, as well as under Canadian eyes only, allied, and coalition caveats. As a fundamental principle, the provision of timely intelligence should never be artificially restricted by the classification of the dissemination means. For instance, if a critical intelligence item is too sensitive to appear in a regular INTSUM, a tailored INTREP should be produced and disseminated by separate means to those who require it. All finished intelligence documents (regardless of format) should be produced, disseminated, and stored digitally.
Intelligence contribution to operations enabling activities 0529. During the conduct of operations, the JTF staff contribute to a number of specific processes aimed at targeting the adversary and exploiting the operational environment. These processes assist the commander to seize and maintain the initiative, achieve information superiority and contribute to the OPSEC of friendly forces. These processes are:
a. information operations;
b. targeting; and
c. force protection.
0530. Intelligence contribution to information operations. Information operations are defined as actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversary’s decision makers by affecting their information and/or information systems, while exploiting and protecting one’s own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies.94 Information operations are conducted in the information domain, an inherent component of the operational environment that includes the World Wide Web (the Internet); the command and control (C2) systems of both friendly and adversarial forces; and all personnel (friendly or adversary) who make decisions and handle information.
0531. Intelligence support is critical to information operations, particularly in the planning, coordination and employment of military capabilities available to achieve the desired effects. Information operations cannot be conducted without intelligence on adversary information and CIS, perceptions, and C2 vulnerabilities.
0532. To that end, Intelligence will focus on defining critical nodes and vulnerabilities in an adversary’s decision-making process. This will orient the key aspects of information operations towards the systematic disruption and degradation of an adversary’s ability to make timely and informed decisions. Intelligence provides the foundation for conducting information operations through:
a. an understanding of the perceptions of an adversary, neutral, and local populations and their susceptibilities to being influenced;
b. adversarial information operations capabilities, intent, morale, and vulnerability to offensive information operations;
c. adversarial C2 aspects such as key adversary personnel, target audiences, headquarters, communications nodes, CIS, and intelligence collection capabilities; and
94 DTB Record 31721.
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d. assessments on friendly force vulnerability to adversary information operations.
0533. There are two categories of information operations:
a. Offensive, which include actions taken to influence adversary decision makers and commanders. This may be done by affecting an adversary’s use of, or access to, information and CIS. Offensive information operations can include psychological operations (PsyOps), deception, electronic attack95 (EA – a component of EW), intelligence, computer network attack, and physical destruction. These operations have two principal objectives:
(1) attacking an adversary’s perception of the situation, undermining will, and weakening resolve, painting the inevitability of defeat; and
(2) disrupting an adversary’s ability to exercise command, thereby preventing the adversary from taking the initiative.
b. Defensive, which include actions taken to protect friendly information and ensure friendly decision-makers and commanders have timely access to necessary, relevant, and accurate information. Defensive information operations also ensure that friendly commanders are protected from any adversarial offensive information operations efforts. These operations strive to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from all adverse effects, deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental. To this end, it is an activity that integrates and coordinates policies, procedures, operations, intelligence, law, and technology. Defensive information operations have as their principal objective the preservation of friendly force cohesion through the maintenance of the integrity of CIS. They are aimed at protecting friendly information and CIS against attack. This encompasses the capability to:
(1) assess the vulnerability of friendly information, information-based processes, C2 systems and CIS to manipulation and/or disruption by an adversary or natural conditions in the operational environment;
(2) protect friendly information, information-based processes, C2 systems and CIS against adversary information operation attacks;
(3) identify the perpetrators of information operations attacks; and
(4) restore friendly information and information-based processes that have been damaged or corrupted as a result of adversary, natural, or accidental actions.
0534. Intelligence supports a number of capabilities which contribute to successful information operations:
a. OPSEC. In operations, OPSEC seeks to reduce or deny the adversary information concerning friendly forces, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. To support OPSEC, Intelligence focuses on both the capabilities and limitations of an adversary’s ISR systems and offensive information operations in order to reduce the vulnerability of friendly C2 to information operations attack.
b. PsyOps. PsyOps aims to influence the adversary’s attitudes and behaviour to damage the adversary C2 system, by lowering morale, instilling fear, and breeding distrust. PsyOps requires intelligence on cultural, religious, social, and economic aspects of target population groups within the operational environment.
95 EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying adversary capabilities.
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c. Deception. Intelligence analyzes an adversary’s ISR capabilities and seeks to identify how an adversary’s perception of the operational environment may be subjected to deception. The adversary’s own deception capabilities against friendly forces are also assessed.
d. EW. Intelligence supports EA96 and electronic protection (EP).97 Support to EA includes assessing the adversary C2 and CIS infrastructure and determining critical nodes, vulnerabilities, and how it is protected. Support to EP includes assessing intent and the potential effectiveness of adversary EA systems against friendly C2 and CIS.
0535. Intelligence input to joint targeting. A target is defined as the object of a particular action such as planned for capture, exploitation, neutralization or destruction by military forces.98 Some examples of targets are: a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.99
0536. Intelligence lays the foundation for targeting even before the process has begun. Analysis conducted within the IPOE process will provide the commander and targeting staff with intelligence assessments on how and where an adversary may be vulnerable and what the adversary is vulnerable to. Intelligence assessments on adversary capabilities and intentions provide further insights into the success or failure of targeting activity.
0537. The joint targeting cycle is a continuous six-stage process consisting of:
a. the commander’s objectives, guidance and intent;
b. target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization;
c. capabilities analysis;
d. the commander’s decision and force allocation;
e. mission planning and force execution; and
f. combat assessment.
0538. Commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. The commander’s objectives provide direction for target selection and prioritization and set the criteria for measuring mission success. Guidance sets the limits on objectives and how they are to be achieved. Specific guidance is essential for determining the best targeting options for any given objective and includes, but is not restricted to, rules of engagement (ROE) and the limits on collateral damage. Together, the objectives and guidance embody the commander’s intent.
0539. Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the adversary in terms of probable intent, objectives, centre of gravity, strengths, weaknesses, and courses of action. In addition, Intelligence also identifies potential collateral damage concerns for targeting, such as non-combatants, historical, cultural, and religious structures, and facilities that contain hazardous material such as chemical plants or
96 “The division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.” DTB Record 30833. 97 “The division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability.” DTB Record 37260. 98 DTB Record 1031. 99 DTB Record 5514.
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nuclear power plants. From these considerations, Intelligence assists in the development of both no-strike lists (NSL)100 and restricted target lists (RTL).101
0540. Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization. The commander’s objectives are now translated into a joint prioritized target list (JPTL).102 Target development entails the systematic examination of potential target systems and their components (including individual targets and even elements of targets) to determine the necessary action that must be exerted on each to generate an effect consistent with the commander’s intent.
0541. Intelligence provides the basis for the target system analysis on which effective target development is based. Integral to target development is target validation. This process determines whether a target remains a viable element of the target system and whether it is a lawful target under the ROE. Once potential targets are identified and validated, they are then nominated, through the proper channels for approval. Targets are prioritized based on the commander’s objectives and guidance.
0542. Capabilities analysis. This stage of the joint targeting cycle involves estimating the most likely outcome resulting from the use of lethal or non-lethal capabilities against specific targets to achieve desired effects. Target intelligence permits a careful determination of which specific weapons or weapons systems may provide the optimum effect, a process known as weaponeering.103
0543. Commander’s decision and force allocation. Force allocation is primarily an operations function, but requires considerable Intelligence support including the coordination of ISR assets, current target status, and collateral damage estimates. The Intelligence staff then works with the operations staff to provide targeting recommendations for the commander’s decision.
0544. Mission planning and force execution. Once the commander has decided on the targets to engage, Intelligence provides accurate and complete target intelligence to the responsible planners while supplying the tasked unit with the target data necessary to execute the mission. Intelligence also ensures that preparations for combat assessment are made as appropriate.
0545. Combat assessment. The last stage of the joint targeting cycle, combat assessment involves determining the effectiveness of targeting. It consists of battle damage assessment and munitions effects assessment (MEA). Battle damage assessment considers whether the commander’s objectives were met as a result of the weapons employed against the selected targets while MEA considers whether the weapons performed as expected. A full range of Intelligence capabilities (e.g., SIGINT, MASINT, TECHINT, HUMINT, and IMINT) will be employed to support combat assessment. The results of combat assessment will inform the next round of continuous activities in the joint targeting cycle.
0546. Intelligence contribution to force protection. Force protection is the means, resources, and measures available to commanders to protect their assets. In domestic operations, JTF commanders apply force protection within their AOR in cooperation with federal, provincial, and municipal authorities. In overseas operations, commanders will cooperate with allied, coalition, (and according to the situation) the host nation. Effective force protection provides commanders with a greater degree of freedom of movement and action.
100 DTB 43615 101 DTB 43616 102 Ibid: “A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by the joint force commander or designated representative and maintained by a joint force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander’s objectives and guidance.” Pending approval. 103 Ibid: “The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapons effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability.” Pending approval.
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0547. Intelligence support to force protection is based on a balanced threat assessment resulting from accurate and timely all-source intelligence. The threat assessment is a continuous process: as the situation changes, and intelligence on new threats to the force protection posture is received, JTF force protection measures will be reviewed and adapted.
0548. The J2 staff will consider the full array of conventional, security, asymmetric, environmental, and medical threats to the JTF. Conventional threats are those normally faced by friendly forces in the course of operations. Security threats include espionage by adversary and other Intelligence services, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Asymmetric threats are those means or methods used by an adversary to circumvent or negate JTF strengths while exploiting JTF weaknesses to achieve a degree of effectiveness out of proportion to the forces involved. Extreme weather, health, and hygiene conditions also pose a threat to a JTF.
0549. In the contemporary operational environment, Intelligence support to force protection can represent a substantial focus of effort. It will not only involve an ongoing programme of CI activity, but could also include specialist Intelligence activity in support of the counter-IED process, biometrics, TECHINT, protection of operating bases and convoys. In addition, the J2 staff may need to consider the implications for force protection of working alongside, and exchanging information with, non-governmental organizations, neutral elements, and host-nation agencies and groups.
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Chapter 6 Domestic Operations
0601. The CF conducts domestic operations for a variety of purposes. As the Canadian military doctrine makes clear, the CF “must help assert Canada’s sovereignty and ensure the security of its citizens by fulfilling essential national responsibilities.”104 Domestic operations represent particular challenges for Intelligence support; the scope of Intelligence activities is circumscribed by law, by the specific responsibilities of various federal departments and agencies and by the balance of jurisdiction between federal and provincial authorities. Situations and incidents arising from a range of issues such as sovereignty, humanitarian disasters, terrorism, and assistance to law enforcement will make varying demands on the CF and, by extension, the support provided by the defence Intelligence community.
0602. The domestic operational environment, known as the Canadian AOR, is considered as a single theatre with three distinctive zones of operation: its maritime regions, its internal territory, and the Arctic.105 Within the AOR, routine, contingency, and rapid-response operations are conducted:
a. to assert Canada’s sovereignty; and
b. in response to requests for CF assistance by civil authorities.
Sovereignty 0603. The defence of Canada is one of the three major roles of the CF.106 Consequently, the CF must be capable of detecting and deterring the activities of any foreign states or hostile entities directed towards actual or potential attack, or other acts of aggression against Canada. This provides an important clear nexus between the maintenance of sovereignty and the employment of the CF to ensure that sovereignty, as it pertains to Canadian waters, territory, and airspace. Sovereignty operations will demand a range of military capabilities, up to and including combat, but will normally focus on the surveillance of air and maritime approaches, and on deployments to demonstrate a presence in remote regions, such as the Arctic.
0604. These operations generally have the advantage of being routine in nature and the Intelligence capabilities that support them are in most cases well-established and practised, based on unique-to-environment requirements (e.g., maritime patrols and air interception).
Assistance to civil authorities 0605. Most contingency and rapid-response operations conducted within the Canadian AOR are executed in response to a request for assistance from civil authorities. These authorities will represent a range of federal departments and agencies as well as provincial and territorial governments and their ministries. A request for assistance will usually only be made when a situation arises that exceeds the capacities of civil authorities and/or requires skills, equipment, and capabilities unique to CF. Operations carried out in aid of the civil authorities remain subject to Canadian laws. The most common categories of CF assistance provided in domestic operations are:
a. duties involving public service;
b. assistance to law-enforcement agencies (ALEA);
c. aid of the civil power.
104 CFJP 01, p. 6-11. 105 CFJP 3-0, pp.2-2 and 2-3. 106 Canada First Defence Strategy, June 2008.
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0606. The Intelligence support requirement will vary according to the type of assistance requested. The most demanding operations are those where security becomes a critical concern, placing J2 staff in a delicate situation, where the range of activities must be balanced to satisfy the requirements of Canadian law. However, even the most benign operations could require expertise in areas such as geospatial Intelligence support.
Legal framework 0607. The framework outlined at Chapter 1 applies to all defence Intelligence activities, regardless of where they are conducted. However, domestic operations demand particular constraints and restraints on the collection, production, dissemination, retention, and disposal of information for intelligence purposes. The CF does not have a standing legal mandate to collect intelligence on persons within Canada unless collected under auspices of an operating program or activity of the DND/CF. Authority to gather intelligence in Canada is well-defined by law and rests firmly with civil LEA and security agencies.107 At the federal level, the RCMP is mandated to collect and maintain criminal intelligence while CSIS is responsible for domestic security intelligence. Provincial, territorial, and municipal LEA hold similar mandates within their jurisdictions for criminal intelligence.
0608. Sovereignty operations are normally the least legally complex since there is generally a clear defence nexus that permits the collection of intelligence on actual and potential external threats to the defence of Canada. Much surveillance and Intelligence activity covers areas outside the territorial limits of Canada (12 nautical miles). Nevertheless, where such operations are conducted within Canadian territorial limits there will still be certain limitations on collection, and close liaison with legal staff is strongly recommended.
0609. In operations conducted to assist civil authorities, the legal framework will be tailored to the particular situation. A request to DND from a civil authority must always indicate specific details of the CF support required. A lead federal, provincial or territorial department or agency will be identified and clear direction will be provided through operational orders or through a provision of service agreement if applicable. For ALEA operations, the CF may receive criminal and/or security intelligence for the specific purpose of contributing to a JTF commander’s SA on the operational environment. The dissemination and retention of such intelligence will be strictly controlled.
0610. All DND and CF domestic Intelligence activity is limited to the CDI who is authorized to conduct liaison with OGDA and LEAs in order to acquire intelligence on security threats to DND and CF establishments, bases, organizations, and personnel in Canada. The CDI exercises this authority through the CF National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU).108
0611. Given the potential complexity of laws affecting domestic operations, Intelligence staff shall:
a. consult with legal and policy advisors early in the planning process; and
b. clearly establish the mandate and/or set of authorities under which any given operation or activity is to be conducted prior to commencing operations.
107 One such operating program or activity of the DND/CF is for the CF National Counter-intelligence Unit IAW DAODs 8002-1 and 8002-2, which gives it the mandate to identify threats to the security of DND/CF, to monitor assess, investigate, and counter those threats. An additional operating program would be the criminal intelligence function of the CFNIS. 108 Refer to Chap 2 Annex A, paras 6-7.
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d the JTF.
Responsibility for Intelligence support 0612. With some exceptions, such as operations conducted by NORAD, CANSOFCOM, and to a lesser extent, CFNCIU, Canada COM is responsible for all CF operations within the Canadian AOR. The J2 Canada COM provides the Intelligence support to Headquarters Canada COM for the planning and conduct of domestic operations. Canada COM has six permanent regional JTF headquarters.109 Depending on the geographical location of the planned operation, one of these headquarters normally will be assigned to comman
0613. Intelligence support to a domestic operation is planned and conducted by defence Intelligence staff at three levels: CDI, Canada COM, and the assigned JTF HQ.110 Each will have particular responsibilities:
a. CDI will:
(1) provide defence Intelligence support to the MND, DM, CDS and SJS, and the J2 Canada COM;
(2) coordinate Strategic Intelligence activity with the national Intelligence community;
(3) direct CFNCIU support to the J2 Canada COM and JTF as required;
(4) generate specialist Intelligence capabilities for the JTF intelligence architecture; and
(5) provide defence Intelligence directives for the JTF as necessary.
b. J2 Canada COM will:
(1) provide Intelligence support to the Commander Canada COM and the J2 JTF;
(2) coordinate Operational Intelligence activity with OGDA and LEA at the national level; and
(3) in concert with CDI and the force generators, determine the JTF intelligence architecture and coordinate its generation.
c. The JTF J2 will:
(1) provide Intelligence support to the JTF Commander and JTF subordinate elements; and
(2) coordinate JTF Intelligence activity with OGDA and LEA at the regional level.
JTF Intelligence architecture 0614. The general principles outlined at Chapter 4 apply to intelligence architecture in all operations. However, there are factors that must be considered in determining the architecture for domestic operations.
0615. Legal restrictions. Certain Intelligence capabilities will be restrained by the requirements of domestic law; others may even be prohibited. These capabilities include, but are not necessarily restricted to:
a. SIGINT:
(1) COMINT collection is severely circumscribed by law. In most domestic operations, CF COMINT collection is not permitted.
109 Refer to Chapter 1, p. 1-10. 110 One of the regional JTF headquarters or 1 Cdn Div HQ, if assigned to Canada COM as the JTF HQ.
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(2) CF ELINT and FISINT collection is permitted, subject to legal restrictions. Close liaison with JAG staff is required in order to determine what Intelligence activities are legally permitted and what activities are prevented and restricted.
b. HUMINT. Except when explicitly authorized by the CDS, HUMINT will not be conducted in Canada.
c. IMINT. Depending on the operation, CF IMINT may be collected for internal CF purposes. Depending on the nature of the imagery it may not be shared in original form, if at all, with OGDA and LEAs.
d. CI. CFNCIU will conduct authorized CI investigations and/or operations domestically that entail the full spectrum of CI activities for the purpose of identifying threats to the security of DND/CF.
e. OSINT. The collection and retention of OSINT, even though unclassified and freely available to the J2, may be constrained by legislation such as the Privacy Act.
f. Intelligence assessments. The scope of analysis could be limited to providing the JTF Commander and staff with only those assessments strictly necessary to maintain awareness of security threats to the JTF.
g. Proportionality. Many domestic operations will simply not require a full spectrum of Intelligence capabilities. In many situations, OGDA and LEAs will provide their own capabilities. At the same time, some unique CF Intelligence capabilities take on additional significance, for example, GEOINT in operations supporting significant national events or humanitarian relief. The JTF should include only those capabilities that are practical, sustainable, and directly relevant to the needs of the operation.
h. Liaison and representation. Limitations on JTF intelligence collection activities can be compensated by a comprehensive liaison programme with OGDA and LEAs. The presence of OGDA and LEA representatives in the JTF headquarters, coupled with JTF liaison/duty staff in the operations centres or headquarters of the supported civil authority will mitigate against reduced intelligence collection capabilities.
0616. During domestic operations, the JTF will often cooperate with provincial and municipal government organizations and LEAs with limited or no knowledge of CF operational procedures and security practices. The JTF J2 staff will have to tailor Intelligence activities to cater to this reality. It is also important to recognize that although certain legal protections from disclosure exist for the protection of information and intelligence provided to civil authorities, through legislation such as the Canada Evidence Act, this protection is not absolute and is subject to judicial interpretation. Operators must be aware that information and intelligence, potentially of a sensitive nature, provided to civil authorities may be subsequently disclosed during a criminal proceeding. Likewise, those CF members involved with the collection, analysis, and handling of intelligence may be subpoenaed to provide testimony during these proceedings.
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a
ractices.
Chapter 7 Combined Operations
0701. The CF’s operations overseas are a reflection of Canada’s commitment to its two other core roles: the defence of North America and the defence of Canadian interests abroad. Such operations occur in two geographical settings:
a. Continental operations. These operations are conducted within North America111 in pursuit of shared Canada-US Strategic objectives. In many cases, these operations are supported by longstanding memoranda of understanding and agreements with the US Department of Defense, and other US departments and agencies with mutual security interests. Commander Canada COM has the operational responsibility for these operations. Due to the unique nature of certain special operations, CANSOFCOM may operate under the direct authority of the CDS and report directly to the CDS.
b. International operations. These are all other operations conducted overseas by the CF. Commander CEFCOM has the operational responsibility for all international operations with the exception of operations conducted solely by special forces where, due to the unique nature of the operation, CANSOFCOM is operating under the direct authority of CDS and reporting directly to the CDS. 112
0702. These operations will almost certainly always be conducted within an environment that brings together forces of more than one nation to accomplish a single mission. They are therefore combined operations and, in the majority of situations, will be joint in nature as well. International operations will be conducted within one of three mission frameworks,113 each placing different demands on CF Intelligence:
a. coalition operations;
b. NATO operations; and
c. UN operations.
0703. Coalition operations are combined operations based on ad hoc agreements, standards, and procedures.114 Coalition operations are generally formed around a lead-nation concept to conduct missions that a single nation would have difficulty achieving. For the J2 of a JTF, coalitions offer both advantages and disadvantages in the conduct of Intelligence operations. The lead nation might be Canaditself but more likely one of Canada’s traditional defence allies, whether from the five-eyes community orNATO. This will provide a considerable degree of Intelligence interoperability between forces familiar with one another’s capabilities and p
0704. Composition of the coalition may well bring in non-traditional partners, nations with widely differing Intelligence capabilities, and no established Intelligence relationship. Intelligence CIS architecture is likely to be based on a triad of national, allied, and common coalition infrastructures, a situation that will place considerable strain on the J2 staff. Further, the J2 staff and the Intelligence staff of the subordinate elements of the JTF will be expected to develop and maintain Intelligence relationships with these non-traditional partners.
111 For the purposes of continental operations, North America includes Canada, the US, and Mexico. 112 In certain situations, with the concurrence of the CDS and in coordination with Commander CEFCOM, Commander Canada COM may be also given responsibility for specific operations in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. 113 Refer to CFJP 01, pp. 6-5 to 6-10. 114 DTB Record 35678.
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0705. NATO operations. NATO operations offer the advantage of working within a well-established Intelligence community of nations as well as associated partner and dialogue nations. Among these nations are to be found a longstanding core of historical allies. Through BICES,115 NATO nations have a secure Intelligence CIS.
0706. UN operations. UN operations will present many Intelligence support challenges. The sheer difficulty of achieving consensus among an organization of over 190 states with widely differing national interests, tends to hamper, if not inhibit, the employment of Intelligence capabilities. In addition, the UN is generally sensitive about national Intelligence activities conducted during its missions. The JTF J2 will be required to rely heavily on national Intelligence means, and close cooperation with traditional allies if these are also participating. In the absence of a well-developed UN Intelligence CIS infrastructure, great strain will be placed on national means.
Intelligence responsibility 0707. CEFCOM is responsible for all international CF operations except those conducted by CANSOFCOM. J2 CEFCOM provides the Intelligence support to Headquarters CEFCOM for the planning and conduct of these operations. JTF headquarters are generated from existing environmental headquarters staff depending on the type of operation. For example, an Army brigade group headquarters might form the nucleus for a JTF headquarters in an operational environment where the principal operations will require command and control of land combat capabilities.
0708. Intelligence support is planned and conducted by defence Intelligence staff at three levels: CDI, CEFCOM, and the assigned JTF HQ. Each will have particular responsibilities:
a. CDI will:
(1) provide defence Intelligence support to the MND, DM, CDS and SJS, and the J2 CEFCOM;
(2) coordinate Strategic Intelligence activity with the national Intelligence community and allied defence Intelligence communities;
(3) generate specialist Intelligence capabilities for the JTF intelligence architecture, to include training, certification, and validation; and
(4) provide defence Intelligence policies and directives for the JTF as necessary.
b. J2 CEFCOM will:
(1) provide Intelligence support to Commander CEFCOM and the JTF J2;
(2) coordinate Operational Intelligence activity with OGDA at the national level and with participating allied Operational-Level Intelligence staff; and
(3) determine the JTF intelligence architecture and coordinate its generation in concert with CDI and the force generators.
c. the JTF J2 will:
(1) provide Intelligence support to the JTF Commander and JTF subordinate elements; and
(2) coordinate JTF Intelligence activity with OGDA elements and allied/coalition Intelligence elements within the AOR.
115 Refer also to Chapter 4, para 443(c)(2), p. 4-10.
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Intelligence architecture 0709. The JTF intelligence architecture in combined operations will be determined by the operational context in which the JTF will function. Regardless of that context, the JTF Commander always retains operational command (OPCOM)116 of all CF components. There are three possible scenarios:
a. The Canadian JTF commander functions as both the national and combined operational commander. The entire JTF is normally allocated to the operational control (OPCON)117 of the commander. The J2 normally becomes the CJ2 for the combined operation. By extension, the JTF intelligence architecture forms the outline structure for the combined operation intelligence architecture, with CF Intelligence capabilities augmented by contributions from other troop-contributing nations (TCNs). As the demands of the operation permit, the CJ2 will normally also act as the senior CF Intelligence officer in theatre.118
b. The Canadian JTF commander functions as a subordinate combined operational commander within a CJTF. The commander exercises OPCON over subordinate formations and units whether CF, allied, or coalition. As Canadian National Commander (CNC),119 the commander retains OPCOM of the Canadian JTF. Depending upon the TCN-agreed composition of the headquarters, the J2 may or may not act as the CJ2 but will act as the national J2 in support of the CNC.
c. The Canadian JTF commander does not function as an operational commander. Designated subordinate components of the JTF are normally assigned OPCON to the combined operational commander. In this case, the principal function of the JTF Commander is to act as the CNC while the JTF headquarters serves as a national command element (NCE).120 The J2 acts as the national J2 in support of the CNC. The JTF intelligence architecture includes only those capabilities required to support decision making by the CNC. Again, the J2 may or may not be the senior CF Intelligence officer in theatre.
0710. The degree to which the JTF intelligence architecture shadows that of the combined operations depends largely on the cohesion and interoperability of the combined operation. In a robust coalition operation (e.g., one led by the US), or a NATO operation, the JTF often requires fewer capabilities to meet its intelligence needs. In a UN-led operation, where the Operational intelligence architecture may be extremely minimal, the JTF must rely on its own national capabilities.
0711. Intelligence plays a critical role in force employment. The success of any campaign is dependent on a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the operational environment. The commander, the staff, and all subordinate formations and units allocated to a CF operation, will rely on timely and relevant intelligence. The coordination of Intelligence capabilities in an operation is a complex and demanding responsibility—a responsibility that Intelligence staff, units, and teams at all levels must execute with efficiency, professionalism, and persistent application.
116 DTB, Record 19477. 117 DTB Record 1056. 118 In other words, act as an OPI for advice and consultations with the CNC, CDI and J2 CEFCOM/J2 Canada COM on the employment of all in-theatre DND/CF intelligence elements and capabilities. 119 DTB Record 35681. 120 DTB, Record 35170.
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Glossary
Note: The definitions contained in this Glossary are derived from a number of sources. Where this publication is the source of a definition, no source is indicated. Definitions taken from other sources are indicated in brackets at the end of each term, utilizing the following abbreviations:
o CFJP 01 CFJP 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine
o DTB DND Defence Terminology Bank
acoustic intelligence; ACINT Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of acoustic phenomena. [DTB Record # 3265]
agency In intelligence usage, an organization or individual engaged in collecting and/or processing information. [DTB Record # 3322]
air intelligence Intelligence that supports the development and maintenance of aerospace capabilities and the planning and conduct of air operations.
analysis In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. [DTB Record # 3468]
area of intelligence interest; AII The area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current and future operations. [AAP-6]
area of intelligence responsibility; AIR The area allocated to a commander for which he is responsible for the provision of Intelligence within the means at his disposal. [AAP-6]
armed forces intelligence Intelligence concerning all aspects of foreign space, sea, land, air and special forces including their orders of battle (ORBAT), their command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), weapons systems, training and personnel, doctrine, strategy and tactics, logistics and defence economy.
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battle damage assessment; BDA The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective. [DTB Record # 26988]
The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. (pending JTP approval definition taken from US Joint Publication JP 1-02)
biographic intelligence Intelligence on the views, traits, habits, skills, importance, relationships, health and curriculum vitae of foreign leaders and personnel of actual or potential interest.
collation In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which the grouping together of related items of information provides a record of events and facilitates further processing. [DTB Record # 19491]
collection [stage in the Intelligence cycle] The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. [DTB Record # 3796]
combat assessment; CA The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components:
a. battle damage assessment;
b. munitions effectiveness assessment; and
c. reattack recommendation.
(pending JTP approval definition taken from US Joint Publication JP 1-02)
combat indicator An item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.
combat intelligence That intelligence concerning the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. [DTB Record # 3811]
combined; multinational; MN Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. [DTB Record # 18750]
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commander’s critical information requirements; CCIR Crucial information identified and required by the commander that directly affects decision making and the successful execution of operations. [DTB Record # 41494])
communications intelligence; COMINT Intelligence derived from electromagnetic communications and communication systems by other than intended recipients or users. [DTB Record # 3843]
counter-intelligence; CI Activities concerned with identifying and counteracting threats to the security of DND employees, CF members, and DND and CF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities. [DTB Record # 333]
current intelligence Time critical intelligence concerning the current situation and events that has undergone limited analysis.
deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. [DTB Record # 4012]
defence intelligence All joint, maritime, land force and aerospace intelligence from the Tactical up to the Strategic Level as well as geopolitical, economic, scientific and technical and security intelligence where such intelligence supports the defence mission.
direction (stage in the intelligence cycle) The determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, the issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies. [DTB Record # 5785]
dissemination (stage in the intelligence cycle) The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it. [DTB Record # 4100]
document intelligence; DOCINT Intelligence derived from exploiting documents including paper, videotape, computer databases and disks, marked maps, overlays and other items capable of storing information.
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economic intelligence Intelligence concerning a foreign nation’s economic resources, activities and policies, including the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, labour, finance, and other aspects of the international economic system such as aid, trade, investment and the economic potential to support and develop defence capabilities.
electronic attack; EA The division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. [DTB Record #30833]
electronic intelligence; ELINT Intelligence derived from electromagnetic non-communication transmissions by those who are not the intended recipients of the information. [DTB Record #507]
electronic protection; EP The division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability. [DTB Record #37260]
electronic warfare; EW Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. [DTB Record #4164]
estimative intelligence Intelligence produced as a result of comprehensive analysis.
evaluation In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle constituting appraisal of an item of information in respect of the reliability of the source, and the credibility of the information. [DTB Record #20203]
force development; FD A system of integrated and interdependent processes that identifies necessary changes to existing capability and articulates new capability requirements for the CF. It is driven by changes in policy, actual or projected, changes in the security environment and lessons learned from operations. Force development comprises capability based planning, capability management and capability production. [DTB Record #32172]
CFJP 2-0
GL-5
force employment; FE 1. At the Strategic Level, the application of military means in support of strategic objectives. 2. At the Operational Level, the command, control and sustainment of allocated forces. [DTB Record # 32173]
force generation; FG The process of organizing, training and equipping forces for force employment. [DTB Record # 32171]
force protection; FP All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. [DTB Record # 23554]
foreign instrument signals intelligence; FISINT Intelligence derived by intercepting signals from telemetry, beacons, electronic interrogators and tracking, fusing, arming and command guidance systems.
functional authority Functional authority sets standards, communicates clear expectations, issues binding functional direction, offers non-binding functional advice and guidance, consults and obtains feedback, monitors to ensure compliance with direction and creates a management framework whereby the DM or CDS can hold senior commanders and advisors across the organization accountable for compliance. [CFJP 01, Glossary]
fusion Canada – The synergistic blending of information from multiple sources to enhance situational awareness. NATO – In intelligence usage, the blending of intelligence and/or information from multiple sources or agencies into a coherent picture. The origin of the initial individual items should then no longer be apparent. [DTB Record # 43350]
geospatial; geo Pertaining to the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on, above, or below the earth’s surface.
geospatial intelligence; GEOINT The exploitation and analysis of imagery, geospatial information, meteorology and oceanography to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.
CFJP 2-0
GL-6
human intelligence; HUMINT A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. [DTB Record # 700]
identification indicator Indicator that identify the type and role of a formation, unit or installation, determined from the recognition of its organisation, equipment or tactics.
imagery intelligence; IMINT Intelligence derived from imagery acquired by photographic, radar, electro-optical, infrared, thermal and multispectral sensors which can be seaborne, ground-, air- and space-based.
indicator In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. [DTB Record # 1451]
information Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. [DTB Record # 18621]
information operations; info ops Actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversary's decision makers by affecting their information and/or information systems, while exploiting and protecting one's own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies. [DTB Record # 31721]
information requirement; IR In intelligence usage, information regarding an adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that needs to be collected and processed to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. [DTB Record # 43334]
infrastructure intelligence Intelligence concerning rail, road, pipeline, water and air transportation networks and telecommunications systems and utilities.
integration In intelligence usage, a step in processing phase of the intelligence cycle whereby analyzed information and/or intelligence is selected and combined into a pattern in the course of the production of further intelligence. [DTB Record # 43334]
CFJP 2-0
GL-7
intelligence The product resulting from the collection, processing, analysis, integration and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or the geography and the culture that contributes to the understanding of an actual or potential operations environment. The term is also applied to the process and activity which results in the product and to the organizations dedicated to such activity.
intelligence architecture The sum of all the intelligence personnel, equipment and procedures required to provide intelligence support.
intelligence operation; int op The implementation of the intelligence cycle under the direction of the intelligence staff. Intelligence operations extend beyond collection management to include aspects of operations and logistics planning, oversight, personnel management and supervision.
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ISR The activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of all collection capabilities, with exploitation and processing, to disseminate the resulting information to the right person, at the right time, in the right format in direct support of current and future operations.
interpretation In intelligence usage, the final step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which the significance of information and/or intelligence is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge. [DTB Record # 4591]
joint Said of activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two components participate.[DTB Record # 35248]
joint integrated prioritized target list; JIPTL A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by the joint force commander or designated representative and maintained by a joint force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander’s objectives and guidance.
joint intelligence Intelligence which supports the development and maintenance of joint warfare capabilities, the planning and conduct of operations in any environment, or the planning and conduct of operations in which a temporary grouping of elements of at least two environments participates for the purpose of achieving a common objective.
CFJP 2-0
GL-8
land intelligence; army intelligence Intelligence which supports the development and maintenance of land force capabilities and the planning and conduct of land operations.
logistics intelligence Intelligence concerning the ability of the adversary to move forces, and support and sustain military operations, as well as intelligence needed to support friendly logistics efforts.
maritime intelligence Intelligence which supports the development and maintenance of maritime capabilities and the planning and conduct of maritime operations.
measurement and signature intelligence; MASINT Intelligence obtained by the quantitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation and so forth). Note: MASINT is derived from specific sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender as well as facilitating subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same.
medical intelligence Intelligence concerning health support facilities and capabilities, the impact of disease and environmental hazards on military forces, and other health-related information.
munitions effectiveness assessment; MEA Conducted concurrently and interactively with battle damage assessment, the assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing, and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness.
no-strike list; NSL A list of geographic areas, complexes, or installations not planned for capture or destruction. Attacking these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments.
open-source intelligence; OSINT Intelligence derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. [DTB Record # 4974]
CFJP 2-0
GL-9
operational command; OPCOM The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reallocate forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Notes: 1. Operational command does not include responsibility for administration. 2. In the NATO definition, the expression “to reassign forces” is used rather than “to reallocate forces.” [DTB Record # 19477]
operational control; OPCON The authority delegated to a commander to direct allocated forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned, and to retain or delegate tactical control of those units. Notes: 1. Operational control does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned, neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. 2. In the NATO definition, the expression “to reassign forces” is used rather than “to reallocate forces.” [DTB Record # 1056]
Operational intelligence Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the Operational Level. [DTB Record # 18751]
operations security; OPSEC The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. [DTB Record # 4986]
overclassification The tendency to place a higher classification and caveat on an intelligence product than is required by the nature and sensitivity of the contents.
political intelligence Intelligence concerning the dynamics of the internal and external political affairs of foreign countries, regional groupings, multilateral treaty arrangements and organizations, and foreign political movements directed against or impacting on, established governments and authorities. This includes foreign government structures and domestic and foreign policies.
priority intelligence requirements; PIR Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making. [DTB Record # 1105]
CFJP 2-0
GL-10
processing (stage in the intelligence cycle) The stage of the Intelligence cycle during which collected information is sorted and converted into a form suitable for the production of intelligence.
production (stage in the intelligence cycle) The stage of the Intelligence cycle during which processed information is analyzed, integrated and interpreted to produce intelligence.
psychological operation; PsyOp Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. [DTB Record # 1149]
radar intelligence; RADINT Intelligence derived from the use of radar as a detection device. Note: For example, the identification of an object and/or activity, which may or may not be recognizable, at a specific location. This is distinct from the exploitation of radar data to produce IMINT.
reachback The means by which a deployed force receives support from organizations external to the area of responsibility. [DTB Record # 37303]
reconnaissance A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. [DTB Record # 1202]
request for information; RFI A request for information or intelligence to a higher or adjacent command, formation or unit, as well as to other national, Allied and foreign intelligence agencies and organizations.
restricted target A valid target that has specific one or more restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it.
scientific and technical intelligence Intelligence concerning foreign scientific and technical research and development including engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapons systems and their capabilities.
CFJP 2-0
GL-11
security intelligence Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities. [DTB Record # 5338]
signals intelligence; SIGINT Intelligence derived either individually, or in combination from, communications intelligence, electronic intelligence and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.
situational awareness; SA The perception of the elements of an operating environment within a defined time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, the projection of their status into the near future and the prediction of how various actions will affect the fulfillment of one’s goals. [DTB Record # 41441]
sociological intelligence Intelligence concerning social and cultural factors including population parameters, ethnicity, social stratification and stability, public opinion, education, religion, health, history, language, values, perceptions and behaviour.
source In intelligence usage, a person from whom or thing from which information can be obtained. [DTB Record # 5388]
Strategic intelligence Intelligence required for the formulation of policy, military planning and the provision of indications and warning, at the national and/or international levels. [DTB Record # 5435]
surveillance The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. [DTB Record # 1418]
Tactical intelligence Intelligence required for the planning and execution of operations at the tactical level. [DTB Record # 2681]
target A target is any area, structure, object, person, organization, mindset, thought process, attitude, or behavioural pattern which may be suitably and effectively influenced by a weapon.
CFJP 2-0
GL-12
target intelligence Intelligence that concerns the analysis of a target, target complex or target system in order to determine how its functional characteristics and vulnerabilities may be exploited in a systematic manner to achieve a desired effect. Note: Target intelligence also concerns analysis of post-attack effects.
targeting The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. [DTB Record # 5514]
technical intelligence; TECHINT Intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. [DTB Record # 5517]
warning indicator Indicator that provides early warning of imminent adversary hostile actions.
warning intelligence Intelligence which provides warning of imminent and potential threats.
weapon Any physical, mental or electronic process that can be used against a target to produce a specific and desired effect.
weaponeering The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapons effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability.
CFJP 2-0
AL-1
Abbreviations List
AAP Allied administrative publication (NATO)
ACDS (IC) Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence Capabilities) (UK)
ACINT acoustic intelligence
ADF Australian Defence Force
ADM (IM) Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management)
AGS Allied Ground Surveillance Programme (NATO)
AJP Allied Joint Publication (NATO)
AII area of intelligence interest
AIR area of intelligence responsibility
ALEA assistance to law enforcement agencies
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
ASIC all-source intelligence centre
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service
BDA battle damage assessment
BICES Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (NATO)
CA Canadian Army
CA combat assessment
Canada COM Canada Command
CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CEFCOM Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
CBSA Canadian Border Services Agency
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CCIRM collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
CDI Chief of Defence Intelligence (Canada and UK)
CD compact disc
CDA Canadian Defence attaché
CDS Chief of the Defence Staff
CFJP 2-0
AL-2
CEO Canadian eyes only
CF Canadian Forces
CF FEPP CF Force Employment Planning Process
CFJIC Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre
CFJP Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFIOG Canadian Forces Information Operations Group
CFNCIU Canadian Forces National Counter-intelligence Unit
CI Counter-intelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CIFC coalition intelligence fusion centre
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communications and information systems
CJTF combined joint task force
CNC Canadian national commander
COA course of action
COMINT communications intelligence
CONOPs concept of operations
COP common operating picture
COS chief of staff
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSNI Consolidated Secure Network Infrastructure
CSS combat service support
C2 command and control
DCDI Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (UK)
DDIS Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (New Zealand)
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
D Geo Int Director Geospatial Intelligence
DGIP Director General Intelligence Production
DGMS Director General Military SIGINT
DI Defence Intelligence
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (US)
CFJP 2-0
AL-3
DIAS Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff (UK)
DIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (Australia)
D Int Cap Director Intelligence Capabilities
D Int IM Director Intelligence Information Management
DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)
DIR Defence Intelligence Review
DIS Defence Intelligence Staff (UK)
DISC Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (UK)
DM deputy minister
DND Department of National Defence
DNI Director of National Intelligence (US)
DoD Department of Defense (US)
DOMEX document and media exploitation
DPP Int Director Policy and Programmes Intelligence
DSD Defence Signals Directorate (Australia)
DVD digital versatile disc
DOCINT document intelligence
DTB Defence Terminology Bank
EA electronic attack
EAB External Assessments Bureau (New Zealand)
ELINT electronic intelligence
EM electromagnetic
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EP electronic protect
EW electronic warfare
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FEPP force employment planning process
FISINT foreign instrument signals intelligence
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
CFJP 2-0
AL-4
GCSB Government Communications Security Bureau (New Zealand)
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GIO Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (New Zealand)
GIST geospatial intelligence support team
GoC Government of Canada
HCI human intelligence and counter-intelligence
HMCS Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
I&W indicators and warnings
ICG Intelligence Collection Group (UK)
ICP intelligence collection plan
ID initiating directive
IFC Intelligence Fusion Centre in Support of NATO
ILO intelligence liaison officer
IM information management
IMINT imagery intelligence
INTREP intelligence report
INTSUM intelligence summary
IO information operations
IOLA intelligence and operations look ahead
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
IR information requirements
IRT intelligence response team
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
ISSM information systems security manager
ITAC integrated threat assessment centre
ITSEC information technology security
JIC joint intelligence centre
CFJP 2-0
AL-5
JINTWG Joint Intelligence Working Group (NATO)
JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list
JP Joint Publication (US)
JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK)
JTF joint task force
JTP joint terminology panel
LEA law enforcement agency
MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic
MARPAC Maritime Forces Pacific
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MCE Mapping and Charting Establishment
MDET multidisciplinary exploitation team
MEA munitions effects assessment
MEDINT medical intelligence
METOC Meteorology and oceanography
MI5 Security Service (UK)
MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
MND Minister of National Defence
MOD Ministry of Defence (UK)
MP military police
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCAGS Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping
NCE National Command Element
NDA National Defence Act
NDHQ National Defence Headquarters
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (US)
NGO non-governmental organization
NIC National Intelligence Cell
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRO National Reconnaissance Office (US)
CFJP 2-0
AL-6
NSA National Security Advisor (Canada)
NSA National Security Agency (US)
NSL no-strike list
NZDF New Zealand Defence Force
NZSIS New Zealand Security Intelligence Service
OGDA other government departments and agencies
ONA Office of National Assessments (Australia)
OPCOM operational command
OPCON operational control
OP O operations order
OPP operational planning process
OPSEC operations security
OSINT open source intelligence
PCO Privy Council Office
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PMESII political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information
PSC Public Safety Canada
PsyOp psychological operation
RADINT radar intelligence
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN Royal Canadian Navy
RFI request for information
RJTF regional joint task force
ROE rules of engagement
RTL restricted target list
SA situational awareness
SIGINT signals intelligence
SJS Strategic Joint Staff
CFJP 2-0
AL-7
SOCINT social and cultural intelligence
SUPINTREP supplementary intelligence report
TCN troop-contributing nation
TECHINT technical intelligence
TF task force
TSSA Top Secret Special Access
TTP tactics, techniques and procedures
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UCC Unified Combatant Command (US)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
USD(I) Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence) (US)
USNORTHCOM US Northern Command
Ca na da
CFJP 2-0 -Intelligence