chapter 2 – economic concepts of regulation public utility – for-profit firm whose operations...
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Chapter 2 – Economic Concepts of Regulation
• Public Utility – for-profit firm whose operations were strictly controlled so as to not jeopardize the public interest– Controlled by• Who enters/exits• Extent and quality of service• Prices charged• “obligation to serve” all customers
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Chapter 2 – Economic Concepts of Regulation
• Who was controlled: • electricity• natural gas• grain elevators• railroads• stockyards• water suppliers• telephones• banks• airlines• dairy producers
• Controlled firms were guaranteed a certain rate-of-return on the cost of operating and investments
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Theory of Regulation
• Mimic a competitive market outcome, even when the underlying market is not competitive.
• Reality is that regulators may have other goals– Environmental and renewable concerns– Providing service everywhere– Keeping transmission lines and generators from
locating in certain areas to keep property values high
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Model of Perfect CompetitionP P
Q Q
P*
Individual Firm Competitive Market
AC1
MC1
QF QM
S=∑MC
D
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Consumer and Producer SurplusP
Q
P*
Competitive Market
QM
CS
PS
S
D
V=CS+PS
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Imperfect Markets
• Imperfect Markets occur because of– Natural monopoly– High barriers to entry
• Definition of a Natural Monopoly– Demand falls on decreasing AC curve– Economics of Scale– Economies of Scope
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Natural MonopolyP
QQM
ACMC
D
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Reasons for regulation
• Nature of natural monopoly (we want to capture economies of scale and scope)
• Competition difficult given that the nature of the industry requires the company to hold excess capacity most of the year
• High barriers to entry/exit– Large initial capital investments– Costs borne by new firms but not incumbent firm
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2.1 Natural Monopoly in the Single-product Firm
Two concepts are fundamental for our understanding of single-product natural monopolies:
Decreasing Average Cost: unit costs fall with increases in output.
Subadditivity: A firm with rising unit costs is able to produce a given level of output at a lower total cost than multiple firms if its cost function is subadditive.
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Decreasing Average Cost and Subadditivity
• A decreasing average cost for all positive output less than or equal to q can then be expressed as (2.1) C(qi)/qi < C(qj)/qj
for all qi and qj , where 0 < qj < qi ≤ q. - C(q) is the firm’s continuously differentiable cost function. - q is a measure of the firm’s output.
This condition is sufficient to ensure that production costs will be lowest when there is a single firm supplying the output, but not necessary.
• Subadditivity has a cost function at q if and only if (2.2)
for all quantities q1 ,………. qm such that ∑i=0m qi = q.
This condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that costs will be lowest when there is a single supplier.
m
i
i
m
i
i qCqC11
)()(
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Where 0 < qi <q, i= 1,….,m, and . In turn this can be written as
And summing both sides over all i yields
Which is the definition of strict subadditivity.
Equation (2.1) implies (2.2), however, (2.2) does not imply (2.1)
q
qC
q
qC
i
i )()(
qqm
i
i 1
)()( qCq
qqC
ii
)()()( 1
1
qCqCq
qqC
m
i
im
i
i
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Total Cost
C(q)
q q′ qo o
A
B
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Price setter vs. price taker P
QQM
DWLMC
D
MR
Q*
P*
PM
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One Regulatory Solution: Average Cost Pricing
P
QQ*
ACMC
D
QM
MR
DWL
PM
QAC
PAC
P*
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Definition of natural monopoly
• Strong natural monopoly satisfies (2.1)• Weak natural monopoly satisfies (2.2) but not
necessarily (2.1) over the relevant range of q
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2.2 Regulation for the single-product firm• Social Planner Max W = CS + π q Where π = p(q)q – C(q) and p(q) is the inverse market-demand function.
The first order necessary condition from this maximization problem yields a price equal to marginal cost, or
p(qw) = C‘(qw)≡ MC(qw) The prime indicates a derivative, and qw is the output produced
and sold.
q
qqpdxxpCS0
)()(
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• If the firm behaves as a profit-maximizer, then the monopolist will simply maximize the profit. The calculation will yield a price that satisfies
MR(qm)≡ p(qm ) + qmp‘(qm ) = C' (qm ) ≡ MC (qm )
where qm is the profit-maximizing output, and primes indicated derivatives. This process yields similar result that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
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Figure 2.2 The monopoly and the welfare-maximizing outcomes
$
p(q)
MRR
MC
AC
p(qm)
p(qw) y
b
a
q
c
qm qw
g
f d
e
x
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Other Complicating Factors• Measuring actual costs• Firms produce multiple goods/services, which makes
pricing complex• Multiple goods in multiple markets (regulated and
unregulated)• Viewed as convenient wealth redistribution to give
lower rates to low income citizens, but this complicates the rate structure and who shares what burden of the cost
• RPS – changes the structure of cost curves• Reliability is a public good
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Additional Issues
• High Upfront Capital Costs => who should pay the costs intergenerationally?
• To obtain investors, firms must be able to capture some return of their capital investments. Otherwise, there would be no incentive to invest
• Some argue that demand is on the increasing side of the AC curve
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Monopoly Power
• Monopoly Power measured by– Market share– Contestability- the ease of entry/exit of other
firms in the market (for example, garbage collection has small contestability)
• The challenge of regulating the price of a natural monopoly is setting a price so the firm recovers cost, but also produces the competitive market amount
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Alternative Regulatory Policies
• If regulation induced no inefficient response by firms in terms of input-mix distortions, the gains to regulation would depend on three factors:
1, The extend of the resource misallocation in the absence of intervention (often accompanied by large profit).
2, The existence of barriers to entry into the market.
3, whether the firm is a strong or weak natural monopoly.