chapter 12: the physician services industry health economics

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Chapter 12: The Chapter 12: The Physician Services Physician Services Industry Industry Health Economics Health Economics

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Page 1: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Chapter 12: The Physician Chapter 12: The Physician Services IndustryServices Industry

Health EconomicsHealth Economics

Page 2: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

OUTLINEOUTLINE

Physician Market Structure

Conduct in the Physician Market

Physician Market Performance

Physician Practice Management Companies

Page 3: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Are there “too many” specialists Are there “too many” specialists and “too few” primary care docs?and “too few” primary care docs?

Proportion of specialists in U.S. higher than in W. European countries and Canada (60% vs. 25-50%).Specialists more prone to use new, high-

tech medical procedures.

May explain why U.S. medical costs per capita are highest in the world.

Page 4: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Matching Physician Supply & Matching Physician Supply & RequirementsRequirements

“Future physician supply does not appear well-matched with requirements.

(Politzer, 1996)

A shortage of 33,000 primary care physicians is predicted by 2020.

The same set of assumptions also generates a surplus of specialists.

Page 5: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Why are there differences in Why are there differences in specialty choice?specialty choice?

Elasticity of the % of residents in a given specialty with respect to:expected earnings: .30 to .60expected hours worked: -1.2 to -2.0

Specialty choice relatively unresponsive to length of residency requirement or indebtedness.

Page 6: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Why are there differences in Why are there differences in specialty choice?specialty choice?

Nonprimary care specialists are motivated by:Higher expected income.Prestige.Opportunity for research.More regular working hours.

Choice of primary care motivated by:Interest in working directly with patients.Interest in providing continuity of care.

Can gov’t shift the balance towards more primary care?

Page 7: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Employed vs. Independent PhysiciansEmployed vs. Independent Physicians

Employed physicians worked 5-7 fewers hours a week.

Employed physicians’ median net income was $142,000 in 1996, vs. $198,000 for all private-practice physicians.

Practice mgmt. Companies typically pay physicians $300,000-$400,000 per physician for practice assets (land, equipment). Tradeoff: 20% of practice’s net revenues.

Page 8: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Managed Care Reimbursement of Managed Care Reimbursement of PhysiciansPhysicians

MCOs hope to modify physician behavior in order to control costs.

94% of all practicing docs in 1998 had at least one managed care contract.

In 1998, 52¢ of every $1 of physician revenue came from an MCO.8¢ of every $1 came from a capitated

contract.

Page 9: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Are there barriers to entry?Are there barriers to entry? Requirements for licensure to practice

M.D. from accredited med school.Internship or residency at recognized

institution.Pass a medical exam.

AdvantageProtects public from incompetent doctors.

DisadvantageState licensure boards controlled by

physicians who can restrict entry to keep salaries high.

Page 10: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Is market reform better than Is market reform better than government licensure?government licensure?

Market reform may encourage physician monitoring better than government regulation.More salaried docs are being monitored by

HMOs.Laws shifting medical malpractice liability

towards hospitals and HMOs.For-profit providers have direct financial

stake in quality of their physicians.

Page 11: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Production, Costs, and Production, Costs, and Economies of ScaleEconomies of Scale

Do certain physician organizations have a production or cost advantage?Group practice physicians are 22% more

productive than those in solo practice. (Brown, 1988).

The lowest-cost practice size has been estimated at 5.2 physicians (Pope & Burge, 1996).

Economies of scale may exist for practices as large as 100 physicians (Marder &

Zuckerman, 1985).

Page 12: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Physician Market Structure SummaryPhysician Market Structure Summary

Physicians have outpaced growth in the general population.

The U.S. may have too many specialists and too few generalists.

A move towards multi-physician practices.Production & cost advantages.Pressures of managed care.

Despite barriers to entry, competition is increasing.

Page 13: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Physician Market ConductPhysician Market Conduct

The Supplier-induced demand hypothesis.

The legal environment and physician behavior.

The impact of managed care on physician conduct.

Page 14: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Has the over-supply of physicians led Has the over-supply of physicians led to “physician-induced demand?”to “physician-induced demand?”

Def’n: physicians may take advantage of asymmetric information to convince their patients to consume more medical care than would be in their self-interest.

How much care can physicians induce?Easier with surgery?Is the physician willing to induce?

Can insurers limit demand inducement?

Page 15: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Has the over-supply of physicians led Has the over-supply of physicians led to “physician-induced demand?”to “physician-induced demand?”

Can insurers limit demand inducement?

The empirical evidence on physician-induced demand is limited.The exception may be the market for

surgical services, where surgeons have a greater ability to manipulate demand.

Page 16: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Defensive Medicine &Defensive Medicine & Malpractice Reform Malpractice Reform

Physician malpractice premiums account for 1% of US health care spending.

Physicians may over-provide care in order to avoid malpractice suits.Defensive medicine may add another $4b

to $25b to the nation’s health care bill.

Page 17: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Defensive Medicine &Defensive Medicine & Malpractice Reform Malpractice Reform

States which implemented direct reforms to their malpractice system (caps on damages, abolition of punitive damages) reduced hospital expenditures 5 to 9%.

Indirect reforms (caps on contingency fees, mandatory periodic payments) had no measurable impact on costs.

Page 18: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

MCOs and Physician ConductMCOs and Physician Conduct

HMOs combine the insurance and production functions in health care.

They are different from traditional indemnity (FFS) plans, in that they attempt to control how health care is provided.

How do HMOs influence physicians?

Page 19: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Types of Managed Care Orgs Types of Managed Care Orgs

S ta ff M od e l G ro up M o d e l N e tw o rk M o d e l IP A M o d e l

H M O P P O /P O S

M a n ag e d C a re

Page 20: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

MCOs and Physician ConductMCOs and Physician Conduct

Staff model HMOs pay physicians a salary. No incentive to over-provide care.

IPA HMOs usually pay physicians discounted FFS. Physicians have incentive to over-provide

care. How can the HMO control costs?

Page 21: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

MCOs and Physician ConductMCOs and Physician Conduct

Caution: Distinctions between different types of HMOs are blurring over time.

28% of staff HMOs pay based on salary only (Gold, 1996).

90% of PPOs use discounted FFS.

Page 22: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Financial Risk Arrayed on a Spectrum from Full Risk for the Insurer to Full Risk for the Provider

HBS Case Study 9-698-060, Note on Managed Care

Page 23: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Additional MCO Compensation ToolsAdditional MCO Compensation Tools

Risk sharing - The insurer can make the physician bear some of the risk of insuring the patient, so that the physician will also feel the need to restrain medical costs.

CapitationWithholdingsBonuses

Page 24: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Additional MCO Compensation ToolsAdditional MCO Compensation Tools

Capitation - Physician receives a fixed payment per person in return for providing medical services regardless of the quantity of medical care delivered.

e.g. A physician may receive $9 per member per month for each enrollee who chooses an HMO plan and elects him to be their primary care caregiver.

Page 25: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Additional MCO Compensation ToolsAdditional MCO Compensation Tools

Capitation Physician has an incentive to restrict # of

patient visits.

Problem - Physician can reduce visits by referring patients to other providers in the same HMO plan.

e.g. If the patient has high blood pressure, refer her to a cardiologist.

Solution - Withholding

Page 26: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Additional MCO Compensation ToolsAdditional MCO Compensation Tools

Even if docs paid thru capitation, HMO responsible for costs of hospital services, outpatient diagnostic tests, physician referrals.

How can the HMO limit these costs? Withhold a portion of physician payment

(PMPM) until end of fiscal year.

Page 27: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

HMO Reimbursement StrategiesHMO Reimbursement Strategies

Assign these funds to specific expenditure categories (e.g. lab tests).

At end of year, return a portion of the withhold to physicians if surplus exists in that expenditure category.

Can even change next year’s withhold or capitation based on this year’s performance.

Page 28: Chapter 12: The Physician Services Industry Health Economics

Additional MCO Compensation ToolsAdditional MCO Compensation Tools

Bonuses - MCOs can give a portion of their profits at the end of the year to physicians who elect cost-effective behavior.

e.g. Pay bonuses to primary caregivers who reported lower number of specialist referrals.